The security dynamics of the Arabian Peninsula have long hinged on a key assumption: that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), despite occasional disagreements, would ultimately remain aligned. This partnership has been the region’s stabilising force, a predictable pillar in an otherwise unpredictable neighbourhood. However, the events of late 2025 and early 2026 have subjected that assumption to a severe stress test. Saudi Arabia’s recent actions in southern Yemen, particularly its strikes on coalition assets, are more than just a localised skirmish; they signal a deeper shift in Riyadh’s strategic thinking.
At the end of December 2025, the trajectory of the Yemen conflict changed drastically, not due to a Houthi offensive or a peace agreement, but because Saudi Arabia escalated the situation by launching precision strikes against UAE-linked maritime assets. The strikes, which targeted supply vessels in Mukalla on December 30, quickly escalated from a tactical move to a full-blown diplomatic crisis. Within forty-eight hours, Riyadh had demanded the immediate withdrawal of UAE forces from Yemen by instigating the Yemeni Presidential Council to formally demand the immediate removal of all Emirati personnel from Yemeni soil.
My soon-to-be-released report, ‘Israel 2048: a Blueprint for a Rising Asymmetric Geopolitical Power’ addresses how Saudi Arabia is creating a competing security architecture to the Abraham Accords with diverging strategic priorities to the UAE. This alternative security architecture includes Saudi Arabia aligning itself with Turkey and Qatar, both sponsors of the Muslim Brotherhood, nuclear-armed Pakistan, and deepening its rapprochement with Iran.
Despite Riyadh’s strategic realignment, each of these actors can undermine Saudi Arabia’s security interests. By prioritising its own domestic timelines over coalition unity and using military force against a key ally, the Kingdom has introduced a high level of uncertainty into Gulf security. In Western eyes, the Mukalla incident is a sign that the Gulf’s security architecture is no longer as solid as it once seemed, and the risks of missteps are growing.
For years, the Saudi-UAE coalition had been defined by its joint efforts against shared enemies, especially the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists. But by attacking its ally’s ships and pushing for the evacuation of UAE forces from Yemen, Saudi Arabia abandoned this logic that had held the alliance together. In turn, the Kingdom’s imposition of its political will to maintain Yemen’s territorial integrity at the expense of countering Islamism entailed structural damage to Gulf stability.
Saudi Arabia’s flexing its muscle accompanies Riyadh’s growing international standing. Riyadh’s newfound regional dominance has led it to position itself as a sophisticated regional mediator and a sponsor of political resets in theatres such as Syria. This shift introduces substantial political risks for international partners, who must now contend with a new climate of uncertainty and the steady erosion of diplomatic trust that once anchored the most critical security pacts in the Middle East.
Saudi Arabia’s growing regional dominance precludes its recognition of the UAE having grown into a power in its own right, with global economic ties and a diplomatic flexibility that often outpaces Saudi Arabia’s more traditional approach. By pushing the UAE out of Yemen, Riyadh seems to be rejecting this new reality, seeing the UAE not as a partner but as a rival to be checked. Riyadh has chosen to curb an ally’s influence, even if that ally is advancing shared interests of countering the threat of Islamism.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia is increasingly treating a settlement with the Houthis as a pragmatic tool to secure its borders and refocus inward to protect flagship projects like NEOM, and broader Vision 2030 aspirations.
This unilateral approach suggests that the Kingdom is willing to prioritise its own breathing room over the collective stability of the region. If the Houthis find they can achieve their goals by negotiating solely with Riyadh, the incentive for a multi-party resolution vanishes, which could result in a dangerous security vacuum and the erosion of an effective end to the Houthi threat.
The Gulf alliance has entered a new era, one where competition between once-close allies and different security architectures is becoming more pronounced. This does not mean the alliance is doomed, but its foundations are now crumbling under the weight of this new rivalry and growing distrust.
For the West, the Mukalla incident has fundamentally altered the confidence Western capitals have in Saudi Arabia as a reliable partner. If reliability is no longer the cornerstone of the relationship, the entire architecture of Western engagement in the region must be re-evaluated.
