Humanitarian aid is intended to save lives. But as Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA) becomes one of the most widely used forms of relief globally, evidence is mounting that in certain conflict zones it is inadvertently fuelling the very forces it seeks to alleviate.
This report examines how CVA – the practice of giving money or vouchers to crisis-affected civilians in place of in-kind aid – operates in contexts where armed groups like Hamas, the Houthis, and Boko Haram exert significant control over markets, financial networks, and supply chains. By analysing documented case studies from Gaza, Yemen, northeast Nigeria and Sudan, we identify predictable mechanisms through which cash aid slides into extremist-linked economic systems.
Our findings are clear: when a marketplace, banking or money-changing system is under the control or influence of armed groups – even ones not designated as terrorist actors by the UN – cash transfers become predictable sources of revenue for those actors. In Gaza, money-changer “fees” of 20 – 40 per cent are common; in Yemen, at least $161 million in cash aid flowed into Houthi-held territory in 2024, and UN agencies have documented widespread diversion; in Nigeria, militants impose levies on traders and transport networks that capture value from aid transactions.
In response, this report outlines a set of policy recommendations designed to improve transparency, tighten oversight, and better mitigate the risk that humanitarian cash assistance will be co-opted by violent actors, while still preserving the capacity of aid agencies to deliver life-saving support.
