Despite facing enormous domestic opposition resulting from social and economic discontent, the Iranian regime has demonstrated enormous resilience in sustaining the regime. My recently released report, ‘Regime Collapse in Iran: A Necessity for Regional Stability?’ describes how the Iranian regime achieves this by coopting the opposition in its hybrid political system that offers the façade of being democratic.
In general, hybrid regimes combine authoritarian mechanisms -such as restricted civil liberties, and suppression of dissent- with limited and controlled democratic institutions -such as parliaments, courts, and elections.[1] These governments appear to embrace democratic features which endows them with a degree of legitimacy, while wielding them to maintain authoritarian control.[2] This enables hybrid regimes that are authoritarian in nature to adapt to changing circumstances.
In the case of Iran, both ‘Hardliners’ and ‘Reformists’ operate like a Russian Matryoshka doll within the existing authoritarian framework of the regime. There is no meaningful choice in terms of how Iran will be governed, as both hardliners and reformers ultimately operate under the same authoritarian system with no meaningful plan (or potential) to change the fundamentals.
Even though Iran appears to have democratic features with elected institutions and a judiciary, they, along with unelected institutions are subordinate to the Supreme Leader, an unelected figure who holds ultimate authority over the armed forces, judiciary, media, foreign policy, and the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Iran’s Supreme Leader enjoys such power due to the founding doctrine of the Islamic Republic of ‘Velayat-e Faqih’ (Guardianship of the Jurist) developed by Ayatollah Khomeini. This doctrine places ultimate authority in the hands of one senior Islamic jurist—the Supreme Leader—who acts as the political and religious guardian of the nation.
The clerical class is influential but structurally subordinated to the office of the Supreme Leader (rahbar). As such, the influence of the clerics is limited to religious interpretation, not governance. As such, they reinforce and legitimise rather than scrutinize the Supreme Leader. Furthermore, the IRGC is more loyal to the Supreme Leader than to any clerical body.
Elected institutions that include the president, parliament (Majles), and city councils are subordinated to unelected institutions. An example of such an unelected institution includes the Guardian Council a body of twelve clerics and jurists—half of whom are directly appointed by the Supreme Leader. The Guardian Council is responsible for vetting candidates for elections and approving all legislation passed by the parliament. In practice, this means that only regime-approved individuals can run for office, while dissenting voices and reformist candidates are systematically disqualified. This yet again shows that Iran’s democracy is a sham, as even its elected officials are subject to the approval of the unelected. This approval is never granted to those who would meaningfully challenge and change how Iran is actually governed.
The Iranian President lacks any real ability to advance his independent policies. Unelected organs of the Iranian regime including the IRGC, and the Judiciary, whose roles are formally defined in the Constitution, can override, veto, or block any of the President’s initiatives, and effectively dictate the scope of the President’s reforms and policy.
Mousavi’s 2009 presidential camp emphasized greater civil liberties and judicial transparency, but within the regime’s existing framework. Advocating such reforms within the autocratic structures of the regime merely serves to sustain the regime’s survivability. My report, ‘Regime Collapse in Iran: A Necessity for Regional Stability?’ demonstrates both the social and foreign policy implications of Iran’s hybrid regime along with the continuity of the strategic and security threats it poses the international community.
Regardless of being situated in the Middle East or Europe, numerous authoritarian regimes have adopted hybrid regimes to differing degrees.
Ukraine
Yanukovych’s regime combined manipulated elections with oligarchic patronage networks. Courts were pliable, and while the media retained a degree of freedom, it operated under significant pressure. At one point under the Yanukovych regime, according to Reporters Without Borders, Ukraine had less press freedom than countries like Iraq and Haiti.[3] So the press may have been “free”, but not in the sense a Westerner would typically understand the term.
Yet, Ukraine stands out as the only case study demonstrating that hybrid regimes can be overthrown when the government has not dominated every sphere of government. As a result, when institutions align in opposition to the regime, cracks in the system widen into fractures.
The 2013/2014 Euromaidan protests against the government’s attempts to suppress dissent and pivot towards Russia, which clashed with a West-leaning civil society. However, unlike Iran, the Ukrainian opposition benefited from elite allies and some institutional backing (e.g., local governments, parliamentary factions), which ultimately enabled the collapse of Yanukovych’s regime.
It is possible to advance that the suspension of elections under President Zelensky is not due to him advancing a hybrid regime, but due to the onset of war with Russia since 2022, and the infeasibility of conducting national elections under conditions of total war. Similarly, elections were suspended in the UK during World War II, which again, was not due to a desire by Winston Churchill to create a hybrid regime.
Hungary
Democracy in Hungary has begun to erode as Viktor Orban has reshaped social, economic, and political rules by installing party loyalists throughout the administration, enabling him to modify the constitution.[4] This has led to media repression, restricting NGOs receiving foreign aid, and manipulating the electoral system through gerrymandering preventing a coalition from the opposition from confronting the ruling party in the last parliamentary elections.
The Hungarian Fundamental Law of 2012 is the new constitution of the country centralizing power under Orbán’s Fidesz party, significantly weakening democratic checks and balances. It curtailed judicial independence by limiting the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction and established political control over court appointments. Electoral laws were rewritten to favor the ruling party, while media and civil society came under tighter state control. The law emphasized Hungary’s Christian identity, restricted LGBT rights, and promoted a nationalist historical narrative.[5] This is a direct example of how “the party has been able to take root in civil society and occupy the state at the same time.”[6] It has been widely criticized by EU institutions and scholars as enabling Hungary’s shift toward an illiberal, hybrid authoritarian regime.
The current hybrid regime is based off the paternalistic image of Orbán, a protector of the Hungarian people and their national interests, that controls the media, political, and cultural features of the nation making it very complicated for the opposition to topple the status quo.[7]
Despite being on the brink of economic turmoil, the situation does not appear to be severe enough to mobilise a groundswell of opposition.
Poland
Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS) implemented a hybrid system between 2015 to 2023 that led to democratic backsliding conducting judiciary reforms, media takeovers, and popular nationalism despite EU membership.[8]
Widespread grassroots protests and sustained opposition efforts complicated the ruling party’s grip on power and ultimately led to the election of a left-leaning government in the 2023 elections.
Although the ideological basis of the Iranian regime is religious as opposed to ethnic or cultural, Poland is similar to Iran, as Poland weaponises traditional values and national identity against perceived liberal elites.
Egypt
Egypt’s regime has historically been dominated by the an alliance between the military and elite. It had a de facto single-party dominance by the National Democratic Party (NDP). Throughout Egypt’s three authoritarian regimes, it has maintained the Emergency Law that expanded police power, curtailed rights, and legalised censorship.[9] The regime’s resilience was further bolstered by the dominant role of the paramilitary and state security forces.
Egypt’s hybrid system enabled it to not undergo regime change, but merely regime continuation under a new leader: “When Islamic extremist assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat hoping to end the secular regime he led, another military officer and dominant-party official from Sadat’s inner circle, Hosni Mubarak, quickly replaced him. The regime continued, controlled by the same leadership group and following the same basic rules.”[10]
Egypt experienced a brief transition towards democracy after the Arab Spring (started 17th December, 2010), driven mostly by youth activism and sparked by cases like the Khaled Said case. Just as social media has sparked demonstrations in Iran, in Egypt widespread social media and mobile telephones were an important part of mobilising resources that fueled the “Facebook Revolution” contributing to uprisings in cities including Cairo and Alexandria offers.[11]
However, widespread dissatisfaction and division amongst the opposition soon led to a military coup enabling the regime to reverse the transition. Under President Al-Sisi, power has been consolidated with support from the military, judiciary, bureaucracy, and a government-controlled parliament.[12]
Syria
From 1970 until 2024, the Assad regime in Syria was a security-state autocracy maintaining power through coercion, elite patronage, and foreign backing. The Assad regime was rooted in Ba’athist Arab nationalism where power was highly centralised in the Alawite minority (an offshoot of Shia Islam) and in the secular personalist dictatorship in the form of the Assad family, with dynastic succession from Hafez to Bashar.[13]
Despite this, the Assad regime was able to coopt any opposition either by brute force or by wielding a veneer of electoral legitimacy where there was a powerless parliament and fake elections. Similarly, the judiciary had no real independence and served the Assad regime.
The Assad experienced internal and external pressures. The Arab Spring led to the Syrian revolution in 2011, that was met by a brutal response by the Assad regime. In turn, this escalated into a civil war. The US and EU responded by imposing sanctions on the Assad regime. External pressure on the regime increased by the support the US and Turkey offered the opposition. Despite the Assad regime benefiting from support from Russia and Iran that in effect propped up the regime, Russia had to reallocate its military assets to Ukraine, and Iran had been set back by its air defences destroyed by Israel and its proxies capabilities eroded. As its protectors pulled back due to pressure elsewhere, Assadist Syria was left to its fate by Russia and Iran.These factors all contributed to the toppling of the Assad regime at the end of 2024.[14]
Libya
Gaddafi had a highly personalised regime in which he held absolute power without constitutional constraints, political parties, or meaningful elections. Nonetheless, Gadaffi presented Libya as a hybrid system in which the state was divided into several small communities that were essentially “mini-autonomous States” within a State. These autonomous States had control over their districts and could make a range of decisions including how to allocate oil revenue and budgetary funds. Within these mini autonomous States, the three main bodies of Libya’s democracy were Local Committees, People’s Congresses, and Executive Revolutionary Councils. This was known as the Jamahiriya system, or “state of the masses” in which “people’s committees” and “popular congresses” governed Libya. In 2009, the New York Times commented about the Jamahiriya system that “everyone is involved in every decision…Tens of thousands of people take part in local committee meetings to discuss issues and vote on everything from foreign treaties to building schools.[15]”
Despite the portrayed openness of the Jamahiriya system, Gadaffi’s regime was not sustainable as it did not advance genuine benefits for the Libyan people. There was only limited tolerance to dissenting voices and the media was state-controlled. Furthermore, the government failed to invest in the nation’s infrastructure, healthcare system and education services.[16] This was accompanied by a number of repressive laws which aim to target civic group operations.[17]
This led to the Gadaffi regime experiencing internal and external pressures including the aftermath of the Arab Spring sparked protests over corruption, unemployment, and lack of political freedom that led to the Libyan civil war in 2011. This was accompanied by NATO strikes against Gadaffi’s forces. These factors led to the fall of the Gadaffi regime.
What replaced the Gadaffi regime was a vacuum of governance in which “Ordinary citizens have no role in Libya’s political affairs, which are currently dominated by armed factions, foreign governments, oil interests, smuggling syndicates, and other extra political forces. Citizens and civilian political figures are subject to violence and intimidation by the various armed groups.”[18] Furthermore, freedom of speech is restricted everywhere in Libya whether it is by east or west of the country, both major parties (GNU & GNS) battling for power are not lenient on this.[19]
Around the world, the authoritarian use of hybrid political systems has had the effect of coopting the opposition and effectively trapping them in transition. This stalls the path to democracy and provides authoritarian regimes with enormous resilience. Yet, it is important to avoid the trap of confusing artificially imposed stability with genuine legitimacy.
[1] Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan, “Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the cold war”, 2010, Cambridge University Press, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-new-competitive-authoritarianism/
[2] Eckman, Joakim, “Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes”, 2009, Sage Publications, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20445173.pdf
[4] Carothers, Thomas and Press, Benjamin, “Understanding and Responding to Global Democratic Backsliding”, 2022, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Carothers_Press_Democratic_Backsliding_v3_1.pdf
[5] Benson, Robert, “Hungary’s Democratic Backsliding Threatens the Trans-Atlantic Security Order”, 2024, American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/hungarys-democratic-backsliding-threatens-the-trans-atlantic-security-order/
[6] Huber, Daniela and Pisciotta, Barbara, “From democracy to hybrid regime. Democratic backsliding and populism in Hungary and Tunisia”, 2022, Contemporary Politics, p637 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2022.2162210
[7] Huber & Pisciotta, “From democracy to hybrid regime. Democratic backsliding and populism in Hungary and Tunisia”
[8] Bernhard, M, “Democratic Backsliding in Poland and Hungary”, 2021, Slavic Review, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/slavic-review/article/democratic-backsliding-in-poland-and-hungary/8B1C30919DC33C0BC2A66A26BFEE9553
[9] Adigbuo, E.R., “Authoritarianism and Regime Change: The Case of Egypt”, 2018, AE-FUNAI Journal of Humanities, https://nsibidi.funaifoh.com/journal/Vol_1_Issue_1_October_2018/nsibidi-1-1-2.pdf
[10] Geddes et al., , “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set”, p131
[11] Wackenbut, Arne, “Revisiting the Egyptian Uprising of 2011: Exploring the Role of Relational Networks within the Cairo-Based Political Opposition”, 2020, Social Problems, https://academic.oup.com/socpro/article-abstract/67/2/342/5510295
[12] Adigbuo, “Authoritarianism and Regime Change: The Case of Egypt”
[13] Alshamary et al., “The Assad regime falls. What happens now?”, 2024, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-assad-regime-falls-what-happens-now/
[14] Financial Times, “The Fall of the Assad Regime and the End of a Dynasty”, 2024, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/35855345-05b5-4e4f-a978-2754cd8b31ab
[15] Chengu, Garikai, “Gaddafi’s Libya was Africa’s Most Prosperous Democracy”, 2013, Foreign Policy Journal, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2013/01/12/gaddafis-libya-was-africas-most-prosperous-democracy/
[16] Amnesty International, “Libya: The battle for Libya: Killings, disappearances and torture”, 2011, Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde19/025/2011/en/
[17] Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Barriers to Justice”, 2025, Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/02/libya-barriers-justice
[18] Freedom House, “Libya: Freedom in the World 2024”, 2024, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/libya/freedom-world/2024
[19] Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Barriers to Justice”
