MUSLIM ANTI-SEMITISM IN CONTEMPORARY GREAT BRITAIN

BY DR RAKIB EHSAN

DEFENDING EUROPE: "GLOBAL BRITAIN" AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICS

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About the Author

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Rakib has had research published by a number of UK-based think-tanks, including Runnymede Trust, Policy Exchange and Intergenerational Foundation, as well as the Mackenzie Institute, an independent security think-tank based in Toronto, Canada. He has spoken at parliamentary events and academic conferences on the ideological motivations driving the growth of far-right extremism.

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About Us

The Henry Jackson Society is a think-tank and policy-shaping force that fights for the principles and alliances which keep societies free, working across borders and party lines to combat extremism, advance democracy and real human rights, and make a stand in an increasingly uncertain world.

The Centre on Social & Political Risk (CSPR) is a citizen-focused, international research centre, which seeks to identify, diagnose and propose solutions to threats to governance in liberal Western democracies. Its fundamental purpose is to underscore the potential harm that various forms of social, cultural and political insecurity, conflict and disengagement can pose to the long-term sustainability of democracies – including the resilience of their institutions, public policy outcomes, citizens’ health and wellbeing, and economic growth and prosperity. Moreover, to underscore how social and political instability can make nations vulnerable to internal and external actors seeking to deepen cleavages, undermine consensus and ultimately, to weaken democratic functioning.

The Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism (CRT) is unique in addressing violent and non-violent extremism. By coupling high-quality, in-depth research with targeted and impactful policy recommendations, we aim to combat the threat of radicalisation and terrorism in our society.
Executive Summary

In late 2019, the Henry Jackson Society commissioned polling organisation Savanta ComRes to undertake a survey involving a weighted sample of 750 British Muslims. Respondents were asked about their perspectives on a number of topics. These included: other faith groups; prominent geopolitical players; and the perceived level of Jewish global control. This represents one of the most systematic and comprehensive surveys into the socio-political attitudes – both domestic and international – of British Muslims. According to the study:

- When compared with their perception of other faith groups, British Muslims have the least favourable attitude towards Jewish people.

- The only people viewed less favourably by British Muslims than Jewish people are those belonging to no religious group (atheists/non-believers).

- British Muslims who are more socially integrated through their friendship groups, have a more favourable view of both Jews and the State of Israel.

These are a number of observations of significance:

- A December 2019 ICM Unlimited poll found that 18% of the general population felt Jews have disproportionate influence over business and finance. In this survey of British Muslims, 34% were of the view that Jews have too much control over the global banking system.

- The same ICM poll found that 15% of the general population felt Jews have disproportionate influence in politics. In this Savanta ComRes poll, 33% of the British Muslim respondents were of the view that Jews have too much control over the global political leadership.

- On the matter of ‘dual loyalty’, the ICM survey found that 24% of the general population believed British Jews were more loyal to Israel than to the UK. The corresponding figure for British Muslims, in this survey by Savanta ComRes, is 44%.

- When compared to British Muslims who are not university-educated, British Muslims who are university-educated are more likely to agree with the view that British Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the UK, along with holding the broader belief that Jews have too much global control.

- The majority of British Muslims who report that they attend a mosque at least 3-4 times a week, believe British Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the UK – 55%. The corresponding figure for British Muslims who very occasionally or never attend a mosque is 34%.
1. Introduction

We are presented with the depressing reality that Britain – once a safe haven for those fleeing the horrors of Nazism in continental Europe – has a serious anti-Semitism problem.

Anti-Semitism is at the forefront of our politics. Under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour Party has witnessed the departure of a number of its own Jewish parliamentarians – including Luciana Berger and Dame Louise Ellman – over concerns about anti-Semitism. The party is currently under investigation by the Equality and Human Rights Commission over allegations of institutional anti-Semitism.¹ But it is not just a problem for the Labour Party. The December 2019 General Election saw the suspension of a number of parliamentary candidates – of a Muslim background – over allegations of anti-Semitism. Reflecting the cross-party nature of the problem, this included Conservative Party candidate Amjad Bashir (Leeds North West),² Liberal Democrat candidate Waheed Rafiq (Birmingham Hodge Hill)³ and Labour candidate Safia Ali (Falkirk).⁴

A number of existing studies suggest that anti-Semitic attitudes in the UK are more concentrated within its Muslim communities.⁵ Building on these studies, this report, which makes use of an online survey of 750 British Muslims, provides an analytical account of socio-demographic characteristics and social factors most strongly associated with Muslim anti-Semitism in Great Britain.⁶ The survey, conducted by polling organisation Savanta ComRes between 25 November and 5 December 2019, is one of the most systematic and comprehensive surveys into the socio-political attitudes and behaviour of British Muslims to date. Crucially, the survey provides a wealth of data on what drives anti-Semitic beliefs and anti-Israel attitudes within British Muslim communities – both of which are underdeveloped areas of research.

Through quantitative analysis, this survey data – weighted to be demographically representative of British Muslim adults by age, region, gender and ethnicity – is used to provide a comprehensive account of the socio-demographic characteristics and societal behaviours that are mostly strongly associated with prejudicial attitudes and conspiratorial beliefs among British Muslims. Demonstrating the reality that British Muslims are far from being a monolithic, homogeneous bloc, this report identifies sections of the British Muslim population that hold more favourable views towards ‘outgroupers’ (those who do not follow Islam), such as Jews, and are less likely to hold anti-Semitic conspiratorial beliefs.

The report is structured as follows. It first presents an overview of existing research and political commentary on anti-Semitism in the UK and the broader European context. As well as demonstrating how little attention has been paid to Britain’s Muslim communities by the

⁶ The survey data collection only took place in Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) owing to the exceptionally low percentage of the Northern Irish population identifying as Muslim.
academic, policy and media communities in the context of anti-Semitism, the report explores the potential relevance of social integration, educational attainment and frequency of mosque attendance when examining British Muslim attitudes. The report moves on to the analysis section, which is split into two parts. The first part includes descriptive statistics which provide an insight into what shapes British Muslim attitudes towards non-Muslim groups and prominent countries in international geopolitics, as well as perceptions of Jewish global control over industries such as banking and arms production. The second part of the analysis robustly tests key relationships of interest through multivariate analysis in the form of ordinal logistic regression. Following a discussion of the analysis, the report concludes by outlining the policy and political implications of the main findings.
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Motivations

While research into Muslim anti-Semitism is somewhat underdeveloped, there is a burgeoning body of scholarship that includes recent studies of relevance. As well as reviewing the content and main findings of these studies, this part of the report reviews existing literature that has explored the effects of social integration and education level on perceptions of other groups in society. This section also covers existing studies and media commentary on the potential role of mosques in influencing domestic attitudes and geopolitical considerations within Western Muslim communities, including those living in Britain.

2.1. Muslim Anti-Semitism in Perspective

Reported cases of anti-Semitic hatred and abuse of numerous kinds have risen in the West over recent years. A 2019 report by the European Union Agency on Fundamental Rights (EUFRA) found that 89% of European Jewish people questioned felt that anti-Semitism had grown in their countries in the previous five years, while the same body stated that 39% of Jewish people had themselves personally experienced anti-Semitism in the same period.

Research has generally focused on three specific groups in society thought to be characterised by disproportionate levels of anti-Semitism when compared with the general population, namely those on the far right, those on the far left and those from a Muslim background. There is, of course, some overlap between these categories, so it is important that they are not treated as being entirely distinct. However, it is certainly true that each group has some separate history of anti-Jewish rhetoric or action, though this has not by any means spread to all members.

EUFRA reports that when asked to identify the background of the perpetrators of the most serious anti-Semitic acts in a five-year period, respondents answered 30% of the time that it was “someone with Muslim extremist views”, as opposed to 21% of the time identifying left-wing perpetrators and 13% of the time right-wing perpetrators. Those of an Islamic background were therefore found to be seen by European Jews as the biggest perpetrators of serious anti-Semitic hatred. As British-based academic L. Daniel Staetsky has reflected, these findings suggest that, although all such groupings require investigation, concerns about Islam and the far left are stronger than those about the far right. It should be noted, however, that categorisation was solely done by the victims, hence their subjective understandings of what constitutes left-wing, right-wing or Islamist views will have influenced the results. Respondents were asked to indicate as many categories as applied, so some crossover between categories may also have resulted.

10 ‘Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism: Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU’, EUFRA, 2019, Summary.
12 For the questionnaire used in the survey, see ‘Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism: Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU’, EUFRA, 2019, Questionnaire.
13 Ibid.
EUFRA’s predecessor, the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), based on research conducted during 2002–2003, reached the view that “the Middle East conflict has a negative impact on the lives of the Jewish communities” in Europe, with its sample of Jewish interviewees reporting a conflation of the state of Israel with Jews and perceiving a degree of anti-Semitism in the anti-war movement prevalent around the time of the invasion of Iraq.  

The conflation of Jews and Israel and the linking of Jews to war play into long-standing anti-Semitic tropes, such as the concept of ‘dual loyalty’. This is based on the notion that Jews cannot be relied upon to be loyal to their country of residence because of their perceived emotional ties to the State of Israel. This in turn is interwoven with the over-arching conspiratorial belief that through control of private corporations and mainstream politicians, an international Jewry engineers international conflicts in the name of financial profit.

In terms of domestic attitudes, ICM Unlimited found in a poll for Channel 4 that some 30% of British Muslims felt that Jews saw themselves as “better” than other people, and whereas 6% of the general population felt that Jews were to blame for most wars, more than 25% of British Muslims did. However, the size and character of the sample used in this report has been criticised for focusing on deprived neighbourhoods with high proportions of residents of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin, in places such as Bradford, Birmingham and East London. It has been argued such areas tend to be characterised by more socially conservative views, when compared with the mainstream British Muslim population.

Elsewhere, the Pew Global Attitudes Project claimed that only 32% of British Muslims view Jewish people in a positive way, whereas the figure for the general population is 74%. Staetsky’s work also demonstrates that UK Muslims are significantly more likely than the general population to hold anti-Semitic views. Only 37% of British Muslims feel Jews make a positive contribution to society, whereas the figure for the general population is over 60%. Whereas 8% of Muslims believe the Holocaust is a myth, 2% of the general population do; and while 4% of the public feel the Holocaust has been exaggerated, 14% of Muslims do.

With anti-Semitism being more concentrated within such communities when compared with the general population, there is value in developing an in-depth understanding of what potentially shapes and conditions such attitudes in the British Muslim context.

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15 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
2.2. The Effects of Social Integration

There is an existing body of research that has critically investigated the effects of social intergroup contact in ethnically and religiously diverse contexts.

The debate between contact and conflict theory is well established in the existing literature, and provides the general framework for the analysis. As early as 1954, American psychologist G. W. Allport advanced the argument that positive intergroup contact can help to improve perceptions of outgroupers and reduce prejudice between different groups.\(^{23}\) There exists a wealth of relatively recent research to support this argument.\(^{24}\) These studies collectively suggest that greater intergroup contact reduces cross-group hostility and anxiety, as it helps to develop bonds of trust, familiarity and mutual understanding between different ethnic groups. Thus, intergroup contact can moderate prejudices among the in-group towards outgroup members of society and help to develop social trust in diverse settings.\(^{25}\)

These findings are also supported by mixed-methods research which has found that British ethnic minority people who are more integrated through friendship groups and their place of work, are more likely to be socially trusting and report more positive views of the outgroup.\(^{26}\) In addition to this, a meta-analytical study of 713 studies by Pettigrew and Tropp found that, in most cases, intergroup contact tended to be associated with prejudice reduction.\(^{27}\) By developing bonds of trust and mutual understanding, contact helps to reduce prejudice by providing improved knowledge of others, which helps to overcome both innate human prejudices and negative societal stereotypes.\(^{28}\) Drawing inspiration from the existing body of literature on the effects of intergroup contact, this study will investigate the role of social integration in shaping the attitudes of British Muslims towards non-Muslim groups, as well as their perception of prominent geopolitical players such as the US, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

2.3. The Effects of Education

A number of studies draw a link between levels of education and the degree of tolerance in society. The basic argument of such studies is that individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to be tolerant and accepting of different cultures and ways of life than those with lower levels of education. Bobo and Licari’s 1989 study of political tolerance makes this case,\(^{29}\) as does Baklashova et al.’s study of students in Kazan (though it is unclear whether the latter sees higher education itself or the social aspect of university as more important in encouraging tolerance).\(^{30}\) This is a question that recurs throughout consideration of the topic.

Many studies have applied this theory to the UK’s departure from the EU. For example, writing in 2019, Alabrese et al. state that “voting Leave is associated with ... low educational

\(^{24}\) For example, D’Appollonia, A. C., *Migrant Mobilization and Securitization in the US and Europe: How Does It Feel to Be a Threat?* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).
attainment”, while a study from the University of Leicester identifies a similar trend. From this data, the latter report argues that Remain might have won the vote had an additional 3% of British people attended university. Implicit in such assessments is the view that Brexit was the result of a lack of access to higher education and the advantages — whether they be intellectual or cultural (tolerance) — that it apparently brings. This position is built upon up by the Online Privacy Foundation’s claims, made in 2017, that Leave voters have a lower degree of “openness” as well as a lower degree of “numeration” and “reasoning” — lagging in both cultural and more formally academic terms.

In the case of British Muslims, a 2018 Ipsos MORI study reported more conservative views on gender and sexuality among British Muslims than among the general population, with 45% of male British Muslims agreeing that “wives should always obey their husbands” and 52% of British Muslims saying they do not think homosexuality should be legal. The figures are lower among younger Muslims, more of whom were born in the UK. This might suggest that being educated in the UK lowers the level of disagreement with gender equality and increases tolerance towards sexual minorities. However, the Ipsos MORI study illustrates that even young adult British Muslims (aged 18-24) are more conservative than the general population on the issues of gender roles and sexual orientation, notwithstanding the fact that a significantly higher proportion of British Muslims are in education than is the case among the wider population — 13.3% compared to 5.3% respectively.

Indeed, political sociologist Frederick D. Weil’s investigation of the link between education and anti-Semitism argues that the link is only partial and varies from country to country, depending upon how long the country in question has been democratic and the degree of religious heterogeneity in the country. Consequently, the shibboleth that higher levels of education result in greater tolerance must be questioned. Testing the conventional wisdom that higher levels of formal education foster positive attitudes towards outgroupers and a generally tolerant worldview, this study on British Muslims will explore how levels of educational attainment are potentially associated with attitudes towards non-Muslims, as well as country perceptions and the view that Jewish people hold a disproportionate amount of global control.

2.4. The Effects of Mosque Attendance

Following the 7/7 London attacks and other Islamist terrorist incidents in the UK, attention has increasingly turned towards British mosques as potential breeding grounds for extremist ideology. Academic Jonathan Birt’s ‘good imam, bad imam’ paradigm is useful for understanding perceptions of Muslim religious leaders in Britain. While many have viewed radical clerics

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33 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
and mosques as sources of British Islamism, it is also the case that imams have been seen as potential front-line soldiers in the fight against that very same extremism.\textsuperscript{40} Indeed, Moroccan academic Mohammed Errihani’s study of government policy regarding mosques in Morocco, which included setting up a central college for training imams which encouraged moderate interpretations of Islam, suggests that mosques and Islamic religious schools (madrassas) are themselves key battlegrounds in the fight between extreme and moderate Islam.\textsuperscript{41}

The 2007 Channel 4 documentary \textit{Undercover Mosque} contributed to growing anxiety about the prevalence and influence of radical mosques and ‘bad imams’ in the UK, showing footage of clerics apparently legitimising the killing of Jews, marriage to underage girls and rejection of \textit{kaffir} laws in favour of \textit{sharia} law.\textsuperscript{42} The debate was further fuelled that year by Policy Exchange’s ‘The hijacking of British Islam’ report.\textsuperscript{43} This report claimed to find radical literature in roughly a quarter of British mosques investigated.\textsuperscript{44} A protracted legal dispute then followed about whether all the evidence used in the project was genuine, reflecting how politically charged the issue had become.\textsuperscript{45}

British think-tank Quilliam produced a report on British mosques in 2009 which states that, with 97% of imams in the UK born abroad, more radical versions of Islam with followings overseas, have a vastly disproportionate share of the platform in British mosques.\textsuperscript{46} According to the study, this platform is being used to lead young British Muslims into extremism.\textsuperscript{47} Quilliam’s Director Maajid Nawaz said, “With foreign imams who are physically in Britain, but psychologically in Pakistan or Bangladesh, mosques lack the requisite resilience to challenge Islamist extremists.”\textsuperscript{48}

These concerns are further fuelled by the apparent funding of mosques in the UK by the Saudi Arabian government, known to be committed to a deeply conservative interpretation of Islam.\textsuperscript{49} This has caused anxiety among critics who fear Saudi resources are being used to support the spread of Islamism in the UK, a phenomenon that the British government has been accused of being hesitant to act on owing to its close relationship with Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{50}

Such analyses run in contrast to academic work that advances the view that, in the American case, mosque attendance actually encourages integration and belief in the importance of

\begin{thebibliography}{50}
\bibitem{40}Ibid.
\bibitem{44}Ibid.
\bibitem{47}Ibid.
\bibitem{48}Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
political participation. Indeed, this work suggests that Islamic “religiosity fosters support for American democratic values”. This contrast in part reflects differences in attitudes over how compatible Islam is with Western values of democracy, liberalism and tolerance.

Among a range of factors, this study, motivated by the literature reviewed in this section, will explore how social integration, level of education and frequency of mosque attendance shape British Muslim attitudes. This includes how favourably separate non-Muslim groups are viewed, and the perception of a number of selected countries of geopolitical significance. The report will also explore which sections of the British Muslim population tend to be of the view that British Jewish people are more loyal to Israel than to the UK, and believe that Jewish people have too much global control in the spheres of politics, banking, media, entertainment and arms manufacturing.

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52 Ibid.
3. Survey Analysis Findings

This part of the report presents descriptive statistical findings on the attitudes of the British Muslim survey sample in three main areas: in-group perceptions and attitudes towards non-Muslim faith groups such as Jews; perceptions of a number of selected countries of geopolitical importance, including Israel and Palestine; and levels of support for the view that Jewish people hold too much global control in the spheres of politics, banking, media, entertainment and arms/weapons production.

3.1. Group Perceptions

This section investigates the attitudes of British Muslims towards different religious groups, as well as towards non-believers. Along with looking at in-group attitudes towards co-religionists, it will investigate how favourably British Muslims view the following faith outgroups: Jews, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists, as well as atheists. The section will also examine what shapes and conditions both in-group and outgroup perceptions among British Muslims.

**Figure 1: British Muslim Attitudes Towards Faith Groups and Atheists**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faith Groups/Atheists</th>
<th>Mean Favourability Score (maximum score of 10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>8.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>6.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>5.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikhs</td>
<td>5.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>5.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheists</td>
<td>5.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

British Muslims were asked how favourably they viewed the following groups, on a scale of 0 to 10 (0 being very unfavourable and 10 being very favourable): Muslims, Christians, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and atheists. Figure 1 shows the mean favourability score registered towards each of the aforementioned groups.

Demonstrating in-group favouritism, the highest mean favourability score is for fellow Muslims (8.09). Of the non-Muslim religious groups, the highest favourability score is for those who follow the Christian faith (6.23), followed by Sikhs (5.78), Buddhists (5.68), and Hindus (5.58). Of the faith groups included in the analysis, the lowest mean favourability score is for Jews (5.49), with the only group receiving a lower score being atheists/non-believers (5.10).
Figure 2: British Muslim Attitudes Towards Faith Groups and Atheists (By Gender)

Figure 2 shows how group favourability perceptions are broken down by gender. The differences are generally slight, with no clear trend being identified. British Muslim women polled have a more favourable view of Jews (5.57 compared with 5.45), Hindus (5.66 compared with 5.53), Sikhs (5.90 compared with 5.69) and atheists (5.20 compared with 5.04). British Muslim men have marginally more favourable views of Christians (6.25 compared with 6.24) and Buddhists (5.71 compared with 5.67). In terms of in-group perceptions, there is a notable gender difference – British Muslim women have a less-favourable view of other Muslims (7.93 compared with 8.24).

Figure 3: British Muslim Attitudes Towards Other Faith Groups and Atheists (By Education)
Figure 3 shows how perceptions of other religious groups (and atheists) are broken down by level of educational attainment. For the analysis, the sample of British Muslims has been split into two distinct categories: those with no tertiary education and individuals with a tertiary education. 53

A clear trend can be identified from the bivariate analysis, wherein British Muslims with a tertiary education report more-favourable views towards all non-Muslim groups, when compared to co-religionists who are not university educated (Jews – 5.66 compared with 5.24; Christians – 6.46 compared with 5.95; Hindus – 5.64 compared with 5.47; Sikhs – 6.01 compared with 5.51; Buddhists – 5.91 compared with 5.38; and atheists – 5.32 compared with 4.84).

Figure 4 shows how perceptions of other religious groups (and atheists) are broken down by social class. For the analysis, the sample of British Muslims has been split into two distinct socio-economic classes: the higher ABC1 grade and the lower C2DE grade.

Similar to the case of educational attainment, a clear pattern can be identified. British Muslims who are categorised in the higher-status ABC1 social grade report, on average, more favourable views towards all non-Muslim groups, when compared to British Muslims in the lower-status C2DE social classes (Jews – 5.66 compared with 5.17; Christians – 6.44 compared with 5.85; Hindus – 5.77 compared with 5.22; Sikhs – 5.98 compared with 5.40; Buddhists – 5.88 compared with 5.29; Atheists – 5.26 compared with 4.80).

Figure 5 shows how perceptions of other religious groups (and atheists) are broken down by place of birth. For the analysis, the sample of British Muslims has been split into two distinct categories: those who are foreign-born and individuals who were born in the UK.

A consistent pattern can be observed. British Muslims born in the UK have more favourable views towards all non-Muslim groups, when compared to the views of foreign-born British Muslims.

53 “No Tertiary Education” includes respondents with no formal qualifications and those educated to NVQ Levels 1–3. “Tertiary Education” includes respondents who hold academic qualifications that are at least equivalent to NVQ Level 4. The latter category includes respondents who hold an NVQ Level 5 qualification (such as a doctorate). The education data includes qualifications obtained outside of the UK.
Muslims. There is a difference of more than one point in the case of perceptions of atheists (5.41 compared with 4.20), Buddhists (5.95 compared with 4.88) and Jews (5.76 compared with 4.72). British Muslims born in the UK also have more favourable views towards Christians (6.35 compared with 5.91), Hindus (5.79 compared with 4.96) and Sikhs (6.00 compared with 5.16).

Figure 6 shows how perceptions of faith groups (and atheists) are broken down by Muslim composition of their close friendship networks. For the analysis, the sample of British Muslims
has been split into two clear categories: ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ friendship networks. The bonding friendship network category includes British Muslim respondents who reported that about half, most, or all of their close friends belong to the same faith group. The bridging friendship network category includes British Muslims who stated that only a few or none of their friends are co-religionists.

Figure 7: Attitudes Towards Jews (By Level of Mosque Attendance)

With the exception of the near-identical mean favourability score for Christians (bonding - 6.26; bridging - 6.25), British Muslims who have a network of close friends who predominantly share the same faith have a less-favourable view of non-Muslim groups. British Muslims who are part of bridging friendship networks – where only a few or none of their close friends are fellow Muslims – have a comparatively favourable view of Jews (5.65 compared with 5.42), Hindus (5.78 compared with 5.46), Sikhs (5.87 compared with 5.75), Buddhists (5.80 compared with 5.64) and atheists (5.23 compared with 5.05). The British Muslim respondents who fall into the bridging category register a lower mean favourability score when asked how favourably they view Muslims as a group (7.92 compared with 8.25).

Figure 7 shows mean favourability scores for attitudes towards Jews, broken down by level of mosque attendance. The analysis shows that there is no clear link between perceptions of Jews as a group and the frequency of mosque attendance. For the British Muslims surveyed, the most favourable view towards Jews are among those who attend a mosque at least 3-4 times week (5.64). The mean score for those who attend a mosque on a weekly basis is 5.46, with a mean score of 5.58 for those who attend once or twice a month and every 2-3 months. The lowest favourability score towards Jews in this analysis is for those who either never attend or attend a mosque only once or twice a year (5.35).

Figure 8 shows attitudes towards religious groups and atheists, broken down by frequency of mosque attendance. The two categories considered for this analysis are British Muslim respondents who attend a mosque at least 3-4 times a week, and those who either never attend or only attend a mosque once or twice a year.

54 Respondents were asked the following survey question: “On average, how often, if at all, do you attend a religious service (excluding special occasions such as marriages, funerals, etc.)?”
A consistent pattern emerges from the analysis. British Muslim respondents who reported that they attend a mosque at least 3-4 times a week, hold more-favourable views of all groups considered in the analysis, when compared to those who reported that they never attend, or only attend a mosque once or twice a year (Muslims – 8.54 compared with 7.24; Christians – 6.38 compared with 6.06; Jews – 5.64 compared with 5.35; Hindus – 5.72 compared with 5.37; Sikhs – 6.03 compared with 5.69; Buddhists – 5.79 compared with 5.61; Atheists – 5.20 compared with 5.09).

The British Muslim respondents who participated in the survey were given a list of ‘dual loyalty’ items and asked to what extent they agreed (or disagreed) with the view that the British religious group in question was more loyal to the country/territory of religious significance, when compared with loyalty to the UK. 55

Figure 9 shows that British Muslims are far more likely to agree than disagree with the view that the selected British faith groups are more loyal to the stated country/territory of religious significance than to the UK. This applies to the perception of loyalty ties within the British Muslim population. Of the respondents polled, 42.7% agreed with the view that British Muslims are more loyal to Saudi Arabia than to the UK (with 24.0% disagreeing with this view, providing a net agree/net disagree difference of 18.7 percentage points).

The highest level of net agreement for the dual loyalty items presented is in regard to the loyalty ties of British Hindus. Of the British Muslim respondents polled, 44.3% agreed with the view that British Hindus are more loyal to India than to the UK (with only 13.9% disagreeing with this view, providing a net agree/net disagree difference of 30.4 percentage points). A total of 31.7% of respondents agreed with the view that British Roman Catholics are more loyal to the Vatican than to the UK, with 18.7% disagreeing with this view (providing a net agree/net disagree difference of 13 percentage points – the lowest difference in this part of the analysis).

55 “Net Agree” includes respondents who responded “strongly agree” or “agree” to survey item. “Net Disagree” includes respondents who responded “strongly disagree” or “disagree” to survey item. Analysis included those who responded “neither agree nor disagree”.

Figure 8: Attitudes Towards Faith Groups and Atheists (By Level of Mosque Attendance)
The highest net agree/net disagree difference is for the survey item on British Jews and their loyalty ties in regard to the State of Israel and the UK. Of the British Muslims polled, 43.9% agreed with the view that British Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the UK, with only 12.9% disagreeing with this view – providing a net agree/net disagree difference of 31 percentage points.

Figure 9: Dual Loyalty Perceptions of British Muslims, Jews, Hindus and Roman Catholics

The highest net agree/net disagree difference is for the survey item on British Jews and their loyalty ties in regard to the State of Israel and the UK. Of the British Muslims polled, 43.9% agreed with the view that British Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the UK, with only 12.9% disagreeing with this view – providing a net agree/net disagree difference of 31 percentage points.

Figure 10: Dual Loyalty Perceptions (By Level of Mosque Attendance)
Figure 10 shows levels of net agreement for the view that separate British faith groups are more loyal to a foreign country/territory of religious significance, when compared with their loyalty to the UK. This is broken down by two categories which measure frequency of mosque attendance: British Muslim respondents who reported that they attend a mosque at least 3-4 times a week, and those who either never attend or only attend a mosque once or twice a year.

A clear pattern emerges from the analysis. British Muslims who frequently attend a mosque are more likely to agree with the view that British faith groups are more loyal to the country/territory of religious significance than to the UK. For in-group dual loyalty perceptions, nearly 6 in 10 – 58.5% - of respondents who reported that they attend a mosque at least 3-4 times a week, agree with the view that British Muslims are more loyal to Saudi Arabia than to the UK. The corresponding figure for respondents who either never attend or only attend a mosque once or twice a year, is 26.9% - a difference of 31.6 percentage points.

A majority of British Muslim respondents who reported that they attend a mosque at least 3-4 times a week, agree with the view that British Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the UK – 54.6%. The corresponding figure for British Muslim respondents who never attend a mosque or do so only once or twice a year, is 33.8% - a difference of 20.8 percentage points. While 57.8% of respondents who attend a mosque at least 3-4 times a week agree with the view that British Hindus are more loyal to India than to the UK, the corresponding figure for those who either never attend or only attend a mosque once or twice a year is 29.7% - a difference of 28.1 percentage points. British Muslims who attend a mosque at least 3-4 times a week, are more likely to agree with the view that British Roman Catholics are more loyal to The Vatican than to the UK (42.9% compared with 16.0%) – a difference of 26.9 percentage points.

Figure 11 shows data on levels of net agreement and disagreement with the view that British Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the UK – broken down by gender, education and Muslim composition of close friendship network.

**Figure 11: Dual Loyalty Perceptions of British Jews**
(By Gender, Education and Friendship Network)
The analysis shows that 46.2% of the British Muslim men surveyed agreed with the view that British Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the UK, with 13.1% disagreeing (a net agree/net disagree difference of 33.1 percentage points). Among the British Muslim women surveyed, 41.9% agreed with the view that British Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the UK, with 12.3% disagreeing (a net agree/net disagree difference of 29.6 percentage points).

There are notable differences based on education. British Muslims with a tertiary education are more likely to agree with the view that British Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the UK, when compared to those surveyed who are not university educated. Of the British Muslims respondents with a tertiary education, 47.3% agreed with the view that British Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the UK, with 12.1% disagreeing (a net agree/net disagree difference of 35.2 percentage points). Of the respondents who are not tertiary educated, 40.0% are of the view that British Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the UK, with 14.9% reporting their disagreement (a net agree/net disagree difference of 25.1 percentage points).

There are also noteworthy differences based on the Muslim composition of close friendship networks. Nearly half – 48.6% – of respondents who reported that at least half (or more) of their close friends are fellow Muslims agreed with the view that British Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the UK. With 14.0% disagreeing, this provides a net agree/net disagree difference of 34.6 percentage points. Of respondents who reported that only a few or none of their close friends are fellow Muslims, a notably lower proportion agreed with the view that British Jews are more loyal to Israel than the UK – 38.7%. With 11.6% within the bridging category disagreeing with this view, the net agree/net disagree difference provided is 27.1 percentage points.
3.2. Country Perceptions

Along with being asked how favourably they viewed separate religious groups (as well as atheists/non-believers), the British Muslims surveyed were asked how favourably they viewed a selected group of countries: the UK, the US, Russia, China, India, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel and Palestine. As in the case of the survey item on perception of religious groups and atheists, respondents were asked to report how favourably they viewed the aforementioned countries on a scale of 0 to 10 (0 – very unfavourable; 10 – very favourable).

Figure 12 shows the mean favourability score for the nine countries included in the survey item. For this survey of British Muslims, the highest mean favourability score registered is for the UK (7.60). The country with the next-highest mean favourability score is Palestine (6.56), followed by Saudi Arabia (6.25), Iran (5.64) and India (5.36). A higher mean favourability score is registered for the US (5.14) when compared with those for Russia (5.06) and China (5.05). The country given the lowest mean favourability score in the analysis is Israel (4.53). This is notably lower than the mean favourability score for Jews as a faith group (5.49).

Figure 13: Country Perceptions
(Mean Favourability Score By Muslim Density of Friendship Group)

Figure 13 shows the mean favourability scores for each country broken down by Muslim density of close friendship networks. As in the case of previous analyses, the British Muslim sample is split by bonding and bridging friendship networks.

British Muslim respondents who stated that only a few or none of their close friends are fellow Muslims (bridging friendship network) reported, on average, a less-favourable view of the UK (7.53), when compared to those who fall into the bonding friendship network category, which includes respondents who report that about half, most or all of their close friends are fellow Muslims (7.69).

When compared to those in the bonding category, British Muslims who are part of predominantly non-Muslim bridging friendship networks, on average, have a more-favourable
view of the US (5.40 compared with 4.92), Israel (4.78 compared with 4.39), China (5.34 compared with 4.80), India (5.45 compared with 5.32) and Russia (5.16 compared with 5.00). For the remaining Muslim-majority countries, the pattern is reversed. When compared to those who have close friendship networks that are more Muslim concentrated, British Muslims who are part of predominantly non-Muslim bridging friendship groups have a comparatively less-favourable view of Palestine (6.17 compared with 6.89), Saudi Arabia (5.92 compared with 6.51) and Iran (5.50 compared with 5.78).

Figure 14 shows mean favourability scores for attitudes towards Israel, broken down by level of mosque attendance. The analysis shows that as the level of mosque attendance declines, the perception of Israel becomes less favourable. The mean scores, based on level of mosque attendance, are as follows: at least 3 or 4 times a week – 5.13; weekly – 4.78; once or twice a month – 4.40; every 2–3 months – 4.30; once or twice a year/never attends – 3.55.

### 3.3. Perceptions of Jewish Global Control

The British Muslim respondents surveyed were asked whether or not they agreed with the view that Jewish people have “too much” control over the global spheres of media, banking, arms/weapons manufacturing, politics and entertainment.

As Figure 15 shows, for each of the survey items under analysis, around one in three of the British Muslims polled agreed with the view that Jewish people have too much control over that specific global sphere. Only a quarter, approximately, disagreed. The highest level of agreement was with the view that Jewish people have too much control over the global banking system (34.1%), with 22.6% disagreeing. The next highest figure for net agreement relates to global media, with 33.6% agreeing with the view that Jewish people have too much control in this

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56 Respondents were asked the following survey question: “On average, how often, if at all, do you attend a religious service (excluding special occasions such as marriages, funerals, etc.)?”
Figure 15: “Jews have too much control over the... ”

Figure 16: “Jews have too much control over the... ” (By Education)
area (and 23.8% disagreeing). Similar levels of agreement (and disagreement) can be reported for the view that Jewish people have too much control over global political leadership (33.1% compared with 25.3%), the global entertainment industry (33.0% compared with 24.9%) and the global arms/weapons manufacturing industry (32.1% compared with 27.2%).

Figure 16 shows figures for the level of agreement (and disagreement) with the view that Jewish people have too much control over the global spheres of media, banking, arms manufacturing, political leadership and entertainment, broken down by whether or not the British Muslims polled have a tertiary education.

The bivariate analysis shows that, when compared with those with no tertiary education, university-educated British Muslims are more likely to agree with the view that Jews have too much global control across all five spheres. British Muslims with no tertiary education are more likely to disagree than agree with the view that Jewish people have too much control over the global spheres of arms manufacturing, politics and entertainment.

Figure 16 shows that British Muslims with no university education are more likely to agree than disagree with the view that Jewish people have too much control over the global media (28.6% compared with 24.3%) and the global banking system (29.3% compared with 22.1%). University-educated British Muslims are consistently more likely to agree than disagree with the view that Jewish people have too much global control. Among the British Muslims polled who have a tertiary education, there are particularly high levels of agreement with the view that Jewish people have too much control over global political leadership (38.8%) and the global entertainment sector (38.6%).

Figure 17: “Jews have too much control over the... ” (By Muslim Density of Friendship Group)
political leadership and entertainment, broken down by Muslim density of close friendship networks. As in previous analyses, bridging includes respondents who reported that only a few or none of their friends are Muslim, with bonding including respondents who stated that about half, most or all of their close friends are Muslim.

The bivariate analysis shows that, when compared with those who report that only a few or none of their close friends are co-religionists, British Muslims who are part of bonding friendship networks are more likely to agree with the view that Jewish people have too much global control across all five spheres (media – 37.7% compared with 30.2%; banking system – 38.4% compared with 30.2%; arms/weapon industry – 37.9% compared with 26.0%; political leadership – 38.1% compared with 28.1%; global entertainment industry – 38.6% compared with 27.0%).

Specifically focusing on British Muslims who are part of bonding friendship networks (respondents who report that about half, most or all of their close friends are fellow Muslims), the highest net agree/net disagree differences reported are for the view that Jewish people have too much control over the global banking system (16.7 percentage points) and the global media (15.5 percentage points).

**Figure 18: “Jews have too much control over the... ” (By Level of Mosque Attendance)**

![Figure 18: Bar chart showing percentages of agreement and disagreement with the view that Jewish people have too much control over various global spheres, broken down by frequency of mosque attendance.](image)

Figure 18 shows figures for the level of agreement (and disagreement) with the view that Jewish people have too much control over the global spheres of media, banking, arms manufacturing, political leadership and entertainment, broken down by frequency of mosque attendance. As in previous analyses, there are two categories of interest: British Muslim respondents who report that they attend a mosque at least 3-4 times a week, and a merged category which includes respondents who either never attend, or only attend a mosque once or twice a year.
The bivariate analysis shows that, when compared with those who either never attend or only attend a mosque once or twice a year, British Muslims who attend a mosque at least 3-4 times a week, are more likely to agree with the view that Jewish people have too much global control across all five spheres (media – 38.1% compared with 27.8%; banking system – 41.3% compared with 29.0%; arms/weapons industry – 39.2% compared with 25.5%; political leadership – 38.1% compared with 25.5%; global entertainment industry – 40.6% compared with 22.8%).

Specifically focusing on British Muslims who report that they attend a mosque at least 3-4 times a week, the highest net agree/net disagree differences reported are for the view that Jewish people have too much control over the global entertainment industry (15.0 percentage points) and the global banking system (13.8 percentage points).

**Figure 19: “Jews have too much control over the... ” (By Islamic Denomination)**

Figure 19 shows figures for the level of agreement (and disagreement) with the view that Jewish people have too much control over the global spheres of media, banking, arms manufacturing, political leadership and entertainment, broken down by Islamic denomination (British Sunni Muslims and British Shia Muslims). Respondents who responded “neither agree or disagree” and “don’t know” to these survey items, are included in this analysis.

The bivariate analysis shows that, when compared with British Sunni Muslims, British Shia Muslims are more likely to agree with the view that Jewish people have too much global control across all five spheres (media – 38.2% compared with 36.2%; banking system – 41.2% compared with 35.2%; arms/weapons industry – 43.1% compared with 33.1%; political leadership – 45.1% compared with 34.1%; global entertainment industry – 42.2% compared with 33.8%). While British Shia Muslims are also more likely than British Sunni Muslims to disagree with the view that Jewish people have too much global control in the spheres of media, banking, politics, and entertainment, the Shia respondents report higher net agreement/net disagreement differences for all spheres apart from the global media.
A notable Shia-Sunni difference emerges in the case of global arms/weapons manufacturing. Within the British Sunni Muslim sample, 33.1% agree with the view that Jewish people have too much control over the global arms/weapons industry (with 27.8% disagreeing) – a net agree/net disagree difference of 5.3 percentage points. Within the British Shia Muslim sample, 43.1% agree with the view that Jewish people have too much control over the global arms/weapons industry (with 26.5% disagreeing) – a net agree/net disagree difference 16.6 percentage points.

**Figure 20: Mean Scores for Perception of Global Jewish Control (By Gender, Education, Social Class, Birthplace, Friendship Network, and Level of Mosque Attendance)**

For this analysis, a ‘Perception of Global Jewish Control’ scale has been created. If a respondent responded “strongly agree” to one of the five survey items on Jewish global control in the spheres of media, banking, politics, entertainment and arms/weapons manufacturing, two points were added. A response of “agree” resulted in the addition of one point. If a respondent responded “neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree” or “strongly disagree”, no points were given.

The highest score on the scale is 10 (if a respondent responded “strongly agree” for all five items and subsequently ‘scored’ two points on each occasion), which demonstrates the strongest possible perception of overall Jewish global control in the study. The lowest score on the scale is 0 (in the event of the respondent not agreeing with any of the five statements). This index is used as a dependent variable in the ordinal logistic regression analysis, which will be presented later.
Figure 20 shows the mean score based on the index created, broken down by gender, education, social class, birthplace, Muslim density of close friendship network and mosque attendance. Higher mean scores indicate that the group contained respondents who are more likely to hold the view that Jewish people have too much global control.

In the analysis, British Muslim men score higher on the index when compared to their female counterparts (2.55 compared with 2.43). In regard to education, British Muslims who are university educated register a higher mean score when compared to respondents with no tertiary education (2.81 compared with 2.08). When it comes to social class, British Muslim respondents who fall into the higher-status social grade ABC1 register a higher mean score when compared to those who fall into the lower-status C2DE social grade (2.53 compared with 2.43).

Foreign-born respondents register a higher mean score for the index when compared to individuals born in the UK (2.88 compared with 2.37). Respondents who report that at least half of their close friends are fellow Muslims register a higher mean score when compared to those who report that only a few or none of their friends share the same faith (2.89 compared with 2.12). Respondents who attend a mosque at least 3-4 times a week register a higher mean score than those who very occasionally or never attend a mosque (3.03 compared with 2.06).
4. Survey Findings: Advanced Analysis

This section presents the second part of the analysis. It examines which socio-demographic characteristics and social factors among the British Muslims surveyed are most strongly associated with attitudes towards Jews as a people and towards the State of Israel, as well as broader perceptions of Jewish global control. These relationships of interest are tested through multivariate analysis in the form of ordinal logistic regression.

The model includes the following variables: voting intention for the 2019 UK General Election; gender; age; place of birth; ethnicity; Islamic denomination; education level; social class; whether or not English is the main language at home; Muslim density of close friendship network; and level of mosque attendance. The three separate ordered dependent variables are the 0-to-10 favourability scales for Jews and the State of Israel, along with the Perception of Jewish Global Control Index scaled 0 to 10.

Table 1: Ordinal Logistic Regression Models: Attitudes Towards Jews, Attitudes Towards the State of Israel, and Perceived Jewish Global Control

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Model 1: Attitudes Towards Jews</th>
<th>Model 2: Attitudes Towards Israel</th>
<th>Model 3: Perception of Jewish Global Control</th>
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Table 1 presents the results of three ordinal logistic regression models (Model 1 – attitudes towards Jews; Model 2 – attitudes towards Israel; Model 3 – perception of Jewish global control).

For Model 1, attitudes towards Jews, there are no significant effects to report for 2019 General Election voting intention, gender, age, ethnicity, Islamic denomination and social class. Controlling for all other variables in Model 1, British Muslims born in the UK are more likely to report favourable views of Jews, when compared with foreign-born respondents (b = .592). This finding is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. There are significant effects to report regarding primary household language. Controlling for all other variables, British Muslims who do not have English as a primary language at home are less likely to report favourable views of Jewish people (b = -.304). This finding is statistically significant at the 10% confidence level.

There are also significant education effects to report from Model 1. When controlling for all other variables, British Muslims who are university educated are more likely to report favourable views of Jews (b = .254). This finding is statistically significant at the 10% confidence level. In Model 1, British Muslims who are part of a bonding friendship network – where at least half of their close friends are Muslim – are less likely to report favourable views towards Jews (b = -.254). Similar to the case of education, this finding is also statistically significant at the 10% confidence level.

In regard to level of mosque attendance, controlling for all other variables, British Muslims who either never attend a mosque or only attend on average once or twice a year, are less likely to report favourable views of Jews than British Muslims who attend an Islamic place of worship at least 3-4 times a week (b = -.461). This finding is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level.

For Model 2, attitudes towards Israel, there are no significant effects to report for the following variables: gender, birthplace, ethnicity, social class and main language at home. No significant effects can be reported between Sunni Muslim and Shia Muslim respondents, or between university-educated respondents and those with no tertiary education. There are, however, significant party voting intention effects. Controlling for all other variables included in Model 2, British Muslims who intended to vote for the Conservative Party in the 2019 UK General Election are more likely to report favourable views of Israel than those who intended to vote for the Labour Party (b = .994). This finding is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. In regard to age, controlling for all other variables, older British Muslims are less likely to
report favourable views on Israel (b = -.015). This finding is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level.

There are also significant effects to report from Model 2, based on Muslim density of close friendship network. British Muslims who are part of bonding friendship networks (where about half, most or all of their close friends share the same religious background) are less likely to report a favourable view of Israel than those who have only a few or no Muslim friends (b = -.323). This finding is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level.

Following on from Model 1, there are significant effects to report from Model 2 in regard to frequency of mosque attendance. British Muslims who attend a mosque once or twice a month (b = -.522), every 2-3 months (b = -.573) or once or twice a year/never attend (b = -1.017) are less likely to report a favourable view of Israel than British Muslims who attend a mosque at least 3-4 times a week. The first two findings are statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, with the third and final finding being so at the 1% confidence level.

For Model 3, where the dependent variable measures perception of Jewish global control, there are no significant effects to report for the following variables: 2019 UK General Election voting intention, gender, birthplace, ethnicity, Islamic denomination, social class and main language at home. There are significant effects to report for the following variables: age, education, Muslim density of close friendship network and level of mosque attendance.

Controlling for all other variables, older British Muslims are more likely to be of the view that Jewish people have too much global control (b = .035). This finding is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. In regard to education, controlling for all the other variables included in the model, university-educated British Muslims are more likely to be of the view that Jewish people have too much global control than those with no tertiary education (b = .461). This finding is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.

In Model 3, controlling for all other factors included, British Muslims who are part of relatively Muslim-dominant bonding friendship networks are more likely to be of the view that Jewish people have too much global control (b = .443). This finding is also statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. In regard to mosque attendance, British Muslims who either never attend a mosque or only do so once or twice a year, are less likely to be of the view that Jewish people have too much global control than British Muslims who attend a mosque at least 3-4 times a week (b = -.707). This finding is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
5. Conclusion

There is a tendency for politicians and media commentators to homogenise social groups that are both socio-politically diverse and internally stratified. Much of this homogenisation is politically motivated and is often influenced by personal ideology. These tendencies have often been exhibited in respect of the British Muslim population. This report has sought to challenge long-standing efforts to portray British Muslims as a uniform, homogeneous bloc that speaks in one voice on issues as varied as attitudes towards non-Muslims, views about prominent nations in international politics and broader perceptions of Jewish global influence and control.

The report shows that when compared to their perception of other faith groups, British Muslims have a less favourable view of Jews, along with holding relatively negative views of Israel. However, there is evidence to support the long-standing view that social integration and greater opportunities for intergroup contact can facilitate more positive views of the outgroup in the British Muslim context. At the bivariate level, British Muslims who are better socially integrated through their closest friends hold a more-favourable view of a range of non-Muslim groups – including Jews and Atheists. The findings also show that being more socially integrated and being part of a predominantly non-Muslim friendship group is notably associated with more positive orientations towards countries such as the United States and Israel. This suggests that predominantly Muslim social networks act as ‘arenas’ of hardened anti-US and anti-Israel views, while social integration may heighten exposure to different political viewpoints which in turn contributes to the fostering of more favourable views of such countries.

The one consistent thread throughout the report is that regarding social integration. British Muslims who are part of predominantly non-Muslim friendship groups report more favourable views towards both Jews and Israel, and are less likely to be of the view that Jewish people have too much control over the global spheres of banking, media, politics, entertainment and arms production. Conversely, those who are part of social networks that predominantly – or indeed exclusively – comprise fellow Muslims, hold comparatively unfavourable views of both Jews and Israel. In addition to this, British Muslims who are ‘socially segregated’ in terms of the religious background of their closest friends are more likely to possess the view that Jewish people hold too much control over the global media, banking system, political leadership, entertainment sector and weapons manufacturing industry. With previous studies showing that anti-Semitic attitudes are more concentrated within the British Muslim population when compared to the social mainstream, the findings contained in this report suggest that Muslim-dominant, tight-knit social networks are more likely to contain particularly sharp forms of both anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiments.

Much has been made of the role of Britain’s mosques and Islamic centres in the development and consolidation of domestic extremist views and prejudicial attitudes towards non-Muslim outgroups. Public discourse has implied that lower levels of mosque attendance are associated with more secular, open-minded views – an indication of positive integration into the tolerant mainstream. There are findings which suggest that the picture is somewhat more complicated. At various levels of analysis, British Muslims who frequently attend their place of worship (excluding wedding ceremonies and services such as funerals), are more likely to report pro-Jewish and pro-Israel views. This provides some indication that Britain’s mosques are generally socially beneficial places of worship, with a good number actively looking to build bridges and strengthen social ties with other faith communities.

However, there are other findings which are cause for concern. When compared with British Muslims who either never or very occasionally attend a mosque, British Muslims who frequently attend a mosque are more likely to be of the view that British Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the UK, and also more likely to think that Jewish people have too much control in the global spheres of media, banking, politics, arms manufacturing, and entertainment. It is important to note that a comfortable majority of those who frequently attend a mosque, are also of the view
that British Muslims are more loyal to Saudi Arabia than to the UK. Indeed, frequent attendees are far more likely to be of the view that various faith groups are more loyal to a foreign country of religious significance, than to the UK. This perhaps reflects a broader ‘Religion First’ perception – with religious frequent attendees thinking that a number of faith groups, including their own, are more loyal to other countries (and territories) of religious significance.

The finding that British Muslims who rarely or never attend an Islamic place of worship have generally less favourable views of non-Muslims, as well as sharper feelings of anti-Israelism, lays the foundation for future discussions on how certain forms of British Muslim identification are associated with anti-Jewish perceptions and anti-Israelism. Indeed, this particular finding is likely to generate debate on the social and political implications of certain types of Islamic identity in the British context. The findings on mosque attendance may reflect the possibility that a more spiritual attachment and community-spirited approach to Islamic practice provides the ground for the cultivation of stronger ties with, and more positive views of, other religious faith groups in society. Indeed, the relationship between hardened forms of anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiment, and low levels of mosque attendance, suggests that the Muslim identity of those at the heart of this intersection is not so much built on faith, spirituality and community-orientedness, but rather is strongly related to forms of political activism and feelings of grievance at both the domestic and international levels.

It is important to note that across the report’s analysis sections there are findings that appear to be somewhat contradictory in nature. British Muslims who are university educated tend to hold more favourable views of non-Muslim groups and the State of Israel than those with no tertiary education; at the same time, university-educated British Muslims are more likely to be of the view that Jewish people have too much global control in the spheres of media, banking, politics, entertainment and arms production. A similar pattern emerges in the case of mosque attendance. Frequent attendees hold relatively positive views of both Jews and Israel when compared to those who very occasionally or never attend; at the same time, frequent attendees are more likely to be of the view that Jewish people hold a disproportionate level of global control. This perhaps reflects a need for researchers to acknowledge that feelings towards Jews in the domestic context, and broader perceptions of Jewish control and influence at the global level, are very much distinct in their own right. It is also important to note more broadly that the British Muslims surveyed are relatively more favourable towards Jews than they are towards Israel, and, while there may be a degree of overlap, the distinction between anti-Jewish sentiment and anti-Israelism ought to be more strongly recognised in British political, policy and media discourse.

While Britain has not suffered any lethal Islamist-inspired anti-Semitic terrorism, there is no room for complacency. When compared to the general population, British Muslims are more likely to be of the view that the Holocaust is a myth and that Jewish people possess general feelings of group superiority over non-Jews. Leading on from the ICM Unlimited poll completed in the same month, the Savanta ComRes survey shows that when compared with the general population, British Muslims are more likely to be of the view that British Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the UK, and that Jews have disproportionate control in the realms of politics and finance. In order to challenge anti-Semitic views of this nature, which are more concentrated within Britain’s Muslim communities when compared to levels in the general population, a multi-agency effort is required. This will need to incorporate both national and local politicians, grassroots community groups, Muslim civil society organisations, and interfaith bodies which continue to play an integral role in building bonds of social trust and mutual respect across Britain’s various faith groups.

