by Dr. John Hemmings
The recent comments to the Observer by former Goldman Sachs economist, Jim O’Neill, that Britain needed to “get real” on China and that it is one of the “places that is going to make a difference to our trade and investment performance” are unsurprising. The inventor of the “BRICS” term has long been a cheerleader for closer UK-China relations, promoting “Golden Era” policies under Conservative Chancellor George Osborne in the Treasury in the Cameron government. He also served under Theresa May, with some speculating that his resignation was in protest over her cautious approach towards Chinese investment into the UK’s nuclear infrastructure. Now O’Neill is back, this time at the side of Andy Burnham, the man of the hour, Britain’s next Prime Minister and someone who’s career tracks O’Neill’s two favourite ideas: the “Northern Powerhouse” investment into the north, and closer UK-China political ties as a means of increasing bilateral trade and investment.
In the UK, any given government’s China policy has always been a competing balance between national security and the Special Relationship with the US on the one hand, and with China’s promise for foreign direct investment into the UK on the other. For those watching the former Manchester Mayor for signs of the UK’s future foreign policy, O’Neill’s emergence as a senior Burnham advisor is yet another signal that we are likely to have a China policy that was last in vogue ten years ago in 2015. In 2013, Osborne wanted China to invest into reinvigorating the UK’s ageing nuclear infrastructure, into the UK’s financial services sector, and into £24bn worth of “Northern Powerhouse” projects – schemes like the Atlantic Gateway, Newcastle’s Science Central, and Airport City development. That year, he led the establishment of the Manchester – China Forum (MCF), an all-purpose private public forum for political engagement, trade, and academic collaboration. All of those projects and the Chinese funding helped fuel Andy Burnham’s successes as Mayor and saw him building ties with the authoritarian government. In September 2018, Burnham led a massive trade delegation to Beijing, Tianjin, and Shenzhen, and he has a track record to meeting with Chinese officials based at their consulates and embassies here in the UK.
Like Osborne, Burnham enters public life with little prior experience in national security, defence, or geopolitics. As others have noted, his own personal inclinations to apply Manchesterism to nation, he will still have to navigate the reality of China as a geopoltiical threat to the West writ large. First, it is the primary “adversary” to the US, Britain’s greatest ally. Second, China is the primary enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine, supplying 90% of Russia’s micro-electronics, the majority of Russia’s drone technology, and according to Reuters, supporting the training of Russian military units inside China. The “no limits” partnership cannot be sidelined in the quest for investment without challenging deep UK national interests. Third, China has spent the last decade dismantling the rules-based order in the South China Sea, constructing militarized islands across one of the world’s most strategically important sea lanes, despite a 2016 finding by the Permanent Court of Arbitration that its claims were unlawful. Fourth, Chinese trade has increasingly become securitized and a source of geopolitical tension, as Beijing has honed investment as a strategic tool – using trade dependency as political leverage, as a means of extracting valuable technologies, and as a form of gaining market access.
Burnham’s past comments on climate change and his approach towards green technology is likely to become an added complicating factor in his China policy. Beijing spent the last decade subsidizing its solar and wind sectors – breaking its obligations under the World Trade Organisation – and destroying European, American, and Japanese competitors with its subsidies and dumping. Now China leads the world in renewable energies and produces 80% of the main components of solar photovoltaic (PV) panels and theoretically could restrict exports to the UK in any bilateral dispute. It’s a form of leverage that’s waiting to be operationalized. And then there are his technology ambitions. While laudable in that he wants to bolster British leadership across the sector, any partnership with Chinese technology leaders must be approached with caution since Beijing’s Civil Military Fusion Doctrine means that all Chinese tech companies are compelled to cooperation with its military.
And in a sense, that’s the rub. Those who run to embrace Chinese trade, usually find that there are always accompanying political requirements – on Taiwan, on market access, on data security, and on human rights. Is Burnham going to join the long list of left-leaning political leaders who abandon UK national interests for Chinese investment? Let’s hope not.
