After years of concern over Hungary’s democratic trajectory, a moment of political rupture has finally arrived. On Sunday, Peter Magyar defeated Viktor Orbán in a landslide, securing a two-thirds majority and opening the door to a potential reset.
It was no easy victory. Orbán deployed the full weight of the state and party machinery: near-total media control, mass rallies, and relentless fearmongering about Hungary’s future should he lose. He also benefited from an unusual level of foreign backing – with support signals coming not only from the Kremlin but also from Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition and figures in the United States, including Vice President J.D. Vance, who made a highly controversial visit urging Hungarians to back Orbán.
This level of international involvement was striking, particularly given the controversies surrounding Orbán’s rule. It reinforced his long-standing narrative that Hungary’s geopolitical identity – and stability – were inseparable from his leadership.
Domestically, the playing field was equally skewed: Magyar did not appear once on state-owned media.
And yet, none of it was enough.
Not even gerrymandering – designed to entrench Orbán’s power – could save him. In fact, the system ultimately turned against its architect.
Hungarian voters had simply had enough. Sixteen years in power is a long tenure in any democracy, and fatigue had clearly set in. More importantly, corruption within Orbán’s party had become systemic. As living standards stagnated or declined, many Hungarians grew increasingly frustrated watching the political elite accumulate wealth.
Orbán’s systematic dismantling of democratic institutions further eroded public trust. Independent media were among the first casualties, followed by universities and other key institutions, all gradually reshaped to serve the ruling party. Loyalty, rather than competence, became the primary criterion for leadership. The depth of institutional capture became so profound that, by today’s standards, Hungary would likely struggle to qualify for EU membership.
Relations with the European Union also deteriorated sharply under Orbán. EU funds were frozen, and Hungary frequently obstructed collective decision-making – most notably on Ukraine. For many Hungarians, improving ties with Brussels was not just a political preference but an economic necessity.
Against this backdrop, Magyar emerged as a credible alternative. A former Fidesz insider, he understood the system from within – and crucially, he succeeded where others had failed: he built a viable electoral challenge capable of mobilising broad support.
His victory has rightly been hailed as a win for democracy. If his campaign promises and early statements are any indication, Magyar intends to begin by restoring media freedom, including suspending state news broadcasts until independent standards can be ensured. He has also pledged to tackle corruption and increase institutional accountability. Perhaps most importantly, his win demonstrates that even a system drifting towards authoritarianism can still be reversed through elections – and that peaceful transfers of power remain possible.
The implications extend beyond Hungary. The European Union, long frustrated with Orbán, now sees an opportunity to rebuild relations with Budapest. Elsewhere in Europe, particularly in countries grappling with democratic backsliding, Magyar’s victory is being watched closely. In Serbia, for instance, the student-led protest movement has already drawn cautious inspiration from developments next door.
Yet for all the optimism, caution is warranted.
Magyar’s roots in Fidesz raise legitimate questions about how far he is willing – or able – to break with the system he once served. His foreign policy positions also remain somewhat ambiguous. While he has committed to repairing relations with the EU, he has also indicated that Hungary will continue purchasing Russian oil due to its affordability, suggesting continuity in energy dependence. On Ukraine, his stance is similarly mixed: he has signalled that Hungary will not obstruct EU support, but neither will it actively participate.
Domestically, the challenges are even greater. Dismantling a system of entrenched patronage and institutional capture will take time – likely years. Orbán may be out of office, but “Orbánism” remains deeply embedded in Hungary’s political and institutional fabric.
Magyar’s victory is undeniably significant – a rare and meaningful democratic breakthrough in a region where such moments have become increasingly scarce. But whether it marks a genuine transformation or merely the beginning of a long and uncertain transition will depend on what comes next.
