

Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism – The Terrorism and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TEDS): Empowering Families and Communities to Reject Radicalising and Extremist Influences

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Executive Summary

- The current Prevent referral process continues to be ineffective in engaging ‘friends and family’ and ‘community’ sectors – as evidenced by disproportionately low referral rates. A new alternative mechanism is therefore required to increase engagement from these sectors.
- The Terrorism and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TEDS) is a disclosure and risk management scheme designed by the author of this policy paper. Its aim is to empower parents, carers and guardians to protect children from all forms of radicalising and extremist influences.
- TEDS draws upon influence from disclosure schemes already employed to safeguard and protect children and vulnerable people from other types of exploitation and abuse, including Child Sexual Abuse and Domestic Abuse.
- TEDS would enable the disclosure of information relevant to a subject’s terrorism

and racially or religiously motivated criminal offending history to parents, carers and guardians. This would empower them to reject radicalising and extremist influences, and protect their children from harm.

- TEDS would consist of two disclosure pathways; *Right to Ask*, which allows members of the public to request disclosure from police, and *Right to Know*, which allows police to proactively disclose information to parents, carers and guardians.
- TEDS would create an 'expectation to disclose' where a subject has convictions (including cautions, reprimands and final warnings) for terrorism-related and racially or religiously motivated offences.
- TEDS would not require the passing of any new legislation.
- TEDS would be facilitated by existing multi-agency architecture: applications would be processed by counter-terrorism (Prevent) Policing personnel, and disclosure decision making conducted within existing Channel panel arrangements.
- We propose a twelve-month TEDS pilot scheme in parts of the UK, with independent evaluation and analysis.

Introduction

The U.K counter-terrorism landscape is experiencing a triple crisis: a ten per cent increase in referrals to the Prevent programme following radicalisation-related concerns in the year ending March 2020; a doubling in the number of individuals under eighteen years of age arrested for terrorist-related activity in the year ending September 2020; and an otherwise effective Prevent referral infrastructure demonstrating consistently and disproportionately low referral rates from ‘friends and family’ and ‘community’ sectors, each of which have accounted for just two per cent of referrals for a second consecutive year.

There is a pressing need to explore new and innovative ways to increase engagement from these sectors – who are often best-placed and first to notice the signs indicative of radicalisation. Doing ‘with’, rather than ‘to’, the authorities must empower ‘friends and family’ and ‘community’ sectors to reject all forms of radicalising and extremist influences, and safeguard their children from being drawn into terrorism.

The Terrorism and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TEDS) proposes a way to do exactly that.

What is radicalisation and why does it matter?

The radicalisation of children and young people is a significant and growing problem in the U.K.¹ Radicalisation is defined by the U.K Home Office as: “a process by which a person comes to support terrorism and [the] extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups”.² Though the possession of radical beliefs by no means predicts violent behaviour, it is helpful to consider terrorism as an end point, and the radicalisation process as a road that leads to it.³ Some experts consider the radicalisation process to comprise of two distinct yet connected processes: non-violent radicalisation, and violent radicalisation,⁴ while others regard both elements as being two constituent parts of one singular process.⁵

Radicalisation may helpfully be characterised by the following: 1) that it is a cumulative process that occurs over time; 2) that it involves an increased commitment to beliefs and attitudes consistent with an extremist

ideology (but not necessarily extending to a commitment or intent to engage in violence in furtherance of said ideology); and 3) that it is driven to some extent by exposure to content that advocates beliefs and attitudes consistent with an extremist ideology.⁶

Over the last (almost) two decades, a number of different metaphorical models including those depicting ‘staircases’, ‘pyramids’, and ‘conveyor belts’ have attempted to characterise the ‘journeys’ and ‘pathways’ that can lead individuals toward terrorism. Randy Borum’s 2003 *Four-Stage* model depicts an incremental and linear process of increasing hostility to a perceived out-group, beginning with by an unpleasant event or grievance, and ending with the justification or impetus for aggression;⁷ Fathali Moghaddam’s 2015 *Staircase to terrorism* model conceptualizes the terrorist act as the final step on a narrowing staircase, ascended by relatively few individuals, but who come to see terrorist organisations as legitimate;⁸ and finally, there is Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko’s

¹ Safeguarding and Radicalisation, *Department for Education*, August 2017, available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/635262/Safeguarding_and_Radicalisation.pdf, last visited: 28 February 2021.

² Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: For England and Wales, *Home Office* 2019, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance/revise-prevent-duty-guidance-for-england-and-wales#f-glossary-of-terms>, last visited: 07 March 2021.

³ Moskalenko, S. and Clark McCauley, *Radicalization to Terrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp.4-5.

⁴ Khalil, J., Horgan, J, and Martine Zeuthen, ‘The Attitudes-Behaviors Corrective (ABC) Model of Violent Extremism’, *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2011)

⁵ Braddock, K., *Weaponized Words* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p.33.

⁶ Braddock, K., *Weaponized Words*, p.31.

⁷ Borum, R., ‘Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research’, *Journal of Strategic Security* 4.4 (2011): pp. 34-62.

⁸ Moghaddam, F. M., ‘The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration’, *American Psychologist*, 60.2 (2005): pp. 161-169.

Two Pyramid model, which presents ‘radicalisation of opinion’, and ‘radicalisation of action’ as two separate processes: the former culminates in a personal moral obligation to take up violence in defence of the cause, and the latter in their engagement in illegal action that targets civilians, otherwise known as terrorism.⁹

Many radicalisation ‘models’ serve to simplify a complex phenomenon for ease of consumption. However, many models (perhaps unwittingly) depict radicalisation as a linear and predictable process, which is not borne out in practitioners’ observations of real-life cases. An individual’s radicalisation experience will likely be affected over time by various social, psychological and environmental factors which can – and often do – affect its trajectory in multiple and unpredictable ways.

The study of ‘the terrorist’ has long sought (and failed) to identify a ‘uniqueness’ inherent in the terrorist that might explain their behaviour, and crucially, differentiate them from you and me. Depictions of ‘the terrorist’ as either ‘mad’ or ‘bad’ gained significant traction in the 1970’s and 80’s, perhaps as a natural human reaction to our collective

inability or unwillingness to consider that any ‘normal’ person could play any role in what are often such brutal actions. Such reductionist thinking has thankfully been largely discredited in more recent years, with research firmly showing that there is no ‘terrorist personality’ or ‘type’ of person destined to become a terrorist.

One fundamental and largely unanswered question on terrorism remains: why do some individuals from a general population in a given context - and with relatively common and often shared experiences and beliefs - become terrorists, while others do not?¹⁰ While the reality is that we will likely never be able to predict with any certainty which person or ‘type of person’ is likely or not to become a terrorist,¹¹ the examination of radicalisation processes at the individual level can generate important insights as to the role of vulnerability, risk and protective factors. This can, in turn, lead to the development of strategies to both prevent individuals being drawn into terrorism, and to attempt to reverse the journeys of those already engaged in terrorism.

What is clear, is that there is not any one-size-fits-all radicalisation ‘journey’: instead each process is a

⁹ McCauley, C. and Sophia Moskalenko, ‘Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two-Pyramids Model’, *American Psychologist*, 72.3 (2017): pp. 205-216.

¹⁰ Taylor, M., *The Terrorist* (London: Brassey’s), p.176)

¹¹ Horgan, J., *Walking away from Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.11.

deeply personal and individual experience, influenced and affected by a multitude of social, psychological and environmental factors. Extremism expert J.M Berger emphasizes the deeply personal nature of radicalisation, stating how: “Some people take years to go through the process of radicalization, from its initial stages to the decision to act; Others speed through it in months or even weeks. Some individuals will leapfrog past certain steps. So-called lone wolf terrorists may skip some of these steps entirely”.¹²

¹² Berger, J.M., *Extremism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2018), p.127.

The increasing prevalence of young people in both non-criminal and criminal spaces

The Prevent strategy, published in its current form by the U.K government in 2011, is part of its wider counter-terrorism strategy, Contest.¹³ The overall objective of Prevent is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism,¹⁴ which it seeks to achieve through its Channel programme. Channel is the multi-agency decision-making mechanism of Prevent, designed to provide support to anyone who is assessed as vulnerable to being drawn into any form of terrorism or supporting terrorist organisations.¹⁵ Referrals to the Prevent programme saw an overall increase of 10 per cent in the year to March 2020 - 72 per cent of which having been for those under the age of thirty.¹⁶

Such an increase is not exclusive to the 'non-criminal' Prevent space. Home Office statistics of arrests for terrorist activity for the year ending September 2020 further evidence the over-representation of young people in radicalisation and terrorism spaces: there were falls in arrests for terror related activity across all age groups except those under eighteen, which doubled to account for 8 per cent of all arrests - the highest proportion ever seen in any annual period to date.¹⁷ Some three months later, Home Office statistics for the year ending December 2020 reveal a further increase, with arrests for those under eighteen rising further to account for 10 per cent of all terror related arrests.¹⁸

Assistant Commissioner and Head of Counter-Terrorism Policing, Neil Basu stated: "We are seeing more young people being drawn towards terrorist

¹³ Revised Prevent duty guidance: for England and Wales, *Home Office*, 2015, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance/revised-prevent-duty-guidance-for-england-and-wales>, last visited: 28 February 2021.

¹⁴ CONTEST: The United Kingdom's strategy for countering terrorism, *HM Government*, 2018, available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf, last visited: 28 February 2021.

¹⁵ Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, *H.M Government*, 2020, available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/964567/6.6271_HO_HMG_Channel_Duty_Guidance_v14_Web.pdf, last visited: 02 March 2021.

¹⁶ New Prevent statistics warn of increase in young men becoming fixated on violent extremism, *Counter-Terrorism Policing*, 2020, available at: <https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/new-prevent-statistics-warn-of-increase-in-young-men-becoming-fixated-on-violent-extremism/>, last visited: 18 February 2021.

¹⁷ Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stop and search Great Britain, year ending September 2020, *Home Office*, 2021, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-quarterly-update-to-september-2020/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stop-and-search-great-britain-year-ending#court-proceedings>, last visited: 16 February 2021.

¹⁸ Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes, and stop and search Great Britain, year ending December 2020, *Home Office*, 2021, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-quarterly-update-to-december-2020/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stop-and-search-great-britain-year-ending>, last visited: 04 March 2021.

activity. In the last 18 months or so, 17 children under the age of 18 were arrested in relation to terrorism offences, some as young as 14-years-old. This is a relatively new and worrying trend in the U.K, because just a few years ago we were not seeing anyone that young amongst our casework”.¹⁹ This analysis from the head of U.K counter-terrorism policing further emphasizes the scale of this concerning trend.

There have been a number of cases of children under eighteen years of age convicted of terrorism offences in the last five years. In 2015, a 15-year-old boy from Blackburn, Lancashire – known only as RXG due to a court imposed anonymity order – was jailed, aged then just 14, for inciting an Australian Jihadist to murder police in a terrorist attack on an Anzac day remembrance parade. He was, at the time, the UK’s youngest ever terror offender.²⁰ In January 2020, 18-year-old Jack Reed, who can now be named after losing an anonymity battle was jailed for six years and eight months for preparing acts of terrorism, disseminating terrorist publications and the possession of

materials for terrorist purposes. Reed had planned to ‘firebomb’ synagogues, schools and council buildings in-line with his adherence to accelerationist and “Siege” culture inspired neo-Nazi ideology.²¹ Then in 2021, a 16-year-old boy from Cornwall – who also cannot be named for legal reasons – was convicted and sentenced for 12 separate terrorism offences, including possession and dissemination of terrorist material: offences he began committing when just 13 years old. He was responsible for leading a neo-Nazi cell from his grandmother’s cottage.²² While being far from exhaustive, these cases clearly evidence a concerning downward age-related demographic shift of young and often vulnerable people being convicted of terrorism offences.

Understanding the lack of engagement from ‘friends and family’ and ‘community’ sectors

In the year to March 2020, just 2 per cent (139) of all Prevent referrals came from ‘friends and family’, and 2 per cent (101) from ‘community’ sectors.²³

¹⁹ CT Policing launch new safeguarding website, *Counter-Terrorism Policing*, 2020, available at: <https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/ct-police-launch-act-early/>, last visited: 18 February 2021.

²⁰ Youngest person in UK convicted of terrorism can go free: Parole Board, *BBC News*, 2021, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-55707342>, last visited: 17 February 2021.

²¹ Dearden, L., One of UK’s youngest terror plotters names after losing anonymity battle, *The Independent*, 2021, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/n>

[eo-nazi-terror-plot-durham-jack-reed-b1785650.html](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/n), last visited: 18 February 2021.

²² Evans, M., Neo Nazi teen becomes Britain’s youngest convicted terrorist, *The Telegraph*, 2021, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/02/01/neo-nazi-teen-becomes-britains-youngest-convicted-terrorist/>, last visited: 18 February 2021.

²³ Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, April 2019 to March 2020, *Home Office*, 2020, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/indi>

It was a similar story the previous year (ending March 2019), again with just 2 per cent (99), and 2 per cent (92) respectively.²⁴ In fact, in the years ending since March 2016 when such records began, referrals from ‘friends and family’ and ‘community’ sectors have not peaked above 4 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. By contrast, during the same period, referral rates from police and education (the two highest referring sectors) have never fallen below 31 per cent.²⁵

The fact that just 2 per cent of referrals came from both ‘friends and family’ and ‘community’ sectors – despite the fact that they are often the first to spot the worrying behavioural changes indicative of a loved one being radicalised – is acknowledged as ‘worrysome’ by Counter-Terrorism policing. Discussing the launch of *ACT Early* – a new dedicated safeguarding website and advice line to help parents, friends and families get

specialist support to stop their loved ones being drawn into harmful activities or groups – CTP’s National Prevent Coordinator, Chief Superintendent Nik Adams, said: “We need parents, friends and family to help us by acting early, by talking to their children about what they view online, and sharing their concerns or seeking support if they fear someone they know is in danger of being radicalised”.²⁶ Despite genuine efforts to increase engagement from ‘friends and family’ and ‘community’ sectors, there appears to be as yet, little sign of progress – at least none that is borne out in Prevent referral data thus far.

There is no one explanation for the disproportionately low Prevent referral rates from ‘friends and family’ and ‘community’ sectors. Discussing the need for better community engagement on matters of radicalisation, Counter-Terrorism

[individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2019-to-march-2020/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2019-to-march-2020](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2019-to-march-2020/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2019-to-march-2020), last visited: 18 January 2021.


²⁴ Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, April 2018 to March 2019, *Home Office*, 2019, available at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/853646/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2018-mar2019-hosb3219.pdf#:~:text=In%20the%20year%20ending%2031%20March%202019,%20a,for%20the%20highest%20number%20of%20referrals%20\(1,887:%2033%\),](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/853646/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2018-mar2019-hosb3219.pdf#:~:text=In%20the%20year%20ending%2031%20March%202019,%20a,for%20the%20highest%20number%20of%20referrals%20(1,887:%2033%),) last visited: 18 January 2021.

²⁵ Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, April 2015 to March 2016, *Home Office*, 2016, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2015-to-march-2016>, last visited: 08 February 2021; Individuals referred to

and supported through the Prevent programme, April 2016 to March 2017, *Home Office*, 2017, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2016-to-march-2017>, last visited: 08 February 2021; Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, April 2017 to March 2018, *Home Office*, 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2017-to-march-2018>, last visited: 08 February 2020.

²⁶ New statistics warn of increase in young men becoming fixated on violent extremism, *Counter-Terrorism Policing*, 2020, available at: <https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/new-prevent-statistics-warn-of-increase-in-young-men-becoming-fixated-on-violent-extremism/>, last visited: 11 January 2021.

Figure 1: Prevent Referrals by Sector



Source: Home Office, *Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2019 to March 2020*.

Policing’s National Prevent Coordinator, Detective Chief Superintendent Nik Adams commented that: “Asking for help is a difficult and emotional step, but we must see it for what it is – action which won’t ruin their lives but may well save them”.²⁷ This ‘difficult and emotional step’ may well offer significant explanatory value for the disproportionately low Prevent referral rates from ‘friends and family’ and ‘community’ sectors. Despite the reality that *Prevent* does not criminalise those referred, and that support offered through its Channel programme is consent-based - it appears that for many – referring a friend, family member, or immediate member of their community for support may often prove too difficult a step to take.

²⁷ New statistics warn of increase in young men becoming fixated on violent extremism, *Counter-Terrorism Policing*, 2020, available at: <https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/new->

[prevent-statistics-warn-of-increase-in-young-men-becoming-fixated-on-violent-extremism/](#), Last visited: 11 January 2021.

Policy Recommendation: The Terrorism and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TEDS)

The Terrorism and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TEDS) is a ‘two-way’ information sharing mechanism focussed on disclosure and risk management where a subject is identified as being convicted (including cautions, reprimands and final warnings) of terrorism and racially or religiously motivated offences. Disclosure would empower a parent, carer or guardian to reject all forms of radicalising or extremist influences, and protect their child from radicalisation and from being drawn into terrorism.

TEDS consists of two disclosure pathways: *Right to Ask*, where members of the public can apply to police for disclosure of relevant information, and *Right to Know*, where police can proactively disclose relevant information. While any member of the public can apply for disclosure, it would only be provided (if applicable) to a parent, carer or

guardian who is best placed to protect the child.

An ‘expectation to disclose’ exists when a subject has a history of convictions (including cautions, reprimands, and final warnings) for terrorism offences contrary to legislation including but not limited to the Terrorism Act 2000, the Terrorism Act 2006, the Anti-Terrorism and Security Act 2001, the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015; or those related to racially or religiously motivated or aggravated offences committed contrary to sections 28-32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998,²⁸ and sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.²⁹

TEDS does not require the passing of any additional legislation. Disclosure is instead enabled by existing police common law powers, which permit the disclosure of information for purposes including the prevention of crime, where there is a ‘pressing social need’ to disclose.³⁰ Disclosure must also satisfy the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998,³¹ and the Human Rights Act 1998,³² and will

²⁸ Crime and Disorder Act 1998, *legislation.gov.uk*, 1998, available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/37>, last visited: 10 February 2021.

²⁹ Criminal Justice Act 2003, *legislation.gov.uk*, 2003, available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/44#:~:text=Criminal%20Justice%20Act%202003%20203%20CHAPTER%2044%20An,proceedings%20brought%20by%20offenders;%20and%20for%20connected%20purposes>, last visited: 10 February 2021.

³⁰ Information Management: Common Law, *College of Policing*, 2016, available at:

<https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/information-management/sharing-police-information/#common-law>, last visited: 11 February 2021.

³¹ Data Protection Act 1998, *legislation.gov.uk*, 1998, available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/contents>, last visited: 23 March 2021.

³² Human Rights Act 1998, *legislation.gov.uk*, 1998, available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents>, last visited: 23 March 2021.

consider necessity and proportionality in-line with the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.³³

TEDS should be integrated into and facilitated by existing multi-agency safeguarding architecture. Applications should be processed by counter-terrorism (Prevent) Policing personnel, and disclosure decision-making conducted within existing multi-agency Channel panel protocols. This would ensure a consistency of approach, and visibility for key stakeholders across the Prevent and Channel work-streams for purposes of threat and risk assessment and support provision.

TEDS takes inspiration from disclosure schemes already employed to safeguard and protect children and vulnerable people from other types of exploitation and abuse, including *The Child Sexual Offence Disclosure Scheme (CSODS)*, otherwise known as *Sarah's Law*,³⁴ and the *Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (DVDS)*, known as *Claire's Law*.³⁵ TEDS was designed in its initial iteration by the author of this policy recommendation between June 2018 and February 2019.³⁶

Outlined below are the two available disclosure routes – *Right to Ask*; and *Right to Know*.

Route 1: Right to Ask

Right to Ask enables a responsible adult ('the applicant') to make a disclosure request to their local Police Prevent teams, where they feel an individual ('the subject') may pose a radicalisation risk to a young or vulnerable person eighteen years of age or below ('the person at-risk'). A successful disclosure is intended to empower the 'applicant' (or the parent, carer or guardian where the applicant is a third party) to take proactive steps to safeguard the 'person at risk' from a potentially radicalising or extremist influence ('the subject'). Disclosure information may include – where reasonable, proportionate and necessary – information regarding the subject's terrorism and racially or religiously motivated criminal convictions (including cautions, reprimands and final warnings). Police intelligence held relating to terrorist or extremist group affiliations, associations or activities may also be disclosed if deemed reasonable, proportionate and necessary.

³³ Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, *legislation.gov.uk*, 1974, available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1974/53>, last visited: 23 March 2021.

³⁴ Find out if a person has a record for child sexual offences, *Home Office*, 2013, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/find-out-if-a-person-has-a-record-for-child-sexual-offences>, last visited: 12 February 2021.

³⁵ Policy Paper: Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme Factsheet, *Home Office*, 2020, available

at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/domestic-abuse-bill-2020-factsheets/domestic-violence-disclosure-scheme-factsheet>, last visited: 12 February 2021.

³⁶ Dryden, M., 'Policy Paper: The Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDs)', *Journal for Deradicalization* 18 (2019): pp. 244- 271.

Figure 2. Route 1: Right to Ask process flow.



Step 1: Application Registration

Any member of the public (the applicant) can register their TEDS application online, or in person to police should they not have access to the internet. Police will acknowledge receipt of the application registration and proceed to conduct relevant checks in order to discount any imminent threat posed by the subject.

Step 2: Initial Police Checks

Police conduct criminal record and intelligence checks against the 'subject' to ensure they do not pose

any imminent threat to the 'person at risk' or any other party. Any imminent threat identified will be dealt with immediately or referred onwards to other relevant agencies where appropriate. Providing there are no concerns of imminent threat and risk, the application will proceed as normal to a face-to-face meeting with 'the applicant'.

Step 3: Face-to-Face Meeting: Police and 'the applicant'

Police will contact the applicant and arrange a face-to-face meeting. The

purpose of this step is to allow police to ensure the application is genuine and being made in good faith, and allows the verification of the applicant's identity – the applicant must provide one form of photo identification, including passport or drivers licence, and one further form of identification verifying their address. The applicant will be asked to provide an in-depth account of their concern and basis for their application in order for the application to proceed. The applicant must be willing to sign an official document accepting that they will not misuse any information provided to them, and that failure to uphold the agreement could render them liable to prosecution. Misuse of the information provided could include posting on social media, providing information to the press, or any action deemed inappropriate or unnecessary in exercising their duty to protect their child from harm.

Step 4: In-depth Threat and Risk Assessment

Police will conduct criminal record, intelligence, and other appropriate checks to establish whether or not the subject has convictions for terrorism and racially or religiously motivated offences. Only information deemed relevant for the TEDS application will be compiled and used for this process. However, should information be found

indicating that the subject may pose a different type of threat to the 'person at risk' – such as having a history of child sexual abuse – it will be passed by police to the relevant safeguarding department to be actioned separately outside of the TEDS process.

Step 5: Disclosure Decision-Making

Following the completion of the police checks, a decision will be made whether or not a disclosure should be made to the applicant (or third party if the applicant does not have direct responsibility for the person at risk). If no relevant information of concern is established, the applicant (or third party) will be updated accordingly. If relevant information of concern is identified, a decision will be made whether the information is relevant and therefore warrants disclosure, or whether it may not be relevant and therefore does not (this is potentially applicable when information is sufficiently historic).

Responsibility for disclosure decision making will rest with existing local multi-agency Channel panels, incorporating the TEDS process into the existing Prevent and Channel multi-agency architecture. All TEDS applications will be discussed and disclosure decisions made at existing local monthly Channel panel meetings.

Step 6: Disclosure or Non-Disclosure

Disclosure should be conducted in person at the applicant (or third-party's) home address, a police station, or another safe place. Disclosures will comprise a set form of words, advising the applicant that there is cause for concern. The disclosure outcome will be presented in written form – however, it will not identify the applicant, person at risk or subject. The disclosure will not divulge specific offences or the nature or

sources of intelligence used to make the determination at any point. Any disclosure should be made to the relevant party no later than 30 days after application was made.

Non-Disclosures should also be conducted in person where practicable. A non-disclosure decision can be relayed to the applicant over the phone, for example, should they wish. However, any further explanation of the non-disclosure decision should be conducted in person.

There are many circumstances and scenarios in which TEDS *Right to Ask* could be deployed to help protect children from radicalising and extremist influences. The below example is fictional, and for illustrative purposes only.

Case Study: Right to Ask


Mikey, 14, has recently begun learning the electric guitar. He and his mother seek out a guitar teacher online. After some weeks of online lessons, Mikey's mother becomes concerned about the suspected racist nature of some of the song lyrics she hears Mikey listening to in his bedroom. Concerned that this may be the influence of the guitar teacher, she conducts an internet search on him to allay her fears. Instead, she finds information suggesting the guitar teacher used to be part of the neo-Nazi music scene. Mikey's parents decide to submit a TEDS application so that they can be in possession of the facts and therefore in a position to make an informed decision about whether the lessons should continue. The subsequent TEDS disclosure identifies the teacher as having been a well-known member of the neo-Nazi music scene and has previous convictions for racially aggravated assault. Police intelligence suggests that he is still a known associate of a number of far-right activists. Having possession of the relevant information needed to

make an informed decision, Mikey's parents decide to put a stop to his lessons with the teacher and instead consult a reputable local teaching school where all teachers are suitably vetted. In so doing, they protect their child from a potentially radicalising and extremist influence.

Route 2: Right to Know

Right to Know enables police to make a proactive disclosure to parents, carers or guardians, where they feel an individual ('the subject') may pose a radicalisation risk to a young or vulnerable person ('the person at-risk'). A successful disclosure is intended to empower the 'applicant' (or the parent, carer or guardian where the applicant is a third party) to take proactive steps to safeguard the 'person at risk' from a potentially radicalising or extremist influence ('the subject'). Disclosure information may include – where reasonable, proportionate and necessary – information regarding the subject's terrorism and racially or religiously motivated criminal convictions (including cautions, reprimands and final warnings). Police intelligence held relating to terrorist or extremist group affiliations, associations or activities may also be disclosed if deemed reasonable, proportionate and necessary.

Figure 3. Route 2: Right to Know process flow.



Step 1: Information identified and verified by police

Where police identify, during the course of their duties, information which indicates that an individual with relevant convictions for terrorism or racially or religiously motivated criminal offences (including cautions, reprimands and final warnings) may pose a radicalising or extremist influence threat to a young person of eighteen years or under, they must act. This information may have come directly from police activities or intelligence, or from multi-agency partners. Police will immediately work to verify the reliability and relevance of the information.

Step 2: Police Checks

Police conduct criminal record and intelligence checks against the 'subject' to ensure they do not pose any imminent threat to the person at risk or any other party. Any imminent threat or risk identified will be dealt with immediately, or referred onwards to other relevant agencies where appropriate. Provided there are no concerns of imminent threat and risk – but that evidence of terrorism and racially or religiously motivated criminal offending is found – police personnel will proceed to the TEDS multi-agency decision-making process to determine whether or not a disclosure is deemed necessary.

Step 3: Multi-agency discussion and decision-making process

Following the completion of the police checks, a decision will be made whether or not a disclosure should be made to the applicant (or third party if the applicant does not have direct responsibility for the person at risk).

Responsibility for disclosure decision-making will rest with existing local multi-agency Channel panels, incorporating the TEDS process into the existing Prevent and Channel multi-agency architecture. All TEDS applications will be discussed and disclosure decisions made at existing local monthly Channel panel meetings.

Step 4: Disclosure or Non-Disclosure

Disclosure should be conducted in person at the applicant (or third-party's) home address, a police station, or another safe place. Disclosures will comprise a set form of words, advising the applicant that there is cause for concern and therefore they may wish to consider disallowing contact between the 'person at risk' and the 'subject'. The disclosure outcome will be presented in written form, however will not identify the applicant, person at risk or subject. The disclosure will not divulge specific offences or the nature or sources of intelligence used to make the determination at any point. Any

disclosure should be made to the relevant party no later than 30 days after the information of concern came to light.

There are many circumstances and scenarios in which TEDS *Right to Know* could be deployed to help protect children from radicalising and extremist influences. The below example is fictional, and for illustrative purposes only.

Case Study: Right to Know

Police have been investigating an individual, whom they subsequently charge with membership of a proscribed terrorist organisation. During the course of their investigation they discover information relating to communication between the subject of the investigation and his brother, who has a previous conviction for dissemination of a terrorist publication. The information identifies the brother as recently entering into a new relationship with a woman who has a 15-year-old autistic son. Due to his previous terrorist conviction, police decide to present their case to the Channel panel suggesting that disclosure should be made to the parent, enabling them to make an informed decision about whether or not they continue to expose their child to a potentially radicalising and extremist influence. The Channel panel agree that the subject's terrorist offending history does warrant disclosure, and so disclosure is made to the parent. As a result, the parent decides to end their relationship with

the man, thus protecting their child from a potentially radicalising and extremist influence.

We recommend that the Terrorism and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TEDS) be given the opportunity to demonstrate its effectiveness through a twelve-month pilot scheme in at least two U.K counter-terrorism policing areas. The pilot should run for at least 12 months in order to allow sufficient public awareness of the scheme to be generated through advertising, and for it to generate a sufficient amount of data for analysis. This would allow a rigorous independent evaluation.

Conclusion

The combination of an increase in referrals of young people to the Prevent programme; the doubling in the number of individuals under 18 years of age arrested for terrorist-related activity; and the consistently and disproportionately low referral rates from ‘friends and family’ and ‘community’ sectors, paints a concerning picture for the U.K counter-terrorism landscape.

While continued government efforts to engage ‘friends and family’ and ‘community’ sectors are welcomed – they do not represent any real departure from existing methods – and continue to yield poor results. We must not be so complacent as to consider existing methods alone to be the only approach capable of protecting vulnerable people from radicalisation. Indeed, the U.K government document *CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism* (2018)³⁷ explicitly outlined a series of strategic objectives by which to improve its response to radicalisation, including:

- To develop a series of multi-agency pilots to trial methods

to improve our understanding of those at risk of involvement in terrorism and enable earlier intervention

- To re-enforce safeguarding at the heart of Prevent to ensure our communities and families are not exploited or groomed into following a path of violent extremism

The Home Office’s own strategic objectives outlined above – coupled with the consistently and disproportionately low Prevent referral rates from ‘friends and family’ and ‘community’ sectors – clearly illustrates the urgent need (and the apparent desire) to explore creative and innovative ways to improve our collective efforts to increase engagement from these sectors. The introduction of the Terrorism and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TEDS) would do just that, by empowering ‘friends and family’ and ‘community’ sectors to reject all forms of radicalising and extremist influences, and safeguard their children from being drawn into terrorism.

³⁷ CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, *HM Government*, 2018, available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/

[716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf](#), last visited: 18 January 2021.

