COUNTERING THE FAR RIGHT: AN ANTHOLOGY
EDITED BY DR RAKIB EHSAN AND DR PAUL STOTT
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Front Cover: Edinburgh, Scotland, 23rd March 2019. Demonstration by the Scottish Defence League (SDL), with supporters of National Front and white pride, and a counter demonstration by Unite Against Facism demonstrators, outside the Scottish Parliament, in Edinburgh. The Scottish Defence League claim their protest was against the sexual abuse of minors, but the opposition claim the rally masks the SDL’s racist beliefs. Credit: Jeremy Sutton-Hibbert/Alamy Live News.
About the Editors

**Dr Paul Stott** joined the Henry Jackson Society’s Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism as a Research Fellow in January 2019.

An experienced academic, he received an MSc in Terrorism Studies (Distinction) from the University of East London in 2007, and his PhD in 2015 from the University of East Anglia for the research “British Jihadism: The Detail and the Denial”. He is a frequent commentator in both the British and international media on terrorism, the Middle East, security and the political fringe. His last published article on far-right extremism was ‘The White Wolves: The Terrorist Manifesto that Wasn’t?’ in Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol 13 No 4 (2019).

**Dr Rakib Ehsan** is a Research Fellow in the Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism. He holds a BA Politics & International Relations (First-Class Honours), MSc Democracy, Politics & Governance (Pass with Distinction), and a PhD in Political Science, all from Royal Holloway, University of London. His PhD investigated the effects of social integration for British ethnic minorities.

Rakib has had research published by a number of UK-based think-tanks, including Runnymede Trust, Policy Exchange and Intergenerational Foundation, as well as the Mackenzie Institute, an independent security think-tank based in Toronto, Canada. He has spoken at parliamentary events and academic conferences on the ideological motivations driving the growth of far-right extremism.

With Dr Paul Stott, Dr Rakib Ehsan co-authored the 2020 CRT report “Far-Right Terrorist Manifestos: A Critical Analysis”, which was supported by the Airey Neave Trust.

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About Us

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About The Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism

The Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism (CRT) at the Henry Jackson Society is unique in addressing violent and non-violent extremism. By coupling high-quality, in-depth research with targeted and impactful policy recommendations, we aim to combat the threat of radicalisation and terrorism in our society.
Glossary of Key Terms

Black sun
The black sun or sun wheel (Sonnenrad in German) is a neo-Nazi symbol that frequently appears on far-right websites and publications.

BNP
British National Party – a far-right political party that for a period enjoyed some political success, before fading after 2014.

Far-right
Far-right beliefs centre on the promotion of a separation of the races, rooted in the view there is a common, exclusively white identity threatened by the presence of an ‘other’. The term is frequently used interchangeably with the ‘extreme right’ and white supremacism. In the United States, violence from activists holding these beliefs is often characterised as ‘religiously or ethnically motivated terrorism’ (REMT).

Fascism
A political ideology which seeks an authoritarian state with strong, centralised control by a commanding figure or party, usually in order to protect against a declared internal or external threat. Often this threat is characterised in racial terms.

FLA
Football Lads Alliance. A group of English football supporters who held street protests after the 2017 Islamist terror attacks in the UK. They were quickly accused of containing far-right elements.

Great replacement
A concept most closely associated with the French writer Renaud Camus, it postulates that white populations in Europe are being deliberately replaced by migrants from the developing world.

Nazi
Adolf Hitler’s party was the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, or Nazi Party. The party was active between 1920 and 1945. The term ‘Nazi’ has survived WW2 to be applied to those who follow its ideals.

Neo-Nazi
A literal phrase meaning ‘new Nazi’, the term refers to those who have attempted to keep the Nazi flame burning since the defeat of 1945.

Pegida
An anti-Islamic organisation which first appeared in Germany in 2014, and for a short period had a grouping in England. Pegida is the abbreviation of a group whose name translates into English as Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident.

Special Branch
A section of British police forces dedicated, amongst other duties, to monitoring potential threats to public order by those considered to hold politically extreme views.
Contributors

Ben Pierce is a pseudonym for an individual who investigates the online activity of far-right actors.

Nikita Malik is the Director of the Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism (CRT) at the Henry Jackson Society. She is an internationally recognised expert on countering violent extremism, terrorism, and hate-based violence, with a focus on youth deradicalisation. In her role, she has worked with key policymakers and government departments in the UK and globally. Her work led Forbes magazine to honour her in 2018 as one of its ‘30 Under 30’, and a key influencer in law and policy. Nikita was educated at the University of Oxford (where she completed her MA and MSc) and has a second MSc in Middle Eastern Politics and Arabic from SOAS, University of London.

Andrew Staniforth is Director of Research and Innovation at Saher (Europe), a security research, training and consultancy operating at a global level, supporting police forces and private-sector organisations to identify and implement innovative security technologies to maximise impact. He is a Researcher of Cyber Threats at the Hillary Rodham Clinton School of Law and Criminology, University of Swansea. As a former Special Branch Intelligence Officer and Counter-Terrorism Detective, he has worked across the world and supported missions of the United Nations Terrorism Prevention Branch.

Paul Stott joined the Henry Jackson Society’s Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism (CRT) as a Research Fellow in January 2019. An experienced academic, he received an MSc in Terrorism Studies (Distinction) from the University of East London in 2007, and his PhD in 2015 from the University of East Anglia for the research ‘British Jihadism: The Detail and the Denial’. He is a frequent commentator in both the British and international media on terrorism, the Middle East, security, and the political fringe.

Paul Jackson is a historian of twentieth century and contemporary history, and his main teaching and research interests focus on understanding the impact of radical and extreme ideologies on wider societies. His research currently focuses on the dynamics of neo-Nazi, and other, extreme-right ideologies, in Britain and Europe in the post-war period. He is also interested in researching the longer history of radical ideologies and cultures in Britain, especially those linked in some way to the extreme right. His teaching engages with wider themes related to the history of fascism, genocide, totalitarian politics, and revolutionary ideologies.

Rakib Ehsan is a Research Fellow in both the Henry Jackson Society’s Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism (CRT) and its Centre on Social and Political Risk (CSPR). Rakib specialises in the socio-political behaviour and attitudes of British ethnic minorities, with a particular focus on the UK’s Bangladeshi and Pakistani ethnic groups. He holds a BA in Politics & International Relations (First Class Honours), an MSc in Democracy, Politics & Governance (Pass with Distinction), and a PhD in Political Science, all from Royal Holloway, University of London. His PhD investigated the effects of social integration for British ethnic minorities.

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Eric Kaufmann is Professor of Politics at Birkbeck College, University of London. He is the author of Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? (Profile, 2010), The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America (Harvard University Press, 2004), The Orange Order: A Contemporary Northern Irish History (OUP, 2007) and, with Henry Patterson, Unionism and Orangeism in Northern Ireland
since 1945 (Manchester University Press, 2007). He is a co-editor, of Political Demography (OUP, 2012) and Whither the Child: causes and consequences of low fertility (Paradigm, 2012), and editor of Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities (Routledge, 2004). His current ESRC grant, affiliated with the think-tank Demos, examines white working-class responses to diversity in the UK.

Craig McCann is a specialist in the UK government’s counter-terrorism Prevent strategy and Channel programme, state responses to right-wing extremism, counter-extremism, and international CVE/PVE programming from an operational and strategic perspective. He researches, writes, and lectures on state responses to right-wing extremism. As the Director of S.P.E.C.T.R.U.M. Universal Ltd, Dr McCann provides consultative services for international development programmes with an emphasis on preventative counterterrorism strategy and delivery. Dr McCann holds a Law Degree and an MA in Criminology from the University of Kent at Canterbury. His PhD explored the impact of the government’s decision to include right-wing extremism within its Prevent strategy on local responses to the English Defence League.
1. Introduction

What is the ‘far right’? Does it stem from an extremist political ideology, or is it motivated by religious or ethnic prejudice?

In a quest to answer these questions, the Henry Jackson Society (HJS) hosted a three-part series of events over the course of 2019. The series, which took place both in the Houses of Parliament and at HJS, fostered engagement from parliamentarians on all sides of the political spectrum, as well as academics and leading thinkers in the fields of counterterrorism and combating extremism. The first of the three events, chaired by the then Labour MP Caroline Flint, examined the ideological content of far-right terrorist manifestos. The second event analysed the security challenges posed by contemporary far-right extremism. The third and final session explored how the growth of far-right extremism could be effectively tackled through political engagement and policy responses.

This Anthology is the result of that series. What follows presents a unique set of ideas from a number of speakers at the events, as well as practitioners, policymakers, and academics working in the field. Ben Pierce examines the use of the Internet by the far-right, dating back to at least 1984. In doing so, he sheds light on new techniques employed by organisations and actors to use web forums and new messaging boards to communicate ideas. My own contribution examines how definitional ambiguities around a concept of extremism complicate efforts to understand the behaviour of the far-right online, meaning many individuals and organisations continue to have a strong presence on widely accessible platforms such as Twitter and YouTube.

In his piece, Andrew Staniforth examines how northern England has proved its propensity for producing right-wing extremists, and the difficulties that authorities face in combating a threat that is challenging neighbourhood safety and national security. Paul Stott sheds light on how, while the British far right has historically been too weak to sustain an enduring terrorist group, this may change as the threat from lone actors evolves. Paul Jackson reflects on the reinvention of male-dominated neo-Nazi cultures in far-right groups such as National Action, and how increased networking with counterparts in the United States could risk the development of a global neo-Nazi movement.

Rakib Ehsan studies the complexity of far-right terrorist manifestos, investigating the ideological components of these documents and putting forward a number of policy recommendations for the future. Sadie Chana’s piece builds on this by suggesting several responses to the far-right in the United Kingdom, highlighting areas for improvement and renewal.

Eric Kaufmann’s analysis of changes in demographic composition and how they feed into populist politics and the legitimacy of populist political parties makes an interesting read, and puts forward a flexible ‘multivocal’ approach to nationhood, in which people of different backgrounds identify with the nation in their own way. Craig McCann makes a case for better integrating communities as a way of neutralising the threat of the far right in the United Kingdom – points which were raised in the same vein by Dame Louise Casey when she was asked to undertake a review into integration and opportunity in Britain’s most isolated and deprived communities.

The compilation of essays makes essential reading for anyone interested in the rise of the far right in the United Kingdom and globally, the use of the Internet to spread views, the risks of global networking, and the renewal of far-right movements. It puts forward policy solutions to counter these trends and threats. It is our pleasure to have worked with the contributors to the Anthology and it is hoped that the report serves as an important contribution to the wider debate on how to tackle the appeal of the far right.

Nikita Malik

Director of the Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism at the Henry Jackson Society
2. The Online Tradecraft of the Extreme Right

Ben Pierce

The extreme right has a long history of Internet use, dating back to at least 1984 with the bulletin board system in the US. Since then, it has exploited advances in the Internet to further its own aims. In the mid-1990s, extreme-right activists began to use white-supremacist web forums, such as Stormfront, which remains in operation today. From 2003 onwards, they began to use new messaging boards such as Reddit and 4chan. As social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube emerged and grew in popularity, they too became a key area of online operations.

Multi-platform presence

Today, the picture is complex. Faced with growing online crackdowns on mainstream social media platforms, extreme-right activists have diversified, with some gravitating to a combination of lesser-known platforms while others have created new ones themselves, such as neo-Nazi websites Fascist Forge and Iron Volk.

This has resulted in extreme-right actors developing a multi-platform online strategy. On 19 September 2019, a new UK-based neo-Nazi group called Blutkrieg Division emerged on the messaging app Telegram. In the space of two weeks, it established a multi-platform presence, using each platform differently to tailor messages to its followers. Blutkrieg used Telegram and gaming chat app Discord for in-group chats, organising real-world meetups, and inciting hatred. It used website-building services such as Weebly and Blogger to publish longer-form posts promoting the group’s ideology and objectives, while social networking services like Gab were used to connect it to the wider online neo-Nazi community. Having a presence on multiple platforms means groups like Blutkrieg can boost their resilience to online takedowns, allowing them to maintain visibility and contact with supporters.

Online security

The threat of online detection by the authorities has made extremists more aware of the need to protect their online footprint. US-based neo-Nazi groups such as the Atomwaffen Division and The Base urge potential new recruits to make contact via encrypted e-mail services like ProtonMail and Tutanota, as they perceive such services to be more secure forms of e-mail. Others have created security-focused Telegram channels to raise awareness among their followers. One channel, Privacy and Security Goys, gives followers advice on how to cover their tracks through the use of specific virtual private network services, web browsers, and operating systems. The UK-based far-right group Britain First gives followers tips on how to use platforms like Telegram more securely through maximising use of Telegram’s privacy features.

Extreme-right groups and activists are also attempting to police their own chat groups better. Since 24 April 2019, the Australian branch of Proud Boys, a global network of extreme-right groups, has been running a Telegram chat group to vet new members. Before being allowed to join the branch, prospective members must post videos of themselves pledging allegiance to the group. Similar methods have been deployed by activists on the gaming chat app Discord, with prospective members asked to record a voice message that is screened before the applicant is admitted.


2 Blutkrieg Division, Telegram, last visited: 8 December 2019.

Specific web browsers are also used to evade detection. One, Dissenter, was launched in February 2019 by Gab. It creates an alternative comments section on any website that can only be seen by users who have downloaded the browser. This gives extreme-right activists the means to by-pass website moderators, but it also has a radicalising effect, acting as an echo chamber for extreme-right viewpoints. The ongoing threat of detection and online takedowns has seen a small number of extreme-right actors gravitate to the dark web, a part of the Internet that can only be accessed with specialised web-browsing software. The Atomwaffen Division website on the dark web has given the group a stable online presence, which it uses to disseminate its propaganda and recruit new members.

Making connections

The Internet has given the extreme right more opportunities to connect across and within borders. These connections are most prominent on social networking services like Gab, where extreme-right users from different countries connect with each other via public chat groups. The chat group National Socialists has 1,500 members and brings together neo-Nazis from North America and Europe. Another, The Anglosphere, has 800 members. Its stated purpose is to connect extreme-right individuals from New Zealand, the UK, the US, Australia, Canada, and South Africa.

Raising funds

Neo-Nazi groups such as the pan-Scandinavian Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) have become increasingly creative in using the Internet to generate funds. Having been denied access to banking services in Scandinavia, the group has set up wallets to receive donations in at least 10 cryptocurrencies, which it promotes on its website. It also uses a peer-to-peer system called Wire, which is integrated into the social media platform Minds. The system allows Minds users to send each other recurring payments, in either US dollars or cryptocurrency, to financially support content creators on the platform. NRM has amassed more than 1,100 followers on Minds, and in November 2019 alone received 16 payments through Wire.

Outlook

Following online crackdowns in March 2019, the extreme right has gravitated to lesser-known social media platforms like Telegram and Gab, where they have been able to stabilise their online presence. On Telegram they have not yet faced the same level of scrutiny given to Islamist extremists on the platform, who were targeted in a 2019 joint operation by Europol and Telegram to take down terrorist propaganda.

For now, Telegram remains the key platform for tracking extreme-right actors online. Neo-Nazi channels operate there unhindered, posting PDF versions of key neo-Nazi books like Siege, which encourages the violent overthrow of the authorities, bomb-making guides, designs for 3D-printed guns, and strategy documents produced by the now proscribed UK neo-Nazi group National Action.

All this could change if Telegram decides to implement a crackdown. If this transpires, the question is then where the extreme right will go next. One possible option is the dark web, but gravitating there would limit their visibility to the point where they might struggle to attract new recruits. A more plausible option could be decentralised social networks like Steemit, which, unlike mainstream social media platforms, are spread across multiple servers and are not controlled by a single entity.

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3. Analysing The Use of Social Media Platforms by the Far Right

Nikita Malik

Over the last two years, our work at the Henry Jackson Society’s Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism (CRT) has increasingly focused on the use of social media platforms by organisations and individuals deemed to be part of the far right. This work has been facilitated by two grants: the Trusted Flagger programme at Google’s YouTube, and an individually tailored grant focused specifically on research into these areas by Facebook.

These projects have meant that we have collected, analysed, and flagged more than 4,000 extremist videos and material over this period. It is extremely difficult to label an individual or an organisation as ‘extremist’, given there is no UK offence of extremism (offenders tend, instead, to be prosecuted using terrorism and/or hate crime offences). Nonetheless, in March 2019 Facebook banned what it deemed to be ‘white nationalist’ content from its platform. While the long-term effectiveness of such bans is questionable, they nonetheless represent an important first step in identifying which behaviour, individuals, and organisations should be prevented from exploiting platform terms and conditions to spread and amplify their views to a larger audience.

Perhaps due in part to these definitional ambiguities, there are inconsistencies between the monitoring and control of extremist content between the online space and the offline one. Twitter, for example, suspended Britain First leader Paul Golding from its platform in December 2017, and in March 2018 Facebook banned Britain First for hateful conduct. In 2019, Facebook permanently banned the British National Party and Nick Griffin, the English Defence League and Paul Ray, Paul Golding, Knights Templar and Jim Dowson, and National Front and Tony Martin. Yet these organisations and individuals have not met with state-imposed restrictions on their online presence, nor have they crossed the divide between non-violent and violent extremism. And though they are banned from Facebook, most of them continue to have a largely unrestricted presence on Twitter and YouTube.

Proscribing organisations in the real world (as social media companies have done) will allow for greater powers to prosecute those who commit crimes. In a similar vein to Islamist groups, proscribed organisations such as National Action and Scottish Dawn continue to operate under splinters after being banned by the British government. Moreover, unlike Islamist organisations, where extremist rhetoric tends to be framed in language against the West and its institutions, far-right language glorifies Western countries – including Britain – and their superiority. This is then conflated with monikers on immigration conspiracies, race relations, and white supremacy. As a result, it is often more difficult to police such material, particularly when it is framed in the form of satire, online memes, or irony.

Research published by the Henry Jackson Society in 2020 found both similarities and differences in how those on the far right and Islamists exploit social media platforms. In 2015–2019, 27.1% of offenders who shared offensive or hateful material online did so from a far-right ideology. In our database, far-right content was primarily divided into two strands. First was content associated with the traditional far right, including neo-Nazism, anti-

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Semitism, and Holocaust denial. Second was content associated with the Alt-Right, much of it anti-Muslim, anti-migrant, and hostile to minority groups. Where far-right individuals were arrested or convicted of offences, it became harder to find their content. This was seen with Atomwaffen Division and the Rise Above Movement. Nevertheless, other far-right groups such as the Misanthropic Division continued to have a presence on YouTube, using the platform to recruit Western fighters to participate in the conflict in Ukraine. Particularly notable was the controversial Azov battalion, whose logo features the Wolfsangel (a symbol used by the Waffen-SS) and sometimes a black sun (Sonnenrad). In 2018 Azov had a YouTube channel, with National Socialist Black Metal (NSBM) and Rock Against Communism (RAC) playlists in their honour on YouTube.

As challenging as it may be to monitor and remove far-right content online, individuals still tend to use public and well-known platforms to disseminate their views. This makes content moderation and removal easier. Unlike the far right, Islamist-related content tends to be spread on a variety of platforms, indicating that perpetrators are getting better at hiding and spreading their messages. Thirty-three percent of Islamist-related offenders used encryption – the process of encoding a message or information in such a way that only authorised parties can access it – to communicate. The migration of far-right accounts to lesser-known, ‘alt-tech’ platforms may occur in the future, as organisations and law-enforcement agencies become better at proscribing groups, defining violating content, and recognising trends. If this occurs, it will be all the more important for multiple stakeholders to work together to monitor the emigration of this content. Leading this may be the job of the new independently run Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT).

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13 GIFCT website: https://gifct.org/.
4. Northern Powerhouse: Tackling the Rise of Far-right Terrorism

Andrew Staniforth

For several generations the north of England has had a propensity for producing right-wing extremists. The level of far-right activity across the region meant that Special Branch officers working in the secretive and sensitive domain of policing political violence during the 1970s, 80s and 90s would closely monitor right-wing extremists as a daily priority.

Understanding the social, economic, and political landscape of communities in northern towns and cities provided Special Branch officers with unique insights into the influences and motivations of extreme far-right groups and their activists. From this understanding, when combined with information gained from a network of covert human intelligence sources, surveillance activity, and contacts with neighbourhood policing, Special Branch officers in the north were able, in the main, to restrain far-right extremists to just talking about their prejudices to each other in pubs and clubs, and on the football terraces. Rarely did the extreme right-wing activists of this era act upon their beliefs in any way and, even when they did, minor offences under public order legislation would in the vast majority of cases be used to address their actions.

Moreover, many of the subversive far-right activities not covered by the covert operations of local Special Branches were entirely predictable, with extreme right-wing groups fuelling local community tensions during general elections, or in direct response to a particular local community issue. In summary, the extreme right-wing movement in the north was largely reactive, and senior police officers considered the threat they posed to be under Special Branch control. It was definitely not a threat to concern the higher policing authority of the Security Service (MI5). Furthermore, many senior police officers regarded extreme right-wing groups as a public nuisance and an annoyance to the wider mission of local policing, as opposed to the threats of extreme acts of indiscriminate violence which trouble UK national security today from a new generation of right-wing terrorists.

Threat to threat

Since the events of 9/11, to the tragic events of 7/7 in London during 2005, the nature of far-right activism in the UK became increasingly aggressive. In the north of England, the discovery of the home-grown 7/7 bombers from areas of Leeds, Bradford, and Dewsbury, inspired by the ideologies of Al-Qaeda (AQ), fuelled hate, resentment, and anger towards Muslims from right-wing extremists. The North East Counter Terrorism Unit (NECTU), created in 2007 as part of the UK police’s counter-terrorism network in response to threats from AQ, quickly found it had to refocus its efforts from international terrorism to a more familiar foe.

When Humberside Police officers raided Martyn Gillear’s home on 31 October 2007, they were expecting to find indecent images of children. However, they also uncovered ammunition, home-made bombs, and a large amount of white-separatist literature and gunpowder. From literature discovered it appeared that Gillear, a 31-year-old forklift driver, was preparing for an ethnic war, his aim being to protect the purity of the ‘white race’. Police officers seized a diary in which Gillear wrote his intentions, stating that: “I’m so sick and tired of hearing Nationalists talk of killing Muslims, of blowing up Mosques, of fighting back, only to see these acts of resistance fail to appear. The time has come to stop the talk and start to act.”

During his trial Gilleard admitted to being a member of the National Front and the British People's Party, describing himself as a white nationalist. On 24 June 2008 at Leeds Crown Court, Gilleard was found guilty of being in possession of articles for terrorist purposes and of possessing indecent images of children, and was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment.

**Teenage terror**

The discovery of a home-grown extreme right-wing terrorist raised serious concerns about the intelligence coverage of the newly established Counter Terrorism Units, especially in the north of England, as the threat posed by Gilleard had been exposed during routine police operations unconnected to any counter-terror operation. Gilleard was not included on any counter-terrorism watch list at that time, and his motivations had been detected by chance. It appeared as though the rise of right-wing extremists in the north had gone undetected, a concern that remains to this day as such cases continue.

On 20 September 2019 at Leeds Crown Court, a boy who tried to build a bomb at the age of 15 was convicted of terrorism offences and jailed for five years. Kieran Cleary had researched “extreme right-wing and anti-Muslim material” online and praised Adolf Hitler during his radicalisation journey. 16

When Counter Terrorism Policing North East (the rebranded NECTU) arrested Cleary and searched his home in August 2018, they found a shrapnel-filled device that could have been made into a viable CO2 bomb.

**Review and reform**

Reinforcing the recent rise of far-right terrorism, the Home Office shared important insights into their efforts to protect vulnerable individuals from adopting the extremist ideologies of the far right, revealing that during 2017–18 1,312 extreme-right-wing-related referrals were made to Prevent programmes. 17 British intelligence agencies also revealed that, of the 18 terrorist attacks foiled in the UK since March 2017, four came from the extreme right-wing. 18

If the policing of extremism, and the approach of Prevent, is to have an impact in at least interdicting the most savage excesses of extremism at the most local level, it is vital that all in authority appropriately prioritise the various forms of extremism that lead to violence and terrorism. For more than a decade, far-right extremism has not been given suitable priority by those charged with the responsibility of keeping communities safe from violent extremism. As a direct result, authorities are now combating a scale of threat that is challenging neighbourhood safety and national security. Considering right-wing extremism in the north as a lower priority than other terrorist threats for a prolonged period is unwelcome and unwise. There must now be a rededication to tackling the rise of far-right terrorism across Britain, and efforts must focus upon developing a richer intelligence picture, which is required at the most local level to prevent right-wing terrorism, especially in the north, which remains a powerhouse for the far right.

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5. The Security Challenges Posed by Far-right Terrorism

Dr Paul Stott

This article assesses the threat posed by far-right organisations that support terrorism, flirt with its imagery or rhetoric, or provide an ideological setting through which individuals may pass who go on to commit terrorist attacks. It argues that the British far right was historically too weak to sustain an enduring terrorist group. While this continues to be the case and looks likely to be so going forward, the threat from lone actors is a different matter entirely.

Fighting a race war?

Overlooking the odd minnow, since the 1980s several fascist organisations have been active whose literature clearly rejected any democratic engagement and openly advocated violence and conflict. These are:

The British Movement: openly neo-Nazi, but its main achievement is arguably its endurance in surviving for over 50 years. 19

Combat 18 (C18): called for a race war in the 1990s. Its dalliance with terrorism saw letter bombs posted by comrades in Denmark to targets in the UK. 20 However, the only person ultimately killed by C18 was one of its own members, Chris Castle, during internal feuding in 1997. 21

National Socialist Movement (NSM): a splinter from C18. The 1999 London nail bomber David Copeland was a member, having left the British National Party. The NSM, with no more than 20 members, dissolved upon his arrest. 22

Blood and Honour (B&H): less a political party, more an international structure for promoting far-right bands and musicians. Both B&H and C18 were recently proscribed in Canada. 23

National Action (NA): proscribed by the Home Secretary in 2016 following social media comments supporting the murder of Jo Cox MP. 24 NA member Jack Renshaw has since been convicted of planning to murder Labour MP Rosie Cooper. 25 There has also been a series of trials of activists associated with NA, for example for membership of a proscribed organisation. 26

There was also some interaction during the Northern Ireland conflict between Ulster loyalists and the far right on the mainland, 27 although the views on race of the fascists were not widely shared within loyalism.

22 O’Hara, L., ‘David Copeland, the White Wolves & the state – some unanswered questions (Part One)’, Notes from the Borderland 3, Autumn–Winter 2000–1, pp.14–38.
27 See, for example, Portinari, F., Left-Right-Loyalist: From one extreme to another (Troubador Publishing, 2016).
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Prospects for far-right terrorism

There is little evidence that any of the groups listed above could maintain themselves organisationally and at the same time run a substantive terrorist campaign. These are small organisations, with membership more likely to be counted in the dozens or the hundreds than the thousands, although C18 and B&H at times enjoyed wider support.

It is therefore unlikely that a far-right terrorist current will emerge and endure in the style of the various Northern Ireland groupings or the international jihadist organisations. If terrorists are considered as fish who swim in the sea of the people, then here are fish from small shoals and often with distinctive markings.

In addition, these have also been organisations under pressure, from both the authorities and political rivals. Far from being a 21st-century re-creation of the Brownshirts, one of National Action’s final acts before proscription was to hide in the left luggage facility at Liverpool Lime Street station, besieged by counter-demonstrators. 28

This indicates that, whilst far-right terrorism is a threat, it is as likely to come from racist individuals who have perhaps been through extremist organisations, dipping a toe in the water, but may not be acting out of any formal affiliation or directed group policy. That was arguably the case with Thomas Mair, the killer of Jo Cox MP, who lacked any sustained background in political activism, but had been in touch with a pro-apartheid group in the UK, as well as the National Alliance in the US. 29

Two wildcards to consider

What evidence emerges from the Finsbury Park mosque attack in 2017, for which Darren Osborne was jailed for life in 2018, 30 and the attacks carried out in 2013 in the West Midlands by Ukrainian fascist Pavlo Lapshyn? 31

In Darren Osborne we find someone without significant engagement in the far right, save for recent interest in social media. A large part of his enmity towards Muslims came from watching a BBC drama about the grooming scandals of recent years. 32 Set Osborne against the backdrop of the groups described above and we see why far-right terrorism is difficult to combat. In the latter we have a small pool of extremists – members, ex-members, and contacts of neo-fascist movements, such as Copeland or Mair. And simultaneously, we have an unknown number of people disaffected or angered by issues they see as involving a minority of British Muslims, but who may never have joined or contacted any political organisations.

In 2013, Pavlo Lapshyn murdered 82-year-old Mohammed Saleem as he walked home from prayers in Birmingham. He also planted bombs at two mosques, which failed to explode. Lapshyn had been in the UK less than a week when he committed the murder. How readily can the authorities counter that?


In Lapshyn’s home country of Ukraine, fascists have responded to the 2019 Christchurch massacre by translating a paperback version of the gunman’s manifesto - it is now being widely disseminated across Eastern Europe in both Russian and Ukrainian.\(^{33}\) This internationalisation of the far right, with linkages between North America, Australasia, and Europe moving potentially faster than the authorities or political opponents can keep up, presents a significant challenge.

All these factors ensure that, despite severe structural weaknesses, sporadic outbreaks of far-right terrorism in the UK will continue to occur.

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Dr Paul Jackson

British neo-Nazism has always been a culture, primarily created by and targeted at men, that has possessed a surprising ability to reinvent the fascist past. Continued reinvention of male-dominated neo-Nazi cultures can be seen among the neo-Nazi activists linked to National Action, an overtly neo-Nazi youth group founded in 2013 and proscribed under terrorism legislation in December 2016. Since its proscription, a number of follow-on groups have also emerged. The young men linked to these groups have interacted internationally, including with an American variant, Atomwaffen Division, founded in 2015. This networking has led to the creation of specialist online spaces, such as www.ironmarch.org and, more recently, www.fascistforum.com. These sites promote engagement with neo-Nazis across the world. This new, Internet-savvy neo-Nazi youth activism is distinct from wider far-right cultures, which often aim for some degree of respectability to attract followers. Where many far-right groups resist being described as ‘Nazi’ or ‘fascist’, this aspect of the milieu welcomes such identification.

Epitomising this embrace of the Nazi past, National Action developed its logo from a variation of the Sturmabteilung (SA) logo, while activists have repeatedly turned to extreme variants of anti-Semitism, central to their activism. This included targeting Labour MP Luciana Berger in an online anti-Semitic campaign in 2014. National Action was eventually proscribed because it praised the murderer of Jo Cox MP, Thomas Mair. The group’s misogyny is also prominent in such examples targeting female MPs. Highlighting a culture cultivating terrorism, in 2019 a leading figure in the group, Jack Renshaw, was convicted of a plot to kill Labour MP Rosie Cooper.

Underpinning the new neo-Nazi fringe is a discourse steeped in what historians of fascism identify as the myth of national and racial regeneration. According to academic Roger Griffin, fascists past and present consider the world around them as being in a state of profound corruption and decay, use conspiracy theories to identify the supposed causes of this degeneration, and call for a revolution, led by violent men, to restore society to a supposed prior state of order and stability. Historian Aristotle Kallis highlights that fascist ideologies identify an ‘other’ in society that is emotively denounced in a variety of ways as posing an imminent existential threat to the race and nation – often this has been Jewish people. This perceived need to resolve an immediate danger underpins fascism, and explains why it is steeped in a profound mood of urgency and need for action, giving licence to extreme ideas and violence.

Echoes of this fascist past can be found repeatedly in National Action’s materials. Most obviously, they revel in themes taken from the Nazi era itself. The hashtag ‘#hitlerwasright’ summarises this borrowing. Their anti-Semitic conspiratorial narrative was taken directly from

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the National Socialist era. The group also identified with a fascist past closer to home, praising Oswald Mosley and the British Union of Fascists and developing links with other British neo-Nazi groups, such as the British Movement.

Many aspects of this fascist framing, arguing for revolution led by a fascist new man, can be seen in National Action’s ideological booklet *Attack*. This text idealised violence in the name of a revolution as transformative and morally necessary:

... we ... must answer with our own political faith, exchanging a defence for the battle-cry of attack which will summon the best of our people. Out of the catharsis will come a new type of man who doesn’t flinch – whether it is a soldier or a politician. We do not need ‘intellectuals’, what we need are brutes who can form the lines hard. Moral men who can rise above fear so they can both take and dish out punishment. 41

With at best around 100 activists, National Action was clearly never likely to achieve a successful, violent revolution. However, there was nevertheless a genuine belief among activists that they were revolutionary men fighting a noble cause.

Moreover, the presence of this ideological vision, based around establishing a modernised, Nazi-style state, does not alone explain why such groups might appeal to the small number of primarily young men linked to them. Aside from updated variants of a fascist rhetoric, what is striking about much of this material is text that describes, and images that depict, what can be seen as potentially empowering ideals of youthful masculinity.

From its formation, there was a concerted effort by National Action to create a visual style that was striking and spoke to the concerns of a new generation of disaffected young men. This has also continued in the follow-on groups, and is reflected in other aspects of the wider network, such as material developed by Atomwaffen Division in the United States.

*Figure 1: National Action Propaganda*

The sociologist Michael Kimmel has explored the attraction of the types of masculinity found in the contemporary extreme right. He concludes that young men drawn to such groups often feel they are experiencing profound threats. They ‘feel ashamed and humiliated’, and from such

'aggrieved entitlement' some also ‘search for a way to redeem themselves as men, to restore and retrieve that sense of manhood that has been lost’. The American academic Cynthia Miller Idriss similarly argues that it is essential to understand the ‘hyper-masculine nature of much of the far right and its idealised notions on manhood and what a “real man” does for the nation’.

Depictions of a revolutionary masculinity among neo-Nazi youth groups are varied, yet also central to the movement’s discourse. As can be seen in Figure 2, they can be steeped in mythical tropes, to evoke the heroic warrior.

*Figure 2: National Action Promotional Material*

Altematively, they can revel in more modern depictions of war and violence, here also styled as a form of holy war, as shown in Figure 3.

*Figure 3: Sonnenkrieg Division Promotional Material*

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Moreover, while young men can be presented in overtly violent ways, they can be depicted as noble and honourable, as shown in Figure 4.

*Figure 4: National Action: British Youth Awake*

Such evocations of youthful masculinities that specifically speak to boys and men looking for a form of redemptive politics are an important part of this culture to consider. These groups have repeatedly packaged an extreme, fascist ideology, steeped in Nazi-style themes and anti-Semitic conspiracism, within a sense of ‘positive’ masculinity targeting young, disaffected men looking for meaning. This is important to recognise in order to understand and tackle the risks posed by neo-Nazism. With this in mind, more work is needed to explore the relationship between the problems facing boys and young men, and how evocations of masculine ideals are used to persuade some to dedicate themselves to the most extreme forms of a neo-Nazi, radicalised sub-culture.
Countering the Far Right: An Anthology

7. More Than Meets the Eye? The Ideological Complexity of Far-right Manifestos

Dr Rakib Ehsan

The Western world has been rocked by a number of far-right terrorist attacks in recent times. March 2019 saw 51 Muslim worshippers being gunned down during Friday prayers in the New Zealand city of Christchurch. 44 The following month, a gunman targeted a California synagogue during Passover celebrations, killing a Jewish worshipper. 45 In August, Patrick Crusius allegedly drove over 600 miles to kill 22 shoppers in an anti-Hispanic attack at Cielo Vista Mall in El Paso, Texas. 46 While the target groups across the three terrorist attacks were diverse – Muslims, Jews, and Hispanics – what these three high-profile attacks had in common was the publication of a manifesto by the suspected perpetrator immediately beforehand.

Ideological character of manifestos

The manifestos can be broadly classified as far-right and do contain overlapping ideological motivations. All three contained references to white people being replaced in Western countries, a hallmark of modern far-right extremist ideology. What has been under-discussed is the anti-corporation sentiment expressed in such documents, and how this ties in with broader white-replacement narratives.

Brenton Tarrant’s manifesto – ‘The Great Replacement’ – had a segmented Sun Wheel (Sonnenrad) on its front cover. Two of the segments were labelled “workers’ rights” and “anti-imperialism”. Tarrant makes a total of 15 separate references to corporations, advancing the view that mass inward migration of cheap labour to Western countries is encouraged by the profit-driven interests of private capital – subsequently placing native populations under both demographic and socio-cultural threat. Further demonstrating his support for left-leaning economics, Tarrant’s manifesto includes excerpts in favour of greater unionisation of workers, as well as a rise in the minimum wage in Western economies. 47

Similar white-replacement narratives are contained in John Earnest’s pre-attack manifesto, ‘An Open Letter’. Like Tarrant, Earnest blames demographic change on corporations that thrive on the importation of cheap migrant labour. The key difference between Tarrant and Earnest is that the latter directs his primary frustrations towards Jews. Whether it is the bankrolling of political parties that supposedly enable mass immigration to displace the white race, or the financing of entertainment industries that peddle “degenerate propaganda” to wear down traditional values, it is an international Jewry that is supposedly behind it all. 48

In his manifesto ‘The Inconvenient Truth’, El Paso suspect Patrick Crusius fleshes out the connection between corporate interests, inward migration of cheap labour, and demographic change. 49 Critical of both pro-business Republicans and Democrats, Crusius makes a simple assertion: “pro-corporation = pro-immigration”. 50 He also ties the shifting ethno-racial

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47 ‘The Great Replacement’, p.68.
49 ‘The Inconvenient Truth’.
50 ‘The Inconvenient Truth’, p.3.
demographics of the Texas electorate with the perceived threat of political colonisation: “Hispanics will take control of the local and state government of my beloved Texas”. 51 And, following in the footsteps of both Tarrant and Earnest, Crusius makes clear that a transnational white uprising is needed to confront these perceived threats, declaring that “this is just the beginning of the fight for America and Europe”. 52

The documents are ultimately designed to inspire a ‘wave’ of further attacks – a militant alliance of like-minded “brethren” across the Western world. While broadly characterising these manifestos and their authors as ‘far-right’ is understandable, it is important that all-encompassing definitions do not prevent us from recognising the ideologically complex nature of such documents.

Anti-corporation sentiment runs through the manifestos, with ‘big business’ being blamed for the large-scale importation of low-cost labour in the name of profit maximisation. Hefty flows of inward migration from the developing world to advanced Western societies are framed as a multidimensional threat: demographic, cultural, political, and even environmental. Much of the ideological content in the manifestos is textbook national socialism – in Earnest’s in particular. Ultimately placing the blame for all these frustrations at the door of an international Jewry – an all-powerful global Jewish financier class – lies at the heart of anti-Semitic conspiratorial narratives aggressively advanced by the extremist far right. 53

**Policy solutions**

Complicated problems require a multidimensional response. A censorship-led approach to tackling the online consumption of extremist material will be limited in terms of effectiveness. Extremist material can spread across the web at a furious pace. After being downloaded and subsequently stored, it can be disseminated as a file to countless others for consumption. Much of the battle against the spread of extremism will have to be ideological. While the tendency to adopt censorious methods over potentially dangerous material is understandable, engagement with the ideological character of such manifestos should form part of a broader political and counter-terrorist response.

The far right is now the fastest-growing terrorist threat in the UK. 54 This is perhaps unsurprising when one considers the anti-corporation sentiment and concerns over moral decay contained in the manifestos. Multiple decades of Thatcherite neoliberal orthodoxy have produced serious economic inequalities, the chipping away of workers’ rights, and consolidation of employer power. This is all against a backdrop in which Britain is now a world leader when it comes to family breakdown, 55 with an unhealthy obsession with celebrity culture establishing itself as a dominant feature of the social mainstream. 56

Coupled with the aggressive promotion of materialistic individualism, the UK’s laissez-faire approach to multiculturalism has seen the construction of ‘parallel lives’ between different ethno-racial and religious groups. 57 This has placed considerable strain on community relations

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51 ‘The Inconvenient Truth’, p.3.
52 ‘The Inconvenient Truth’, p.4.
...in more urbanised, deprived parts of the country – especially in post-industrial northern towns such as Burnley and Oldham. In a number of British cities and towns, the ethnic and religious composition of those found guilty of participating in large-scale grooming scandals (explicitly mentioned in Tarrant’s manifesto) have given rise to the view that ‘politically-correct’ public authorities have failed to perform their duties – in turn heightening the appeal of the far right’s traditional anti-establishment narratives.\textsuperscript{58}

With far-right and Islamist-inspired extremism essentially feeding off one another, the UK – like other multi-ethnic, religiously diverse societies – faces serious challenges in neutralising extremist threats in society. Surveillance activities of security agencies, neighbourhood policing in local communities, and regulation of online material promoting extremist activity will continue to play integral parts in a broader counter-extremism strategy. But in terms of countering the ideological extremist threat, the political development of effective anti-extremist narratives and social cohesion initiatives is critical. The fight against extremism includes a battle of ideas and ideology – and, in order to win the battle, it is important to understand the ideological motivations and socio-cultural grievances driving the growth of far-right extremism.

8. How Should We Be Responding to the Extreme Right?

Sadie Chana

This contribution will look at how society has responded to the street demonstrations and electoral ambitions of the extreme right. Since the diminishing of the British National Party (BNP), there has been a lack of political representation of the extreme right. The consequence of this has been an increase in street-based activity from a range of organisations such as the English Defence League (EDL), Britain First, Pegida, and the Football Lads Alliance (FLA). These groups have typically met with different approaches: the first is exclusion or no-platforming, and the second is limited engagement.

Exclusion has been a tactic used in relation to extreme-right political parties. For example, the German party Die Republikaner (REP) was isolated by both the press and the Bundestag (parliament), denying it a platform and thereby limiting its reach. In the UK, MPs are able to use petitions, parliamentary procedures, and the media to pressure police and local authorities to ban a particular proposed activity of far-right groups. At the local level, councillors can bring forward motions in the council to ban a demonstration, or otherwise liaise with police and refuse to interact with the organisations in question.

UK authorities also have the option to not respond to the activities or protests. The aim of this tactic would be to limit how much media coverage the events receive. This was used with some success against the BNP. However, their threat to community cohesion may motivate some action from local councils. The decision to react to demonstrations is in part due to a consideration that they are ‘public order’ issues and so need to be managed in order to protect local businesses and the reputation of the community. This then sets a precedent for how such demonstrations are handled in the future. In addition, many of these demonstrations result in riots, protests, and arrests. These types of behaviour require some sort of response from the authorities and failure to do so would be lamented by the local communities.

Alternatively, authorities can engage with far-right groups directly. This involves engaging with the communities where these groups are supported, in order to address the political alienation or prejudice that may be the drivers behind this support. This approach can also include interactions between alienated extreme-right supporters and the communities that are impacted by the protests and demonstrations. In order to be successful they need to be initiated from within the community and be long-term and sustained. However, these strategies tend to be short-term and inconsistent. Consequently, such initiatives have limited success due to the way in which they are created and implemented.

61 Ibid.
64 Allchorn, W., ‘Political responses to anti-Islamic protest’.
One problem when trying to respond to these groups is their impact and visibility, both in the media and on social media. For example, whilst the activities of Britain First are relatively low level in terms of the numbers of supporters who are present at their demonstrations, the videos of these activities have a greater level of popularity on their social media pages.\textsuperscript{67} The same issue existed with the online support of the EDL via its Facebook page. The use of social media means that content is created by these groups with the intention of being shared by their members and thereby widening their influence. This type of behaviour can only be curtailed by the owners of these platforms, and not by the authorities. In addition, any decision to no-platform these groups in this way would encourage them to move to alternative media platforms that may be harder for authorities to monitor. This problem also persists when looking at how the media responds to these groups. Whilst the national mainstream media can choose not to report on protests or activities, the same cannot be said for local media. When these protests are announced, communities tend to be informed via their local news outlets. This is also where any response by the establishment – be it increased police presence, separating counter-protests, or non-response – is communicated to the community.

Due to the destructive nature of extreme-right protests, it has become necessary for authorities to respond to these activities. However, there has not been a consistent approach. Refusing to allow protests to take place can strengthen the groups as it reinforces their anti-establishment position. Increasing police presence could be considered as having a similar effect, whilst also being an expensive and resource-heavy approach. Politicians themselves may refuse to promote the planned protests by not acknowledging them in their media appearances, or may denounce the protests. Either approach may have the same limited impact on the event itself.

Finally, long-term grassroots initiatives to engage with the communities from which these groups cultivate their support, and address the causal factors that lead to these protests may be a promising approach. Unfortunately, existing attempts to do so have been led from the top rather than the bottom, and consequently have limited community engagement and suffer from short-term thinking and piecemeal application.

9. Demographic Threat and Right-wing Radicalism

Professor Eric Kaufmann

The West is entering what demographer David Coleman (2006) terms its ‘third demographic transition’ – that is, from a position where, in around 1960, whites comprised 85-100% of the population of the countries of North America, Australasia and Western Europe, to one where whites will fall to between 50% (North America, New Zealand) and 75% (many Western European countries) by 2050, with the share in the latter dropping below half towards the end of the current century. Canada, a leader in terms of rate of change, is projected to shift from 80% European in 2006 to around 20% by 2106.

Population change has often played an important part in politics. Yet numbers alone are only part of the story. As academic Paul Morland points out, perceptions of future demographic shifts can have political implications that are every bit as powerful as the actual changes. If we think about the fact that 97% of the world’s population growth (at last count) is taking place in the ‘global south’ belt of religious and non-European tropical countries, while the secular West and East Asia are aging and declining, with below-replacement fertility rates, the stage is set for demographic anxiety.

This is not strictly new, given a genre of alarmist literature going back to T. Lothrop Stoddard’s Rising Tide of Color (1920), but actual demographic developments today lend these worries greater plausibility. Immigration and Islam have become lightning-rod issues because they symbolise the third demographic transition in Western countries. Pollsters note that people frequently overestimate the prevalence of things they are passionate about – crime, immigration, and, in the US context, the share (for Democrats) of Republicans earning over $250,000. The same holds for the Muslim share. In France, respondents in 2016 said that France would be 40% Muslim in 2020, rather than the actual 8%. This said, minorities overestimate minority share more than whites. African-Americans, for instance, believe blacks form 38% of the US population, while the actual figure is 13%.

While these overestimates can appear untethered from reality, this is less true for changes over time. In nine of 10 major European countries, between 2005 and 2016 concern over immigration tracked immigration. And in Western Europe, Pew’s projected Muslim share in 2030 predicts the high watermark of populist right support in a country.

Compared to the eugenicist intellectual atmosphere of Stoddard’s time, the ideological climate in today’s cultural institutions is progressive: seeking to repress ethno-cultural concerns as racist. Thus the latent potential for racial panic may be considerably greater today, suggesting that white-nationalist ideology is likely to resonate better now than a century ago. What to

do? I believe that the progressive strategy of accusing those who raise concerns about ethnic demography of racism may be storing up trouble as ethno-demographics continue to shift. Better to accept majority ethnic attachment. 75

One way to accommodate this is to imagine a future in which, via intermarriage, the pool of people with European ancestry and traditions remains a majority. Immigration may also need to be limited in order to permit deeper ethnic assimilation. The threat of Islam to liberalism is of lesser importance for voters than ethnic loss, even though anti-Muslim themes are prominent in right-wing discourse. While we must hold firm against anti-Muslim prejudice, shutting down discussion of white decline has the potential to backfire, by sublimating this sentiment towards an anti-Muslim civic nationalism, as represented by, for instance, the English Defence League. 76

High immigration, combined with repressing discussion of ethnic change, is a recipe likely to buoy both the populist and the violent right. Nevertheless, the cultural power of progressive norms in elite institutions (including mainstream parties) makes immigration difficult for elites to reduce comfortably. We need to surmount this problem to dissipate populist pressure.

Finally, as shown by Norwegian researcher Jacob Ravndal – who has collected rigorous data on actual, as opposed to perceived, far-right violence – when discontent has a democratic outlet through populist politics, this reduces the chance of white nationalist violence. It is when populist parties are at a lower ebb (due to their exclusion from politics, or internal splits) that the risk of violence tends to be higher. 77 This confirms studies of separatist violence, where democratic alternatives (e.g. Sinn Fein as a party, or independence referendums) can absorb ideological energies. Blocking democratic alternatives forces frustrated separatists to turn to violence.

In the longer term, channelling white-majority conservatives’ attachment from rigid racial categories to more optimistic and flexible conceptions of assimilative ethnicity is the best option. 78 Civic nationalism is insufficient when ethno-demographics are steadily shifting and there is no present danger from foreign powers. I favour a flexible ‘multivocal’ approach to nationhood, in which people of different backgrounds identify with the nation in their own way.

This combination of an inclusive ethnic majority within an inclusive nation with immigration levels set to the preferences of the median voter is our best bet for defusing the majority anxiety which is reshaping politics and the security landscape.

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10. Neutralising the Far-right Threat: The Case for Integrated Communities

**Dr Craig McCann**

In September 2019, the Head of Counter-Terrorism policing in England, Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, stated that the far right was the fastest-growing terror threat in the UK. The police and security services had foiled 22 terror attacks since March 2017, with seven relating to right-wing terrorism, and the ideology accounted for 24% of terrorism-related arrests in the 12 months to June 2019.79

There are many who seek to draw causal links between recent increases in both hate crimes and far-right activity, and the Brexit vote of 2016. The Statistical Bulletin for Hate Crime across England and Wales for 2017–18 highlights a peak in racially and religiously aggravated offences both during the EU referendum campaign and immediately after the result.80 It then subsided, but rose again during the terrorist attacks of 2017. Notwithstanding these peaks, the levels of hate crime reporting have been steadily increasing since 2012.

But what is driving the growth of the far-right threat? My research captured the perspectives of front-line practitioners predominantly working in policing and local authorities in Newcastle upon Tyne, Luton, and Waltham Forest (east London) to explore how the Prevent strategy has been applied to right-wing extremism.81 I found that there continues to be a general lack of understanding of and communication with white working-class communities. Many local authorities have adopted a policy of ‘non-engagement’ with the EDL. But the problem is wider than that. They have also failed to engage with the topics that underpin support for the EDL. In addition to the more extreme elements, the movement was a vent for latent grievances that had built up over some time relating to issues such as the disproportionate impact of uncontrolled immigration across the country, cultural shifts at a local level, a growing sense of inequality, the impact of austerity in post-industrial northern towns, chronic public underinvestment, and a palpable sense of marginalisation.82

Rather than framing the EDL as an existential threat to the status quo, local authorities should have been asking: Why are the EDL’s messages resonating with local people? Why is the EDL coming to our town? Fundamentally, what can we do as a local authority to remove the need for local people to turn out onto the streets to protest with the EDL?

This sense of detachment from statutory services is important. How much of a factor in the creation of the EDL was the perceived inaction of the police in response to the Royal Anglian Regiment’s Homecoming March in Luton, where troops returning from Iraq marched through Luton town centre and faced an abusive demonstration led by the proscribed Islamist organisation Al-Muhajiroun? A police service cowed by political correctness, an establishment unwilling to be honest about the drawbacks of cultural diversity – this all feeds into the narrative

of the extreme right, that you are a second-class citizen. Since the 2016 EU referendum, this ‘left behind’ phenomenon is becoming increasingly referenced in academic and policy circles. And this is a good thing: rather than unleashing a wave of right-wing extremism, Brexit is finally forcing us to face up to some of these deep-seated socio-economic and socio-cultural issues which are driving people to extreme positions.

So, what do we need to do?

1. Operational Response.

This starts with local government re-engaging with all communities and to create the spaces to have the difficult, challenging, and sometimes controversial conversations that need to be had. And to proactively challenge myths; in talking about the social issues that form the raw material for extreme narratives, you are not legitimising extremism, you are staking out the centre ground and preventing people from being pushed to the extremes. If local officials are unwilling to talk about the topics that underpin the narratives of movements such as the EDL or to those who are interested in talking about the positives and negatives of uncontrolled immigration on local communities, or about the fact that there are many instances of communities essentially living apart (as highlighted in Dame Louise Casey’s 2016 review on Opportunity and Integration), then they will look elsewhere. And they will find people very willing to talk about these issues.


The biggest policy deficit we have in this country is that concerning the way we integrate communities. In 2011, which I refer to in my book as the year of the ‘great divorce’ where Prevent was separated from community cohesion efforts, this coincided with cuts of up to 40% to local authorities’ budgets, and we have seen how the implementation of the Integration Strategy has limped on ever since. I recommend a holistic review of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government’s Integration Strategy in conjunction with and understood in the context of associated policies such as the Hate Crime Action Plan, the Prevent strategy and the extremism strategy, which continue to be developed and reviewed in silos (see the most recent review of the extremism strategy as an example of this disjointed approach) and yet are all brought to bear on this area of preventing individuals from escalating to harmful behaviours.

When considering whether Brexit released a wave of hate crime and/or right-wing terrorism, or rather simply shone a light on deep-seated levels of marginalisation and grievance, we need to be a lot more evidence-based than has thus far been the case. Research such as Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion’s ‘Left Behind? Understanding Communities on the Edge’ is a good place to start. This research shows a strong correlation between a ward voting for Brexit and the lack of the three key factors they focus on in their report: places to meet, an engaged community, and good connectivity. There are significant lessons to be learned in relation to

political representation that creates a permissive environment for engagement, debate, and challenge, in order to prevent individuals from being pushed into the very extremism we are seeking to avoid.

If you think the answer to the rise in the far-right threat lies in counter-terrorism and/or counter-extremism policies, you are looking in the wrong place. Rather, it lies in the way we build integrated, cohesive communities. We are failing to do this.