


TERRORISM IN THE WEST: AN AGE OF EXTREMES

BY TOM WILSON

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
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Cover Images (from top to bottom): Armed police at Manchester Arena after reports of an explosion at the venue during an Ariana Grande concert on 22 May 2017 (Picture by: Peter Byrne/PA Archive/PA Images), 31 October 2017 - NYPD and other law enforcement at the scene where the van was halted at the Manhattan terror attack in New York. The driver in the Manhattan attack that killed eight people had been planning for weeks and appeared to have ties to terror suspects, officials said. (Credit Image: © Bryan Smith via ZUMA Wire); and Neo Nazis, Alt-Right, and White Supremacists encircle counter protestors at the base of a statue of Thomas Jefferson after marching through the University of Virginia campus with torches in Charlottesville, Va., USA, on 11 August 2017 (Photo by Shay Horse/NurPhoto).

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BY TOM WILSON

October 2018



About the Author

Tom Wilson is a Research Fellow in the Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism at the Henry Jackson Society. Tom specialises in the study of extremist groups and counter-terrorism strategy. His research has focused on the growth of extremism in the UK as well as terrorist organisations in the Middle East. He regularly appears on broadcast media including the BBC, Sky and CNN, offering his analysis on issues of extremism and terrorism. He has been published in the *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, the *Telegraph*, the *Spectator* and *Standpoint* among others.

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About The Henry Jackson Society

The Henry Jackson Society is a think-tank and policy-shaping force that fights for the principles and alliances which keep societies free, working across borders and party lines to combat extremism, advance democracy and real human rights, and make a stand in an increasingly uncertain world.

CENTRE ON RADICALISATION & TERRORISM

About the Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism

The Centre on Radicalisation & Terrorism (CRT) is unique in addressing violent and non-violent extremism. By coupling high-quality, in-depth research with targeted and impactful policy recommendations, we aim to combat the threat of radicalisation and terrorism in our society.

“Terrorism in the West is a comprehensive and useful survey of terrorist attacks in Western democracies during 2017, combining granular descriptions of individual attacks with overall mapping of trends. A rigorous and readable record of terrorist acts that is essential for serious students and security policy makers.”

Michael Chertoff

Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2005 to 2009)

‘An important piece of analysis that correctly highlights the disturbing rise of extreme right and extreme left wing terrorism in Western countries in recent years alongside the existing challenge of Islamist terrorism. This report will undoubtedly assist policy makers to understand the extent of the challenge of extremism and terrorism and help the intelligence agencies and counter-terrorism police to shape their operational responses’.

Richard Walton

Former Head of SO15 (2011-2016)

“This interesting study illustrates that in 2017 Islamist terrorism remained a significant threat to Western democracies and that Far Right extremism – with associated violence – was on the rise. The ideological mix was therefore becoming more complex to counter, and preventing attacks more challenging for security services and police. It seems likely that the terrorist and extremist threat will continue to evolve.”

The Rt. Hon. The Baroness Neville-Jones DCMG PC

Chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee (1993-4)

Minister of State for Security and Counter Terrorism (2010-11)

“This report is an enormously valuable resource that both comprehensively documents the major terror attacks that took place across the world and skilfully draws out the often overlapping factors which influence those who carry them out. Policy makers and the public will find the data compiled here and the underpinning analysis sobering and very helpful in helping understand the diverse and growing threats from those who would use violent terror to disrupt our way of life.”

John Woodcock MP

Member, Home Affairs Select Committee

“This is an interesting and useful compendium of the terrorist attacks perpetrated in the West during the past two years. Sadly, the UK suffered more attacks than any other Western country during 2017 - an important reminder of the need to resource our police and security agencies adequately to respond to the threat and also to ensure that they have the appropriate powers to act where they need to. It is also significant that in the West as a whole, whilst the greatest share of attacks continues to be carried out by Islamist extremists, there is a sharp rise in the number of domestic extremist attacks from the Far Right but also the Far Left.”

Lord Toby Harris of Haringey

Reviewer, Independent Review of London’s Preparedness to deal with a Major Terrorist Attack

Member, National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)

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Executive Summary

Western countries have experienced a rise in terrorist activity and terrorist attacks over recent years. The threat is increasingly generated not by a single form of extremism but by multiple extremist ideologies. This phenomenon is being perpetuated by a wide range of individuals who come from diverse backgrounds but who are all willing to act upon the violent ideas promoted by their respective belief systems. They have employed numerous types of weapons and have had varying degrees of success at inflicting casualties and fear.

Despite their divergent worldviews, there are signs of commonalities between the extremists driving terrorism. Those who perpetrate these attacks have chosen to step outside of the democratic system as a means to achieve their objectives. Instead, they have resorted to force, violence and intimidation. Almost invariably they adhere to ideologies that fundamentally reject the liberal way of life that the Western democracies have sought to maintain.

This report provides detailed information and a statistical analysis of terrorism in the West in 2017, measured against comparative data from the previous year. The Executive Summary presented here sets out some of the key findings of this research, splitting the information between what is known about the attacks, and what is known about the assailants.

Attacks

Attacks by Regions and Countries

- The amount of terrorist violence in Western countries increased in 2017 compared to 2016. There were 68 terrorist attacks recorded in 2017. This had risen from 54 attacks in the previous year.
- Europe was worst impacted in 2017, with 75% of terrorism in the West occurring in European countries. A further 22.06% of attacks took place in North America, while 2.94% happened in Australasia.
- The United Kingdom (UK) witnessed more attacks than any other Western country, with 19.12% of all incidents in 2017 occurring there. This was a significant increase from 2016, when 9.26% of all terrorism in the West occurred in the UK.
- The United States (US) and France saw the next highest number of attacks in 2017, with 17.65% of incidents occurring in each of these countries.

Attacks by Ideology

- The greatest share of attacks continue to be carried out by Islamists. In 2017, 48.53% of all attacks recorded in the West were Islamist, which had however decreased from 2016 when 66.67% of these incidents were perpetrated by Islamists.
- The ideology that saw the greatest increase in the number of attacks was the Far Right. In 2017, 20.59% of all attacks recorded in the West were perpetrated by assailants from that ideology. This was a near fourfold increase from 2016 when just 5.56% of all terrorism was from this group. As an absolute number, Far Right terrorist attacks rose from 3 to 14, more than quadrupling.
- Along with the rise in attacks from the Far Right, 2017 saw the same proportion of attacks coming from the Far Left, also representing 20.59% of attacks that year. This was a more modest rise from 2016 when 16.67% of attacks were carried out by the Far Left. As an absolute number, attacks from this ideology rose from 9 to 14.

Fatalities and Injuries Overall

- In 2017, the UK suffered more fatalities from terrorism than any other Western country. In all, 40.45% of terrorism fatalities occurred in the UK that year. The next worst affected were the US and Spain with 17.98% of terrorism fatalities occurring in each of these countries.
- Despite the higher number of attacks and attempted attacks in 2017, the number of casualties across the West fell. In 2017 there were 89 fatalities and 918 people injured by terrorism. In 2016 there were 191 fatalities and 987 injured.
- The change is partly accounted for by the reduction in mass-casualty attacks in 2017. In 2016 there were 3.54 fatalities per attack, whereas in 2017 this decreased to 1.31 fatalities for every attack.

Fatalities and Injuries by Ideology

- The largest share of fatalities from terrorism were caused in Islamist attacks. In 2017, 84.27% of all fatalities were caused by Islamist attacks. In 2016 this had been even higher, with 96.34% of fatalities from terrorism caused by Islamist attacks.
- The combined data from both 2016 and 2017 shows that 3.75 people were killed and 26.54 people were injured for every Islamist attack.
- The second largest share of fatalities were caused by Far Right terrorism. In 2017, these attacks accounted for 12.36% of fatalities. This was a significant increase from 2016 when 0.52% of fatalities were caused by Far Right terrorism.
- Combining the data from both 2016 and 2017 shows that 0.71 people were killed and 3.24 people were injured for every Far Right attack.

Responses by Authorities

- In 2017, terrorist assailants were often not apprehended until sometime after their attack, with 33.82% of incidents seeing assailants arrested post attack. Another 26.47% of attacks involved an assailant being arrested at the time. However, 18.03% of attacks that year did not see an assailant apprehended.
- Authorities have at times responded to terror attacks by shooting assailants, sometimes fatally. In 2017, 16.18% of attacks saw at least one assailant shot and killed by the authorities. This was a decrease from 2016, when 27.78% of attacks saw at least one assailant shot and killed by the authorities.
- Islamist attacks were more likely to see an assailant shot and killed than those connected with other ideologies. Across both 2016 and 2017, 34.78% of Islamist attacks resulted in at least one assailant being shot and killed. Adding the number of Islamist attacks in which an assailant was shot and arrested, 52.17% of all Islamist attacks saw at least one assailant shot.

Area Types and Targets

- In 2017, the most common areas for terror attacks were city centres, where 52.94% of attacks occurred. The second most common area for attacks that year were suburban areas, where 36.76% of attacks occurred.

- The areas where terror attacks took place in 2017 contrasted with 2016. That year, suburban areas were more common areas for attacks, seeing 64.81% of these incidents. City centres saw 31.48% of all attacks that year.
- Civilians were among the most common targets of terrorism, with many incidents being indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Across both 2016 and 2017, 38.52% of attacks targeted civilians indiscriminately.
- There was a rise in the proportion of attacks targeting the military in 2017, with 10.29% of all attacks in Western countries having a military target. This figure stood at just 3.70% of attacks in 2016.
- Attacks exclusively targeting police declined in 2017, with 16.18% of attacks that year having police as the only target, compared to 22.22% of all attacks in 2016. Combining these figures in which police were attacked alongside a civilian target, across both 2016 and 2017, 28.69% of attacks featured attacks on police.

Type of Attack

- There has been a significant increase in the share of vehicular attacks. In 2016, 7.41% of attacks involved vehicles as weapons. This almost tripled to 20.59% of attacks, in 2017 being vehicular in nature.
- In 2017, 38.24% of all attacks involved the use of explosives in either bombings or attempted bombings. This was a reduction from 2016, when 46.30% of all attacks involved bombings or attempted bombings.
- Vehicular attacks and bombings consistently caused a significant proportion of the fatalities across both years in the study. In 2017, vehicular attacks accounted for 49.44% of all fatalities from terrorism that year, while in 2016 vehicles caused 51.31% of fatalities. Bombings were responsible for 24.72% of fatalities in 2017 and 17.28% of fatalities in 2016.
- Knives featured in 27.94% of all attacks in 2017, which is consistent with 2016, when knives featured in 27.78% of all attacks that year. The proportion of attacks using firearms decreased, however, from 20.37% of attacks in 2016 to 17.65% of attacks in 2017.
- The most common form of attack for Islamists was knife attacks. Across 2016 and 2017, 44.93% of Islamist attacks featured knives.
- The most common form of attack by the Far Right involved explosives. Across 2016 and 2017, 35.29% of attacks from this ideology took the form of bombings and attempted bombings. However, the Far Right has also increasingly used vehicles as weapons, with four such attacks in 2017 compared with none in 2016.

Organisation

- Islamic State was the most represented terrorist organisation in the study, although this declined over the two years. In 2016, 48.15% of all attacks were connected with Islamic State. While this decreased to 35.29% of all attacks in 2017, it was still far higher than any other group.
 - In 2017, the second most represented terrorist organisation was the Far Left group, Conspiracy Cells of Fire, which was linked to 7.35% of terror attacks that year.
-

- The proportion of attacks carried out by attackers not affiliated to a terrorist organisation increased across the study. In 2017, 26.47% of attacks were carried out by independent actors. This was a rise from 22.22% of attacks in 2016.

Assailants

Gender

- The assailants recorded in the study were overwhelmingly male. Of the 61 assailants identified in 2017, only one was female. In 2016, three of the 56 assailants were female.
- All four of the known female assailants recorded in the study were connected with Islamist attacks.

Age

- The average age of an assailant in 2017 was 30.79 years of age. This was older than in 2016 when the average assailant was 25.82 years old. Combining the data recorded from each year, there is a cluster of assailants with ages between 19 and 31, with 62.50% of ages recorded falling into this category.
- Islamist assailants tended to be younger than the overall average age for assailants. In 2017, the average age of an Islamist assailant was 29.10 years, while in 2016 the average age for an Islamist assailant was 23.84 years.
- Far Right assailants tended to be older than Islamist assailants. In 2017, Far Right assailants had an average age of 32.93 years. This was higher still in 2016 when 36.50 was the average age of Far Right assailants.

Place of Residence and Country of Origin

- In 2017, 45.90% of assailants had a different country of origin from the one where they committed an attack. This marked a rise from 2016, when 30.36% of assailants had a different country of origin from the one in which they carried out an attack.
- Assailants with a different country of origin were predominantly Islamist. In 2017, 66.67% of Islamist assailants had a different country of origin from the place of the attack. This had risen from 2016, when 40.54% of Islamist assailants had a different country of origin.
- Assailants were more likely to carry out an attack in their own town or city of residence, rather than travelling to a different location to perpetrate an attack. In 2017, 57.38% of assailants carried out an attack in their location of residence. This figure was higher in 2016, when 76.79% of assailants carried out attacks in their place of residence.

Known to Authorities

- A significant share of assailants were known to the authorities in connection with extremism or terrorism, prior to perpetrating an attack. In 2017, 40.98% of assailants are recorded as already being known individuals. This had reduced as a percentage from 2016, when 42.86% of assailants are believed to have been known to the authorities.

- This trend is more pronounced with Islamist terrorists. In both 2016 and 2017, more than half of Islamist assailants were already known to the authorities. In 2017, 54.76% of Islamist assailants were already known to the authorities in connection with extremism, while in 2016, 56.76% of this group of assailants were recorded as known.
- In contrast to Islamists, of Far Right assailants recorded in 2016 and 2017, only 4.35% of these individuals were recorded as having been known to the authorities in advance.

Training or Combat Experience

- A minority of attacks involved an assailant with training or combat experience. In 2017, 11.76% of attacks featured at least one assailant with training. As a percentage this was down from 2016 when 12.96% of attacks included at least one assailant with training or combat experience.
- While assailants with training or combat experience were a small minority, this group tended to cause more injuries and fatalities. Across both years, 47.24% of all people injured were victims of an attack involving a trained assailant, while 22.50% of fatalities were caused by these attacks.
- Combining the data from 2016 and 2017, on average an attack with at least one assailant with training or combat experience caused 4.20 fatalities and left 60 people injured. By contrast, attacks where no assailant had training or combat experience caused an average of 2.81 fatalities and left 12.17 people injured in each.

Introduction

This report documents the terrorist attacks that occurred in Western countries in 2017. It provides detailed accounts of these attacks and outlines what is known about those who perpetrated them. The report combines qualitative analysis of the individual attacks with a quantitative and statistical overview of aspects of the data that was collected in the course of this research. The data from 2017 is presented alongside comparable data from 2016, which has been gathered according to the same methodology and definitions used to research the 2017 attacks. In this way the study provides a degree of context for the 2017 data and a snapshot of terrorism trends as they have unfolded in the West over the previous two years.

This research comes during a period when terrorist activity has been on the rise in a number of Western countries. In addition to attacks by formally organised terrorist cells, both 2016 and 2017 witnessed multiple violent incidents perpetrated by independent, lone-acting individuals improvising with vehicles, hammers and household knives for the purpose of inflicting mass casualty attacks. There has been confusion about the nature of these incidents, with much disagreement about the extent to which these attacks can be regarded as terrorism. Better comprehension of the evolution of this phenomenon and assessment of its relation to more familiar forms of highly networked terrorism is likely to remain a core challenge for those seeking to counter terrorism in Western countries over the coming years.

This study seeks to provide greater insight into the nature of the terror threat in the West, giving further details on the places from which this threat emanates, what forms that threat takes and which targets of terrorism have been most at risk. It provides information on the kinds of attacks assailants have perpetrated, where they have carried out these attacks and the nature of the damage they have been able to inflict. It also includes analysis on the backgrounds of assailants and accused assailants, assessing such basic indicators as age, gender, place of residence, country of origin, level of combat experience and whether or not they were known to the authorities at the time of the attacks they committed. In this way the study aims to give a better indication of who has been committing terror attacks and where attention might be focussed to try to prevent terrorism in the future.

A number of other ongoing surveys of contemporary terrorism exist, and continue to be published. The research presented here differs from these surveys in a number of ways. Firstly, other projects covering this subject have tended to take either a global view or one exclusively focussed on Europe. This study is concerned with terrorism in Western liberal democracies, including North America and Australasia, as well as Europe. Secondly, whereas many other studies have exclusively focussed on providing a statistical analysis of terrorism over the course of a given year, this study gives added weight by providing a qualitative assessment of the terror attacks and includes a degree of profiling of the relevant assailants and accused assailants. Thirdly, some studies have favoured a relatively broad definition of terrorism, logging a high number of incidents that may be assumed to have had some degree of terrorist motivation or possible terrorist connection. This report intentionally seeks to avoid including more obscure or questionable cases that might not be widely recognised as being terrorist in nature.

Determining how terrorism should be defined is a contentious and increasingly politicised matter. The definition of terrorism used in this study (see Methodology) defines terrorism narrowly and sets a high bar for determining which events should be included. Specifically, the report is only concerned with attacks that employed – or attempted to employ – a significant level of violence. Of equal importance is the availability of evidence indicating that the assailants acted out of a conscious ideological motivation and intent. Incidents that do not meet both of these criteria have not been included.

This study is not an exhaustive survey of all terrorist activity in the West. While it does include failed and foiled terrorist attacks, it does not cover terror plots foiled by the security services. Nor does it seek to comprehensively document the wider networks of extremists who support terrorists either ideologically or practically. Similarly, there are any number of acts of criminal violence committed by people who may also be terrorists but which do not meet the threshold for inclusion in this study as terror attacks. Furthermore, there are other types of violence that may carry some degree of ideological motivation – such as certain hate crimes and incidents of honour-based violence – that are not included here as terror attacks.

The account provided here is restricted to terrorist attacks and attempted attacks in Western countries in 2017, presented alongside the data from 2016. Considerable debate continues about the nature of that terrorist threat and its causes, as well as the extent of its impact. This study seeks to be a modest step towards documenting the current state and ongoing trends of terrorism in the West.

Methodology and Definitions

This report uses both quantitative and qualitative research methods for documenting and assessing terror attacks in Western countries during 2017. Statistical data is also provided for attacks that occurred in the same countries during 2016.¹ The report includes terrorist attacks executed as the assailants intended, as well as attempted attacks that failed to be executed as planned.

The first section of the report gives an account of each attack from 2017 in the form of a full profile. The profiles include data fields with the available information about the attack itself as well as about the assailant or accused assailant. This is the data that forms the basis for the statistical analysis in the second part of the report. Each profile also includes a written section detailing the events of the attack, what is known about the attacker or accused attacker, and what is known about any relevant terrorist or extremist organisation that may have been linked to the attack.

The second section of the report provides a detailed statistical analysis of the data from the terror attacks that occurred in 2017. This data is compared alongside the same information from terror attacks in the previous year. This section also includes a statistical analysis of the data gathered on the individuals who have been identified as having perpetrated these attacks, or who have been convicted or charged with doing so. The information in this section includes an assessment of what kinds of terrorism have occurred over the previous two years, which ideologies have been most prevalent, what methods of attack have been used, where these attacks have occurred and what kinds of casualties these attacks have caused. Similarly, the analysis of assailants includes information on gender, age and nationality of these individuals. Where known, data is provided on those assailants who were known to authorities in connection with extremism or terrorism, and those who received training or combat experience overseas.

Defining Terrorism

There is no universally-accepted definition of terrorism. The various countries included in this research have both a wide range of government definitions for terrorism, as well as varying legal systems by which the state prosecutes and confronts wider activities associated with terrorism. There is neither agreement between international bodies, nor among the nations that belong to these institutions about how terrorism should be defined. In many instances, signatories to United Nations conventions, or members of the European Union, maintain their own distinct definitions of terrorism in addition to endorsing the definitions used by these international bodies.

The need for countries to have a concrete and workable legal definition of terrorism became particularly relevant following the attacks on 11 September 2001, with many countries updating and strengthening the counter-terror legislation on their statute books. This trend was encouraged, in part, by UN Resolution 1373 (2001) in which the Security Council mandated national governments to criminalise terrorism in their domestic laws as a serious offence.² However, the development of legislation in Western countries undoubtedly also arose in response to a growing sense on the part of governments and publics that there was a real and formidable threat – and that existing laws were not sufficiently able to confront it.

¹ Research for this report continued to collect data on 2016 and 2017 until September 2018.

² 'Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) on Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts', *United Nations and the Rule of Law*, 2001, available at: <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/security-council-resolution-1373-2001-on-threats-to-international-peace-and-security-caused-by-terrorist-acts/>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

Some have questioned the necessity of a specific law defining and criminalising terrorism, given that most activity associated with a terror attack would already be criminalised under existing laws. In his 2007 review of the subject, Lord Carlile of Berriew, at the time the United Kingdom's Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, argued for the necessity of a distinct definition of terrorism and a specific set of laws to prosecute terrorist activity, making the case on account of the severity of the threat that the UK faces from terrorists.³

Specific counter-terror legislation can be particularly crucial not simply for the purpose of prosecuting those who have committed terrorist violence, but also for the disruption of terror activity in advance of terrorists being able to carry out an attack. However, Lord Carlile also conceded that there is a great difficulty in creating a satisfactory and comprehensive definition of terrorism.⁴ In particular, there is a difficulty in finding a definition that is neither so narrow that it excludes some activities that would widely be regarded as terrorist, nor so broad as to unintentionally include acts that are not terrorism, and may not even be illegal or illegitimate.

Lord Carlile's investigation highlighted the ongoing contentions about whether violence undertaken in an allegedly just cause against oppression should be defined as terrorist in nature, or whether attacks motivated by religion, or those that seek only to damage property, should be classed as such.⁵ Other debates have focussed on what might be referred to as 'state terrorism' or terrorism by governments. As the International Law professor Ben Saul observed, "Terrorism laws make most sense when protecting a democracy from violent adversaries; less sense when they shield authoritarian states from those who rightly resist them."⁶ These are difficult to resolve questions that will necessarily challenge anyone seeking to establish a comprehensive definition of terrorism.

For the purposes of this report, a number of legal and academic definitions of terrorism were reviewed, with the need to find a narrow but robust definition. Particularly significant for this work was that any definition needed to emphasise the importance of ideological motives and avoid including violence undertaken for reasons that would be regarded as beyond the bounds of terrorism as it is commonly understood. Equally, a definition was required that would not unwittingly frame many incidents of vandalism or violent public disorder as terrorism. For the purposes of this report then, terrorism is defined as:

Acts which seek to cause fear through the use, or attempted use, of potentially lethal force or severe violence by a non-state group or individual, when seeking to further a political or religious ideological cause.

In this context "potentially lethal force or severe violence" is defined as "the intentional and direct use of weapons or improvised objects in a manner capable of killing, maiming, or causing serious lasting injury to a person". There are numerous instances where this level of force may be used in association with extremism and ideological violence, or by those groups and individuals involved with terrorism, but which nevertheless do not qualify as terror attacks for the purposes of this study. Hate crime being one of the most obvious examples.

Also excluded are incidents of non-terror related criminal acts, even when committed by terrorist groups or individuals. Similarly excluded are incidents of vigilantism by terrorist groups and individuals, violence associated with gang fighting and feuds, organised crime, violence

³ Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, 'The Definition of Terrorism', March 2007, available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228856/7052.pdf, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Saul, B., 'Terrorism as a Legal Concept', in Lennon, G. and C. Walker, *Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism* (Routledge, 2015), p. 19.

involving rioting and public disorder, violent acts of personal revenge, and incidents of so-called 'honour-based violence'.

Furthermore, the report only includes incidents where assailants have attempted to cause direct harm to human life. Accordingly, acts of arson and vandalism are not included if there are grounds to believe that the perpetrators only intended to cause damage to property, and not risk causing serious physical injuries to people in the process.

As such, incidents were included in this study if they met all of the following three criteria:

- Evidence of the use, or the attempted use, of force intended to directly cause, or risk causing, fatal or severe injuries to persons.
- Evidence of a political or religious ideology adhered to by the assailants that would serve as the motive for the act, or attempted act, of violence.
- The absence of a motive that would disqualify terrorist intent, such as: criminal activity; personal vendetta; gang feud; vigilante activity; or, severe mental illness.

Geographic Remit

This study records and analyses terror attacks that occurred and were attempted in Western countries in 2017, as well as including comparable data for 2016. For the purposes of this study, Western countries are understood as being located in three separate regions – North America, Europe and Australasia. The countries included within North America are the United States and Canada, while those in Australasia are Australia and New Zealand. Not all countries in Europe are included in this study. The European countries covered by this report are the member states of the European Union, as well as any non-member states in Western Europe, such as Norway and Switzerland.⁷

Ideology

Establishing ideological motivation, either political or religious, is a crucial element of determining whether or not an act of violence meets the criteria set for inclusion. For an attack to be recorded as terrorism in this study, there must be evidence that the assailant was associated with a particular extremist worldview and that they acted primarily out of ideological conviction derived from this worldview – it being accepted that individuals may become involved in terrorist activity for a combination of reasons or motives.

The attacks and attempted attacks recorded in this study fell within five ideological strands. These were categorised as: Far Right; Far Left; Islamist; Separatist/Nationalist; and, Black Supremacist. Acts of extremist violence and terrorism have been committed by those associated with other ideologies in previous years, such as Christian Fundamentalism, Animal Rights, Environmentalism and others. However, no incidents associated with these ideologies that met the criteria for inclusion were recorded during the two-year period covered by this report. This system of categorisation is not intended to suggest that any of these ideologies are homogenous movements or that an individual who commits a violent act on behalf of one of these ideologies will necessarily be in agreement with, or supportive of, other assailants who

⁷ The countries and territories that data was gathered for are as follows: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Denmark (and Greenland), Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, The Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The United Kingdom (and the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and Gibraltar), The United States, Vatican City.

carry out attacks under the same ideology. It is well documented that individuals and groups within these various ideological strands can often be in fierce and even violent disagreement with one another.

- **Far Right** in this study refers to a broad and diverse set of political beliefs that can be placed at the extreme end of the political spectrum, beyond mainstream conservatism, patriotism and traditionalist points of view. It encompasses various strands of authoritarianism, neo-fascism, white supremacist racism, extreme nationalism, illiberalism, extreme social conservatism, anti-Jewish conspiracies, violently anti-migrant sentiments and hatred of those from a Muslim background. Terrorist acts by the Far Right recorded in this study include those by individuals who have been inspired by aspects of Far Right belief systems, as well as by those from organisations with a consciously formulated Far Right ideology. The contemporary Far Right continues to consist of traditional nativist, white supremacist and neo-Nazi elements. However, in recent years there has also been the emergence and growth of the identitarian Alt-Right: as well as what is sometimes referred to as the counter-jihad movement; a non-unified milieu of groups and individuals who particularly focus their animosity towards Muslims and the perceived Muslim world as a whole.
 - **Far Left** refers to a wide range of political perspectives that are associated with socialist, anti-capitalist and anti-establishment beliefs. It includes those who may ascribe to hardline versions of traditional socialist, Marxist, anarchist and left-libertarian worldviews, as well as individuals belonging to such campaign movements as those for anti-globalisation, anti-war, open borders and others promoting anti-Western sentiments. Individuals aligned with this part of the political spectrum may also be supportive of causes that could be defined as distinct ideologies in their own right, including extreme environmentalism, radical feminism, militant anti-racism and so-called anti-Zionism. Acts of terrorism defined as Far Left in this study include those by individuals who acted out of adherence to any combination of the political ideas outlined above, as well as attacks carried out by groups that openly identify as militant left wing or anarchist organisations that embrace violence as a fundamental or even defining element of their activities.
 - **Islamism** is a political and religious worldview which holds that Islam provides an all-encompassing programme for the organising of society, and promotes government in accordance with Islamic principles. As such, Islamists advocate for the establishment of Islamic theocracy governed by Sharia law and support the eventual or immediate creation of an expansionist Caliphate. Many Islamists are non-violent in practice; however, others may support or actively participate in violence to achieve their objectives, justifying such acts through a particular interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence. To the further extremes of this ideology are versions of Salafi-Jihadism that promote a particularly literalist understanding of Islamic piety while also emphasising the importance of armed jihad and martyrdom in its cause. Acts of terrorism described as Islamist in this study refer to violence motivated by any form of religious or political extremism derived from an interpretation of the Islamic religion. This includes individuals who may have been loosely inspired by their understanding of this ideology, all the way through to those who acted as part of a tightly organised cell closely directed by a well-established Islamist terrorist group.
 - **Separatist/Nationalist** refers to any non-state individual, organisation or movement acting in the cause of self-determination for a national or ethnic group, or as part of a sectarian conflict associated with one or more of these causes. Those falling into this
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category do not align as one clearly definable ideology but rather are supporters of causes that all share certain fundamental commonalities. Historically, and in recent years, Europe has been impacted by incidents relating to Irish Republicans, Basque separatists, Corsican nationalists, Palestinian militants, Kurdish nationalists and those acting in connection with the conflict in Kashmir. Attacks carried out on behalf of these causes and others like them would be included under this category, as would violent acts carried out by those opposing these movements as part of associated sectarian conflicts. As such, any terrorist acts carried out by, for example, Northern Irish Unionists or Turkish groups attacking Kurdish targets would be included under this category.

- **Black Supremacist** is a term used in this study to refer to acts of terrorist violence carried out by individuals motivated by political beliefs that fall within an extreme form of Black Nationalism or anti-white hatred. Worldviews in this category have often featured a particular animosity towards Jewish people, as well as towards the authorities, primarily the police force. In the past, versions of this ideology have been promoted by those associated with Black Panther groups, the Nation of Islam and elements within the Black Hebrew Israelites. The term Black Supremacist is not intended to imply an exact parallel with White Supremacism. The two persuasions are distinctly different in both origin and character.

Hate Crime

The study makes a distinction between hate crimes and terrorism. This has become an increasingly complicated undertaking in the era of independent, lone-actor terrorism, where individuals unconnected with any formalised terrorist group are inspired by hateful ideologies to carry out small-scale and low-tech attacks. In this way, some terror attacks may share elements of the appearance of a hate crime. At the same time, hate crimes have often been influenced by wider belief systems and may include the use of lethal force, without qualifying as acts of terrorism.

As part of the research for this study, three primary points of distinction were drawn between hate crimes and terrorism so as to determine which incidents would be recorded in this report:

1. Terrorist acts are associated with a more advanced ideological or religious worldview, whereas hate crimes may merely be the result of unthinking prejudice or reflexive bigotry.
2. Terrorist acts are undertaken with some intention of fulfilling a wider ideological objective, whereas a hate crime may not be conceived of as having any intended objective beyond simply serving as an immediate outlet for personal bigotry.
3. Terrorist acts usually have some degree of premeditation, whereas hate crimes may occur spontaneously.

Determining Assailant Identity and Motive

During the time period covered by this study, a large number of unexplained violent incidents occurred which may have had the initial appearance of terrorism and might have been widely reported to the public as being terrorist acts. However, for this study, a lack of evidence for a non-terrorist motive is not proof of a terrorist one. Rather, indication of an ideological motive behind a violent act is a necessary requirement for establishing whether an attack is an act of terrorism.

In each case, determining whether an incident can be included as a terror attack requires an assessment of the nature of the assailant's motive at the time of the attack. As such, those

incidents where the identity of the perpetrator is in such doubt that an ideological motive cannot be determined or reasonably assumed have not been included in this study.

On its own, the nature of the target of an attack is not taken as sufficient evidence to determine that an incident was terrorism related. For example, the violent targeting of a particular minority may initially have the appearance of terrorism perpetrated by extremists from outside that community. In the past, however, there have been cases of incidents that were initially assumed to be terror or hate-crime related, but were later revealed to have resulted from intra-community conflicts or personal vendettas.

This study puts particular emphasis on the categorisation of the ideological nature of attacks. In 2016, a number of violent attacks were suffered by Muslims which it was initially suspected might have been carried out by those on the Far Right.⁸ In several of these cases, further investigation determined that the attacks had been carried out by Islamist terrorists or by other sectarian militants. For this reason, the target on its own cannot be assumed as definitive evidence of a terrorist motive, nor to be indicating association with a particular ideology. However, where what is regarded as an authentic claim of responsibility has been released by a known terrorist or extremist group, in most cases this would be classed as sufficient to meet the threshold for inclusion. Similarly, where law enforcement authorities are in possession of specific evidence linking an attack to a known terror group or extremist movement, this would also be taken as sufficient grounds for inclusion.

Mental Health

During the two-year period covered by this report, multiple violent incidents were perpetrated by individuals known to suffer from mental health problems. Some of these cases were terror attacks perpetrated by individuals who had a less-serious mental health issue, while others were carried out by individuals who were not primarily acting out of ideological conviction but rather who appear to have been driven by psychological issues.

Drawing a distinction between these two categories of violence is a problematic task that confronts any investigation in this area of study. Mental health issues and ideological motivation for violence are not mutually exclusive. There have been numerous cases of individuals who became involved in terrorist acts on account of a complex combination of ideological beliefs and psychological issues. Research published by the Combatting Terrorism Centre at West Point has suggested that among lone-actor Islamic State (IS) assailants in the West, a higher percentage of those merely inspired by IS - rather than those being directed by the group - had mental health problems.⁹ However, evidence presented in the same study indicated that among possible IS assailants in the West overall, a history of psychological instability was reported in 27.6% of cases; this is consistent with the levels believed to exist in the general population.¹⁰

Earlier research into mental health and far-right terrorism outlined similar trends among Islamic State-linked assailants, although these appeared to be still more pronounced. Research published in 2013 in the journal *Criminology and Public Policy* found that while 7.6% of those on the extreme right who offended had mental health issues, among lone offenders this rose to 40%.¹¹

⁸ 'Racist Motive Not Ruled Out In Rochdale Killing', *Sky News*, 19 February 2016 available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/racist-motive-not-ruled-out-in-rochdale-killing-10173279>, last visited: 10 October 2018.

⁹ Corner, E. and P. Gill, 'Is There a Nexus Between Terrorist Involvement and Mental Health in the Age of the Islamic State?', *CTC Sentinel*, January 2017.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Gruenewald, J., S. Chermak and J. D. Freilich, 'Distinguishing "loner" attacks from other domestic extremist violence: A comparison of far-right homicide. Incident and offender characteristics', *Criminology and Public Policy*, February 2013, Volume 12, Issue 1.

A further area of terrorist activity in which mental health and genuine terrorist intent are not mutually exclusive is where those with mental health issues or severe learning difficulties might be exploited by those seeking to mastermind and direct terror attacks. The Metropolitan Police in the United Kingdom have previously warned that Islamic State has actively sought to recruit those with mental health issues.¹² Examples of this tactic have been more explicitly seen in cases of suicide bombings in conflict zones in Middle Eastern countries. However, no such instances are believed to have occurred in the time period or geographic remit of this report.

Research for this project did not offer the opportunity to carry out any kind of psychological assessment of those accused of carrying out the attacks recorded in the study. Where questions around the mental health of an accused assailant have arisen, judgement on inclusion has largely relied upon independent assessments carried out by the authorities regarding the individual's capacity to stand trial and the degree to which they were culpable for their actions at the time at which the attack happened. These assessments, along with any publicly available information about the mental health history of an individual, have been taken into account when determining whether an attack can be classed as terrorism. In a substantial number of cases the perpetrators of these attacks are either dead or yet to be identified and apprehended. This necessarily represents a further limitation with regard to assessment of mental health.

Data Collection

The information in this study was collected from open-source material. This primarily consisted of reporting from online news sites as well as material found through the Nexis online archive. Some of the data in the study was sourced from publicly available government reports documenting and investigating terror attacks. The incidents documented were also cross referenced against other databases of terror attacks that have been published, such as the annual Country Reports on Terrorism released by the US State Department,¹³ or by research institutions such as the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START) led by the University of Maryland.¹⁴

The data has been collected by a team of researchers who closely monitored news reports throughout 2016, 2017 and 2018. Researchers with fluency in numerous relevant European languages collected news stories from both the British and international press, cataloguing all incidents that had the potential to meet the study's criteria for inclusion. As noted above, a high proportion of these incidents were disqualified on account of not falling within the study's definition of terrorism.

As with any database of this nature, it is not possible to guarantee that no events that qualify for inclusion have gone undocumented. As well as the possibility that the research for this study missed reports of certain attacks, it is also possible that some minor incidents were not reported or known to the press. The authorities in the different countries covered by this report have varying policies as to how much information they release about foiled plots, and about the arrested and convicted assailants in the successful attacks. It is a limitation of this research that the full information could not be found or adequately verified for several attacks and assailants recorded in this report. It is also possible that some of the incidents excluded from this report, owing to lack of evidence sufficiently demonstrating that they were terrorist in nature, would have met the threshold for inclusion had more evidence been available.

¹² Whitehead, T., 'Jihadi John and Isis "trying to inspire terrorist cult of misfits and mentally ill to commit atrocities"', *The Telegraph*, 21 April 2015, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11553271/Jihadi-John-and-Isil-trying-to-inspire-terrorist-cult-of-misfits-and-mentally-ill-to-commit-atrocities.html>, last visited: 10 October 2018

¹³ 'Country Reports on Terrorism 2016', *US Department of State*, available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

¹⁴ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism And Responses To Terrorism, *University of Maryland*, available at: <http://www.start.umd.edu/>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

Profile Structure

The Attack

Date: The date on which the attack took place.

Day: The day of the week on which the attack took place.

Time: The time of day at the location where the attack happened.

Country: The nation state in which the attack took place.

Place: The city, town or other nearest settlement in which a terror attack took place.

Area Type: A basic description of the area in which an attack was carried out. This is broken down first as to whether the attack took place in a built up urban centre (referred to as City Centre in the study), a Suburban Area, a smaller or more isolated community (referred to as a Small Town in the study), or if the attack took place outside any significant settlement then this is recorded as being in a Rural Area. This data field provides an additional subcategory giving further details on the nature of the area of the attack. Included is information about whether the district is primarily residential or commercial, whether it is a government district, associated with education such as a university campus, or whether the vicinity could be described as a familiar landmark, particularly if the attack took place at a location with iconic international status.

Location: Further information on the premises where the attack took place. This specifically concerns the type of institution, building or means of transport that may have been targeted as part of the terror attack. Additionally, a subcategory of information is provided where relevant, specifying whether the attack took place inside the building or to the building's exterior.

Type of Attack: Specifying the category of force or weaponry employed by assailants as part of the attack, detailing whether the attack included the use of firearms, a bladed weapon, the use of a vehicle as a weapon or a form of explosive, including rudimentary Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and, where appropriate, types of petrol bombs and bombs featuring gas canisters. Suicide bombings are listed as a separate form of attack under this category. Entries under this data field also specify whether an attack was attempted but failed to come to fruition, or if the attack was foiled by the authorities or members of the public. Disrupted plots are not included in the study.

Target: The type of person or people towards which the terrorist violence was directed, or who are believed to have been the intended target, as part of the attack. This is broken down into whether those being targeted were police, military or civilians. Additionally, it is specified whether or not the attack was directed towards civilians indiscriminately or whether specific types of civilians were targeted. Where required, this section also provides a subcategory of information detailing the group of civilians being intentionally targeted. This may be a minority religious group or a particular ethnicity or community. In other cases, there is specification as to whether a civilian, group of civilians or civilian institution was targeted on account of their political views and associations, or because of a particular position of office that they might have held.

Ideology: The worldview that inspired those who committed the attack or sought to commit the attack. This is broken down into five primary ideologies that have driven the documented incidents of terrorism. These include Far Right, Far Left, Islamist, Black Supremacist and Separatist/Nationalist.

Organisation/Affiliation: Any known terrorist or extremist organisation connected to the assailant and believed to be relevant to the assailant's decision to carry out the attack. The nature of the relationship between the assailant and the organisation is also specified as a subcategory.

The term "Directed" is used to indicate where an assailant is believed to have been in communication with a terrorist group that has knowingly been involved with preparations for the attack or its execution. In some instances, this will have involved an individual having been dispatched by the group to carry out a specific and carefully organised attack. In other cases, an assailant may have been provided with instructions for carrying out the attack, or they may have been in communication with a member of a terrorist organisation who was providing general guidance and encouragement to carry out the attack.

The relationship will be listed as "Affiliated" in those instances where an assailant has membership or some other connection with an extremist or a terrorist group without that group having been directly involved in carrying out or assisting with the attack.

The assailant is described as "Inspired" when they have carried out an attack in the name of a particular organisation, or are otherwise believed to have acted upon the general encouragement of a terror group, without actually receiving direction, support or communication from that group. Evidence that an assailant supported a terror group and carried out an attack in line with that group's promoted methods and targets can also be taken as grounds for describing an attack as being "Inspired".

The relationship is listed as "Suspected" where there is a lack of further evidence confirming the nature of the relationship with a group, but where there are nevertheless reasonable grounds for believing that such a connection exists.

Claimed: Confirmation of whether or not a terrorist group has publicly released a claim of responsibility for a specific attack. Not all of these claims may be truthful. Terrorist groups – such as Islamic State – may claim attacks and specifically release statements naming assailants as their "soldiers" when there is no known evidence of the individual having any communications or interactions with that group. These claims are still recorded in this report. However, the study does seek to avoid inauthentic claims, such as any statement by a third party claiming responsibility for an attack on behalf of a group of which they are not a member.

Number of Injured: The number of individuals injured in the course of the terror attack. This figure includes both those who may have been hospitalised with severe injuries and those who may have only required minimal medical attention. The figure does not include any assailants who may have been injured during the attack or by security forces responding to the attack.

Number of Fatalities: The number of individuals killed in the course of the terror attack, as well as those who may have later died of injuries sustained during the attack. The figure does not include any assailants who may have been killed during the attack or by security forces responding to the attack.

Response: The action taken against the assailant by the authorities in reaction to the attack or attempted attack. It details the immediate action taken at the first point at which the authorities were able to apprehend the assailant or would-be assailant, rather than providing information on whether the assailant was prosecuted or is currently serving a prison sentence.

The (Accused) Assailant(s)

Number: The number of individuals accused of being directly involved with carrying out the attack.

Gender: Detailing whether the individual accused of carrying out the attack is male or female.

Name(s): The name of the individual accused of carrying out the attack.

Age(s): The age of the individual accused of carrying out the attack, at the time at which the attack occurred.

Country of Origin: The country of birth and original place of nationality of the individual accused of the attack. In most cases this is also the country in which the individual was raised for at least the early part of childhood.

Nationality: The nationality of the individual accused of the attack at the time at which the attack occurred.

Resident: The city, town or community inhabited by the individual accused of the attack at the time at which the attack occurred.

Training/Combat Experience: Detailing whether or not the accused assailant received military, combat or bomb making training and instruction, or was involved in armed conflict, either at home or overseas. This would include those who served in a conventional military force of a nation state. It would not include those who might have trained themselves, such as those accessing online instructions for bomb making purposes.

Known to Authorities: Detailing whether an accused assailant was known to the authorities in the country where they carried out an attack, in connection with terrorism or extremism. This might include those being actively monitored by intelligence services as part of a live terror investigation, those who were previously monitored as part of a terror investigation, those known to the authorities but not under active surveillance, and those reported to the authorities over concerns about terrorism or extremism.

Current Status: The legal status of the accused assailant at the time at which this study was undertaken.

Attacks in 2017

1. Florence Bookshop Bombing

The Attack

Date: 1 January 2017

Day: Sunday

Time: 5.30 am

Country: Italy

Place: Florence

Area Type: Suburban – Commercial & Residential

Location: Shop – Exterior

Type of Attack: Bombing

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Political)

Ideology: Far Left

Organisation/Affiliation: Unknown

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 1

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailants

Number: 2

Gender: Male

Names: Pierloredo Fallanca, Giovanni Ghezzi

Ages: 30, 31

Country of Origin: Italy

Nationalities: Italian

Resident: Florence

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Unknown

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

In the early hours of 1 January, an explosive device detonated as a police bomb disposal team approached the object.¹⁵ The detonation, which is believed to have been triggered by timer, happened at 5.30 am, badly injuring one of the men in the bomb disposal unit.¹⁶ The victim lost a hand and an eye in the explosion.¹⁷ The bomb, which had been hidden in a shopping bag, was discovered by a police patrol car passing through the Coverciano neighbourhood of Florence.¹⁸ The target was the right-wing Il Bargello bookshop associated with the Italian fascist group CasaPound.¹⁹ The bookshop had reportedly been the target of two similar attacks over the previous 12-month period.²⁰ Following the explosion, on 1 January, a cryptic and satirical message celebrating the attack was posted on the Italian anarchic website Finimondo.²¹

¹⁵ 'Bomb at Florence far right bookshop', *The Times*, 2 January 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/bomb-at-bookshop-wounds-officer-wz63wp62g>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ 'Five anarchists arrested over Florence New Year bomb', *ANSA English*, 3 August 2017, available at: http://www.ansa.it/english/news/2017/08/03/five-anarchists-arrested-over-florence-new-year-bomb-2_1196754b-96c0-42c7-932a-9b838e5eee32.html, last visited: 3 September 2018.

¹⁸ 'Bomb at Florence far right bookshop', *The Times*, 2 January 2017.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ 'Chi ben comincia', *Finimondo*, 1 January 2017, available at: <https://finimondo.org/node/1976>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

Another anarchist news site reported on 4 January that police were carrying out searches among anarchist circles in Florence and Tuscany, with the prosecutor carrying out investigations on the grounds of attempted murder.²² However, there appeared to be no further declaration of responsibility.

On 3 August Italian police and counter-terror personnel raided several properties in Florence that were being used by anarchists, during which they evicted a number of people squatting in the buildings.²³ In the course of the raids in the Galluzzo neighbourhood south of Florence, two of the anarchists held out for ten hours on the roof of the La Riottosa house before being arrested.²⁴ In addition to arresting five individuals in relation to the January CasaPound bookshop bombing, police took another three individuals into custody in relation to Molotov cocktail attacks on a Florence police barracks in April 2017.²⁵

While it was subsequently determined that the majority of those detained in the raids had not been connected to the bombing, in October the Florence Review Tribunal ruled that 30-year-old Pierloredo Fallanca and 31-year-old Giovanni Ghezzi would have to remain in custody.²⁶ Both Fallanca and Ghezzi faced allegations of having constructed the explosive used in the Florence bookshop attack.²⁷ During the course of the investigation into the attack, it was revealed that the bomb-makers had received some training from a more experienced anarchist bomb-maker from Turin.²⁸ According to the October report, Fallanca was also being held in prison for membership of a criminal anarchist group,²⁹ while the 30-year-old anarchist Salvatore Vespertino has also been held in prison since the arrests on 3 August.³⁰ Nicola Almerigogna, 34, was also found to have criminal association with the anarchist group, although not in connection with the bombing itself.³¹

2. Gothenburg Migrant Centre Bombing

The Attack

Date: 5 January 2017

Day: Thursday

Time: 3.30 pm

Country: Sweden

Place: Gothenburg

Area Type: Suburban – Residential

Location: Migrant Centre – Exterior

²² 'Italy: Bomb against neo-fascist bookshop, a bomb disposal cop wounded & anarchist places raided', *Insurrection News Worldwide*, 4 January 2017, available at: <https://insurrectionnewsworldwide.com/2017/01/04/italy-bomb-against-neo-fascist-bookshop-a-bomb-disposal-cop-wounded-anarchist-places-raided/>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

²³ 'Blitz contro gli anarchici accusati della bomba di Capodanno a Firenze e di un attacco in caserma. Si rifugiano sul tetto per scappare', *Huffington Post*, 3 August 2017, available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2017/08/03/blitz-contro-gli-anarchici-accusati-della-bomba-di-capodanno-a-f_a_23063026/, last visited: 3 September 2018.

²⁴ 'Firenze, otto arresti fra gli anarchici per gli attentati a una libreria e alla caserma dei carabinieri', *Repubblica*, 3 August 2017, available at: http://firenze.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/08/03/news/arrestati_gli_autori_dell_attentato_di_capodanno_a_firenze_un_agente_aveva_perso_una_mano_e_un_occhio-172230445/?refresh_ce, last visited: 3 September 2018.

²⁵ 'Blitz contro gli anarchici accusati della bomba di Capodanno a Firenze e di un attacco in caserma. Si rifugiano sul tetto per scappare', *Huffington Post*, 3 August 2017.

²⁶ 'I due anarchici devono andare in carcere', *QUI News*, 26 October 2017, available at: <http://www.quinewsfirenze.it/firenze-i-due-anarchici-vanno-in-carcere.htm>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

²⁷ 'Firenze, bomba a libreria Casapound: da riesame carcere per 2 anarchici', *il Gironale*, 26 October 2017, available at: <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/firenze-bomba-libreria-casapound-riesame-carcere-2-anarchici-1456621.html>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

²⁸ 'Firenze, otto arresti fra gli anarchici per gli attentati a una libreria e alla caserma dei carabinieri', *Repubblica*, 3 August 2017.

²⁹ 'Firenze, bomba a libreria Casapound: da riesame carcere per 2 anarchici', *il Gironale*, 26 October 2017.

³⁰ 'I due anarchici devono andare in carcere', *QUI News*, 26 October 2017.

³¹ 'Firenze, bomba a libreria Casapound: da riesame carcere per 2 anarchici', *il Gironale*, 26 October 2017.

Type of Attack: Bombing

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Anti-migrant), (Political)

Ideology: Far Right

Organisation/Affiliation: Nordic Resistance Movement – Affiliated

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 1

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Assailants

Number: 3

Gender: Male

Names: Anton Thulin, Viktor Melin, Jimmy Jonasson

Ages: 20, 23, 50

Country of Origin: Sweden

Nationalities: Swedish

Resident: Gothenburg

Training/Combat Experience: Yes

Known to Authorities: Unknown

Current Status: Sentenced – Anton Thulin to One Year and Six Months (increased to One Year and Ten Months), Viktor Melin to Eight Years and Six Months (reduced to Six Years and Six Months), Jimmy Jonasson to Five Years (reduced to Two Years and Six Months)

NOTES:

In late 2016 and early 2017, the Swedish city of Gothenburg was the target of a number of bombings and attempted bombings by a far-right cell of individuals associated with the Nordic Resistance Movement, a neo-Nazi organisation.³² The bombings, involving small and not always successful explosive devices, targeted locations where they were likely to injure or kill newly arrived migrants to Sweden, as well as individuals associated with the left. The rudimentary explosives used in the attacks had included home-made dynamite, a further stockpile of which was discovered during the course of the investigation.³³

The first of the attacks took place on 11 November 2016, when an explosive device detonated outside the Syndikalistiskt Forum Kafe in Gothenburg, which is a location known to be frequented by those on the political left.³⁴ No one was injured in the explosion, although windows were shattered and there was some external damage to the building.³⁵ The timing of the attack may have been significant, as it happened during the night; it is unclear whether this was intended to cause human injury. However, the bombing came ahead of anti-fascist action being planned by left-wing activists against an upcoming Nordic Resistance Movement march in Stockholm.³⁶ Regardless of the timing of this explosion, the chamber prosecutor noted that the location of the bomb meant that people could have been killed.³⁷

³² 'Trio locked up over Gothenburg bomb attacks', *The Local*, 7 July 2017, available at: <https://www.thelocal.se/20170707/trio-locked-up-over-gothenburg-bomb-attacks-sweden-neo-nazi>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

³³ 'These Swedish Nazis Trained In Russia Before Bombing A Center For Asylum Seekers', *Buzzfeed*, 22 July 2017, available at: https://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/these-swedish-nazis-trained-in-russia?utm_term=.ucl36exPB#.heoq38G9L, last visited: 3 September 2018.

³⁴ 'Trio locked up over Gothenburg bomb attacks', *The Local*, 7 July 2017.

³⁵ 'Gothenburg Infoshop Syndicalist Forum rocked by explosion, but damage limited', *Libcom*, 12 November 2016, available at: <https://libcom.org/forums/news/gothenburg-infoshop-syndicalist-forum-rocked-explosion-damage-limited-12112016>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ 'Därför får nazisten Viktor Melin sänkt straff efter bombdåden', *GP*, 21 September 2017, available at: <http://www.gp.se/nyheter/g%C3%B6teborg/d%C3%A4rf%C3%B6r-f%C3%A5r-nazisten-viktor-melin-s%C3%A4nkt-straff-efter-bombd%C3%A5den-1.4656832>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

The second attack took place on 5 January 2017, when an explosive device detonated at 3.30 pm outside a migrant centre in the Frolunda area of Gothenburg.³⁸ The device had been placed inside a large rubbish container and was triggered when a cleaner attempted to empty the waste container.³⁹ The victim sustained serious injuries to his legs as a result of the explosion.⁴⁰

The third incident occurred on 25 January when an explosive device – which had apparently failed to detonate – was discovered at the Lilleby campsite⁴¹ in Gothenburg, which was also being used to temporarily house migrants.⁴²

On 2 February three suspects were arrested in connection with the three attacks. The Swedish intelligence service Sapo released a statement confirming that the attacks were linked and believed to have been driven by a political motive.⁴³ Sweden's anti-terror prosecutor also confirmed that all of the suspects "are or were in the past members of the Nordic Resistance Movement".⁴⁴ Indeed, the leader of the group, 23-year-old Viktor Melin, appears to have become prominent within the local Gothenburg branch of the Nordic Resistance Movement and in February 2016 was made a *Kampgruppschef* (Battle Group Chief) within the organisation.⁴⁵ In August 2016, just months before the first attack in November 2016, Melin and 19-year-old Anton Thulin – another of the Gothenburg bombers – travelled to St Petersburg and, once in Russia, underwent 11 days of paramilitary training arranged through the Russian Imperial Movement,⁴⁶ a right-wing group that has been allied with the Nordic Resistance Movement, including through the transfer of financial support.⁴⁷ During a raid on Melin's apartment the police discovered Russian documents on weapons and explosives; pictures of the two men posing with machine guns in Russia were also found to have been posted on social media by the Partisan training course.⁴⁸

As a teenager, Viktor Melin committed a number of criminal offences relating to robbery and drug abuse, and spent time in a youth detention centre and later prison, where he participated in an aggression replacement therapy programme.⁴⁹ Having lost a job in construction, Melin appears to have become involved with the Nordic Resistance Movement in early 2016.⁵⁰ At this time Melin participated in a far-right radio discussion in which he explained that he had first become interested in right-wing politics two years previously, and spoke of how he "saw the Muslims as a big problem" and also made reference to "the Jewish Question".⁵¹ He had joined a small group of other men from the Nordic Resistance Movement in vigilante night patrols around Gothenburg that purported to protect Swedish women, with Melin explaining "there are many racial foreigners, drug dealing, pure and simple decadence."⁵²

³⁸ 'Police suspect Gothenburg trash explosion was attempted murder', *the Local*, 11 January 2017, available at: <https://www.thelocal.se/20170111/police-suspect-gothenburg-trash-explosion-was-attempted-murder>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ 'Här är de dömda nazisterna', *GP*, 4 February 2017, available at: <http://www.gp.se/nyheter/g%C3%B6teborg/h%C3%A4r-%C3%A4r-de-d%C3%B6mda-nazisterna-1.4144949>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁴² 'Swedish neo-Nazis held over Gothenburg refugee centre blast', *the Local*, 3 February 2017, available at: <https://www.thelocal.se/20170203/swedish-neo-nazis-held-over-gothenburg-refugee-centre-blast>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ 'Dömd: Viktor Melins väg till nazismen', *GP*, 22 September 2017, available at: <http://www.gp.se/nyheter/g%C3%B6teborg/d%C3%B6md-viktor-melins-v%C3%A4g-till-nazismen-1.4659660>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁴⁶ 'These Swedish Nazis Trained In Russia Before Bombing A Center For Asylum Seekers', *Buzzfeed*, 22 July 2017.

⁴⁷ 'Intent on Unsettling E.U., Russia Taps Foot Soldiers From the Fringe', *The New York Times*, 24 December 2016, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/24/world/europe/intent-on-unsettling-eu-russia-taps-foot-soldiers-from-the-fringe.html>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁴⁸ 'These Swedish Nazis Trained In Russia Before Bombing A Center For Asylum Seekers', *Buzzfeed*, 22 July 2017.

⁴⁹ 'Dömd: Viktor Melins väg till nazismen', *GP*, 22 September 2017.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

It appears, however, that during 2016, as the Nordic Resistance Movement was experiencing a period of growth, the organisation was also seeking to transition its image from being associated with street thuggery to one of a party participating in the national political process. Transcripts from Skype conversations between Viktor Melin and Anton Thulin that took place in early November 2016 after they had returned from Russia, and shortly before the attack on the Syndikalistiskt Forum Kafe, show that the two men rejected claims by the Nordic Resistance Movement that the group could achieve its National Socialist objectives “peacefully and democratically”.⁵³

Fifty-year-old Jimmy Jonasson, who was also part of the Nordic Resistance Movement, appears to have been a less integral part of Melin’s terror cell,⁵⁴ having likely only had a direct role in assisting with two of the attacks.⁵⁵ However, there is also evidence that it was Jonasson who was responsible for providing the group with explosive materials.⁵⁶ When the case came to trial, both Viktor Melin and Jimmy Jonasson were acquitted of attempted murder, with the court judging that there was reasonable doubt as to whether the men really intended to kill or injure through the attacks.⁵⁷ Rather, the court found that they were responsible for acts that posed danger to human life or health.⁵⁸ Anton Thulin’s conviction was for attempted public destruction with regard to the explosive device placed at the Lilleby camping ground.⁵⁹

3. January PASOK Office Shooting

The Attack

Date: 10 January 2017

Day: Tuesday

Time: 6.00 am (approximate)

Country: Greece

Place: Athens

Area Type: City Centre – Commercial

Location: Political Office – Exterior

Type of Attack: Shooting

Target: Police & Civilian – Targeted (Political)

Ideology: Far Left

Organisation/Affiliation: Revolutionary Self-Defence – Directed

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 1

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Not Apprehended

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Unknown

⁵³ ‘These Swedish Nazis Trained In Russia Before Bombing A Center For Asylum Seekers’, *Buzzfeed*, 22 July 2017.

⁵⁴ ‘Viktor Melin, 23, sprängde städare’, *Expressen GT*, 7 July 2017, available at: <https://www.expressen.se/gt/aklagaren-viktor-melin-23-gick-till-bombattack/>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁵⁵ ‘Därför får nazisten Viktor Melin sänkt straff efter bombdåden’, *GP*, 21 September 2017.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ ‘Viktor Melin, 23, sprängde städare’, *Expressen GT*, 7 July 2017.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

Name: Unknown
Ages: Unknown
Country of Origin: Unknown
Nationality: Unknown
Resident: Unknown
Training/Combat Experience: Unknown
Known to Authorities: Unknown
Current Status: At Large

NOTES:

The Greek authorities reported that a police officer was injured when shots were fired in a pre-dawn attack outside the offices of the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in central Athens.⁶⁰ Following the shooting, which happened shortly before 6.00 am, the injured police officer was treated for what were described as non-life-threatening injuries, including shrapnel wounds to the chest and leg.⁶¹ Shots were also fired at a policeman stationed at a guard post outside the PASOK office, while a further three bullets caused damage to a parked police bus.⁶² The police reported that CCTV footage showed the assailant using a “Kalashnikov-style assault rifle” and that the attacker had fled on foot.⁶³

It remains unclear whether the shooting was only targeting the anti-riot police guarding the offices of the political party or whether the offices themselves were being specifically targeted. The leader of PASOK, Fofi Gennimata, said of the attack, “This was a murderous, terrorist attack – an attack against the police and the party they were guarding, an institution of our democracy.”⁶⁴ It has also been noted that the area is known to be a place where police and anarchist groups have often clashed.⁶⁵

While there was no immediate claim of responsibility, the authorities stated that they had reason to believe that the anarchist guerrilla group Revolutionary Self-Defence was behind the action and that the attack was likely to have been in response to the recent arrest of Panagiota Roupa, a leader of the anarchist group Revolutionary Struggle.⁶⁶ Forensic evidence gathered from the scene of the attack established that the same firearm had been used in this shooting as during previous attacks claimed by Revolutionary Self-Defence, including at the Mexican Embassy in Athens in July 2016.⁶⁷ The PASOK office in Athens had suffered an armed attack in May 2014 which was believed to have been carried out by the same anarchist guerrilla group,⁶⁸ and in November 2016 Revolutionary Self-Defence claimed responsibility for a hand-grenade attack on the French Embassy in Athens.⁶⁹ At the time of the November attack the group released a statement threatening further attacks on the police and justifying its previous attacks by saying, “The political aim of the Revolutionary Self-Defence Group in

⁶⁰ ‘Greece: Policeman injured in shooting at political party’, *CNBC*, 10 January 2017, available at: <https://www.cnbcm.com/2017/01/10/greece-policeman-injured-in-shooting-at-political-party.html>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁶¹ ‘Policeman injured in shooting at political party’, *Daily Mail*, 10 January 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-4104438/Greece-Policeman-injured-shooting-political-party.html>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁶² ‘Greek police sees active group behind attack at PASOK offices’, *Ekathimerini*, 10 January 2017, available at: <http://www.ekathimerini.com/215163/article/ekathimerini/news/greek-police-sees-active-group-behind-attack-at-pasok-offices>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ ‘Policeman injured in shooting at political party’, *Daily Mail*, 10 January 2017.

⁶⁵ ‘Greece: Policeman injured in shooting at political party’, *CNBC*, 10 January 2017.

⁶⁶ ‘Greek police sees active group behind attack at PASOK offices’, *Ekathimerini*, 10 January 2017.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ ‘Guerrilla group claims responsibility for attack at French embassy in Athens’, *Reuters*, 14 November 2016, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-france-diplomacy-attack/guerrilla-group-claims-responsibility-for-attack-at-french-embassy-in-athens-idUSKBN1392M6?il=0>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

all three armed interventions was clear: attacking the state oligarchy, the dictatorship of the capital and its armed guards.”⁷⁰

For more information on attacks by Revolutionary Self-Defence, see the entry for “65. November PASOK Office Shooting”.

4. January Belfast Foiled Roadside Bomb

The Attack

Date: 14 January 2017

Day: Saturday

Time: Unknown

Country: United Kingdom

Place: Belfast

Area Type: Suburban – Residential

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Foiled Bombing

Target: Police

Ideology: Separatist/Nationalist

Organisation/Affiliation: Oglaiigh na hEireann (ONH)

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Not Apprehended

The Assailants

Number: Unknown

Gender: Unknown

Name: Unknown

Age: Unknown

Country of Origin: Unknown

Nationality: Unknown

Resident: Unknown

Training/Combat Experience: Unknown

Known to Authorities: Unknown

Current Status: At Large

NOTES:

On the evening of Saturday, 14 January, police were alerted to a suspicious device that had been observed in the Poleglass area of West Belfast, Northern Ireland.⁷¹ The authorities confirmed that the object was in fact a viable explosive device.⁷² In a statement, police said that the bomb was intended to kill, and that although the police were the target, the explosive could also have maimed or killed a member of the public.⁷³ An army bomb disposal team was brought in to

⁷⁰ “‘Revolutionary Self-Defense Group’ claims responsibility for grenade in French Embassy”, *Keep Talking Greece*, 15 November 2016, available at: <http://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2016/11/15/revolutionary-self-defense-group-claims-responsibility-for-grenade-in-french-embassy/>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁷¹ ‘Poleglass alert: Police say explosive device was ‘designed to kill’’, *BBC News*, 15 January 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38629910>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Millar, J., ‘Police targeted by ROADSIDE BOMB in Belfast’, *Express*, 15 January 2017, available at: <https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/754545/belfast-bomb-psni-Brian-Well-Road>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

remove the device.⁷⁴ Days later, on 18 January, it was reported that the breakaway Republican group Oglaiġ na hEireann (ONH) had claimed responsibility for the attempted attack.⁷⁵

Primarily based in Belfast, the group first came into being in 2009 as part of a split within the Real IRA involving a dispute over the organisation's new leadership.⁷⁶ Since its establishment the group has carried out dozens of attacks on security forces, as well as so-called punishment shootings.⁷⁷ As well as using car bombs to target the police and disrupt elections, ONH has also been known to force taxi drivers to deliver bombs.⁷⁸ In 2010, it was suggested that the group consisted of about 50 members and was recruiting in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.⁷⁹ In addition to ramping up attempts to purchase firearms, ONH has also focussed on manufacturing home-made explosives.⁸⁰

It has been widely suggested that the Republican Network for Unity (RNU) functions as the political wing of Oglaiġ na hEireann, with the group having been heavily infiltrated and its chairman, Carl Reilly, having faced charges for membership of an illegal organisation and for directing terrorism.⁸¹ In April 2017, during the RNU's annual Easter commemoration held in North Belfast, leading members of the organisation indicated that they might be ready for a long-term ceasefire.⁸²

In late January 2018, just over a year after the attempted roadside bomb in Poleglass, it was reported that ONH had declared a ceasefire.⁸³

5. North Belfast Petrol Station Shooting

The Attack

Date: 22 January 2017

Day: Sunday

Time: 7.30 pm

Country: United Kingdom

Place: Belfast

Area Type: Suburban – Residential

Location: Shop – Exterior

Type of Attack: Shooting

Target: Police

Ideology: Separatist/Nationalist

Organisation/Affiliation: New IRA – Directed

⁷⁴ 'Poleglass alert: Police say explosive device was 'designed to kill'', *BBC News*, 15 January 2017.

⁷⁵ Morris, A., 'ONH claim bomb intended to kill police officers', *The Irish News*, 18 January 2017, available at: <http://www.irishnews.com/paywall/tsb/irishnews/irishnews/irishnews/news/2017/01/18/news/onh-claim-bomb-intended-to-kill-police-officers-890180/content.html>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁶ O'Driscoll, S., 'Dissident republicans Oglaiġ na hEireann hint at permanent ceasefire', *The Belfast Telegraph*, 18 April 2017, available at: <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/dissident-republicans-oglaigh-na-heireann-hint-at-permanent-ceasefire-35629987.html>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁷ O'Driscoll, S., 'Óglaiġ na hEireann set to call a ceasefire', *The Times*, 18 April 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/glaigh-na-h-ireann-set-to-call-a-ceasefire-9spmglvzhz>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Brady, T., 'Oglaiġ na hEireann is now the main threat', *The Belfast Telegraph*, 2 December 2010, available at: <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/oglaigh-na-heireann-is-now-the-main-threat-28573986.html?r=RSS>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ O'Driscoll, S., 'Óglaiġ na hEireann set to call a ceasefire', *The Times*, 18 April 2017.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ 'Dissident group Óglaiġ na hEireann calls ceasefire', *BBC News*, 23 January 2018, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-42786530>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 1

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Not Apprehended

The Assailants

Number: Unknown

Gender: Unknown

Name: Unknown

Age: Unknown

Country of Origin: Unknown

Nationality: Unknown

Resident: Unknown

Training/Combat Experience: Unknown

Known to Authorities: Unknown

Current Status: At Large

NOTES:

At around 7.30pm on the evening of Sunday 22 January, police officers came under fire at the Edenderry petrol station on the Crumlin Road in North Belfast.⁸⁴ A police officer in his twenties was hit two or three times in the arm and subsequently underwent emergency surgery in hospital with non-life-threatening injuries.⁸⁵ It was reported that during the attack as many as ten shots were fired from an automatic weapon.⁸⁶ Some initial reports claimed that the shots had been fired from a car in a drive-by shooting scenario,⁸⁷ although Chief Constable George Hamilton later said that this was unlikely and instead suggested that the assailant may have been lying in wait behind a nearby fence.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the police believed that a burned-out red Audi found in West Belfast on the evening of the attack was the likely getaway car.⁸⁹

Shortly after the attack a 36-year-old man was arrested, but after being held for nearly 48 hours he was later released unconditionally.⁹⁰ The man in question is understood to be a well-known North Belfast republican, although his lawyers questioned the appropriateness of this arrest.⁹¹ The following day a 30-year-old man and a 39-year-old man were taken in for questioning and later released.⁹² On Wednesday 25 January, two more men were arrested in the West of Belfast on suspicion of being connected with the attack.⁹³ However, the men, aged 18 and 33, were also both later released without charge.⁹⁴

⁸⁴ 'Man arrested after officer wounded in Belfast drive-by shooting', *The Irish Times*, 23 January 2017, available at: <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/man-arrested-after-officer-wounded-in-belfast-drive-by-shooting-1.2947077>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁸⁵ 'Belfast gun attack: 'New IRA' says it shot police officer', *BBC News*, 25 January 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38742705>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ 'Man arrested after officer wounded in Belfast drive-by shooting', *The Irish Times*, 23 January 2017, available at: <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/man-arrested-after-officer-wounded-in-belfast-drive-by-shooting-1.2947077>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁸⁸ 'Crumlin Road shooting suspect "lay in wait across the road"', *Belfast Live*, 23 January 2017, available at: <http://www.belfastlive.co.uk/news/belfast-news/crumlin-road-shooting-suspect-lay-12493653>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁸⁹ 'Dissident 'IRA' group say they shot PSNI officer in north Belfast', *The Irish Times*, 25 January 2017, available at: <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/2017/01/25/news/-ira-say-they-shot-psni-officer-in-north-belfast-903472/>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁹⁰ 'Police probing shooting of NI officer release man unconditionally', *Belfast Telegraph*, 24 January 2017, available at: <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/police-probing-shooting-of-ni-officer-release-man-unconditionally-35395287.html>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁹¹ 'Dissident 'IRA' group say they shot PSNI officer in north Belfast', *The Irish Times*, 25 January 2017.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ 'Belfast gun attack: Two men released after PSNI officer shot', *BBC News*, 28 June 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-40429160>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

Days after the attack, on 25 the January, it was reported that the republican dissident group the New IRA had claimed responsibility for the attack, describing the shooting as a targeted attempt to kill two police officers.⁹⁵ The group said that the attack had been planned for several months and that it had been monitoring the movements of the police.⁹⁶ The same group is accused of carrying out a number of similar actions, including in 2013 when shots were fired at a passing police vehicle through Ardroyne in North Belfast, as well as in November 2015 when a stationary police vehicle was fired upon in Rosnareen, West Belfast.⁹⁷

The New IRA has been identified as one of the most dangerous of the republican dissident groups and is understood to be a loose amalgamation of other vigilante and paramilitary groups, such as the Real IRA and Republican Action Against Drugs.⁹⁸ The alignment came together in 2012, simply calling itself the IRA, and has since been responsible for numerous attacks and attempted attacks targeting police, soldiers and prison officers.⁹⁹ It is thought that, as well as taking some of its leadership from the Provisional IRA, the group inherited technical knowledge in constructing explosives and stockpiles of Semtex from the former group.¹⁰⁰ In September 2017 it was reported that the New IRA had developed a new under-car bomb, with authorities raising concerns that the group might have access to high-level explosives.¹⁰¹

6. Gothenburg Migrant Camp Attempted Bombing

The Attack

Date: 25 January 2017

Day: Thursday

Time: NA

Country: Sweden

Place: Gothenburg

Area Type: Rural – Recreational

Location: Migrant Centre – Exterior

Type of Attack: Attempted Bombing

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Anti-migrant)

Ideology: Far Right

Organisation/Affiliation: Nordic Resistance Movement – Affiliated

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Assailants

Number: 3

Gender: Male

Names: Anton Thulin, Viktor Melin, Jimmy Jonasson

⁹⁵ 'Dissident 'IRA' group say they shot PSNI officer in north Belfast', *The Irish Times*, 25 January 2017.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ 'New IRA the deadliest of the dissident republican groupings', *The Irish Times*, 7 March 2016, available at: <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/new-ira-the-deadliest-of-the-dissident-republican-groupings-1.2563243>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ 'New IRA "develops new under-car bomb"' *BBC News*, 1 September 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-41124001>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

Ages: 20, 23, 50

Country of Origin: Sweden

Nationalities: Swedish

Resident: Gothenburg

Training/Combat Experience: Yes

Known to Authorities: Unknown

Current Status: Sentenced - One Year and Six Months (increased to One Year and Ten Months), Eight Years and Six Months (reduced to Six Years and Six Months), Five Years (reduced to Two Years and Six Months)

NOTES:

See the entry for “2. Gothenburg Migrant Centre Bombing”.

7. Quebec Mosque Attack

The Attack

Date: 29 January 2017

Day: Sunday

Time: 7.50 pm

Country: Canada

Place: Quebec City

Area Type: Suburban – Residential

Location: Mosque – Exterior & Interior

Type of Attack: Shooting

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Anti-Muslim)

Ideology: Far Right

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor

Claimed: NA

Number of Injured: 19

Number of Fatalities: 6

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Assailants

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Alexandre Bissonnette

Age: 27

Country of Origin: Canada

Nationality: Canadian

Resident: Quebec City

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Convicted

NOTES:

On the night of 29 January, 27-year-old student Alexandre Bissonnette carried out a shooting attack at Quebec City’s largest mosque, Centre Culturel Islamique Québec, in the suburb of Ste-Foy.¹⁰² At just after 7.50 pm Bissonnette started his attack on mosque worshippers, shortly

¹⁰² ‘What happened the night of the Quebec mosque attack’, *The Star*, 4 February 2017, available at: <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/02/04/what-happened-the-night-of-the-quebec-mosque-attack.html>, last visited: 9 July 2018.

after the evening's prayers had been concluded.¹⁰³ The shooting began outside the mosque at a time when Muslim worshippers were exiting the building; however, the gunman then proceeded to enter the building and continued to fire, with witnesses saying that the assailant reloaded his weapon several times during the attack.¹⁰⁴ In the course of the shooting six individuals, all male, aged between 39 and 60, were killed.¹⁰⁵ One of the victims, Azzeddine Soufiane, is reported by eyewitnesses to have attempted to apprehend the assailant before being fatally shot.¹⁰⁶ A further 19 individuals were wounded during the attack,¹⁰⁷ and it is understood that in addition to those killed, 35 other individuals were in close proximity when the attack happened.¹⁰⁸

Following the attack, Alexandre Bissonnette fled the scene and made his way to a bridge leading from Quebec City to Ile d'Orleans.¹⁰⁹ From there the assailant called the police to turn himself in.¹¹⁰ This was where the police found and arrested the attacker while he was still in his car.¹¹¹ Bissonnette was charged with six counts of murder and appeared in court the following day, although he did not enter a plea.¹¹²

At the time of the attack, Alexandre Bissonnette was a student at Laval University where he was studying Social Sciences and Anthropology.¹¹³ He had been living in a rented apartment with his twin brother not far from the mosque where he perpetrated his attack.¹¹⁴ While Bissonnette was not known to the police, nor on any extremist watch lists, it appears that those who monitored far-right online activists in the Quebec City area were familiar with him.¹¹⁵ Activists involved with a Facebook group dedicated to welcoming refugees in Quebec City claimed that Bissonnette was known online for expressing extreme views and for promoting the statements of extreme French nationalists, as well as for following Facebook profiles of individuals associated with right-wing politics.¹¹⁶

Those acquainted with the attacker have also stated that he was known for espousing anti-Muslim views,¹¹⁷ while another individual familiar with Bissonnette described him as "very right-wing and ultra-nationalist white supremacist".¹¹⁸ One acquaintance who described having debated with Bissonnette stated that he viewed Bissonnette as a "xenophobe" and as being "enthralled by a borderline racist nationalist movement".¹¹⁹ Others confirmed Bissonnette's

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Feyerick, D., 'Quebec mosque gunman was calm, witness says', *CNN*, 1 February 2017, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/01/americas/quebec-mosque-shooting-scene/index.html>, last visited: 9 July 2018.

¹⁰⁵ Plante, C., 'Quebec City mosque shooting suspect to go straight to trial, Crown says', *The Star*, 2 October 2017, available at: <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/10/02/quebec-city-mosque-shooting-suspect-to-go-straight-to-trial-crown-says.html>, last visited: 9 July 2018.

¹⁰⁶ Feyerick, D., 'Quebec mosque gunman was calm, witness says', *CNN*, 1 February 2017.

¹⁰⁷ MacKinnon, C., 'Crown charges Quebec City mosque shooter with attempted murder of attack witnesses', *CBC*, 2 October 2017, available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/crown-charges-quebec-city-mosque-shooter-with-attempted-murder-of-attack-witnesses-1.4316764>, last visited: 9 July 2018.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ 'Quebec mosque attack: Student Alexandre Bissonnette charged', *BBC*, 31 January 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-38805163>, last visited: 9 July 2018.

¹¹⁰ Riga, A., 'Quebec mosque shooting suspect Alexandre Bissonnette changes lawyer', *Montreal Gazette*, 30 March 2017, available at: <http://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/quebec-mosque-shooting-suspect-alexandre-bissonnette-back-in-court>, last visited: 9 July 2018.

¹¹¹ 'Quebec mosque attack: Student Alexandre Bissonnette charged', *BBC*, 31 January 2017.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ 'Who is Quebec mosque attack suspect Alexandre Bissonnette', *BBC*, 31 January 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-38810695>, last visited: 9 July 2018.

¹¹⁴ Narayan, C., 'Quebec mosque suspect known to people who monitor far-right groups', *CNN*, 9 February 2017, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/31/americas/quebec-mosque-shooting-suspect/index.html>, last visited: 9 July 2018.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Riga, A., 'Quebec mosque shooting suspect Alexandre Bissonnette changes lawyer', *Montreal Gazette*, 30 March 2017.

¹¹⁸ Kassam, A., 'Québec City mosque attack: man charged with six counts of murder', *The Guardian*, 31 January 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/30/quebec-city-mosque-shooting-alexandre-bissonnette-murder-charge>, last visited: 10 July 2018.

¹¹⁹ Narayan, C., 'Quebec mosque suspect known to people who monitor far-right groups', *CNN*, 9 February 2017.

attraction to right-wing ideas, but also noted that he had never advocated violence for political purposes.¹²⁰ Little else has been publicly revealed about the nature of Bissonnette's worldview or motive, although following his arrest he told police that he had begun to consider an attack of his own after the Islamist attack in Ottawa in 2014, and those in Paris and Nice in 2016.¹²¹ Bissonnette claimed that the final trigger for him had come on the day of his attack when the Canadian Prime Minister had tweeted welcoming refugees to the country and promoting diversity.¹²² In reference to the tweet, he told police, "I saw that and I like lost my mind. I don't want us to become like Europe I don't want them to kill my parents, my family."¹²³

While it appears that Bissonnette was an essentially anti-social figure, those familiar with him observed that in the month leading up to the attack he had become even more isolated and ceased to return calls or reply to messages.¹²⁴

8. Denver Union Station Shooting

The Attack

Date: 31 January 2017

Day: Tuesday

Time: 11.00 pm

Country: United States of America

Place: Denver

Area Type: City Centre – Transport

Location: Train Station – Exterior

Type of Attack: Shooting

Target: Police (Security Personnel)

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 1

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Assailants

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Joshua Cummings

Age: 37

Country of Origin: United States of America

Nationality: American

Resident: Denver

Training/Combat Experience: Yes

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Sentenced – Life

¹²⁰ Siekierski, B., 'Alexandre Bissonnette lone Quebec City suspect: reports', *iPolitics*, 30 January 2017, available at: <https://ipolitics.ca/2017/01/30/alexandre-bissonnette-lone-quebec-city-suspect-reports/>, last visited: 10 July 2018.

¹²¹ Mindock, C., 'Quebec City mosque killer Alexandre Bissonnette says Justin Trudeau welcoming refugees was 'last straw'', *Independent*, 13 April 2018, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/quebec-city-mosque-attacker-alexandre-bissonnette-justin-trudeau-refugees-last-straw-a8303801.html>, last visited: 9 July 2018.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ 'Voici ce que l'on sait sur le suspect de la tuerie de la mosquée', *Le Journal De Quebec*, 2017, available at: <http://www.journaldequebec.com/2017/01/30/voici-ce-que-lon-sait-sur-le-suspect-de-la-tuerie-de-la-mosquee>.

NOTES:

At around 11.00 pm on the night of 31 January, a Regional Transportation District (RTD) guard was shot at point-blank range and died in an ambulance on the way to hospital.¹²⁵ The attacker, 37-year-old Joshua Cummings, had approached the guard while he was standing outside Denver Union Station giving directions to two women.¹²⁶ Eyewitnesses recounted that the assailant had placed a gun to the security officer's neck, telling him to "do as I tell you", before shooting the victim.¹²⁷ Joshua Cummings was arrested less than an hour later a few blocks away from the scene of the attack, apparently hiding from the police and still in possession of the weapon: a loaded 9mm handgun.¹²⁸

Days after his arrest, Cummings told a journalist that he had carried out his attack "purely and solely for the pleasure of Allah".¹²⁹ He also told the reporter, "I give my *bay'ah* [pledge] to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and I am committed to being a soldier for the Islamic State."¹³⁰ However, there is no evidence to suggest that the Islamic State has claimed the attack as one of its own. Cummings' own comments might be regarded as contradictory, having at one point insisted that the attack itself was not carried out for Islamic State, but rather for Allah, while also maintaining that he pledged allegiance to the group as one of Islamic State's soldiers.

Joshua Cummings grew up in Pampa in Texas¹³¹ and had been in the United States military between 1997 and 2002 serving as an infantryman, although it is understood that he did not see combat during this period.¹³² In late 2016, Cummings left Pampa and moved to Colorado, having converted to Islam a number of years prior to this.¹³³ Residents of Pampa who knew Cummings report that he had run a martial arts class where he had attempted to promote Islam to them and their children.¹³⁴ While some of those who knew him expressed surprise at news of the attack, Cummings had been charged with domestic violence in 2010, and one Pampa resident who knew him described him as having been "extremely violent".¹³⁵

Cummings had been thrown out of a mosque he attended in Texas, although it is not clear whether this had any relation to issues concerning Islamist extremism.¹³⁶ Nevertheless, shortly after Cummings' arrival in Colorado some concerns were raised concerning his possible extremism. In late December 2016, a mosque in Denver wrote to the Department for Homeland Security warning of Cummings and stating that he "seems pretty advanced in his path of radicalization".¹³⁷ Specifically, the letter mentioned that Cummings had attended a lunch for converts during which he had accused the mosque of being idolatrous and quoted a verse

¹²⁵ Mitchell, K., Paul, J., and Phillips, N., 'Man accused of shooting RTD guard at Union Station was former soldier who posted about police, Islam', *The Denver Post*, 1 February 2017, available at: <http://www.denverpost.com/2017/02/01/shooting-rt-d-union-station-soldier-police-islam/>, last visited: 10 July 2018.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Sallinger, R., 'Man accused of killing RTD guard: Actions were 'for pleasure of Allah', *CBS Denver*, 27 February 2017, available at: <http://denver.cbslocal.com/2017/02/27/joshua-cummings-scott-von-lanken-shooting-rt-d/>, last visited: 10 July 2018.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Luby, R. and Freeman, B., 'It doesn't look like him anymore', says friend of radicalized, accused gunman at Union Station', *Denver7*, 6 February 2017, available at: <http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/investigations/it-doesnt-look-like-him-anymore-says-friend-of-radicalized-accused-gunman-at-union-station>, last visited: 10 July 2018.

¹³² Mitchell, K., Paul, J., and Phillips, N., 'Man accused of shooting RTD guard at Union Station was former soldier who posted about police, Islam', *The Denver Post*, 1 February 2017.

¹³³ Luby, R. and Freeman, B., 'It doesn't look like him anymore', says friend of radicalized, accused gunman at Union Station', *Denver7*, 6 February 2017.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Sanchez, T., 'Anti-cop Muslim executes armed Denver transit security officer', *Truth Revolt*, 2 February 2017, available at: <https://www.truthrevolt.org/news/anti-cop-muslim-executes-armed-denver-transit-security-officer>, last visited: 10 July 2018.

¹³⁶ O'Neill, N., 'Mosque members warned feds that accused killer was radicalized', *New York Post*, 3 February 2017, available at: <https://nypost.com/2017/02/03/mosque-members-warned-feds-that-accused-killer-was-radicalized/>, last visited: 10 July 2018.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

from the Quran referring to the killing of those who worshipped the Golden Calf.¹³⁸ The mosque letter also warned that Cummings had rebuked a visiting speaker for not supporting sharia punishments and had justified the use of violence in the pursuit of establishing Islam.¹³⁹

The profession of the victim in the attack may indicate the possible targeting of the police as opposed to an indiscriminate attack. It has been suggested that the RTD security officer's uniform was similar in appearance to that of a police officer,¹⁴⁰ and during a press conference following the attack the Denver police acknowledged the concern that the officer had likely been targeted because of the uniform he was wearing.¹⁴¹ It is also the case that during 2016 Cummings had made a number of posts online about Islam that referenced his sense of animosity towards the police.¹⁴²

9. Louvre Machete Attack

The Attack

Date: 3 February 2017

Day: Friday

Time: 10.00 am

Country: France

Place: Paris

Area Type: City Centre – Landmark

Location: Museum – Exterior

Type of Attack: Knife

Target: Military

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor

Claimed: N/A

Number of Injured: 1

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Shot & Detained

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Abdullah Reda al-Hamamy

Age: 29

Country of Origin: Egypt

Nationality: Egyptian

Resident: Dubai

Training/Combat Experience: No

¹³⁸ Phillips, N., Paul, J., and Mitchell, K., 'Denver mosque leaders warned Homeland Security that RTD shooting suspect "was advanced in his path of radicalization"', *The Denver Post*, 2 February 2017, available at: <https://www.denverpost.com/2017/02/02/denver-mosque-homeland-security-rtd-shooter/>, last visited: 10 July 2018.

¹³⁹ Roberts, M., 'Joshua Cummings, alleged RTD officer killer: I'm a soldier for the Islamic State', *Westworld*, 28 February 2017, available at: <http://www.westword.com/news/joshua-cummings-alleged-rtd-officer-killer-im-a-soldier-for-the-islamic-state-8760645>, last visited: 10 July 2018.

¹⁴⁰ Mitchell, K., Paul, J., and Phillips, N., 'Man accused of shooting RTD guard at Union Station was former soldier who posted about police, Islam', *The Denver Post*, 1 February 2017.

¹⁴¹ Roberts, M., 'Joshua Cummings arrested in execution-style killing of RTD security officer', *Westworld*, 1 February 2017, available at: <http://www.westword.com/news/joshua-cummings-arrested-in-execution-style-killing-of-rtd-security-officer-8751682>, last visited: 10 July 2018.

¹⁴² Roberts, M., 'Joshua Cummings, alleged RTD officer killer: I'm a soldier for the Islamic State', *Westworld*, 28 February 2017.

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

At 10.00 am on Friday 3 February, a man armed with two machetes and wearing a rucksack rushed towards a patrol of four soldiers at the Carrousel du Louvre area in central Paris.¹⁴³ It is reported that the man had attempted to enter the museum but had become violent upon being told that he would not be able to enter with the two bags he was carrying.¹⁴⁴ The assailant was fired upon five times by one of the soldiers, although he managed to inflict a light head injury to one of the soldiers.¹⁴⁵ Having received a bullet wound to the stomach, the attacker was taken to hospital in an ambulance and was still conscious when arrested.¹⁴⁶ Witnesses reported that the attacker had shouted “Allahu Akbar” as he launched himself towards the soldiers.¹⁴⁷ The rucksack the assailant was carrying did not contain any explosive devices but rather spray paints.¹⁴⁸ Following his arrest he told police that he had wanted to damage artwork in the museum to avenge the Syrian people.¹⁴⁹

The attacker was subsequently named as Abdullah Reda al-Hamamy, a 29-year-old Egyptian national and a law graduate who had been working in the United Arab Emirates for the previous five years.¹⁵⁰ His visit to Paris had been planned some time in advance: he had first requested a French tourist visa in October of 2016, and had made arrangements to rent an apartment in Paris earlier that summer.¹⁵¹ Having obtained a tourist visa in Dubai, Hamamy arrived in Paris on 26 January, apparently having told his family that he was travelling there on business.¹⁵² It is understood that Hamamy is married and that his wife and seven-month-old son reside in Saudi Arabia.¹⁵³

On 28 January, just days after his arrival in France, Hamamy purchased two 15-inch-long machetes for a total of 680 euros.¹⁵⁴ In the days immediately prior to the attack Hamamy also made two money transfers to an Egyptian national in Poland, the first for 3,000 euros and second for 2,000 euros.¹⁵⁵

Following the attack, Hamamy later told police that while he identifies with the beliefs of the Islamic State, he did not carry out the attack upon direct orders from IS, nor had he formally

¹⁴³ Smith-Spark, L. and Goehler, L., ‘Louvre knife attack: Soldier shoots assailant near Paris museum’, *CNN*, 3 February 2017, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/03/europe/france-paris-louvre-incident/index.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁴⁴ Longbottom, W., ‘Louvre: ‘Terrorist’ armed with machete shot at Paris museum’, *Sky News*, 3 February 2017, available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/louvre-terrorist-armed-with-machete-shot-at-paris-museum-10754100>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁴⁵ Smith-Spark L. and Goehler, L., ‘Louvre knife attack: Soldier shoots assailant near Paris museum’, *CNN*, 3 February 2017.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ Chrisafis, A., ‘Louvre knife attack sparks fresh warnings of French terror threat’, *The Guardian*, 3 February 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/03/french-soldier-shoots-man-outside-louvre-paris>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁴⁸ Longbottom, W., ‘Louvre: ‘Terrorist’ armed with machete shot at Paris museum’, *Sky News*, 3 February 2017.

¹⁴⁹ Rosemain, M. and Rose, M., ‘Suspect in Louvre attack wanted to harm paintings, avenge Syrian people: source’, *Reuters*, 7 February 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-shooting/suspect-in-louvre-attack-wanted-to-harm-paintings-avenge-syrian-people-source-idUSKBN15M11J>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁵⁰ Nikolaeva, M. and Noueihed, L., ‘Louvre attacker refuses to speak to investigators – source’, *Reuters*, 5 February 2017, available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-shooting/louvre-attacker-refuses-to-speak-to-investigators-source-idUKKBN15K0FP>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁵¹ Blachere, E., ‘Attaque au Louvre: le touriste était un terroriste’, *Paris Match*, 13 February 2017, available at: <https://www.parismatch.com/Actu/Societe/Attaque-au-Louvre-le-touriste-etait-un-terroriste-1184744>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁵² Nikolaeva, M. and Noueihed, L., ‘Louvre attacker refuses to speak to investigators – source’, *Reuters*, 5 February 2017.

¹⁵³ Samaan, M., ‘Louvre machete suspect Egyptian who posted ‘support for Isil minutes before attack’, *The Telegraph*, 4 February 2017, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/04/louvre-machete-suspect-egyptian-posted-support-isil-minutes/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁵⁴ Blachere, E., ‘Attaque au Louvre: le touriste était un terroriste’, *Paris Match*, 13 February 2017.

¹⁵⁵ Balmforth, R., ‘Suspect in Louvre attack says he did not get orders from Islamic state’, *Reuters*, 8 February 2017, available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-election-shooting/suspect-in-louvre-attack-says-he-did-not-get-orders-from-islamic-state-idUKKBN15N2G7>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

sworn allegiance to the group.¹⁵⁶ However, on the morning of the attack, Hamamy had posted a message on Twitter which read, “Why are they afraid of the establishment of an Islamic state? Because the country of Islam will defend its resources and territory and the honour and dignity of Muslims.”¹⁵⁷ In several other tweets, some posted just minutes before he carried out his attack, Hamamy called on others to “fight in the cause of Allah and kill”, while in another tweet he wrote, “In the name of Allah the merciful... for our mujahedeen brothers in Syria and across the world.”¹⁵⁸

10. Londonderry Car Bombing

The Attack

Date: 22 February 2017
Day: Wednesday
Time: NA
Country: United Kingdom
Place: Londonderry
Area Type: Rural – Residential
Location: Car – Exterior
Type of Attack: Foiled Bombing
Target: Police & Civilian – Indiscriminate
Ideology: Separatist/Nationalist
Organisation/Affiliation: The New IRA – Directed
Claimed: Yes
Number of Injured: 0
Number of Fatalities: 0
Response: Not Apprehended

The Assailants

Number: Unknown
Gender: Unknown
Name: Unknown
Age: Unknown
Country of Origin: Unknown
Nationality: Unknown
Resident: Unknown
Training/Combat Experience: Unknown
Known to Authorities: Unknown
Current Status: At Large

NOTES:

On the morning of Wednesday 22 February, a bomb was discovered beneath a car parked outside a police officer’s home in Culmore on the outskirts of Londonderry, Northern Ireland.¹⁵⁹ The “under vehicle improvised explosive device” went off as a military bomb disposal unit attempted to dismantle what they described as a device that was more intricate than a pipe

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Nikolaeva, M. and Noueihed, L., ‘Louvre attacker refuses to speak to investigators – source’, *Reuters*, 5 February 2017.

¹⁵⁸ Dearden, L., ‘Le Louvre attack suspect denies acting under Isis orders after Twitter messages show support for ‘Islamic state’’, *Independent*, 9 February 2017, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/le-louvre-attack-soldiers-machete-stabbing-abdallah-el-hamahmy-paris-isis-islamic-state-twitter-a7572291.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁵⁹ ‘Bomb explodes at police officer’s Londonderry home’, *BBC*, 23 February 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-foyle-west-39049459>, last visited: 12 July 2018.

bomb.¹⁶⁰ Houses in the area had been evacuated, with police stating that the device had been intended to kill and injure and warning that the targeted officer had had a “very lucky escape”.¹⁶¹ Months later in 2017, on 29 September, two individuals were arrested in connection with the attempted bombing, one aged 43 and the other 59.¹⁶²

At the time of the discovery of the bomb, the authorities had expressed their belief that the device had been planted by violent dissident republicans.¹⁶³ Days later, on 27 February, the New IRA released a message using established code terminology to indicate its responsibility for the attack.¹⁶⁴ The message claimed that a new design had been used on the explosive and that it had included a “secondary anti-handling device”.¹⁶⁵ The group also threatened that it would “continue to attack members of the British armed forces at a time of our choosing”.¹⁶⁶

The group is known for having used under-car bombs in recent years. In March of 2016 a prison officer died 11 days after being severely injured when a device exploded beneath his van in east Belfast.¹⁶⁷ In June of the previous year an explosive device was discovered underneath a car parked outside the home of two police officers in Eglington, also located near to Londonderry.¹⁶⁸

For more information on the New IRA see the entry for “5. North Belfast Petrol Station Shooting”.

11. Athens Police Station Explosive

The Attack

Date: 25 February 2017

Day: Saturday

Time: 3.00 am

Country: Greece

Place: Athens

Area Type: City Centre – Residential

Location: Police Station – Exterior

Type of Attack: Foiled Bombing

Target: Police

Ideology: Far Left

Organisation/Affiliation: Revolutionary Struggle – Directed

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Not Apprehended

The Assailants

Number: Unknown

Gender: Unknown

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Young, D., ‘Two held over bomb under Derry officer’s car’, *Belfast Telegraph*, 29 September 2017, available at: <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/two-held-over-bomb-under-derry-officers-car-36178890.html>, last visited: 12 July 2018.

¹⁶³ ‘Bomb explodes at police officer’s Londonderry home’, *BBC*, 23 February 2017.

¹⁶⁴ Young, C., ‘IRA says it planted bomb under PSNI officer’s car in Derry’, *The Irish News*, 27 February 2017, available at: <http://www.irishnews.com/news/2017/02/27/news/-ira-says-it-planted-bomb-under-psni-s-officer-s-car-in-derry-945355/>, last visited: 12 July 2018.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

Name: Unknown
Age: Unknown
Country of Origin: Unknown
Nationality: Unknown
Resident: Unknown
Training/Combat Experience: Unknown
Known to Authorities: Unknown
Current Status: At Large

NOTES:

Shortly after 3.00 am on Wednesday 25 February, the police at the Dafni police station in Athens received an anonymous phone call telling them that there was a bomb behind the station and that it would be detonated in 40 minutes' time.¹⁶⁹ Greek counter-terrorism police and explosives specialists were able to successfully locate and defuse the explosive without any casualties being caused.¹⁷⁰ The bomb had been constructed with a grenade attached to a timer and a nine-volt battery.¹⁷¹ The explosive had been hidden inside a bag and placed in a small park¹⁷² about five metres away from the station itself.¹⁷³ Dafni police station is a relatively small local station and sits within a residential area.¹⁷⁴ It is near a main road, Leof. Al. Papanastasiou, which runs south-west to north-east through a built-up area of central Athens.¹⁷⁵

The report received by the police claimed the attack on behalf of the anti-globalisation anarchist group Revolutionary Struggle, with the caller reportedly telling police that the attack was in memory of Lambros Fountas, a member of the Revolutionary Struggle who had been killed seven years previously in a shootout with the police.¹⁷⁶ There have been a number of other attacks by the Revolutionary Struggle that the group has associated with the shooting of Fountas, including a bomb placed at the Greek Embassy in Rome in 2010.¹⁷⁷ Greek police say they believe that during the anniversary period of the Fountas' killing there is a higher probability of anarchist attacks, and as such they are often on a higher state of alert during February and March.¹⁷⁸ In addition, the Dafni police station incident came shortly after the arrest of Panagiota Roupa, a leading figure within Revolutionary Struggle.¹⁷⁹ An anarchist website also connected the bomb to Revolutionary Struggle, although the website did not carry a statement from the group, as is often the case following such attacks.¹⁸⁰

¹⁶⁹ 'Police Set-off Controlled Explosion of Device Planted Near Dafni Police Station', *The Greek Reporter*, 25 February 2017, available at: <http://greece.greekreporter.com/2017/02/25/police-set-off-controlled-explosion-of-device-planted-near-dafni-police-station/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ 'Revelation for the explosive device in Daphne: ELAS sees this connection for the first time', *CNN*, 25 February 2017, <http://www.cnn.gr/news/ellada/story/69189/apokalypsi-gia-ton-ekriktiko-mixanismo-sti-dafni-proti-fora-vlepei-i-elas-tetoia-syndesmologia>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁷² 'Terrorist Hand Grenade Device Defused Outside Athens Police Office', *The National Herald*, 26 February 2017, available at: <https://www.thenationalherald.com/152016/terrorist-hand-grenade-device-defused-outside-athens-police-office/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁷³ 'Revelation for the explosive device in Daphne: ELAS sees this connection for the first time', *CNN Greece*, 25 February 2017.

¹⁷⁴ 'Police Department of Dafni', *Greek Travel Pages*, last updated March 2010, available at: <https://www.gtp.gr/TDirectoryDetails.asp?ID=66552>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ 'Terrorist Hand Grenade Device Defused Outside Athens Police Station', *The National Herald*, 26 February 2017; 'Security increased for anniversary of Fountas death', *Ekathimerino.com*, 9 March 2016, available at: <http://www.ekathimerino.com/206818/article/ekathimerino/news/security-increased-for-anniversary-of-fountas-death>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁷⁷ 'Explosive found in parcel at Greek Embassy in Rome', *CNN*, 27 December 2010, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/12/27/italy.embassy.packages/index.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁷⁸ 'Security increased for anniversary of Fountas death', *Ekathimerino.com*, 9 March 2016.

¹⁷⁹ 'Terrorist Hand Grenade Device Defused Outside Athens Police Office', *The National Herald*, 26 February 2017.

¹⁸⁰ 'Athens, Greece: Bomb left outside Dafni police precinct in memory of Revolutionary Struggle member Lambros Foundas', *Insurrection News Worldwide*, 27 February 2017, available at: <https://insurrectionnewsworldwide.com/2017/02/27/athens-greece-bomb-left-outside-dafni-police-precinct-in-memory-of-revolutionary-struggle-member-lambros-foundas/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

12. Athens Bookstore Bombing

The Attack

Date: 15 March 2017

Day: Wednesday

Time: 2.00 am

Country: Greece

Place: Athens

Area Type: Suburban – Residential

Location: Shop – Exterior

Type of Attack: Bombing

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Political)

Ideology: Far Left

Organisation/Affiliation: Conspiracy of Cells of Fire – Directed

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Not Apprehended

The Assailants

Number: Unknown

Gender: Unknown

Name: Unknown

Age: Unknown

Country of Origin: Unknown

Nationality: Unknown

Resident: Unknown

Training/Combat Experience: Unknown

Known to Authorities: Unknown

Current Status: At Large

NOTES:

At approximately 2.00 am on Wednesday 15 March, a bomb detonated outside an Athens bookshop owned by the New Democracy politician Adonis Georgiades.¹⁸¹ The police had received a warning about the bomb from an anonymous caller who had contacted the Zougla.gr, a Greek news webpage.¹⁸² The bomb was described as being home-made and consisted primarily of three gas canisters.¹⁸³ No one was in the vicinity of the device at the time of the explosion and so there were no injuries on this occasion.¹⁸⁴ However, the blast did cause some damage to the exterior of the building.¹⁸⁵

Talking on the radio, Georgiades reported that his businesses have been repeatedly targeted by vandalism and arsonists who he suspects of being linked to far-left anarchist groups.¹⁸⁶ In early

¹⁸¹ 'Gas canisters at the bookstore of Adonis Georgiadis in Kifissia', *The Athens Times*, 15 March 2017, available at: <http://www.athens-times.com/greece/gas-canisters-at-the-bookstore-of-adonis-georgiadis-in-kifissia/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁸² 'Bookstore owned by ND vice president damaged in bomb attack', *Ekathimerini*, 15 March 2017, available at: <http://www.ekathimerini.com/216888/article/ekathimerini/news/bookstore-owned-by-nd-vice-president-damaged-in-bomb-attack>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁸³ 'Gas canisters at the bookstore of Adonis Georgiadis in Kifissia', *The Athens Times*, 15 March 2017.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ 'Bookstore owned by ND vice president damaged in bomb attack', *Ekathimerini*, 15 March 2017.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

April an anarchist website published a claim of responsibility for the attack, attributing the action to Conspiracy Cells of Fire.¹⁸⁷ In its claim the group explained that it had targeted Georgiades in the attack on account of what they described as his “neoliberal ideas”, his TV persona, his book store selling nationalist literature and his allegedly repressive attitude towards anarchists.¹⁸⁸ At the end of the claim the group indicated that the recent attacks were dedicated to their “imprisoned comrades” and indicated that these activities would continue.¹⁸⁹ Conspiracy of Cells of Fire is also believed to be responsible for several attacks and attempted attacks in 2017, including the parcel bomb sent to the former German Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, on 15 March 2017,¹⁹⁰ and a day later at the International Monetary Fund building in Paris.¹⁹¹

13. German Finance Ministry Foiled Letter Bomb

The Attack

Date: 15 March 2017

Day: Wednesday

Time: NA

Country: Germany

Place: Berlin

Area Type: City Centre – Government

Location: Government Building – Interior

Type of Attack: Foiled Bombing

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Political)

Ideology: Far Left

Organisation/Affiliation: Conspiracy Cells of Fire – Directed

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Constantinos Yiagtzoglou (Giagtzoglou)

Age: 29

Country of Origin: Greece

Nationality: Greek

Resident: Athens

Training/Combat Experience: No

¹⁸⁷ ‘Athens, Greece: Explosive attack against New Democracy politician Adonis Georgiades’s bookstore by CCF-FAI/IRF’, *Insurrection News Worldwide*, 5 April 2017, available at: <https://insurrectionnewsworldwide.com/2017/04/05/athens-greece-explosive-attack-against-new-democracy-politician-adonis-georgiadess-bookstore-by-ccf-faiirf/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁸⁸ ‘Athens: Explosive attack against the bookstore of Adonis Georgiades, Politician of New Democracy by CCF – FAI/IRF (Greece)’, *325.nostate*, 5 April 2017. <https://325.nostate.net/2017/04/05/athens-explosive-attack-against-the-bookstore-of-adonis-georgiades-politician-of-new-democracy-by-ccf-faiirf-greece/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁸⁹ ‘Athens, Greece: Explosive attack against New Democracy politician Adonis Georgiades’s bookstore by CCF-FAI/IRF’, *Insurrection News Worldwide*, 5 April 2017.

¹⁹⁰ ‘Greek group claims it mailed parcel bomb to German finance minister’, *Reuters*, 16 March 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-schaueble-parcelbomb/greek-group-claims-it-mailed-parcel-bomb-to-german-finance-minister-idUSKBN16N1BA>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁹¹ ‘Blast at IMF Paris offices when letter opened’, *Die Welt*, 16 March 2017, available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/blast-at-imf-paris-offices-when-letter-opened/a-37964229>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

On Wednesday 15 March a parcel bomb was intercepted by the postal department of the German Finance Ministry in Berlin.¹⁹² The item had been addressed to the German Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble.¹⁹³ The parcel consisted of a book containing explosives and wires, although it has been questioned whether or not the explosive device was definitely viable.¹⁹⁴ However, a police statement confirmed that it had been intended to cause severe injuries.¹⁹⁵ It was also established that the parcel had been sent from a post office branch in Athens and that the sender's name had been given as Adonis Georgiades, a centre-right Greek politician and vice president of the New Democracy Party.¹⁹⁶ Notably, Georgiades' bookshop had been attacked with gas canisters the night before the parcel was intercepted.¹⁹⁷

The following day the Greek anarchist group Conspiracy Cells of Fire claimed responsibility for the attempted attack. In an online message the group stated, "We still have the rage. We sent the package to Germany's finance minister as part of the second act of the Nemesis Plan," and that "nothing is over, everything continues".¹⁹⁸ The claim of responsibility appears to reference what has also been called "Operation Nemesis", with which the group announced its return to violent activities in October 2016.¹⁹⁹

The day after the interception of the letter bomb at the German Finance Ministry, a parcel exploded at the Parisian offices of the International Monetary Fund.²⁰⁰ Later that month another eight explosive devices were intercepted at an Athens postal sorting office; these too were addressed to European officials and institutions across the continent.²⁰¹ On 25 May the former Greek Prime Minister Lucas Papademos was badly injured when an explosive device went off in his car.

In late October, 29-year-old Constantinos Yiagtzoglou was arrested and accused of being responsible for that attack and a number of other parcel bombs and attempted parcel bombings carried out earlier in the year.²⁰² Yiagtzoglou was also charged with being a member of Conspiracy Cells of Fire.²⁰³

For more information, see the entries "16. Athens Attempted Letter Bombings" and "29. Lucas Papademos Assassination Attempt".

¹⁹² 'Greek group claims it mailed parcel bomb to German finance minister', *Reuters*, 16 March 2017.

¹⁹³ 'Paris IMF letter bomb that injured one was sent from Greece', *BBC News*, 16 March 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39292671>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁹⁴ 'Greek group claims it mailed parcel bomb to German finance minister', *Reuters*, 16 March 2017.

¹⁹⁵ 'Paris IMF letter bomb that injured one was sent from Greece', *BBC News*, 16 March 2017.

¹⁹⁶ 'Greek group claims it mailed parcel bomb to German finance minister', *Daily Mail*, 16 March 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/reuters/article-4319694/Greek-group-claims-mailed-parcel-bomb-German-finance-minister.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ 'Greek group claims it mailed parcel bomb to German finance minister', *Reuters*, 16 March 2017.

¹⁹⁹ 'A new generation of Greek terrorists', *Deutsche Welle*, 21 March 2017, available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/a-new-generation-of-greek-terrorists/a-38058747>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁰⁰ 'Paris IMF letter bomb that injured one was sent from Greece', *BBC News*, 16 March 2017.

²⁰¹ 'Greek Police Arrest Suspect in Letter Bomb Attacks', *The New York Times*, 28 October 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/world/europe/greece-letter-bomb-suspect.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁰² 'Parcel Bombs Terror Suspect to be Kept in Custody', *Greek Reporter*, 2 November 2017, available at: <http://greece.greekreporter.com/2017/11/02/parcel-bombs-terror-suspect-to-be-kept-in-custody/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

14. International Monetary Fund Letter Bomb

The Attack

Date: 16 March 2017

Day: Thursday

Time: Unknown

Country: France

Place: Paris

Area Type: City Centre - Commercial

Location: Office - Interior

Type of Attack: Bombing

Target: Civilian - Targeted (Political & Financial)

Ideology: Far Left

Organisation/Affiliation: Conspiracy Cells of Fire - Suspected

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 1

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Constantinos Yiagtzoglou (Giagtzoglou)

Age: 29

Country of Origin: Greece

Nationality: Greek

Resident: Athens

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

On 16 March an employee at the Paris office of the International Monetary Fund was injured while opening a letter containing an explosive device.²⁰⁴ The secretary who was hurt suffered injuries to her face and arms when the home-made device, described as being “like a big firecracker”, exploded.²⁰⁵ The letter was intended for Jeffrey Franks, who had served as director of the IMF’s Europe office since March 2015.²⁰⁶ The letter included a Greek return address and had the residue of Greek stamps.²⁰⁷

A connection was quickly drawn between this explosive device and one which had arrived at the German Finance Ministry the previous day. That item had given the name of its sender as the Greek politician Adonis Georgiadis of the conservative New Democratic party.²⁰⁸ Similarly, the letter bomb sent to the IMF gave its sender as Vassilis Kikilias, also a senior figure within

²⁰⁴ ‘Paris IMF letter bomb that injured one was sent from Greece’, *BBC News*, 16 March 2017.

²⁰⁵ Samuel, H., ‘Greek militants suspected of sending letter bomb to IMF that blew up in secretary’s face’, *The Telegraph*, 16 March 2017, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/16/imf-letter-bomb-one-hurt-envelope-explosion-paris-office/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸ ‘Greek group claims it mailed parcel bomb to German finance minister’, *Reuters*, 16 March 2017.

the New Democratic party.²⁰⁹ On the same day as the incident at the IMF office, a message was posted online in which Conspiracy Cells of Fire took responsibility for the explosive device sent to the German Finance Ministry, leading to further speculation that the Greek anarchist group was also behind the IMF letter bomb.²¹⁰

Later that month, Greek authorities intercepted another eight letter bombs at Athens' central sorting office; these too were addressed to European officials and institutions across the continent.²¹¹ On 25 May, the former Greek Prime Minister Lucas Papademos was badly injured when an explosive device went off in his car. At the end of October, a 29-year-old Greek man, Constantinos Yiagtzoglou, was arrested and accused of being responsible for that attack and a number of other parcel bombs and attempted parcel bombings carried out earlier in the year.²¹² Yiagtzoglou was also accused of being a member of Conspiracy Cells of Fire.²¹³

For more information, see the entries "16. Athens Attempted Letter Bombings" and "29. Lucas Papademos Assassination Attempt".

15. Orly Airport Attack

The Attack

Date: 18 March 2017

Day: Saturday

Time: 6.55 am

Country: France

Place: Paris

Area Type: Suburban – Transport

Location: Road & Airport – Interior

Type of Attack: Foiled Shooting

Target: Police & Military

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor

Claimed: N/A

Number of Injured: 2

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Shot Dead

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Ziyed Ben Belgacem

Age: 39

Country of Origin: France

Nationality: French

Resident: Paris

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Dead

²⁰⁹ 'Paris IMF letter bomb that injured one was sent from Greece', *BBC News*, 16 March 2017.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ 'Greek Police Arrest Suspect in Letter Bomb Attacks', *The New York Times*, 28 October 2017.

²¹² 'Parcel Bombs Terror Suspect to be Kept in Custody', *Greek Reporter*, 2 November 2017.

²¹³ *Ibid.*

NOTES:

On 18 March, two terrorist-related incidents took place in Paris, both committed by the same individual over the course of roughly two hours. At 6.55am, 39-year-old Ziyed Ben Belgacem was stopped by police for speeding in the Parisian suburb of Garges-lès-Gonesse.²¹⁴ Belgacem responded by firing a pellet gun at the female police officer, who was lightly injured as a result.²¹⁵ It has also been reported that at this point Belgacem took the police officer's weapon.²¹⁶ The assailant then drove south to a bar in the Vitry-sur-Seine area of the city where he again fired his gun, this time without causing any injuries.²¹⁷ Belgacem drove from the scene at high speed, abandoned his vehicle a short distance away and then proceeded to take another car from its driver, whom he held at gunpoint, before driving towards Orly Airport.²¹⁸

At some point during this initial phase of the attack Ziyed Ben Belgacem had phoned his father to say, "Dad, I've done something stupid ... Dad, please forgive me, I've screwed up."²¹⁹ Once at the airport, the attacker threw a gas canister to the floor and then targeted a patrol of three soldiers, grabbing a female soldier by the neck and holding a gun to her head.²²⁰ Witnesses report that Belgacem shouted to the other soldiers, "Put down your weapons. Put your hands on your head. I am here to die for Allah. Whatever happens, there will be deaths."²²¹ A scuffle then ensued, during which the attacker attempted to take the soldier's gun from her, at which point the other two soldiers shot Belgacem a number of times.²²²

Following the attack, Belgacem's father and brother were held by police for questioning, but are not believed to have been charged with any criminal offences.²²³ The French president, François Hollande, claimed that the attacker "had a terrorist plot behind him".²²⁴ However, the man's father insisted that his son was neither an extremist nor a terrorist, reporting that "he never prayed and he drank".²²⁵ Subsequently it was confirmed that levels of alcohol were found in Belgacem's body that were nearly twice the legal limit for driving, as well as evidence of cannabis and cocaine.²²⁶

Ziyed Ben Belgacem was a resident of the Parisian suburb Garges-lès-Gonesse²²⁷ and was known to the authorities in connection with Islamist extremism, having been placed on an

²¹⁴ Rubin, A.J. and Morenne, B., 'Gunman Is Killed in Orly Airport in France After Attacking a Soldier', *The New York Times*, 18 March 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/world/europe/orly-airport-france-shooting.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Bell, M., Smith-Spark, L. and Masters, J., 'Paris Orly Airport: Father of gunman says son 'not a terrorist'', *CNN*, 20 March 2017, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/19/europe/paris-orly-airport-attack/index.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²¹⁷ Rubin, A.J. and Morenne, B., 'Gunman Is Killed in Orly Airport in France After Attacking a Soldier', *The New York Times*, 18 March 2017.

²¹⁸ Johnston C., 'Paris shooting: terror investigation launched after suspect shot dead', *The Guardian*, 18 March 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/12/four-hurt-after-man-launches-knife-attack-in-paris>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²¹⁹ Stewart, J., 'What we do know about the Paris Orly attacker should concern us - terrorism doesn't always start where we think', *Independent*, 20 March 2017, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/zied-blegacem-paris-orly-airport-attack-bataclan-prison-extremism-a7639636.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²²⁰ Rubin, A.J. and Morenne, B., 'Gunman Is Killed in Orly Airport in France After Attacking a Soldier', *The New York Times*, 18 March 2017.

²²¹ Chandler M., 'Paris Orly airport shooting: 'Islamic extremist' phoned father to say 'I've screwed up' before shooting', *Evening Standard*, 19 March 2017, available at: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/paris-orly-airport-shooting-islamic-extremist-phoned-father-to-say-ive-screwed-up-before-shooting-a3493586.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²²² Bell, M., Smith-Park, L. and Almasry, S., 'Paris Orly Airport: Assailant shouted 'I'm here to die in the name of Allah'', *CNN*, 18 March 2017, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/18/europe/france-airport-evacuated-in-police-operation/index.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²²³ Willsher, K., 'Paris airport attacker had long criminal record', *The Guardian*, 18 March 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/18/paris-airport-attacker-had-long-criminal-record>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Bell, M., Smith-Spark, L. and Masters, J., 'Paris Orly Airport: Father of gunman says son 'not a terrorist'', *CNN*, 20 March 2017.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Vincent E., 'Attaque d'Orly: le profil inédit de Ziyed Ben Belgacem', *Le Monde*, 20 March 2017, available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2017/03/20/attaque-d-orly-questions-sur-une-fuite-en-avant_5097445_1653578.html, last visited: 4 September 2018.

official watch list,²²⁸ although not on France's national security S File.²²⁹ The attacker's home had been one of several searched by police following the Stade de France and Bataclan attacks in November 2015.²³⁰ It is believed that Belgacem had adopted a more extreme worldview during time he spent in prison between 2011 and 2012.²³¹ Indeed, the assailant had a considerable criminal record, including offences for drug dealing and armed robbery.²³² Despite his erratic behaviour on the day of his attack, there was no known history of mental illness in Belgacem's past.²³³

On 25 March it was announced that two men, aged 30 and 43, had been charged with criminal terrorist association, it being believed that they had assisted the Orly Airport attacker in some way.²³⁴ The 30-year-old was also charged for being in possession of a weapon in connection with terrorist activity.²³⁵

16. Athens Attempted Letter Bombings

The Attack

Date: 20 March 2017

Day: Monday

Time: NA

Country: Greece

Place: Athens

Area Type: Multiple & Undisclosed

Location: NA

Type of Attack: Attempted Bombings

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Political & Financial)

Ideology: Far Left

Organisation/Affiliation: Conspiracy Cells of Fire – Suspected

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Constantinos Yiagtzoglou (Giagtzoglou)

Age: 29

Country of Origin: Greece

²²⁸ Willsher, K., 'Paris airport attacker had long criminal record', *The Guardian*, 18 March 2017.

²²⁹ 'Ce que l'on sait de Ziyed Ben Belgacem, 39 ans, l'homme abattu à Orly', *Le Parisien*, 18 March 2017, available at: <http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/orly-qui-est-l-assailant-abattu-par-les-soldats-de-l-operation-sentinelles-18-03-2017-6773694.php>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²³⁰ Willsher, K., 'Paris airport attacker had long criminal record', *The Guardian*, 18 March 2017.

²³¹ Barigazzi, J. and Vinocur, N., 'France investigates terror link to Orly attack', *Politico*, 20 March 2017, available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/france-investigates-terror-link-orly-attack-ziyed-ben-belgacem-francois-molins/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²³² Willsher, K., 'Paris airport attacker had long criminal record', *The Guardian*, 18 March 2017.

²³³ Vincent, E., 'Attaque d'Orly: le profil inédit de Ziyed Ben Belgacem', *Le Monde*, 20 March 2017.

²³⁴ 'Attaque à Orly: deux hommes en lien avec Ziyed Ben Belgacem écroués', *Le Parisien*, 25 March 2017, available at: <http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/attaque-a-orly-deux-hommes-en-lien-avec-ziyed-ben-belgacem-ecroues-25-03-2017-6794850.php>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²³⁵ Ibid.

Nationality: Greek

Resident: Athens

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

On 20 March there were press reports that eight explosive parcels had been intercepted by Greek counter-terrorism services at the Hellenic Post Office (ELTA) sorting centre at Kryoneri, north of Athens.²³⁶ The discovery and interception of these devices came just days after similar letter bombs had reached the German Finance Ministry in Berlin and the International Monetary Fund offices in Paris.

While the authorities did not reveal the targets that the explosive parcels had been intended for, it was widely reported that they were being mailed to other senior financial targets across Europe, including European Union officials and executives at multinational corporations.²³⁷

In the Greek press it was reported that the Dutch finance minister and president of the Eurogroup Jeroen Dijsselbloem was among those targeted.²³⁸ It has been suggested that Dijsselbloem may have been a target by Greek militants on account of his role in representing European creditors during the bailout negotiations with Greece in 2015.²³⁹ Another reported target in this wave of attempted attacks was Pierre Moscovici, European Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs.²⁴⁰ Later reports in the media claimed that a Milan-based ratings agency was also an intended recipient of one of the eight letter bombs.²⁴¹

The eight items intercepted at the postal sorting office on 20 March may have been part of the same batch that reached the German Finance Ministry and Parisian IMF offices on 15 and 16 March, however, it is thought that they had been delayed in reaching the sorting office because they had been posted via a number of remote mailboxes, possibly in an effort to avoid the security camera surveillance maintained for the sorting office mailboxes.²⁴² As with similar parcel bombs sent by Greek anarchists, the mail was labelled with false identities for the senders. On these occasions they claimed to have been sent by economists and academics, as well as from former Greek finance ministers Gikas Hardouvelis and Yanis Varoufakis.²⁴³

The explosives appear to have been fairly rudimentary, with parcels having been described as “booby-trapped” and using the kind of explosives associated with the production of fireworks.²⁴⁴

Given that the Greek anarchist group Conspiracy Cells of Fire had already claimed responsibility for the letter bomb sent to the German Finance Minister, it was widely suspected that the same group was responsible for the further eight parcels intercepted in Athens. In its declaration of

²³⁶ ‘Greek police find eight more parcel bombs intended for EU officials as anarchist terror campaign continues’, *The Independent*, 17 March 2017, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/greek-police-eight-parcel-bombs-letter-eu-officials-imf-paris-office-germany-finance-ministry-a7641241.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²³⁷ ‘Eurogroup President Among Targets of Parcel Bombs from Greece’, *Greek Reporter*, 21 March 2017, available at: <http://greece.greekreporter.com/2017/03/21/eurogroup-president-among-targets-of-parcel-bombs-from-greece/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁹ ‘Greek police find eight more parcel bombs intended for EU officials as anarchist terror campaign continues’, *The Independent*, 17 March 2017.

²⁴⁰ ‘Eurogroup President Among Targets of Parcel Bombs from Greece’, *Greek Reporter*, 21 March 2017.

²⁴¹ ‘Parcel-Bomb Addressed to Milan Rating Agency Intercepted in Athens, Greek Police Say’, *Greek Reporter*, 28 May 2017, available at: <http://greece.greekreporter.com/2017/05/28/parcel-bomb-addressed-to-milan-rating-agency-intercepted-in-athens-greek-police-say/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁴² ‘Eurogroup President Among Targets of Parcel Bombs from Greece’, *Greek Reporter*, 21 March 2017.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ ‘Greek police find eight more parcel bombs intended for EU officials as anarchist terror campaign continues’, *The Independent*, 17 March 2017.

responsibility for that attack, Conspiracy Cells of Fire claimed that the incident formed part of Operation Nemesis – a campaign of revenge attacks for the imprisonment of Greek anarchist militants since 2008 – and indicated that there would be further attacks.²⁴⁵ The intercepted parcels appeared to be a continuation of this same campaign. A similar wave of parcel bombs in 2010 caused the Greek authorities to suspend post leaving Greece for a two-day period when anarchists similarly targeted European leaders, Europol and foreign embassies with explosives sent by mail.²⁴⁶

In May 2017, Lucas Papademos, the former Prime Minister of Greece, was badly injured and hospitalised when a letter bomb exploded as he was travelling in his car.²⁴⁷ At the time there was no claim of responsibility; however, once again Conspiracy Cells of Fire were suspected of being behind the attack and the police revealed no apparent leads. Later in the year, on 28 October, Athens police arrested 29-year-old Constantinos Yiagtzoglou in connection with both the attempted assassination of Papademos and the March parcel bombs.²⁴⁸ Yiagtzoglou was also accused of being a member of Conspiracy Cells of Fire.²⁴⁹

For more information, see the entry “29. Lucas Papademos Assassination Attempt”.

17. New York Sword Attack

The Attack

Date: 20 March 2017

Day: Monday

Time: 11.15 pm

Country: United States of America

Place: New York

Area Type: City Centre – Commercial

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Knife

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Anti-Black)

Ideology: Far Right

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor

Claimed: N/A

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 1

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: James Harris Jackson

Age: 28

²⁴⁵ ‘Anarchist terror threat emerges across Europe after parcel bombs sent to French and German officials’, *The Independent*, 17 March 2017, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/imf-france-paris-letter-parcel-bombing-german-finance-ministry-anarchists-terror-greece-conspiracy-a7636116.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁴⁶ ‘Greece suspends foreign airmail service after attacks’, *BBC News*, 3 November 2010, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11680593>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁴⁷ ‘Former Greek PM Lucas Papademos wounded in letter bomb blast’, *The Guardian*, 26 May 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/26/former-greek-pm-lucas-papademos-wounded-in-letter-bomb-blast>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁴⁸ ‘Parcel Bombs Terror Suspect to be Kept in Custody’, *Greek Reporter*, 2 November 2017.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

Country of Origin: United States of America

Nationality: American

Resident: Baltimore

Training/Combat Experience: Yes

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

At around 11.15 pm on 20 March,²⁵⁰ White supremacist James Harris Jackson is accused of having stabbed to death a 66-year-old African American man in the Chelsea neighbourhood of Manhattan, New York.²⁵¹ During the attack, the assailant used what has been described as a sword with an 18-inch blade as his weapon.²⁵² The victim was taken to hospital where he died from his injuries.²⁵³ Following the attack, the assailant went to the bathroom of a nearby restaurant where he washed the blood from his clothes.²⁵⁴ Some days after this, in the early hours of 22 March, 28-year-old James Harris Jackson turned himself in at a police station on Times Square, having seen his picture on the news.²⁵⁵

It is believed that Jackson had in fact initially gone on to Times Square to carry out further racially motivated attacks, with the murder he had already carried out intended to have only been a “practice attack” prior to his plans for perpetrating several more.²⁵⁶ In addition to the sword Jackson had used in the earlier killing, police found two more knives in his coat.²⁵⁷ Another possible attack reportedly conceived of by Jackson would have involved seizing a police officer’s gun and using the weapon to carry out an attack on others.²⁵⁸ Jackson told investigators that he had chosen New York as the location for his attack because he believed it would receive greater publicity.²⁵⁹

On 17 March, Jackson had travelled to New York by bus from Washington DC, having come from Baltimore where he was resident.²⁶⁰ He went to New York with the specific intention of carrying out murderous attacks against black men.²⁶¹ It has been reported that Jackson had harboured a hatred of black men for more than a decade,²⁶² although there are some indications that these attitudes may have intensified and become more extreme in recent years.

²⁵⁰ Southall, A., ‘White Suspect in Black Man’s Killing Is Indicted on Terror Charges’, *The New York Times*, 27 March 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/nyregion/timothy-caughman-james-harris-jackson-terrorism.html>, last visited: 12 July 2018.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Agerholm, H., ‘White supremacist charged with terrorism after ‘killing black man in practice run’’, *Independent*, 28 March 2017, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/white-supremacist-james-harris-jackson-terrorism-charge-kill-black-man-tim-caughman-manhattan-a7653221.html>, last visited: 12 July 2018.

²⁵³ ‘White murder suspect went to NYC to attack blacks, police say’, *Fox News US*, 22 March 2017, available at: <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/03/22/police-man-accused-murder-came-to-nyc-to-target-blacks.html>, last visited: 12 July 2018.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Lartey, J., ‘White veteran ‘regarded fatal stabbing of black man as practice for larger attack’’, *The Guardian*, 24 March 2018, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/24/new-york-hate-crime-stabbing-james-jackson-timothy-caughman>, last visited: 12 July 2018.

²⁵⁷ Southall, A., ‘Suspect in Manhattan Killing Hated Black Men, Police Say’, *The New York Times*, 22 March 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/nyregion/manhattan-nyc-james-harris-jackson-hate-crime.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁵⁸ Kleinfeld, N.R., ‘A Man Who Hated Black Men Found a Victim Who Cared for Others’, *The New York Times*, 23 March 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/nyregion/james-harris-jackson-timothy-caughman.html>, last visited: 12 July 2018.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Jenkins, A., ‘A Man Arrested in a Fatal Stabbing Came to New York Specifically to Kill Black Men, Police Say’, *Time*, 22 March 2018, available at: <http://time.com/4709644/james-harris-jackson-new-york-black-men/>, last visited: 12 July 2018.

²⁶² Peled, S., ‘White stabbing suspect targeted black men, police say’, *CNN*, 23 March 2017, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/22/us/racially-motivated-stabbing-new-york/index.html>, last visited: 12 July 2018.

A number of early news reports recounted that Jackson had belonged to a Maryland hate group, although the alleged group in question was not identified.²⁶³ Jackson had also written a racist manifesto which he had wanted to deliver to *The New York Times*; however, further details of the manifesto's contents have not been publicised.²⁶⁴ What has been available is evidence of Jackson's online extremism. Reportedly Jackson told investigators that he was an enthusiastic reader of the *Daily Stormer*; an online neo-Nazi news site.²⁶⁵ A YouTube account maintained by the attacker came to light²⁶⁶ which gave some indication of the kind of far-right and hateful content consumed by Jackson.²⁶⁷ While he did not use the account to post his own videos, it is possible to see that Jackson subscribed to a number of other extremist accounts and had clicked "Like" on many videos promoting hate and a far-right worldview.²⁶⁸

James Harris Jackson grew up in Baltimore and attended a prestigious Quaker school before going on to serve in the US military.²⁶⁹ Jackson enlisted in 2009 and served in Afghanistan between December 2010 and November 2011.²⁷⁰ From what is known, Jackson failed to settle after having been discharged from the army and appears to have been a solitary character who did not mix or fit in with the community where he lived.²⁷¹

On 28 March, Jackson was charged with murder as a hate crime and also as an act of terrorism.²⁷²

18. Strabane Bombing

The Attack

Date: 21 March 2017

Day: Tuesday

Time: 8.30 pm

Country: United Kingdom

Place: Strabane

Area Type: Suburban – Residential

Location: Police Vehicle – Exterior

Type of Attack: Bombing

Target: Police & Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Separatist/Nationalist

Organisation/Affiliation: The New IRA – Directed

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 0

²⁶³ Conti, A., 'Cops Say Hell's Kitchen Stabber Came to New York to Kill Black People', *Vice*, 22 March 2018, available at: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qkmazq/cops-say-hells-kitchen-stabber-came-to-new-york-to-kill-black-people, last visited: 12 July 2018.

²⁶⁴ Southall, A., 'Suspect in Manhattan Killing Hated Black Men, Police Say', *The New York Times*, 22 March 2017.

²⁶⁵ Milton, J., Carranco, S., and Curtis, C., 'Exclusive: Major neo-Nazi figure recruiting in Montreal', *Montreal Gazette*, 21 May 2018, available at: <http://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/major-neo-nazi-figure-recruiting-in-montreal>, last visited: 12 July 2018.

²⁶⁶ Norton, B., 'White Supremacist Who Travelled to New York to Murder Black Men Followed Extremist Racist On-Line Groups Who Support Trump', *AlterNet*, 23 March 2017, available at: <https://www.alternet.org/james-harris-jackson-alt-right-white-supremacist-youtube>, last visited: 12 July 2018.

²⁶⁷ Jack Johnson, archived YouTube account, available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20170323023930/https://www.youtube.com/user/barris417>, last visited: 12 July 2018.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Kleinfield, N.R., 'A Man Who Hated Black Men Found a Victim Who Cared for Others', *The New York Times*, 23 March 2017.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² 'Man accused of killing black man in 'practice run' charged with terrorism', *The Guardian*, 28 March 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/27/new-york-stabbing-hate-crime-james-jackson-timothy-caughman>, last visited: 12 July 2018.

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Not Apprehended

The Assailants

Number: Unknown

Gender: Unknown

Name: Unknown

Age: Unknown

Country of Origin: Unknown

Nationality: Unknown

Training/Combat Experience: Unknown

Known to Authorities: Unknown

Current Status: At Large

NOTES:

At 8.30 pm on Tuesday 21 March an explosion took place in Strabane in Northern Ireland when a bomb detonated as police patrolled in the area.²⁷³ The attack came just hours after the funeral of the republican politician Martin McGuinness in nearby Londonderry.²⁷⁴ The bomb, which was described as being a roadside-style device attached to a command wire, was detonated in the Townsend Street area of Strabane, on the outskirts of the town.²⁷⁵ Three police officers had been driving along the street in the patrol car when the bomb was triggered, with the authorities stating that the officers had been “incredibly lucky” not to have been killed.²⁷⁶ Residents were evacuated while police checked the area, warning that the device “could quite easily have killed or maimed members of the public”.²⁷⁷

Days later, on 24 March, a 20-year-old was arrested in Newtownstewart in connection with the attack,²⁷⁸ while a 31-year-old man was also arrested in Strabane the following day.²⁷⁹ On 11 April two more men were arrested in connection with the attack, a 46-year-old and a 48-year-old, in Strabane and Omagh.²⁸⁰ However, both were unconditionally released shortly after being taken in for questioning.²⁸¹

On 26 March the dissident republican group the New IRA claimed responsibility for the Strabane bombing.²⁸² The group said that it had fired an explosive containing Semtex from a distance of nine feet from the police patrol car, and also claimed that the projectile had actually hit the vehicle.²⁸³

For more information on the New IRA see the entry for “5. North Belfast Petrol Station Shooting”.

²⁷³ ‘PSNI officers ‘very lucky’ to survive Strabane bombing’, *The Guardian*, 22 March 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/22/psni-officers-very-lucky-to-survive-strabane-bombing>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ ‘Strabane attack an attempt to kill police’, *Irish News*, 25 March 2017, available at: <http://www.irishnews.com/news/2017/03/25/news/strabane-attack-an-attempt-to-kill-police-977729/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁷⁶ ‘Strabane explosion was “attempt to kill PSNI officers”’, *BBC News*, 22 March 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-39350435>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁷⁷ ‘Strabane attack an attempt to kill police’, *Irish News*, 25 March 2017.

²⁷⁸ ‘A 20 year old man has been arrested in connection with an attack in Strabane’, *Derry Now*, 24 March 2017, available at: <https://www.derrynow.com/news/20-year-old-man-arrested-connection-attack-strabane/152502>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁷⁹ ‘Man arrested over Strabane bomb attack’, *BBC News*, 26 March 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-foyle-west-39397688>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁸⁰ ‘Two men arrested in Strabane bomb attack probe released unconditionally’, *Belfast Telegraph*, 13 April 2017, available at: <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/two-men-arrested-in-strabane-bomb-attack-probe-released-unconditionally-35620986.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*

²⁸² ‘“IRA” says it struck police vehicle with mortar bomb’, *Irish News*, 27 March 2017, available at: <http://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2017/03/27/news/strabane-explosion-claimed-by-ira--978028/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*

19. Westminster Bridge Attack

The Attack

Date: 22 March 2017

Day: Wednesday

Time: 2.40 pm

Country: United Kingdom

Place: London

Area Type: City Centre – Landmark

Location: Bridge & Government Building – Exterior

Type of Attack: Vehicular & Knife

Target: Police & Civilian – Indiscriminate & Civilian – Targeted (Political)

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 49

Number of Fatalities: 5

Response: Shot Dead

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Khalid Masood

Age: 52

Country of Origin: United Kingdom

Nationality: British

Resident: Birmingham

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Dead

NOTES:

On the afternoon of Wednesday 22 March 2017, an assailant drove a large car across Westminster Bridge towards Parliament, deliberately running into pedestrians.²⁸⁴ The car mounted the pavement on the south side of Westminster Bridge at 2.40 pm.²⁸⁵ The attacker drove his vehicle at up to 76 miles per hour, hitting more than fifty people,²⁸⁶ including a group of French school-children, visiting tourists and Londoners.²⁸⁷ Four people were killed during this phase of the attack, including a woman who was knocked into the Thames and died in hospital on 6 April.²⁸⁸

Once across the bridge, the attacker crashed the vehicle into the railings outside Parliament, hitting other pedestrians.²⁸⁹ Armed with a knife, the attacker exited his vehicle and ran to the

²⁸⁴ 'London attack: What we know so far', *BBC News*, 7 April 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39355108>, last visited: 31 July 2018.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁷ 'London attack: The victims', *BBC News*, 7 April 2017, available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39363933, last visited: 31 July 2018.

²⁸⁸ Horton, H., 'Andreea Cristea: Romanian woman who fell in Thames during Westminster attack dies as family say she was "brutally ripped away" shortly before she was due to be proposed to', *The Telegraph*, 7 April 2017, available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/07/andreea-cristea-woman-fell-thames-westminster-attack-dies-hospital/, last visited: 31 July 2018.

²⁸⁹ 'London attack: What we know so far', *BBC News*, 7 April 2017.

entrance gate of the parliamentary estate where he stabbed and killed an unarmed²⁹⁰ police officer.²⁹¹ As he ran further into the grounds directly in front of Parliament the assailant was shot by a member of the Defence Secretary's protection team, who happened to be present that day on account of the Defence Secretary visiting Parliament at the time.²⁹² The attacker was declared dead shortly after this and was later identified as Khalid Masood, a 52-year-old convert to Islam.²⁹³

Islamic State claimed the attack through its Amaq news agency the day after the attack,²⁹⁴ and repeated this claim in the seventy-fourth edition of its weekly newsletter, *Al-Naba*, on 30 March.²⁹⁵ In the days following the attack, Britain's Prime Minister Theresa May confirmed before Parliament that although Khalid Masood had been investigated by intelligence services some years earlier, it had only ever been as a peripheral figure.²⁹⁶ Theresa May said that Masood was "once investigated in relation to concerns about violent extremism. He was a peripheral figure. The case is historic – he was not part of the current intelligence picture. There was no prior intelligence of his intent or of the plot."²⁹⁷ The police stated that while Masood had "an interest in jihad",²⁹⁸ the precise nature of his motive might remain unknown.²⁹⁹

In the period leading up to the attack Khalid Masood sold his car and, on 9 March, purchased two large knives and sent himself an email message titled "Retaliation".³⁰⁰ In the week before the attack, Masood is reported to have told a family member, "You will soon hear of my death, but don't worry, be happy, because I will be in a better place, I will be in paradise."³⁰¹

Masood hired the car he used in his attack in the Spring Hill area of Birmingham less than 48 hours before he carried out the attack in central London.³⁰² He had stayed at a hotel in Brighton on England's south coast the night before he carried out the attack.³⁰³ The security services

²⁹⁰ Holden, M. and Shirbon, E., 'Police identify British-born attacker, victim count rises to four', *Reuters*, 23 March 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-security-idUSKBN16UOMO>, last visited: 31 July 2018.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Mendick, R. and Allen, E., 'Khalid Masood: Everything we know about the London attacker', *The Telegraph*, 27 March 2017, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/24/khalid-masood-everything-know-london-attacker/>, last visited: 1 August 2018.

²⁹⁴ Dearden, L., 'Isis claims responsibility for London attack that killed at least three victims', *The Independent*, 23 March 2017, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-london-attack-westminster-terror-responsibility-latest-islamic-state-daesh-a7645696.html>, last visited: 1 August 2018.

²⁹⁵ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018', European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (2018), available at: https://news247worldpressuk.files.wordpress.com/2018/06/tesat_2018.pdf, last visited: 1 August 2018, p.23.

²⁹⁶ Summers, H., MacAskill, E. and Dodd, V., 'Westminster attack: Khalid Masood identified as potential extremist in 2010', *The Guardian*, 26 March 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/26/westminster-attack-khalid-masood-identified-as-potential-extremist-in-2010>, last visited: 1 August 2018.

²⁹⁷ 'Westminster terror attack: Theresa May's statement to the Commons', *The Spectator*, 23 March 2017, available at: <https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/03/westminster-terror-attack-theresa-mays-statement-commons/>, last visited: 1 August 2018.

²⁹⁸ 'Police: "No evidence" London attacker associated with ISIS', *MPR News*, 27 March 2017, available at: <https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/03/27/police-no-evidence-london-attacker-associated-with-isis>, last visited: 1 August 2018.

²⁹⁹ MacAskill, E., 'Westminster attacker acted alone and motive may never be known, say police', *The Guardian*, 25 March 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/25/westminster-attack-khalid-masood-acted-alone>, last visited: 1 August 2018.

³⁰⁰ Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester', David Anderson QC (2017), available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/664682/Attacks_in_London_and_Manchester_Open_Report.pdf, last visited: 1 August 2018, p.14.

³⁰¹ Wahid, O., "'You'll hear I'm dead soon but be happy ... I will be in paradise': Westminster killer's chilling farewell phone call to his family", *Daily Mail*, 15 April 2017, available at: www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4415218/Khalid-Masood-s-chilling-farewell-call-family.html, last visited: 1 August 2018.

³⁰² Hickey, S., 'Westminster attack: car hire firms urged to tell police about suspicious customers', *The Guardian*, 25 March 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/25/westminster-attack-car-hire-firms-urged-tell-police-suspicious-customers-khalid-masood>, last visited: 1 August 2018.

³⁰³ Powell, T., "He was very friendly": Boss of hotel where London attacker Khalid Masood stayed the night before reveals killer spoke about his family', *Evening Standard*, 24 March 2017, available at: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/he-was-very-friendly-boss-of-hotel-where-khalid-masood-slept-before-attack-reveals-killer-spoke-a3498496.html>, last visited: 1 August 2018.

have revealed that, minutes before he began driving into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge, Masood used WhatsApp to send a message in which he asserted that he was waging jihad in revenge for the actions taken by Western militaries in Muslim countries.³⁰⁴ It is understood that just before he carried out the attack, Masood sent this message to numerous contacts over WhatsApp, iMessage and SMS.³⁰⁵

The attacker was born in 1964 as Adrian Russell Elms and later became Adrian Russell Ajao after his mother remarried.³⁰⁶ Masood grew up in Rye, a coastal town in East Sussex.³⁰⁷ He later moved to an upmarket area of Kent: Tunbridge Wells.³⁰⁸ Masood was first convicted for criminal damage in November 1983, at the age of 18.³⁰⁹ In July 2000, when he was 35 and living in the Sussex village of Northiam, he was involved in a violent altercation that reportedly had “racial overtones”.³¹⁰ Following this he was jailed for two years on charges of grievous bodily harm, which then seems to have led to the collapse of his first marriage.³¹¹ In 2003, shortly after his release from prison, Masood was accused of stabbing a man in the face in Eastbourne.³¹² Following this he was convicted for possession of an offensive weapon and sentenced to six months in prison.³¹³

It is unclear precisely when Masood converted to Islam. Some have suggested that it may have been during one of the periods he spent in prison, possibly between 2000 and 2004.³¹⁴ After the period during which his conversion likely happened, Masood’s criminal behaviour appears to have stopped, and in 2004 he began a relationship with a Muslim woman, whom he married.³¹⁵ It was at this time that he began the first of two periods living in Saudi Arabia,³¹⁶ with this stay lasting from 2005 to 2006 and the second lasting from 2008 to 2009.³¹⁷ According to Masood’s CV, he earned a TESOL certificate, which would allow him to teach English to foreigners, and in Saudi Arabia he taught employees of the General Authority of Civil Aviation (GACA) in Jeddah.³¹⁸ It was at this time that he changed his name to Khalid Masood, a further indication of the date by which he may have converted to Islam.³¹⁹ Masood returned to Britain in the spring of 2009 and joined a TEFL college in Luton as an English

³⁰⁴ Sengupta, K., ‘Last message left by Westminster attacker Khalid Masood uncovered by security agencies’, *The Independent*, 27 April 2017, available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/last-message-left-by-westminster-attacker-khalid-masood-uncovered-by-security-agencies-a7706561.html, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁰⁵ Anderson Q.C., D., ‘Attacks in London and Manchester’, David Anderson QC (2017), available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/664682/Attacks_in_London_and_Manchester_Open_Report.pdf, last visited: 30 July 2018.

³⁰⁶ Mendick, R. and Allen, E., ‘Khalid Masood: Everything we know about the London attacker’, *The Telegraph*, 27 March 2017.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁸ Laville, S. and Booth, R., ‘Khalid Masood: from Kent schoolboy to Westminster attacker’, *The Guardian*, 25 March 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/25/khalid-masood-profile-from-popular-teenager-to-isis-inspired-terrorist>, last visited: 8 August 2018.

³⁰⁹ Mendick, R. and Allen, E., ‘Khalid Masood: Everything we know about the London attacker’, *The Telegraph*, 27 March 2017.

³¹⁰ Press Association and Horton, H., ‘I saw he was quieter and much more serious: Westminster killer converted to Islam after jail says childhood friend’, *The Telegraph*, 25 March 2017, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/25/westminster-killer-left-jail-muslim-childhood-friend/>, last visited: 8 August 2018.

³¹¹ White, S. and Lines, A., ‘Wife of Westminster terrorist Khalid Masood fled to Oldham to escape her “violent, controlling psychopathic” husband’, *Manchester Evening News*, 24 March 2017, available at: www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/khalid-masood-first-wife-oldham-12795936, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³¹² Mendick, R. and Allen, E., ‘Khalid Masood: Everything we know about the London attacker’, *The Telegraph*, 27 March 2017.

³¹³ *Ibid.*

³¹⁴ Burke, J., ‘Khalid Masood was a convert with a criminal past. So far, so familiar’, *The Guardian*, 25 March 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/25/khalid-masood-was-a-convert-with-a-criminal-past-so-far-so-familiar>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*

³¹⁶ Mendick, R. and Allen, E., ‘Khalid Masood: Everything we know about the London attacker’, *The Telegraph*, 27 March 2017.

³¹⁷ Anderson, D., ‘Attacks in London and Manchester’, David Anderson QC (2017), p. 12.

³¹⁸ Mendick, R., Evans, M., Sawyer, P. and Harley, N., ‘First picture of Khalid Masood reveals how he went from football-loving teenager to London attacker’, *The Telegraph*, 24 March 2017, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/23/violent-extremist-dropped-polices-radar/>, last visited: 18 October 2018.

³¹⁹ Anderson, D., ‘Attacks in London and Manchester’, David Anderson QC, December 2017, pg. 12.

teacher.³²⁰ Having separated from his second wife, Masood began a relationship with his third wife,³²¹ with whom he had two children,³²² and the couple moved to Luton in 2010.³²³

Some have hypothesised that Masood's time living in Luton may have been linked to his move towards Islamist extremism. Luton was at that time the base for Al-Muhajiroun,³²⁴ the extremist group run by Anjem Choudary, who is now in prison after inviting support for Islamic State.³²⁵ While it has been speculated that during this period Masood may have been in contact with Al-Muhajiroun extremists who were being kept under surveillance, he is not believed to have been a member of that group.³²⁶ Another proposed connection between Masood and extremism in Luton is via the Luton Islamic Centre mosque.³²⁷ Until shortly after his attack, Masood was listed as a public contact on the mosque's 'Call to Islam' webpage, which was subsequently found to have promoted extremist material.³²⁸ In a further link to the mosque, it was revealed that the Elas UK school in Luton, where Masood taught, was a project of the Luton Islamic Centre and run by several figures from the mosque.³²⁹ In 2013, Masood and his family moved to Forest Gate in East London for a period before relocating to Birmingham in mid-2016.³³⁰ However, in December of that year the family abruptly left their home, with Masood's wife and children returning to London to live in Stratford³³¹ while Masood is understood to have moved in with a group of men in a flat above a takeaway in Birmingham.³³²

Investigations into Khalid Masood's electronic devices demonstrated that he favoured what has been described as a "conservative, Saudi-influenced, Salafist interpretation of Islam".³³³ According to intelligence reports, Masood had been researching violent attacks and Islamic State vehicular attacks from as early as April 2016.³³⁴ In the weeks prior to the Westminster attack, he had searched for YouTube videos relating to suicide attacks³³⁵ and also had created a document titled "Jihad in the Quran and Sunnah", which featured quotes from Islamic religious texts that could be used to give theological support for martyrdom

³²⁰ Mendick, R., Evans, M., Sawyer, P., and Harley, N., 'First picture of Khalid Masood reveals how he went from football-loving teenager to London attacker', *The Telegraph*, 24 March 2017.

³²¹ Mendick, R. and Allen, E., 'Khalid Masood: Everything we know about the London attacker', *The Telegraph*, 27 March 2017.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ 'Police appeal for Luton people who knew Westminster terrorist to get in touch', *Luton Today*, 24 May 2017, available at: <https://www.lutontoday.co.uk/news/crime/police-appeal-for-luton-people-who-knew-westminster-terrorist-to-get-in-touch-1-7882725>, last visited: 8 August 2018.

³²⁴ Swann, S. and Casciani, D., 'Going undercover against extremism', *BBC News*, 18 August 2016, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36985766>, last visited: 8 August 2018.

³²⁵ Farmer, B., 'How Anjem Choudary swore allegiance to Islamic State after curry house meeting', *The Telegraph*, 6 September 2016, available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/06/how-anjem-choudary-swore-allegiance-to-islamic-state-after-curry/, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³²⁶ Dearden, L., 'Westminster terrorist Khalid Masood took steroids before launching attack, inquest hears', *The Independent*, 15 January 2018, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/westminster-attack-khalid-masood-took-steroids-terrorist-london-parliament-isis-inquest-latest-a8159926.html>, last visited: 8 August 2018; and "No evidence' Khalid Masood had links to IS or al-Qaeda", *BBC News*, 27 March 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39408786>, last visited: 8 August 2018.

³²⁷ Gillian, A., 'Khalid Masood served as link man for radical mosque', *The Times*, 9 April 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/khalid-masood-served-as-link-man-for-radical-mosque-westminster-parliament-terror-attack-xkxvn8plh>, last visited: 8 August 2018.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ MacAskill, E. and Dodd, E., 'Khalid Masood: questions over how much MI5 knew about attacker', *The Guardian*, 24 March 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/24/khalid-masood-questions-over-how-much-mi5-knew-about-attacker>, last visited: 8 August 2018.

³³¹ Ibid; and Cooke, P., 'Wife of Westminster terrorist Khalid Masood 'saddened and shocked' by attack', *Newham Recorder*, 28 March 2018, available at: <http://www.newhamrecorder.co.uk/news/crime-court/wife-of-westminster-terrorist-khalid-masood-saddened-and-shocked-by-attack-1-4950596>, last visited: 8 August 2018.

³³² MacAskill, E. and Dodd, E., 'Khalid Masood: questions over how much MI5 knew about attacker', *The Guardian*, 24 March 2017.

³³³ Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester', David Anderson QC (2017), p. 14.

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Ibid.

operations.³³⁶ However, with his file having been closed by intelligence services in 2012, he was not being monitored, and none of these indicators were picked up by the authorities.³³⁷

20. Queanbeyan Stabbing Attacks

The Attack

Date: 6 April 2017

Day: Friday

Time: 11.50 pm

Country: Australia

Place: Queanbeyan

Area Type: Suburban – Commercial & Residential

Location: Shop – Interior

Type of Attack: Knife

Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 3

Number of Fatalities: 1

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailants

Number: 2

Gender: Male

Names: Unknown

Ages: 15, 16

Country of Origin: Australia

Nationality: Australian

Resident: Queanbeyan

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

On Thursday 6 April 2017, just before midnight, a petrol station worker was killed in a knife attack by two teenagers. Three other attacks that night were committed by the same two assailants.³³⁸ The attacks started with an attempted robbery at the Oaks Estate at 8.00 pm. The assailants then assaulted a man in his home in Queanbeyan with a tyre iron and attacked another man with a beer bottle in a park.³³⁹ They went on to murder a man at a Caltex service station just before midnight, and a few hours later – at around 6.00 am – they are reported to

³³⁶ Dearden, L., 'Westminster terrorist Khalid Masood took steroids before launching attack, inquest hears', *The Independent*, 15 January 2018.

³³⁷ Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester', David Anderson QC (2017), p. 13.

³³⁸ Koubaridis, A., 'Queanbeyan Caltex service station attack 'might be an act of terrorism'', *news.com.au*, 7 April 2017, available at: <http://www.news.com.au/national/nsw-act/crime/police-are-hunting-two-teenage-boys-after-a-fatal-stabbing-at-a-queanbeyan-service-station/news-story/Oc057cf80c7300e4fb5dc16b0fd66b34>, last visited: 13 July 2018.

³³⁹ 'Police say 'physical evidence' found at scene of fatal NSW service station stabbing suggests possible', *YouTube*, 7 April 2017, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XioYvHRxk5o>, last visited: 13 July 2018.

have flagged down a car, joined the driver in the car before stabbing the driver and hijacking the car.³⁴⁰

The police were called at 11.55 pm to come to the service station where the attack had happened, and on the Friday morning at 6.20 am the police were called again, this time to the second and non-fatal stabbing.³⁴¹ The police pursued the assailants in the stolen car, crossing the border from New South Wales into Canberra territory, where the police stopped the vehicle and took the two assailants into custody.³⁴²

Police stated that evidence left by the teenagers on the scene at the Caltex service station suggested that the incident could be an act of terrorism,³⁴³ and so the Joint Counter Terrorism Team took charge of the investigation.³⁴⁴ NSW (New South Wales) Police Deputy Commissioner Catherine Burn informed the media that the older of the two assailants was being investigated for links to terrorism.³⁴⁵ The assailants were both arrested just after 6.30 am on Friday 7 April.³⁴⁶

The assailants were aged 15 and 16 and, being minors, their identities were not revealed by the police. However, it appears that they were both New South Wales residents.³⁴⁷ It was later revealed that the 16-year-old was already on bail for a previous offence: aggravated sexual assault with a weapon.³⁴⁸

There are widespread reports that the letters “IS” – referring to Islamic State – were written in the blood of the victim at the Caltex service station, although the police did not confirm this at the time.³⁴⁹ It is also reported that the 16-year-old shouted “Allahu Akbar” as he was being arrested.³⁵⁰ Investigators then focussed their inquiries on the 16-year-old assailant as evidence emerged of his having posted extremist content relating to Islamic State online.³⁵¹ The mother of the older boy is reported to have told police that she thought her son had adopted more extreme views in the weeks leading up to the attacks and that he had been talking about the Islamic State and killing non-believers.³⁵²

³⁴⁰ Partridge, E., ‘Two schoolboys accused of murder with possible links to terrorism refuse to face court’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 28 June 2017, available at: <https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/two-schoolboys-accused-of-murder-with-possible-links-to-terrorism-refuse-to-face-court/news-story/95853070c3322e4671b99b1af33e1a89>, last visited: 13 July 2018; and Hart, C., ‘Queanbeyan stabbing: Teens to remain behind bars as bail officially denied’, *ABC News*, 9 April 2017, available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-09/queanbeyan-stabbing-accused-teens-denied-bail/8428978>, last visited: 13 July 2018.

³⁴¹ Koubaridis, A., ‘Queanbeyan Caltex service station attack ‘might be an act of terrorism’’, *news.com.au*, 7 April 2017.

³⁴² *Ibid.*

³⁴³ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁴ Trask, S., ‘Teens charged with Queanbeyan killing separated in youth detention’, *The Canberra Times*, 10 May 2017, available at: <http://www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/teens-charged-with-queanbeyan-killing-separated-in-youth-detention-20170510-gw1a9w.html>, last visited: 13 July 2018.

³⁴⁵ ‘Counter-terrorism police investigate fatal stabbing at Queanbeyan service station’, *The Guardian*, 7 April 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/apr/07/counter-terrorism-police-investigate-fatal-stabbing-at-queanbeyan-service-station>, last visited: 13 July 2018.

³⁴⁶ ‘Queanbeyan stabbing death: two teens charged with murder’, *The Guardian*, 8 April 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/apr/08/queanbeyan-stabbing-death-two-teens-charged-with>, last visited: 13 July 2018.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁸ Hall, L., ‘Two teenagers charged with Queanbeyan crime rampage refused bail’, *The Sunday Morning Herald*, 9 April 2017, available at: <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/two-teenagers-charged-with-queanbeyan-crime-rampage-refused-bail-20170409-gvgz9n.html>, last visited: 13 July 2018.

³⁴⁹ Fife-Yeomans, J. and Hansen, N., ‘Queanbeyan service station fatal stabbing ‘may be related to terror’’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 8 April 2017, available at: <https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/manhunt-for-teens-following-queanbeyan-stabbing-death/news-story/e4b6b6f166282181f9faa66a8d4a895d>, last visited: 13 July 2018; and Koubaridis, A., ‘Queanbeyan Caltex service station attack ‘might be an act of terrorism’’, *news.com.au*, 7 April 2017.

³⁵⁰ Margan, M., Cleary, B. and Maclaughlin, S., ‘Teenager charged with fatally stabbing service station worker in an ‘ISIS-inspired attack’ shouted ‘Allahu Akbar’ after his arrest’, *Daily Mail*, 8 April 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4392222/Queanbeyan-stabbing-Boys-charged-Caltex-murder.html>, last visited: 13 July 2018.

³⁵¹ Hall, L., ‘Two teenagers charged with Queanbeyan crime rampage refused bail’, *The Sunday Morning Herald*, 9 April 2017.

³⁵² *Ibid.*; and Harris, L., ‘Queanbeyan stabbing: Mother declares her son ‘is not a terrorist’ after he is charged with murder’, *The Sunday Telegraph*, 9 April 2018, available at: <https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/queanbeyan-stabbing-mother-declares-her-son-is-not-a-terrorist-after-fatally-killing-man/news-story/7d67813af70a44beefcd0ef04488453b>, last visited: 13 July 2018.

Joint Counter Terrorism Task Force officers charged the two assailants with murder, robbery and wounding with intent. Moreover, the older assailant was further charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm.³⁵³ They appeared before a Children’s Court in Canberra on 1 June and were then extradited to the New South Wales Children’s Court.³⁵⁴ In court, it is reported that police would confirm reports that the Caltex assailants used the victim’s blood to write “IS” on the window of the service station.³⁵⁵

While detained in custody, the two assailants were separated and sent to different juvenile detention centres. The older boy was detained in Frank Baxter Juvenile Justice Centre in Kariong, New South Wales; the younger in Cobham Juvenile Justice Centre, Western Sydney.³⁵⁶ It has since been reported that the 16-year-old has allegedly threatened to rape and murder prison guards and their families “in the name of Allah”.³⁵⁷

Despite objections from the assailants’ attorneys, the magistrate ruled that the police could have more time to investigate and that further forensic investigations would proceed,³⁵⁸ with the cases being scheduled to return to court on 25 October that year.³⁵⁹

21. Stockholm Truck Attack

The Attack

Date: 7 April 2017

Day: Friday

Time: 2.53 pm

Country: Sweden

Place: Stockholm

Area Type: City Centre – Commercial

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Vehicular

Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Directed

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 14

Number of Fatalities: 5

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Rakhmat Akilov

³⁵³ ‘Queanbeyan stabbing death: two teens charged with murder’, *The Guardian*, 8 April 2017.

³⁵⁴ Margan, M., Cleary, B. and Maclaughlin, S., ‘Teenager charged with fatally stabbing service station worker in an ‘ISIS-inspired attack’ shouted ‘Allahu Akbar’ after his arrest’, *Daily Mail*, 8 April 2017.

³⁵⁵ Partridge, E., ‘Two schoolboys accused of murder with possible links to terrorism refuse to face court’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 28 June 2017.

³⁵⁶ Trask, S., ‘Teens charged with Queanbeyan killing separated in youth detention’, *The Canberra Times*, 10 May 2017.

³⁵⁷ Johnson, S., ‘Teenager accused of fatally stabbing service station worker segregated for ‘threatening to rape and murder prison guards in the name of Allah’, *Daily Mail*, 7 May 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4480904/Servo-killer-accused-threatened-murder-prison-guards.html>, last visited: 13 July 2018.

³⁵⁸ Partridge, E., ‘Two schoolboys accused of murder with possible links to terrorism refuse to face court’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 28 June 2017.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

Age: 39

Country of Origin: Uzbekistan

Nationality: Uzbek

Resident: Stockholm

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Sentenced – Life

NOTES:

At 2.53 pm on Friday 7 April, a truck in central Stockholm intentionally drove into pedestrians, injuring 14 people and killing four,³⁶⁰ while a fifth man died of his injuries three weeks later.³⁶¹ The masked assailant had hijacked a brewery lorry on Adolf Fredriks Kyrkogata while the driver was briefly out of the driving seat, with the assailant also attempting to hit the driver of that vehicle, lightly injuring him in the process.³⁶² The attacker then drove the lorry at high speed towards the busy shopping thoroughfare on Drottningatan Street.³⁶³ Witnesses described how, as the attacker drove the truck down the crowded street, he had intentionally swerved the vehicle in an effort to hit people.³⁶⁴ The truck only came to a stop when it crashed into Ahlens department store.³⁶⁵ At this point the assailant fled the scene on foot, while the crashed truck caught fire.³⁶⁶ Police confirmed that a suspicious object was discovered in the driver's seat of the vehicle, and the Swedish media reported that this was an explosive device.³⁶⁷ The device was destroyed in a controlled explosion;³⁶⁸ however, the police refused to confirm whether it was actually a bomb, or whether it was simply something containing flammable materials.³⁶⁹

Hours after the attack, the Swedish authorities released a CCTV image of the suspected attacker, Rakhmat Akilov.³⁷⁰ Six hours after the attack, at 9.00 pm, Akilov was detained by police in Stockholm's northern suburb of Marsta.³⁷¹ This is the same location as Stockholm's Arlanda airport, and so he may have been attempting to flee the country. The suspect was described as behaving suspiciously and as having sustained minor injuries.³⁷² The injuries to the assailant's hands and legs were reported to have been caused by him having spilt chemicals

³⁶⁰ 'Truck drives into crowd in Stockholm, killing four people', *The Guardian*, 8 April 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/07/truck-crashes-in-central-stockholm-sweden>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁶¹ 'Stockholm terror attack claims 5th victim', *CNN*, 28 April 2017, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/28/world/sweden-attack-death/index.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁶² 'Sweden Hunts for Driver of Rampaging Truck That Killed 4 People', *Bloomberg*, 7 April 2017, available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-07/people-run-down-in-stockholm-as-truck-rams-into-building>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁶³ 'Truck drives into crowd in Stockholm, killing four people', *The Guardian*, 8 April 2017.

³⁶⁴ 'Stockholm lorry attack: Eyewitnesses recount 'sheer panic'', *BBC News*, 7 April 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39531280>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁶⁵ 'Truck drives into crowd in Stockholm, killing four people', *The Guardian*, 8 April 2017.

³⁶⁶ 'Stockholm attack driver 'deliberately targeted young children' as he drove hijacked lorry into crowd', *The Telegraph*, 8 April 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/07/truck-crashes-crowd-people-stockholm/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁶⁷ 'Swedish police say a 39-year-old Uzbek was behind the deadly attack in Stockholm', *The Washington Post*, 8 April 2017, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/sweden-has-been-attacked-truck-crashes-into-stockholm-store-killing-4/2017/04/08/bd58de7c-1c3e-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html?utm_term=.109bcd95dac, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁶⁸ 'Stockholm attack: 'Suspect device' in Sweden crash lorry', *BBC News*, 9 April 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39539689>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁶⁹ 'Arrest in Stockholm Truck Attack: 'We Think He Is the Driver'', *The New York Times*, 8 April 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/08/world/europe/stockholm-truck-attack-arrest.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁷⁰ 'Truck drives into crowd in Stockholm, killing four people', *The Guardian*, 8 April 2017.

³⁷¹ 'Stockholm attack suspect Rakhmat Akilov admits terrorist crime', *The Guardian*, 11 April 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/11/stockholm-attack-suspect-rakhmat-akilov-admits-terrorist>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁷² 'Stockholm attack: 'Homemade bomb' found in lorry used to kill at least four people in Sweden', *The Independent*, 8 April 2017, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/stockholm-attack-sweden-lorry-truck-crash-terror-isis-islamic-state-manhunt-latest-suspect-police-a7673527.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

on himself.³⁷³ Conceivably, the injuries may have been sustained in relation to the possible explosive device found inside the truck.

Days later, on Tuesday 11 April, Akilov confessed during an initial court hearing to having carried out a terrorist attack.³⁷⁴ The suspect also requested that his lawyer be replaced with a Sunni Muslim, a request which the judge denied.³⁷⁵ Akilov is reported to have told police that he was a supporter of Islamic State and that he had carried out the attack in response to the bombing of Syria.³⁷⁶ It has subsequently been reported that Akilov told authorities that he had carried out his attack because Sweden had supported the US-led coalition's attacks against Islamic State.³⁷⁷ On 24 April it was reported that the assailant's brother, Olim Akilov, had also been arrested by the Uzbek authorities.³⁷⁸

The attacker was a 39-year-old Uzbek national and father of four.³⁷⁹ A failed asylum seeker, Akilov had been born in Samarkand in 1978 and came to Sweden in 2014.³⁸⁰ He applied for asylum in Sweden at that time under the false name Rahmatgon Kurbonov and claimed to have been tortured in Uzbekistan, which was later judged to be untrue.³⁸¹ Having worked in construction while living in the Varberg neighbourhood of southern Stockholm,³⁸² it is reported that he lost his job months before the attack after falling asleep at work.³⁸³ Akilov's asylum claim was rejected in June 2016 and he had been ordered to leave the country, but he remained in Sweden and was not deported.³⁸⁴

Uzbekistan's Foreign Minister has said that Akilov had been recruited by Islamic State and that he had encouraged other Uzbeks to travel to Syria for the purpose of fighting for IS.³⁸⁵ Investigators later confirmed that a memory card that Akilov had brought with him to Sweden contained videos linked to Islamic State that dated from 2014.³⁸⁶ While the Uzbek government has claimed that he was only recruited after having left his home country, Akilov had sent Islamist propaganda videos to family members and contacts back in Uzbekistan,³⁸⁷ where his

³⁷³ 'Stockholm terror suspect 'sent Whatsapps to ISIS supporter before and after attack'', *Evening Standard*, 10 April 2017, available at: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/stockholm-terror-suspect-sent-whatsapps-to-isis-supporter-before-and-after-attack-a3511381.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁷⁴ 'Suspect in Stockholm truck attack admits terrorist crime', *Reuters*, 11 April 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sweden-attack-suspect-detention/suspect-in-stockholm-truck-attack-admits-terrorist-crime-idUSKBN17DOUD>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ 'I am a Muslim and I support ISIS': Stockholm terrorist CONFESSES and tells police 'attack was REVENGE for bombing in Syria', *Daily Mail*, 11 April 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4400644/Rakhmat-Akilov-confesses-terror-truck-attack-Stockholm.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁷⁷ 'Rakhmat Akilov sentenced to life imprisonment for Stockholm terror attack', *The Local*, 7 June 2018, available at: <https://www.thelocal.se/20180607/rakhmat-akilov-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-for-stockholm-terror-attack>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁷⁸ 'Relatives Say Brother Of Stockholm Truck-Attack Suspect Arrested In Uzbekistan', *Radio Free Europe*, 25 April 2017, available at: <https://www.rferl.org/a/stockholm-uzbekistan-suspect-brother-arrested/28450822.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁷⁹ 'Stockholm terror suspect 'sent Whatsapps to ISIS supporter before and after attack'', *Evening Standard*, 10 April 2017.

³⁸⁰ 'Suspect in Stockholm Attack Was an ISIS Recruit, Uzbek Official Says', *The New York Times*, 14 April 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/world/europe/stockholm-attack-isis-rakhmat-akilov.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁸¹ 'I am a Muslim and I support ISIS': Stockholm terrorist CONFESSES and tells police 'attack was REVENGE for bombing in Syria', *Daily Mail*, 11 April 2017.

³⁸² 'Stockholm attack suspect is Uzbek denied residency in Sweden', *Reuters*, 9 April 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sweden-attack-profile/stockholm-attack-suspect-is-uzbek-denied-residency-in-sweden-idUSKBN17B0ZG>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁸³ 'Stockholm truck attack: Who is Rakhmat Akilov?', *BBC News*, 7 June 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39552691>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁸⁴ 'Stockholm attack: Rakhmat Akilov admits 'terrorist crime'', *The Week*, 11 April 2017, available at: <http://www.theweek.co.uk/stockholm-attack/83422/stockholm-attack-rakhmat-akilov-admits-terrorist-crime>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁸⁵ 'Suspect in Stockholm Attack Was an ISIS Recruit, Uzbek Official Says', *The New York Times*, 14 April 2017.

³⁸⁶ 'Isis follower Rakhmat Akilov admits lorry death spree in Stockholm', *The Times*, 14 February 2018, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/isis-follower-rakhmat-akilov-admits-lorry-death-sprees-in-stockholm-bevington-9pm6s5z3t>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁸⁷ 'Suspect in Stockholm Attack Was an ISIS Recruit, Uzbek Official Says', *The New York Times*, 14 April 2017.

wife and children were still living.³⁸⁸ The Swedish authorities did not comment on the Uzbek Foreign Minister's claims at the time; however, it was confirmed that Akilov had been known to the Swedish security services in relation to Islamist extremism.³⁸⁹ The country's national police chief stated that, while Akilov had been named in security information, he had not been under recent investigation.³⁹⁰ Echoing language used by the British Prime Minister in reference to Westminster attacker Khaled Masood, he described Akilov as a "more marginal character".³⁹¹

A police spokesman confirmed that the assailant was known to have expressed support for extremist groups, including Islamic State.³⁹² A Facebook account believed to have belonged to Akilov followed a page called 'Friends of Libya and Syria', which claimed to expose the "terrorism of the imperialistic financial capitals" of the United States of America, Britain and Arab dictatorships.³⁹³ The page also featured extremist videos, including one about the victimisation of Muslims which claimed there is hypocrisy regarding the definition of terrorism, while another was about a family in Mosul calling on others to join Islamic State.³⁹⁴

During police interrogations, Rakhmat Akilov claimed that the order to carry out his attack had come directly from Islamic State in Syria.³⁹⁵ It has been reported that Akilov sent messages to IS supporters over a Russian encrypted messaging app, both before and after carrying out the attack.³⁹⁶

One message exchange was with an IS supporter in Tajikistan using the name Abu Fatyma.³⁹⁷ In one message Akilov told Fatyma that he had matches, acetone, lighters, gas lighters and bolts, before then asking about how to construct a bomb.³⁹⁸ In the same message Akilov wrote, "Tomorrow I want to find a great car and run into a crowd."³⁹⁹

Fatyma replied to him saying, "Do not waste time in vain."⁴⁰⁰

Roughly an hour after the attack Fatyma messaged Akilov, asking, "Are you alive?"⁴⁰¹

The attacker replied, "I ran over 10 people in the centre of Stockholm, now I have to get out of here."⁴⁰² Akilov said of his attack, "It went bad, I hit a few, but the car went wrong. Now I'm at the airport, a dead end."⁴⁰³

Fatyma responded, "Allahu Akbar, my brother, I cry, I love you, how are you stand firm, you are going."⁴⁰⁴

³⁸⁸ 'Stockholm attack suspect is Uzbek denied residency in Sweden', *Reuters*, 9 April 2017.

³⁸⁹ 'Stockholm attack suspect 'known to security services'', *The Guardian*, 8 April 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/08/stockholm-attack-suspect-arrested-for-terrorist-after-truck-deaths>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*

³⁹² 'Stockholm terror suspect 'sent Whatsapps to ISIS supporter before and after attack'', *Evening Standard*, 10 April 2017.

³⁹³ 'Suspect in Stockholm truck attack admits terrorist crime', *Reuters*, 11 April 2017.

³⁹⁴ 'Stockholm attack suspect is Uzbek denied residency in Sweden', *Reuters*, 9 April 2017.

³⁹⁵ "I am a Muslim and I support ISIS": Stockholm terrorist CONFESSES and tells police 'attack was REVENGE for bombing in Syria', *Daily Mail*, 11 April 2017.

³⁹⁶ 'Stockholm terror suspect 'sent Whatsapps to ISIS supporter before and after attack'', *Evening Standard*, 10 April 2017.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁰ 'Belgian psychologist who worked with failed asylum seekers among Stockholm terror victims', *The Telegraph*, 10 April 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/10/stockholm-terror-suspect-boasted-had-run-10-people-whatsapp/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴⁰¹ 'Stockholm terror suspect 'sent Whatsapps to ISIS supporter before and after attack'', *Evening Standard*, 10 April 2017.

⁴⁰² 'Belgian psychologist who worked with failed asylum seekers among Stockholm terror victims', *The Telegraph*, 10 April 2017.

⁴⁰³ 'Stockholm terror suspect 'sent Whatsapps to ISIS supporter before and after attack'', *Evening Standard*, 10 April 2017.

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

The conversation reportedly ended with Akilov sending a video taken from the site of the attack.⁴⁰⁵ Screenshots from the message conversation were originally posted on an Islamist online forum.⁴⁰⁶ However, the authenticity of the images showing the conversation have never been fully verified.⁴⁰⁷ Nevertheless, reports from Akilov's trial did appear to confirm that the assailant had discussed his plans to carry out the attack with unidentified contacts on social media from as early as January 2017.⁴⁰⁸ Akilov also confirmed that he had sought authorisation for his attack from Islamic State through his communications on messaging apps.⁴⁰⁹ Islamic State did not claim responsibility for the attack. This may be on account of the fact that the assailant had been captured alive.

In February 2018, Rakhmat Akilov put in a plea of guilty to terrorism offences.⁴¹⁰ He was subsequently sentenced to life in prison.⁴¹¹

22. Foiled Gronland Bombing

The Attack

Date: 8 April 2017

Day: Saturday

Time: Unknown

Country: Norway

Place: Oslo

Area Type: City Centre – Commercial

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Foiled Bombing

Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested Prior to Attack

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Withheld

Age: 17

Country of Origin: Russia

Nationality: Russian

Resident: Oslo

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ 'Påstådd Akilov-chatt ifrågasätts', *Expressen*, 10 April 2017, available at: <https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/pastadd-akilov-chatt-ifragasatts/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴⁰⁸ 'Prosecutors call for life in jail for Stockholm truck attacker Rakhmat Akilov', *The Local*, 26 April 2018, available at: <https://www.thelocal.se/20180426/prosecutors-call-for-life-in-jail-for-stockholm-truck-attacker-rakhmat-akilov>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴⁰⁹ 'Stockholm terrorist trial ends', *New Europe*, 3 May 2018, available at: <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/stockholm-terrorist-trial-ends/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴¹⁰ 'Uzbek man pleads guilty in Stockholm terror trial', *BBC News*, 13 February 2018, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43043287>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴¹¹ 'Stockholm lorry attacker jailed for life after killing five people', *Sky News*, 7 June 2017, available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/stockholm-lorry-attacker-jailed-for-life-after-killing-five-people-11397428>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Sentenced – Nine Months

NOTES:

On Saturday 8 April, just a day after the truck attack in Stockholm, a teenager was arrested in the centre of Norway's capital, carrying a home-made explosive device. Late that night, Norwegian police apprehended a 17-year-old in possession of an explosive device in Oslo's Gronland neighbourhood.⁴¹² The area was cordoned off and a controlled explosion carried out in the early hours of Sunday morning⁴¹³ by Norway's bomb disposal team using a remote controlled machine for the task.⁴¹⁴ The individual carrying the device was taken into custody and identified as being a Russian citizen, although on account of his young age his name has not been made public.⁴¹⁵

The area where the teenager was arrested has been described as a multi-ethnic one, home to both the Islamic Cultural Centre of Norway – a sizeable mosque – and also to the city's primary police station.⁴¹⁶ Indeed, when arrested, the suspect had been less than a kilometre away from the police station.⁴¹⁷ This incident, along with the attack in the Swedish capital, contributed to Norway raising its terror threat level from "possible" to "probable".⁴¹⁸

The device itself appears to have been small and rudimentary, liable to have only been capable of causing limited damage.⁴¹⁹ It is understood that the device consisted of lighter fluid and metal pieces cut from wire mesh fencing.⁴²⁰ Explosive experts who attempted to reconstruct a version of the bomb stated that, when detonated, the device had the potential to cause a fireball of four metres by four metres.⁴²¹ Had it been set off in a crowded area it could have been more seriously harmful.⁴²² During the course of the trial it transpired that the suspect had learned how to make the device by watching a video on YouTube.⁴²³ When the suspected was spotted by a member of the public he had reportedly been kneeling on the ground with the device, leading to speculation that he may have been attempting to set it off in Oslo city centre.⁴²⁴ His defence, however, has claimed that the teenager was actually taking the device to a wooded area outside the city to detonate it as a prank.⁴²⁵ This explanation was rejected in court.⁴²⁶

⁴¹² 'Oslo police detonate "bomb-like device"; suspect in custody', *Reuters*, 8 April 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-police/oslo-police-detonate-bomb-like-device-suspect-in-custody-idUSKBN17AOTS>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁴ 'Norway: "bomb-like device" destroyed in central Oslo', *The Guardian*, 9 April 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/09/norway-bomb-like-device-found-in-central-oslo>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴¹⁵ '17-year-old accused of Oslo bomb scare remanded for two weeks', *The Local*, 11 April 2017, available at: <https://www.thelocal.no/20170411/17-year-old-accused-of-oslo-bomb-scare-remanded-for-two-weeks>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴¹⁶ 'Oslo police detonate "bomb-like device"; suspect in custody', *Reuters*, 8 April 2017.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁸ 'Norway bomb scare teenager avoids terror charge in trial', *The Local*, 2 October 2017, available at: <https://www.thelocal.no/20171002/norway-bomb-scare-teenager-avoids-terror-charge-in-trial>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴¹⁹ 'Norway sentences "homemade bomb" teenager to nine months in prison', *The Local*, 30 October 2017, available at: <https://www.thelocal.no/20171030/norway-sentences-homemade-bomb-teenager-to-nine-months-in-prison>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴²¹ '17-åring med hjemmelaget bombe dømt til ni måneder i fengsel', *NRK*, 30 October 2017, available at: <https://www.nrk.no/norge/17-ar-ning-med-hjemmelaget-bombe-domt-til-ni-maneder-i-fengsel-1.13756014>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴²² '17-year-old accused of Oslo bomb scare remanded for two weeks', *The Local*, 11 April 2017.

⁴²³ 'Teenage bomb-maker sentenced to jail', *News in English Norway*, 30 October 2017, available at: <http://www.newsinenglish.no/2017/10/30/teenage-bomb-maker-sentenced-to-jail/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴²⁴ '17-åring med hjemmelaget bombe dømt til ni måneder i fengsel', *NRK*, 30 October 2017.

⁴²⁵ '17-year-old accused of Oslo bomb scare remanded for two weeks', *The Local*, 11 April 2017.

⁴²⁶ 'Norway sentences "homemade bomb" teenager to nine months in prison', *The Local*, 30 October 2017.

While the bomb-maker's identity has not been disclosed, it has been confirmed that the 17-year-old is a Russian citizen whose background is in the North Caucasus.⁴²⁷ He arrived in Norway as an asylum seeker with his family in 2010 and had been living in the Finnmark region of northern Norway.⁴²⁸ More recently he had moved to Oslo to attend secondary school.⁴²⁹ Norway's police intelligence unit, the PST, has contended that at the time of the teenager's move to Oslo he was in the process of coming to embrace a more extremist set of views.⁴³⁰ However, it appears that the assailant may have harboured extremist sympathies for quite some time prior to the bomb incident. At the age of 15 he had "Liked" a picture of the Islamic State executioner Mohammed Emwazi that had been posted to social media.⁴³¹ The PST also reported that he had previously accessed websites advocating jihad,⁴³² while evidence taken from his phone showed that he had searched the term "Islamic state" some 235 times.⁴³³ Some further evidence was also found of Islamic State videos on a messaging app on the teenager's phone.⁴³⁴ Despite being already known to the PST prior to the attempted attack in April, he denied being in contact with any extremist networks.⁴³⁵

The police produced a number of online messages that the assailant had sent, including messages referring to travelling to Syria and to an unexplained "plan" he wished to carry out.⁴³⁶ In one message, sent on 1 March, he wrote that there was a concrete plan but that he was unable to say what it was in the message.⁴³⁷ In that same message he stated that this was "one thing I have to get done before *hijra*. Enjoy good news from here and do the *dua* for me ... If everything goes as planned, with Allah's permission, then we will do this."⁴³⁸ Typically, *hijra* would refer to undertaking Islamic pilgrimage, but it can also be used to refer to travelling to Islamic State's caliphate.

In another message to a different acquaintance sent in February, he stated that he had a plan but that he could not talk about it, warning, "Brother, I know many brothers who have been taken by the *kuffar* [unbelievers] because of statements in such groups. Brother, do not talk like this openly. Be careful! These cursed *kuffar* have all possible technology, so be careful."⁴³⁹

Initially, the suspect was charged with terrorism offences; however, these were downgraded to charges relating to the illegal possession of explosive materials.⁴⁴⁰ The downgrade came on account of the fact that the explosive device was judged to be less serious than it could potentially have been.⁴⁴¹ However, the change in charge did not appear to take into account the question of the suspect's intent in possessing the explosives, with it still appearing likely to have been for terrorist purposes. The trial took place in October 2017 and was mostly conducted behind closed doors.⁴⁴² The prosecution had sought a sentence of at least two years in prison;⁴⁴³ however, the accused was sentenced to nine months in prison, with the 210

⁴²⁷ '17-åring i chat: Bror, jeg har en plan, men kan ikke si den her', *NRK*, 10 October 2017, available at: <https://www.nrk.no/norge/17-arig-i-chat-bror-jeg-har-en-plan-men-kan-ikke-si-den-her-1.13726793>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁹ 'Norway sentences "homemade bomb" teenager to nine months in prison', *The Local*, 30 October 2017.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴³¹ '17-year-old accused of Oslo bomb scare remanded for two weeks', *The Local*, 11 April 2017.

⁴³² 'Teenage bomb-maker sentenced to jail', *News in English Norway*, 30 October 2017.

⁴³³ '17-åring i chat: Bror, jeg har en plan, men kan ikke si den her', *NRK*, 10 October 2017.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁵ 'Norway bomb scare teenager avoids terror charge in trial', *The Local*, 2 October 2017.

⁴³⁶ '17-åring i chat: Bror, jeg har en plan, men kan ikke si den her', *NRK*, 10 October 2017.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁰ 'Norway bomb scare teenager avoids terror charge in trial', *The Local*, 2 October .

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴² 'Norway sentences "homemade bomb" teenager to nine months in prison', *The Local*, 30 October 2017.

⁴⁴³ 'Teenage bomb-maker sentenced to jail', *News in English Norway*, 30 October 2017.

days he had spent in custody awaiting trial to be deducted from this.⁴⁴⁴ There was also some suggestion that his legal team might seek to appeal the sentence.⁴⁴⁵

23. Fresno Shootings

The Attack

Date: 18 April 2017

Day: Tuesday

Time: 10.43 am

Country: United States of America

Place: Fresno

Area Type: Suburban – Residential

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Shooting

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Anti-White)

Ideology: Black Supremacist

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor

Claimed: N/A

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 3

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Kori Ali Muhammad

Age: 39

Country of Origin: United States of America

Nationality: American

Resident: Fresno

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

On Tuesday 18 April, a shooting spree took place in central Fresno, California. The attack began at around 10.43 am when the gunman approached a parked utility truck and fired four shots at a man in the passenger seat, fatally wounding him as a result.⁴⁴⁶ However, the driver of the truck was spared, apparently on account of his being Hispanic.⁴⁴⁷ Walking a short distance, the attacker then fired a shot at a man as he was coming out of his house, this time missing his target.⁴⁴⁸ Following this he fired a shot at a car carrying three passengers, however upon approaching the vehicle and discovering that the passengers were also Hispanic, he took no further action against them.⁴⁴⁹ The gunman then went on to shoot and kill another man on

⁴⁴⁴ 'Norway sentences "homemade bomb" teenager to nine months in prison', *The Local*, 30 October 2017.

⁴⁴⁵ 'Teenage bomb-maker sentenced to jail', *News in English Norway*, 30 October 2017.

⁴⁴⁶ Appleton, R. and Benjamin, M., 'Dyer: Rampage shooter is 'calloused' racist who 'set out to kill as many as he could'', *The Fresno Bee*, 19 April 2017, available at: <http://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/crime/article145499739.html>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

nearby Fulton Street.⁴⁵⁰ After this the gunman fired at a group of men standing by a bus stop, causing the men to flee the area. He pursued one of the men to the car park of the Catholic Charities building before shooting and killing him also.⁴⁵¹ Minutes later, the suspect turned himself over to police at the junction of Fulton and Divisadero Streets.⁴⁵²

The attack on the morning of 18 April was also connected to a murder that took place several days earlier, on 13 April. The suspect in both cases was 39-year-old Kori Ali Muhammad. The earlier murder took place during an altercation at Motel 6 in central Fresno involving a security guard, Muhammad and a woman he was acquainted with.⁴⁵³ The attacker later claimed that he had shot the security guard because he felt the man had disrespected him.⁴⁵⁴ That killing does not appear to have had a premeditated ideological motive. However, it did lead to Muhammad seeking to evade capture by the authorities and may in some way have contributed to the chain of events that led him to carry out the attack in the following days. He would later tell police that upon discovering he was wanted for the motel murder, he had wanted to carry out his attack before being caught.⁴⁵⁵

There had been initial speculation that the attacks carried out on 18 April had an Islamist motive. This appears largely to have been based on reports that Muhammad had shouted “Allahu Akbar” while being arrested following the shootings.⁴⁵⁶

Born Kori Taylor,⁴⁵⁷ Muhammad had apparently converted to Islam as a teenager, when he changed his name and became involved with the Nation of Islam, an extremist group associated with Black Supremacism.⁴⁵⁸ Muhammad told police that he was Muslim but he had not attended a mosque for many years and that he now practices voodoo rituals.⁴⁵⁹ The attack appears to have in fact been racially motivated, with Muhammad saying that he had wanted to kill as many white people as possible.⁴⁶⁰

In March he had posted a music video to YouTube featuring these views.⁴⁶¹ Muhammad’s Facebook page promoted Black nationalism and as well as featuring the Pan-African flag; it also listed him as a warrior of the RGB Nation, a further allusion to the same flag.⁴⁶² In the days prior to the attacks, Muhammad had used his profile to make a number of anti-White statements,

⁴⁵⁰ ‘Fresno shooting rampage: Suspect who shot dead 3 wanted to kill as many people as possible, police say’, *Fox News*, 18 April 2017, available at: <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/04/18/fresno-shooting-spree-3-people-killed-suspect-in-custody.html>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁴⁵¹ Appleton, R. and Benjamin, M., ‘Dyer: Rampage shooter is ‘calloused’ racist who ‘set out to kill as many as he could’’, *The Fresno Bee*, 19 April 2017.

⁴⁵² *Ibid.*

⁴⁵³ Jacobo, J. and Stone, A., ‘Suspect in Fresno shooting rampage charged with previous murder of motel security guard’, *ABC News*, 20 April 2017, available at: <http://abcnews.go.com/US/suspect-fresno-shooting-rampage-charged-previous-murder-motel/story?id=46925155>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁵ ‘Fresno shooting spree suspect charged with 3 counts of first-degree murder’, *CBS News*, 26 April 2017, available at: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fresno-shooting-spree-kori-ali-muhammad-first-degree-murder-counts/>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁴⁵⁶ ‘California gunman kills three ‘in race attack’ in Fresno’, *BBC News*, 19 April 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-39636104>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁸ Levin, S., ‘Fresno shooting decried as anti-white hate crime, but truth is complicated’, *The Guardian*, 19 April 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/19/fresno-shooting-hate-crime-kori-ali-muhammad>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁴⁵⁹ Jacobo, J. and Stone, A., ‘Suspect in Fresno shooting rampage charged with previous murder of motel security guard’, *ABC News*, 20 April 2017.

⁴⁶⁰ ‘Fresno shooting spree suspect charged with 3 counts of first-degree murder’, *CBS News*, 26 April 2017.

⁴⁶¹ Appleton, R., ‘Suspected Fresno rampage killer may have threatened Trump on social media’, *The Fresno Bee*, 18 April 2017, available at: <https://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/crime/article145293959.html>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁴⁶² ‘Suspect in Fresno shooting rampage spoke about racial conflict and black nationalism’, *Los Angeles Times*, 18 April 2017, available at: <http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-fresno-shooter-suspect-20170418-story.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

some of them referencing African and Black Supremacist folklore and one including the term “Allah U Akbar”.⁴⁶³ In another he had written, “BLACK WARRIORS MOUNT UP AND RIDE OUT *ASÈ* #LETBLACKPEOPLEGO.”⁴⁶⁴ During court hearings that took place following his arrest, Muhammad shouted, “Let Black people go,” and, “Reparations!”⁴⁶⁵

A father of three, Muhammad had previously served time in prison for drug-related offences and possession of firearms.⁴⁶⁶ He has also had some recorded mental health issues, although it remains unclear how prevalent these were at the time of the attack.⁴⁶⁷ Having been charged with four counts of murder following his arrest, in August a panel of three doctors disagreed about whether Muhammad was competent to stand trial, with one doctor arguing that he was able to stand trial and two disagreeing.⁴⁶⁸ Therefore the decision was subsequently passed to a jury to decide whether or not Muhammad would be mentally competent to stand trial.⁴⁶⁹

24. Eurobank Office Bombing

The Attack

Date: 19 April 2017

Day: Wednesday

Time: 10.38 pm

Country: Greece

Place: Athens

Area Type: City Centre - Commercial

Location: Bank - Exterior

Type of Attack: Bombing

Target: Civilian - Targeted (Financial)

Ideology: Far Left

Organisation/Affiliation: The People’s Fighters Group (OLA) - Directed

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Not Apprehended

The Assailants

Number: Unknown

Gender: Unknown

Name: Unknown

Age: Unknown

Country of Origin: Unknown

Nationality: Unknown

Resident: Unknown

Training/Combat Experience: Unknown

Known to Authorities: Unknown

Current Status: At Large

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ Lopez, P., ‘Accused mass killer Kori Muhammad incompetent for trial, doctors say’, *The Fresno Bee*, 22 August 2017, available at: <http://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/crime/article168621072.html>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁴⁶⁶ Levin, S., ‘Fresno shooting decried as anti-white hate crime, but truth is complicated’, *The Guardian*, 19 April 2017.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁸ Lopez, P., ‘Accused mass killer Kori Muhammad incompetent for trial, doctors say’, *The Fresno Bee*, 22 August 2017.

⁴⁶⁹ ‘Jury Will Decide Mental Fitness of Black Gunman Who Says He Targeted White Men’, *CBS Sacramento*, 12 September 2017, available at: <http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2017/09/12/kori-ali-muhammad-trial/>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

NOTES:

On the evening of Wednesday 19 April, a small explosive device detonated outside the offices of Eurobank on Santarozza Street in central Athens.⁴⁷⁰ The bomb went off at 10.38 pm, damaging the entrance to the building but not causing any injuries.⁴⁷¹ A month later, the far-left militants The People's Fighters Group (OLA) claimed responsibility for carrying out the attack.⁴⁷² The group also took responsibility for an earlier attempted bombing which took place at Greece's Ministry of Labour on 12 December 2016.⁴⁷³ The claim of responsibility referenced a number of the government's economic policies, such as cuts to wages and pensions, as a source of complaint.⁴⁷⁴ The claim also made reference to a "capitalist crisis" which it claimed is happening in every country and called for "armed class struggle".⁴⁷⁵ It also made mention of a recent Palestinian hunger strike.⁴⁷⁶

In the past the OLA has taken responsibility for a number of small explosions, including a bombing outside the Athens office of a Greek business federation in 2015.⁴⁷⁷ The group is also understood to have been responsible for two similar bombings in 2013, one outside the headquarters of the conservative New Democracy Party and the other at the residence of Germany's ambassador to Greece.⁴⁷⁸ It is believed that the OLA was established in 2013 in direct response to the Greek debt crisis and in protest at the austerity measures that came as a condition of German loans to the country.⁴⁷⁹ As such the group has partly focussed on attacking German-linked targets and has described itself as being at war with "the German capitalist machine".⁴⁸⁰

For more information on attacks by the People's Fighters Group, see the entry for the "68. Athens Courthouse Bombing".

25. Champs-Élysées Shooting

The Attack

Date: 20 April 2017

Day: Thursday

Time: 9.00 pm

Country: France

Place: Paris

Area Type: City Centre – Landmark

Location: Street

⁴⁷⁰ 'Small explosive device damages Eurobank offices in Athens, no injuries', *Reuters*, 19 April 2017, available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-blast/small-explosive-device-damages-eurobank-offices-in-athens-no-injuries-idUSKBN17L2WA>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

⁴⁷² 'Greek urban guerrilla group claims responsibility for Eurobank attack', *Daily Mail*, 30 May 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/reuters/article-4556052/Greek-urban-guerrilla-group-claims-responsibility-Eurobank-attack.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴⁷³ 'The OLA terrorist organization assumed responsibility for the Eurobank & Minisrty of Labour attacks', *Thema*, 30 May 2017, available at: <http://en.protothema.gr/the-ola-terrorist-organization-assumed-responsibility-for-the-eurobank-minisrty-of-labour-attacks/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁷ 'Greek urban guerrilla group claims responsibility for Eurobank attack', *Daily Mail*, 30 May 2017.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁹ 'Popular Fighters Group – Greece', *Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium*, available at: <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/popular-fighters-group-greece>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

Type of Attack: Shooting

Target: Police

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 3

Number of Fatalities: 1

Response: Shot Dead

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Karim Cheurfi

Age: 39

Country of Origin: France

Nationality: French

Resident: Paris

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Dead

NOTES:

At around 9.00 pm on the evening of 20 April, in the final days of the French election, a man drove his car close to a parked police van on the Champs-Élysées in Paris, at which point he exited the vehicle and used an assault rifle to shoot at the van, killing one of the police officers inside.⁴⁸¹ The assailant then began to run away from the police, but continued to shoot back towards the van as he did so, injuring two more police officers who had been standing beside the van.⁴⁸² A passing female tourist was also injured by the shots.⁴⁸³ The officers returned fire at the assailant, killing him as a result.⁴⁸⁴ The man killed by the police was identified as Karim Cheurfi.⁴⁸⁵

At the time of the shooting the police found a handwritten note close to the assailant's body, which expressed support for Islamic State.⁴⁸⁶ The note is reported to have also expressed the man's desire to die as a martyr in the name of Allah.⁴⁸⁷ Furthermore, it was confirmed that a list of police station addresses were found in the assailant's car, as were a pump-action shotgun, knives and a copy of the Quran.⁴⁸⁸ During the night following the attack, police raided several properties in Paris and detained three of Cheurfi's relatives.⁴⁸⁹

⁴⁸¹ Chrisafis A. and Smith D., 'French police officer killed in shooting on Champs Élysées', *The Guardian*, 21 April 2017.

⁴⁸² 'Paris Champs Elysees shooting: Gunman was 'focus of anti-terror' probe', *BBC News*, 21 April 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39663300>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴⁸³ Dearden, L. and Pasha-Robinson, L., 'Paris attack: Champs- Elysees suspect was jailed for shooting police and subject of terror investigation', *The Independent*, 21 April 2017, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris-attack-isis-terror-champs-elysees-gunman-accomplice-police-manhunt-belgian-karim-cheurfi-a7694266.html>, 4 September 2018.

⁴⁸⁴ 'Paris Champs Elysees shooting: Gunman was 'focus of anti-terror' probe', *BBC News*, 21 April 2017.

⁴⁸⁵ 'Paris Champs Elysees attack gunman named as Karim Cheurfi', *BBC News*, 21 April 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39671542>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴⁸⁶ Jarry, E. and Irish, J., 'Police seek possible accomplices of Paris gunman', *Reuters*, 20 April 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-shooting-idUSKBN17N0JP>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴⁸⁷ Décuguis, J-M. and Pelletier, E., 'Attentat des Champs-Elysées: Karim Cheurfi, de la haine du 'flic' au terrorisme', *Le Parisien*, 22 April 2017, available at: <http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/attentat-des-champs-elysees-karim-cheurfi-de-la-haine-du-flic-au-terrorisme-22-04-2017-6876774.php>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴⁸⁸ Jarry, E. and Irish, J., 'Police seek possible accomplices of Paris gunman', *Reuters*, 20 April 2017.

⁴⁸⁹ 'What we know about Champs-Elysees gunman as Paris home raided', *Sky News*, 21 April 2017, available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/paris-attack-police-launch-manhunt-for-second-gunman-still-at-large-10844483>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

The attack was claimed soon after in a statement released by Islamic State through Amaq two and a half hours after the shooting had been carried out.⁴⁹⁰ This led to some speculation that it may have been a directed attack.⁴⁹¹ The statement claimed that the attacker was one of Islamic State's fighters and named the attacker as Abu Yusuf al-Beljiki.⁴⁹² As Cheurfi was French, this reference to the assailant being Belgian led to concerns that IS had identified the wrong man, and that a second individual who was planning an attack was still at large.

The following day, it was confirmed that a Belgian individual who was thought to have travelled to France on the day of the attack had handed himself over to police in Antwerp.⁴⁹³ Hours before the attack in Paris, a separate Belgian police investigation into that individual had uncovered weapons, balaclavas and a train ticket departing to France on the Thursday morning.⁴⁹⁴ The 35-year-old Belgian man was described as a "very dangerous individual en route to France", and it was confirmed that he had been sought by the authorities as part of a separate investigation that had begun prior to Cheurfi's attack.⁴⁹⁵ The man in question was identified in the press as Youssouf El Osri, with the Belgian authorities having warned their French counterparts that Osri was travelling to France by the Thalys high-speed train.⁴⁹⁶ However, it was later confirmed that the Belgian man was not in any way linked to the Champs-Élysées attack.⁴⁹⁷

A 39-year-old French national, Karim Cheurfi lived with his mother in the Parisian suburb of Chelles.⁴⁹⁸ He had been born in 1977 in Livry-Gargan, a suburb in the Seine-Saint-Denis area to the north of the city,⁴⁹⁹ and had a significant criminal record, particularly relating to theft.⁵⁰⁰ However, more seriously, in 2001 Cheurfi was sentenced to 20 years in prison for attempted murder after shooting at police officers who had been pursuing the assailant in a stolen car.⁵⁰¹ After winning an appeal in 2005 he was able to leave prison in 2013.⁵⁰² In July 2014 Cheurfi was sentenced to four years in prison for violent robbery;⁵⁰³ however, he was released on probation in October 2015.⁵⁰⁴ It is also reported that during his time in prison, Cheurfi attacked a prison officer, grabbing the officer's gun, shooting and wounding him.⁵⁰⁵

In February of 2017, Cheurfi was detained after threatening to kill a police officer; however, he was not charged owing to lack of evidence.⁵⁰⁶ However, that investigation found that he had acquired hunting knives, a mask and a Go Pro camera.⁵⁰⁷ Cheurfi's threats were reportedly made

⁴⁹⁰ 'Champs Elysees shooting: Isil's quick claim of responsibility points to directed attack', *The Telegraph*, 21 April 2017, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/21/champs-elysees-shooting-isils-quick-claim-responsibility-points/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

⁴⁹² Henley J., 'Paris gunman served more than 12 years in jail for shooting at police', *The Guardian*, 21 April 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/21/paris-shooting-police-search-property-as-isis-claims-responsibility>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁶ Jarry, E. and Irish, J., 'Police seek possible accomplices of Paris gunman', *Reuters*, 20 April 2017.

⁴⁹⁷ Paravicini, G., 'Belgian man has no link to Paris attack: security officials', *Politico*, 21 April 2017, available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/paris-attack-champs-elysees-terror-belgian-man-has-no-link-to-paris-attack-security-officials/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁴⁹⁸ Jarry, E. and Irish, J., 'Police seek possible accomplices of Paris gunman', *Reuters*, 20 April 2017.

⁴⁹⁹ Henley, J., 'Paris gunman served more than 12 years in jail for shooting at police', *The Guardian*, 21 April 2017.

⁵⁰⁰ Palazzo, C. and Chazan, D., 'Paris attack: who is Karim Cheurfi, the gunman who lived with his mother and was 'let go' by French authorities in February?', *The Telegraph*, 22 April 2017, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/20/paris-attack-suspect/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁵⁰¹ 'What we know about Champs-Élysées gunman as Paris home raided', *Sky News*, 21 April 2017.

⁵⁰² Henley, J., 'Paris gunman served more than 12 years in jail for shooting at police', *The Guardian*, 21 April 2017.

⁵⁰³ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁴ 'What we know about Champs-Élysées gunman as Paris home raided', *Sky News*, 21 April 2017.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ Chichizola, J. and Caravagna, L., 'Attaque sur les Champs-Élysées: Karim Cheurfi, multi-condamné dès 2001', *Le Figaro*, 21 April 2017, available at: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2017/04/21/01016-20170421ARTFIG00078-des-2001-l-explosion-de-violence-de-karim-c-l-auteur-presume-de-l-attaque-sur-les-champs-elysees.php>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

over the encrypted messaging app Telegram, and the police had also received information suggesting that he had been attempting to acquire weapons for the purpose of attacking a police officer.⁵⁰⁸ Prior to the February arrest, Cheurfi had spent a number of days in Algeria during January 2017, although this was in contravention of the terms of his probation.⁵⁰⁹

There have been conflicting reports about whether Cheurfi had been known to the authorities as an extremist and indeed about the extent to which he had been associated with Islamist extremism. Shortly after the attack a prosecutor claimed that the assailant had not shown any previous signs of extremist views.⁵¹⁰ Indeed, Cheurfi had not been flagged as an Islamic radical during his time in prison and is understood not to have been on the primary S File watch list of known security threats maintained by French police.⁵¹¹ However, it has also been reported in the French press that Cheurfi had come on to the radar of counter-terrorism services in December 2016.⁵¹² Contrary to other reports, his name is believed to have been added to a terror prevention and radicalisation list in January, one specific to those individuals where concerns exist about the possibility of violent plans.⁵¹³ However, this is a list which is reported to have some 16,000 names on it.⁵¹⁴

Statements from those familiar with Karim Cheurfi have created a varied picture of the assailant and the extent to which he held an Islamist worldview. Neighbours confirmed that Cheurfi harboured a particularly intense hatred towards the police, and it is understood that he had expressed the desire to kill police officers in revenge for the killing of children in Syria.⁵¹⁵ Indeed, investigations opened into Cheurfi at the beginning of March indicate that he had expressed an intention to travel to Iraq and Syria on numerous occasions.⁵¹⁶ There is little publicly available evidence about the degree of Cheurfi's religious observance, although a neighbour claimed that he had never been seen at his local mosque.⁵¹⁷ Some of his neighbours described Cheurfi as a relatively isolated or closed-off character.⁵¹⁸ Others spoke of him as being psychologically troubled.⁵¹⁹ His former lawyer described Cheurfi as being both a "psychologically fragile character" and "very isolated", but also claimed that he had shown no sign that he belonged to any movement, nor any sign of radical beliefs.⁵²⁰

⁵⁰⁸ Palazzo, C. and Chazan, D., 'Paris attack: who is Karim Cheurfi, the gunman who lived with this mother and was 'let go' by French authorities in February?', *The Telegraph*, 22 April 2017.

⁵⁰⁹ Jarry, E. and Irish, J., 'Police seek possible accomplices of Paris gunman', *Reuters*, 20 April 2017.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹¹ Palazzo, C. and Chazan, D., 'Paris attack: who is Karim Cheurfi, the gunman who lived with this mother and was 'let go' by French authorities in February?', *The Telegraph*, 22 April 2017.

⁵¹² *Ibid.*

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁵ Allemandou S., 'Questions remain over Champs-Élysées attacker's links to IS group', *France 24*, 22 April 2017, available at: <https://www.france24.com/en/20170422-questions-remain-champs-elysees-attacker-links-islamic-state-group>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁵¹⁶ Vincent, E., 'Attaque des Champs-Élysées: Karim Cheurfi était signalé pour radicalisation depuis fin 2016', *Le Monde*, 21 April 2017, available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2017/04/21/attaque-des-champs-elysees-karim-cheurfi-un-homme-excessivement-dangereux-au-long-passe-judiciaire_5114879_1653578.html, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁵¹⁷ Henley, J., 'Paris gunman served more than 12 years in jail for shooting at police', *The Guardian*, 21 April 2017.

⁵¹⁸ 'What we know about Champs-Élysées gunman as Paris home raided', *Sky News*, 21 April 2017.

⁵¹⁹ Chichizola, J. and Caravagna, L., 'Attaque sur les Champs-Élysées: Karim Cheurfi, multi-condamné dès 2001', *Le Figaro*, 21 April 2017.

⁵²⁰ Palazzo, C. and Chazan, D., 'Paris attack: who is Karim Cheurfi, the gunman who lived with this mother and was 'let go' by French authorities in February?', *The Telegraph*, 22 April 2017.

26. Foiled Whitehall Stabbing Attack

The Attack

Date: 27 April 2017

Day: Thursday

Time: 2.20 pm

Country: United Kingdom

Place: London

Area Type: City Centre – Government & Landmark

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Knife

Target: Unknown

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Al Qaeda – Affiliated

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested Prior to Attack

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Khalid Mohamed Omar Ali

Age: 27

Country of Origin: Somalia

Nationality: British

Resident: London

Training/Combat Experience: Yes

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Sentenced – Life

NOTES:

At 2.20 pm on 27 April, police arrested a man in central London, close to both the Houses of Parliament and Downing Street.⁵²¹ Acting as part of what has been described as an intelligence-led operation,⁵²² police and MI5 were tracking the man who was found to be in possession of several knives at the time of his arrest.⁵²³ Although it is reported that Ali had been living in Edmonton in North London,⁵²⁴ on the day of the attempted attack, Ali had travelled to London's government district in Westminster and Whitehall, travelling on the subway system from Ealing in the west of the city.⁵²⁵ At the time of his arrest he was in

⁵²¹ 'Terror arrest near Houses of Parliament', *BBC News*, 27 April 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39736733>, last visited: 16 July 2018.

⁵²² *Ibid.*

⁵²³ Dodd, V., 'Man arrested after Whitehall alert charged with terrorism offences', *The Guardian*, 9 May 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/09/westminster-knife-suspect-charged-with-terrorism-offence-khalid-mohammed-omar-ali>, last visited: 16 July 2018.

⁵²⁴ 'Khalid Ali: British Taliban bomber guilty of Westminster plot', *BBC News*, 26 June 2018, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-44613587>, last visited: 16 July 2018.

⁵²⁵ Baker, K., 'Al-Qaeda bomb-maker, 28, who was arrested with a stash of knives just yards from Downing Street claimed he had a 'message' for Britain's political leaders, court hears', *Daily Mail*, 4 June 2018, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5803759/Al-Qaeda-bomb-maker-28-arrested-stash-knives-just-yards-Downing-Street.html>, last visited: 16 July 2018.

possession of a total of three knives: one in each pocket of his jacket and a larger knife in the waistband of his trousers.⁵²⁶

It is reported that the authorities were alerted after receiving information from a member of the Muslim community.⁵²⁷ The man was arrested under the Terrorism Act and held on suspicion of possession of an offensive weapon and preparation for acts of terrorism.⁵²⁸ The arrest took place only a short distance from the location where Khalid Masood had carried out his attack the previous month.⁵²⁹ Hours after the foiling of this attempted attack, the authorities reported that they had disrupted a terror plot consisting of at least seven people across London and Kent;⁵³⁰ however, this transpired to be unrelated to the events on Whitehall.⁵³¹

The man arrested was identified as 27-year-old Khalid Mohamed Omar Ali.⁵³² Although he was born in Somalia,⁵³³ Ali was mostly raised in the UK and has British citizenship;⁵³⁴ he is also understood to be of Ethiopian heritage.⁵³⁵ Ali attended Northumberland Park Community School in Tottenham, north London.⁵³⁶ Former teachers and students have spoken highly of his character during his time there.⁵³⁷ A former school friend who knew Ali as a teenager has reported that he began to change during this period of his life, becoming more religiously devout and taking part in heated debates about religion.⁵³⁸ His friend suggested that there had been “something not quite right” about his changing attitudes.⁵³⁹ It has also been reported that during his teenage years, Ali began to associate with a group regarded as extremist.⁵⁴⁰ Eventually Ali’s views on religion became a source of tension between him and family members, from whom he later became estranged.⁵⁴¹

In October 2010, Ali joined a convoy to Gaza known as ‘Road to Hope’.⁵⁴² The group travelled through North Africa before eventually reaching the Hamas-controlled enclave,⁵⁴³ although

⁵²⁶ Gardham, D., ‘Man accused of plotting Westminster knife attack ‘wanted to send message’, *Sky News*, 5 June 2018, available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/man-accused-of-plotting-westminster-knife-attack-wanted-to-send-message-11394703>, last visited: 16 July 2018.

⁵²⁷ Dodd, V. and Mason, R., ‘Police thwart suspected terror attack in Westminster’, *The Guardian*, 27 April 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/apr/27/man-arrested-over-incident-in-whitehall-near-parliament>, last visited: 16 July 2018.

⁵²⁸ ‘Westminster terror suspect identified’, *BBC News*, 28 April 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-39741590>, last visited: 16 July 2018.

⁵²⁹ Evans, M. and Mendick, R., ‘Whitehall terror suspect smiles and says ‘One love’ as he sets off on aid convoy to Palestine’, *The Telegraph*, 28 April 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/28/whitehall-terror-suspect-smiles-says-one-love-sets-aid-convoy/>, last visited: 16 July 2018.

⁵³⁰ ‘Active plot’ foiled in London anti-terror raid’, *Sky News*, 29 April 2017, available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/active-plot-foiled-in-london-anti-terror-raid-10853903>, last visited: 16 July 2018.

⁵³¹ Smith-Spark, L., McKirdy, E. and Elwazer, S., ‘UK police foil second alleged London terror plot in a day’, *CNN*, 28 April 2017, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/27/europe/london-counterterror-operation-woman-shot/index.html>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁵³² ‘Westminster terror suspect identified’, *BBC News*, 28 April 2017.

⁵³³ Levy, A. and Kelly, T., ‘Whitehall knife suspect ‘spent several years in Afghanistan after being refused permission to stay in the Gaza Strip’ before returning to the UK late last year’, *Daily Mail*, 28 April 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4457166/Whitehall-knife-suspect-spent-years-Afghanistan.html>, last visited: 17 July 2018.

⁵³⁴ ‘Khalid Mohamed Omar Ali denies Westminster knife plot’, *BBC News*, 26 September 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-41405225>, last visited: 17 July 2018.

⁵³⁵ Dodd, V., ‘Westminster terrorism suspect claimed he was approached by MI5’, *The Guardian*, 30 April 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/apr/30/westminster-terrorism-suspect-claimed-he-was-approached-by-mi5>, last visited: 17 July 2018.

⁵³⁶ Joshi, A., ‘Whitehall terror suspect Khalid Mohamed Omar Ali ‘a model pupil’’, *Sky News*, 30 April 2017, available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/whitehall-terror-suspect-khalid-mohamed-omar-ali-a-model-pupil-10858211>, last visited: 17 July 2018.

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁸ O’Neill, S., ‘Westminster knife suspect volunteered for Gaza aid convoy’, *The Times*, 29 April 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/westminster-knife-suspect-volunteered-for-gaza-aid-convoy-b6mtv7h9f>, last visited: 17 July 2018.

⁵³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁰ Dodd, V., ‘Westminster terrorism suspect claimed he was approached by MI5’, *The Guardian*, 30 April 2017.

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴² ‘Captive’ aid workers arrive in Greece after ship trip’, *BBC News*, 12 November 2010, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11742063>, last visited: 17 July 2018.

⁵⁴³ O’Neill, S., ‘Westminster knife suspect volunteered for Gaza aid convoy’, *The Times*, 29 April 2017.

there is no evidence known to have come to light linking Ali to terrorist elements in Gaza. Ali is reported to have been outside the United Kingdom between 2011 and 2016⁵⁴⁴ and was allegedly travelling through India and Pakistan.⁵⁴⁵ However, he also spent a period of time in Afghanistan,⁵⁴⁶ where he is accused of having been involved with terrorist activity.⁵⁴⁷ Operating from a Taliban training camp linked to Al Qaeda,⁵⁴⁸ Ali was involved in bomb-making, and police reported that he was responsible for constructing and detonating some 300 bombs over a five-year period.⁵⁴⁹

Ali has admitted to fighting British troops in Afghanistan but refused to confirm whether he had killed any.⁵⁵⁰ During interrogations, he told police that his loyalty is to the Taliban and Al Qaeda and that he was heading for the gates of Downing Street that day to “send a message” to Britain’s leaders, demanding that the West exit Muslim lands.⁵⁵¹ When asked by police if he had returned to the UK for the purpose of carrying out jihad, Ali is recorded as replying, “Jihad is what we do. We are *Mujahideen*.”⁵⁵²

Ali returned to the United Kingdom in November 2016⁵⁵³ and complained of having been harassed by the British security services, who he claimed had called and visited him.⁵⁵⁴ In reality the British authorities had assisted Ali with his return to the United Kingdom. In October of 2016 he arrived at the British consulate in Istanbul and, although he was not in possession of a British passport, he was provided with the necessary travel documents to complete his journey back to Britain.⁵⁵⁵ He had, however, been intercepted by police upon his arrival at Heathrow.⁵⁵⁶

It is alleged that he had begun to make plans for his attack in March of 2017. On 18 March Ali had joined a demonstration in central London held by the far-left group Stand Up to Racism, which, it is alleged, he used as an opportunity to assess which areas of Whitehall were guarded by police.⁵⁵⁷ Police also recovered Ali’s smartphone which he had discarded into the River Thames prior to his arrest. On this device they found evidence that he had used Google Street View to examine the MI6 building, including possible entry points and the location of CCTV cameras and police officers guarding the building.⁵⁵⁸ The information that led to Ali’s arrest appears to have come from his mother, who alerted police that she had found knives in his room.⁵⁵⁹

Of the three charges filed against Ali, two were related to activities in Afghanistan.⁵⁶⁰ The Crown Prosecution Services charge stated “on or before 28 January 2012 [Ali] unlawfully and maliciously made or had in his possession or under his control a quantity of explosive substances with intent by means thereof to endanger life or cause serious injury to property

⁵⁴⁴ ‘Westminster operation: Man appears in court on terror charges’, *BBC News*, 10 May 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39873547>, last visited: 17 July 2018.

⁵⁴⁵ Dodd, V., ‘Westminster terrorism suspect claimed he was approached by MI5’, *The Guardian*, 30 April 2017.

⁵⁴⁶ Levy, A. and Kelly, T., ‘Whitehall knife suspect ‘spent several years in Afghanistan after being refused permission to stay in the Gaza Strip’ before returning to the UK late last year’, *Daily Mail*, 28 April 2017.

⁵⁴⁷ Dodd, V., ‘Man arrested after Whitehall alert charged with terrorism offences’, *The Guardian*, 9 May 2017.

⁵⁴⁸ ‘Khalid Ali: British Taliban bomber guilty of Westminster plot’, *BBC News*, 26 June 2018.

⁵⁴⁹ Gardham, D., ‘Man accused of plotting Westminster knife attack ‘wanted to send message’’, *Sky News*, 5 June 2018.

⁵⁵⁰ ‘Khalid Ali: British Taliban bomber guilty of Westminster plot’, *BBC News*, 26 June 2018.

⁵⁵¹ Baker, K., ‘Al-Qaeda bomb-maker, 28, who was arrested with a stash of knives just yards from Downing Street claimed he had a ‘message’ for Britain’s political leaders, court hears’, *Daily Mail*, 4 June 2018.

⁵⁵² ‘Khalid Ali: British Taliban bomber guilty of Westminster plot’, *BBC News*, 26 June 2018.

⁵⁵³ Gardham, D., ‘Man accused of plotting Westminster knife attack ‘wanted to send message’’, *Sky News*, 5 June 2018.

⁵⁵⁴ Dodd, V., ‘Westminster terrorism suspect claimed he was approached by MI5’, *The Guardian*, 30 April 2017.

⁵⁵⁵ ‘Khalid Ali: British Taliban bomber guilty of Westminster plot’, *BBC News*, 26 June 2018.

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁷ Gardham, D., ‘Man accused of plotting Westminster knife attack ‘wanted to send message’’, *Sky News*, 5 June 2018.

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁹ ‘Khalid Ali: British Taliban bomber guilty of Westminster plot’, *BBC News*, 26 June 2018.

⁵⁶⁰ Dodd, V., ‘Man arrested after Whitehall alert charged with terrorism offences’, *The Guardian*, 9 May 2017.

or to enable any other person to do so”.⁵⁶¹ Ali put in a plea of not guilty,⁵⁶² but initially refused the services of a legal defence team, as he said he was represented by Allah.⁵⁶³ Only in December 2017 did Ali agree to have legal representation.⁵⁶⁴

27. Milan Station Stabbing

The Attack

Date: 18 May 2017

Day: Thursday

Time: 8.00 pm

Country: Italy

Place: Milan

Area Type: City Centre – Transport

Location: Train Station – Exterior

Type of Attack: Knife

Target: Military & Police

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 3

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Ismail Hosni (Ismail Tommaso Beïn Yousef Hosni)

Age: 20

Country of Origin: Italy

Nationality: Italian & Tunisian

Resident: Milan

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Sentenced – Seven Years

NOTES:

At around 8.00 pm on the evening of 18 May, a young man armed with a kitchen knife attacked and stabbed two army officers and a policeman at Milan’s central station.⁵⁶⁵ The man was approached by the officers who asked to see his identification, then he drew the knife and

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.

⁵⁶² Brunt, M., ‘Whitehall terror suspect Khalid Mohamed Omar Ali appears in court’, *Sky News*, 10 May 2017, available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/whitehall-terror-suspect-khalid-mohamed-omar-ali-appears-in-court-10871186>, last visited: 17 July 2018.

⁵⁶³ Dinham, P., ‘Whitehall terror suspect, 27, accused of having a rucksack full of knives near Downing Street tells court he does not want a lawyer because he is represented by Allah’, *Daily Mail*, 19 May 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4522630/Whitehall-terror-suspect-says-Allah-representing-him.html>, last visited: 17 July 2018.

⁵⁶⁴ ‘Accused terrorist agrees to be represented by lawyer after relying on Allah’, *Court News UK*, 19 December 2017, available at: <http://courtnewsuk.co.uk/accused-terrorist-agrees-represented-lawyer-relying-allah/>, last visited: 17 July 2018.

⁵⁶⁵ Galli, A. and Giuzzi, C., ‘Soldiers and Policeman Knifed in Milan’s Central Station’, *Corriere Della Sera*, 19 May 2017, available at: https://www.corriere.it/english/17_maggio_19/soldiers-and-policeman-knifed-milan-s-central-station-8aea69d2-3cb0-11e7-bc08-57e58a61572b.shtml?refresh_ce-cp, last visited: 9 August 2018.

carried out the attack.⁵⁶⁶ None of the victims received life-threatening injuries, although following the attack they were treated in hospital as “moderately critical cases”.⁵⁶⁷ Immediately after the arrest of the assailant, a police spokesperson said that the incident was not being treated as a terror attack.⁵⁶⁸ However, the following day it was reported that in addition to treating the attack as attempted murder, the authorities had also opened an investigation into possible terrorism charges after it was discovered that the suspect may have expressed support for Islamic State on social media.⁵⁶⁹

Only a limited amount of information about the suspected attacker has so far been made publicly available. Police have confirmed that the 20-year-old was born in Milan.⁵⁷⁰ The man, named as Ismail Hosni, is also understood to have dual Italian–Tunisian nationality.⁵⁷¹ His mother originated from the Puglia region of southern Italy, while his father came from Tunisia.⁵⁷² It has been reported that Hosni came from a particularly troubled family, with both his parents having been previously involved in criminal activity.⁵⁷³ It appears that police in the area of the city’s central station were also familiar with Hosni, who had been arrested in December in relation to drug dealing.⁵⁷⁴ Between 2008 and 2015 he had been living in Tunisia with his father.⁵⁷⁵ Although Hosni had eventually returned to Italy to live with his mother, it is understood that by the time of the attack he was living out of a van in the area around Milan’s central station.⁵⁷⁶

It is the suspect’s activities online that primarily point to the presence of radical beliefs and a likely Islamist motive for the attack. In particular, this evidence took the form of Hosni sharing videos glorifying Islamic State on his Facebook page, which was taken offline hours after the attack.⁵⁷⁷ It is reported that into 2016 his Facebook account still primarily pointed to an interest in Latin American gang culture.⁵⁷⁸ More recently, however, in the autumn of 2016, Hosni began to use his Facebook profile to share videos glorifying Islamic State and to write posts expressing hostility towards non-believers.⁵⁷⁹ One of the first extremist videos to appear on Hosni’s page was a YouTube video posted in September 2016 featuring a *nasheed* [Islamic hymn] praising IS martyrs.⁵⁸⁰ In a comment written in Arabic, Hosni states that this is the “most beautiful” of the Islamic State’s songs he had ever heard.⁵⁸¹

It also appears that Hosni may have been linked to Islamist extremism through the man he was arrested with in December: a 24-year-old Libyan individual using the name Ahamad Salah, who

⁵⁶⁶ ‘Italy investigates Milan station attacker for alleged terrorism: source’, *Reuters*, 19 May 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-security-milan/italy-investigates-milan-station-attacker-for-alleged-terrorism-source-idUSKCN18F1MB?il=0>, last visited: 9 August 2018.

⁵⁶⁷ ‘Man stabs policeman and soldier at Milan train station’, *Astro Awani*, 19 May 2017, available at: <http://english.astroawani.com/world-news/man-stabs-policeman-and-soldier-milan-train-station-143261>, last visited: 9 August 2018.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁹ ‘Italy investigates Milan train station attacker for terrorism’, *The Local*, 19 May 2017, available at: <https://www.thelocal.it/20170519/italy-investigates-milan-train-station-attacker-for-terrorism>, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁵⁷⁰ ‘Italy investigates Milan station attacker for alleged terrorism: source’, *Reuters*, 19 May 2017.

⁵⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷² Cicchetti, E., ‘Chi è Hosni, l’assalitore di Milano passato in un mese da donne e droga alla fascinazione per l’isis’, *Il Foglio*, 19 May 2017, available at: <http://www.ilfoglio.it/cronache/2017/05/19/news/chi-e-hosni-l-assalitore-di-milano-passato-in-un-mese-da-donne-e-droga-alla-fascinazione-per-l-isis-135480/>, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁵ Milosa, D., ‘Milano, dal Cie alla stazione. “L’amico libico legato all’Is”’, *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, 21 May 2017, available at: <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/premium/articoli/milano-dal-cie-alla-stazione-lamico-libico-legato-allis/>, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁷ ‘Italy investigates Milan station attacker for alleged terrorism: source’, *Reuters*, 19 May 2017.

⁵⁷⁸ ‘Chi è Hosni, l’assalitore di Milano passato in un mese da donne e droga alla fascinazione per l’isis’, *Il Foglio*, 19 May 2017.

⁵⁷⁹ ‘Milano, l’aggressore della stazione centrale e i video inneggianti all’Isis. I pm lo indagano per terrorismo internazionale’, *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, 19 May 2017, available at: <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/05/19/milano-laggressore-della-stazione-centrale-e-video-inneggianti-allisis-pm-lo-indagano-per-terrorismo-internazionale/3596697/>, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁵⁸⁰ ‘Chi è Hosni, l’assalitore di Milano passato in un mese da donne e droga alla fascinazione per l’isis’, *Il Foglio*, 19 May 2017.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*

had also been registered under the name Ahmed Jbali at a migrant reception centre in Isola Capo Rizzuto in July 2016.⁵⁸² On another occasion the same Libyan individual was recorded using the name Omar Khalifa Ahmed.⁵⁸³ It is reported that this man has been listed in counter-terrorism documents because of concerns that he was associated with extremist circles.⁵⁸⁴ Indeed, Jbali's name is allegedly included among some 30 Libyan individuals the Italian authorities believe to be linked to Islamic State.⁵⁸⁵ As such there have been suggestions that Jbali may have been involved in Hosni coming to adopt more radical beliefs, and even that he may have been a recruiter for IS.⁵⁸⁶ The appearance of extremist videos on Hosni's page in the autumn of 2016 would seem to coincide with the two men meeting, and there has been speculation in the Italian press that Hosni choosing to grow a beard at this time may have been an indication of increased religiosity.⁵⁸⁷

In November 2017 it was determined that Hosni was psychologically fit to stand trial, although it was acknowledged that the assailant suffers from a personality disorder and may have been under the influence of cocaine at the time of his attack, possibly warranting a judgement on diminished responsibility.⁵⁸⁸ The hearing was subsequently postponed until 8 February 2018 while further investigations are carried out into Hosni's possible links to militant groups.⁵⁸⁹ Hosni was convicted at the beginning of March 2018 and was sentenced to seven years in prison.⁵⁹⁰ The judge took into account Hosni's partially impaired mental ability and the influence of drugs at the time of his attack.⁵⁹¹

⁵⁸² Giuzzi, C. and Santucci, G., 'Milano, accoltellamento alla Centrale La rete di Hosni e i due coltelli rubati nel supermarket vicino alla stazione', *Corriere Della Sera*, 21 May 2017, available at: http://milano.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/17_maggio_21/milano-accoltellamento-centrale-rete-hosni-due-coltelli-rubati-supermarket-alla-stazione-43e02398-3dc2-11e7-a425-2bfa959c761.shtml?refresh_ce-cp, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁵⁸³ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁴ 'Agenti accoltellati a Milano: oggi l'interrogatorio di Hosni', *L'Eco Vicentino*, 21 May 2017, available at: <https://www.ecovicentino.it/cronaca-italia/agenti-accoltellati-a-milano-oggi-linterrogatorio-di-hosni/>, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁵⁸⁵ Milosa, D., 'Milano, dal Cie alla stazione. "L'amico libico legato all'Is"', *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, 21 May 2017.

⁵⁸⁶ Giuzzi, C. and Santucci, G., 'Milano, accoltellamento alla Centrale La rete di Hosni e i due coltelli rubati nel supermarket vicino alla stazione', *Corriere Della Sera*, 21 May 2017.

⁵⁸⁷ Cicchetti, E., 'Chi è Hosni, l'assalitore di Milano passato in un mese da donne e droga alla fascinazione per l'isis', *Il Foglio*, 19 May 2017.

⁵⁸⁸ 'Aggressione in Centrale a Milano, Hosni al giudice: "Curatemi in una comunità psichiatrica"', *la Repubblica.it*, 22 November 2017, available at: http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/11/22/news/aggressione_in_centrale_a_milano_hosni_curatemi_in_una_comunita_psichiatrica_cosi_il_20enne_davanti_al_giudice_-181833575/, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁰ 'Milano, militari e agente accoltellati in Stazione Centrale: condanna a 7 per Hosni. «Vizio parziale di mente»', *Corriere Della Sera*, 2 March 2018, available at: https://milano.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/18_marzo_02/milano-militari-agente-accoltellati-stazione-centrale-condanna-7-hosni-vizio-parziale-mente-1d17a708-1e0a-11e8-af9a-2daa4c2d1bbb.shtml?refresh_ce-cp, last visited: 9 August 2018.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid.

28. Manchester Arena Bombing

The Attack

Date: 22 May 2017

Day: Monday

Time: 10.31 pm

Country: United Kingdom

Place: Manchester

Area Type: City Centre – Recreational

Location: Music Venue – Interior

Type of Attack: Bombing – Suicide

Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Directed

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 512

Number of Fatalities: 22

Response: N/A

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Salman Ramadan Abedi

Age: 22

Country of Origin: United Kingdom

Nationality: British

Resident: Manchester, UK

Training/Combat Experience: Yes

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Dead

NOTES:

At just after 10.30 on the evening of 22 May, a suicide bomber self-detonated in the foyer of the Manchester Arena as crowds exited a pop concert. The attack was carried out close to the main exit, where a large crowd of people were leaving the concert,⁵⁹² the venue having a capacity of up to 21,000 people.⁵⁹³ In addition to killing himself, the attacker murdered 22 other people and wounded another 512.⁵⁹⁴

Prior to carrying out the attack, the bomber waited in the area of Manchester's city centre with his explosive for several hours prior to his attack.⁵⁹⁵ While it is most likely that he was simply waiting until the concert finished, it has been suggested that potentially he could have detonated his explosive in a number of other public places that evening.⁵⁹⁶

⁵⁹² 'Manchester attack: What we know so far', *BBC News*, 12 June 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-40008389>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁵⁹³ Collie, J. and Simpson, F., 'Manchester Arena explosion: 22 people killed and 59 injured in terrorist attack at Ariana Grande concert', *Evening Standard*, 22 May 2017, available at: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/manchester-arena-explosion-people-killed-in-blast-at-ariana-grande-gig-a3545786.html>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁵⁹⁴ 'Manchester Arena attack: Police investigation delays inquests', *BBC News*, 24 November 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-42111239>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁵⁹⁵ 'Manchester attack: Salman Abedi 'carried bomb for hours'', *BBC News*, 6 July 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-40519495>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁵⁹⁶ Parveen, N., 'Manchester bombing: police say Salman Abedi did not act alone', *The Guardian*, 6 July 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/06/manchester-bombing-police-believe-salman-abedi-did-not-act-alone>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

There was initial speculation about whether the attacker had worn the bomb in an explosive vest; however, preliminary investigations suggested it was most likely that the bomb was carried in a backpack and that the explosive had a relatively sophisticated design.⁵⁹⁷ A forensic investigation found that the device had also been equipped with a backup detonation system.⁵⁹⁸ It appears to have used a Yuasa 12-volt, 2.1 amp-hour lead acid battery, which would have made it more powerful than the kind of battery usually seen in suicide vests.⁵⁹⁹ The bomb was packed inside a tin container⁶⁰⁰ with nuts, bolts, and other shrapnel, and exploded with such force that it left a crater in the foyer's concrete floor, as well as shattering a 250 square-foot glass skylight in the roof.⁶⁰¹ The explosion had also been strong enough to carry the bomber's upper torso beyond the foyer area and back inside the arena itself, possibly in the direction away from the main explosion.⁶⁰² However, almost all of the fatalities were individuals who had been standing in a circle directly adjacent to the bomber at the time of detonation, while two other victims were killed on the far side of the foyer, across from the arena entrance.⁶⁰³

Initial false reports about possible gunmen at the scene of the attack led police to suspect they faced a scenario comparable to the Paris Bataclan attacks of 2015.⁶⁰⁴ This led to Operation Plato being put into effect: the measures devised for the eventuality of a marauding terrorist firearms attack.⁶⁰⁵ As well as sending in armed officers, fears about a secondary explosive device meant a team of sniffer dogs was also deployed.⁶⁰⁶ These concerns about securing the scene of the attack meant that most paramedics teams remained outside the venue for up to an hour after the bomb had been detonated, hampering the evacuation of victims and the treatment of those who were too severely injured to be moved.⁶⁰⁷ Members of the fire service reported being repeatedly prevented from attending the scene by their superiors.⁶⁰⁸ Although not all emergency services had been made aware that Operation Plato had been declared, the fire service officers also believed there was a marauding attacker inside the venue and thus ordered the brigade to stay at a distance and wait. Therefore, it was more than two hours after the blast that the fire brigade was instructed to enter the scene.⁶⁰⁹

⁵⁹⁷ Chivers, C., 'Found at the Scene in Manchester: Shrapnel, a Backpack and a Battery', *The New York Times*, 24 May 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/24/world/europe/manchester-arena-bomb-materials-photos.html>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁵⁹⁸ Bennhold, K., Castle, S. and Zway, S., 'Hunt for Manchester Bombing Accomplices Extends to Libya', *The New York Times*, 24 May 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/world/europe/manchester-bomber-salman-abedi.html>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁵⁹⁹ Chivers, C., 'Found at the Scene in Manchester: Shrapnel, a Backpack and a Battery', *The New York Times*, 24 May 2017.

⁶⁰⁰ Gordon, A., 'Newly-released photos show Manchester bomber's final hours and a barrel he stored in his car as police release all those arrested over the attack without charge', *Daily Mail*, 11 June 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4593788/Newly-released-photos-Manchester-bomber-s-final-hours.html>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁰¹ Parveen, N., 'Manchester bombing: police say Salman Abedi did not act alone', *The Guardian*, 6 July 2017.

⁶⁰² Chivers, C., 'Found at the Scene in Manchester: Shrapnel, a Backpack and a Battery', *The New York Times*, 24 May 2017.

⁶⁰³ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁴ Pidd, H., 'Kerslake findings: emergency responses to Manchester Arena attack', *The Guardian*, 27 March 2018, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/27/kerslake-report-manchester-arena-attack-police-fire-ambulance-and-media-responses-to-attack>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁷ Tozer, J., Hull, L. and Marsden, R., 'Revealed: Just THREE paramedics were allowed into the Manchester Arena to treat dying bomb victims despite 56 ambulances being scrambled to the scene', *Daily Mail*, 26 March 2018, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5546759/Manchester-Arena-victims-treated-just-THREE-paramedics.html>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁰⁸ 'Manchester attack: 'Treatment delayed' for bomb victims', *BBC News*, 6 November 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-41838579>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁰⁹ Pidd, H., 'Kerslake findings: emergency responses to Manchester Arena attack', *The Guardian*, 27 March 2018.

Islamic State claimed the attack within 24 hours, saying the attacker was a “soldier of the *Khilafah* (Caliphate)” and had struck “in the midst of the gatherings of the Crusaders ... [at a] shameless concert arena”⁶¹⁰ in “revenge for Allah’s religion”.⁶¹¹

The attacker was identified as Salman Abedi, a British-born 22-year-old of Libyan descent.⁶¹² Abedi’s parents had fled Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime in Libya and were granted political asylum in Britain in 1993, the year before Salman Abedi was born.⁶¹³ Abedi had lived at various addresses in Manchester, attending Burnage Academy for Boys from 2009 to 2011, then The Manchester College from 2011 to 2013.⁶¹⁴ Abedi then began studying at Salford University in 2014 where he had enrolled in a Business and Management course, dropping out in 2016.⁶¹⁵ Friends of Abedi report that he enjoyed sport, clubbing, drinking⁶¹⁶ and he allegedly also smoked cannabis.⁶¹⁷

While some reports suggest Abedi was popular within his social group, teachers and classmates tell of him having been bullied and of having a temper he struggled to control, often getting into fights.⁶¹⁸ While at The Manchester College, Abedi had punched a girl in the head because he considered her skirt to be too short.⁶¹⁹ An acquaintance reported that violence against and mistreatment of women was normalised in the circle Abedi was part of.⁶²⁰ There are also indications of Abedi having been alienated from wider British society, with some of those he went to school with reporting his poor fluency in English.⁶²¹ Abedi is also known to have associated with a criminal gang operating in the south Manchester area which is known for its Islamist network in Moss Side.⁶²²

There appear to have been some changes in Abedi’s character in the period prior to the attack. One member of his wider social circle observed that he had shown signs of becoming much more devoutly religious,⁶²³ while a relative observed that he appeared to have become

⁶¹⁰ Dearden, L., ‘Manchester bombing: Isis claims responsibility for concert attack as part of ‘shock and awe’ tactics, analysts say’, *The Independent*, 23 May 2017, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/manchester-bombing-isis-responsibility-salman-abedi-ariana-grande-concert-shock-awe-tactics-syria-a7752056.html>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶¹¹ Cobain, I., Perraudin, F., Morris, S. and Parveen, N., ‘Salman Ramadan Abedi named by police as Manchester Arena attacker’, *The Guardian*, 23 May 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/23/manchester-arena-attacker-named-salman-abedi-suicide-attack-ariana-grande>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶¹² Evans, M., Ward, V. and Mendick, R., ‘Everything we know about Manchester suicide bomber Salman Abedi’, *The Telegraph*, 26 May 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/26/everything-know-manchester-suicide-bomber-salman-abedi/>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶¹³ Greenhill, S., Sinmaz, E. and Kent, E., ‘Revealed: How the Manchester bomber was a dope-smoking and vodka-drinking party boy nicknamed Dumbo who said he had anger issues’, *Daily Mail*, 25 May 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4539532/Manchester-bomber-dope-smoking-vodka-drinking-party-boy.html>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶¹⁴ ‘Manchester attack: What we know so far’, *BBC News*, 12 June 2017.

⁶¹⁵ Walker, H., ‘Students at Manchester bomber’s university ‘tried to BLOCK Government anti-terror scheme’, *Express*, 25 May 2017, available at: <https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/809029/manchester-bombing-salman-abedi-salford-university-prevent-anti-terror-scheme>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶¹⁶ Addley, E., Parveen, N., Grierson, J. and Morris, S., ‘Salman Abedi: from hot-headed party lover to suicide bomber’, *The Guardian*, 26 May 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/26/salman-abedi-manchester-arena-attack-partying-suicide-bomber>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶¹⁷ Bennhold, K., Castle, S. and Zway, S., ‘Hunt for Manchester Bombing Accomplices Extends to Libya’, *The New York Times*, 24 May 2017.

⁶¹⁸ Addley, E., Parveen, N., Grierson, J. and Morris, S., ‘Salman Abedi: from hot-headed party lover to suicide bomber’, *The Guardian*, 26 May 2017.

⁶¹⁹ Osuh, C., ‘The making of a monster: How Manchester boy Salman Abedi became a mass murderer’, *Manchester Evening News*, 17 September 2017, available at: <http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/salman-abedi-manchester-arena-bomber-13601393>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶²⁰ Roberts, J., ‘Manchester: The Night of the Bomb — My search for Salman Abedi’, *The Times*, 16 May 2018, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/manchester-the-night-of-thebomb-my-search-for-salman-abedi-x2zdzq678f>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶²¹ Greenhill, S., Sinmaz, E. and Kent, E., ‘Revealed: How the Manchester bomber was a dope-smoking and vodka-drinking party boy nicknamed Dumbo who said he had anger issues’, *Daily Mail*, 25 May 2017.

⁶²² Parveen, N., Morris, S., Pidd, H., Halliday, J. and Connolly, K., ‘Salman Abedi had connections to gangs and terrorists in Manchester’, *The Guardian*, 25 May 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/25/salman-abedi-had-connections-to-gangs-and-terrorists-in-manchester>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶²³ ‘Manchester attack: Who was Salman Abedi?’, *BBC News*, 12 June 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40019135>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

depressed and isolated.⁶²⁴ In the two years prior to the attack, he is said to have cut himself off from many of his friends and family members, accusing them of being *kuffar*.⁶²⁵

In Manchester, Salman Abedi's family were part of a much larger Libyan community and had maintained connections with the Libyan opposition group the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), an Al Qaeda branch that had been largely driven out in the 1990s after an attempt to overthrow Qaddafi.⁶²⁶ Salman Abedi's father, Ramadan Abedi, led the call to prayer at the Didsbury Mosque in south Manchester, which has been alleged to have been run along Salafist [strictly Islamically conservative] lines⁶²⁷ and to have been administered by the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1990s.⁶²⁸ Salman Abedi's father is also reported to have been close to a number of LIFG-linked extremists who had attended the mosque, including Nazih al-Ruqai'l (Abu Anas al-Libi), Abd al-Baset Azzouz and Basheer al-Faqih.⁶²⁹ Several of these men played key roles in the British-based Sanabel charity, which, as well as acting as the primary means of fundraising for the LIFG, channelled funds to Al Qaeda affiliates and has also been accused of serving as an "incubator" for jihadists.⁶³⁰

In 2011, Salman Abedi's father returned to Libya to join the uprising against Colonel Qaddafi's regime, fighting alongside the LIFG.⁶³¹ Ramadan Abedi stayed in Libya while his son continued to live in Manchester to complete his studies, although during this period Salman travelled regularly between Manchester and Tripoli.⁶³² Other individuals from the Libyan community in Manchester, and known to Salman Abedi, were also fighting in Libya at this time. One was Abdalraouf Abdallah, who was paralysed from the waist down after being shot.⁶³³ Abdallah returned to the UK, from where he facilitated travel for those going from Manchester to join terror groups in Syria, with his brother Mohammed Abdallah going to Syria in 2014 to join Islamic State.⁶³⁴ Salman Abedi appears to have been friends with Abdalraouf: the two were seen together at a mosque in Manchester and Abedi visited him in prison, including on an occasion just weeks before he carried out the bombing at the Manchester Arena.⁶³⁵ It has also been suspected that during one of his visits to Libya in 2014, Salman himself fought and was injured while fighting for an Islamist group near Ajdabiya in eastern Libya.⁶³⁶ That he participated in fighting during the Libyan Civil War when he was 17 appears to have become largely accepted as fact.⁶³⁷ A picture from Facebook that was circulated widely in the media following the attack also showed Salman's younger brother, Hashem Abedi, in Libya posing with firearms.⁶³⁸

⁶²⁴ Roberts, J., 'Manchester: The Night of the Bomb — My search for Salman Abedi', *The Times*, 16 May 2018.

⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁶ Greenhill, S., Sinmaz, E. and Kent, E., 'Revealed: How the Manchester bomber was a dope-smoking and vodka-drinking party boy nicknamed Dumbo who said he had anger issues', *Daily Mail*, 25 May 2017.

⁶²⁷ Gardham, D. and Hamilton, F., 'Salman Abedi worshipped at Didsbury mosque where two others went to fight for Isis', *The Times*, 29 May 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/salman-abedi-worshipped-at-didsbury-mosque-where-two-others-went-to-fight-for-isis-3c9nx6mvp>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶²⁸ Doward, J., Cobain, I., Stephan, C. and Quinn, B., 'How Manchester bomber Salman Abedi was radicalised by his links to Libya', *The Guardian*, 28 May 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/28/salman-abedi-manchester-arena-bomber-radicalisation>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶³¹ Parveen, N., 'Bomber's father fought against Gaddafi regime with 'terrorist' group', *The Guardian*, 24 May 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/24/bombers-father-fought-against-gaddafi-regime-with-terrorist-group>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶³² Doward, J., Cobain, I., Stephan, C. and Quinn, B., 'How Manchester bomber Salman Abedi was radicalised by his links to Libya', *The Guardian*, 28 May 2017.

⁶³³ Casciani, D., 'Manchester attack: The Libya-jihad connection', *BBC News*, 24 May 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-40037830>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶³⁴ Hamilton, F. and Gardham, D., 'Mohammed Abdallah, friend of Manchester bomber Salman Abedi, jailed for ten years', *The Times*, 8 December 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mohammed-abdallah-friend-of-manchester-bomber-salman-abedi-jailed-for-ten-years-m6lmqxcdz>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁶ Doward, J., Cobain, I., Stephan, C. and Quinn, B., 'How Manchester bomber Salman Abedi was radicalised by his links to Libya', *The Guardian*, 28 May 2017.

⁶³⁷ Roberts, J., 'Manchester: The Night of the Bomb — My search for Salman Abedi', *The Times*, 16 May 2018.

⁶³⁸ Casciani, D., 'Manchester attack: The Libya-jihad connection', *BBC News*, 24 May 2017.

Another crucial point of contact with violent extremism was Salman Abedi's connections with Raphael Hostey.⁶³⁹ The two grew up in the same area and both attended Didsbury Mosque.⁶⁴⁰ Hostey has served as an important recruiter for Islamic State, guiding the group's foreign intelligence operations, the *Amn al-Kharji* and recruiting at least three men from the Moss Side and south Manchester area: Stephen Gray, Raymond Matimba and Ronald Fiddler.⁶⁴¹ Another Islamic State fighter who left the same area of Manchester for Syria in 2013 was Anil Khalil Raoufi, who also lived in Abedi's neighbourhood, and worshipped at Didsbury Mosque.⁶⁴²

This involvement in Islamist extremism appears to have gone on for a number of years prior to Salman Abedi carrying out his attack. As early as 2015, an imam at Abedi's mosque contacted authorities to report concerns about Abedi's extremism, after he had reacted abusively to the imam giving a lecture condemning IS and terrorism.⁶⁴³

There had also been reports that two members of the Muslim community in Manchester had separately reported Abedi to a hotline with concerns about his extremism from as early as 2012.⁶⁴⁴ Friends had been alarmed by Abedi's remarks that appeared to show approval of suicide bombings.⁶⁴⁵ However, on 2 June 2017, Manchester police revealed that it had "no record" of any calls to the anti-terrorism hotline about Abedi.⁶⁴⁶ He is also reported to have been unknown to those working on the UK's counter-radicalisation programme, Prevent.⁶⁴⁷ Salman Abedi was neither on the Schengen Information System nor on a list of potential Islamists being tracked by European Union governments.⁶⁴⁸

In his assessment of the internal reviews conducted by MI5 and police into the Manchester Arena bombing, Britain's former independent reviewer of counter-terror legislation, David Anderson, noted that while Abedi was not the subject of a live counter-terror investigation, he had been a potential person of interest in the past in relation to other investigations in 2014 and briefly in 2015.⁶⁴⁹ In both instances the information had not caused significant concern about Abedi, who was classed as being of low residual risk, and the file on him was closed.⁶⁵⁰ However, Anderson reports that during the months leading up to Abedi's attack, on two separate occasions MI5 received information that could have been of great significance but which was judged to relate to criminal rather than terrorist activity.⁶⁵¹ Furthermore, MI5 technology had identified Abedi as one of 20,000 individuals investigated in relation to

⁶³⁹ Hughes, A., 'Manchester suicide bomber Salman Abedi linked to key UK IS recruiter', *Sky News*, 25 May 2017, available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/manchester-suicide-bomber-salman-abedi-linked-to-key-uk-is-recruiter-10891692>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid.

⁶⁴² Greenhill, S., Sinmaz, E. and Kent, E., 'Revealed: How the Manchester bomber was a dope-smoking and vodka-drinking party boy nicknamed Dumbo who said he had anger issues', *Daily Mail*, 25 May 2017.

⁶⁴³ Bennhold, K., Castle, S. and Zway, S., 'Hunt for Manchester Bombing Accomplices Extends to Libya', *The New York Times*, 24 May 2017.

⁶⁴⁴ Mendick, R., Rayner, G., Evans, M. and Dixon, H., 'Security services missed five opportunities to stop the Manchester bomber', *The Telegraph*, 6 June 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/24/security-services-missed-five-opportunities-stop-manchester/>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁶ 'Manchester attack: Salman Abedi's cousins say 'he did it secretly'', *BBC News*, 2 June 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40122572>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁴⁷ Perraudin, F., 'Salman Abedi was unknown to Prevent workers, says police chief', *The Guardian*, 30 May 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/30/salman-abedi-unknown-prevent-workers-manchester-police>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁴⁸ Dearden, L., 'Salman Abedi travelled through Turkey and Germany four days before launching Manchester suicide attack', *The Independent*, 25 May 2017, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/manchester-bomber-salman-abedi-germany-turkey-four-days-suicide-attack-istanbul-dusseldorf-police-a7754836.html>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁴⁹ Anderson Q.C., D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester', David Anderson QC (2017).

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid.

extremism who might warrant further assessment.⁶⁵² A meeting to make a decision on this had been scheduled for 31 May; however, Abedi carried out his attack on 22 May.⁶⁵³

Salman Abedi's plot is thought to have evolved over approximately one year, beginning in May 2016 when he opened a bank account that was used exclusively to purchase materials for the nail bomb he used.⁶⁵⁴ It is alleged that Abedi received approval for his attack in August 2016, in a chat on the messaging app Zello.⁶⁵⁵ The conversation was intercepted by the FBI and involved five people, one of whom is believed to have been Abedi.⁶⁵⁶ The conversation also included an Islamic State operative in Syria, a jihadist recruiter in Dallas (alleged to be Said Azzam Mohamad Rahim) and a Moroccan-born Islamist living in Turin.⁶⁵⁷ The individual believed to be Abedi asked, "Sheikh, I live in Manchester, in Great Britain. I live among non-Muslims. I have found work with them. Am I allowed to kill them? Is it permitted to kill them with a bomb?"⁶⁵⁸

The Syria-based participant responded with a Quranic phrase: "Fight the pagans all together."⁶⁵⁹

The man from Dallas replied, "To the boy from Manchester I say, OK, kill them! Show no mercy to civilians."⁶⁶⁰

Salman Abedi purchased a white Nissan Micra on 13 April 2017, where he is believed to have stored equipment later used to create the bomb used at the Manchester arena.⁶⁶¹ The car was discovered outside a block of flats in Rusholme in Manchester on 2 June 2017.⁶⁶² The area was cordoned off and evacuated, and 13 hours later the vehicle was removed.⁶⁶³

On 15 April, just days after purchasing the car, Abedi flew to Libya where his parents and siblings were.⁶⁶⁴ ⁶⁶⁵ He remained in Libya until 17 May,⁶⁶⁶ and during that time it has been alleged that he may have had contact with Islamic State, with a retired intelligence chief reporting that during his visits to Libya Abedi met with Islamic State operatives Katibat al-Battar al-Libi in Tripoli and Sabratha.⁶⁶⁷ On his way back to the UK, Abedi is recorded as having flown back from Istanbul via Dusseldorf, and, while there is no evidence that he left the airport, there were concerns that he may have connected with an Islamist network in Germany.⁶⁶⁸

The extent to which Abedi had assistance in carrying out his attack remains the subject of investigation. In a press conference on 6 July 2017 investigators confirmed their belief that

⁶⁵² Ibid.

⁶⁵³ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁴ Willan, P., 'Manchester terrorist attack was planned via app', *The Times*, 14 August 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/manchester-terrorist-attack-was-planned-via-app-ttldgq5wm>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁶¹ Parveen, N. and Halliday, J., 'Manchester attack: police release images of bomber's car', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/06/manchester-attack-police-release-images-of-bombers-car>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁶² 'Manchester attack: Manchester police find 'significant' car', *BBC News*, 2 June 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40132725>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁶³ Parveen, N. and Halliday, J., 'Manchester attack: police release images of bomber's car', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017.

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁵ Dearden, L., 'Salman Abedi travelled through Turkey and Germany four days before launching Manchester suicide attack', *The Independent*, 25 May 2017.

⁶⁶⁶ Bennhold, K., Castle, S. and Zway, S., 'Hunt for Manchester Bombing Accomplices Extends to Libya', *The New York Times*, 24 May 2017.

⁶⁶⁷ Callimachi, R. and Schmitt, E., 'Manchester Bomber Met with ISIS Unit in Libya, Officials Say', *The New York Times*, 3 June 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/world/middleeast/manchester-bombing-salman-abedi-islamic-state-libya.html>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁶⁸ Huggler, J., 'Manchester bomber passed through Dusseldorf four days before the attack, German media reports', *The Telegraph*, 25 May 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/25/manchester-bomber-dusseldorf-four-days-attack-german-media-reports/>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

Salman Abedi had not acted alone.⁶⁶⁹ The police were examining possible contact between Abedi and Raphael Hostey, as well with Abdalraouf Abdallah.⁶⁷⁰ Abdallah is reported to have been in contact with Mohamed Abrini, the IS operative who came to Manchester in 2015 before taking part in the November 2015 Paris attacks and March 2016 Brussels attacks.⁶⁷¹

On 23 May 2017, Abedi's older brother Ismail Abedi was detained in south Manchester,⁶⁷² and later released without charge on 5 June.⁶⁷³ The following day a 38-year-old man was arrested at Heathrow Airport in connection with the Manchester investigation,⁶⁷⁴ and a 33-year-old man arrested in Wigan on 24 May was released.⁶⁷⁵ By this time, 19 people had been arrested as part of the investigation, with twelve released and seven in custody.⁶⁷⁶ Other suspects were held in custody following raids in Wigan and Nuneaton.⁶⁷⁷

Libyan authorities arrested Abedi's father, Ramadan, and his younger brother Hashem in Tripoli on 24 May.⁶⁷⁸ According to Libyan security services, Hashem was "aware of all the details" of the attack.⁶⁷⁹ The Libyan Special Deterrence Forces claimed Hashem was arrested on his way to withdrawing funds that had reportedly been sent by Salman.⁶⁸⁰ The Libyan authorities reported that Hashem Abedi had travelled from the UK to Libya on 16 April where he had been planning an attack in Tripoli.⁶⁸¹ The Special Deterrence Forces also reported that Hashem Abedi confessed to his and his brother's membership of Islamic State.⁶⁸² The Libyan authorities claimed that Hashem had been in daily contact by phone with his brother.⁶⁸³

Salman Abedi is known to have called both his parents on the night of the attack.⁶⁸⁴ In his call to his mother, just ten minutes before the bombing, Abedi is reported to have apologised for anything he had done wrong.⁶⁸⁵ Yet Salman's father has claimed his son could not have carried out the attack on the Manchester Arena and that some in the Abedi family believe the British security services were behind the bombing.⁶⁸⁶

⁶⁶⁹ Parveen, N., 'Manchester bombing: police say Salman Abedi did not act alone', *The Guardian*, 6 July 2017.

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁷¹ Evans, M., Dixon, H. and Malnick, E., 'The Manchester Libyan connection – a recruiting ground for jihadists', *The Telegraph*, 23 May 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/23/manchester-libyan-connection-recruiting-ground-jihadists/>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁷² Dearden, L., 'Salman Abedi travelled through Turkey and Germany four days before launching Manchester suicide attack', *The Independent*, 25 May 2017.

⁶⁷³ 'Abedi's brother released without charge', *BBC News*, 5 June 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40167767>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁷⁴ Batchelor, T., 'Manchester attack: Police arrest 38-year-old man at Heathrow Airport on suspicion of terror offences', *The Independent*, 7 June 2017, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/manchester-attack-latest-terror-arrest-police-heathrow-airport-38-year-old-man-a7776381.html>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁷⁵ Britton, P., 'A far-reaching police response: Every arrest and raid in connection with the Manchester Arena bomb', *Manchester Evening News*, 30 May 2017, available at: <https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/far-reaching-police-response-every-13109611>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁷⁶ Parveen, N. and Halliday, J., 'Manchester attack: police release images of bomber's car', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017.

⁶⁷⁷ Dearden, L., 'Salman Abedi travelled through Turkey and Germany four days before launching Manchester suicide attack', *The Independent*, 25 May 2017.

⁶⁷⁸ Parveen, N. and Halliday, J., 'Manchester attack: police release images of bomber's car', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017.

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁰ Bennhold, K., Castle, S. and Zway, S., 'Hunt for Manchester Bombing Accomplices Extends to Libya', *The New York Times*, 24 May 2017.

⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

⁶⁸² Graham, C., 'Manchester bomber's brother in Libya 'knew he was planning attack'', *The Telegraph*, 25 May 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/25/manchester-bombers-brother-libya-knew-planning-attack/>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁸³ Bennhold, K., Castle, S. and Zway, S., 'Hunt for Manchester Bombing Accomplices Extends to Libya', *The New York Times*, 24 May 2017.

⁶⁸⁴ Parveen, N., 'Manchester bombing: police say Salman Abedi did not act alone', *The Guardian*, 6 July 2017.

⁶⁸⁵ Bennhold, K., Castle, S. and Walsh, D., "Forgive Me": Manchester Bomber's Tangled Path of Conflict and Rebellion', *The New York Times*, 27 May 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/27/world/europe/manchester-bombing-salman-abedi-ramadan-abedi.html>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁸⁶ Roberts, J., 'Manchester: The Night of the Bomb – My search for Salman Abedi', *The Times*, 16 May 2018.

It was announced on 31 August 2017 that Hashem Abedi would stand trial in Libya on suspicion of having assisted Salman, including for the charge of having gathered some of the materials for the attack.⁶⁸⁷ In November 2017, the British government issued an arrest warrant for Hashem and requested that Libya extradite him.⁶⁸⁸ Another relative of Salman Abedi, Mohamed Younis Abedi, has been taken into custody in eastern Libya on allegations that his credit card was used to buy components for Salman's bomb.⁶⁸⁹

29. Lucas Papademos Assassination Attempt

The Attack

Date: 25 May 2017

Day: Thursday

Time: 6.30 pm

Country: Greece

Place: Athens

Area Type: City Centre - Commercial

Location: Car - Interior

Type of Attack: Bombing

Target: Civilian - Targeted (Political)

Ideology: Far Left

Organisation/Affiliation: Conspiracy Cells of Fire - Suspected

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 3

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Constantinos Yiagtzoglou (Giagtzoglou)

Age: 29

Country of Origin: Greece

Nationality: Greek

Resident: Athens

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

On 25 May, the former Prime Minister of Greece, Lucas Papademos, was injured when a letter bomb exploded in his car as he was being driven through Athens city centre. The blast happened shortly after 6.30 pm, with Papademos suffering injuries to his legs, arms and stomach.⁶⁹⁰ Other sources reported that he had sustained injuries to his chest and burns to

⁶⁸⁷ 'Manchester bomber's brother faces trial in Libya', *BBC News*, 31 August 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-41104450>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁸⁸ Dearden, L., 'Manchester attack: British police granted arrest warrant for bomber Salman Abedi's younger brother', *The Independent*, 2 November 2017, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/manchester-attack-latest-salman-abedi-hashem-abedi-arrest-warrant-libya-ariana-grande-a8032576.html>, last visited: 30 July 2018.

⁶⁸⁹ 'Manchester bomber's brother faces trial in Libya', *BBC News*, 31 August 2017.

⁶⁹⁰ 'Greek ex-PM Lucas Papademos injured in Athens car blast', *BBC News*, 25 May 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40052213>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

the face.⁶⁹¹ The 69-year-old former Prime Minister was taken to hospital and was described as being seriously hurt.⁶⁹² His driver was also lightly injured, as was a third person travelling in the car who is reported to have been an employee of the Bank of Greece.⁶⁹³

The bomb appears to have been triggered when the former Prime Minister opened a parcel inside the car. The parcel is believed to have been mailed to the Academy of Athens, of which Papademos is president.⁶⁹⁴ Another report suggested that the parcel may have been mailed to the Bank of Greece, where Papademos maintains an office.⁶⁹⁵ At the time of the explosion the car was travelling through an intersection on Marni Street, as Papademos was being driven home after a meeting.⁶⁹⁶

Lucas Papademos served as Greece's caretaker Prime Minister for six months from 2011 to 2012, at the height of the country's debt crisis when the government was obliged to implement a policy of austerity in return for international financial assistance.⁶⁹⁷ He had served as the governor of the Bank of Greece between 1994 and 2002, and had also been vice-president of the European Central Bank between 2002 and 2010.⁶⁹⁸ These positions in the Greek government and European financial system, as well as his role implementing austerity policies, marked Papademos as a potential target for militant far-left groups. Earlier in the year, Greek anarchists had already targeted the German Finance Minister and the Parisian office of the International Monetary Fund with similar letter bombs. In what is suspected to have been part of the same campaign, the authorities also intercepted another eight such letter bombs that were being mailed through the Athens sorting office.⁶⁹⁹ It was leaked in the Italian press that one of these explosives had been addressed to a Milan-based rating agency.⁷⁰⁰ Another reportedly included among the targets was Dutch finance minister and Eurogroup president Jeroen Dijsselbloem.⁷⁰¹

During Lucas Papademos' stay in hospital, pamphlets were thrown into the hospital grounds, which read, "Die, Papademos, so we can celebrate."⁷⁰² However, in the days following the incident no group claimed responsibility for the attack. Nevertheless, it was widely suspected that the anarchist group Conspiracy Cells of Fire was responsible, given that the group had already declared its responsibility for the parcel bomb sent to the German Finance Ministry in March.⁷⁰³

⁶⁹¹ 'Former Greek PM injured in car bombing', *Politico Europe*, 25 May 2017, available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/former-greek-pm-injured-in-car-bombing/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁶⁹² 'Former Greek PM Lucas Papademos injured in letter bomb explosion', *The Times*, 26 May 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/former-greek-pm-lucas-papademos-injured-in-letter-bomb-explosion-t7kz09ws8>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁶⁹³ 'Ex-Premier of Greece Is Hurt When Bomb Explodes in His Car', *The New York Times*, 25 May 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/world/europe/lucas-papademos-athens-bomb.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁶⁹⁴ 'Booby-trap blast injures former Greek PM Papademos', *Reuters*, 25 May 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-bomb-papademos/booby-trap-blast-injures-former-greek-pm-papademos-idUSKBN18L28G>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁶⁹⁵ 'Former Greek PM Papademos recovering well after booby-trap blast', *Reuters*, 26 May 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-bomb-papademos/former-greek-pm-papademos-recovering-well-after-booby-trap-blast-idUSKBN18MOUR>

⁶⁹⁶ 'Greek ex-PM Lucas Papademos injured in Athens car blast', *BBC News*, 25 May 2017.

⁶⁹⁷ 'Ex-Premier of Greece Is Hurt When Bomb Explodes in His Car', *The New York Times*, 25 May 2017.

⁶⁹⁸ 'Booby-trap blast injures former Greek PM Papademos', *Reuters*, 25 May 2017.

⁶⁹⁹ 'Greek police intercept eight suspect packages following parcel bombs to IMF, Germany', *Reuters*, 20 March 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-security-packages/greek-police-intercept-eight-suspect-packages-following-parcel-bombs-to-imf-germany-idUSKBN16R29T>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁷⁰⁰ 'Parcel-Bomb Addressed to Milan Rating Agency Intercepted in Athens, Greek Police Say', *Greek Reporter*, 28 May 2017.

⁷⁰¹ 'Greek police find eight more parcel bombs intended for EU officials as anarchist terror campaign continues', *The Independent*, 21 March 2017.

⁷⁰² 'Greece's Open Wound of Division', *The New York Times*, 16 June 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/opinion/greece-politics-lucas-papademos.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁷⁰³ 'Papademos bomb blast raises 'revenge attacks' concern', *The Financial Times*, 14 June 2017, available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/6d55c196-5047-11e7-af2-d19572361bb>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

Later in 2017, on 28 October, Greek police arrested an individual outside a central Athens apartment block in connection with the attack on Lucas Papademos.⁷⁰⁴ The 29-year-old man is believed to be part of Conspiracy Cells of Fire, and was also arrested in connection with the March letter bombs sent to the IMF and the German Finance Ministry.⁷⁰⁵ Subsequently named as Constantinos Yiagtzoglou, the man was charged and remanded in custody.⁷⁰⁶ Yiagtzoglou faced a second set of charges regarding possession of weapons and fake identification which were found at the time of his arrest.⁷⁰⁷ Police also discovered a partially constructed explosive device along with detonators and a handgun in an apartment being rented by Yiagtzoglou under a false identity.⁷⁰⁸ The 29-year-old denied construction of the parcel bombs, denied being a member of Conspiracy of the Cells of Fire⁷⁰⁹ and claimed that he had been transporting the weapons found in his possession for the purpose of removing himself from criminal wrongdoing.⁷¹⁰

Yiagtzoglou was known to Greek anti-terrorist authorities as a far-left extremist, having been arrested – although not charged – in 2012 when a group of Greek anarchists took over an Athens radio station and demanded that a statement supporting jailed members of Conspiracy of the Cells of Fire be read out on air.⁷¹¹ Not long after Yiagtzoglou's arrest in October 2017, anarchist groups distributed a message in solidarity with the suspect, referring to him as Konstantinos “Dino” Yiagtzoglou.⁷¹² Calling themselves simply the “Chaotic and Individualist Anarchists” the senders of the message did not confirm or contest whether Yiagtzoglou had been a member of Conspiracy of the Cells of Fire, however the message on the poster stated, “We do not care for democracy, for the media spectacle and the cop mentality that is the junta of innocence or guilt.” It concluded by stating, “What we care for is the continuation of the armed struggle against the necropolis of authority,” and with the words, “Strength to our anarchist comrade Dinos Yiagtzoglou. Soul and Body, nothing is over, the conflict continues!”⁷¹³

30. Portland Train Attack

The Attack

Date: 26 May 2017

Day: Friday

Time: 4.30 pm

Country: United States of America

Place: Portland

Area Type: Suburban – Transport

Location: Train – Interior

Type of Attack: Knife

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Political & Anti-Muslim)

Ideology: Far Right

⁷⁰⁴ ‘Greek Police Arrest Suspect in Letter Bomb Attacks’, *The New York Times*, 28 October 2017.

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁶ ‘Suspect in terror letter-bombs case remanded over second set of charges’, *Greek Observer*, 3 November 2017, available at: <http://thegreekobserver.com/greece/article/25163/suspect-terror-letter-bombs-case-remanded-second-set-charges/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁸ ‘Man arrested for Papademos parcel bomb faces terrorism charges’, *The Financial Times*, October 2017, available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/a0fc5230-92e7-3358-b22f-e7312dbc22de>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁷¹⁰ ‘Suspect in terror letter-bombs case remanded over second set of charges’, *Greek Observer*, 3 November 2017.

⁷¹¹ ‘Man arrested for Papademos parcel bomb faces terrorism charges’, *The Financial Times*, October 2017.

⁷¹² ‘Poster for anarchist comrade Dino Yagtzoglou (Greece)’, *No State*, 28 October 2017, available at: <https://325.nostate.net/2017/11/23/poster-for-anarchist-comrade-dino-yiagtzoglou-greece/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁷¹³ Ibid.

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor

Claimed: NA

Number of Injured: 1

Number of Fatalities: 2

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Jeremy Joseph Christian

Age: 35

Country of Origin: United States of America

Nationality: American

Resident: Portland

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

On the evening of 26 May 2017, 35-year old Jeremy Joseph Christian boarded a crowded light-rail train in Portland in Oregon before approaching two teenage girls, one of whom was wearing a hijab. Christian then began shouting anti-Muslim slurs at the girls, including telling them to get out of his country and to “go back to Saudi Arabia”, and saying that Muslims “were nothing and they should kill themselves”.⁷¹⁴ The two girls walked further down the train carriage; however, Christian pursued them and continued shouting.⁷¹⁵ At this point, three men travelling on the train intervened to defend the girls, placing themselves between Christian and the two teenagers.⁷¹⁶

A witness reported that one of the young men told Christian, “You need to get off this train. Please, get off this train.”⁷¹⁷

According to the mother of one of the girls, one of the men said, “You can’t get at them like that – they’re little girls.”⁷¹⁸

One of the men intervening had taken his phone out⁷¹⁹ when Christian abruptly hit the phone away, pulled out a knife and stabbed the young man in his neck.⁷²⁰ Another of the men was also badly stabbed, while the third was slashed in the neck.⁷²¹ One of the victims was pronounced dead at the scene and a second died in hospital soon after.⁷²²

⁷¹⁴ ‘Portland man accused of fatal train stabbing has outburst in court’, *The Guardian*, 31 May 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/30/portland-stabbing-anti-muslim-jeremy-joseph-christian-court>, last visited: 7 August 2018.

⁷¹⁵ Campuzano, E. and Ryan, J., ‘Man saw teenagers, one with hijab, and launched into racial tirade’, *The Oregonian*, 27 May 2017, available at: https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2017/05/man_saw_teenagers_one_with_hij.html, last visited: 7 August 2018.

⁷¹⁶ ‘Bernstein, M., ‘Portland MAX hero’s last words: ‘Tell everyone on this train I love them’’, *The Oregonian*, 29 May 2017, available at: https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2017/05/max_heros_last_words_tell_ever.html#incart_big-photo, last visited: 7 August 2018.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid.

⁷¹⁸ Campuzano, E. and Ryan, J., ‘Man saw teenagers, one with hijab, and launched into racial tirade’, *The Oregonian*, 27 May 2017.

⁷¹⁹ Bernstein, M., ‘Portland MAX hero’s last words: ‘Tell everyone on this train I love them’’, *The Oregonian*, 29 May 2017.

⁷²⁰ Ibid.

⁷²¹ Crombie, N., ‘Surviving victim of Portland MAX train attack got critical medical aid from fourth Samaritan’, *The Oregonian*, 31 May 2017, available at: https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2017/05/surviving_victim_of_portland_m.html, last visited: 7 August 2018.

⁷²² Dobuzinskis, A., ‘Two men stabbed to death on Oregon train trying to stop anti-Muslim rant’, *Reuters*, 27 May 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-muslims-portland/two-men-stabbed-to-death-on-oregon-train-trying-to-stop-anti-muslim-rant-idUSKBN18N080>, last visited: 7 August 2018.

Shortly after the attack, once the train reached the next stop, passengers fled.⁷²³ Christian also ran from the train, but was soon located and detained by police.⁷²⁴

In the police car, Christian was recorded shouting, “That’s what liberalism gets you,”⁷²⁵ and, “I hope they all die. I’m gonna say that on the stand. I’m a patriot, and I hope everyone I stabbed died.”⁷²⁶

At his initial court hearing, Christian was heard shouting, “You call it terrorism! I call it patriotism!” and, “Death to the enemies of America!”⁷²⁷ Christian was held without bail on two counts of aggravated murder, attempted murder, second-degree intimidation and possession of a restricted weapon as a felon, among other charges.⁷²⁸

The accused assailant, Jeremy Joseph Christian, is a Portland native with a history of involvement in both crime and extremism. His criminal record includes pleading guilty in 2002 to robbery and kidnapping, for which he spent eight years in prison,⁷²⁹ and in 2010 he was charged with theft and possession of a restricted weapon for a felon.⁷³⁰ A month before the train attack, Christian was seen caped in an American flag while giving a Nazi salute at a “Free Speech” rally in Portland, where police confiscated a baseball bat he was using to threaten counter-protestors.⁷³¹ Footage also emerged of Christian from the evening before the train attack, in which he was shown on a train shouting anti-Christian, anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic abuse while threatening to stab someone.⁷³²

Friends who knew Christian as a teenager claimed he had never been involved with far-right extremism prior to his time in prison.⁷³³ His Facebook posts show extensive radical views, however, including a death threat directed at Hillary Clinton and praise for Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh.⁷³⁴ He publically admired both Bernie Sanders and President Donald Trump, and had posted, “If Donald Trump is the Next Hitler then I am joining his SS.”⁷³⁵

Christian’s trial is set for June 2019 and is expected to last five weeks.⁷³⁶ If found guilty, he could face either the death penalty, life in prison or life in prison with the possibility of release after 30 years.⁷³⁷

⁷²³ Bernstein, M., ‘Portland MAX hero’s last words: ‘Tell everyone on this train I love them’’, *The Oregonian*, 29 May 2017.

⁷²⁴ Wang, A., ‘Final act of bravery’: Men who were fatally stabbed trying to stop anti-Muslim rants identified’, *The Washington Post*, 27 May 2017, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/05/27/man-fatally-stabs-2-on-portland-ore-train-after-they-interrupted-his-anti-muslim-rants-police-say/?utm_term=.b66da18fa6fe, last visited: 7 August 2018.

⁷²⁵ ‘Portland train stabbing suspect said “that’s what liberalism gets you,” docs say’, *CBS News*, 31 May 2017, available at: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/portland-train-stabbing-suspect-thats-what-liberalism-gets-you-docs/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁷²⁶ ‘Portland train suspect: ‘I hope everyone I stabbed died’’, *CNN*, 31 May 2017, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/31/us/portland-train-stabbing-what-happened/index.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁷²⁷ ‘Portland train stabbing suspect said “that’s what liberalism gets you,” docs say’, *CBS News*, 31 May 2017.

⁷²⁸ Wang, A., ‘Final act of bravery’: Men who were fatally stabbed trying to stop anti-Muslim rants identified’, *The Washington Post*, 27 May 2017.

⁷²⁹ Flaccus, G., ‘Portland stabbing suspect made life about hate after prison’, *The Globe and Mail*, 4 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/portland-stabbing-suspect-made-life-about-hate-after-prison/article35199427/>, last visited: 7 August 2018.

⁷³⁰ ‘Portland stabbing: Jeremy Joseph Christian appears in court’, *BBC News*, 30 May 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-40096993>, last visited: 7 August 2018.

⁷³¹ *Ibid.*

⁷³² ‘Train-stabbing suspect went on racist rant the night before deadly attack’, *New York Post*, 29 May 2017, available at: <https://nypost.com/2017/05/29/train-stabbing-suspect-went-on-racist-rant-the-night-before-deadly-attack/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁷³³ Crombie, N., ‘Surviving victim of Portland MAX train attack got critical medical aid from fourth Samaritan’, *The Oregonian*, 31 May 2017.

⁷³⁴ ‘Portland stabbing: Jeremy Joseph Christian appears in court’, *BBC News*, 30 May 2017.

⁷³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁶ Green, A., ‘Jeremy Christian trial set for 2019 in MAX train killings’, *The Oregonian*, 19 December 2017, available at: https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2017/12/jeremy_christian_trial_set_for.html, last visited: 7 August 2018.

⁷³⁷ *Ibid.*

31. June Czech Train Attack

The Attack

Date: 1 June 2017
Day: Thursday
Time: Unknown
Country: Czech Republic
Place: Mlada Boleslav
Area Type: Rural – Transport
Location: Railway
Type of Attack: Vehicular
Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate
Ideology: Far Right
Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor
Claimed: NA
Number of Injured: 0
Number of Fatalities: 0
Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1
Gender: Male
Name: JB
Age: 70
Country of Origin: Czech Republic
Nationality: Czech
Resident: Bakov nad Jizerou
Training/Combat Experience: No
Known to Authorities: No
Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

On Thursday 1 June, a train crashed as it hit trees on the line between Bakov nad Jizerou and Mladá Boleslav in the central Bohemian region of the Czech Republic.⁷³⁸ While the incident did not cause any injuries, public attention was drawn to the event when police confirmed reports that messages in Arabic had been discovered at the scene.⁷³⁹

For more information, see the entry for “43. July Czech Train Attack”.

⁷³⁸ ‘Czech terrorist allegedly a fanatical supporter of ultra-right party who has attacked Romani people in the past’, *Romea.cz*, 4 March 2018, available at: <http://www.romea.cz/en/news/czech/czech-terrorist-allegedly-a-fanatical-supporter-of-ultra-right-party-who-has-attacked-romani-people-in-the-past>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷³⁹ *Ibid.*

32. Toronto Tyre Store Attack

The Attack

Date: 3 June 2017

Day: Saturday

Time: 5.10 pm

Country: Canada

Place: Toronto

Area Type: Suburban – Commercial

Location: Shop – Interior

Type of Attack: Knife

Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 1

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Female

Name: Rehab Dughmosh

Age: 32

Country of Origin: Syria

Nationality: Syrian-Canadian

Resident: Toronto

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

At 5.10 pm on the 3 June 2017, a woman wearing an Islamic State bandana⁷⁴⁰ entered a tyre store at a shopping mall in the Scarborough area of Toronto⁷⁴¹ and began swinging a golf club at customers and employees while shouting, “Allahu Akbar.”⁷⁴² This was followed by the assailant also pulling out a large knife from within her clothing and proceeding to injure one of the employees.⁷⁴³ The assault ended when an employee was able to subdue the woman by grabbing hold of her wrist and wrestling the knife from her hand.⁷⁴⁴

⁷⁴⁰ Blatchford, C., ‘Entitled terror suspect pleads not guilty, re-affirms love for ISIL and pledges attacks’, *National Post*, 20 September 2017, available at: <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/christie-blatchford-entitled-terror-suspect-pleads-not-guilty-re-affirms-love-for-isil-and-pledges-attacks>, last visited: 6 August 2018.

⁷⁴¹ D’Amore, R., ‘Woman pulls out knife, expresses support for Islamic state at Cedarbrae Mall’, *CTV News Toronto*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://toronto.ctvnews.ca/woman-pulls-out-knife-expresses-support-for-islamic-state-at-cedarbrae-mall-1.3445683>, last visited: 6 August 2018.

⁷⁴² Warmington, J., ‘Counter-terror unit probes Scarborough store attack’, *Toronto Sun*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://torontosun.com/2017/06/06/counter-terror-unit-probes-scarborough-store-attack/wcm/b5b4e08b-6b6f-4c43-91d7-49191be0eef7>, last visited: 6 August 2018.

⁷⁴³ Winter, J., ‘Toronto woman charged with assault at Scarborough mall’, *The Star*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://www.thestar.com/news/crime/2017/06/06/toronto-woman-charged-with-assault-at-scarborough-mall.html>, last visited: 6 August 2018.

⁷⁴⁴ D’Amore, R., ‘Woman pulls out knife, expresses support for Islamic state at Cedarbrae Mall’, *CTV News Toronto*, 6 June 2017.

Upon her arrest, the assailant was identified as 32-year-old Rehab Dughmash, a Syrian-born Canadian citizen and mother of two.⁷⁴⁵ A year earlier, she had left Canada in an attempt to join Islamic State in Syria; however, she was intercepted in Turkey.⁷⁴⁶ It has been reported that Dughmash believed her tyre store attack was inspired by her desire to avenge the bombing campaign of Syria by Canadian and American forces.⁷⁴⁷

Dughmash was psychologically assessed and found fit to stand trial.⁷⁴⁸ During her court hearing, she simultaneously pled not guilty to her charges while also pledging her allegiance to Islamic State and promising to further perpetrate attacks if she were released.⁷⁴⁹ When asked to state her name in court, Dughmash responded through an Arabic translator, "ISIS ... I pledge to the leader of the believers – Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi."⁷⁵⁰ She also requested that she be sent to a country where she could be tried under Sharia law,⁷⁵¹ saying she waived her Canadian citizenship and denied her right to legal counsel.⁷⁵² During the hearing she was heard to shout, "Damn your legislation, damn your nationality, go to hell,"⁷⁵³ while also calling the judge and prosecution infidels.⁷⁵⁴ Dughmash faces 21 charges, including attempted murder "for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a terrorist group".⁷⁵⁵

33. London Bridge Attack

The Attack

Date: 3 June 2017

Day: Saturday

Time: 10.06 pm

Country: United Kingdom

Place: London

Area Type: City Centre – Landmark

Location: Bridge, Bar – Exterior

Type of Attack: Vehicular & Knife

Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 48

Number of Fatalities: 8

Response: Shot Dead

⁷⁴⁵ Warmington, J., 'Counter-terror unit probes Scarborough store attack', *Toronto Sun*, 6 June 2017.

⁷⁴⁶ Blatchford, C., 'Entitled terror suspect pleads not guilty, re-affirms love for ISIL and pledges attacks', *National Post*, 20 September 2017.

⁷⁴⁷ McDonald, C. and Miller, A., 'I meant to harm those people': Toronto woman who pledged allegiance to ISIS appears in court', *Global News*, 26 June 2017, available at: <https://globalnews.ca/news/3556964/toronto-woman-court-isis/>, last visited: 6 August 2018.

⁷⁴⁸ Loriggio, P., 'Woman facing terror charges in alleged Canadian Tire attack will stand trial', *CTV News Toronto*, 10 November 2017, available at: <https://toronto.ctvnews.ca/woman-facing-terror-charges-in-alleged-canadian-tire-attack-will-stand-trial-1.3672554>, last visited: 6 August 2018.

⁷⁴⁹ Blatchford, C., 'Entitled terror suspect pleads not guilty, re-affirms love for ISIL and pledges attacks', *National Post*, 20 September 2017.

⁷⁵⁰ D'Amore, R., 'Woman pulls out knife, expresses support for Islamic state at Cedarbrae Mall', *CTV News Toronto*, 6 June 2017.

⁷⁵¹ Loriggio, P., 'Woman facing terror charges in alleged Canadian Tire attack will stand trial', *CTV News Toronto*, 10 November 2017.

⁷⁵² Blatchford, C., 'Entitled terror suspect pleads not guilty, re-affirms love for ISIL and pledges attacks', *National Post*, 20 September 2017.

⁷⁵³ Loriggio, P., 'Woman facing terror charges in alleged Canadian Tire attack will stand trial', *CTV News Toronto*, 10 November 2017.

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁵ Blatchford, C., 'Entitled terror suspect pleads not guilty, re-affirms love for ISIL and pledges attacks', *National Post*, 20 September 2017.

The Assailants

Number: 3

Gender: Male

Names: Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane, Youssef Zaghba

Ages: 27, 30, 22

Countries of Origin: Pakistan, Morocco, Morocco

Nationalities: British-Pakistani, Moroccan, Italian-Moroccan

Resident: London, London, London

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Dead

NOTES:

Shortly after 10.00 pm on 3 June, a van intentionally ploughed into pedestrians on London Bridge. Three pedestrians were killed, including one man who was knocked into the river.⁷⁵⁶ As the van came to a halt by Southwark Cathedral, three attackers wearing fake suicide vests⁷⁵⁷ emerged from the vehicle. The men then ran a short distance from the abandoned vehicle, shouting, "This is for Allah." They then began to stab people gathered outside pubs and bars in the Borough Market area.⁷⁵⁸ The men were using large ceramic kitchen knives which they had taped to their wrists.⁷⁵⁹ Members of the public fought back, improvising with chairs, crates and glass bottles.⁷⁶⁰ Others were able to hide inside bars and restaurants.⁷⁶¹ A member of the British transport police was badly injured when he attempted to use his baton to fight off one of the attackers, while an off-duty police officer was also hurt as he attempted to wrestle an attacker to the ground.⁷⁶² At 10.16 pm, armed police arrived at the scene and shot the three men dead, less than ten minutes after being alerted to the attack.⁷⁶³ In total, eight people were murdered and 48 were injured.⁷⁶⁴ Later, the attackers were spotted on earlier CCTV footage apparently conducting a practice drive for their attack, shortly before the actual attack began.⁷⁶⁵

The attackers were all identified and publicly named by 6 June.⁷⁶⁶ They were identified as Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba. The man widely believed to have been the ringleader of the group was 27-year-old Khuram Butt,⁷⁶⁷ who had been born in Pakistan

⁷⁵⁶ 'London attack: What happened', *BBC News*, 30 May 2018, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-40147164>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁸ Mendick, R., "They shouted 'this is for Allah', as they stabbed indiscriminately" - How the London terror attack unfolded', *The Telegraph*, 4 June 2017, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/04/shouted-allah-stabbed-indiscriminately-london-terror-attack/>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁵⁹ 'London attack: What happened', *BBC News*, 30 May 2018.

⁷⁶⁰ 'London attack: What happened', *BBC News*, 30 May 2018; and Samuelson, K., 'People in London's Borough Market Fought Back as Terrorists Struck', *Time*, 4 June 2017, available at: <http://time.com/4804588/london-attack-people-fought-back/>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁶¹ McGuinness, A., 'Britain's year of terror: Timeline of attacks in 2017', *Sky News*, available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/britains-year-of-terror-timeline-of-attacks-in-2017-11036824>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁶² 'London attack: What happened', *BBC News*, 30 May 2018.

⁷⁶³ Morton, S., 'London Bridge attack: IPCC completes investigation into shooting of Barking and Ilford terrorists', *Barking and Dagenham Post*, 21 December 2017, available at: <http://www.barkinganddagenhampost.co.uk/news/crime-court/london-bridge-attack-ipcc-completes-investigation-into-shooting-of-barking-and-ilford-terrorists-1-5329687>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁶⁴ Kanter, J., 'These are all 8 victims of the London Bridge terror attacks', *Business Insider*, 8 June 2017, available at: <http://uk.businessinsider.com/names-victims-london-bridge-borough-market-terror-attacks-2017-6>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁶⁵ Knapton, S., Evans, M., Harley, N., Yorke, H., Farmer, B. and Mendick, R., 'Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba named: Everything we know about the London Bridge Terrorists' *The Telegraph*, 6 June 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/05/ringleader-london-bridge-terror-attack-named-khuram-butt/>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁶⁶ 'London attack: Third attacker named as Youssef Zaghba', *BBC News*, 6 June 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40169985>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁶⁷ Gadher, D., 'MI5 monitored Khuram Butt's London Bridge killers', *The Times*, 18 February 2018, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mi5-monitored-khuram-butts-london-bridge-killers-v68ztmbzc>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

and had arrived in Britain in 1998 when his family had claimed asylum on grounds of political oppression.⁷⁶⁸ Having been granted indefinite leave to remain, Butt gained British citizenship in 2005.⁷⁶⁹ Butt attended school in East London's Forest Gate⁷⁷⁰ and lived nearby in Barking.⁷⁷¹ He married in 2013, with a son being born in October 2014 and a daughter in May 2017.⁷⁷²

Khuram Butt had been identified with Islamist extremism for some considerable time prior to the London Bridge attack. Although he did not have a particularly noteworthy appearance in the programme, he was very publicly linked with extremism in January 2016, when he was featured in the Channel 4 documentary, *The Jihadis Next Door*, where he was shown as part of an extremist circle whose membership had links with Al Muhajiroun.⁷⁷³ During the course of the programme, Butt and other members of their circle are seen openly posing with an Islamic State flag in a London park.⁷⁷⁴ His appearance in the film is now known to have triggered additional MI5 investigations into Butt, which were still being conducted at the time of the attack.⁷⁷⁵

MI5 intelligence services had first begun investigating Butt in 2015 when information was found suggesting that he may have been planning an attack in the UK. However, he was subsequently judged to pose only a medium risk, for while he was thought to have a high level of intent, the authorities believed that he only had a limited degree of capability.⁷⁷⁶ Over the next two years, Butt's degree of engagement with the Al Muhajiroun circle fluctuated and his extremist focus concentrated on foreign travel instead, potentially with a wish to join Islamic State in Syria.⁷⁷⁷ Further reviews of Butt's file by the intelligence services in May and June of 2017 failed to resolve whether his case should be either escalated or closed.⁷⁷⁸

Khuram Butt is thought to have been involved in Islamist extremism from as early as 2013, when, as part of a group led by Al Muhajiroun's Anjem Choudary, he is believed to have demonstrated against anti-extremist and liberal Muslim groups in the wake of the murder of the British soldier Lee Rigby.⁷⁷⁹ From late 2015 onwards, Butt is recorded as having frequently expressed a desire to travel to Syria.⁷⁸⁰ In that same year, a man had called an anti-terrorism line with concerns about Butt's links to extremism.⁷⁸¹ A woman also reported Butt to the police over concerns that he was seeking to indoctrinate her child with radical views.⁷⁸² In addition,

⁷⁶⁸ Anderson Q.C., D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester', David Anderson QC (2017), p. 16.

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid. p.16.

⁷⁷⁰ Grierson, J., 'London Bridge attacker Khuram Butt had argued with anti-extremist Muslims', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/06/london-bridge-attacker-khuram-butt-had-argued-with-anti-extremist-muslims>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁷¹ Booth, R., Cobain, I., Dodd, V., Taylor, M., and O'Carroll, L., 'London Bridge attacker named as Khuram Butt', *The Guardian*, 5 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/05/london-bridge-attacker-named-as-khuram-butt>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁷² Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester: Independent Assessment of MI5 and Police Internal Reviews', David Anderson QC (2017), pp.16-17.

⁷⁷³ Dearden, L., 'London attacker Khuram Butt 'cautioned by police over extremist behaviour' six months before rampage', *The Independent*, 7 June 2017, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/london-attacker-khuram-butt-police-caution-extremism-terrorism-january-bridge-borough-choudary-isis-a7778096.html>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁷⁴ Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester: Independent Assessment of MI5 and Police Internal Reviews', David Anderson QC (2017), p.17.

⁷⁷⁵ Knapton, S. *et al.*, 'Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba named: Everything we know about the London Bridge Terrorists' *The Telegraph*, 6 June 2017.

⁷⁷⁶ Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester: Independent Assessment of MI5 and Police Internal Reviews', David Anderson QC (2017), p.17.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid. pp.17-18.

⁷⁷⁸ Ibid. p.19.

⁷⁷⁹ Dearden, L., 'London attack linked to hate preacher Anjem Choudary's extremist network', *The Independent*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/london-attack-bridge-borough-isis-perpetrators-khuram-butt-links-anjem-choudary-documentary-jihadis-a7776101.html>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁸⁰ Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester: Independent Assessment of MI5 and Police Internal Reviews', David Anderson QC (2017), p.17.

⁷⁸¹ Booth, R. *et al.*, 'London Bridge attacker named as Khuram Butt', *The Guardian*, 5 June 2017.

⁷⁸² Ibid.

Butt was identified as the suspect of a common assault against a prominent liberal Muslim figure in July 2016. The incident appears to have been motivated by Islamist extremism.⁷⁸³

In the period before the attack, Butt is also believed to have been influenced by Ahmad Musa Jibril,⁷⁸⁴ an American extremist preacher who has been a significant distributor of Islamist content over social media.⁷⁸⁵ Jibril's preaching has been referenced as a source of inspiration for a number of those who have gone on to become Islamic State fighters.⁷⁸⁶ Since early 2017, Butt appears to have expanded and deepened his interactions with like-minded extremists.⁷⁸⁷ He began regularly attending the Ummah Fitness Centre,⁷⁸⁸ where it is believed he may have connected with fellow attacker Rachid Redouane, as well as teaching an Islamic class to young people in which the third attacker, Youssef Zaghba, was also involved.⁷⁸⁹ The three attackers were captured on CCTV meeting outside the Ummah Fitness Centre days prior to the attack on London Bridge.⁷⁹⁰

The second attacker, 30-year-old Rachid Redouane was born in Morocco in 1986.⁷⁹¹ It is reported that he had been in Libya following the outbreak of civil war there in 2011,⁷⁹² and it is believed that he had fought alongside Liwa al-Umma in Tripoli, an Islamist faction which later sent fighters into Syria to participate in the conflict there.⁷⁹³ While in Libya, Redouane had acquired a fake Libyan passport.⁷⁹⁴

He first travelled to the UK in 2006 and lived in north London.⁷⁹⁵ In 2009 he attempted to seek asylum under his false Libyan identity, but when this was rejected he was reported to immigration officials as an absconder in 2011, and in 2012 he was arrested by police in Scotland as he attempted to travel to Northern Ireland.⁷⁹⁶ Between 2013 and 2015 Redouane was living in Morocco for a period, before gaining a visa to travel to Ireland, where he settled in Dublin with his wife.⁷⁹⁷ The couple had a daughter but they had separated not long before the attack,

⁷⁸³ Madaser, M., 'Quilliam had directly reported London Bridge terrorist Khurram Butt to Counter-Terror Officials after he physically attacked its staff and family', *Quilliam*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://www.quilliaminternational.com/quilliam-had-directly-reported-london-bridge-terrorist-khurram-butt-to-counter-terror-officials/>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁸⁴ Thomas-Peter, H., 'Preacher who 'influenced' London attacker Khuram Butt is 'still loose'', *Sky News*, 8 June 2017, available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/preacher-who-influenced-london-attacker-khuram-butt-is-still-loose-10908040>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁸⁵ Carter, J., Maher, S. and Neumann, P., '#Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks', The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (2014), available at: <http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ICSR-Report-Greenbirds-Measuring-Importance-and-Influence-in-Syrian-Foreign-Fighter-Networks.pdf>, last visited: 16 August 2018, pp.19-20.

⁷⁸⁶ Thomas-Peter, H., 'Preacher who 'influenced' London attacker Khuram Butt is 'still loose'', *Sky News*, 8 June 2017.

⁷⁸⁷ Dodd, V., Taylor, M., Ross, A. and Grierson, J., 'London Bridge attackers were regulars at Sunday afternoon pool sessions', *The Guardian*, 7 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/07/london-bridge-attackers-were-regulars-at-sunday-afternoon-pool-sessions>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁸⁸ Gibbons, K. and Gardham, D., 'East London gym used by London Bridge attacker Khuram Butt raided by police', *The Times*, 8 June 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/east-london-gym-used-by-london-bridge-attacker-khuram-butt-raided-by-police-6nr85dq57>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁸⁹ Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester: Independent Assessment of MI5 and Police Internal Reviews', David Anderson QC (2017), p.18.

⁷⁹⁰ Gibbons, K. and Gardham, D., 'East London gym used by London Bridge attacker Khuram Butt raided by police', *The Times*, 8 June 2017.

⁷⁹¹ 'London Bridge killer used false name to enter UK', *The Times*, 28 June 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/london-bridge-killer-used-false-name-to-enter-uk-p9jkhqd9h>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁹² Dearden, L., 'London attack: Rachid Redouane's wife says she is 'numbed' by his actions amid reports of domestic abuse', *The Independent*, 7 June 2017, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/london-attack-rachid-redouane-wife-domestic-abuse-numbed-response-bridge-borough-market-isis-a7778041.html>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁹³ Farmer, B., Nathan, A. and Yorke, H., 'London attacker Rachid Redouane refused UK asylum in 2009', *The Telegraph*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/06/london-attacker-rachid-redouane-refused-uk-asylum-2009/>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁶ Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester: Independent Assessment of MI5 and Police Internal Reviews', David Anderson QC (2017), p.19.

⁷⁹⁷ Ibid. p.20.

with their differing views on religion reportedly being a cause for the separation.⁷⁹⁸ Having obtained a residency card on account of his marriage,⁷⁹⁹ Redouane was able to relocate to the United Kingdom⁸⁰⁰ and settled in Dagenham, placing him in close proximity to Khuram Butt.⁸⁰¹ Following the attack it was revealed that while Redouane had never been investigated by MI5, the British intelligence services had received a number of pieces of information about an individual who was subsequently confirmed to be Rachid Redouane.⁸⁰²

The third attacker was Youssef Zaghba, a 22-year-old Moroccan-Italian who was also living not far from Khuram Butt, in east London's Ilford.⁸⁰³ He is similarly known to have attended the same Ummah Fitness Centre as Butt.⁸⁰⁴

Having been raised in Morocco as a child, Zaghba had moved from Morocco to Italy with his mother when his parents separated.⁸⁰⁵ He is known to have been working in the UK from June 2015.⁸⁰⁶ However, in March 2016 he was stopped at Bologna Airport as he attempted to travel to Turkey for what is believed to have been an effort to join Islamic State in Syria.⁸⁰⁷ This led to his name being placed on the EU travel warning list, although this was apparently only with regard to concerns about "serious crime" rather than as a security risk.⁸⁰⁸ Despite this measure, Zaghba was able to continue travelling between Italy and the UK, and in January 2017 the Italian authorities removed the warning.⁸⁰⁹ While it was confirmed that MI5 had never investigated him, he was under surveillance in Italy,⁸¹⁰ and at the time of his attempt to travel to Syria in 2016, the Italian authorities had contacted MI5 to request information on Zaghba, although the request appears to have been missed.⁸¹¹

On 5 June, Islamic State claimed the London Bridge attack via its Amaq news agency, stating, "A detachment of Islamic State fighters executed yesterday's London attack."⁸¹² While there is a lack of evidence that Islamic State actually directed the attack, or that the assailants were anything more than inspired by IS, evidence did come to light in September 2017 that gave reason to suspect that Islamic State had been seeking to recruit for an attack very similar to the one carried out on London Bridge. It was revealed that an undercover BBC reporter had been in communication with the British Syria-based IS recruiter Junaid Hussein over an

⁷⁹⁸ Knapton, S. *et al.*, 'Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba named: Everything we know about the London Bridge Terrorists' *The Telegraph*, 6 June 2017.

⁷⁹⁹ Farmer, B., Nathan, A. and Yorke, H., 'London attacker Rachid Redouane refused UK asylum in 2009', *The Telegraph*, 6 June 2017.

⁸⁰⁰ Booth, R., Dodd, V., Tondo, L. and Kirchgaessner, S., 'London Bridge: third attacker named as Youssef Zaghba', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/06/london-bridge-attack-third-attacker-named-in-italy-as-youssef-zaghba>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁸⁰¹ Cobain, I., McDonald, H. and Watt, H., 'Second London attacker was chef who lived in Dublin, say sources', *The Guardian*, 5 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/05/rachid-redouane-second-london-attacker-moroccan-libyan-chef-living-in-dublin-say-sources>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁸⁰² Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester: Independent Assessment of MI5 and Police Internal Reviews', David Anderson QC (2017), p.20.

⁸⁰³ Farmer, B., Nathan, A. and Yorke, H., 'London attacker Rachid Redouane refused UK asylum in 2009', *The Telegraph*, 6 June 2017.

⁸⁰⁴ Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester: Independent Assessment of MI5 and Police Internal Reviews', David Anderson QC (2017), p.21.

⁸⁰⁵ Booth, R. *et al.*, 'London Bridge: third attacker named as Youssef Zaghba', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017.

⁸⁰⁶ Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester: Independent Assessment of MI5 and Police Internal Reviews', David Anderson QC (2017), p.20.

⁸⁰⁷ Booth, R. *et al.*, 'London Bridge: third attacker named as Youssef Zaghba', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017.

⁸⁰⁸ Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester: Independent Assessment of MI5 and Police Internal Reviews', David Anderson QC (2017), pp.20-21.

⁸⁰⁹ *Ibid.* p.21.

⁸¹⁰ 'London attack: UK was warned about third attacker', *BBC News*, 7 June 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40183147>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁸¹¹ Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester: Independent Assessment of MI5 and Police Internal Reviews', David Anderson QC (2017), p.21.

⁸¹² Phipps, C., Grierson, J., Khomami, N., Sparrow, A. and Johnston, C., 'Islamic State claims responsibility for terror attack on London – as it happened', *The Guardian*, 5 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/live/2017/jun/03/london-bridge-closed-after-serious-police-incident-live>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

encrypted messaging app.⁸¹³ Hussein had offered to train the journalist remotely in bomb-making. In July 2016 another IS recruiter was encouraging recruits to target police officers and had also encouraged the undercover journalist to target London bridge, either in a lone-actor attack or as part of a group.⁸¹⁴

34. Melbourne Hostage Taking

The Attack

Date: 5 June 2017

Day: Monday

Time: 4.00 pm

Country: Australia

Place: Melbourne

Area Type: Suburban – Residential

Location: Apartments – Interior

Type of Attack: Hostage Taking & Shooting

Target: Police & Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State & Al Qaeda – Inspired

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 3

Number of Fatalities: 1

Response: Shot Dead

The Assailants

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Yacqub Khayre

Age: 29

Country of Origin: Somalia

Resident: Melbourne

Nationality: Somali–Australian

Training/Combat Experience: Yes

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Dead

NOTES:

On Monday 5 June 2017, two people were killed in a hostage situation in Melbourne. The hostage was an escort who had been contacted by the assailant through an escort agency, with the two having arranged to meet at an apartment building in Brighton, Melbourne.⁸¹⁵ The assailant arrived with a firearm and waited to take the woman hostage.⁸¹⁶ The escort arrived

⁸¹³ Press Association, 'Isis agent tried to recruit undercover reporter for London Bridge attack', *The Guardian*, 4 September 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/04/isis-agent-tried-to-recruit-undercover-reporter-for-london-bridge-attack>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

⁸¹⁴ Ibid.

⁸¹⁵ Knaus, C. and Davey, M., 'Isis claims responsibility for Melbourne siege that left two people dead', *The Guardian*, 5 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/jun/05/police-shoot-gunman-dead-and-free-hostage-in-melbourne>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁸¹⁶ Knaus, C., 'Melbourne siege: Turnbull questions how Yacqub Khayre was on parole – live', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/live/2017/jun/06/melbourne-siege-police-investigate-gunman-yacqub-khayres-terrorism-links-live?page=with:block-5935e3cee4b00493c8279b94#liveblog-navigation>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

at the apartment and was seized at gunpoint by the assailant just after 4.00 pm, at which point she was immediately blindfolded, tied up and locked in the bathroom.⁸¹⁷ At 4.10 pm the hostage victim managed to call the police; however, her attacker then took over the call and told the police that this was a hostage situation and that no one was to come to apartment 11 or the hostage would be killed.⁸¹⁸ He also confirmed that the building receptionist was already dead and claimed that he had a bomb on the premises.⁸¹⁹ It appears that the attacker had shot the man working on the reception desk prior to taking the escort hostage. The police's Critical Incident Response Team arrived and created a cordon around the area as well as evacuating nearby facilities, having received other emergency calls about a possible explosion.⁸²⁰ At 4.44 pm the assailant called the police again and repeated these same threats.⁸²¹ At 5.04 pm the police discovered the body of the building's receptionist in the lobby.⁸²²

At 5.41 pm the assailant called Australia's Channel 7, declaring himself to be the hostage taker, the man told the channel, "This is for IS," and, "This is for al-Qaeda."⁸²³ It is reported that during the call a woman's screaming could be heard in the background, and that the woman was then made to confirm by phone that she was the Brighton hostage.⁸²⁴ The police attempted to negotiate with the hostage taker, however, at just before 6.00 pm the assailant exited the apartments and fired at police with a sawn-off shotgun, wounding three policemen before being shot dead himself.⁸²⁵ The policemen's injuries were not life-threatening.⁸²⁶ The woman who had been taken hostage was found uninjured. The police have suggested that the early reports of sounds of an explosion were most likely caused by gunfire.⁸²⁷

The authorities subsequently identified the gunman as 29-year-old Yacqub Khayre, an individual with a long history of violence, crime and links to Islamist extremism.⁸²⁸

Yacqub Khayre was born in Somalia and had left Mogadishu with his parents when he was three.⁸²⁹ His family relocated to a refugee camp in Kenya and, as part of Australia's humanitarian immigration programme,⁸³⁰ he was subsequently moved to Australia in 1991 to live with his uncle and grandfather.⁸³¹ He grew up in the middle class suburb Gladstone Park, in the north of Melbourne.⁸³² It has been suggested that following the death of his grandfather, when he was 12 years old, Khayre began to become involved with antisocial behaviour and

⁸¹⁷ 'Hearing to set direction for Brighton siege investigation', *News.com.Au*, 22 August 2017, available at: <http://www.news.com.au/video/id-5348771529001-5547516766001/hearing-to-set-direction-for-brighton-siege-investigation>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁸¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁰ 'Knaus, C. and Davey, M., 'Isis claims responsibility for Melbourne siege that left two people dead', *The Guardian*, 5 June 2017.

⁸²¹ 'Hearing to set direction for Brighton siege investigation', *News.com.Au*, 22 August 2017.

⁸²² *Ibid.*

⁸²³ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁴ Tomlinson, S. and Burnip, L., "'This is for ISIS' First pictures of Melbourne gunman 'known to terror police' who killed man and took woman hostage before calling TV channel to say he was inspired by ISIS', *The Sun*, 5 June 2017, available at: <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/worldnews/3724988/melbourne-siege-hostage-isis/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁸²⁵ 'Isis claims responsibility for Melbourne siege that left two people dead', *The Guardian*, 5 June 2017.

⁸²⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁸ Doherty, B., 'Yacqub Khayre: Melbourne siege gunman's history of violent crime and drugs', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/jun/06/yacqub-khayre-melbourne-siege-gunmans-history-of-violent-and-drugs>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁸²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸³¹ Hanrahan, J., 'ISIS claims responsibility for Melbourne attack: Meth-taking Somali gunman, 29, shot dead by cops after murdering a man in the name of ISIS was cleared of terrorist plot to attack Sydney army barracks', *Daily Mail*, 5 June 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4573974/Melbourne-terror-attack-gunman-named-Yacqub-Khayre.html>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁸³² *Ibid.*

petty criminal activity.⁸³³ In 2007, at the age of 19, Khayre was sentenced for more than 40 offences, including burglary, drug possession, assault and theft.⁸³⁴

In 2009, aged 21, Khayre travelled to Somalia and is believed to have attended a training camp where he learnt how to use weapons.⁸³⁵ In August of that year he was arrested in Australia during a pre-dawn raid as part of the disruption of a terror plot.⁸³⁶ He was accused of being part of a group of five men believed to be planning a terrorist attack on the Holsworthy army barracks in which they intended to kill as many soldiers as possible before being killed themselves.⁸³⁷ He spent 16 months in a high-security prison while awaiting trial.⁸³⁸ All of the men in the plot had attended the same 8 Blacks prayer hall in Melbourne, which has been regarded by the police as a centre of Islamist extremist activity.⁸³⁹

During sentencing in 2011 by the Supreme Court of Victoria, the terrorist plot at the Holsworthy army barracks was linked to the Somali jihadist group al-Shabaab, and Khayre's travelling to Somalia was raised during court proceedings.⁸⁴⁰ The prosecutors alleged that Khayre's travel to Somalia was to obtain a *fatwa* [religious ruling] from clerics which would add credibility to their cause and ensure the men would be regarded as martyrs.⁸⁴¹ Khayre's defence argued that he had in fact travelled to Somalia to fight in the civil war there.⁸⁴² However, he was acquitted of the charges after it was claimed that he had no animosity towards Australia and so was not planning to actually go through with the attack.⁸⁴³ The same was concluded of another one of the five men: Abdirahman Ahmed.⁸⁴⁴ However, the three others – Wissam Mahmoud Fattal, Saney Edow Aweys and Nayef El Sayed – were sentenced to 18 years in prison.⁸⁴⁵ During the period he was held in detention prior to the trial, Khayre participated in a deradicalisation initiative in the prison.⁸⁴⁶

Khayre had subsequently been imprisoned in 2012 for several further offences, including aggravated burglary, and was given a sentence of five years and six months.⁸⁴⁷ It is also reported that he committed arson while in the correctional system, leading to an extension of his sentence.⁸⁴⁸ However, at the time of the hostage taking, Khayre was out of prison on parole, having been released from prison in November 2016.⁸⁴⁹ He is reported to have been living with his mother in Roxburgh Park, Melbourne.⁸⁵⁰

⁸³³ Ibid.

⁸³⁴ Davey, M., 'Focusing on Yacqub Khayre's parole may look 'tough on crime' but it misses the point', *The Guardian*, 8 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/jun/08/focussing-on-yacqub-khayres-parole-may-look-tough-on-but-it-misses-the-point>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁸³⁵ Doherty, B., 'Yacqub Khayre: Melbourne siege gunman's history of violent crime and drugs', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017; Milovanovic, S., 'An uncle's regret: a flight from Somalia gone wrong', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 August 2009, available at: <http://www.smh.com.au/national/an-uncle's-regret-a-flight-from-somalia-gone-wrong-20090805-ea2y.html>, last visited: 18 July 2018.

⁸³⁶ Rintoul, S., 'Two cleared but three convicted over army base terror attack plan', *The Australian*, 23 December 2010, available at: <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/two-cleared-but-three-convicted-over-army-base-terror-attack-plan/news-story/06921bd333ba0ad2c4eb445a42a7c7fc?sv=545fed2beed20fa1898875a4e0b6521d>, last visited: 19 July 2018.

⁸³⁷ Doherty, B., 'Yacqub Khayre: Melbourne siege gunman's history of violent crime and drugs', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017.

⁸³⁸ Davey, M., 'Focusing on Yacqub Khayre's parole may look 'tough on crime' but it misses the point', *The Guardian*, 8 June 2017.

⁸³⁹ Doherty, B., 'Yacqub Khayre: Melbourne siege gunman's history of violent crime and drugs', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017.

⁸⁴⁰ Knaus, C., 'Melbourne siege: Turnbull questions how Yacqub Khayre was on parole – live', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017.

⁸⁴¹ Ibid.

⁸⁴² Rintoul, S., 'Two cleared but three convicted over army base terror attack plan', *The Australian*, 23 December 2010.

⁸⁴³ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁵ Doherty, B., 'Yacqub Khayre: Melbourne siege gunman's history of violent crime and drugs', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017.

⁸⁴⁶ Davey, M., 'Focusing on Yacqub Khayre's parole may look 'tough on crime' but it misses the point', *The Guardian*, 8 June 2017.

⁸⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁸ Knaus, C., 'Melbourne siege: Turnbull questions how Yacqub Khayre was on parole – live', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017.

⁸⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁰ Ibid.

The day following the attack, the police stated that they were treating the hostage incident as an act of terrorism but were not able to confirm whether Islamic State had been directly involved in Yacqub Khayre's adoption of radical beliefs or in directing the attack itself.⁸⁵¹ However, the police later confirmed that they believed that the assailant had been acting alone,⁸⁵² with Victoria's police commissioner telling press that despite Khayre's involvement in general criminal activity, there was nothing recent that had flagged him up as a major concern to the intelligence services.⁸⁵³ The police commissioner also speculated about whether or not Khayre's plan had been to ambush the police.⁸⁵⁴ A month prior to the incident, the Islamic State magazine *Rumiyah* had incited its readers to take hostages into buildings and murder them to attract police in order to attack them, which conceivably Khayre could have been inspired to do.⁸⁵⁵ Later, Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack.⁸⁵⁶ In a statement released on the Amaq News Agency, Islamic State announced, "The attack in Melbourne, Australia, was carried out by a soldier of the Islamic State in response to the call for targeting the subjects of the coalition states."⁸⁵⁷ However, police expressed doubt about the validity of the claims, owing to the fact that Khayre had expressed allegiance to both Islamic State and Al Qaeda.⁸⁵⁸

The attack has raised questions about the strength of Australia's parole system. However, the Victoria premier Daniel Andrews said that Khayre had been compliant with his parole conditions up to the point of the attack.⁸⁵⁹

35. Notre Dame Hammer Attack

The Attack

Date: 6 June 2017

Day: Tuesday

Time: 4.30 pm

Country: France

Place: Paris

Area Type: City Centre - Landmark

Location: Church - Exterior

Type of Attack: Hammer

Target: Police

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State - Inspired

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 1

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Shot & Arrested

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

⁸⁵¹ 'Knaus, C. and Davey, M., 'Isis claims responsibility for Melbourne siege that left two people dead', *The Guardian*, 5 June 2017.

⁸⁵² Knaus, C., 'Melbourne siege: Turnbull questions how Yacqub Khayre was on parole - live', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017.

⁸⁵³ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁵ Doherty, B., 'Yacqub Khayre: Melbourne siege gunman's history of violent crime and drugs', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017.

⁸⁵⁶ 'Knaus, C. and Davey, M., 'Isis claims responsibility for Melbourne siege that left two people dead', *The Guardian*, 5 June 2017.

⁸⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁸ Knaus, C., 'Melbourne siege: Turnbull questions how Yacqub Khayre was on parole - live', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017.

⁸⁵⁹ Ibid.

Name: Farid Ikken
Age: 40
Country of Origin: Algeria
Nationality: Algerian
Resident: Paris
Training/Combat Experience: No
Known to Authorities: No
Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

At 4.30 pm on Tuesday 6 June, a man ran up behind three policemen patrolling outside Notre Dame Cathedral in central Paris and proceeded to use a hammer to attack one of the officers, taking his victim to the ground.⁸⁶⁰ As he carried out the attack the assailant was heard shouting, "This is for Syria."⁸⁶¹ One of the other officers shot the attacker, firing two bullets into the attacker's torso, disabling and arresting him before he was able to inflict any further injuries.⁸⁶² He was taken to hospital for treatment and described as being in a serious condition.⁸⁶³

It was subsequently discovered that the man had also been armed with kitchen knives.⁸⁶⁴ As a result of the attack, some 900 tourists and visitors were detained inside the cathedral for an hour.⁸⁶⁵

The assailant was identified as a 40-year-old Algerian man called Farid Ikken.⁸⁶⁶ The accused attacker appeared in court on 10 June and was charged with attempted murder of law enforcement officials and association with terrorists.⁸⁶⁷

Following the attack, a government spokesperson reported that Ikken had never previously shown any signs of radicalisation.⁸⁶⁸ However, investigators searching Ikken's home in the suburbs of northern Paris discovered a laptop and USB keys pointing to the assailant's process of adopting a pro-Islamic State position.⁸⁶⁹ Adding to speculation that Farid Ikken may have been encouraged to carry out his attack after seeing the events of the London Bridge attack three days earlier, a number of images from that attack were discovered on his electronic devices.⁸⁷⁰ There were similarly videos glorifying previous Islamist attacks in Paris and Brussels.⁸⁷¹ Giving further evidence that Ikken had been inspired by Islamic State, the devices contained an Islamic State manual issued specifically for lone actors, as well as a video message pledging allegiance to IS which Farid Ikken had recorded and unsuccessfully attempted to upload to social media

⁸⁶⁰ Willsher K., 'Paris police shoot man who attacked officer outside Notre-Dame Cathedral', *The Guardian*, 7 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/06/paris-police-shoot-man-who-attacked-officer-outside-notre-dame-cathedral>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁸⁶¹ Ibid.

⁸⁶² 'Notre Dame terror hammer attack on Paris police officers caught on film', *Sky News*, 8 June 2017, available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/notre-dame-terror-hammer-attack-on-paris-police-officers-caught-on-film-10908197>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁸⁶³ Bremmer C., 'Algerian student Farid Ikken in Notre-Dame attack left video pledging allegiance to Isis', *The Times*, 7 June 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/algerian-student-farid-ikken-in-notre-dame-attack-left-video-pledging-allegiance-to-isis-tv9hf9pg0>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁸⁶⁴ Willsher K., 'Paris police shoot man who attacked officer outside Notre-Dame Cathedral', *The Guardian*, 7 June 2017.

⁸⁶⁵ McLaughlin K., 'Revealed: Footage shows the moment ISIS-supporting Algerian student shouting 'this is for Syria' attacks French police with a hammer before being shot and wounded', *Daily Mail*, 7 June 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4579792/Footage-shows-student-attacking-French-police-hammer.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁸⁶⁶ Bremmer C., 'Algerian student Farid Ikken in Notre-Dame attack left video pledging allegiance to Isis', *The Times*, 7 June 2017.

⁸⁶⁷ 'Notre-Dame attack: Farid Ikken appears in Paris court', *BBC News*, 11 June 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40236305>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁸⁶⁸ Bremmer C., 'Algerian student Farid Ikken in Notre-Dame attack left video pledging allegiance to Isis', *The Times*, 7 June 2017.

⁸⁶⁹ 'Notre-Dame attack: Farid Ikken appears in Paris court', *BBC News*, 11 June 2017.

⁸⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁷¹ Ibid.

prior to carrying out his attack.⁸⁷² In that declaration of loyalty, Ikken had described himself as a “soldier of the caliphate”.⁸⁷³

While Islamic State did not claim the attack, a statement claiming to be issued by the “Commander of The Believers in France” addressed to the Christians of the country was issued on the day of the attack.⁸⁷⁴ That message warned, “O people of France, demand of your government to stop its campaign against the Islamic State, if not, we will conduct operations of invasion and horror as you have lived in the cities of Paris and Nice.”⁸⁷⁵ The message also signed itself as being from the “Soldiers of the Islamic State in France”.⁸⁷⁶

According to what Farid Ikken told investigators, he claimed he had radicalised himself over a period of ten months.⁸⁷⁷ He specifically identified the significance of accessing extremist content online in this process, but denied having had any contact with anyone else in this process.⁸⁷⁸ In his own explanation, he described himself as a Sunni Muslim who had “hardened” his religious practice over the previous ten months.⁸⁷⁹ Originally from Akbou in northern Algeria, Ikken was both a journalist and a PhD student studying communications and was described by the Paris prosecutor as essentially being a novice jihadist, having an atypical profile.⁸⁸⁰

Having been raised in a middle class family, Ikken had moved to Sweden in 2001⁸⁸¹ and worked there as a journalist in the 2000s.⁸⁸² During this period he earned a Master’s degree at Stockholm University and spent some time working in Norway, and he is reported to have married a Swedish woman whom he later divorced.⁸⁸³ During his time in Sweden, Ikken was awarded the EU’s National Journalist Prize Against Discrimination for his writing on the treatment of asylum seekers.⁸⁸⁴ Following the Arab Spring in 2011, Ikken returned to Algeria, where he worked for the national newspaper *Al Watan*.⁸⁸⁵ In 2013 he moved to France, where both his brother and cousin live,⁸⁸⁶ and began doctoral studies at Metz University.⁸⁸⁷

While the Paris prosecutor Francois Molins noted that Farid Ikken’s profile was atypical, it appears that he had displayed personality traits paralleled in the cases of other lone actor attackers. Notably, Molins had also described the suspect as socially and psychologically “isolated”.⁸⁸⁸ Similarly, family members who knew him in France spoke of Ikken as being “solitary, serious, discreet”.⁸⁸⁹ The assailant is understood to have originally come from a relatively irreligious family,

⁸⁷² Ibid.

⁸⁷³ ‘Notre Dame attacker radicalised over the internet, Paris prosecutor says’, *CBS News*, 10 June 2017, available at: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/internet-radicalized-notre-dame-attacker-paris-prosecutor-says/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁸⁷⁴ McLaughlin K. *et al.*, ‘Algerian Notre Dame terror attacker ‘was given an EU award for writing about discrimination against migrants when he was a journalist in Sweden’’, *Daily Mail*, 7 June 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4581672/Notre-Dame-terror-attacker-given-EU-award.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁸⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁶ McLaughlin K. *et al.*, ‘Algerian Notre Dame terror attacker ‘was given an EU award for writing about discrimination against migrants when he was a journalist in Sweden’’, *Daily Mail*, 7 June 2017.

⁸⁷⁷ ‘Notre-Dame attack: Farid Ikken appears in Paris court’, *BBC News*, 11 June 2017.

⁸⁷⁸ ‘Self-radicalised’ Notre Dame attacker charged with attempted murder’, *RFI*, 11 June 2017, available at: <http://en.rfi.fr/france/20170611-self-radicalised-notre-dame-attacker-charged-attempted-murder>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁸⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁰ ‘Notre-Dame attack: Farid Ikken appears in Paris court’, *BBC News*, 11 June 2017.

⁸⁸¹ ‘Notre Dame attacker radicalised over the internet, Paris prosecutor says’, *CBS News*, 10 June 2017.

⁸⁸² Bremmer C., ‘Algerian student Farid Ikken in Notre-Dame attack left video pledging allegiance to Isis’, *The Times*, 7 June 2017.

⁸⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁴ McLaughlin K. *et al.*, ‘Algerian Notre Dame terror attacker ‘was given an EU award for writing about discrimination against migrants when he was a journalist in Sweden’’, *Daily Mail*, 7 June 2017.

⁸⁸⁵ Bremmer C., ‘Algerian student Farid Ikken in Notre-Dame attack left video pledging allegiance to Isis’, *The Times*, 7 June 2017.

⁸⁸⁶ ‘Notre Dame attacker radicalised over the internet, Paris prosecutor says’, *CBS News*, 10 June 2017.

⁸⁸⁷ Bremmer C., ‘Algerian student Farid Ikken in Notre-Dame attack left video pledging allegiance to Isis’, *The Times*, 7 June 2017.

⁸⁸⁸ ‘Notre Dame attacker radicalised over the internet, Paris prosecutor says’, *CBS News*, 10 June 2017.

⁸⁸⁹ Ibid.

and although Ikken claimed that he had adopted a “quite radical” form of religious observance in the period directly prior to carrying out the attack, the assailant’s nephew has suggested that the man first became interested in religion during his time in Sweden.⁸⁹⁰ A number of his acquaintances stressed that not only had he not shown signs of adopting Islamist extremism, but that he had also been an advocate of Western democratic values and an opponent of jihadism.⁸⁹¹ However, this alleged opposition to groups such as Islamic State reportedly included the potentially extremist and conspiratorial belief that the group’s self-appointed Caliph, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, was in fact merely a creation of the West.⁸⁹²

36. Turin Letter Bombs

The Attack

Date: 7 June 2017

Day: Wednesday

Time: 12.00 am

Country: Italy

Place: Turin

Area Type: City Centre – Commercial & Residential

Location: Court Building – Interior

Type of Attack: Foiled Bombing

Target: Civilian – Legal

Ideology: Far Left

Organisation/Affiliation: Informal Anarchic Federation – Directed

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Not Apprehended

The Assailants

Number: Unknown

Gender: Unknown

Name: Unknown

Age: Unknown

Country of Origin: Unknown

Nationality: Unknown

Resident: Unknown

Training/Combat Experience: Unknown

Known to Authorities: Unknown

Current Status: At Large

NOTES:

On Wednesday 7 June, security officials at the Palace of Justice court buildings in the Italian city of Turin intercepted two letter bombs addressed to the judges Roberto Sparagna and Antonio Rinaudo.⁸⁹³ The envelopes were detected in an area used for sorting correspondence

⁸⁹⁰ Bremmer C., ‘Algerian student Farid Ikken in Notre-Dame attack left video pledging allegiance to Isis’, *The Times*, 7 June 2017.

⁸⁹¹ Ibid.

⁸⁹² Ibid.

⁸⁹³ Griseri, P., ‘Lettere-bomba ai pm di Torino, la minaccia degli anarchici: ‘Sarà un giugno molto pericoloso’’, *Repubblica*, 8 June 2017, available at: http://torino.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/06/08/news/lettere-bomba_ai_pm_di_torino_la_minaccia_degli_anarchici_sara_un_giugno_molto_pericoloso_-167616167/, last visited: 17 August 2018.

and security agents quickly recognised them as being highly suspicious.⁸⁹⁴ The discovery caused a public evacuation of the courthouse during an emergency period which lasted for approximately one hour while a bomb disposal team responded to the discovery.⁸⁹⁵ The devices are understood to have been viable and were judged to have posed a serious danger.⁸⁹⁶ The explosive parcels were not found to contain any message and had been assembled using a form of gunpowder, electric wires and batteries.⁸⁹⁷

Both judges targeted were in the course of dealing with trials relating to a Turin-based anarchist cell as well as individuals associated with the so-called No Tav movement, which has opposed the construction of a high-speed railway through Italy's Susa Valley.⁸⁹⁸ Some in the No Tav movement had been involved in violent clashes⁸⁹⁹ as part of demonstrations against the high-speed rail construction.⁹⁰⁰ This appears to have led to some speculation that the packages could have been linked to this issue.

In September 2016, the Informal Anarchist Federation (Federazione Anarchica Informale) had threatened attacks, targeting those involved in prosecuting cases against seven of their members, including the cell named after the female anarchist leader known as "Olga".⁹⁰¹ In a statement at the time, the group specifically referred to Justice Roberto Sparagna as a target and said, "Solidarity as we understand it is what you do, continue to carry out the attacks and practices for which the comrades were arrested."⁹⁰² The statement went on to say, "We want to reiterate, again and again, that the revolutionary violence of direct destructive action is a practice that becomes necessary. As anarchists, every single action by our comrades belongs to us; it belongs to us and is the patrimony of the whole anarchist movement."⁹⁰³

The Informal Anarchist Federation subsequently claimed the attempted bombing, stating, "It is a real joy to see the blasting of barracks, courts, all representatives of power ... the system and its structures are not abstract and those responsible have names and surnames that are easily identifiable."⁹⁰⁴ It has been suggested that the envelopes had been sent by a softer faction of the anarchist groups, which may have been attempting to win acceptance from a number of more-established anarchist organisations.⁹⁰⁵ The packages appeared to have been posted from Genoa and gave the names of lawyers as senders.⁹⁰⁶ The Informal Anarchist Federation is believed to be closely associated with the Conspiracy Cells of Fire group in Greece.⁹⁰⁷

⁸⁹⁴ 'Buste bomba al tribunale di Torino, pesanti minacce al pm durante 'Scripta manent'', *La Stampa*, 8 June 2017 available at: <http://www.lastampa.it/2017/06/08/cronaca/buste-bomba-al-tribunale-di-torino-le-minacce-al-pm-durante-il-processo-scripta-manent-ismRMXIGPkxUftjg9lpmoO/pagina.html>, last visited: 17 August 2018.

⁸⁹⁵ Cravero, F. and Contaldo, A., 'Allarme bomba al tribunale di Torino, buste esplosive ai pm Rinaudo e Sparagna: "Potevano esplodere"', *Repubblica*, 7 June 2017, available at: http://torino.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/06/07/news/allarme_bomba_al_tribunale_di_torino_borse_sospette_indirizzate_ai_pm_rinaudo_e_sparagna-167479834/, last visited: 17 August 2018.

⁸⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁷ Griseri, P., "Lettere-bomba ai pm di Torino, la minaccia degli anarchici: 'Sarà un giugno molto pericoloso'", *Repubblica*, 8 June 2017.

⁸⁹⁸ Cravero, F. and Contaldo, A., 'Allarme bomba al tribunale di Torino, buste esplosive ai pm Rinaudo e Sparagna: "Potevano esplodere"', *Repubblica*, 7 June 2017.

⁸⁹⁹ Ghiglione, G., 'After 20-year battle, protests over Italian high-speed train derail', *The Christian Science Monitor*, 25 July 2015, available at: <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2012/0725/After-20-year-battle-protests-over-Italian-high-speed-train-derail>, last visited: 17 August 2018.

⁹⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁰¹ Ricca, J. 'Torino, gli anarchici promettono nuovi attacchi e mettono nel mirino il pm che indaga', *Torino*, 9 September 2016, available at: http://torino.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/09/09/news/gli_anarchici_promettono_nuovi_attacchi_e_mettono_nel_mirino_il_pm_che_indaga-147457042/, last visited: 17 August 2018.

⁹⁰² Ibid.

⁹⁰³ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁴ Numa, M., "Due ordigni inviati ai magistrati al Palagiustizia di Torino. La firma è degli 'anarchici informali'", *La Stampa*, visited: January 22, 2018, <http://www.lastampa.it/2017/06/07/cronaca/le-firme-degli-anarchici-informali-sullordigno-inviato-ai-magistrati-di-torino-SbrtF5XlicS20DzXsXVqkN/pagina.html>, last visited: 17 August 2018.

⁹⁰⁵ Genta, F. And Numa, M., "Bomba a due magistrati, allarme a Torino", *La Stampa*, visited: January 22, 2018, <http://www.lastampa.it/2017/06/08/italia/cronache/bomba-a-due-magistrati-allarme-a-torino-UySV4WPec57kC5O5GWPVKM/pagina.html>, last visited: 17 August 2018.

⁹⁰⁶ Cravero, F. and Contaldo, A., 'Allarme bomba al tribunale di Torino, buste esplosive ai pm Rinaudo e Sparagna: "Potevano esplodere"', *Repubblica*, 7 June 2017.

⁹⁰⁷ 'Italy: Authorities have identified and destroyed two envelopes with explosives', *CNN*, 7 June 2017, available at: <http://www.cnn.gr/news/kosmos/story/83893/italia-oi-arxes-entopisan-kai-exoydeterosan-dyo-fakeloy-s-me-ekriktika>, last visited: 17 August 2018.

37. Alexandria Baseball Park Shooting

The Attack

Date: 14 June 2017

Day: Wednesday

Time: 7.00 am

Country: United States of America

Place: Alexandria

Area Type: Suburban – Recreational

Location: Sports Ground – Interior

Type of Attack: Shooting

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Political)

Ideology: Far Left

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor

Claimed: NA

Number of Injured: 5

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Shot Dead

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: James T. Hodgkinson

Age: 66

Country of Origin: United States of America

Nationality: American

Resident: Belleville

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Dead

NOTES:

Shortly after 7.00 am on the morning of 14 June, a gunman shot Republican congressman Steve Scalise and four other individuals at a baseball park in Alexandria, Virginia, just outside Washington DC.⁹⁰⁸ Steve Scalise serves as the House Majority Whip and representative for the first congressional district of Louisiana.⁹⁰⁹ Congressman Scalise and other Republican members of Congress had been practising at the Eugene Simpson Stadium Park in preparation for an annual congressional baseball game due to take place the following day.⁹¹⁰

On the morning of the shooting, at 6.23 am and again at 6.35 am, the man identified as the assailant entered the YMCA building across the street from the baseball park and accessed a storage unit he used in the building, and it is suspected that this is where he had been keeping his firearms.⁹¹¹ The man had then parked his van across from the Simpson Field, in sight of the practising team, and at just after 7.00 am he approached two individuals leaving the practice

⁹⁰⁸ Porter, B., 'Simpson Field Shooting – June 14, 2017', Office of the Commonwealth's Attorney – City of Alexandria (2017), available at: <https://www.alexandriava.gov/uploadedFiles/commattorney/info/17-001%20-%20Simpson%20Field%20Shooting%20-%20FINAL%2010.06.17.pdf>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

⁹⁰⁹ *Congressman Steve Scalise*, available at: <https://scalise.house.gov/>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

⁹¹⁰ Shortell, D., 'Congressional baseball shooter fired at least 70 rounds, cased area for months', *CNN*, 6 October 2017, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/06/politics/congressional-shooter-70-rounds/index.html>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

⁹¹¹ Porter, B., 'Simpson Field Shooting – June 14, 2017', Office of the Commonwealth's Attorney – City of Alexandria (2017).

and questioned them about whether it was the Republican or Democrat team playing.⁹¹² Having confirmed that the team practising was Republican, the attacker collected an assault rifle and a pistol from his van and approached the field, where between 20 and 25 people were taking part in the practice—and positioning himself by a gate on the edge of the field, he used the rifle to fire a single round towards the players.⁹¹³

After the gunman had opened fire the first time, two US Capitol Police Officers assigned to protecting the congressmen came onto the field, and at 7.09 am an emergency call was made to the Alexandria police.⁹¹⁴ As the gunman continued to shoot, the first person injured was Congressman Scalise, who was hit in the hip by a bullet, while a lobbyist and former Republican staffer was then hit in the chest.⁹¹⁵ A congressional assistant in the middle of the field was one of those who dropped to the ground for safety when the shooting began; however, he was hit in his lower leg by a bullet.⁹¹⁶ One of the Capitol Police Officers began to return fire, at which point the gunman changed position, but then he continued to fire at the two members of security, during this shootout one of the officers was hit by a bullet to his leg.⁹¹⁷ Members of the Alexandria police arrived at 7.12 am and the assailant began firing at them also, switching from his assault rifle to his pistol. During this period the assailant was shot, first in the chest then in the hip, and was knocked off balance.⁹¹⁸ While engaging the assailant, the officers shouted at him to “get on the ground”, the assailant ignored these commands and continued to fire at the officers.⁹¹⁹ Shortly after this, the assailant was arrested and, despite the efforts of the officers and medics on the scene, later died of his injuries.⁹²⁰

After the assailant was shot, more information about his identity became clear. The man was James T. “Tom” Hodgkinson, a 66-year-old resident of Illinois.⁹²¹ He was married with children and owned a home inspection business; however, towards the end of 2016 he had been experiencing some financial difficulties and he dissolved his business in January 2017.⁹²² An official report into the attack produced by the City of Alexandria provides some indication as to what Hodgkinson’s motive may have been. As the report notes, Hodgkinson had extremely strong political views and was particularly aggrieved by the 2016 presidential election.⁹²³ In February 2017, he had posted online saying, “Republicans are the Taliban of the USA,” and had previously called for all Republicans to be voted out of Congress.⁹²⁴ Indeed, it has been reported that he spent a significant amount of time on social media expressing his political views, including his strong support for the left-wing Democrat politician Bernie Sanders during his campaign for the leadership of the party.⁹²⁵ Hodgkinson’s Facebook activity going back to 2012 was nearly exclusively concerned with promoting left-wing political causes.⁹²⁶

⁹¹² Ibid.

⁹¹³ Ibid.

⁹¹⁴ Almsy, S., ‘Police radio: ‘I still have shots being fired’’, *CNN*, 15 June 2017, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/15/politics/alexandria-emergency-dispatch-gop-shooting/index.html>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

⁹¹⁵ Porter, B., ‘Simpson Field Shooting – June 14, 2017’, Office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney – City of Alexandria (2017).

⁹¹⁶ Ibid.

⁹¹⁷ Ibid.

⁹¹⁸ Ibid.

⁹¹⁹ Ibid.

⁹²⁰ Ibid.

⁹²¹ ‘Gunman dead after attacking congressmen at Virginia baseball field’, *BBC News*, 15 June 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-40275055>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

⁹²² Laughland, O. and Swaine, J., ‘Virginia shooting: gunman was leftwing activist with record of domestic violence’, *The Guardian*, 15 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/14/virginia-shooting-suspect-james-t-hodgkinson-leftwing-activist>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

⁹²³ Porter, B., ‘Simpson Field Shooting – June 14, 2017’, Office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney – City of Alexandria (2017).

⁹²⁴ Pagliery, J., ‘Suspect in congressional shooting was Bernie Sanders supporter, strongly anti-Trump’, *CNN*, 15 June 2017, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/14/homepage2/james-hodgkinson-profile/index.html>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

⁹²⁵ Porter, B., ‘Simpson Field Shooting – June 14, 2017’, Office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney – City of Alexandria (2017).

⁹²⁶ Pagliery, J., ‘Suspect in congressional shooting was Bernie Sanders supporter, strongly anti-Trump’, *CNN*, 15 June 2017.

Hodgkinson is not believed to have had any ties to a terrorist group or other extremist groups, although his extreme hostility to Republicans was evidenced on numerous occasions, not least when, prior to carrying out his attack, he asked whether the baseball practice was a Democrat or Republican one.⁹²⁷ Months prior to the attack, Hodgkinson had written on social media, “Trump is a Traitor. Trump Has Destroyed Our Democracy. It’s Time to Destroy Trump & Co.”⁹²⁸

Those who knew Hodgkinson described him as “hot-tempered”.⁹²⁹ He had a history of alcoholism⁹³⁰ and domestic violence.⁹³¹ In 2006 he had been arrested for domestic battery and discharge of a firearm after reportedly attacking his foster daughter and two of her friends.⁹³²

In March 2017, Hodgkinson had left his home in Belleville in southern Illinois and since that time had been living out of a white van close to the baseball park in Alexandria where the shooting took place.⁹³³ He was often seen using a computer at the nearby YMCA building, and many of those who saw him regularly assumed that he was homeless.⁹³⁴ These factors would seem to raise some questions about precisely how far in advance Hodgkinson had been intending to carry out his attack, as well as the possibility of there being some low level mental health issues in this case.

38. Finsbury Park Mosque Attack

The Attack

Date: 19 June 2017

Day: Monday

Time: 00.15 am

Country: United Kingdom

Place: London

Area Type: Suburban – Commercial

Location: Mosque – Exterior

Type of Attack: Vehicular

Target: Civilian - Targeted (Anti-Muslim)

Ideology: Far Right

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor

Claimed: NA

Number of Injured: 9

Number of Fatalities: 1

Response: Arrested

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

⁹²⁷ Porter, B., ‘Simpson Field Shooting – June 14, 2017’, Office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney – City of Alexandria (2017).

⁹²⁸ Pagliery, J., ‘Suspect in congressional shooting was Bernie Sanders supporter, strongly anti-Trump’, *CNN*, 15 June 2017.

⁹²⁹ Porter, B., ‘Simpson Field Shooting – June 14, 2017’, Office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney – City of Alexandria (2017).

⁹³⁰ Sheth, S., ‘The congressional baseball shooter was reportedly an abusive alcoholic in a volatile home’, *Business Insider UK*, 19 June 2017, available at: <http://uk.businessinsider.com/james-hodgkinson-congressional-baseball-shooter-abusive-alcoholic-2017-6>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

⁹³¹ Laughland, O. and Swaine, J., ‘Virginia shooting: gunman was leftwing activist with record of domestic violence’, *The Guardian*, 15 June 2017.

⁹³² Ibid.

⁹³³ Porter, B., ‘Simpson Field Shooting – June 14, 2017’, Office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney – City of Alexandria (2017).

⁹³⁴ Finley, B. and Durkin Richer, A., ‘James T. Hodgkinson, the Alexandria shooter, was living in van, called a ‘loner’’, *The Star*, 15 June 2017, available at: <https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2017/06/15/james-t-hodgkinson-the-alexandria-shooter-was-living-in-van-called-a-loner.html>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

Name: Darren Osborne
Age: 47
Country of Origin: United Kingdom
Nationality: British
Resident: Cardiff
Training/Combat Experience: No
Known to Authorities: No
Current Status: Sentenced - Life

NOTES:

On 19 June 2017 at 00:15, one person was killed and nine were injured when a van was deliberately driven into a group of pedestrians in Finsbury Park, north London.⁹³⁵ The attack happened as the assailant accelerated the van, crossing a carriageway and driving directly into the group, stopping only when the vehicle hit bollards.⁹³⁶ Those hit were worshippers gathered outside the Finsbury Park Mosque and Muslim Welfare House, following the nightly Taraweed prayers during Ramadan.⁹³⁷ At the time of the attack, the group had gathered around a 52-year-old man who had been experiencing chest pains and was lying on the ground.⁹³⁸ As the attack took place during Ramadan, many in the group were wearing traditional white gowns,⁹³⁹ and would have been easily identifiable as Muslim worshippers.

An eyewitness reported that as the assailant emerged from the van he said, "I want to kill Muslims."⁹⁴⁰ Others reported that he said, "You deserve it... I did my bit."⁹⁴¹ Soon after exiting the vehicle he was surrounded by individuals from the crowd he had targeted, who then started kicking and punching him.⁹⁴² The Mosque's Imam, Mohamed Mahmoud, stepped in to stop this.⁹⁴³ Emergency services were called in at 00:20; the first police van arrived within one minute and the area was cordoned off in ten minutes.⁹⁴⁴ Within eight minutes of the first emergency call to police, the attack had been declared a terrorist incident.⁹⁴⁵ A team of 60 medics, made up of ground ambulance services, London Air Ambulance, paramedics, specialist response teams and a trauma team, all arrived at the scene to aid the injured.⁹⁴⁶ Nine people were taken to three different hospitals in London; some were in a critical condition.⁹⁴⁷ There was one fatality and all of the victims were Muslim.⁹⁴⁸

The assailant was apprehended and arrested as soon as the police arrived, and was initially taken in for a mental health assessment⁹⁴⁹ before being charged with murder and attempted

⁹³⁵ 'Finsbury Park attack: What we know so far', *BBC News*, 19 June 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40323769>, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁹³⁶ 'Darren Osborne guilty of Finsbury Park mosque murder', *BBC News*, 1 February 2018, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42910051>, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁹³⁷ Evans, M., Singh, A. and Telford, L., 'Terror suspect ploughs into Muslims before yelling: "You deserve it... I did my bit"', *The Telegraph*, 19 June 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/19/terror-suspect-ploughs-muslims-yelling-deserve-iti-did-bit/>, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁹³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴⁰ 'Finsbury Park attack: What we know so far', *BBC News*, 19 June 2017.

⁹⁴¹ Boyle, D., Graham, C., Millward, D., 'Finsbury Park Mosque attack latest: Theresa May vows hatred and evil will never succeed as Labour warns of rise in Islamophobia', *The Telegraph*, 20 June 2017, available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/19/finsbury-park-mosque-latest-terror-attack-london-live/, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁹⁴² Dearden, L., 'Finsbury Park attack: Imam tells court how he stopped angry crowd taking 'vengeance' on Darren Osborne', *The Independent*, 24 January 2018, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/finsbury-park-attack-latest-updates-darren-osborne-imam-name-crowd-violence-stop-court-trial-a8176406.html>, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁹⁴³ Evans, M., Singh, A. and Telford, L., 'Terror suspect ploughs into Muslims before yelling: "You deserve it... I did my bit"', *The Telegraph*, 19 June 2017; 'Finsbury Park attack: What we know so far', *BBC News*, 19 June 2017.

⁹⁴⁴ 'Finsbury Park attack: What we know so far', *BBC News*, 19 June 2017.

⁹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴⁹ Evans, M., Singh, A. and Telford, L., 'Terror suspect ploughs into Muslims before yelling: "You deserve it... I did my bit"', *The Telegraph*, 19 June 2017.

murder.⁹⁵⁰ The assailant was identified as Darren Osborne, a 47-year-old resident of Cardiff since 2006.⁹⁵¹ He had a long history of convictions, having appeared before courts 33 times previously for 102 different offences.⁹⁵² His previous convictions include public disorder and assault of a police officer.⁹⁵³ However he was not known to British security services in connection with far-right extremism prior to this attack.⁹⁵⁴

Darren Osborne is a British Citizen born to British parents in Singapore in 1969.⁹⁵⁵ However, Osborne grew up in Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire before moving to Weston-Super-Mare in Somerset.⁹⁵⁶ There he attended Broadoak Mathematics and Computing College.⁹⁵⁷ In 2006 he moved to Cardiff, where he lived with his partner and four children.⁹⁵⁸ It is reported that Osborne had not been employed in the past ten years.⁹⁵⁹ He had a history of mental health issues and had been prescribed antidepressants, with his partner of 20 years describing him as a “loner and a functioning alcoholic”.⁹⁶⁰ Along with his previous convictions, he had been ordered to undergo community rehabilitation, but had often ignored this.⁹⁶¹ He had also previously been referred to a specialist NHS centre in Cardiff for drug and alcohol misuse.⁹⁶² In the weeks prior to the attack Osborne had threatened to kill himself.⁹⁶³

Until a few weeks before the attack, however, Osborne was not known to have held extreme views, with Muslim neighbours describing him as previously friendly.⁹⁶⁴ The assailant’s sister claimed that he was not political and that she had never heard him say anything about Muslims.⁹⁶⁵ Following his arrest, police found an apparent suicide letter in the van, in which Osborne particularly focussed on the 2017 Manchester and London attacks, as well as referencing the Islamist-linked Al Qud’s Day march which had been taking place in London on the day of his attack.⁹⁶⁶ In his letter, Osborne called Muslims “rapists” and “feral”, and wrote that Muslim men are “preying on our children”.⁹⁶⁷

It became evident that Osborne expected to be shot at the scene, as had happened during the London Bridge attack.⁹⁶⁸ Shortly after the attack he reportedly said, “I’ve done my job, you

⁹⁵⁰ Dodd, V. and Ross, A., ‘Darren Osborne charged with murder over Finsbury Park van attack’, *The Guardian*, 23 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/23/darren-osborne-charged-with-terrorism-related-murder-over-finsbury-park-van-attack>, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁹⁵¹ Anderson Q.C., D., ‘Attacks in London and Manchester’, David Anderson QC (2017).

⁹⁵² ‘Finsbury Park attacker Darren Osborne jailed for minimum of 43 years’, *BBC News*, 2 February 2018, available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42920929, last visited: 10 August 2017.

⁹⁵³ *R v Darren Osborne*, Woolwich Crown Court (2018), available at: <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/r-v-osborne-sentencing-remarks.pdf>, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁹⁵⁴ ‘Finsbury Park attack: What we know so far’, *BBC News*, 19 June 2017.

⁹⁵⁵ Anderson, D., ‘Attacks in London and Manchester: March-June 2017’, Independent Assessment of MI5 and Police Internal Reviews by David Anderson, December 2017.

⁹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵⁷ Ward, V., Evans, M. and Furness, H., ‘Who is Darren Osborne? Everything we know about the Finsbury Park mosque suspect’, *The Telegraph*, 21 June 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/darren-osborne-everything-know-finsbury-park-mosque-suspect/>, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵⁹ *R v Darren Osborne*, Woolwich Crown Court (2018).

⁹⁶⁰ ‘Darren Osborne guilty of Finsbury Park mosque murder’, *BBC News*, 1 February 2018.

⁹⁶¹ *R v Darren Osborne*, Woolwich Crown Court (2018).

⁹⁶² Casciani, D., ‘Finsbury Park: What led Darren Osborne to kill?’, *BBC News*, 1 February 2018, available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42886464, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁹⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶⁴ Boyle, D., Graham, C., Millward, D., ‘Finsbury Park Mosque attack latest: Theresa May vows hatred and evil will never succeed as Labour warns of rise in Islamophobia’, *The Telegraph*, 20 June 2017.

⁹⁶⁵ O’Mahony, D., ‘Sister of Finsbury Park terror suspect Darren Osborne: ‘I’ve never heard him say anything about Muslims or anything racist’’, *Evening Standard*, 20 June 2017, available at: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/sister-of-finsbury-park-terror-suspect-what-happened-is-terrible-i-think-im-in-shock-a3568556.html>, last visited: 10 August 2018.

⁹⁶⁶ ‘What did Darren Osborne write in his ‘hate letter’?’, *Daily Mail*, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/fb-5303995/What-did-Darren-Osborne-write-hate-letter.html>, last visited: 14 August 2018.

⁹⁶⁷ ‘Finsbury Park attacker Darren Osborne jailed for minimum of 43 years’, *BBC News*, 2 February 2018; ‘Darren Osborne guilty of Finsbury Park mosque murder’, *BBC News*, 1 February 2018.

⁹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

can kill me now.”⁹⁶⁹ The contents of Osborne’s note combined with the timing of the attack – coming after three Islamist terror attacks in the UK – as well as the vehicular nature of the attack, which could be seen as mimicking the Westminster and London Bridge attacks, does suggest the attacker may have seen his act as a form of reprisal. In particular, it has been reported that following the London Bridge attack Osborne became increasingly hostile toward Muslims, and allegedly insulted his Asian neighbour’s 12-year-old son.⁹⁷⁰

Osborne’s move into far-right extremism is thought to have been a relatively rapid one. Some observers have suggested that May 2017 was a particularly significant point for his change in worldview, when he had watched a BBC television programme about a group of British-Pakistani Muslim men sexually abusing young girls – most of whom were white – in Rochdale.⁹⁷¹ It is reported that after this Osborne had become obsessed with Muslims and Islamist-related terrorism.⁹⁷² At this point he created a Twitter account and began to follow Tommy Robinson, the founder of the English Defence League (EDL), and he also researched the far-right group Britain First.⁹⁷³ The head of counter-terrorism at the Metropolitan Police, Commander Dean Haydon, suggested that Osborne’s online activities “played a major role in what happened”,⁹⁷⁴ and in her sentencing remarks, Justice Cheema Grubb expressed the belief that he had been “rapidly radicalised” via the internet.⁹⁷⁵

In the days before attacking the Finsbury Park Mosque, Osborne hired a van from Citroen in Cardiff and drove it to London.⁹⁷⁶ It is believed that initially Osborne had intended to attack the Al Qud’s Day march on 18 June,⁹⁷⁷ believing that he would be able to strike down the Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, but he was unable to access the march owing to security obstructions.⁹⁷⁸ During his trial, Osborne told the court that had he been able to kill Sadiq Khan, London’s Muslim mayor, that “would have been like winning the lottery”.⁹⁷⁹ Having failed to reach the march, he then spent the evening driving around London, and at around 8.00 pm asked a passer-by in south London’s Forest Hill where the nearest mosque was.⁹⁸⁰

During the initial stage of the trial, which began on 22 January 2018 and lasted nine days, Osborne made a last-ditch attempt to divert the blame, arguing that a “guy called Dave” had been driving the van.⁹⁸¹ Osborne said he, Dave and Terry had met at a pub in Treforest near Cardiff to discuss terrorism, and they had talked about forming a Welsh Far Right group, Taffia.⁹⁸²

⁹⁶⁹ *R v Darren Osborne*, Woolwich Crown Court (2018), para.7.

⁹⁷⁰ Boyle, D., Graham, C., Millward, D., ‘Finsbury Park Mosque attack latest: Theresa May vows hatred and evil will never succeed as Labour warns of rise in Islamophobia’, *The Telegraph*, 20 June 2017.

⁹⁷¹ Casciani, D., ‘Finsbury Park: What led Darren Osborne to kill?’, *BBC News*, 1 February 2018.

⁹⁷² Dearden, L., ‘Darren Osborne: How Finsbury Park terror attacker became ‘obsessed’ with Muslims in less than a month’, *The Independent*, 2 February 2018, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/darren-osborne-finsbury-park-attack-who-is-tommy-robinson-muslim-internet-britain-first-a8190316.html>, last visited: 14 August 2018.

⁹⁷³ Casciani, D., ‘Finsbury Park: What led Darren Osborne to kill?’, *BBC News*, 1 February 2018

⁹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷⁵ *R v Darren Osborne*, Woolwich Crown Court (2018), para.7.

⁹⁷⁶ Anderson, D., ‘Attacks in London and Manchester: March-June 2017’, Independent Assessment of MI5 and Police Internal Reviews by David Anderson, December 2017, p.1.

⁹⁷⁷ ‘Finsbury Park attacker Darren Osborne jailed for minimum of 43 years’, *BBC News*, 2 February 2018; ‘Darren Osborne guilty of Finsbury Park mosque murder’, *BBC News*, 1 February 2018.

⁹⁷⁸ Dearden, L., ‘Finsbury Park terror trial: Darren Osborne only targeted mosque after planned attack on Jeremy Corbyn failed, court hears’, *The Independent*, 30 January 2018, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/finsbury-park-terror-trial-latest-updates-darren-osborne-jeremy-corbyn-terror-attack-fail-a8185431.html>, last visited: 14 August 2018.

⁹⁷⁹ ‘Darren Osborne guilty of Finsbury Park mosque murder’, *BBC News*, 1 February 2018.

⁹⁸⁰ Dearden, L., ‘Finsbury Park terror suspect Darren Osborne read messages from Tommy Robinson days before attack, court hears’, *The Independent*, 23 January 2018, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/tommy-robinson-darren-osborne-messages-finsbury-park-attack-mosque-van-latest-court-trial-muslims-a8174086.html>, last visited: 14 August 2018.

⁹⁸¹ Dearden, L., ‘Finsbury Park terror trial: Darren Osborne ‘wanted to kill Jeremy Corbyn and Sadiq Khan’ ahead of attack, court hears’, *The Independent*, 30 January 2018, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/finsbury-park-terror-trial-latest-darren-osborne-wanted-to-kill-jeremy-corbyn-sadiq-khan-palestine-a8186061.html>, last visited: 15 August 2018.

⁹⁸² Wardle, S. and Crew, J., ‘Man accused of Finsbury Park van attack said he was planning to form ‘Welsh far-right group’’, *Wales Online*, 30 January 2018, available at: <https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/man-accused-finsbury-park-van-14223651>, last visited: 15 August 2018.

However, managers from the pub, The Pick and Shovel, said Osborne had only ever been there alone.⁹⁸³ Furthermore, Osborne had also previously said he was “flying solo”, suggesting he acted entirely alone.⁹⁸⁴ Soldier Callum Spence testified that, in the days before the attack, Osborne had made threats and comments against Muslims, such as, “Muslims are all terrorists,” and “I’m going to kill all Muslims.”⁹⁸⁵ Additionally, during the trial Osborne told the jury he had planned to “plough through as many of them as possible”, in reference to the Al Qud’s Day march.⁹⁸⁶ The jury took one hour to convict Osborne of murder and attempted murder, and on 2 February 2018 he was sentenced to life in prison with a 43-year minimum period of imprisonment.⁹⁸⁷

39. Champs- Élysées Car-Ramming

The Attack

Date: 19 June 2017

Day: Monday

Time: 3.40 pm

Country: France

Place: Paris

Area Type: City Centre – Landmark

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Vehicular

Target: Police

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: NA

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Djaziri Adam Lotfi

Age: 31

Country of Origin: France

Nationality: French

Resident: Paris

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Dead

NOTES:

At around 3.40 pm on Monday 19 June, the day after France’s parliamentary elections, an individual rammed his vehicle into a convoy of police vans as it made its way on to the

⁹⁸³ Dearden, L., ‘Finsbury Park terror trial: Darren Osborne ‘wanted to kill Jeremy Corbyn and Sadiq Khan’ ahead of attack, court hears’, *The Independent*, 30 January 2018.

⁹⁸⁴ *R v Darren Osborne*, Woolwich Crown Court (2018), para.7.

⁹⁸⁵ Wright, T., ‘Finsbury Park trial: Osborne wanted to ‘kill all Muslims’’, *Weston Mercury*, 24 January 2018, available at: <http://www.thewestonmercury.co.uk/news/court/darren-osborne-said-in-a-cardiff-bar-he-would-kill-all-muslims-woolwich-crown-court-is-told-1-5367366>, last visited: 15 August 2018.

⁹⁸⁶ *R v Darren Osborne*, Woolwich Crown Court (2018), para.1.

⁹⁸⁷ ‘Finsbury Park attacker Darren Osborne jailed for minimum of 43 years’, *BBC News*, 2 February 2018.

Champs-Élysées in central Paris.⁹⁸⁸ The assailant's vehicle hit a police van and instantly burst into flames, causing fatal injuries to the attacker.⁹⁸⁹ None of the police targeted were injured, however. Moments after the impact, the individual attempted to exit his car with a weapon in his hand, but then collapsed to the ground.⁹⁹⁰ In a conflicting account of events, a journalist for *Libération* newspaper, who was present at the time of the incident, described how the police responded by smashing the windows of the car and dragging the assailant out from the vehicle before other security officials used extinguishers to put out the flames inside the car.⁹⁹¹

The vehicle used in the attack was found to contain a number of weapons, including handguns, an AK-47 assault rifle and a large amount of ammunition, as well as two gas canisters.⁹⁹² French Interior Minister Gérard Collomb stated that there had been enough explosives in the vehicle to have blown up the car.⁹⁹³ Observers noted yellow smoke coming from the vehicle following the attack, leading to speculation that there had been explosives which had failed to properly detonate as intended.⁹⁹⁴ The man who carried out the attack was badly burned in the blast and died during the course of his attempt to carry out the attack.⁹⁹⁵ The assailant was identified as 31-year-old Djaziri Adam Lotfi, a resident of the Paris suburb Argenteuil.⁹⁹⁶ In the wake of the attack, the police arrested Lotfi's father, ex-wife, brother and sister-in-law.⁹⁹⁷ However, it does not appear to have been confirmed whether any of his family members had any role in planning the attack.

Lotfi was known to the authorities as an extremist and since 2015 had been listed on France's S File, indicating his status as a national security threat.⁹⁹⁸ However, he had no other record of criminal history.⁹⁹⁹ In a letter written to his brother-in-law prior to the attack, Lotfi swore allegiance to the Islamic State.¹⁰⁰⁰

Lotfi was born in France in 1985 to a Tunisian father and a Polish mother; with the family he grew up in having been described as a Salafist one.¹⁰⁰¹ In 2013, the Tunisian authorities had reported Lotfi to their French counterparts and also communicated with Interpol on account of his involvement with the terrorist group Ansar Al Sharia during his regular visits to the country.¹⁰⁰² It appears there had been heightened concerns about his extremist status in 2015

⁹⁸⁸ Henley, J., 'Champs Élysées: driver dead as car carrying firearms rams police van', *The Guardian*, 19 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/19/champs-elysees-sealed-off-car-hits-police-van-paris>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁹⁸⁹ Samuel, H., 'Explosive-laden car rams police van on Paris' Champs-Elysées in 'botched suicide attack', *The Telegraph*, 19 June 2017, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/19/police-operation-way-champs-elysees-paris/>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁹¹ Withnall, A. and Dearden, L., 'Champs-Élysées incident: Attacker dies after ramming police van with car carrying 'explosive device and guns'', *The Independent*, 19 June 2017, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/champs-elysees-evacuated-security-operation-paris-police-latest-updates-live-a7797601.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁹⁹² Henley, J., 'Champs Élysées: driver dead as car carrying firearms rams police van', *The Guardian*, 19 June 2017.

⁹⁹³ 'Champs-Elysees attack car 'had guns and gas' - Paris police', *BBC News*, 19 June 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40332532>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁹⁹⁴ Samuel, H., 'Explosive-laden car rams police van on Paris' Champs-Elysées in 'botched suicide attack', *The Telegraph*, 19 June 2017.

⁹⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁶ Henley J., 'Champs Élysées: driver dead as car carrying firearms rams police van', *The Guardian*, 19 June 2017.

⁹⁹⁷ Philippe, E., 'Champs Elysées, fonti vicine alle indagini: 'L'attentatore presto giuramento all'Isis'', *Repubblica*, 20 June 2017, available at: http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2017/06/20/news/champs_elyse_es_attentatore_arsenale-168625099/, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁹⁹⁸ Peron I., 'Champs-Élysées: se sachant surveillé, Adam Djaziri a-t-il précipité son attaque?', *L'Express*, 21 June 2017, available at: https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/fait-divers/champs-elysees-se-sachant-surveille-adam-djaziri-a-t-il-precipite-son-attaque_1920021.html, last visited: 4 September 2018.

⁹⁹⁹ Philippe, E., 'Champs Elysées, fonti vicine alle indagini: 'L'attentatore presto giuramento all'Isis'', *Repubblica*, 20 June 2017.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Jarry, E. and Lough, R., 'Champs Elysees attacker was Islamic State loyalist, on French watchlist', *Reuters*, 20 June 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-police/champs-elysees-attacker-was-islamic-state-loyalist-on-french-watchlist-idUSKBN19B1B8>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁰⁰¹ Philippe, E., 'Champs Elysées, fonti vicine alle indagini: 'L'attentatore presto giuramento all'Isis'', *Repubblica*, 20 June 2017.

¹⁰⁰² Ibid.

and 2016 when Lotfi took his wife and children on several trips to Turkey, although there was no evidence of any attempt having been made to cross the border into Syria.¹⁰⁰³ At the time of the attack, particular concerns had been raised about the fact that, despite his presence on the S File, Lotfi had still been able to renew his gun licence in the autumn of 2016.¹⁰⁰⁴

As part of surveillance efforts, counter-terror police had requested that Lotfi come in for questioning, but on the two occasions appointments had been arranged, Lotfi had failed to attend the meetings, claiming health problems.¹⁰⁰⁵ The second of the missed appointments had been booked for May, and, more significantly, a third had been booked for the same day on which the assailant perpetrated his attack.¹⁰⁰⁶ Just an hour after missing that appointment, Lotfi drove his weapons-packed vehicle into the convoy of police vans on the Champs-Élysées.¹⁰⁰⁷

In the letter that he had left for his family member, the attacker expressed his desire to go to Syria and stressed his resentment at being prevented from doing so.¹⁰⁰⁸ He also swore his allegiance to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.¹⁰⁰⁹ Islamic State, however, appears not to have commented on the incident, possibly because of the attack's failure to inflict any casualties other than on the attacker.¹⁰¹⁰

40. Brussels Central Station Attempted Bombing

The Attack

Date: 20 June 2017

Day: Tuesday

Time: 8.44 pm

Country: Belgium

Place: Brussels

Area Type: City Centre – Transport

Location: Train Station – Interior

Type of Attack: Attempted Bombing

Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Shot Dead

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

¹⁰⁰³ Peron, I., 'Champs-Élysées: se sachant surveillé, Adam Djaziri a-t-il précipité son attaque?', *L'Express*, 21 June 2017.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Deneux, M., 'Attaque des Champs-Élysées: Adam D. voulait 'faire de son véhicule un engin explosif'', *Le Figaro*, 22 June 2017, available at: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2017/06/22/01016-20170622ARTFIG00172-attaque-des-champs-elysees-la-famille-de-l-assailant-relachee.php>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Pham-Le, J., 'Champs-Elysées: Djaziri a preté allégeance a Daech dans une lettre', *L'Express*, 20 June 2017, available at: https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/champs-elysees-le-suspect-a-prete-allégeance-a-daech-dans-une-lettre_1919789.html, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁰¹⁰ Ibid.

Name: Oussama Zariouh
Age: 36
Country of Origin: Morocco
Nationality: Moroccan
Resident: Brussels
Training/Combat Experience: No
Known to Authorities: No
Current Status: Dead

NOTES:

On the evening of Tuesday 20 June, the central train station in Brussels suffered an attempted suicide bombing. However, the explosive device failed to detonate and the assailant was shot dead by a soldier on patrol in the station.

On the evening of the attack, the would-be attacker had taken a taxi to Veeweide Metro station in Anderlecht and from there had travelled on the subway to Brussels Central Station.¹⁰¹¹ The assailant was carrying a suitcase packed with explosives, gas canisters, nails and glass bottles.¹⁰¹² Arriving at Brussels Central Station at 8.39pm, the man passed through the ticketing hall and stood among a group of around 20 or 30 people who were gathered around a train announcement board in an area directly below the main concourse.¹⁰¹³ At 8.44pm, the attacker attempted to detonate the explosive device, causing the suitcase to catch fire but not to properly explode.¹⁰¹⁴

At this point the man then abandoned the suitcase and rushed towards the platforms, at which point the suitcase exploded for a second time, causing a larger blast but still failing to properly detonate as intended.¹⁰¹⁵ The attacker shouted to a station attendant that he wished to travel to La Chapelle station.¹⁰¹⁶ Unable to board that train, the attacker ran back to the area where he had originally detonated the device before charging towards a soldier and shouting, "Allahu Akbar."¹⁰¹⁷ The soldier opened fire and shot the assailant a number of times; the attacker subsequently died from his injuries.¹⁰¹⁸ The authorities did not immediately approach the man's body, owing to initial concerns that he might have been wearing a suicide vest, according to some witnesses, although this was later established not to be the case.¹⁰¹⁹

The attacker was later identified as Oussama Zariouh, a 36-year-old Moroccan man.¹⁰²⁰ A search of Zariouh's home revealed bomb-making materials as well as evidence to suggest that he was a supporter of Islamic State.¹⁰²¹ However, he was not previously known to the police in connection

¹⁰¹¹ 'Familie van terrorist Brussel-Centraal: 'Oussama had geen oog voor ISIS en was geen lid van terreurgroep'', *Nieuwsblad*, 22 June 2017, available at: https://www.nieuwsblad.be/cnt/dmf20170622_02936739, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁰¹² 'Four detained over failed Brussels Central Station attack', *Euronews*, 22 June 2017, available at: <http://www.euronews.com/2017/06/22/four-detained-over-failed-brussels-central-station-attack>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁰¹³ Waterfield, B., 'Foiled Brussels bomber Oussama Zariouh was an Isis sympathiser', *The Times*, 22 June 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/foiled-brussels-bomber-oussama-zariouh-was-an-isis-sympathiser-3vsbdwk0h>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁰¹⁴ Dearden, L., 'Brussels explosion: Prosecutors say major terror attack at station averted after bomb packed with nails fails', *The Independent*, 21 June 2017, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/brussels-central-station-explosion-bomb-attempted-terror-attack-latest-molenbeek-isis-allahu-akbar-a7800666.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁰¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹⁶ Waterfield, B., 'Foiled Brussels bomber Oussama Zariouh was an Isis sympathiser', *The Times*, 22 June 2017.

¹⁰¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹⁸ Dearden L., 'Brussels explosion: Prosecutors say major terror attack at station averted after bomb packed with nails fails', *The Independent*, 21 June 2017.

¹⁰¹⁹ 'Suspected suicide bomber shot at Brussels railway station', *BBC News*, 21 June 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40349654>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁰²⁰ Emmott, R. and Blenkinsop, P., 'Brussels station attacker was secretive loner', *Reuters*, 21 June 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-attacks-brussels-attacker/brussels-station-attacker-was-secretive-loner-idUSKBN19C2OA>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁰²¹ *Ibid.*

with Islamist extremism and had not been on any kind of counter-terror watch list.¹⁰²² The authorities reported that the materials found to have been used in the bomb were similar chemicals to those used in the Islamic State Brussels airport and Metro bombings in March 2016.¹⁰²³ Investigators believe that the explosive device used in the attack had been made in the assailant's home and that, although the bomb had been made with powerful triacetone triperoxide (TATP), poor preparation meant it had failed to properly detonate.¹⁰²⁴ This has been taken by some analysts as an indication that Zariouh was not receiving outside operational support or guidance.¹⁰²⁵

Oussama Zariouh was born and raised in the Moroccan coastal town of Nador.¹⁰²⁶ In 2002, he is thought to have graduated from Oujda University, close to his home town, and he had then come to Belgium shortly after this.¹⁰²⁷ He had also been married for a short period between 2004 and 2007.¹⁰²⁸ Zariouh is known to have been living in the neighbourhood of Molenbeek since 2013.¹⁰²⁹ While this area of Brussels has become notorious for its connection with jihadism, and particularly its use as a hideout for the Islamic State cell responsible for carrying out the Paris and Brussels attacks, Molenbeek's mayor has claimed that Zariouh actually lived in a more prosperous part of the neighbourhood, an area not associated with either deprivation or radicalism.¹⁰³⁰ Described as a self-employed fitter in a telephone shop,¹⁰³¹ Zariouh had an extensive criminal record, according to Belgian media, which included a series of drug and sex offences.¹⁰³² The attacker's father and sister, who still live in Nador in Morocco, claimed that he was neither a supporter of Islamic State nor a member of any terrorist group.¹⁰³³ They also claimed that there was an arrangement in place for Zariouh to come to Morocco to marry that summer.¹⁰³⁴

A Facebook account belonging to the attacker had not been updated for a year and so this has offered little indication of Zariouh's state of mind in the period immediately prior to the attack. However, the posts on his page featured a range of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, Islamic charitable appeals for causes in Morocco and Syria, as well as videos about Islamic prayer¹⁰³⁵ and doctrine.¹⁰³⁶ The profile also included some non-political posts, such as selfies and an interest in both Western and Middle Eastern popular music.¹⁰³⁷

There is limited indication of Zariouh's ideological leanings on account of how isolated he appears to have been, with those living in his neighbourhood claiming to have been unfamiliar

¹⁰²² Smith-Spark, L. *et al.*, 'Explosive TATP used in Brussels Central Station attack, initial exam shows', *CNN*, 21 June 2017, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/21/europe/brussels-train-station-attack/index.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁰²³ Emmott, R. and Blenkinsop, P., 'Brussels station attacker was secretive loner', *Reuters*, 21 June 2017.

¹⁰²⁴ Smith-Spark, L. *et al.*, 'Explosive TATP used in Brussels Central Station attack, initial exam shows', *CNN*, 21 June 2017.

¹⁰²⁵ Emmott, R. and Blenkinsop, P., 'Brussels station attacker was secretive loner', *Reuters*, 21 June 2017.

¹⁰²⁶ Waterfield, B., 'Foiled Brussels bomber Oussama Zariouh was an Isis sympathiser', *The Times*, 22 June 2017.

¹⁰²⁷ Blenkinsop, P. *et al.*, 'Brussels attacker may have supported Islamic State', *Reuters*, 20 June 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-attacks-brussels-idUSKBN19B2WK?il=0>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁰²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁰ Waterfield, B., 'Foiled Brussels bomber Oussama Zariouh was an Isis sympathiser', *The Times*, 22 June 2017.

¹⁰³¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³² Davies, G. *et al.*, 'The bomber shot dead during terror attack in Belgium was Moroccan 'sex offender' from jihadi ghetto Molenbeek: Fanatic screamed Allahu akbar and triggered explosion before being 'neutralised'', *Daily Mail*, 20 June 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4622952/Explosion-reported-Brussels-central-station.html>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁰³³ 'Familie van terrorist Brussel-Centraal: 'Oussama had geen oog voor ISIS en was geen lid van terreurgroep'', *Nieuwsblad*, 22 June 2017.

¹⁰³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁵ Waterfield, B., 'Foiled Brussels bomber Oussama Zariouh was an Isis sympathiser', *The Times*, 22 June 2017.

¹⁰³⁶ Dearden, L., 'Brussels explosion: Prosecutors say major terror attack at station averted after bomb packed with nails fails', *The Independent*, 21 June 2017.

¹⁰³⁷ 'Brussels Central Station suitcase bomber supported IS, prosecutors say', *ABC Net*, 22 June 2017, available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-22/brussels-central-station-bomber-supported-islamic-state/8641698>, last visited: 4 September 2018.

with him.¹⁰³⁸ This lack of interaction with others may have been part of the reason why he had not come on to the radar of security services. It is also believed that he did not have direct links or communications with any terrorist or extremist group, and Islamic State did not claim responsibility for the failed attack.¹⁰³⁹ However, IS did praise the Brussels station bomber in its online magazine *Rumiyah* in an issue calling for lone actor attacks in the West.¹⁰⁴⁰ The same edition carried a piece celebrating those who perpetrated failed attacks, including Oussama Zariouh.¹⁰⁴¹

41. Flint Airport Stabbing

The Attack

Date: 21 June 2017

Day: Wednesday

Time: 9.40 am

Country: United States of America

Place: Flint

Area Type: Suburban – Transport

Location: Airport

Type of Attack: Knife & Club

Target: Police

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor

Claimed: NA

Number of Injured: 1

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Amor Ftouhi

Age: 49

Country of Origin: Tunisia

Nationality: Canadian–Tunisian

Resident: Montreal

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

On the morning of Wednesday 21 June, a stabbing attack on a police officer occurred at Bishop International Airport in Flint, Michigan. The attacker arrived at the airport carrying two bags

¹⁰³⁸ Blenkinsop, P. *et al.*, 'Brussels attacker may have supported Islamic State', *Reuters*, 20 June 2017.

¹⁰³⁹ Dearden, L., 'Brussels explosion: Prosecutors say major terror attack at station averted after bomb packed with nails fails', *The Independent*, 21 June 2017.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Warrick, J. and Mekhennet, S., 'A battered ISIS grows ever more dependent on lone wolves, simple plans', *The Washington Post*, 20 July 2017, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-battered-isis-grows-ever-more-dependent-on-lone-wolves-simple-plans/2017/07/19/3eeef9e8-6bfa-11e7-96ab-5f38140b38cc_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.17333f7d93c0, last visited: 4 September 2018.

¹⁰⁴¹ *Ibid.*

and spent around 40 minutes waiting in public areas of the airport, including in a restaurant and a bathroom.¹⁰⁴² The man abandoned his bags in the bathroom shortly before carrying out the attack, which happened just before 9.40 am.¹⁰⁴³ Witnesses recalled that directly before carrying out the attack the assailant had been heard to shout, “You have killed people in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, and we are all going to die.”¹⁰⁴⁴ The man was also reported to have shouted “Allahu Akbar” when he pulled out a twelve-inch knife and proceeded to stab a police officer in the back and then the neck, resulting in what were described as life-threatening injuries.¹⁰⁴⁵ However, the officer and bystanders were able to fight off the attacker, at which point the assailant asked the police officer why he had not killed him, apparently indicating that the man had intended the attack to also be a suicide or martyrdom mission.¹⁰⁴⁶ The victim of the attack was taken to hospital in a critical condition and underwent emergency surgery.¹⁰⁴⁷

The arrested man and accused attacker was identified as a 49-year-old Tunisian-Canadian man named Amor Ftouhi.¹⁰⁴⁸ It was subsequently revealed that Ftouhi had legally entered the United States, crossing over from Canada at Champlain, New York, on 16 June, less than a week before the attack.¹⁰⁴⁹ He is believed to have been in Michigan since at least 18 June.¹⁰⁵⁰ Once in the United States he had attempted to purchase a gun but had been denied a gun licence just days prior to the attack.¹⁰⁵¹ Having failed to acquire firearms, Ftouhi had been able to purchase a knife instead.¹⁰⁵² Following his arrest, Ftouhi is recorded as having spat in the face of a Flint police officer.¹⁰⁵³

There is a limited amount of publicly available biographical information on Amor Ftouhi. The 49-year-old was born and brought up in Tunisia, where most of his immediate family still lives.¹⁰⁵⁴ According to a Facebook page identified as belonging to Ftouhi, he studied in the humanities and social sciences department at the University of Tunis.¹⁰⁵⁵ He told a court hearing that he had come to Canada a decade earlier, and in that time had gained Canadian citizenship.¹⁰⁵⁶ During that period Ftouhi had been living in Montreal, where he lists having studied at the city’s College O’Sullivan.¹⁰⁵⁷ The suspect’s Facebook page also claimed that Ftouhi worked for a Canadian insurance firm called Industrial Alliance; however, the company clarified that he had been studying

¹⁰⁴² Prokupecz, S., Kopan, T. and Sanchez, R., ‘Suspect in Flint airport stabbing attempted gun purchase, official says’, *CNN*, 25 June 2017, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/22/us/flint-airport-stabbing/index.html>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁰⁴³ ‘Timeline of Events Before, During Michigan Airport Stabbing’, *U.S. News*, 21 June 2017, available at: <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/michigan/articles/2017-06-21/timeline-of-events-before-during-michigan-airport-stabbing>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Prokupecz, S., Kopan, T. and Sanchez, R., ‘Suspect in Flint airport stabbing attempted gun purchase, official says’, *CNN*, 25 June 2017.

¹⁰⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴⁶ ‘Flint airport stabbing suspect was not on radar of Canada or US authorities’, *The Guardian*, 23 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/23/flint-airport-stabbing-suspect-amor-ftouhi-lone-wolf>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁰⁴⁷ ‘Who is Amor Ftouhi, Canadian accused in U.S. airport stabbing?’, *CTV News*, 22 June 2017, available at: <https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/who-is-amor-ftouhi-canadian-accused-in-u-s-airport-stabbing-1.3471100>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Grafton-Green, P., ‘Michigan airport stabbing: Amor Ftouhi shouted Allahu Akbar before knifing police officer in neck’, *Evening Standard*, 22 June 2017, available at: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/man-shouted-allahu-akbar-before-stabbing-police-officer-in-neck-at-michigan-airport-a3570431.html>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁰⁴⁹ ‘Flint airport stabbing suspect was not on radar of Canada or US authorities’, *The Guardian*, 23 June 2017.

¹⁰⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵¹ Prokupecz, S., Kopan, T. and Sanchez, R., ‘Suspect in Flint airport stabbing attempted gun purchase, official says’, *CNN*, 25 June 2017.

¹⁰⁵² ‘Flint airport stabbing suspect was not on radar of Canada or US authorities’, *The Guardian*, 23 June 2017.

¹⁰⁵³ Riga, A., ‘Montrealer Amor Ftouhi expected to face more charges in stabbing at Michigan airport’, *Montreal Gazette*, 23 June 2017, available at: <https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/alleged-montreal-terrorist-used-large-jungle-survival-knife-expected-police-to-kill-him>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Prokupecz, S., Kopan, T. and Sanchez, R., ‘Suspect in Flint airport stabbing attempted gun purchase, official says’, *CNN*, 25 June 2017.

¹⁰⁵⁵ ‘Who is Amor Ftouhi, Canadian accused in U.S. airport stabbing?’, *CTV News*, 22 June 2017.

¹⁰⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

to become a sales representative but had left the programme after a five-month period and had not obtained the certificate he had been studying for.¹⁰⁵⁸

During the period immediately prior to the attack, it appears that Ftouhi was working as a part-time caretaker in the apartment block where he had been living for the previous six years.¹⁰⁵⁹ Ftouhi lived there with his wife and three teenage children in Montreal's Saint-Michel neighbourhood, however, he appears to have been largely unknown to most of his neighbours.¹⁰⁶⁰ Saint-Michel is a multicultural part of the city, with around half of its residents having been born abroad and 8,000 claiming Arabic as their first language.¹⁰⁶¹ The neighbourhood also has a large immigrant Muslim North African community, like the Ftouhis themselves, but neighbours suggested that the family had little interaction with that community.¹⁰⁶²

Similarly, there has been no evidence to suggest that Ftouhi was part of a wider plot or network.¹⁰⁶³ The US House Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul said the authorities believe Ftouhi had most likely "self-radicalised".¹⁰⁶⁴ His isolation and lack of communication with other extremists may explain why the suspected attacker was not on the radar of either the Canadian authorities or those in the United States.¹⁰⁶⁵ His social media presence also gives few clues about an extremist worldview. His Facebook page had had few updates: only two Arabic language YouTube videos, one of which concerned memorising the Quran.¹⁰⁶⁶ Nevertheless, from interrogations following Ftouhi's arrest it was reported that the suspect subscribes to the ideology of Osama Bin Laden and had celebrated the attacks on 9/11.¹⁰⁶⁷ Ftouhi told the authorities that he praised Bin Laden for the 2001 attacks and that he considers the United States to be an "enemy of Allah".¹⁰⁶⁸

Amor Ftouhi appeared in court on 5 July and was heard chanting "Allahu Akbar" before he would be seated.¹⁰⁶⁹ He was charged with violence at an international airport and interference with airport security.¹⁰⁷⁰ A not guilty plea was entered.¹⁰⁷¹ In August, Ftouhi waived his right to a swift trial when the prosecution requested more time for the purpose of translating documents, many of which were not in English.¹⁰⁷² The prosecution subsequently requested an extension, and in November it was announced that the trial date would be set for 30 July 2018.¹⁰⁷³ In March 2018, the United States Department of Justice served the additional charge of committing an act of terrorism transcending national boundaries against Ftouhi.¹⁰⁷⁴

¹⁰⁵⁸ 'Flint airport stabbing suspect was not on radar of Canada or US authorities', *The Guardian*, 23 June 2017.

¹⁰⁵⁹ 'Who is Amor Ftouhi, Canadian accused in U.S. airport stabbing?', *CTV News*, 22 June 2017.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Prokupecz, S., Kopan, T. and Sanchez, R., 'Suspect in Flint airport stabbing attempted gun purchase, official says', *CNN*, 25 June 2017.

¹⁰⁶¹ 'Flint airport stabbing suspect was not on radar of Canada or US authorities', *The Guardian*, 23 June 2017.

¹⁰⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶⁴ Prokupecz, S., Kopan, T. and Sanchez, R., 'Suspect in Flint airport stabbing attempted gun purchase, official says', *CNN*, 25 June 2017.

¹⁰⁶⁵ 'Flint airport stabbing suspect was not on radar of Canada or US authorities', *The Guardian*, 23 June 2017.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Shingler, B., 'Montreal suspect in Michigan airport stabbing had tried to buy a gun, FBI says', *CBS News*, 22 June 2017, available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-flint-amor-ftouhi-airport-1.4172909>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Williams, C., 'Prosecutors: Flint airport stabber Amor Ftouhi celebrated 9/11 attacks', *Toronto Sun*, 9 August 2017, available at: <http://torontosun.com/2017/08/09/prosecutors-flint-airport-stabber-amor-ftouhi-celebrated-911-attacks/wcm/03aaad87-ffcc-47d3-abe9-42f95491bf4a>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁰⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶⁹ Pierret, A., 'Amor Ftouhi waves right to speedy trial', *ABC12*, 5 July 2017, available at: <http://www.abc12.com/content/news/Amor-Ftouhi-expected-back-in-federal-court-Wednesday-432689283.html>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁰⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷³ 'Trial for Montreal man accused of Michigan airport stabbing put off until July 30', *CBS*, 6 November 2017, available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/windsor/trial-for-montreal-man-accused-of-michigan-airport-stabbing-put-off-until-july-30-1.4390208>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Mordock, J., 'Amor Ftouhi, Canadian national, hit with additional charges in Flint airport terror attack', *The Washington Times*, 21 March 2018, available at: <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/mar/21/canadian-man-hit-additional-charges-related-flint-/>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

42. Linz Elderly Couple Attack

The Attack

Date: 30 June 2017

Day: Friday

Time: Unknown

Country: Austria

Place: Linz

Area Type: Suburban – Residential

Location: Apartment – Interior

Type of Attack: Knife & Club

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Political)

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 2

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Mohamed H. Khalid

Age: 54

Country of Origin: Tunisia

Nationality: Tunisian

Resident: Linz

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Sentenced – Life

NOTES:

On Friday 30 June 2017, an elderly couple, who resided in Linz, Austria, were murdered in their home.¹⁰⁷⁵ The assailant gained access to the apartment while making a scheduled delivery to the couple, apparently bringing his weapons with him as part of a premeditated attack. The assailant first slit the throat of the 85-year-old woman who was living at the property, and subsequently attacked her husband with a knife and club.¹⁰⁷⁶ He then set fire to their kitchen and fled the scene; the couple's bodies were found by emergency responders to the fire,¹⁰⁷⁷ after a neighbour alerted the authorities upon seeing smoke coming from their home.¹⁰⁷⁸

¹⁰⁷⁵ 'Tunisian had Islamist motive for killing Austrian couple – minister', *Reuters*, 6 July 2017, available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-austria-attack/tunisian-had-islamist-motive-for-killing-austrian-couple-minister-idUKKBN19ROUD>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁰⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷⁷ Pleasance, C., 'Elderly couple are stabbed to death by Tunisian in first Islamist attack on Austrian soil... as the country SCRAPs plan to send troops to its border to stop flow of migrants from Italy', *Daily Mail*, 6 July 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4670262/Austria-suffers-terror-attack-couple-murdered.html>, last visited: 16 July 2018.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Krieglsteiner, A., '“Es wird gelogen und gelogen“: Die kranke Psyche des Doppelmörders', *OöNachrichten*, 19 June 2018, available at: <http://www.nachrichten.at/oberoesterreich/Es-wird-gelogen-und-gelogen-Die-kranke-Psyche-des-Doppelmorders;art4,2926968>, last visited: 16 July 2018.

The assailant was identified as Mohamed H. Khalid,¹⁰⁷⁹ a 54-year-old born in Tunisia who had been residing in Austria for the past 28 years.¹⁰⁸⁰ He regularly delivered groceries from the local store run by his wife, and the murdered couple had aided him financially from time to time.¹⁰⁸¹ In 2011, Khalid was accused by a local activist of the FPÖe (Austria's Far Right party) of animal abuse, and was subsequently convicted.¹⁰⁸²

Austrian intelligence services became aware of Khalid in 2015, after an anonymous source raised concerns that he had shown signs of holding extremist attitudes, and while there was no evidence found at the time to support this accusation of radicalism, it appears that, following these events, Khalid may have become stigmatised within the community where he lived.¹⁰⁸³

Aware that the elderly couple's son was an active member of FPÖe,¹⁰⁸⁴ it appears that Khalid may have been of the belief that his victims were also members, although this would have been an incorrect assumption on his part.¹⁰⁸⁵ Indeed, a police spokesman noted that Khalid stated the murders were because of "political motives and out of hatred of the FPÖe".¹⁰⁸⁶ Investigators initially thought Khalid's motive was purely political, as he blamed the FPÖe for his experiences in the community, such as his claim of being poorly treated at a job centre.¹⁰⁸⁷ However, after investigating his home and data on his electronic devices, it became clear that Islamist extremism was a significant factor in the attack.¹⁰⁸⁸

In the year prior to the attack, Khalid swore allegiance to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on Facebook.¹⁰⁸⁹ David Furtner, the police spokesman, noted that Khalid seemed to have "radicalised himself", and that he was indeed a lone actor.¹⁰⁹⁰ Furtner explained, "He felt he was always badly treated here because he is a Muslim and blames FPÖe for whipping up negative feelings towards foreigners."¹⁰⁹¹ The Austrian Interior Minister Wolfgang Sobotka noted that from the evidence gathered – much of which has been withheld from the public – Khalid was "clearly a radicalised Muslim".¹⁰⁹²

Khalid reported that following his attack he had considered drowning himself in the Danube, however, he turned himself into police, confessing the crime and was subsequently arrested.¹⁰⁹³ Following a short trial, Khalid was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison.¹⁰⁹⁴

¹⁰⁷⁹ 'Tunisian had Islamist motive for killing Austrian couple – minister', *Reuters*, 6 July 2017.

¹⁰⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸¹ 'Linz: Tunesier tötete Ehepaar aus Hass auf FPÖ', *Kronen Zeitung*, 1 July 2017, available at: <https://vladtepesblog.com/2017/07/01/austria-linz-tunisian-kills-couple-out-of-hatred-for-fpo/>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁰⁸² 'Ehepaar getötet: Hass auf Gesellschaft und FPÖ als Motiv', *Die Presse*, 1 July 2017, available at: https://diepresse.com/home/panorama/oesterreich/5244751/Ehepaar-getoetet_Hass-auf-Gesellschaft-und-FPOe-als-Motiv, last visited: 16 July 2018.

¹⁰⁸³ 'Tunisian had Islamist motive for killing Austrian couple – minister', *Reuters*, 6 July 2017.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Krieglsteiner, A., "Es wird gelogen und gelogen": Die kranke Psyche des Doppelmörders', *OöNachrichten*, 19 June 2018.

¹⁰⁸⁵ 'Ehepaar getötet: Hass auf Gesellschaft und FPÖ als Motiv', *Die Presse*, 1 July 2017.

¹⁰⁸⁶ 'Tunisian had Islamist motive for killing Austrian couple – minister', *Reuters*, 6 July 2017.

¹⁰⁸⁷ 'Linz: Tunesier tötete Ehepaar aus Hass auf FPÖ', *Kronen Zeitung*, 1 July 2017.

¹⁰⁸⁸ 'Elderly Austrian couple butchered in "Islamist killing"', *Agence France-Presse*, 6 July 2017, available at: <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/911363/elderly-austrian-couple-butchered-in-islamist-killing>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁰⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹⁰ 'Austria: suspect in double-murder elderly couple 'was Isis supporter'', *The Local*, 10 July 2017, available at: <https://www.thelocal.at/20170711/austria-double-murder-suspect-was-isis-supporter-police>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁰⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹² 'Elderly Austrian couple butchered in "Islamist killing"', *Agence France-Presse*, 6 July 2017.

¹⁰⁹³ 'Linz: Tunesier tötete Ehepaar aus Hass auf FPÖ', *Kronen Zeitung*, 1 July 2017.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Krieglsteiner, A., "Es wird gelogen und gelogen": Die kranke Psyche des Doppelmörders', *OöNachrichten*, 19 June 2018.

43. July Czech Train Attack

The Attack

Date: 28 July 2017

Day: Friday

Time: Unknown

Country: Czech Republic

Place: Mlada Boleslav

Area Type: Rural – Transport

Location: Railway

Type of Attack: Vehicular

Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Far Right

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor

Claimed: NA

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: JB

Age: 70

Country of Origin: Czech Republic

Nationality: Czech

Resident: Bakov nad Jizerou

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

On Friday 28 July, a train crashed as it hit trees on the line between Bělá pod Bezdězem and Bezděz in the Czech Republic.¹⁰⁹⁵ The crash had parallels with a previous incident that had occurred earlier that year, at the beginning of June.¹⁰⁹⁶ The country's State Attorney described how – as with the June incident – notes had been left at the scene “containing linguistically garbled threatening texts to evoke that they were written by a jihadist”.¹⁰⁹⁷ Indeed, both notes are reported to have been in Arabic but to have used Roman letters.¹⁰⁹⁸

It was subsequently determined that the assailant behind both of these attacks was not an Islamist. In February 2018, authorities arrested a native Czech man whom they believed to have been responsible for cutting down trees and causing them to fall onto the line with the

¹⁰⁹⁵ ‘Czech terrorist allegedly a fanatical supporter of ultra-right party who has attacked Romani people in the past’, *Romea.cz*, 4 March 2018.

¹⁰⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹⁷ Embury-Dennis, T., ‘Man caused train crashes then left Arabic messages to provoke anti-Muslim backlash, prosecutors say’, *The Independent*, 1 March 2018, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/pensioner-charged-czech-republic-train-accidents-arabic-messages-muslim-backlash-a8234901.html>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

¹⁰⁹⁸ ‘Czech ‘fake jihadist’ faces life on terror charges’, *News 24*, 3 January 2018, available at: <https://www.news24.com/World/News/czech-fake-jihadist-faces-life-on-terror-charges-20180301>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

intention of causing an accident.¹⁰⁹⁹ Although not publicly named, and only identified by the initials JB,¹¹⁰⁰ the suspect is reported to have been a 70-year-old pensioner.¹¹⁰¹ It is thought that the messages in Arabic were placed at the scene of the two attacks with the intention of giving the incidents the appearance of jihadist attacks so as to provoke anti-Muslim and anti-migrant sentiment among the general population.¹¹⁰²

Although only limited information is available about the identity of the assailant, the man arrested in connection with the incidents is understood to have long-standing connections with far-right and xenophobic politics. Reports from the Czech press claim that the suspect has been a strong supporter of the right-wing Freedom and Direct Democracy movement and was known among neighbours for his hostility to the Roma minority.¹¹⁰³

Czech police have accused the assailant of terrorism offences,¹¹⁰⁴ and under the Czech legal code he faces terrorism charges.¹¹⁰⁵ If found guilty the man could be sentenced to life in prison.¹¹⁰⁶

44. Hamburg Stabbing Attack

The Attack

Date: 28 July 2017

Day: Friday

Time: 3.15 pm

Country: Germany

Place: Hamburg

Area Type: Suburban – Commercial & Residential

Location: Shop – Interior & Exterior

Type of Attack: Knife

Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor

Claimed: NA

Number of Injured: 6

Number of Fatalities: 1

Response: Arrested

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

¹⁰⁹⁹ 'Terror of the Czech Republic: The man said the police had let down the trains with the trees so the Czechs were afraid of Muslims. He's in custody', *Lidovky.cz*, 28 February 2018, available at: https://www.lidovky.cz/terror-po-cesku-muz-nechal-srazit-vlak-y-se-stromy-aby-se-cesi-bali-muslimu-je-ve-vazbe-gmw-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A180227_123703_In_domov_jho, last visited: 16 August 2018.

¹¹⁰⁰ 'Czech terrorist allegedly a fanatical supporter of ultra-right party who has attacked Romani people in the past', *Romea.cz*, 4 March 2018.

¹¹⁰¹ Embury-Dennis, T., 'Man caused train crashes then left Arabic messages to provoke anti-Muslim backlash, prosecutors say', *The Independent*, 1 March 2018.

¹¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰³ 'Czech terrorist allegedly a fanatical supporter of ultra-right party who has attacked Romani people in the past', *Romea.cz*, 4 March 2018.

¹¹⁰⁴ Embury-Dennis, T., 'Man caused train crashes then left Arabic messages to provoke anti-Muslim backlash, prosecutors say', *The Independent*, 1 March 2018.

¹¹⁰⁵ 'Terror of the Czech Republic: The man said the police had let down the trains with the trees so the Czechs were afraid of Muslims. He's in custody', *Lidovky.cz*, 28 February 2018.

¹¹⁰⁶ 'Czech 'fake jihadist' faces life on terror charges', *News 24*, 3 January 2018.

Name: Ahmad Alhaw
Age: 26
Country of Origin: United Arab Emirates
Nationality: Palestinian
Resident: Hamburg
Training/Combat Experience: No
Known to Authorities: Yes
Current Status: Sentenced - Life

NOTES:

On Friday 28 July 2017, at 3.15 pm, an assailant stabbed seven people in and around an Edeka supermarket in Hamburg, killing one and injuring six.¹¹⁰⁷ Witnesses to the scene described how the assailant grabbed a seven-inch-long kitchen knife from a nearby shelf, ripped off the packaging and stabbed a 50-year-old man standing near the meat counter, who later died from his injuries.¹¹⁰⁸ The assailant then ran out of the supermarket, stabbing people as he went. Young men shouted at him in Arabic to drop the knife, blocking his path with chairs, rocks and sticks.¹¹⁰⁹ While attacking customers and passers-by, the assailant reportedly yelled, “Allahu Akhbar.”¹¹¹⁰ The attacker was subdued and arrested outside the supermarket and later charged with murder, six counts of attempted murder and grievous bodily harm.¹¹¹¹

The attacker was later identified as a man of Palestinian ethnicity called Ahmad A (Alhaw), although there have been conflicting reports about his country of origin. Several sources have reported that he was born in the United Arab Emirates.^{1112 1113} Another, however, initially claimed that he was born in Al Baha in Saudi Arabia in 1991.¹¹¹⁴ Following his birth, Ahmad’s family returned to the Jabalia refugee camp in Gaza, from where they originated.¹¹¹⁵ Reports state that Ahmad grew up to become severely fearful of Hamas following his public criticism of the organisation and his activity with the rival Palestinian group, Fatah.¹¹¹⁶ In 2008, with the help of traffickers, Ahmad fled through Egypt and Turkey to Greece, making his way to Spain, Sweden and eventually Norway, seeking asylum there in 2009.¹¹¹⁷ It is reported that he had previously applied for asylum in Sweden and Spain.¹¹¹⁸ Following the rejection of his asylum application in Norway, Ahmad travelled to Germany in 2015, where his application was also rejected.¹¹¹⁹ However, German authorities missed the deadline to send him back to Norway by one day, and so under the Dublin Regulation, as he had no identification documents, he could not be deported.¹¹²⁰ His

¹¹⁰⁷ ‘Hamburg supermarket attacker “was known Islamist”’, *BBC News*, 29 July 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40763369>, last visited: 23 February 2018.

¹¹⁰⁸ Backes, L. *et al.*, ‘Attack Underscores Need to Address Refugees’ Mental Health’, *Spiegel*, 10 August 2017, available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/what-led-ahmed-a-to-go-on-a-stabbing-spree-in-hamburg-a-1161442.html>, last visited: 23 February 2018.

¹¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹⁰ Huggler, J., ‘Hamburg Knife attacker had “Islamist motive”’, *The Telegraph*, 31 July 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/31/hamburg-knife-attacker-had-islamist-motive/>, last visited: 23 February 2018.

¹¹¹¹ ‘Palestinian Pleads Guilty to Hamburg ‘Islamist’ knife attack’, *Naharnet*, 12 January 2018, available at: www.naharnet.com/stories/en/240788, last visited: 23 February 2018.

¹¹¹² Mickiewicz, J., ‘Attack in Hamburg: the aggressor was identified as an ‘Islamist’’, *Le Figaro*, 18 August 2017.

¹¹¹³ Huggler, J., ‘Hamburg Knife attacker had “Islamist motive”’, *The Telegraph*, 31 July 2017.

¹¹¹⁴ Backes, L. *et al.*, ‘Attack Underscores Need to Address Refugees’ Mental Health’, *Spiegel*, 10 August 2017.

¹¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹⁶ Meining, S. and Bettendorf, S., ‘Flight from Hamas?’, *Tagesschau*, 3 March 2017.

¹¹¹⁷ Backes *et al.*, ‘Attack Underscores Need to Address Refugees’ Mental Health’, *Spiegel*, 10 August 2017.

¹¹¹⁸ ‘Palestinian man gets life in prison for deadly Hamburg terror attack’, *The Times of Israel*, 1 March 2018, available at: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/palestinian-man-gets-life-in-prison-for-deadly-hamburg-terror-attack/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹¹¹⁹ Backes, L. *et al.*, ‘Attack Underscores Need to Address Refugees’ Mental Health’, *Spiegel*, 10 August 2017.

¹¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

case with the deportation authorities had been left as “pending”;¹¹²¹ as such, authorities in Hamburg placed him in a refugee hostel in the Langenhorn neighbourhood.¹¹²²

Initially, his stay at the hostel seems to have been uneventful, and in early 2016 Ahmad is reported as saying, “I was born as a Muslim, but I am not religious... I hope for peace, and I hate no one.”¹¹²³ In this earlier period of his stay at the hostel, Ahmad was known to drink alcohol and smoke marijuana, and in his testimony he even described himself as “fascinated” with Western lifestyles.¹¹²⁴ Increasingly, however, Ahmad appeared to experience periods of withdrawal, during which time he would go to the mosque more often than usual and would reportedly berate his friends for their “sins”.¹¹²⁵ The resident who lived in the room next to Ahmad’s described him as “very religious and extreme in his views”, relating a time when Ahmad forbade him to listen to music because he considered it to be religiously prohibited.¹¹²⁶ Another hostel resident described how Ahmad would “pray loudly in the hallway and was very aggressive”, shouting in English, “The West is killing Muslims all over the world.”¹¹²⁷ Increasingly, Ahmad would shout the call to prayer from his window, and he began to change his style of dress, sometimes being seen in an Islamic jalabiya.¹¹²⁸ Others at the hostel noted that, though they complained to the hostel administration about some of Ahmad’s behaviour, no action was taken.¹¹²⁹

In the spring of 2016, friends from the hostel who had become concerned by Ahmad’s changing character contacted a Hamburg counselling centre, Legato, which deals specifically with extremism, however, the counsellors reported that they could not get through to Ahmad, whom they judged to be experiencing “emotional disturbance”.¹¹³⁰ Ahmad became known to authorities as a potential Islamist on 1 April 2016, when a friend from his hostel reported him to the local Hamburg police, who recorded the person of interest as Ahmad al-Ahmad.¹¹³¹ The police forwarded this report to the State Protection Office,¹¹³² although Ahmad’s second name has more recently been given as Alhaw.¹¹³³ Despite reports from the police, in June 2016, when an officer from the State Office of Criminal Investigation (LKA) visited the hostel to train employees, he was unaware that a report had been filed about one of the residents.¹¹³⁴ When hostel employees notified the LKA officer that a resident, Ahmad, had been acting strangely, the officer spoke with Ahmad, who was described as uncooperative; however, the case was not pursued.¹¹³⁵ The failure of the authorities to intervene came despite extremely disturbing rumours from other hostel residents that touched on a number of concerning allegations. Some residents claimed that Ahmad had an Islamic State flag in his room, while a woman who lived in the hostel told a reporter, “We always knew he belonged to Daesh.”¹¹³⁶

¹¹²¹ ‘Hamburg supermarket attacker “was known Islamist”’, *BBC News*, 29 July 2017.

¹¹²² Backes, L. *et al.*, ‘Attack Underscores Need to Address Refugees’ Mental Health’, *Spiegel*, 10 August 2017.

¹¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹¹²⁴ Bronst, S., ‘Palestinian pleads guilty to Hamburg ‘Islamist’ knife attack’, *The Times of Israel*, 12 January 2018, available at: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/palestinian-pleads-guilty-to-hamburg-islamist-knife-attack/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹¹²⁵ Backes, L. *et al.*, ‘Attack Underscores Need to Address Refugees’ Mental Health’, *Spiegel*, 10 August 2017.

¹¹²⁶ Karim, J.A., ‘Germany leaves frustrated young refugees alone’, *Zeit Online*, 7 August 2017, available at: <http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/2017-08/attack-hamburg-ahmad-a-refugeecamp>, last visited: 23 February 2018.

¹¹²⁷ Huggler, J., ‘Hamburg Knife attacker had “Islamist motive”’, *The Telegraph*, 31 July 2017.

¹¹²⁸ Karim, J.A., ‘Germany leaves frustrated young refugees alone’, *Zeit Online*, 7 August 2017.

¹¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹³⁰ Backes, L. *et al.*, ‘Attack Underscores Need to Address Refugees’ Mental Health’, *Spiegel*, 10 August 2017.

¹¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹³² *Ibid.*

¹¹³³ Burns, I., ‘Palestinian Islamist who ‘wanted to kill as many Christians as possible’ when he stabbed a man to death and wounded six others in German supermarket admits murder’, *Daily Mail*, 12 January 2018, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5262541/Palestinian-Islamist-admits-murder-Hamburg-attack.html>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹¹³⁴ Backes, L. *et al.*, ‘Attack Underscores Need to Address Refugees’ Mental Health’, *Spiegel*, 10 August 2017.

¹¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹³⁶ Karim, J.A., ‘Germany leaves frustrated young refugees alone’, *Zeit Online*, 7 August 2017.

In August 2016, an employee with the Hamburg State Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which deals with domestic extremism, interviewed the individual who had initially reported his concerns about Ahmad and discovered that Ahmad had recently been asking about travelling to Syria.¹¹³⁷ Consequently, the State Office requested that federal police detain Ahmad at the border, however, this did not happen as he never attempted to leave the country.¹¹³⁸ In a subsequent interview about the State Office report with the Aliens' Registration Authority, Ahmad insisted he was a "peaceful person"; the report noted, however, that he was "emotionally agitated", although Ahmad never saw a psychologist.¹¹³⁹

In December 2016, Ahmad offered to return to Gaza voluntarily and was described as being cooperative by those involved with his deportation case.¹¹⁴⁰ By February 2017, Ahmad reported to authorities that he was working with the Palestinian diplomatic authorities to obtain the correct documents in order to travel.¹¹⁴¹ At this point, the deportation authorities did not consider Ahmad to be a problem, despite previous reports, and, when interviewed by the Foreigners' Registration Office a week prior to the attack, Ahmad was described as being calm.¹¹⁴² The investigation revealed that Ahmad had spoken to his mother the day before the attack; she said her son "wanted to come back".¹¹⁴³

Following his arrest, Ahmad declared that he wished to be a martyr and insisted he was a terrorist, allegedly signing a statement during his interrogation which stated, "Yes, I am a terrorist."¹¹⁴⁴ Initially, there were questions about Ahmad's ability to stand trial owing to his psychological state.¹¹⁴⁵ Following a psychological evaluation, however, he was deemed fit for trial and subsequently charged.¹¹⁴⁶ During the trial, which started in January 2018, prosecutors noted that Ahmad "sought out his victims indiscriminately", attempting "to kill as many German nationals of the Christian faith as possible".¹¹⁴⁷ The indictment states that Ahmad's attack was in part inspired by the 14 July 2017 incident at the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, in which armed Palestinians shot two Israeli policemen, and which resulted in increased security in the area, including at the al-Aqsa Mosque.¹¹⁴⁸ Ahmad evidently "found ... [these] restrictions ... wrong and intolerable", and considered Germany to be "jointly responsible" for the situation, declaring that Christian Germans should die for atonement.¹¹⁴⁹ The prosecutors also noted how Ahmad had expressed the wish for "his actions to be viewed in the context of an Islamist attack, and understood as a contribution to jihad worldwide".¹¹⁵⁰ Items discovered during the investigation included a self-portrait with the seal of the Prophet, similar to that used by Islamic State.¹¹⁵¹ However, authorities have not been able to directly connect him with IS or any other such organisation.¹¹⁵²

¹¹³⁷ Backes, L. *et al.*, 'Attack Underscores Need to Address Refugees' Mental Health', *Spiegel*, 10 August 2017.

¹¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴⁰ Huggler, J., 'Hamburg Knife attacker had "Islamist motive"', *The Telegraph*, 31 July 2017.

¹¹⁴¹ Backes, L. *et al.*, 'Attack Underscores Need to Address Refugees' Mental Health', *Spiegel*, 10 August 2017.

¹¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴⁴ 'Palestinian Pleads Guilty to Hamburg 'Islamist' knife attack', *Naharnet*, 12 January 2018; Backes, L. *et al.*, 'Attack Underscores Need to Address Refugees' Mental Health', *Spiegel*, 10 August 2017.

¹¹⁴⁵ Eddy, M., 'Suspect in Hamburg Attack Was Known to German Police', *The New York Times*, 29 July 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/europe/germany-hamburg-attacker-radicalized.html>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹¹⁴⁶ 'Palestinian Pleads Guilty to Hamburg 'Islamist' knife attack', *Naharnet*, 12 January 2018.

¹¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴⁸ Weinthal, B., 'Germany charges Palestinian with murder of Christians over Temple Mount tensions', *Jerusalem Post*, 20 November 2017, available at: <https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Palestinian-indicted-for-murder-in-Germany-was-inspired-to-act-over-Temple-Mount-tensions-513945>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*; Bronst, S., 'Palestinian pleads guilty to Hamburg 'Islamist' knife attack', *The Times of Israel*, 12 January 2018.

¹¹⁵⁰ 'Palestinian Pleads Guilty to Hamburg 'Islamist' knife attack', *Naharnet*, 12 January 2018.

¹¹⁵¹ Backes, L. *et al.*, 'Attack Underscores Need to Address Refugees' Mental Health', *Spiegel*, 10 August 2017.

¹¹⁵² *Ibid.*

At his trial, Ahmad admitted murder and assault and was sentenced to life in prison on 1 March 2018.¹¹⁵³

45. Bloomington Mosque Bombing

The Attack

Date: 5 August 2017

Day: Saturday

Time: 5.00 am

Country: United States of America

Place: Bloomington

Area Type: Suburban – Residential

Location: Mosque – Interior

Type of Attack: Bombing

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Anti-Muslim)

Ideology: Far Right

Organisation/Affiliation: White Rabbit Militia – Directed

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailants

Number: 3

Gender: Male

Names: Michael Hari, Michael McWhorter, Joe Morris

Ages: 47, 29, 22

Country of Origin: United States of America

Nationality: American

Resident: Clarence, Illinois

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes, No, No

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

At 5.00 am on 5 August, a bomb exploded at the Dar Al-Farooq Islamic Center in Bloomington, Minnesota.¹¹⁵⁴ There were no fatalities or injuries, but the imam's office suffered heavy damage, with windows being shattered and reports of smoke engulfing much of the building.¹¹⁵⁵ Five people were gathered in a nearby room for morning prayers; however, they were not harmed by the explosion.¹¹⁵⁶ Those living close by reported being woken by the strength of the blast.¹¹⁵⁷

¹¹⁵³ 'Palestinian man gets life in prison for deadly Hamburg terror attack', *The Times of Israel*, 1 March 2018.

¹¹⁵⁴ Montemayor, S., 'FBI: 'Improvised explosive device' caused blast at Bloomington Islamic center', *StarTribune*, 6 August 2018, available at: <http://www.startribune.com/blast-investigated-at-bloomington-islamic-center/438715693/>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁵⁶ Mattias, C. and Reilly, R., 'Mosque Terror Attack Suspect Put In Detailed Bid To Build Trump A 'Great' Border Wall', *Huffington Post*, 13 March 2018, available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/trump-border-wall-mosque-attack-suspect_us_5aa84fcee4b0f7a689cd3f8b, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹¹⁵⁷ Montemayor, S., 'FBI: 'Improvised explosive device' caused blast at Bloomington Islamic center', *StarTribune*, 6 August 2018.

Bloomington police arrived at the scene shortly after and, later that day, the FBI announced that the bomb had been an “improvised explosive device”, but that they were yet to determine who was behind the attack.¹¹⁵⁸

For more information, see the entry for “64. Illinois Women’s Health Clinic Attempted Bombing”.

46. Levallois-Perret Car-Ramming Attack

The Attack

Date: 9 August 2017

Day: Wednesday

Time: 7.45 am

Country: France

Place: Paris

Area Type: Suburban – Residential

Location: Military Base – Exterior

Type of Attack: Vehicular

Target: Military

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 6

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Shot & Arrested

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Hamou Bachir Benlatreche

Age: 36

Country of Origin: Algeria

Nationality: Algerian

Resident: Paris

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

At around 7.45 am on the morning of Wednesday 9 August, a driver intentionally drove his vehicle into a group of soldiers and their vehicle in the Parisian suburb of Levallois-Perret in the north west of the city.¹¹⁵⁹ The attack happened in a pedestrian zone close to the soldiers’ military base, and in the course of the attack the assailant managed to injure six of the soldiers, three seriously.¹¹⁶⁰ The assailant is believed to have used a rented car in the attack and managed

¹¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁵⁹ Constant, J. and Lieures, A., ‘Levallois: l’attaque qui ouvre le débat sur Sentinelle’, *Le Parisien*, 10 August 2017, available at: <http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/levallois-l-attaque-qui-ouvre-le-debat-sur-sentinelle-10-08-2017-7185360.php>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹¹⁶⁰ Burrows-Taylor, E., ‘Man shot and arrested over car attack on anti-terror soldiers outside Paris’, *The Local*, 10 August 2017, available at: <https://www.thelocal.fr/20170810/car-ploughs-into-soldiers-outside-paris-injuring-six-people>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

to escape from the scene in the same vehicle.¹¹⁶¹ Police mobilised a large-scale manhunt in an effort to locate the attacker, which culminated in a car chase, during which the assailant hit at least one other car.¹¹⁶² Eventually, the attacker was intercepted on the A16 motorway, north of Paris, heading towards Calais.¹¹⁶³ The assailant was shot several times when apprehended by police, and a police officer was also reported as being injured during the arrest.¹¹⁶⁴

Having been taken to hospital in a serious condition, the driver was identified as 36-year-old Hamou Bachir Benlatreche.¹¹⁶⁵ The suspect was of Algerian nationality, living in France with a legal resident's permit¹¹⁶⁶ and working as an Uber taxi driver.¹¹⁶⁷ He was identified as a resident of the Parisian suburb Bezons,¹¹⁶⁸ approximately five miles from where the attack took place,¹¹⁶⁹ and also not a great distance from the Saint-Denis neighbourhood, known for its associations with Islamist networks. Police were unable to question Benlatreche for several days while he recovered in hospital.

On 17 August, a man was detained in connection with the accused assailant.¹¹⁷⁰ The man was said to be a 35-year-old living not far from the suspect, in the Argenteuil neighbourhood of Paris. However, he was released two days later without charge.¹¹⁷¹ Only on 29 August was Benlatreche finally charged with terror offences, although he remained in hospital.¹¹⁷²

Initial investigations into Benlatreche's two mobile phones revealed a strong interest in Islamic State, jihadist groups and Syria.¹¹⁷³ Indeed, it has been suggested that he may have had an intention to attempt to travel to Syria.¹¹⁷⁴ Despite this, it appears that Benlatreche was unknown to intelligence services and had only been associated with minor criminal cases, although never convicted.¹¹⁷⁵ In particular, it is alleged that he came to police attention in 2013 on account of his involvement with assisting illegal migrants entering France.¹¹⁷⁶ Reports about Benlatreche suggest that while he may have been religious, he was not identified as being extreme in his religious beliefs or observance, with neighbours stating that he was sometimes seen attending a mosque, but he had not given the impression of being a Salafist.¹¹⁷⁷ During the course of the investigation, however, French police revealed that Benlatreche is a member of the Islamist Tablighi Jamaat movement.¹¹⁷⁸

¹¹⁶¹ Willsher, K., 'Paris car-ramming suspect recovering in hospital before police interview', *The Guardian*, 10 August 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/10/paris-police-wait-to-interview-suspect-after-car-rammed-soldiers>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹¹⁶² 'Paris attack: Man held after car rams into soldiers', *BBC News*, 9 August 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40873801>.

¹¹⁶³ Burrows-Taylor, E., 'Man shot and arrested over car attack on anti-terror soldiers outside Paris', *The Local*, 10 August 2017.

¹¹⁶⁴ 'Paris attack: Man held after car rams into soldiers', *BBC News*, 9 August 2017.

¹¹⁶⁵ Willsher, K., 'Paris car-ramming suspect recovering in hospital before police interview', *The Guardian*, 10 August 2017.

¹¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶⁷ Constant, J. and Lieures, A., 'Levallois: l'attaque qui ouvre le débat sur Sentinelle', *Le Parisien*, 10 August 2017.

¹¹⁶⁸ 'Attaque de Levallois: l'auteur présumé mis en examen', *Le point*, 31 August 2017, available at: http://www.lepoint.fr/justice/attaque-de-levallois-l-auteur-presume-mis-en-examen-31-08-2017-2153442_2386.php, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹¹⁶⁹ 'Man charged for ramming soldiers in Paris suburbs', *The Local*, 31 August 2017, available at: <https://www.thelocal.fr/20170831/man-charged-over-ramming-soldiers-in-paris-suburbs>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹¹⁷⁰ Charlton, A., 'Man detained in French car attack that wounded 6 soldiers', *Times of Israel*, 17 August 2017, available at: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/man-detained-in-french-car-attack-that-wounded-6-soldiers/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹¹⁷¹ 'Attaque de Levallois: l'auteur présumé mis en examen', *Le point*, 31 August 2017.

¹¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷⁴ 'Militaires renversés a Levallois: le suspect mis en examen par un juge antiterroriste', *Le Parisien*, 31 August 2017, available at: <http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/militaires-renverses-a-levallois-le-suspect-mis-en-examen-par-un-juge-antiterroriste-31-08-2017-7225098.php>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷⁶ Constant, J., 'Les enquêteurs cherchent a cerner le profil de l'agresseur de Levallois', *Le Parisien*, 11 August 2017, available at: <http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/les-enqueteurs-cherchent-a-cerner-le-profil-de-l-agresseur-de-levallois-11-08-2017-7186941.php>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷⁸ 'Man arrested in French car attack had radical beliefs', *Daily Star*, 23 August 2017, available at: <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2017/Aug-23/416928-man-arrested-in-french-car-attack-had-radical-beliefs.ashx>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

The attack appears to have had at least some degree of preplanning, and police expressed the belief that Benlatreche had visited the area of the attack three days earlier, apparently to investigate the site in advance.¹¹⁷⁹ However, there has not been any indication that the assault was guided directly by Islamic State, nor that the suspect had been in contact with Islamic State at all.¹¹⁸⁰ Indeed, there was no claim of responsibility put out by Islamic State,¹¹⁸¹ as is commonly the case in incidents where the assailant survives while carrying out the attack.

47. Charlottesville Car-Ramming Attack

The Attack

Date: 12 August 2017

Day: Saturday

Time: 1.40 pm

Country: United States of America

Place: Charlottesville

Area Type: City Centre – Commercial

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Vehicular

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Political)

Ideology: Far Right

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor

Claimed: N/A

Number of Injured: 19

Number of Fatalities: 1

Response: Arrested

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: James Alex Fields Jr

Age: 20

Country of Origin: United States of America

Nationality: American

Resident: Toledo

Training/Combat Experience: Yes

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

On 12 August 2017, a protest was staged by a number of far-right organisations and activists to oppose the removal of the statue of the Confederate General Robert E. Lee in Charlottesville, Virginia. At 1.40 pm, an individual intentionally drove his vehicle into a crowd of mostly left-wing counter demonstrators, killing one and injuring another 19 people. The day before the attack, before the main protest that was to take place the following day, on the night of Friday 11 August, at around 8.45 pm, around 250 white nationalists and members of far-right and

¹¹⁷⁹ 'Attaque de Levallois: l'auteur présumé mis en examen', *Le point*, 31 August 2017.

¹¹⁸⁰ 'Man arrested in French car attack had radical beliefs', *Daily Star*, 23 August 2017.

¹¹⁸¹ Constant, J., 'Les enquêteurs cherchent à cerner le profil de l'agresseur de Levallois', *Le Parisien*, 11 August 2017.

alt-right groups gathered at Nameless Field near the gymnasium of the University of Virginia in preparation for the march.¹¹⁸² They paraded through the streets in the evening, chanting slogans such as “White Lives Matter”, “You will not replace us” and the neo-Nazi “Blood and Soil”,¹¹⁸³ as well as “Jews will not replace us”.¹¹⁸⁴ They were also bearing torches,¹¹⁸⁵ which has been interpreted by some as being reminiscent of Klu Klux Klan marches.¹¹⁸⁶ Organisers of the march were wearing earpieces and issuing instructions to the marchers, telling them to remain in formation.¹¹⁸⁷ The march proceeded through Charlottesville, past the statue of Thomas Jefferson where approximately 30 counter-protesting students from the University of Virginia had formed around the base of the statue.¹¹⁸⁸ The opposing groups exchanged chants and there were reportedly some minor incidents of violence, including the spraying of mace.¹¹⁸⁹

On the morning of 12 August, both far-right and far-left demonstrators arrived before the Unite the Right rally had been scheduled to begin. The rally had been due to start at 12 noon, with a 5.00 pm finish; however, people began to arrive before 8.00 am.¹¹⁹⁰ Members of the Unite the Right rally were carrying various nationalistic flags, including the confederate flag, and were equipped with shields, helmets, clubs and occasionally guns.¹¹⁹¹ It is suspected that members of the Ku Klux Klan may have been present at the rally, as former Grand Wizard of the KKK David Duke was there talking to reporters in support of the event.¹¹⁹² Counter-protesters included various left-wing groups, some of whom were members of Antifa, the anti-fascist leftist movement which has been accused of using violent measures and of endorsing the use of violence.¹¹⁹³ Some of the counter-protesters were equipped with banners, shields, sticks and other tools.¹¹⁹⁴ However, the counter-demonstration was also attended by local people and civil rights activists.¹¹⁹⁵

An independent militia also arrived, wearing camouflage and carrying semi-automatic rifles and handguns.¹¹⁹⁶ Virginia is an open-carry state and the militia claimed they were there to aid the police in containing the situation.¹¹⁹⁷ However, the Virginia Secretary of Public Safety and Homeland Security expressed concern about the militia’s presence and the fact that rifles had been added to the already volatile situation.¹¹⁹⁸ By 10.30 am violence had already started to

¹¹⁸² ‘Recounting a day of rage, hate, violence and death’, *The Washington Post*, 14 August 2017, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-timeline/?utm_term=.6f69107fc03a, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹¹⁸³ ‘Inside what happened at the Charlottesville protests’, *YouTube*, 15 August 2017, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kerAy94eWLc>, last visited: 26 January 2018; ‘A timeline of the deadly weekend in Charlottesville, Virginia’, *6abc Action News*, 14 August 2017, available at: <http://6abc.com/a-timeline-of-events-in-charlottesville-virginia/2305769/>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹¹⁸⁴ ‘Recounting a day of rage, hate, violence and death’, *The Washington Post*, 14 August 2017; ‘Charlottesville: Race and Terror – VICE News Tonight (HBO)’, *YouTube*, 14 August 2017, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P54sPONlmgg>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹¹⁸⁵ ‘Inside what happened at the Charlottesville protests’, *YouTube*, 15 August 2017.

¹¹⁸⁶ ‘A Short History Of Torches And Intimidation’, *Forbes*, 15 August 2017, available at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/drSarahbond/2017/08/15/a-short-history-of-torches-and-intimidation/#6a32e4d06762>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹¹⁸⁷ ‘Recounting a day of rage, hate, violence and death’, *The Washington Post*, 14 August 2017.

¹¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹¹ ‘Charlottesville protests -- raw footage of extremely tense stand-off’, *YouTube*, 12 August 2017, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F8WuJOBK8SA>, last visited: 26 January 2018; ‘Charlottesville: Race and Terror – VICE News Tonight (HBO)’, *YouTube*, 14 August 2017.

¹¹⁹² ‘Charlottesville: Race and Terror – VICE News Tonight (HBO)’, *YouTube*, 14 August 2017.

¹¹⁹³ ‘Antifa activists say violence is necessary’, *The Hill*, 14 September 2017, available at: <http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/350524-antifa-activists-say-violence-is-necessary>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹¹⁹⁴ ‘Recounting a day of rage, hate, violence and death’, *The Washington Post*, 14 August 2017; ‘Charlottesville protests -- raw footage of extremely tense stand-off’, *YouTube*, 12 August 2017.

¹¹⁹⁵ ‘Recounting a day of rage, hate, violence and death’, *The Washington Post*, 14 August 2017.

¹¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

break out between those protesting the removal of the statue and those there to counter-protest.¹¹⁹⁹ Projectiles were thrown from both sides, including water bottles and balloons filled with urine or paint, as well as rocks, and there were incidents of fighting with clubs, batons and sticks.¹²⁰⁰ At 11.22 am, security services declared that the gathering was an unlawful assembly.¹²⁰¹ This forced the rally to relocate and people started to move towards McIntire Park.¹²⁰² At 11.52 am the Governor of Virginia Terry McAuliffe declared a state of emergency.¹²⁰³

At around 1.40 pm, at the intersection of Water and Fourth Streets, near Emancipation Park, the assailant ploughed his car – a Dodge Challenger – into a crowd of counter-protesters and killed a 32-year-old woman.¹²⁰⁴ A further 19 people were injured and required hospital treatment on account of injuries suffered during the vehicular attack.¹²⁰⁵ Surveillance footage shown in court revealed that the assailant stopped the car roughly a block and a half away from the counter-protesters, reversed briefly and then accelerated forward into the crowd, before reversing at speed.¹²⁰⁶ Footage from the attack shows that after the initial impact of the vehicle ploughing into the crowd, eight or nine individuals – some of them masked – appeared to attempt to attack the assailant’s car with large sticks and batons, at which point the attacker then reversed his vehicle at high speed, hitting several of these people also.¹²⁰⁷

Police found and arrested the assailant a few minutes after the attack.¹²⁰⁸ He was identified as James Alex Fields Jr, who was 20 years old at the time of the attack.¹²⁰⁹ It was stated in court that following his arrest, Fields expressed regret when he was taken into custody, and had asked if the people he had hit were alright.¹²¹⁰ The court also heard that when Fields was informed of the death of 32-year-old woman from her injuries caused by the impact of the car,¹²¹¹ Fields had “cried and sobbed”.¹²¹²

James Fields served in the US Army between August and December 2015.¹²¹³ He had been released from service in December for failing to meet training standards.¹²¹⁴ Fields had then been living in an apartment in Toledo, Ohio, having moved out of his mother’s house five or six

¹¹⁹⁹ ‘A timeline of the deadly weekend in Charlottesville, Virginia’, *6abc Action News*, 14 August 2017.

¹²⁰⁰ ‘See the Sparks That Set Off Violence in Charlottesville | National Geographic’, *YouTube*, 19 August 2017, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FDIfPhx-Fm0>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²⁰¹ ‘Recounting a day of rage, hate, violence and death’, *The Washington Post*, 14 August 2017.

¹²⁰² *Ibid.*

¹²⁰³ ‘Virginia governor declares state of emergency as white nationalist rally in Charlottesville breaks out in violence’, *Business Insider*, 12 August 2017, available at: <http://uk.businessinsider.com/virginia-governor-declares-state-of-emergency-amid-alt-right-rally-2017-8>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹²⁰⁴ ‘How the Violence Unfolded in Charlottesville | The New York Times’, *YouTube*, 15 August 2017, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSSIG1MP6Cs>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²⁰⁵ ‘What We Know About James Alex Fields, Driver Charged in Charlottesville Killing’, *The New York Times*, 13 August 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/james-alex-fields-charlottesville-driver-.html>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²⁰⁶ ‘Charge upgraded against suspect in Charlottesville rally killing’, *CNN*, 15 December 2017, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/14/us/charlottesville-james-alex-fields-court-appearance/index.html>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²⁰⁷ ‘Charlottesville car attack suspect denied bail in first court appearance’, *YouTube*, 14 August 2017, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_cF9dngn8ZA, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹²⁰⁸ ‘Charge upgraded against suspect in Charlottesville rally killing’, *CNN*, 15 December 2017.

¹²⁰⁹ ‘James Fields Jr.: A neo-Nazi’s violent, rage-fueled journey to Charlottesville’, *Chicago Tribune*, 18 August 2017, available at: <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-james-fields-jr-charlottesville-20170818-story.html>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²¹⁰ ‘Charge upgraded against suspect in Charlottesville rally killing’, *CNN*, 15 December 2017.

¹²¹¹ ‘Medical Examiner Rules Heyer Died from Blunt Force Injury’, *NBC29*, 17 October 2017, available at: <http://www.nbc29.com/story/36610772/medical-examiner-rules-heyer-died-from-blunt-force-injury>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²¹² ‘Charge upgraded against suspect in Charlottesville rally killing’, *CNN*, 15 December 2017.

¹²¹³ ‘Charlottesville: man charged with murder was pictured at neo-Nazi rally’, *The Guardian*, 13 August 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/13/charlottesville-james-fields-charged-with-was-pictured-at-neo-nazi-rally-vanguard-america>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²¹⁴ ‘Charlottesville: Who is suspect James Alex Fields Jr?’, *BBC News*, 14 August 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-40923489>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

months prior to the date of the attack.¹²¹⁵ His family were originally based in Florence, Kentucky, and it is reported that during their time there his mother made numerous emergency calls to the local police regarding being fearful of her violent son.¹²¹⁶ He is reported to have hit his mother, locked her in a room and threatened her with knives.¹²¹⁷ After these incidents, Fields was arrested and sent to a juvenile detention centre.¹²¹⁸

Following the attack in Charlottesville, Fields was initially charged with second-degree murder, three counts of malicious wounding and failure to stop in an accident that resulted in death.¹²¹⁹ Days later, two more counts of malicious wounding and three counts of aggravated malicious wounding were added to the charges.¹²²⁰ The murder charge was changed to first-degree murder on 14 December 2017.¹²²¹

Footage from the Charlottesville protests shows Fields marching with the white nationalists during the Unite the Right rally.¹²²² He was photographed holding a shield with the emblem of the group Vanguard America on it,¹²²³ an anti-Semitic and white supremacist organisation.¹²²⁴ At the rally, Fields was wearing khaki trousers and a white polo shirt,¹²²⁵ which is the common uniform of Vanguard America members at rallies.¹²²⁶ The same picture shows Fields posing alongside others involved with the same far-right group.¹²²⁷ However, Vanguard America has denied any link with Fields.¹²²⁸ Following the incident the group tweeted that “the shields seen do not denote membership, nor does the white shirt. The shirts were freely handed out to anyone in attendance”.¹²²⁹ In court, Detective Steven Young confirmed that the police had not found any evidence on the accused’s computer, phone or social media accounts that linked him to Vanguard America or any other white supremacist group.¹²³⁰ However, one of Fields’ former teachers, Derek Weimer of Randall K. Cooper High School in Union, Kentucky, told reporters that he believed Fields had an interest in white supremacy, that Fields agreed with the notion that white people were being persecuted and that he admired Adolf Hitler.¹²³¹ Weimer also told reporters that Fields had once confided in him that he suffered from schizophrenia and that he was taking pills to help control it.¹²³²

It is reported that following Fields’ arrest, an investigation was launched into whether there was enough evidence to charge him with domestic terrorism.¹²³³ A civil rights investigation

¹²¹⁵ Ibid.

¹²¹⁶ ‘Mother of James Fields called authorities for help with violent son’, *The Blade*, 15 August 2017, available at: <http://www.toledoblade.com/Police-Fire/2017/08/14/Mother-of-James-Fields-called-authorities-for-help-with-violent-son.html>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²¹⁷ ‘James Fields Jr.: A neo-Nazi’s violent, rage-fueled journey to Charlottesville’, *Chicago Tribune*, 18 August 2017; ‘Mother of James Fields called authorities for help with violent son’, *The Blade*, 15 August 2017.

¹²¹⁸ ‘James Fields Jr.: A neo-Nazi’s violent, rage-fueled journey to Charlottesville’, *Chicago Tribune*, 18 August 2017.

¹²¹⁹ ‘James Alex Fields Jr. has first hearing; tensions still high in Charlottesville’, *CNN*, 15 August 2017, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/14/us/charlottesville-white-nationalist-protests-violence/index.html>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²²⁰ ‘Charlottesville car attack suspect charged with five additional felonies’, *CNN*, 19 August 2017, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/18/us/charlottesville-james-alex-fields-charges/index.html>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²²¹ ‘Charge upgraded against suspect in Charlottesville rally killing’, *CNN*, 15 December 2017; ‘Suspect in Charlottesville car attack faces upgraded charge of first-degree murder’, *Los Angeles Times*, 15 December 2017, available at: <http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-charlottesville-protest-20171215-story.html>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²²² ‘See the Sparks That Set Off Violence in Charlottesville | National Geographic’, *YouTube*, 19 August 2017.

¹²²³ ‘James Fields Jr.: A neo-Nazi’s violent, rage-fueled journey to Charlottesville’, *Chicago Tribune*, 18 August 2017.

¹²²⁴ ‘Vanguard America’, *ADL*, available at: <https://www.adl.org/education/resources/backgrounders/vanguard-america>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²²⁵ ‘Charlottesville: man charged with murder was pictured at neo-Nazi rally’, *The Guardian*, 13 August 2017.

¹²²⁶ ‘Vanguard America’, *ADL*.

¹²²⁷ ‘What We Know About James Alex Fields, Driver Charged in Charlottesville Killing’, *The New York Times*, 13 August 2017.

¹²²⁸ ‘Suspect in Charlottesville car attack faces upgraded charge of first-degree murder’, *Los Angeles Times*, 15 December 2017.

¹²²⁹ ‘What We Know About James Alex Fields, Driver Charged in Charlottesville Killing’, *The New York Times*, 13 August 2017.

¹²³⁰ ‘Suspect in Charlottesville car attack faces upgraded charge of first-degree murder’, *Los Angeles Times*, 15 December 2017.

¹²³¹ Ibid.

¹²³² ‘James Fields Jr.: A neo-Nazi’s violent, rage-fueled journey to Charlottesville’, *Chicago Tribune*, 18 August 2017.

¹²³³ ‘James Alex Fields Jr. has first hearing; tensions still high in Charlottesville’, *CNN*, 15 August 2017.

into the attack was conducted by the FBI and US attorneys.¹²³⁴ Investigations are ongoing, and Fields' trial has been set for 26 November 2018.¹²³⁵ The trial has been anticipated to last three weeks.¹²³⁶

48. Barcelona Attacks

The Attack

Date: 17 August 2017

Day: Thursday

Time: 5.00 pm

Country: Spain

Place: Barcelona

Area Type: City Centre - Landmark & Commercial

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Vehicular & Knife

Target: Police & Civilian - Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State - Inspired

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 131

Number of Fatalities: 15

Response: Shot Dead Post Attack

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Younes Abouyaaqoub

Age: 22

Country of Origin: Morocco

Nationality: Moroccan-Spanish

Resident: Ripoll

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Dead

NOTES:

See the entry for "49. Cambrils Attack".

¹²³⁴ 'Charlottesville: man charged with murder was pictured at neo-Nazi rally', *The Guardian*, 13 August 2017.

¹²³⁵ 'Fields set for three-week trial in November', *The Daily Progress*, 3 January 2018, available at: http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/local/fields-set-for-three-week-trial-in-november/article_d497a604-f0be-11e7-bc83-f7eff49a1576.html, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²³⁶ Ibid.

49. Cambrils Attack

The Attack

Date: 18 August 2017

Day: Friday

Time: 1.15 am

Country: Spain

Place: Cambrils

Area Type: City Centre – Commercial

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Vehicular

Target: Police & Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 6

Number of Fatalities: 1

Response: 4 Shot Dead. 1 Shot & Arrested

The Assailants

Number: 5

Gender: Male

Names: Moussa Oukabir, El Houssaine Abouyaaqoub, Said Aallaa, Omar Hychami, Mohamed Hychami

Ages: 17, 19, 18, 21, 24

Countries of Origin: Morocco & Spain

Nationalities: Moroccan & Moroccan-Spanish

Resident: Ripoll, Ribes de Freser & Girona

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Dead

NOTES:

At 11.15 pm on 16 August 2017, two people were killed and one more was seriously injured as a result of an explosion that destroyed a detached house in Alcanar, a town in the Spanish province of Tarragona, Catalonia.¹²³⁷ Unknown to authorities at the time, the three were members of a ten-man Islamist cell that intended to carry out a series of triacetone triperoxide (TATP) suicide and vehicle-borne improvised explosive-device attacks in Barcelona.¹²³⁸ The two men killed were subsequently identified as 45-year-old Abdelbaki es Satty and 22-year-old Youseff Aallaa, while the injured man was 21-year-old Mohamed Houli Chemlal.¹²³⁹ Initial media reports suggested the

¹²³⁷ Villalonga, C., 'Cronología de los atentados en Barcelona y Cambrils: de las explosiones de Alcanar a la muerte a tiros del terrorista huido', *La Vanguardia*, 21 August 2017, available at: <http://www.lavanguardia.com/sucesos/20170821/43724781571/cronologia-atentado-terrorista-barcelona-cambrils.html>, last visited: 30 January 2018.

¹²³⁸ Reinares, F. and Garcia Calvo, C., 'Spaniards, You Are Going to Suffer: The Inside Story of the August 2017 Attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils', CTC Sentinel (2018), available at: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/01/CTC-Sentinel_Vol11Iss1.pdf, last visited: 16 February 2018.

¹²³⁹ Worley, W. 'Barcelona terror suspects say they were planning 'a larger atrocity' and blame dead imam for attacks', *The Independent*, 22 August 2017, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/barcelona-terror-attack-suspects-latest-imam-dead-blame-larger-atrocity-threat-a7906781.html>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

blast had resulted from a gas explosion associated with an illegal drug laboratory, and failed to mention any suspicions of a terror connection.¹²⁴⁰ In reality, the explosion had been caused by a stockpile of gas canisters which are thought to have been gathered for use in the attack.¹²⁴¹ Emergency workers searching through the rubble subsequently uncovered grenades and suicide vests alongside the explosive materials.¹²⁴²

Between the afternoon of Thursday 17 August 2017 and the early morning of Friday 18 August 2017, 16 more people were killed in a series of connected attacks.¹²⁴³ These are thought to have been carried out as an alternative and improvised action following the Alcanar explosion and destruction of the group's bomb arsenal.¹²⁴⁴ At 4.50 pm on 17 August, an assailant, subsequently identified as Younes Abouyaaqoub, drove a white Fiat Talento van into pedestrians on Las Ramblas, zig-zagging through the tourist-packed boulevard in downtown Barcelona. As a result, 14 people were killed and 131 more injured along a 700-metre distance before the van was brought to a halt.¹²⁴⁵ The attacker fled the scene on foot and, at 6.20 pm, arrived at the city's University District. In a parking lot, he hijacked a white Ford Focus and stabbed its driver, who subsequently bled to death in the rear seat.¹²⁴⁶

At around 7.00 pm, a white Ford Focus crashed through a police checkpoint in Barcelona's Diagonal Avenue, injuring a policewoman.¹²⁴⁷ Following a shootout, the vehicle was intercepted in Sant Just Desvern, a town nearby. Initial reports suggested that the driver had been killed by police.¹²⁴⁸ However, it was later confirmed that the man found in the rear seat had been murdered by the Las Ramblas assailant.¹²⁴⁹ The attacker managed to escape and remained on the run for a period of four days before being apprehended and shot by police.¹²⁵⁰

Nine hours later, in a related incident that took place at 1.15 am on Friday 18 August, a black Audi A3 car ploughed into pedestrians at Cambrils, a seaside town 62 miles along the coast from Barcelona. Six people, including a police officer, were injured as a result.¹²⁵¹ The vehicle was brought to a halt after colliding with a police car and rolling over. Following the crash, five individuals got out of the car carrying knives, machetes and an axe, and wearing fake suicide

¹²⁴⁰ 'Un muerto y siete heridos al derrumbarse casa en una explosión de gas en Alcanar (Tarragona)', *El Mundo*, 17 August 2017, available at: <http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2017/08/17/59954c5e22601d701d8b45b2.html>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹²⁴¹ Worley, W. 'Barcelona terror suspects say they were planning 'a larger atrocity' and blame dead imam for attacks', *The Independent*, 22 August 2017.

¹²⁴² 'Barcelona attack: The jihadists and the hunt for a second gang', *BBC News*, 8 August 2018, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44890504>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹²⁴³ Mouzo Quintans, J. 'Dada de alta la última persona que quedaba hospitalizada por el atentado de La Rambla', *El País*, 9 November 2017, available at: https://elpais.com/ccaa/2017/11/09/catalunya/1510224258_016534.html?rel=_str_articulo#1516966199398, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²⁴⁴ Reinares, F. and Garcia Calvo, C., 'Spaniards, You Are Going to Suffer: The Inside Story of the August 2017 Attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils', CTC Sentinel (2018).

¹²⁴⁵ 'Los ataques terroristas en Cataluña al detalle', *El País*, 22 August 2017, available at: https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/08/17/media/1502988076_693853.html, last visited: 23 January 2018.

¹²⁴⁶ Cerderira, B., 'Así fueron las últimas horas de Pau Pérez, la víctima número 15 de los atentados', *El Español*, 21 August 2017, available at: https://www.elespanol.com/reportajes/20170821/240726289_0.html, last visited: 19 January 2018.

¹²⁴⁷ 'Mor el conductor que ha atropellat una agent dels Mossos d'Esquadra a la Diagonal', *Catalunya Radio 3*, 18 August 2017, available at: <http://www.ccma.cat/324/un-vehicle-atropella-una-agent-dels-mossos-a-la-diagonal-despres-de-saltar-se-un-control/noticia/2804619/>, last visited: 19 January 2018.

¹²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴⁹ Worden, T., 'Pictured: Spanish man, 35, found stabbed to death inside his Ford Focus after it was stolen by a fugitive Barcelona terror suspect then dumped on the outskirts of the city having smashed through a police checkpoint', *Daily Mail*, 19 August 2017 at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4805318/First-picture-Pau-Perez-Villan-killed-terror-suspect.html>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹²⁵⁰ Strange, H., 'Barcelona attack suspect Younes Abouyaaqoub shot dead wearing suicide belt by Spanish police', *The Telegraph*, 21 August 2017, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/21/first-pictures-emerge-barcelona-attack-suspect-younes-abouyaaqoub/>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹²⁵¹ 'Un solo agente de los Mossos abatió a cuatro de los terroristas en Cambrils', *El País*, 18 August 2017, available at: https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/08/18/actualidad/1503059332_365185.html, last visited: 19 January 2018.

belts.¹²⁵² A police officer shot four of them dead, while a fifth briefly managed to escape.¹²⁵³ This fifth individual ran 400 metres before stabbing a female bystander, who later died as a result of her injuries.¹²⁵⁴ The assailant was then shot dead by another police officer,¹²⁵⁵ shortly after being spotted from a police helicopter.¹²⁵⁶

At 3.30 pm on Monday 21 August 2017, residents in Subirats alerted the authorities after spotting a man who matched the description of the Las Ramblas attacker near the town's train station.¹²⁵⁷ At 5.00 pm, two police officers found the suspect hiding in some vineyards.¹²⁵⁸ After he shouted "Allahu Akbar" and started running towards the police offers, the suspect was shot dead.¹²⁵⁹ He was also reported to have been wearing a fake explosives belt at the time and, like the five Cambrils attackers, was armed with knives.¹²⁶⁰

The authorities subsequently publicly identified the Las Ramblas attacker as 22-year-old Younes Abouyaaqoub. The five Cambrils assailants killed in the early hours of Friday 18 August were identified as 17-year-old Moussa Oukabir, 18-year-old Said Aallaa, 19-year-old Houssaine Abouyaaqoub, 21-year-old Omar Hychami and 24-year-old Mohamed Hychami.¹²⁶¹ The assailants were said to be fluent in Spanish and Catalan,¹²⁶² and, according to their neighbours, seemed integrated into Catalan society and were not showing any obvious signs of either isolation or sympathies for Islamist extremism.^{1263 1264} The six assailants were not known to police authorities as potential terrorists. However, in the months prior to the attacks, those in the group had started to change their habits, including the way they dressed and their religious practices.¹²⁶⁵ According to an acquaintance close to the group, they were "all obsessed with praying ... if while on their way to Barcelona it was time to pray, they would stop the car and do so by the road".¹²⁶⁶

In the months before the attack, it was reported that the group had managed to avoid detection by sharing jihadist videos among themselves through the use of a memory card.¹²⁶⁷

¹²⁵² 'Explosive belts worn by Cambrils attackers were fake: Catalan regional head', *Reuters*, 18 August 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-barcelona-explosives/explosive-belts-worn-by-cambrils-attackers-were-fake-catalan-regional-head-idUSKCN1AYONR>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹²⁵³ 'Un solo Mossos d'Esquadra abatió a cuatro de los terroristas de Cambrils', *La Vanguardia*, 18 August 2017, available at: <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20170818/43629617445/cambrils-atentado-mosso-terroristas.html>, last visited: 19 January 2018.

¹²⁵⁴ 'Los ataques terroristas en Cataluña al detalle', *El País*, 22 August 2017.

¹²⁵⁵ 'Muere una mujer alemana de 51 años herida en el atentado de La Rambla y se elevan a 16 las víctimas', *El Mundo*, 27 August 2017, available at: <http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2017/08/27/59a29be2268e3ef05d8b45d6.html>, last visited: 19 January 2018.

¹²⁵⁶ García, J., 'Los Mossos abaten a cinco terroristas que planeaban una nueva masacre en Cambrils', *El País*, 18 August 2017, available at: https://elpais.com/ccaa/2017/08/18/catalunya/1503014552_393278.html, last visited: 23 January 2018.

¹²⁵⁷ Sanchez, G., 'Muere Younes, muere la célula de Ripoll', *El Periódico*, 21 August 2017, available at: <http://www.elperiodico.com/es/sociedad/20170821/abatido-tiros-younes-abouyaaqoub-terrorista-atentado-rambla-barcelona-6236385>, last visited: 19 January 2018.

¹²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵⁹ Burgen, S., 'Barcelona attack: four suspects face court after van driver is shot dead', *The Guardian*, 22 August 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/21/police-searching-barcelona-van-driver-shoot-man>, last visited: 26 July 2018

¹²⁶⁰ Sanchez, G., 'Muere Younes, muere la célula de Ripoll', *El Periódico*, 21 August 2017.

¹²⁶¹ 'Lazos familiares de la célula terrorista de Cataluña', *El País*, 24 August 2017, available at: https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/08/19/media/1503173872_193031.html?rel=mas, last visited: 23 January 2018.

¹²⁶² Peregil, F., 'Mi nieto no se ha educado en Marruecos', *El País*, 21 August 2017, available at: https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/08/20/actualidad/1503251931_200968.html?rel=mas, last visited: 23 January 2018.

¹²⁶³ 'Los terroristas abatidos parecían integrados en su entorno, según los vecinos', *La Vanguardia*, 20 August 2017, available at: <http://www.lavanguardia.com/local/girona/20170820/43708960643/los-terroristas-abatidos-parecian-integrados-en-su-entorno-segun-los-vecinos.html>, last visited: 23 January 2018.

¹²⁶⁴ 'Así veía Ripoll a sus jóvenes vecinos que acabaron convirtiéndose en terroristas', *La Sexta*, 22 August 2017, available at: http://www.lasexta.com/noticias/sociedad/asi-veia-ripoll-a-sus-jovenes-vecinos-que-acabaron-convirtiendose-en-terroristas_20170822599c46040cf2e2ea355d654e.html, last visited: 23 January 2018.

¹²⁶⁵ Ibáñez, M.J., 'Por qué en Ripoll?', *El Periódico*, 20 August 2017, available at: <http://www.elperiodico.com/es/sociedad/20170820/por-que-la-celula-yihadista-atentados-catalunya-se-gesto-en-ripoll-6233726>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²⁶⁶ Álvarez, L., 'Paraban el coche en el arcén para rezar', *La Razón*, 20 August 2017, available at: <https://www.larazon.es/espana/paraban-el-coche-en-el-arcen-para-rezar-JO15820898>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²⁶⁷ Pozas, A., 'Los terroristas de Cambrils se pasaban videos yihadistas en una tarjeta de memoria', *Cadena Ser*, 6 September 2018, available at: http://cadenaser.com/ser/2017/09/05/tribunales/1504620860_503108.html, last visited: 26 January 2018.

Including the wider cell members, three had previous criminal records for petty crime, including Youssef Aallaa – killed in the Alcanar explosion – Houssain Abouyaaqoub and Driss Oukabir, Moussa Oukabir’s older brother, who was later arrested for his connection with the attacks.¹²⁶⁸

Younes Abouyaaqoub was born on 1 January 1995 in Mrirt, Morocco, and had left the country for the Catalanian city of Ripoll with his family, along with his brother Houssaine, when he was four years old.¹²⁶⁹ Living conditions in both the city of Mrirt and the wider region have been described as being relatively deprived, and a significant number of population have travelled to Europe seeking a better quality of life.¹²⁷⁰ From 2006, Abouyaaqoub lived in a social housing apartment block with his older brother, Hicham, two younger siblings and their parents.¹²⁷¹ Abouyaaqoub led an apparently normal life in Ripoll; he studied at the local Joan Maragall school and was successful academically.¹²⁷² He finished his studies at the Institut Abat Oliba and subsequently completed a vocational high-level training course in electrical engineering, which he passed without difficulties.¹²⁷³ He had secured a full-time job at a local welding and industrial maintenance company in January 2017, and his professional performance record in the construction sector had been, according to former co-workers, “excellent”.¹²⁷⁴ Younes was considered a timid, quiet type and described as having exceptionally good manners – someone who would often help older neighbours take their groceries up the stairs for them.¹²⁷⁵

Reports suggest that there were a number of changes in his behaviour in the months before the Ramblas incident. One of his neighbours stated that although prior to the attack the assailant would often spend time playing football with other local youths, he and some other young Moroccans had stopped partaking in these activities in the spring.¹²⁷⁶ The same seems to apply to drinking alcohol and smoking, which it is reported Younes had stopped doing when he began his welding job.¹²⁷⁷ Moreover, a former colleague reported that Abouyaaqoub’s professional demeanour had started to change at around the same time, in March, when he began to show an indifferent attitude towards his work.¹²⁷⁸ He started going to the local mosque every day to pray at midday, and failed to complete the tasks he was requested to do.¹²⁷⁹ A month before the attacks he had resigned from his job at the welding company.¹²⁸⁰ While it may be impossible to know whether the resignation was in connection to preparations for a larger attack, it has been suggested that Younes Abouyaaqoub might have hastily decided to carry

¹²⁶⁸ Reinares, F. and Garcia Calvo, C., ‘Spaniards, You Are Going to Suffer:’ The Inside Story of the August 2017 Attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils’, CTC Sentinel (2018).

¹²⁶⁹ Carretero, N., ‘Tímido, buen estudiante y fanático de los coches y el futbol: así era Younes Abouyaaqoub’, *El País*, 22 August 2017, available at: https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/08/21/actualidad/1503338036_400134.html, last visited: 23 January 2018.

¹²⁷⁰ Errazzouki, S., ‘La familia del sospechoso de Las Ramblas: “Hasta el año pasado, Younes era completamente normal”, *Publico*, 21 August 2017, available at: <http://www.publico.es/espana/atropello-ramblas-familia-sospechoso-ramblas-ano-pasado-younes-completamente-normal.html>, last visited: 23 January 2018.

¹²⁷¹ Álvarez, L., ‘Paraban el coche en el arcén para rezar’, *La Razón*, 20 August 2017.

¹²⁷² Carretero, N., ‘Tímido, buen estudiante y fanático de los coches y el futbol: así era Younes Abouyaaqoub’, *El País*, 22 August 2017.

¹²⁷³ Ibid.

¹²⁷⁴ Vargas Llamas, V., ‘Younes, el joven que cambio el futbol por el terrorismo’, *El Periódico*, 21 August 2017, available at: <http://www.elperiodico.com/es/sociedad/20170821/perfil-yihadista-younes-abouyaaqoub-autor-atentado-rambla-barcelona-6236915>, last visited: 23 January 2018.

¹²⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷⁷ ‘Younes Abouyaaqoub, el terrorista de Las Ramblas, trabajó como voluntario por el sí a la independencia de Cataluña’, *Alerta Digital*, 22 August 2017, available at: <http://www.alertadigital.com/2017/08/22/younes-abouyaaqoub-el-terrorista-de-las-ramblas-trabajo-como-voluntario-por-el-si-a-la-independencia-de-cataluna/>, last visited: 23 January 2018

¹²⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁸⁰ Somolinos, D., ‘Uno de los islamistas de Ripoll dejó una carta de despedida: “Pido Perdón”’, *El Mundo*, 21 August 2017, available at: <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2017/08/21/5999faff468aeb11278b4638.html>, last visited: 30 January 2018.

out the Las Ramblas attack after receiving a phone call from local police just two hours earlier, after they had found his number among some papers in the Alcanar house following an investigation into the 16 August explosion.¹²⁸¹

Abouyaaqoub's 19-year-old younger brother, Houssaine, was among the assailants killed in the Cambrils attack.¹²⁸² He worked as a deliveryman for a kebab restaurant in Ripoll and appeared to be a regular teenager who enjoyed climbing and rally racing.¹²⁸³ However, in the days prior to the attacks, he had been writing cryptic messages on his social media platforms, such as "peace for myself, hate for others", and had spent a lot of time at home, which was reportedly unusual for him.¹²⁸⁴ A close friend explained to the Spanish press that the two had discussed jihad before, and that "El Houssa" (as Houssaine was known) always said "that was awful, that Islam does not say anything about killing".¹²⁸⁵

The Abouyaaqoub brothers were first cousins of Mohamed and Omar Hychami, both of whom were killed by police during the Cambrils attack.¹²⁸⁶ The Hychami brothers were also born in Mrirt, Morocco,¹²⁸⁷ and moved to Ripoll with their family some years prior to the attack.¹²⁸⁸ The two brothers lived together in a social housing apartment block.¹²⁸⁹ The older of the two, 24-year-old Mohamed, was the one who had rented the vans used to carry out the attacks.¹²⁹⁰ He was a manager at a local education advisory firm called Conforsa, and reportedly earned a relatively good salary.¹²⁹¹ However, he had evidently adopted some particularly extreme views, and in a video found months after the attack he can be heard saying in Arabic, "Spaniards, you will suffer."¹²⁹² According to police sources, he served as the group's explosives expert.¹²⁹³ A female relative still living in Morocco reported that Mohamed was "the more conservative one" and that he is blamed for influencing his cousin, claiming that "up until last year, Younes was totally normal, but when he visited us earlier this year, he refused to shake our hands, just like Mohamed".¹²⁹⁴ The same relative pointed out that Mohamed had frequented nightclubs and drank alcohol, until his behaviour had changed a few years earlier.¹²⁹⁵

¹²⁸¹ Cerdán, M., 'Un mosso habló 4 minutos por teléfono con el terrorista de La Rambla dos horas antes de la matanza', *OK Diario*, 15 November 2017, available at: <https://okdiario.com/investigacion/2017/11/15/mosso-hablo-4-minutos-telefono-terrorista-rambla-dos-horas-antes-matanza-1516441>, last visited: 30 January 2018.

¹²⁸² 'Barcelona and Cambrils attacks: What we know so far', *BBC News*, 27 August 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40964242>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹²⁸³ 'Así vivía Houssaine, el terrorista muerto en Cambrils y hermano de Younes Abouyaaqoub', *La Sexta*, 21 August 2017, available at: http://www.lasexta.com/noticias/sociedad/asi-vivia-houssaine-el-terrorista-muerto-en-cambrils-y-hermano-del-huido-younes-abouyaaqoub_201708205999fe080cf2e2ea355994e2.html, last visited: 23 January 2018.

¹²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸⁵ Álvarez, L., 'Paraban el coche en el arcén para rezar', *La Razón*, 20 August 2017.

¹²⁸⁶ Peregil, F., 'Mi nieto no se ha educado en Marruecos', *El País*, 21 August 2017, available at: https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/08/20/actualidad/1503251931_200968.html?rel=mas, last visited: 23 January 2018.

¹²⁸⁷ 'Los hermanos Hychami de la célula de Ripoll, enterrados en Marruecos', *La Vanguardia*, 18 December 2017, available at: <http://www.lavanguardia.com/sucesos/20171217/433714253727/los-hermanos-hychami-de-la-celula-de-ripoll-enterrados-en-marruecos.html>, last visited: 23 January 2018.

¹²⁸⁸ Errazzouki, S., 'Moroccan suspect in Barcelona attack turned more conservative in past year', *Reuters*, 20 August 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-security-morocco-family/moroccan-suspect-in-barcelona-attack-turned-more-conservative-in-past-year-family-idUSKCN1B00SD>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹⁰ Two vans were rented for the attacks. One was used in the Ramblas ramming incident, and another one was abandoned near Cambrils after the accident. 'Los ataques terroristas en Cataluña al detalle', *El País*, 22 August 2018.

¹²⁹¹ Álvarez, L., 'Paraban el coche en el arcén para rezar', *La Razón*, 20 August 2017.

¹²⁹² 'Los terroristas de Cataluña: "Españoles, vais a sufrir"', *Diario Información*, 18 December 2017, available at: <http://www.diarioinformacion.com/nacional/2017/12/18/terroristas-cataluna-espanoles-sufrir/1969523.html>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²⁹³ Cerdán, M., 'La policía descubrió en un móvil que los yihadistas del 17-A querían poner una furgoneta bomba en el Camp Nou', *OK Diario*, 19 January 2018, available at: <https://okdiario.com/investigacion/2018/01/19/policia-descubrio-movil-yihadistas-del-17-querian-poner-furgoneta-bomba-camp-nou-1713731>, last visited: 30 January 2018.

¹²⁹⁴ Errazzouki, S., 'Moroccan suspect in Barcelona attack turned more conservative in past year - family', *Reuters*, 20 August 2018.

¹²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

The younger of the two brothers, 21-year-old Omar Hychami, has been described as a well-integrated and well-formed young man.¹²⁹⁶ In his high school years he was elected class representative by his peers, and was described as someone who inspired their trust.¹²⁹⁷ In the months prior to the attack, from January until March, he worked in a company involved in the construction of infrastructure and machinery for the agribusiness sector in the nearby town of Vic.¹²⁹⁸ During that same period, he reportedly requested sick leave on numerous occasions for alleged medical reasons, although Hychami's co-workers seem to have thought him a hard-working and well-mannered person.¹²⁹⁹ Omar's former manager and friend told Spanish media that he had noticed his behaviour had recently changed, and that he seemed "distant and dreamy".¹³⁰⁰ He was identified as the assailant who initially managed to escape and was responsible for stabbing the woman in the Cambrils attack.¹³⁰¹

Another of the assailants killed by police during the Cambrils attack was 17-year-old Moussa Oukabir. He had been born in Ripoll on 12 October 1999, and had both Moroccan¹³⁰² and Spanish nationality.¹³⁰³ He was initially believed to be the driver of the van used in the attack in Las Ramblas, as his older brother Driss told local police that Moussa had stolen his documentation to rent out the vehicle.¹³⁰⁴ Moussa Oukabir was considered an "example of integration" by his neighbours, and reportedly displayed "exemplary behaviour" at the Abat Oliva high school, at home and in the neighbourhood,¹³⁰⁵ where he had what was described as an "enviable reputation".¹³⁰⁶ According to a Spanish newspaper, during the summer of 2015, Moussa even worked as an event organiser for the light session of the Rich nightclub in Barcelona, situated just 200 metres away from Las Ramblas, which was particularly popular among teenagers from Maghrebi backgrounds.¹³⁰⁷ More recently, it appears he had been living in the city of Girona.¹³⁰⁸

Moussa Oukabir, however, began to display possible signs of moving towards more extreme attitudes. According to his sister, in the months prior to the attacks he had "thrown away all of his clothes, changed the way he dressed and his hairstyle" and would reprimand her for going out and smoking, encouraging her to instead "focus on praying and Allah".¹³⁰⁹ Moreover, the teenager had expressed radical views online. For example, when asked on the Kiwi platform what he would do if he was made king for a day, he replied, "I would kill all infidels, I would

¹²⁹⁶ 'Omar Hychami, educado y aparentemente integrado', *Diario Sur*, 20 August 2017, available at:

<http://www.diariosur.es/nacional/omar-hichamy-educado-20170820104915-ntrc.html>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²⁹⁷ 'Un terrorista abatido en Cambrils fue delegado de clase en el instituto', *El Periódico*, 19 August 2017, available at: <http://www.elperiodico.com/es/barcelona/20170819/amigos-yihadistas-ripoll-detallan-convivencia-sin-sombra-sospecha-atentados-terroristas-barcelona-rambla-6233583>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹²⁹⁸ 'Omar Hychami, educado y aparentemente integrado', *Diario Sur*, 20 August 2017.

¹²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰¹ Garcia, J., 'Seis días de horror y fuga', *El País*, 27 August 2017, available at:

https://elpais.com/ccaa/2017/08/26/catalunya/1503770170_859370.html, last visited: 2 February 2018.

¹³⁰² 'Identificados los cinco terroristas abatidos', *ABC*, 18 August 2017, available at: http://www.abc.es/espana/catalunya/abci-identificados-cinco-terroristas-abatidos-cambrils-201708182141_noticia.html, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹³⁰³ 'Barcelona and Cambrils attacks: who was Moussa Oukabir', *BBC News*, 19 August 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40977650>, last visited: 26 July 2018

¹³⁰⁴ Gálvez, J.J., 'Que papel jugo cada miembro de la célula yihadista', *El País*, 24 August 2017, available at: https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/08/23/actualidad/1503492526_678640.html, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹³⁰⁵ Vargas, V., '¿Quién le ha calentado la cabeza a Moussa?', *El Periódico*, 18 August 2018, available at: <http://www.elperiodico.com/es/sociedad/20170818/estupefacion-en-ripoll-por-los-vecinos-musulmanes-abatidos-y-detenidos-relacion-atentados-terroristas-6232098>, last visited: 30 January 2018.

¹³⁰⁶ Somolinos, D., 'El 'ejemplar' hermano menor de los Oukabir', *El Mundo*, 19 August 2018, available at: <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2017/08/19/5997418822601da8148b45f0.html>, last visited: 30 August 2018.

¹³⁰⁷ 'Moussa Oukabir, de montar la fiesta de la espuma a terrorista del ISIS', *El Mundo*, 5 September 2017, available at: <http://www.elmundo.es/cronica/2017/09/05/59aa847ae5fdea963d8b4621.html>, last visited: 30 January 2018.

¹³⁰⁸ 'Barcelona and Cambrils attacks: who was Moussa Oukabir', *BBC News*, 19 August 2017.

¹³⁰⁹ Pozas, A., 'Los terroristas de Cambrils se pasaban videos yihadistas en una tarjeta de memoria', *Cadena Ser*, 6 September 2018.

only spare Muslims who follow Islam.”¹³¹⁰ On Facebook he reportedly frequently shared videos displaying violence against the police, and posted photos showing him on a motorcycle carrying a gun.¹³¹¹ According to his older brother, he would often watch jihadist videos on a tablet device with the use of a memory card.¹³¹²

Moussa Oukabir’s 28-year-old brother, Driss Oukabir, was not among those killed in Cambrils, but he was subsequently arrested on suspicion of his involvement with the attacks. He admitted to having rented out the Las Ramblas van, but claimed he believed it would be used for removals.¹³¹³ The judge in charge of the case ordered his imprisonment, on account of evidence indicating his involvement with the group’s activities.¹³¹⁴ The judicial statement detailed how the suspect had arrived at Barcelona’s El Prat airport from Morocco on 13 August, just four days before the attacks.¹³¹⁵

According to those who knew them, the two brothers would often argue, as Moussa would reproach Driss for not being a strict enough Muslim, because he would use drugs and see girls.¹³¹⁶ Following the attacks, the Oukabir family claimed that the 28-year-old was a very “conflicted” and “problematic” person who would often get involved in brawls and incidents.¹³¹⁷

Finally, the fifth assailant killed in the Cambrils attack was 18-year-old Said Aallaa, who has been identified as the driver of the black Audi A3 used for the attack.¹³¹⁸ He was born in the Moroccan town of Naour¹³¹⁹ and moved with his family, including his two brothers Youseff and Mohammed, to Ripoll in 1999.¹³²⁰ Reportedly, he worked for a period of time in the town’s Bar Caneules, although he seldom went out “as he had to take care of his family”.¹³²¹ His boss described him as a “hard-working, agreeable, polished young man – a delight”.¹³²² He was part of Ripoll’s indoor football youth team, alongside fellow Cambrils assailant Moussa Oukabir.¹³²³ Following the attacks, local police found a note left in his room addressed to his parents, in which he asked for forgiveness: “I apologise to all those who I might harm during these days. Thank you for all you have given me.”¹³²⁴

Aallaa’s older brother, 27-year-old Mohammed, was arrested and kept in custody after the attacks for a brief period of time, before being released owing to a lack of evidence proving his involvement.¹³²⁵ He was the owner of the black Audi A3 used in Cambrils, which he had lent to

¹³¹⁰ ‘Moussa Oukabir, de montar la fiesta de la espuma a terrorista del ISIS’, *El Mundo*, 5 September 2017.

¹³¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹³¹² Pozas, A., ‘Los terroristas de Cambrils se pasaban videos yihadistas en una tarjeta de memoria’, *Cadena Ser*, 6 September 2018.

¹³¹³ Gálvez, J.J., ‘Que papel jugo cada miembro de la celula yihadista’, *El País*, 24 August 2017.

¹³¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³¹⁵ ‘El terrorista Driss Oukabir se mostró “desafiante” ante el juez y se negó a firmar su declaración’, *OK Diario*, 27 August 2017, available at: <https://okdiario.com/investigacion/2017/08/27/terrorista-driss-oukabir-mostro-desafiante-juez-nego-firmar-declaracion-1261511>, last visited: 26 January 2018.

¹³¹⁶ Álvarez, L., ‘Paraban el coche en el arcén para rezar’, *La Razón*, 20 August 2017.

¹³¹⁷ ‘El terrorista Driss Oukabir se mostró “desafiante” ante el juez y se negó a firmar su declaración’, *OK Diario*, 27 August 2017.

¹³¹⁸ ‘Identificados los cinco terroristas abatidos’, *ABC*, 18 August 2017.

¹³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³²⁰ ‘Barcelona: así era la vida de los jóvenes que se descarriaron y terminaron de terroristas’, *Semana*, 22 August 2017, available at: <http://www.semana.com/mundo/articulo/perfil-de-los-terroristas-de-barcelona-segun-lo-habitantes-de-ripoll/537214>, last visited: 30 January 2018.

¹³²¹ Álvarez, L., ‘Paraban el coche en el arcén para rezar’, *La Razón*, 20 August 2017.

¹³²² ‘El terrorista que almorzó en su casa, recibió llamada, salió y fue abatido en Cambrils’, *El Comercio*, 19 August 2018, available at: <https://elcomercio.pe/mundo/europa/terrorista-almorzo-casa-recibio-llamada-salio-abatido-cambrils-noticia-451529>, last visited: 30 January 2018.

¹³²³ ‘Uno de los terroristas abatidos exhibía armas en su cuenta de Facebook’, *La Vanguardia*, 19 August 2017, available at: <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20170819/43670571815/uno-terroristas-abatidos-exhibia-armas-cuenta-facebook.html>, last visited: 30 January 2018.

¹³²⁴ Somolinos, D., ‘Uno de los islamistas de Ripoll dejó una carta de despedida: “Pido Perdón”’, *El Mundo*, 21 August 2017.

¹³²⁵ ‘El padre de dos terroristas abatidos: ‘Yousseff llevaba un mes por Tarragona’’, *La Vanguardia*, 23 August 2018, available at: <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20170823/43759036929/padre-mohamed-aallaa-atentados-barcelona-ripoll.html>, last visited: 30 January 2018.

his younger brother, 22-year-old Yousseff, who claimed he was working in a nearby province and had not been seen by the family for a month.¹³²⁶ It was later confirmed that Yousseff Aallaa had been killed in the Alcanar explosion the day before the attacks were perpetrated, and that he was fully involved with the group's activities.¹³²⁷ According to their father, "During Ramadan, in July, they would go pray all day and also during the night with the imam. After Ramadan, Youssef had changed. He would take his brother's car and leave, saying he was going to find a job."¹³²⁸

Although Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils¹³²⁹ in an official statement, evidence demonstrating the group's direct involvement has not been discovered, and the extent to which the individuals in the cell were inspired by IS also appears unclear.¹³³⁰ According to Spanish counterterrorism and Defence Ministry experts, the so-called "Ripoll cell" could have been inspired by the ideas and strategy of the Egyptian radical Islamist group Jama'at al-Muslimin, popularly known as Takfir wal-Hijra,¹³³¹ considered among the most extreme and secretive Jihadi-Salafi sects.¹³³² The Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC) describes Takfir Wal-Hijra as promoting "jihad without rules", which involves "accepting non-Muslim practices such as drinking alcohol and drug trafficking as a cover for extremist activities".¹³³³

In this respect, those associated with that group do not follow many of the same strictures as other jihadist groups as part of a conscious strategy to avoid detection by authorities; sometimes wearing Western clothing, not eating halal, drinking alcohol and dancing,¹³³⁴ with the intention that this will allow members to present an image of integration and conceal their extremism from those around them.¹³³⁵ The Barcelona attackers may have avoided attracting police attention precisely because of their adherence to this "double life", particularly given that Spanish security services often relied on leads provided by members of the public for the nearly 200 jihadist arrests made in Catalonia during 2016 and 2017.¹³³⁶

Sources from the investigation have pointed to the 45-year-old imam, Abdelbaki es Satty, as the probable mastermind behind the attacks, as well as being the person responsible for the radicalisation of the young men in the cell.¹³³⁷ Es Satty, unlike most of the young assailants, had an extensive history of criminal behaviour – particularly in relation to trafficking and connections with Islamist extremism – and was already known to Spanish authorities.¹³³⁸ He was born in Madchar Athain in 1973, a province located 60 miles away from Tangier, in northern Morocco.¹³³⁹

¹³²⁶ Ibid.

¹³²⁷ 'La policia descubrió en un móvil que los yihadistas del 17-A querían poner una furgoneta bomba en el Camp Nou', *OK Diario*, 19 January 2018.

¹³²⁸ 'Barcelona: así era la vida de los jóvenes que se descarriaron y terminaron de terroristas', *Semana*, 22 August 2017.

¹³²⁹ 'Spain attacks: ISIS claims responsibility for Cambrils car rampage after Barcelona atrocity', *The Independent*, 19 August 2017, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/spain-attacks-isis-claims-responsibility-cambrils-barcelona-terror-car-rampage-latest-a7901731.html>, last visited: 30 January 2018.

¹³³⁰ Reinares, F. and Garcia Calvo, C., "Spaniards, You Are Going to Suffer: The Inside Story of the August 2017 Attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils", CTC Sentinel (2018).

¹³³¹ Balin, M., 'La doble vida de los soldados de Takfir', *Ideal*, 26 August 2017, available at: <http://www.ideal.es/nacional/doble-vida-soldados-20170826000012-ntrc.html>, last visited: 30 January 2018.

¹³³² 'El imán aleccionó a los terroristas en la corriente más clandestina del salafismo', *El País*, 26 August 2017, available at: https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/08/24/actualidad/1503585337_048149.html, last visited: 30 January 2018.

¹³³³ 'Takfir wal-Hijra', *Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium* [online], available at: <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/takfir-wal-hijra>, last visited: 30 January 2018.

¹³³⁴ 'El imán alecciona a los terroristas en la corriente más clandestina del salafismo', *El País*, 26 August 2017.

¹³³⁵ Ibid

¹³³⁶ Ibid.

¹³³⁷ 'Not A Textbook Case: Barcelona Attackers' Hometown Wonders How it Bred Terrorists', *National Public Radio*, 10 September 2017, available at: <https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/09/10/549142183/not-a-textbook-case-barcelona-attackers-hometown-wonders-how-it-bred-terrorists>, last visited: 30 January 2018.

¹³³⁸ 'Vida y obra del imán de Ripoll', *El País*, 17 September 2017, available at: https://elpais.com/caa/2017/09/02/catalunya/1504350598_171252.html, last visited: 13 February 2018.

¹³³⁹ 'Dentro del paraíso del hachís de Abdelbaki Es Satty, el imán de Ripoll', *El Mundo*, 22 August 2017, available at: <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2017/08/22/599b34a2268e3e00568b45cf.html>, last visited: 2 February 2018.

Prior to moving to Spain in 2002 he arranged for the immigration of undocumented Moroccan citizens from the Spanish autonomous city of Ceuta, in Northern Africa, to Algeciras, in southern Spain's Andalusia region.¹³⁴⁰ He was also reportedly involved in the smuggling of marijuana and hashish, activities he continued following his move to Spain.¹³⁴¹

In November 2002, es Satty was arrested for attempting to illegally bring a Moroccan man into Spain, a crime for which he was sentenced to six months in prison, which he did not serve in full.¹³⁴² During his time living in Jaen in southern Spain, es Satty shared a residence with an Algerian man called Belgacem Bellil, who would later go on to carry out a suicide bombing in 2003 against the Italian base of Nasiriya, Iraq, killing 28 people.¹³⁴³ In 2003, es Satty moved to the town of Vilanova I la Geltru, in the Barcelona province, where until 2005 he shared an apartment with Mohamed Mrabet Fashi, who has been accused of being the leader of a GICM (Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group) cell involved in recruiting and providing support to jihadists willing to carry out attacks for Al Qaeda in Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel.¹³⁴⁴ Mrabet Fashi was later sentenced to seven years in prison owing to his belonging to an Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist cell, however, he was subsequently absolved by Spain's Supreme Court in a 2010 appeal owing to irregularities in the evidence-gathering methods.¹³⁴⁵ In 2006, at least six detained members of the so-called Vilanova cell identified es Satty as a regular attendee and occasional organiser at their meetings, where other Muslim men were reportedly encouraged to carry out global jihad through suicide bombing attacks.¹³⁴⁶

According to investigatory reports, es Satty was not arrested as part of this counter-terror operation because Spanish police tapped the wrong phone number, which prevented officials from adequately monitoring him at the time.¹³⁴⁷ Sources from the investigation believe es Satty's move into Islamist extremism could have resulted from his contact with Mrabet Fashi.¹³⁴⁸ At Mrabet Fashi's home, police found documents providing guidelines for jihadists on how to avoid detection when living in Western societies, in line with the Takfir Wal Hijra doctrine.¹³⁴⁹

From 2010 to 2014, es Satty was imprisoned for attempting to smuggle 121 kg of hashish in his car into Spain from Morocco via Ceuta and Algeciras.¹³⁵⁰ In prison, he shared a cell with Rachid Aglif, who had been sentenced to 18 years in prison for his involvement in the Al Qaeda train bombing attacks in Madrid in 2004.¹³⁵¹ In April 2014, es Satty was released upon completing

¹³⁴⁰ 'Vida y obra del imán de Ripoll', *El País*, 17 September 2017.

¹³⁴¹ 'Dentro del paraíso del hachís de Abdelbaki Es Satty, el imán de Ripoll', *El Mundo*, 22 August 2017.

¹³⁴² 'El imán de Ripoll transportaba a marroquíes a España de forma ilegal', *El País*, 29 August 2017, available at: https://elpais.com/caa/2017/08/29/catalunya/1504004541_809943.html, last visited: 2 February 2018.

¹³⁴³ Reinares, F. and Garcia Calvo, C., "Spaniards, You Are Going to Suffer: The Inside Story of the August 2017 Attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils", CTC Sentinel (2018).

¹³⁴⁴ 'El Supremo absuelve a los islamistas de Vilanova condenados por "Yihadistas"', *El Mundo*, 5 February 2011, available at: <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/02/04/barcelona/1296821971.html>, last visited: 2 February 2018.

¹³⁴⁵ 'La Guardia Civil descarta en 5 cortos párrafos el vínculo de Es Satty con el yihadismo', *El Periódico*, 2 September 2017, available at: <https://www.elperiodico.com/es/politica/20170902/guardia-civil-despacho-parrafos-vinculacion-iman-ripoll-celula-6259506>, last visited: 16 February 2018.

¹³⁴⁶ 'La célula de Vilanova señalo al imán de Ripoll como uno de sus miembros pero Garzón no lo proceso', *OK Diario*, 28 August 2017, available at: <https://okdiario.com/investigacion/2017/08/28/celula-vilanova-senalo-iman-ripoll-uno-miembros-garzon-no-lo-proceso-1271861>, last visited: 2 February 2018.

¹³⁴⁷ 'Es Satty se fue de rositas en la 'Operación Chacal' porque la Policía pincho por error un móvil que no era el suyo', *OK Diario*, 31 August 2017, available at: <https://okdiario.com/investigacion/2017/08/31/satty-fue-rositas-operacion-chacal-policia-pincho-error-movil-no-suyo-1279456>, last visited: 2 February 2018.

¹³⁴⁸ 'Vida y obra del imán de Ripoll', *El País*, 17 September 2017.

¹³⁴⁹ 'Como aprendió el imán de Ripoll a ocultar su radicalización', *MSN Noticias*, 27 August 2017, available at: <https://www.msn.com/es-es/noticias/espana/c%C3%B3mo-aprendi%C3%B3-el-im%C3%A1n-de-ripoll-a-ocultar-su-radicalizaci%C3%B3n/ar-AAQOJmY?li=BBplW3c>, last visited: 13 February 2018.

¹³⁵⁰ 'Es Satty busco contactos con el ISIS en Marruecos', *El País*, 28 August 2017, available at: https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/08/27/actualidad/1503853935_796820.html, last visited: 2 February 2018.

¹³⁵¹ 'El imam de Ripoll "radicalizó" en dos meses a los autores de los atentados en Barcelona y Cambrils', *El Mundo*, 20 August 2017, available at: <http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2017/08/19/5997f791e5fdeaa3338b45a2.html>, last visited: 2 February 2018.

his sentence, as the judge determined he did not pose a danger and was well integrated; in prison, he never showed any signs of having become more extreme in his views, nor was he suspected of being an Islamist.¹³⁵² Es Satty moved to Ripoll in 2015, where he worked in the town's local mosque as an imam for some months, preaching for the local community.¹³⁵³ In 2016, he reportedly lived in Belgium from January to March, seeking employment near Vilvoorde, an area previously associated with Islamist extremism.¹³⁵⁴ In the town of Diegem, three miles away from Vilvoorde, he applied for a job as an imam at the local mosque.¹³⁵⁵ He was, however, rejected, as he failed to provide the required criminal history records, and also acted "suspiciously".¹³⁵⁶ It was further reported that es Satty had given sample sermons and that the mosque's president had considered them not appropriate for Diegen as they "did not follow the prophet" and were deemed "violent and extremist".¹³⁵⁷ It has been reported that Belgian police screened es Satty intensely, at the request of the mosque, and subsequently informed Catalan regional police of his whereabouts.¹³⁵⁸ In their reply the police had said that "he had no known links to radical groups" and was not on their radar.¹³⁵⁹ Months after the Barcelona attacks, the Spanish Intelligence Services (CNI) admitted that es Satty had in fact been an informant for the secret service during part of his time in prison, which may further explain why he was not considered a high-priority threat by Spanish law enforcement.¹³⁶⁰

In June 2016, es Satty returned to Ripoll, where he began working as an imam in the town's new Islamic prayer centre.¹³⁶¹ According to investigations, the imam first approached 22-year-old Yousseff Aallaa (killed in the Alcanar explosion) and 24-year-old Mohamed Hychami (killed in Cambrils), both of whom would subsequently assume leadership positions within the Ripoll cell and who had travelled to Zurich in December 2016, possibly to receive training in bomb-making.¹³⁶² Footage uncovered following the attacks shows Aallaa and Hychami purchasing acetone, pillow cases and ropes on 1 August, which it is suggested indicated they may have been the cell's explosives experts.¹³⁶³

It has been reported that it was through Hychami and Aallaa that es Satty gained the trust of the others in the group, benefitting from their existing family and social ties, which it has been suggested further facilitated the group's ability to remain beneath the radar.¹³⁶⁴ According to

¹³⁵² 'El imán de Ripoll no dio muestras de fanatismo en la cárcel', *El País*, 2 September 2017, available at: https://elpais.com/ccaa/2017/09/01/catalunya/1504298527_348926.html, last visited: 13 February 2018.

¹³⁵³ 'Quien era el iman Abdelbaki Es Saty, sospechoso de ser el cerebro de los ataques de Barcelona', *BBC World*, 21 August 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-40999976>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹³⁵⁴ 'Vilvoorde: The Brussels district fighting radicalisation with kindness', *The Independent*, 30 December 2015, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/vilvoorde-the-brussels-district-fighting-radicalisation-with-kindness-a6791186.html>, last visited: 13 February 2018.

¹³⁵⁵ 'El imán de Ripoll viaja a Bélgica para buscar trabajo', *El País*, 20 August 2018, available at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2017/08/20/actualidad/1503245675_934901.html, last visited: 13 February 2018.

¹³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵⁸ 'Belgium gave tip to Catalan police about imam before attack - source', *Reuters*, 24 August 2018, available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-spain-security-belgium/belgium-gave-tip-to-catalan-police-about-imam-before-attack-source-idUKKCN1B419P>, last visited: 13 February 2018.

¹³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶⁰ 'El CNI admite que tanteo como confidente al imán de Ripoll', *La Vanguardia*, 19 November 2017, available at: <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20171118/432954124996/el-cni-admite-que-tanteo-como-confidente-al-iman-de-ripoll.html>, last visited: 13 February 2018.

¹³⁶¹ Reinales, F. and García Calvo, C., "Spaniards, You Are Going to Suffer: The Inside Story of the August 2017 Attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils", CTC Sentinel (2018).

¹³⁶² 'Dos de los terroristas de Barcelona viajaron a Zúrich en diciembre', *El Periódico*, 25 August 2017, available at: <https://www.elperiodico.com/es/sociedad/20170825/dos-de-los-terroristas-de-barcelona-viajaron-a-zurich-en-diciembre-6245555>, last visited: 16 February 2018.

¹³⁶³ 'Las cámaras grabaron la compra del material para fabricar las bombas', *La Vanguardia*, 25 August 2017, available at: <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20170825/43783781478/atentado-barcelona-terroristas-cambrils-ultimas-horas.html>, last visited: 16 February 2018.

¹³⁶⁴ García, J., 'Seis días de horror y fuga', *El País*, 27 August 2017.

the relatives of those in the cell, es Satty had been meeting with the young men for more than a year, both inside his van¹³⁶⁵ and in secret apartments, while some of those in the cell pretended to barely know each other whenever they passed one another in public places.¹³⁶⁶ Moreover, it is reported that the cell members would never communicate over the internet or through encrypted messaging applications such as Telegram.¹³⁶⁷ When searching es Satty's apartment, investigators found several books providing guidance on how to undertake jihad, as well as how to conceal Salafist affiliations in Western settings, guidelines he appeared to have followed when interacting with the young men.¹³⁶⁸ This account of events appears to undermine previous suggestions that those in the cell may have been indoctrinated within just a couple of months.¹³⁶⁹ Rather, if the cell adhered to the doctrine of seeking to portray an image of apparent integration, the process by which the members adopted extreme beliefs and became convinced of the need to act through terrorist violence may have been hidden for a much longer period of time.¹³⁷⁰

In the months following the attacks, further information emerged regarding the Ripoll cell's plans, as well as the possibility of connections with other Islamist networks and organisations. The group had been regularly meeting in the Alcanar house for about the six months prior to the explosion but, according to Mohamed Houli, he and others in the cell had only been informed about the plans for an attack two months before the attack.¹³⁷¹ This timeframe coincides with the date es Satty told the local mosque he would be leaving for Morocco for family reasons, namely because his mother was sick, while telling his flatmate he was going on vacation.¹³⁷² It has been suggested that this may indicate that the explosives required to carry out the attacks began to be prepared in June, and that the vehicle-ramming attacks were subsequently precipitated after the 16 August accidental explosion in Alcanar, where es Satty and Youssef Aallaa were killed and Mohamed Houli seriously injured.¹³⁷³ According to police sources, the cell started to produce the TATP explosives in a Ripoll apartment but subsequently moved to Alcanar as the house was more appropriate for the scale of explosives the group was aiming to manufacture – around 250 kg.¹³⁷⁴ The explosives were most likely financed by the group members themselves, and some of the materials used to produce the TATP were stolen, as was the electricity required in the Alcanar house.¹³⁷⁵ The group also reportedly financed their activities through the sale of stolen jewellery and gold in Vinaros, a town close to Alcanar.¹³⁷⁶

¹³⁶⁵ 'Un año de reuniones en una furgoneta con el imán de Ripoll: así se radicalizaron los miembros de la célula terrorista', *La Sexta*, 22 August 2017, available at: http://www.lasexta.com/noticias/sociedad/un-ano-de-reuniones-en-una-furgoneta-con-el-iman-de-ripoll-asi-se-radicalizaron-los_20170821599ae0ab0cf2e2ea355afab0.html, last visited: 16 February 2018.

¹³⁶⁶ Garcia, J., 'Seis días de horror y fuga', *El País*, 27 August 2017.

¹³⁶⁷ 'España investiga viajes de yihadistas a París y Bruselas', *The Chicago Tribune*, 4 September 2017, available at: <http://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-bc-eur-gen-espaa-ataques-investigacion-20170904-story.html>, last visited 16 February 2018.

¹³⁶⁸ 'El imán de Ripoll tenía en casa los mismos libros de la Yihad que los terroristas del 11M', *OK Diario*, 1 September 2017, available at: <https://okdiario.com/investigacion/2017/09/01/iman-ripoll-tenia-casa-mismos-libros-que-terroristas-del-11m-1282296>, last visited: 16 February 2018.

¹³⁶⁹ 'El imam de Ripoll "radicalizó" en dos meses a los autores de los atentados en Barcelona y Cambrils', *El Mundo*, 20 August 2017.

¹³⁷⁰ 'Ha sido una captación tipo secta', *La Vanguardia*, 24 August 2017, available at: <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20170823/43742247437/proceso-radicalizacion-secta-atentado-barcelona.html>, last visited: 23 February 2018.

¹³⁷¹ 'El imán de Ripoll creó la célula terrorista en dos años tras salir de prisión en 2014', *El Correo*, 28 August 2017, available at: <http://www.elcorreo.com/politica/iman-ripoll-creo-20170828182829-ntrc.html>, last visited: 23 February 2018.

¹³⁷² Ibid.

¹³⁷³ Ibid.

¹³⁷⁴ 'Los terroristas comenzaron a fabricar el explosivo en Ripoll', *El Periódico*, 17 February 2018, available at: <https://www.elperiodico.com/es/politica/20180217/terroristas-atentados-catalunya-comenzaron-fabricacion-explosivo-ripoll-6628681>, last visited: 23 February 2018.

¹³⁷⁵ 'Los terroristas no iban a suicidarse y planeaban varios días de atentados en Barcelona', *El Periódico*, 17 September 2017, available at: <https://www.elperiodico.com/es/politica/20170917/los-terroristas-del-17-a-no-iban-a-suicidarse-y-planeaban-varios-dias-de-atentados-en-barcelona-6292066>, last visited: 23 February 2018.

¹³⁷⁶ 'La célula de Ripoll se financió con la venta de joyas en Vinaros', *Las Provincias*, 31 August 2017, available at: <http://www.lasprovincias.es/politica/celula-ripoll-financio-20170831001517-ntvo.html>, last visited: 23 February 2018.

According to investigations, the Ripoll cell had planned a series of attacks lasting several days, and thus initially had no intention of immediately carrying out suicide bombings.¹³⁷⁷ Indeed, Houli revealed that their original plan had been to detonate the hired vans, to go into hiding and to then continue carrying out attacks with home-made grenades and explosives belts.¹³⁷⁸ It is believed that the group may have conceived a plan to carry out a series of attacks not only in Barcelona but also in Paris.¹³⁷⁹ In Barcelona, the cell was planning to target the Sagrada Familia cathedral, and possibly FC Barcelona's Camp Nou Stadium; in Paris, the target may have been the Eiffel Tower.¹³⁸⁰ This would explain why, just two days before the attacks, Younes Abouyaaqoub and Omar Hychami had travelled to Paris and recorded footage of the Eiffel Tower, although this travel had led to initial suspicions that their trip might have involved a meeting with members of Islamic State while in that city.¹³⁸¹ The planned methods for this attack were, however, consistent with the Islamic State's guidance on carrying out attacks in Europe, which, it is believed, encourages larger and more sophisticated cells to strike, hide and then strike again.¹³⁸²

According to Moroccan intelligence, es Satty had been in contact with some of the individuals who had travelled from Morocco to Syria for the purpose of fighting with Islamic State, having undertaken his own trip to Morocco between 27 July and 9 August 2016.¹³⁸³ In the rubble of the Alcanar explosion, police officers found a green book belonging to es Satty with a handwritten message in Arabic which read, "In the name of Allah. The merciful. The compassionate. A brief letter from the Soldiers of the Islamic State in the land of Al-Andalus for the crusaders, the hateful, the sinners, the unjust, the corrupt."¹³⁸⁴ This appears to suggest that the group pledged its allegiance to Islamic State. Nevertheless, investigators have not been able to establish responsibility for the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils to any other individuals beyond the immediate Ripoll cell members.¹³⁸⁵

¹³⁷⁷ 'Los terroristas no iban a suicidarse y planeaban varios días de atentados en Barcelona', *El Periódico*, 17 September 2017.

¹³⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁷⁹ Callimachi, R., 'Cell Behind Barcelona Attack May Have Had Sights on Eiffel Tower', *The New York Times*, 24 January 2018, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/world/europe/isis-barcelona-attack.html>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹³⁸⁰ 'La célula de Ripoll quería atentar a la vez contra la torre Eiffel y la Sagrada Familia', *El Periódico*, 17 February 2018, available at: <https://www.elperiodico.com/es/politica/20180217/celula-ripoll-queria-atentar-simultaneamente-sagrada-familia-torre-eiffel-bcn-paris-6631870>, last visited: 23 February 2018.

¹³⁸¹ Ibid.

¹³⁸² Ibid.

¹³⁸³ 'Es Satty busco contactos con el ISIS en Marruecos', *El País*, 28 August 2017.

¹³⁸⁴ 'El juez no halla conexiones internacionales en el atentado yihadista de Barcelona', *El Independiente*, 28 December 2017, available at: <https://www.elindependiente.com/politica/2017/12/28/investigadores-conexiones-internacionales-atentado-yihadista-barcelona/>, last visited: 23 February 2018.

¹³⁸⁵ Ibid.

50. Turku Stabbing Attack

The Attack

Date: 18 August 2017

Day: Friday

Time: 4.00 pm

Country: Finland

Place: Turku

Area Type: City Centre - Commercial

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Knife

Target: Civilian - Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State - Inspired

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 8

Number of Fatalities: 2

Response: Shot & Arrested

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Abderrahman Bouanane

Age: 22

Country of Origin: Morocco

Nationality: Moroccan

Resident: Turku

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Sentenced - Life (under appeal)

NOTES:

On Friday 18 August at approximately 4.00 pm, two women were killed and eight people injured in a marauding stabbing attack that took place in and around the Central Market Square in Turku, Finland. Police were alerted to the event at 4.02 pm and were told a man had attacked pedestrians with a knife.¹³⁸⁶ The man appeared to specifically target women in the attack, only injuring male civilians when they were defending the women being targeted.¹³⁸⁷ Specifically, the attacker killed two women and wounded five other women, two men and a fifteen-year-old girl.¹³⁸⁸ A journalist who was an eyewitness at the scene claimed that a group of people chased the man, and that he was shouting, "Allahu Akbar."¹³⁸⁹ Witnesses at the scene report having

¹³⁸⁶ 'Moroccan suspect named over Finland stabbings in Turku', *BBC News*, 21 August 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40998646>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹³⁸⁷ 'Finland killings: Knifeman 'targeted women in Turku terror attack', *BBC News*, 19 August 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40985528>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹³⁸⁸ 'Finland 'terror' attack: Briton stabbed four times 'trying to save' women targeted in attack which left two dead', *The Telegraph*, 19 August 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/19/finnish-knifeman-moroccan-say-police/>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹³⁸⁹ 'Turun puukottaja poliisikuulustelussa: Allahu Akbar - huuto poisti pelon ja antoi voimaa', *Keskisuomalainen*, 20 March 2018, available at: <https://www.ksml.fi/kotimaa/Turun-puukottaja-poliisikuulustelussa-Allahu-akbar-huuto-poisti-pelon-ja-antoi-voimaa/1125545>, last visited: 2 August 2018

seen the man run to another nearby square, where he stabbed more people before being shot in the thigh by the police.¹³⁹⁰ He was then arrested at 4.05 pm local time.¹³⁹¹

The attacker was hospitalised following his arrest and was initially identified as an 18-year-old Moroccan man by the name of Abderrahman Mechkah.¹³⁹² However, it was subsequently discovered that the assailant had been using a false identity when trying to claim asylum as an unidentified minor.¹³⁹³ The man was not a teenager but in fact a 22-year-old, and his real name was found to be Abderrahman Bouanane.¹³⁹⁴

Investigators reported that, on the day of the attack, Bouanane had cycled into Turku from the city's outskirts, bringing two kitchen knives with him, before attending prayers at a mosque in the city.¹³⁹⁵ Initially the attacker had intended to target a soldier waiting at the bus station, but had instead attacked civilians in the main square.¹³⁹⁶

After the attack, the police detained four other Moroccan men over possible links to the attack, while a car was also seized, and an international search warrant was issued for a sixth individual.¹³⁹⁷ Bouanane appeared in court via a videolink days later, and it was determined that he would face charges of murder and several other counts of attempted murder with terrorist intent.¹³⁹⁸ Initially appearing reluctant to classify the attack as terrorism, the police subsequently stated that there were in fact indications of "some ideological feelings, background and thoughts".¹³⁹⁹ It was also reported that Finland's intelligence services were aware of Bouanane in relation to his Islamist extremism, having received information earlier in 2017.¹⁴⁰⁰ The police had been warned that he was "radicalized and interested in extremist thinking," however, with no further intelligence regarding a specific threat, his case had not been prioritised.¹⁴⁰¹ The Director of the Finnish Security and Intelligence Agency told YLE (the national broadcaster) that Bouanane was not among the 350 individuals being tracked by the agency for potential ties to terrorism,¹⁴⁰² and that it is possible that his extremism was developed online,¹⁴⁰³ with the attacker not believed to be part of larger extremist group or network.¹⁴⁰⁴ Another spokesman at the time of the attack

¹³⁹⁰ 'Finland stabbings: Two dead and suspect shot in Turku', *BBC News*, 19 August 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40978446>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹³⁹¹ 'Moroccan suspect named over Finland stabbings in Turku', *BBC News*, 21 August 2017.

¹³⁹² 'Finnish court names knife attack suspect as Abderrahman Mechkah', *The Guardian*, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/21/finnish-court-names-knife-attack-suspect-abderrahman-mechkah>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹³⁹³ 'Moroccan 'teenager' who killed two women in Finland terror attack is TWENTY-TWO as it emerges he lied about his identity and tried to claim asylum as an unaccompanied minor', *MailOnline*, 29 August 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4833636/Moroccan-teen-admit-killing-Turku-attack-22.html>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹⁵ 'NBI: Turku stabbing suspect radicalised three months before attack, inspired by ISIS propaganda', *YLE Uutiset*, 7 February 2018, available at: https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/nbi_turku_stabbing_suspect_radicalised_three_months_before_attack_inspired_by_isis_propaganda/10063538, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹³⁹⁶ 'KRP: Turuk puukottaja radikalisoitui noin kolme kuukautta ennen iskua - naki itsensa Isisin soturina', *YLE Uutiset*, 7 February 2018, available at: <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10050805>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹³⁹⁷ 'Fatal Knife Attack in Finland Is Investigated as Terrorism', *The New York Times*, August 19 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/19/world/europe/turku-finland-attack.html>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹³⁹⁸ 'Moroccan suspect named over Finland stabbings in Turku', *BBC News*, 21 August 2017.

¹³⁹⁹ 'Fatal Knife Attack in Finland Is Investigated as Terrorism', *The New York Times*, August 19 2017.

¹⁴⁰⁰ 'Moroccan asylum seeker, 18, suspected of stabbing dead two people in Finland terror attack was known to intelligence service as a suspected extremist but was NOT being monitored', *Daily Mail*, 21 August 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4808706/Moroccan-asylum-seeker-suspect-Finland-terror-attack.html>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹⁴⁰¹ 'Finland Attack Suspect, a Moroccan Youth, Was Flagged for Extremist View', *The New York Times*, 21 August 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/world/europe/finland-turku-abderrahman-mechkah.html>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹⁴⁰² 'Finish intelligence received tip-off on Moroccan stabbing suspect', *Reuters*, August 21 2017, available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-finland-stabbing/finnish-intelligence-received-tip-off-on-moroccan-stabbing-suspect-idUKKCN1B1ORQ?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹⁴⁰³ "Finland Attack Suspect, a Moroccan Youth, Was Flagged for Extremist View", *The New York Times*, 21 August 2017.

¹⁴⁰⁴ "Police: Finland stabber not part of wider extremist group", *Daily Mail*, 26 September 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-4921748/Police-Finland-stabber-not-wider-extremist-group.html>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

noted that the number of people in Finland being monitored had risen by 80% over the previous several years.¹⁴⁰⁵

Following the attack, police discovered a manifesto they believed to have been written by Abderrahman Bouanane and which the suspected attacker had posted across social media.¹⁴⁰⁶ The police stated that the document made numerous disparaging comments about Western religions.¹⁴⁰⁷ Officials also concluded that the document had been heavily influenced by Islamic State and Islamist ideology.¹⁴⁰⁸ After further investigations, in February of 2018 Finnish authorities reported that, while they continued to believe that the attacker had acted alone, they believed that he had “seen himself as a warrior, a soldier, an ISIS man” and that “he would have wanted ISIS to claim the attack”.¹⁴⁰⁹ Indeed, at the time of the attack Islamic State did not claim responsibility,¹⁴¹⁰ as has often been the case with incidents where the assailant was captured alive. Bouanane is reported to have closely followed the attacks in France and Belgium and anticipated that he too would die a martyr, and he expected to be shot by the police.¹⁴¹¹

The intelligence services reported finding Islamic State material on the suspect’s phone and computer, and claimed that he had started to become interested in this content three months prior to the attack taking place.¹⁴¹² Investigators suggested that the fall of the Islamic State stronghold in Raqqa may have been a catalyst for the suspected attacker becoming more radical in his outlook.¹⁴¹³ During his trial, Bouanane told the court that prior to carrying out his attack he had visited a mosque and recorded a video in which he spoke about American airstrikes against Islamic State in Syria.¹⁴¹⁴ Reportedly, Bouanane shared his video over the Telegram encrypted messaging service.¹⁴¹⁵

The suspected attacker, Abderrahman Bouanane is believed to have been born in Morocco in 1994, having previously given a false date for the year of his birth.¹⁴¹⁶ Although Bouanane is thought to have used a number of identities in recent years, he has been traced to having arrived in Germany in 2015.¹⁴¹⁷ While he did not file an asylum application in Germany, he was registered at several points across the country.¹⁴¹⁸ Prior to moving to Finland, Abderrahman was registered as living in Dortmund in North-Rhine Westphalia, and also as having lived in Lower Saxony.¹⁴¹⁹

¹⁴⁰⁵ ‘Finland Attack Suspect, a Moroccan Youth, Was Flagged for Extremist View’, *The New York Times*, 21 August 2017.

¹⁴⁰⁶ ‘NBI: Turku stabbing suspect radicalised three months before attack, inspired by ISIS propaganda’, *YLE Uutiset*, 7 February 2018.

¹⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴¹⁰ ‘Finland Attack Suspect, a Moroccan Youth, Was Flagged for Extremist View’, *The New York Times*, 21 August 2017.

¹⁴¹¹ ‘Finnish knife attacker who killed two identified with IS, police say’, *The Times of Israel*, 7 February 2018, available at: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/finnish-knife-attacker-who-killed-two-identified-with-is-police-say/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁴¹² ‘NBI: Turku stabbing suspect radicalised three months before attack, inspired by ISIS propaganda’, *YLE Uutiset*, 7 February 2018.

¹⁴¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴¹⁴ ‘Finland knife attacker says he was “in war against women”’, *Reuters*, 17 April 2018, available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-finland-stabbings/finland-knife-attacker-says-he-was-in-war-against-women-idUKKBN1H01RF>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁴¹⁵ ‘Mielentilatutkimus: Turun sarjapuukotuksesta syytetty Abderrahman Bouanane toimi täydessä ymmärryksessä’, *Inta Sanomat*, 9 March 2018, available at: <https://www.is.fi/kotimaa/art-2000005597201.html>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹⁴¹⁶ ‘Moroccan ‘teenager’ who killed two women in Finland terror attack is TWENTY-TWO as it emerges he lied about his identity and tried to claim asylum as an unaccompanied minor’, *MailOnline*, 29 August 2017.

¹⁴¹⁷ ‘Moroccan who admitted killing two in Finland was refused asylum’ *Reuters*, 22 August 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-stabbing-suspects/moroccan-who-admitted-killing-two-in-finland-knife-attack-was-refused-asylum-idUSKCN1B20NI>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴¹⁹ ‘Turku stabbing attacker had lived in Germany’, *DW*, 22 August 2017, available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/turku-stabbing-attacker-had-lived-in-germany/a-40195827>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

In January 2016, Abderrahman came to the attention of police in Neuss when he was investigated for an assault in a refugee shelter there.¹⁴²⁰ Two weeks after this event he was investigated for an incident of grievous bodily harm, this time in Kerpen.¹⁴²¹ Not long after that he arrived in Finland, in spring of 2016, where he filed for asylum.¹⁴²² It is believed this initial asylum application had been rejected and that at the time of the attack Bouanane was still living in a Red Cross asylum centre in Turku while appealing his rejected asylum application.¹⁴²³

Abderrahman Bouanane was found guilty of murder and eight counts of attempted murder at the end of his trial in June 2018, and sentenced to life in prison, a verdict he has subsequently appealed.¹⁴²⁴

51. Brussels Machete Attack

The Attack

Date: 25 August 2017

Day: Friday

Time: 8.20 pm

Country: Belgium

Place: Brussels

Area Type: City Centre - Commercial

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Knife

Target: Military

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Unknown

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 1

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Shot Dead

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Haashi Ayaanle

Age: 30

Country of Origin: Somalia

Nationality: Belgian-Somalian

Resident: Bruges

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Dead

NOTES:

At approximately 8.20pm on 25 August 2017, a man on Boulevard Émile Jacqmain, in central Brussels, was heard shouting “Allahu Akbar” before attempting to stab two soldiers from

¹⁴²⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴²¹ Ibid.

¹⁴²² ‘Finland Attack Suspect, a Moroccan Youth, Was Flagged for Extremist View’, *The New York Times*, 21 August 2017.

¹⁴²³ ‘Moroccan ‘teenager’ who killed two women in Finland terror attack is TWENTY-TWO as it emerges he lied about his identity and tried to claim asylum as an unaccompanied minor’, *MailOnline*, 29 August 2017.

¹⁴²⁴ ‘Turku stabber appeals decision’, *YLE*, 31 August 2018, available at: https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/turku_stabber_appeals_decision/10382282, last visited: 5 September 2018.

behind with a machete.¹⁴²⁵ ¹⁴²⁶ During the attack, one of the two soldiers was lightly injured, while the attacker was shot twice and later died in hospital.¹⁴²⁷ It was subsequently reported that the assailant had been in possession of a fake gun and two copies of the Quran.¹⁴²⁸

Shortly after the attacker had died of his injuries, the authorities declared the incident to be a terrorist attack.¹⁴²⁹ Belgium's federal prosecutors opened a terror probe into the attack shortly after the incident had been reported.¹⁴³⁰ When questioned about the details of the case, the mayor of Brussels told reporters that the incident was the work of a "lone individual".¹⁴³¹ A local witness told the press that during the attack it had been thought that the assailant had a bomb and that this was when he had been shot.¹⁴³² Islamic State claimed the Brussels attack in the group's news outlet Amaq, and the attack came in the context of IS having claimed responsibility for attacks in Spain and Finland the previous week.¹⁴³³ ¹⁴³⁴

While there appeared to be an initial reluctance on the part of the Belgian authorities to release the identity of the assailant, he was named as Haashi Ayaanle.¹⁴³⁵ He is reported to have been born in Somalia and having arrived in Belgium in 2004.¹⁴³⁶ Ayaanle had been granted asylum by 2009 and was made a Belgian citizen in 2015.¹⁴³⁷ He had been residing in social housing in Bruges at the time of the attack,¹⁴³⁸ and between 2013 and 2017 he worked as a welder for a construction company in Eeklor.¹⁴³⁹

It appears there had been no reports of problems of psychological instability until early in 2017. In April 2017, Ayaanle was involved in physically attacking colleagues, which led to his dismissal from his place of work.¹⁴⁴⁰ ¹⁴⁴¹ It is also reported that he was charged with assault and battery in February 2017.¹⁴⁴² Despite Ayaanle's claims at the time of this violence, it has been claimed that he was not subjected to racial abuse in the workplace.¹⁴⁴³ ¹⁴⁴⁴ His lawyer suggested that Ayaanle had mental health issues,¹⁴⁴⁵ and so upon this advice the police took Ayaanle to a psychiatric clinic.¹⁴⁴⁶ Doctors there judged that it would not be necessary to have him sectioned, but instead

¹⁴²⁵ Dearden, L., 'Brussels attacker shouted "Allahu Akbar" while stabbing soldiers in attempted terror attack', *The Independent*, 26 August 2017, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/brussels-attack-soldiers-stabbed-knife-man-somali-belgian-terror-isis-allahu-akbar-qurans-replica-a7913781.html>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁴²⁶ 'Machete-wielding man shot dead in Brussels terror attack after attacking soldiers', *The Telegraph*, 26 August 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/25/machete-wielding-man-shot-brussels-attacking-soldiers/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁴²⁷ Dearden, L., 'Brussels attacker shouted "Allahu Akbar" while stabbing soldiers in attempted terror attack', *The Independent*, 26 August 2017.

¹⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴²⁹ 'Machete-wielding man shot dead in Brussels terror attack after attacking soldiers', *The Telegraph*, 26 August 2017.

¹⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³⁵ Van den Berghe, C., 'Man die militairen aanviel in Brussel verbleef in april in psychiatrisch ziekenhuis', *VRT*, 28 August 2017, available at: <https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2017/08/28/man-die-militairen-aanviel-in-brussel-verbleef-in-april-in-psych/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁴³⁶ 'Brussels attack: Man shot after stabbing soldier', *BBC News*, 26 August 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41057304>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³⁹ 'Brussels attacker didn't need to be sectioned', *VRT*, 29 August 2017, available at: <http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws.english/News/1.3056836#>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴¹ Maeckelbergh, B., 'Aanvaller militairen ontsloeg zichzelf uit psychiatrie', *HLN*, 28 August 2017, available at: <https://www.hln.be/nieuws/aanvaller-militairen-ontsloeg-zichzelf-uit-psychiatrie-adb6d045/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁴⁴² 'Brussels attack: Man shot after stabbing soldier', *BBC News*, 26 August 2017.

¹⁴⁴³ 'Brussels attacker didn't need to be sectioned', *VRT*, 29 August 2017.

¹⁴⁴⁴ Maeckelbergh, B., 'Aanvaller militairen ontsloeg zichzelf uit psychiatrie', *HLN*, 28 August 2017.

¹⁴⁴⁵ 'Brussels attacker didn't need to be sectioned', *VRT*, 29 August 2017.

¹⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

convinced him to take treatment and be hospitalised voluntarily.¹⁴⁴⁷ After this, Ayaanle found a temporary employment and then broke off contact with his lawyer and the doctors.¹⁴⁴⁸

Those acquainted with the assailant claimed that he had never expressed any sentiments linking him to Islamist extremism, and nothing linking him with Islamic State was discovered at his apartment.¹⁴⁴⁹ However, since the attack it has emerged that Ayaanle's name has surfaced within Somalian Islamist circles operating in Europe.¹⁴⁵⁰ While investigators expressed doubt about the likelihood that Ayaanle had actively been in contact with Islamic State, there was evidence of his having communicated with a Somali extremist cell via the internet.¹⁴⁵¹ There is also evidence of the assailant having taken part in a telephone conversation in which Islamist terrorism was glorified.¹⁴⁵²

52. Buckingham Palace Attack

The Attack

Date: 25 August 2017

Day: Friday

Time: 8.30 pm

Country: United Kingdom

Place: London

Area Type: City Centre - Landmark

Location: Government Building - Exterior

Type of Attack: Vehicular & Knife

Target: Police

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor

Claimed: NA

Number of Injured: 3

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Subdued & Arrested

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Mohiussunnath Chowdhury

Age: 26

Country of Origin: United Kingdom

Nationality: British

Resident: Luton

Training/Combat Experience: No

¹⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴⁹ 'Somalier die militairen aanviel was wel jihadist en stak begin dit jaar al collega', *Nieuwsblad*, 28 August 2017, available at: https://www.nieuwsblad.be/cnt/dmf20170827_03038252, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁴⁵⁰ 'Bruxelles: l'assaillant était en contact avec des islamistes', *La Capitale*, 28 August 2017, available at: <http://www.lacapitale.be/118591/article/2017-08-28/bruxelles-lassaillant-etait-en-contact-avec-des-islamistes>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁴⁵¹ 'L'assaillant de Bruxelles en contact "avec une cellule fondamentaliste somalienne"', *7 sur 7*, 28 August 2017, available at: <http://www.7sur7.be/7s7/fr/3007/Bruxelles/article/detail/3243871/2017/08/28/L-assaillant-de-Bruxelles-en-contact-avec-une-cellule-fondamentaliste-somalienne.dhtml>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁴⁵² Ibid.

Known to Authorities: Unknown

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

At 8.30 pm on the evening of 25 August, an assailant drove a blue Toyota Prius along the wrong side of the road on London's Constitution Hill.¹⁴⁵³ The man drove his vehicle in a restricted area outside Buckingham Palace, close to a police van.¹⁴⁵⁴ As he did so, it is believed he may have been attempting to knock down three police officers.¹⁴⁵⁵ The policemen approached and confronted the driver about where he had parked his vehicle, at which point the attacker reached for a four-foot-long samurai sword and emerged from his vehicle, shouting, "Allahu Akbar."¹⁴⁵⁶ Although the police officers were unarmed they managed to subdue the assailant.¹⁴⁵⁷ In the course of the struggle, which lasted for roughly a minute,¹⁴⁵⁸ the three officers were lightly injured,¹⁴⁵⁹ and CS gas was used against the attacker.¹⁴⁶⁰ Two of the three injured officers were taken to hospital by ambulance for treatment for their injuries.¹⁴⁶¹

The man the police arrested was identified as Mohiussunnath Chowdhury, a 26-year-old from Luton.¹⁴⁶² The Bangladeshi press has written that Chowdhury was born in Bangladesh but that he has British citizenship and attended school in the Uxbridge area of West London.¹⁴⁶³ This was contradicted by reports in a British newspaper that Chowdhury was British-born but of Bangladeshi descent.¹⁴⁶⁴

It subsequently transpired that Chowdhury was an Uber taxi driver, and it is reported that on the day of the attack he had programmed his satellite navigation system to take him to Windsor Castle in Berkshire.¹⁴⁶⁵ He drove from Luton at 6.30 pm in the evening;¹⁴⁶⁶ however, he is believed to have entered the address incorrectly and as a result found himself at the Windsor Castle Pub not far from the destination for the attack.¹⁴⁶⁷ Chowdhury is reported to have then

¹⁴⁵³ Dodd, V., 'Buckingham Palace suspect with 4ft sword shouted 'Allahu Akbar', *The Guardian*, 26 August 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/aug/26/buckingham-palace-attacker-had-a-4ft-sword-police-say>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁵⁴ 'Buckingham Palace suspect was brandishing 4ft sword, police say', *BBC News*, 26 August 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-41055985>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁵⁵ Simpson, J., 'Buckingham Palace attack: suspect was 'Uber driver lost on way to Windsor', *The Times*, 1 September 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/buckingham-palace-attack-suspect-was-uber-driver-lost-on-way-to-windsor-mohiussunnath-chowdhury-zc99fq78q>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁵⁶ Bird, S., Harley, N. and Harrison, S., 'Buckingham Palace knifeman had 4ft sword and shouted 'Allahu Akbar', police reveal', *The Telegraph*, 26 August 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/25/buckingham-palace-lockdown-man-sword-attacks-officer/>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁵⁷ 'Buckingham Palace suspect was brandishing 4ft sword, police say', *BBC News*, 26 August 2017.

¹⁴⁵⁸ Rawlinson, K., 'Second man held after sword attack at Buckingham Palace', *The Guardian*, 27 August 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/aug/27/buckingham-palace-attack-second-man-held>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁵⁹ Dodd, V., 'Buckingham Palace suspect with 4ft sword shouted 'Allahu Akbar', *The Guardian*, 26 August 2017.

¹⁴⁶⁰ Bird, S., Harley, N. and Harrison, S., 'Buckingham Palace knifeman had 4ft sword and shouted 'Allahu Akbar', police reveal', *The Telegraph*, 26 August 2017.

¹⁴⁶¹ Baker, K., 'Uber driver, 26, denies attacking police officers with a 4ft samurai sword after shouting 'Allahu Akbar' outside Buckingham Palace', *Daily Mail*, 15 January 2018, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5270511/Uber-driver-allegedly-attacked-police-officers-sword.html>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁶² Dodd, V., 'Palace terror suspect was Uber driver who had tried to get to Windsor Castle', *The Guardian*, 1 September 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/sep/01/buckingham-palace-terror-suspect-had-tried-to-get-to-windsor-castle>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁶³ Khanna, A., 'Bangladeshi-born British citizen charged in Buckingham Palace attack', *Dhaka Tribune*, 1 September 2017, available at: <http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/crime/2017/09/01/bangladeshi-born-british-citizen-charged-buckingham-palace-attack/>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁶⁴ Gardham, D., Southern, K. and Greenwood, C., "'Terrorist' Uber driver, 26, 'left note vowing "The Queen and her soldiers will all be in hellfire" before attacking police outside Buckingham Palace with a 4ft samurai sword"', *Daily Mail*, 31 August 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4840162/Man-arrested-terror-offences.html>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁶⁵ Simpson, J., 'Buckingham Palace attack: suspect was 'Uber driver lost on way to Windsor', *The Times*, 1 September 2017.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Ward, V., 'Buckingham Palace: Terror suspect headed for Windsor Castle but found himself at pub of the same name', *The Telegraph*, 31 August 2017, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/31/buckingham-palace-man-charged-terror-offence-arrested-4ft-sword/>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁶⁷ Simpson, J., 'Buckingham Palace attack: suspect was 'Uber driver lost on way to Windsor', *The Times*, 1 September 2017.

proceeded to drive through central London and along the Mall outside Buckingham Palace before driving his car towards the police outside the Palace itself.¹⁴⁶⁸ Shortly before setting off, Chowdhury had purchased a knife sharpener from a supermarket, which it is assumed he had intended to use to sharpen the blade he used during the attack.¹⁴⁶⁹

A message was subsequently found, which Chowdhury is accused of having written to his 23-year-old sister.¹⁴⁷⁰ It is reported that the note had been left on his sister's laptop.¹⁴⁷¹ The note is alleged to have said, "To my dearest sister, by the time you read this Insha'Allah I will be with Allah," and continued, "Do not cry and be strong. The Shaheed will take 70 members of his family with him to paradise. I will take you there Insha'Allah."¹⁴⁷² The letter is also reported as saying, "Tell everyone I love them and that they should struggle against the enemies of Allah ...The Queen and her soldiers will all be in the hellfire, they go to war with Muslims around the world and kill them without any mercy."¹⁴⁷³ It is reported that during his interrogation, Chowdhury told police that he was upset about deaths in Yemen and the British government selling arms to Saudi Arabia.¹⁴⁷⁴

A 30-year-old man in west London was arrested on 27 August in connection with the attack outside Buckingham Palace,¹⁴⁷⁵ but he was released on 30 August without any charges being brought against him.¹⁴⁷⁶ Chowdhury appeared in court on 31 August when he was charged with engaging in preparation to commit an act or acts of terrorism.¹⁴⁷⁷ On 15 January 2018, Chowdhury entered a plea of not guilty,¹⁴⁷⁸ and the trial was scheduled to take place in June 2018.¹⁴⁷⁹ On Friday 29 July 2018, after almost 19 hours of deliberations, the jury was dismissed, having failed to reach a verdict.¹⁴⁸⁰ Chowdhury denied having the intent to commit an act of terrorism, claiming instead that he just wanted to get himself killed.¹⁴⁸¹ The prosecutor has said that he will seek a retrial, and the judge has remanded Chowdhury in custody until that date.¹⁴⁸²

¹⁴⁶⁸ Burns, I., "The Queen and her soldiers will all be in hellfire': Note 'written by Uber driver terrorist' who 'got LOST trying to find Windsor Castle before he drove to Buckingham Palace and attacked police with 4ft sword'", *Daily Mail*, 31 August 2017, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4842216/Suspect-went-Windsor-Castle-GPS-sent-PUB.html>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁶⁹ Dearden, L., 'Isis-supporting Uber driver attempted Buckingham Palace terror attack 'because he hated Queen', court hears', *The Independent*, 18 June 2018, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/buckingham-palace-sword-attack-isis-queen-windsor-satnav-mohiussunnath-chowdhury-a8404921.html>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Burns, I., "The Queen and her soldiers will all be in hellfire': Note 'written by Uber driver terrorist' who 'got LOST trying to find Windsor Castle before he drove to Buckingham Palace and attacked police with 4ft sword'", *Daily Mail*, 31 August 2017.

¹⁴⁷¹ Gardham, D. and Gordon, A., "'ISIS-supporting' Uber driver 'attacked police with 4ft Samurai sword outside Buckingham Palace after plotting suicide terror attack because of his hatred for the Queen'", *Daily Mail*, 18 June 2018, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5856771/ISIS-supporting-Uber-driver-attacked-police-outside-Buckingham-Palace.html>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁷² Burns, I., "The Queen and her soldiers will all be in hellfire': Note 'written by Uber driver terrorist' who 'got LOST trying to find Windsor Castle before he drove to Buckingham Palace and attacked police with 4ft sword'", *Daily Mail*, 31 August 2017.

¹⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷⁴ 'Jury fails to reach verdict in Buckingham Palace terror trial', *BBC News*, 29 June 2018, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-44661069>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁷⁵ Rawlinson, K., 'Second man held after sword attack at Buckingham Palace', *The Guardian*, 27 August 2017.

¹⁴⁷⁶ 'Police release second man held over Buckingham Palace incident', *Reuters*, 30 August 2017, available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-security/police-release-second-man-held-over-buckingham-palace-incident-idUKKCN1BA24C>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁷⁷ 'Buckingham Palace sword suspect charged with terrorism offence', *The Guardian*, 31 August 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/aug/31/buckingham-palace-sword-suspect-charged-with-terror-offence>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁷⁸ Dearden, L., 'Buckingham Palace sword attack: Uber driver accused of injuring police officers denies terror offences', *The Independent*, 15 January 2018, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/buckingham-palace-sword-attack-uber-driver-police-officers-injure-terror-offences-isis-terror-a8160451.html>, last visited: 25 July 2018.

¹⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸⁰ Pennink, E., 'Jury fail to reach verdict in trial of Uber driver accused of plotting a sword attack on police outside Buckingham Palace', *The Mirror*, 29 June 2018, available at: <https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/jury-fail-reach-verdict-trial-12820533>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁴⁸¹ 'Jury in Buckingham Palace sword plot trial discharged', *The Guardian*, 29 June 2018, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jun/29/jury-in-buckingham-palace-sword-plot-trial-discharged>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁴⁸² *Ibid.*

53. Lettershandoney Foiled Bombing

The Attack

Date: 30 August 2017

Day: Wednesday

Time: Unknown

Country: United Kingdom

Place: Lettershandoney

Area Type: Rural – Residential

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Foiled Bombing

Target: Unknown

Ideology: Separatist/Nationalist

Organisation/Affiliation: Unknown

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Not Apprehended

The Assailants

Number: Unknown

Gender: Unknown

Name: Unknown

Age: Unknown

Country of Origin: Unknown

Nationality: Unknown

Resident: Unknown

Training/Combat Experience: Unknown

Known to Authorities: Unknown

Current Status: At Large

NOTES:

On Friday 1 September, it was reported that police in Northern Ireland had located what has been described as a viable device in the Oeghill Park area of Lettershandoney, a village close to Londonderry.¹⁴⁸³ Two days earlier, on Wednesday 30 August, unnamed dissident Republicans had used intermediaries to communicate to police that there was a bomb in that area.¹⁴⁸⁴ Some 15 families were evacuated from their homes while a security alert continued over a two-day period.¹⁴⁸⁵ Roads were also put under lockdown overnight.¹⁴⁸⁶ Police blamed the amount of time it took to locate the device on the dissidents' use of intermediaries and the fact that they had been provided with unclear and contradictory information¹⁴⁸⁷

¹⁴⁸³ 'Device found after Lettershandoney 'bomb' claim,' *BBC News*, 1 September 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-41115720>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

¹⁴⁸⁴ 'Bomb near Londonderry, dissident republicans claim', *Belfast Telegraph*, 1 September 2017, available at: <https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/bomb-near-londonderry-dissident-republicans-claim-36091143.html>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁴⁸⁵ 'Londonderry security alert: Residents back home,' *BBC News*, 31 August 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-41102433>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

¹⁴⁸⁶ 'Tell us where you put the bomb: Derry police officer', *Derry Journal*, available at: <https://www.derryjournal.com/news/tell-us-where-you-put-the-bomb-derry-police-officer-1-8130751>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

¹⁴⁸⁷ 'PSNI call on dissidents to provide accurate info over 'bomb' claims,' *ITV News*, available at: <http://www.itv.com/news/utv/update/2017-09-01/psni-call-on-dissidents-to-provide-accurate-info-over-bomb-claims/>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

No further information is known to have been made publicly available about which dissident group may have been behind the incident, or which individuals were involved. Other than stating that the device was viable,¹⁴⁸⁸ there is a lack of further information about the nature of the explosive discovered.

54. Chatelet Metro Station Stabbing

The Attack

Date: 15 September 2017

Day: Friday

Time: 6.30 am

Country: France

Place: Paris

Area Type: City Centre – Transport

Location: Metro Station – Exterior

Type of Attack: Knife

Target: Military

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Omar M.

Age: 39

Country of Origin: Morocco

Nationality: French–Moroccan

Resident: Paris

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

At 6.30 am on Friday 15 September, an assailant attacked an on-duty soldier at the Chatelet-les-Halles Metro station in Paris. The soldier was on duty as part of the counter-terrorist Sentinelle force and was approached from behind and threatened with a seven-inch-long knife held to his throat.¹⁴⁸⁹ According to police reports, the suspect had shouted “Allahu Akbar” and made statements associating himself with Islamic State before the soldier managed to subdue and arrest the attacker.¹⁴⁹⁰ There were no casualties or injuries caused during the incident.

¹⁴⁸⁸ ‘Device found after Lettershantoney ‘bomb’ claim,’ *BBC News*, 1 September 2017.

¹⁴⁸⁹ ‘Militaire attaqué à Chatelet-Les-Halles : les policiers et soldats régulièrement pris pour cible depuis 2012’, *LCI*, 15 September 2017, available at: <https://www.lci.fr/faits-divers/militaire-de-sentinelle-attaque-a-paris-a-chatelet-les-halles-les-policiers-et-les-soldats-regulierement-pris-pour-cible-depuis-2012-2054410.html>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁴⁹⁰ ‘Un militaire de Sentinelle agressé à la station Chatelet de Paris’, *BFMTV*, 15 September 2017, available at: <http://www.bfmtv.com/police-justice/un-militaire-de-sentinelle-agresse-a-la-station-chatelet-de-paris-1256522.html>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

The assailant was subsequently identified as a 39-year-old and was named by the authorities as Omar M.¹⁴⁹¹ Omar was reported to be a Moroccan-born naturalised French citizen.¹⁴⁹² The man is understood to be married and the father of a one-year-old daughter.¹⁴⁹³ Although he was not known to police in connection with violent extremism and had no criminal record, he is believed to have become known to the French intelligence services in 2008 on account of his involvement with an organisation associated with a radical Islamist movement.¹⁴⁹⁴

According to the man's lawyers, he carried out the attack because he sought to commit suicide, as he suffered from severe depression and other mental health issues.¹⁴⁹⁵ Omar M. also told investigators that he had often experienced a feeling of being followed on the streets by the intelligence services, and some of the other comments he made in custody may indicate the presence of some mental disturbance.¹⁴⁹⁶ Sources from the investigation reported that they believed the incident to have been an isolated act.¹⁴⁹⁷

Before carrying out his attack, the assailant left a note, written on the back of an envelope, which read, "I apologise."¹⁴⁹⁸ While in detention, he admitted that he had sought to target the military, and was subsequently indicted for the attempted murder of a person in charge of public authority for terrorist ends.¹⁴⁹⁹ He was placed in custody at the Fresnes prison in Val-de-Marne, located in Ile-de-France.¹⁵⁰⁰

55. Parsons Green Bombing

The Attack

Date: 15 September 2017

Day: Friday

Time: 8.20 am

Country: United Kingdom

Place: London

Area Type: Suburban – Transport

Location: Train – Interior

Type of Attack: Bombing

Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

¹⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹² 'Paris : un militaire attaqué, le parquet antiterroriste saisi', *Le point*, 15 September 2017, available at: http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/paris-un-militaire-de-l-operation-sentinelles-attaque-aucun-blesse-15-09-2017-2157172_23.php, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁴⁹³ 'Paris attaque contre un militaire à Chatelet : le suspect affirme qu'il voulait "se suicider". Il a été écroué.', *Actu17*, 19 September 2017, available at: <https://actu17.fr/paris-attaque-contre-militaire-a-chatelet-suspect-affirme-quil-voulait-se-suicider-a-ete-ecroue/>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁴⁹⁴ 'Un militaire de Sentinelle agressé à la station Chatelet de Paris', *BFMTV*, 15 September 2017.

¹⁴⁹⁵ 'Paris attaque contre un militaire à Chatelet : le suspect affirme qu'il voulait "se suicider". Il a été écroué.', *Actu17*, 19 September 2017.

¹⁴⁹⁶ 'Attaque contre un militaire à Chatelet : L'agresseur mis en examen et écroué', *20 minutes*, 18 September 2017, available at: <https://www.20minutes.fr/paris/2135179-20170918-video-attaque-contre-militaire-chatelet-agresseur-mis-examen-ecroue>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹⁹ 'Attaque d'un militaire près du métro de Chatelet à Paris : l'agresseur mis en examen', *Huffington Post*, 18 September 2017, available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2017/09/18/attaque-dun-militaire-proche-de-chatelet-a-paris-lagresseur-mis-en-examen_a_23213892/, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁵⁰⁰ 'Attaque contre un militaire à Chatelet : Le suspect voulait "se suicider", selon ses avocats', *20 minutes*, 19 September 2017, available at: <https://www.20minutes.fr/societe/2135543-20170919-attaque-contre-militaire-chatelet-suspect-voulait-suicider-selon-avocats>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Affiliated

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 30

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Ahmed Hassan

Age: 18

Country of Origin: Iraq

Nationality: Iraqi

Resident: Sunbury

Training/Combat Experience: Unknown

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Sentenced – Life

NOTES:

At 8.20 am on Friday 15 September, a bomb detonated in the rear carriage of a subway train at Parsons Green station in west London.¹⁵⁰¹ The passengers on the rush-hour commuter train reported witnessing a flash and a fireball in the carriage as the device exploded.¹⁵⁰² In all, 30 people were injured, several hurt during the rush to escape the station, and at least one person sustained life-changing burns to the face.¹⁵⁰³ However, there were no fatalities on account of the fact that the main explosive in the device did not detonate.¹⁵⁰⁴ Had the bomb fully exploded as intended, analysts have warned that dozens could have been killed in the blast.¹⁵⁰⁵

The home-made explosive appears to have been relatively crude. Constructed inside a plastic bucket and placed in a supermarket shopping bag, the bomb contained triacetone triperoxide (TATP),¹⁵⁰⁶ which has sometimes been described as an Islamic State signature explosive.¹⁵⁰⁷ While it has been used as an explosive in the Manchester Arena bombing¹⁵⁰⁸ and in a number of IS attacks in Europe, including Paris¹⁵⁰⁹ and Brussels,¹⁵¹⁰ it is not exclusive to IS, with Al Qaeda having trained the American bomb plotter Najibullah Zazi in the making of TATP

¹⁵⁰¹ 'The unlikely suburban backdrop to London's latest terror attack', *CNN*, 15 September 2017, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/15/europe/parsons-green-london-terror-attack/index.html>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹⁵⁰² 'Fireball' On London Tube A Terror Attack, Homemade Bomb Used', *NDTV*, 15 September 2017, available at: <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/fireball-on-london-tube-a-terror-attack-used-homemade-bomb-1750906>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁵⁰³ 'Parsons Green: Teenager Ahmed Hassan accused of buying parts on Amazon to build Tube bomb', *The Telegraph*, 22 September 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/22/parsons-green-teenager-charged-attempted-murder-tube-attack/>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹⁵⁰⁴ 'Parsons Green bomb could have left dozens of people dead if it had detonated properly, experts warn', *Evening Standard*, 15 September 2017, available at: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/experts-warn-parsons-green-bomb-could-have-left-several-dead-if-it-had-detonated-properly-a3636246.html>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰⁶ 'London attack: Parsons Green bomb contained 'mother of Satan' explosive used in Manchester bombing', *The Independent*, 16 September 2017, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/london-attack-parsons-green-bomb-tube-underground-mother-isis-of-satan-tatp-explosive-manchester-a7950106.html>, last viewed 2 August 2018

¹⁵⁰⁷ 'A Signature ISIS Explosive in Europe', *The New York Times*, 20 March 2016, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/europe/100000004281038/isis-signature-explosive-in-europe.html>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁵⁰⁸ 'London attack: Parsons Green bomb contained 'mother of Satan' explosive used in Manchester bombing', *The Independent*, 16 September 2017.

¹⁵⁰⁹ 'A Signature ISIS Explosive in Europe', *The New York Times*, 20 March 2016.

¹⁵¹⁰ 'Manchester bomb used same explosive as Paris and Brussels attacks, says US lawmaker', *The Guardian*, 25 May 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/25/manchester-bomb-same-explosive-paris-brussels-attacks-mike-mccaul>, last visited: 2 August 2018

explosives,¹⁵¹¹ and TATP was also used in the 21 July 2005 failed London underground bombs.¹⁵¹² The explosive is known to be extremely volatile and can be triggered by heat or friction,¹⁵¹³ meaning that it is possible that the bomb went off earlier than intended, while the train was still above ground. The bomb also contained the additional elements of hydrogen peroxide and sulphuric acid, with the assailant having reportedly acquired these chemicals through Amazon.¹⁵¹⁴ The improvised bomb had been filled with metal nails, screws, bolts and screwdrivers to maximise injuries,¹⁵¹⁵ and used fairy lights as part of the detonator which was attached to a timer.¹⁵¹⁶

The day after the attack, police arrested 18-year-old Ahmed Hassan at the port in Dover as he attempted to board a Channel ferry crossing to France.¹⁵¹⁷ Hassan was identified as the primary suspect, and on 22 September he was charged with preparing explosives and for attempted murder,¹⁵¹⁸ charges to which he would subsequently plead not guilty.¹⁵¹⁹ A further six individuals were taken in for questioning as part of investigations into the Parsons Green attack; however, all of these individuals were later released without charge.¹⁵²⁰

Ahmed Hassan was born in Iraq in 1999¹⁵²¹ to a Kurdish family living in Baghdad.¹⁵²² He reported that both his parents had been killed by the time he was six years old.¹⁵²³ After the loss of his parents, Hassan's uncle took him and his brother to live in Jalawla in northern Iraq.¹⁵²⁴ If the initial version of events Hassan gave to immigration officials and social workers is to be believed, Islamic State took him by force and threatened to kill his brother and his uncle.¹⁵²⁵ During an interview with the UK Home Office, Hassan reported that he had spent three months with Islamic State, explaining, "They trained us on how to kill. It was all religious based."¹⁵²⁶ Hassan claims that he and others were liberated from the IS training camp by Iraqi soldiers and that he then travelled to Turkey and from there into Europe and France.¹⁵²⁷ In 2015 he came to

¹⁵¹¹ 'An ordinary American terrorist', *CNN*, 20 September, 2016, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/19/opinions/new-york-bombing-suspect-typical-bergen/index.html>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵¹² 'We've never seen a bomb like 21/7 devices', *The Telegraph*, 11 July 2007, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1557106/Weve-never-seen-a-bomb-like-217-devices.html>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵¹³ 'Home-made explosives: the facts', *The Independent*, 16 July 2005, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/home-made-explosives-the-facts-5346605.html>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁵¹⁴ 'Iraqi teenager appears in court accused of Parsons Green bombing', *The Guardian*, 22 September 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/sep/22/man-charged-over-parsons-green-tube-bombing>, last visited: 3 August 2018

¹⁵¹⁵ 'Parsons Green: Alleged bomber 'trained by IS in Iraq'', *BBC News*, 6 March 2018, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43318098>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵¹⁶ 'London terror attack: Bucket was packed with nails and Mother or Satan explosive', *The Times*, 16 September 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/london-terror-attack-bucket-on-district-line-train-at-parsons-green-was-packed-with-nails-and-mother-of-satan-tatp-explosive-0828r5lt2>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵¹⁷ 'Iraqi teenager appears in court accused of Parsons Green bombing', *The Guardian*, 22 September 2017.

¹⁵¹⁸ 'Man charged with parsons green tube attack', *Metropolitan Police News*, September 22 2017, available at: <http://news.met.police.uk/news/man-charged-with-parsons-green-tube-attack-261915>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵¹⁹ 'Teenager denies Parsons Green terror attack charges', *The Guardian*, 19 January 2018, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jan/19/ahmed-hassan-mohammed-ali-denies-parsons-green-terror-attack-charges>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵²⁰ 'Parsons Green Bombing: three men released without charge', *The Guardian*, 26 September 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/sep/26/parsons-green-bombing-three-men-released-without-charge>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵²¹ 'Parsons Green: Alleged bomber 'trained by IS in Iraq'' *BBC News*, 7 March 2018.

¹⁵²² 'Parsons Green attack: 'I was recruited by Isis... They trained us on how to kill'', *The Times*, 16 March 2018, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/teacher-saw-whatsapp-from-isis-on-bombers-phone-0clnddtw0>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵²³ 'Parsons Green tube bomber Ahmed Hassan jailed for life', *The Guardian*, 23 March 2018, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/23/parsons-green-tube-bomber-ahmed-hassan-jailed-for-life>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵²⁴ 'Parsons Green attack: 'I was recruited by Isis... They trained us on how to kill'', *The Times*, 16 March 2018.

¹⁵²⁵ 'Parsons Green: Alleged bomber 'trained by IS in Iraq'' *BBC News*, 7 March 2018.

¹⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵²⁷ 'Parsons Green attack: 'I was recruited by Isis... They trained us on how to kill'', *The Times*, 16 March 2018.

the unofficial Calais migrant camp by the English Channel, known commonly as “the jungle”.¹⁵²⁸ Hassan claims that it was during his time there that he was encouraged to fabricate stories to assist his asylum case, and in court he claimed that this was the origin of his story about training with Islamic State, changing his story and denying that he had ever actually spent time with the group.¹⁵²⁹ He explained instead that he came from a wealthy and safe part of Iraq and claimed that he had wanted to leave Iraq so that he could study.¹⁵³⁰

Leaving Calais in October 2015, Ahmed Hassan had managed to illegally smuggle himself into the United Kingdom in the back of a lorry.¹⁵³¹ Police found him near Gatwick airport, south of London, and he was placed in a children’s home in Surrey.¹⁵³² Although Hassan told immigration officials about his time with Islamic State, he also claimed that he had not been sent to Europe by the group.¹⁵³³ While in the children’s hostel, a charity worker who was able to speak Arabic reported having found Hassan listening to a call-to-arms song, with lyrics which were translated as, “We are coming with you to the slaughter in your home country.”¹⁵³⁴ Another member of staff saw him watching an Islamic State *nasheed* via Facebook.¹⁵³⁵ He was placed with a foster family in Sunbury in Surrey while his asylum application was being processed.¹⁵³⁶

During his time studying at a nearby college, Hassan told one of his teachers that he believed he had a duty to hate Britain and that he blamed the country for the killing of his father during an air raid in the Iraqi capital.¹⁵³⁷ One of his teachers reported that Hassan was receiving between 40 and 50 calls and text messages every day, and in August 2016 the teacher saw that Hassan had received a WhatsApp message on his phone saying, “Islamic State has accepted your donation.”¹⁵³⁸ Hassan was referred to the UK’s counter-radicalisation programme known as Channel, which is a component of the government’s wider Prevent scheme.¹⁵³⁹ It is also reported that a Prevent official had visited Hassan shortly after he had first arrived in the UK; however, the official allegedly told staff at the hostel that there was no cause for concern over Hassan’s case.¹⁵⁴⁰ When the attack happened, Hassan had been taking part in the scheme for more than a year¹⁵⁴¹ and, with what has been described as devious behaviour, Hassan reportedly gave the impression that he was responding positively to the programme.¹⁵⁴² As such he was never flagged up with MI5.¹⁵⁴³ His Prevent coordinator has since said that in fact

¹⁵²⁸ ‘Parsons Green bomb suspect: I made device because I was bored’, *The Guardian*, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/13/parsons-green-bomber-ahmed-hassan-old-bailey-isis>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵²⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵³⁰ ‘Parsons Green attack: ‘I was recruited by Isis... They trained us on how to kill’, *The Times*, 16 March 2018.

¹⁵³¹ ‘Parsons Green: Alleged bomber ‘trained by IS in Iraq’, *BBC News*, 7 March 2018.

¹⁵³² ‘Parsons Green attack: The Iraqi Fantasist who wanted attention’, *BBC News*, 16 March 2018, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43392551>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵³³ ‘Parsons Green: Alleged bomber ‘trained by IS in Iraq’, *BBC News*, 7 March 2018.

¹⁵³⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵³⁵ ‘Parsons Green attack: ‘I was recruited by Isis... They trained us on how to kill’, *The Times*, 16 March 2018.

¹⁵³⁶ ‘Iraqi teenager appears in court accused of Parsons Green bombing’, *The Guardian*, 22 September 2017.

¹⁵³⁷ ‘Parsons Green tube bomber Ahmed Hassan jailed for life’, *The Guardian*, 23 March 2018.

¹⁵³⁸ ‘Parsons Green attack: ‘I was recruited by Isis... They trained us on how to kill’, *The Times*, 16 March 2018.

¹⁵³⁹ ‘Prevent let the Parsons Green bomber through the net. That can’t happen again’, *The Guardian*, 28 March 2018, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/28/prevent-parsons-green-bomber-counter-terrorism>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵⁴⁰ ‘Parsons Green attack: The Iraqi Fantasist who wanted attention’, *BBC News*, 16 March 2018.

¹⁵⁴¹ ‘Parsons green tube bomber was referred to Prevent programme’, *The Guardian*, 16 March 2018, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/16/parsons-green-tube-bomber-convicted-of-attempted-murder>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵⁴² Ibid.

¹⁵⁴³ ‘Parsons green Tube bomber Ahmed Hassan was on Prevent deradicalisation scheme’, *The Times*, 17 March 2018, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/parsons-green-tube-bomber-ahmed-hassan-was-on-prevent-deradicalisation-scheme-x8bwd5nwb>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

he did not fully cooperate with the scheme, and it appears that he began constructing the bomb while still on the programme.¹⁵⁴⁴

Officials believe that Ahmed Hassan learned how to make the bomb from instructions found online,¹⁵⁴⁵ so it is not clear that having constructed a TATP explosive device is necessarily proof of his earlier claim of having been trained by Islamic State. Indeed, the precise nature and extent of Ahmed Hassan's interactions with Islamic State remain unknown. Hours after the attack at Parsons Green, IS claimed the bombing through its Amaq news agency, saying, "A security source to Amaq: The bombing using the IED in the London tube was carried out by a unit affiliated to the Islamic State."¹⁵⁴⁶ In a further claim of responsibility, another Islamic State statement said, "The soldiers of the caliphate were able to plant several explosive devices and detonate one of them amid a gathering of crusaders in a metro station in London. It resulted in wounding nearly 30 crusaders and what is coming is more devastating and more bitter, Allah willing."¹⁵⁴⁷

At the conclusion of his trial, Ahmed Hassan was found guilty of the attempted murder of 93 people.¹⁵⁴⁸ On 23 March 2018, he was sentenced to life in prison, with the instruction that he serve a minimum of 34 years.¹⁵⁴⁹

56. Chalon-Sur-Saone Hammer Attack

The Attack

Date: 15 September 2017

Day: Friday

Time: 1.00 pm

Country: France

Place: Chalon-sur-Saone

Area Type: City Centre - Recreational

Location: Park

Type of Attack: Hammer

Target: Civilian - Indiscriminate

Ideology: Far Right

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor

Claimed: NA

Number of Injured: 2

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

¹⁵⁴⁴ 'Parsons Green: Bomber 'didn't agree' to Prevent, says mentor', *BBC News*, 27 March 2018, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43550925>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵⁴⁵ 'Parsons Green bomb suspect: I made device because I was bored', *The Guardian*, 13 March 2018.

¹⁵⁴⁶ 'Isis claims responsibility for London bombing attack', *The Independent*, 15 September 2017, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/isis-london-attack-bomb-tube-parsons-green-terror-claims-responsibility-latest-news-updates-a7949681.html>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵⁴⁷ 'Parsons green: Homemade bomb 'could have killed everyone in the carriage', *The Independent*, 16 September 2017, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/london-attack-parsons-green-bomb-investigation-latest-dover-arrest-isis-surrey-searches-armed-police-a7950816.html>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵⁴⁸ 'Ahmed Hassan found guilty of attempted murder on Parsons Green Tube', *Sky News*, 16 March 2018, available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/ahmed-hassan-found-guilty-of-attempted-murder-on-parsons-green-tube-11292104>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁵⁴⁹ 'Parsons Green tube bomber Ahmed Hassan jailed for life', *The Guardian*, 23 March 2018.

Name: Undisclosed
Age: 17
Country of Origin: France
Nationality: French
Resident: Dijon
Training/Combat Experience: No
Known to Authorities: No
Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

At around 1.00 pm on the afternoon of 15 September, an assailant attacked two people with a hammer on the streets of Chalon-sur-Saone in the Saone-et-Loire department of eastern France.¹⁵⁵⁰ According to French media, the assailant began the attack by assaulting a 50-year-old woman on Morinet Street before then attacking a second woman of a similar age who was sitting on a bench at the Georges Nouvelle park about 15 minutes later.¹⁵⁵¹ He was reported to have shouted “Allahu Akhbar” before fleeing the scene of his attack.¹⁵⁵² Both women were reported as being lightly injured and were taken by the emergency services for treatment, but were released from hospital shortly after.¹⁵⁵³ The first victim received a number of stitches, while the second had suffered head injuries, having been hit on the head with the hammer.¹⁵⁵⁴

Early indications from the investigation reported that the suspect might be mentally disturbed.¹⁵⁵⁵ The assailant was later identified as a 17-year-old male, who surrendered to the police and claimed responsibility for the attack in Chalon-sur-Saone as well as for at least five other incidents that occurred in the same city and Dijon, in the nearby Cote-d’Or region.¹⁵⁵⁶ On 27 September, between 2.00 pm and 4.30 pm, the assailant injured three more women at the University of Dijon campus, again using a hammer, before fleeing the scene.¹⁵⁵⁷ Once again, the assailant attacked his victims by targeting the head, and one of the injured individuals was taken to hospital.¹⁵⁵⁸ Four months later, on 26 January at 5.45 pm, the same individual entered a pharmacy wearing all-black clothes and sunglasses and began to threaten employees with a knife before fleeing with around 200 euros in cash.¹⁵⁵⁹ He was also implicated in a number of arson incidents at the University of Burgundy campus in Dijon.¹⁵⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵⁰ ‘France: Women injured in hammer attack’, *BBC News*, 15 September 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41282294>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁵⁵¹ ‘Un homme agresse deux personnes en ville en criant ‘Allah Akhbar’, *Le Journal*, 15 September 2017, available at: <http://www.lejls.com/edition-de-chalon/2017/09/15/deux-personnes-agressees-au-marteau-un-homme-activement-recherche>, last visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁵² ‘Attaque au marteau a Chalon-sur-Saone: important dispositif pour retrouver l’agresseur’, *Europe 1*, 16 September 2017, Available at: <http://www.europe1.fr/faits-divers/attaque-au-marteau-a-chalon-sur-saone-important-dispositif-pour-retrouver-lagresseur-3437771>, last visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁵³ ‘France: Women injured in hammer attack’, *BBC News*, 15 September 2017.

¹⁵⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵⁵ ‘Attaque au marteau a Chalon-sur-Saone, l’agresseur recherche’, *L’Est Republicain*, 15 September 2017, available at: <https://www.estrepublicain.fr/faits-divers/2017/09/15/attaque-au-marteau-a-chalon-sur-saone-la-piste-psychiatrique>, last visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁵⁶ ‘Ultra-droite: le commando au marteau frappe a nouveau en Bourgogne’, *Le Parisien*, 27 January 2018, available at: www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/ultra-droite-le-commando-au-marteau-frappe-a-nouveau-en-bourgogne-27-01-2018-7526334.php, last visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁵⁷ ‘Au moins trois personnes agressees avec un marteau dans le quartier de l’universite a Dijon’, *France Bleu*, 27 September 2017, available at: <https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/faits-divers-justice/au-moins-trois-personnes-agressees-avec-un-marteau-dans-le-quartier-de-l-universite-a-dijon-1506505638>, last visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵⁹ ‘Ultra-droite: le commando au marteau frappe a nouveau en Bourgogne’, *Le Parisien*, 27 January 2018.

¹⁵⁶⁰ ‘Qui est le jeune de 17 ans derriere le ‘commando’ bourguignon d’ultradroite?’, *20 minutes*, 31 January 2018, available at: <https://www.20minutes.fr/societe/2212615-20180131-jeune-17-ans-derriere-commando-bourguignon-ultradroite>, last visited: 6 April 2018.

The suspect turned himself into the police on 29 January, shortly before 11.00 am, at a police station in Chalon-sur-Saone,¹⁵⁶¹ on the condition that he would be treated with “dignity”.¹⁵⁶² He was unknown to police authorities and described by sources from the investigation as a “solitary individual” who had never known his father and lived with his mother in their family home.¹⁵⁶³ He claimed responsibility for the attacks in the name of a previously unheard of and self-proclaimed anti-Islam group claiming to fight against the Islamisation of France,¹⁵⁶⁴ which he said went by the name Commando for the Defence of the French People and Homeland.¹⁵⁶⁵ The assailant reportedly hoped to secure the release of imprisoned extremists belonging to the far-right.¹⁵⁶⁶

The suspect is known to have been a student in the history department at the University of Dijon, and following his surrender to the police he had at first indicated that he had carried out the attacks with the objective of receiving a lengthy prison sentence so that he would be able to avoid completing his studies.¹⁵⁶⁷ He later claimed that he had wanted to attract attention to himself and that he did not have any racist or radical far-right beliefs.¹⁵⁶⁸ Significantly, although no documents or objects found in his home indicated an affiliation to ultranationalist groups, on examination of his computer, investigators discovered that he had frequently visited “violent websites, both from the Far Left and Far Right, and those belonging to the anti-Jihadist movement”.¹⁵⁶⁹ This may substantiate the suspicion that the assailant’s use of the term “Allahu Akbar” during the 15 September attack was part of an effort to pose as an Islamist during the attack, possibly with the intention of hoping to provoke greater anti-Muslim feeling. In a claim of responsibility for the two hammer attacks put out under the name of the Commando for the Defence of the French People and Homeland in November, it was alleged that use of the “Allahu Akbar” phrase had been an intentional attempt to mislead investigators.¹⁵⁷⁰ The claim of responsibility also threatened further attacks, including against a football match, and expressed admiration for the far-right Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik.¹⁵⁷¹

¹⁵⁶¹ ‘Attaques au marteau a Chalon-Sur-Saone e a Dijon: un jeune homme de 17 ans se rend a la police’, *France Bleu*, 29 January 2018, available at: <https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/faits-divers-justice/attaques-au-marteau-a-chalon-et-a-dijon-un-jeune-homme-de-17-ans-se-rend-a-la-police-1517224878>, last visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁶² Ibid.

¹⁵⁶³ ‘Qui est le jeune de 17 ans derriere le ‘commando’ bourguignon d’ultradoite?’, *20 minutes*, 31 January 2018.

¹⁵⁶⁴ ‘Attaques au marteau: les enquetes de Dijon et Chalon-sur-Saone regroupees’, *Le Point*, 8 November 2017, available at: http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/attaques-au-marteau-les-enquetes-de-dijon-et-chalon-sur-saone-regroupees-08-11-2017-2170788_23.php, last visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁶⁵ ‘Attaques au marteau: les enquetes de Chalon-sur-Saone et Dijon regroupees’, *RTL*, 9 November 2017, available at: <http://www.rtl.fr/actu/justice-faits-divers/attaques-au-marteau-les-enquetes-de-chalon-sur-saone-et-dijon-regroupees-7790873552>, last visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶⁷ ‘Qui est le jeune de 17 ans derriere le ‘commando’ bourguignon d’ultradoite?’, *20 minutes*, 31 January 2018.

¹⁵⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷⁰ ‘Attaques au marteau: les enquetes de Dijon et Chalon-sur-Saone regroupees’, *Le Point*, 8 November 2017.

¹⁵⁷¹ Ibid.

57. Dijon Campus Hammer Attacks

The Attack

Date: 27 September 2017
Day: Wednesday
Time: 2.00 pm
Country: France
Place: Dijon
Area Type: Suburban - Educational
Location: University - Exterior
Type of Attack: Hammer
Target: Civilian - Indiscriminate
Ideology: Far Right
Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actor
Claimed: NA
Number of Injured: 3
Number of Fatalities: 0
Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1
Gender: Male
Name: Undisclosed
Age: 17
Country of Origin: France
Nationality: French
Resident: Dijon
Training/Combat Experience: No
Known to Authorities: No
Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

See the entry for “56. Chalon-Sur-Saone Hammer Attack”.

58. Paris Attempted Apartment Bombing

The Attack

Date: 30 September 2017

Day: Saturday

Time: 4.30 am

Country: France

Place: Paris

Area Type: City Centre - Residential

Location: Apartment - Interior

Type of Attack: Attempted Bombing

Target: Civilian - Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Independent Actors

Claimed: NA

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailants

Number: 3

Gender: Male

Names: Aymen B., Amine A., Sami B.

Ages: 29, 30, 28

Country of Origin: France

Nationality: French

Resident: Essonne

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

At 4.30 am on Saturday 30 September, a resident of an apartment building in Paris' 16th arrondissement near Porte d'Auteuil was woken up by what was described as a "whistling sound" and the smell of petrol.¹⁵⁷² The man went to the ground floor of the stairwell where he discovered two gas canisters covered in petrol, with petrol also having been poured in the hallway.¹⁵⁷³ The resident who had made the discovery later told reporters that he had turned off the gas canisters and removed them from the building, and also called the police and emergency services.¹⁵⁷⁴ A bomb disposal unit arrived at the Rue Chanez and defused the devices.¹⁵⁷⁵

The gas canisters used in the attempted attack were determined to have been part of a set of four, and the other two canisters were found by police in the street outside the building, along

¹⁵⁷² Samuel, H., 'Five questioned over "primed bomb" found in plush Parisian district as France passes tough new anti-terror law', *The Telegraph*, 3 October 2017, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/03/five-questioned-primed-bomb-found-plush-parisian-district-france/>, last visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁷³ 'Islamists to be charged over failed Paris apartment attack', *Times of Israel*, 6 October 2017, available at: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/islamists-to-be-charged-over-failed-paris-apartment-attack/>, last visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁷⁴ Samuel, H., 'Five questioned over "primed bomb" found in plush Parisian district as France passes tough new anti-terror law', *The Telegraph*, 3 October 2017.

¹⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

with a mobile phone which had been wired to the gas canisters in an apparent attempt to create a trigger so that a phone call to the device would ignite the explosives.¹⁵⁷⁶ Court sources said that there had been multiple attempts to remotely detonate the device, although all of these had evidently failed.¹⁵⁷⁷ Had the attack taken place according to the assailants' plan, it is estimated that the explosion could have been powerful enough to destroy the building.¹⁵⁷⁸

Two days after the discovery of the explosives, police arrested five people,¹⁵⁷⁹ having identified them through DNA evidence at the scene,¹⁵⁸⁰ including on the mobile device as well as fingerprints on the gas canisters.¹⁵⁸¹ By 6 October 2017, two men had been released, while three were formally charged with "attempted murder in an organised group in connection with a terrorist enterprise",¹⁵⁸² as well as transporting explosives.¹⁵⁸³ The suspects were arrested in Brétigny-sur-Orge,¹⁵⁸⁴ Essonne, south of Paris,¹⁵⁸⁵ and the three were identified by the authorities only as Amine A., Aymen B. and Sami B., with all three denying having any role in the plot, although they also reportedly refused to answer investigators' questions.¹⁵⁸⁶ French media sources gave Amine A.'s full name as Amine Abbari, while Aymen B.'s name was given as Aymen Balbali.¹⁵⁸⁷ Sami B.'s surname has also been given as Balbali.¹⁵⁸⁸ Of the limited background information available about the three men, Amine A. is reported as 30 years old¹⁵⁸⁹ and originally from Ullis in Essonne.¹⁵⁹⁰ While Aymen B.'s age has been given as 29,¹⁵⁹¹ and Sami B. is reported as being 28 and a father of three.¹⁵⁹² It appears that all the suspects came from the Essonne area, with Amine and Aymen reportedly having been childhood friends in

¹⁵⁷⁶ Ganley, E., 'Three men given terror-linked charges in failed attack on Paris apartment building', *The Star*, 7 October 2017, available at: <https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2017/10/07/three-men-given-terror-linked-charges-in-failed-attack-on-paris-apartment-building.html>, last visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁷⁷ Huet, N., 'Five arrested over homemade bomb found near Paris stadium', *Euronews*, 3 October 2017, available at: <http://www.euronews.com/2017/10/03/five-arrested-over-homemade-bomb-found-near-paris-stadium>, last visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁷⁸ Politi, C. and Chevillard, T., 'Paris: L'étrange tentative d'attentat aux bonbonnes dans le 16e n'a pas livré tous ses secrets', *20 minutes*, available at: <https://www.20minutes.fr/justice/2257419-20180419-paris-etrange-tentative-attentat-bonbonnes-16e-livre-tous-secrets>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁵⁷⁹ 'Paris bomb plot: Five arrested for gas-cylinder explosive found in upmarket apartment', *News Corp Australia Network*, 3 October 2017, available at: <http://www.news.com.au/world/paris-bomb-plot-five-arrested-for-gascylinder-explosive-found-in-upmarket-apartment/news-story/4554e36693c835b83c1a7cd445308db2>, last visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁸⁰ 'Three charged over makeshift gas canister bomb in Paris', *The Local*, 7 October 2017, available at: <https://www.thelocal.fr/20171007/three-charged-over-makeshift-gas-canister-bomb-in-paris>, last visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁸¹ 'Islamists to be charged over failed Paris apartment attack', *Times of Israel*, 6 October 2017; Samuel, H., 'Five questioned over "primed bomb" found in plush Parisian district as France passes tough new anti-terror law', *The Telegraph*, 3 October 2017.

¹⁵⁸² 'Three charged over makeshift gas canister bomb in Paris', *The Local*, 7 October 2017.

¹⁵⁸³ Ganley, E., 'Three men given terror-linked charges in failed attack on Paris apartment building', *The Star*, 7 October 2017.

¹⁵⁸⁴ Chataigner, M., 'Essonne: les deux interpellés a Arpajon et Brétigny-sur-Orge ne seraient pas fichés S', *Le Républicain*, 5 October 2017, available at: <https://www.le-republicain.fr/dernieres-brevs/essonne-deux-interpelles-a-arpajon-bretigny-orge-ne-seraient-fiches-s>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁵⁸⁵ Seelow, S. *et al.*, 'De 2013 à 2018, la France au rythme des attentats', *Le Monde*, 30 March 2018, available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2018/03/30/de-2013-a-2018-la-france-au-rythme-des-attentats_5278453_3224.html, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁵⁸⁶ Ganley, E., 'Three men given terror-linked charges in failed attack on Paris apartment building', *The Star*, 7 October 2017; Associated Press '3 charged in mysterious, failed attack on Paris building', *ABC News*, 7 October 2017, available at: <http://abcnews.go.com/amp/International/wireStory/charged-mysterious-failed-attack-paris-building-50341365>, visited: 6 April 2018.

¹⁵⁸⁷ Seelow, S. *et al.*, 'De 2013 à 2018, la France au rythme des attentats', *Le Monde*, 30 March 2018.

¹⁵⁸⁸ Champagne-Kitetova, A., 'Un ancien aspirant gendarme au Coeur de la tentative d'attentat dans le 16eme arrondissement?', *Reflets*, 22 October 2017, available at: <https://reflets.info/articles/un-ancien-aspirant-gendarme-au-coeur-de-la-tentative-d-attentat-dans-le-16eme-arrondissement>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁵⁸⁹ 'Three charged over makeshift gas canister bomb in Paris', *The Local*, 7 October 2017.

¹⁵⁹⁰ Boutry, T., 'Attentat manqué dans le XVIe à Paris: l'intrigant "gendarme" des bonbonnes', *Le Parisien*, 22 October 2017, available at: <http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/attentat-manque-dans-le-xvie-a-paris-l-intrigant-gendarme-des-bonbonnes-22-10-2017-7347393.php>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁵⁹¹ 'Three charged over makeshift gas canister bomb in Paris', *The Local*, 7 October 2017.

¹⁵⁹² Ganley, E., '3 Charged in Mysterious, Failed Attack on Paris Building', *US News*, 7 October 2017, available at: <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-10-07/3-charged-in-mysterious-failed-attack-on-paris-building>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

Brétigny-sur-Orge.¹⁵⁹³ One of the men is recorded as living in Arpajon, and two are recorded as attending mosques in Brétigny-sur-Orge and Sainte-Geneviève-des-Bois.¹⁵⁹⁴

The French press has conveyed a somewhat confused picture regarding the degree to which the men were already known to the authorities. Two of the men, Amine A. and Aymen B., were known to the authorities prior to the incident.¹⁵⁹⁵ The French Interior Minister, Gerard Collomb, noted that at least one of the men had been under direct government surveillance on account of concerns about his radicalism.¹⁵⁹⁶ In a not entirely explained turn to this case, Amine A. subsequently claimed to have worked as an informant for intelligence services, infiltrating Islamist circles on their behalf.¹⁵⁹⁷ While it is understood that Amine was never formally recruited by these agencies, it has been indicated that some communication may have taken place between him and the intelligence services.¹⁵⁹⁸

Alternatively, the report that at least one of the men had been under surveillance may have been a reference to Aymen B., with the intelligence services suspecting that he might be attempting to acquire weapons.¹⁵⁹⁹ Indeed, two weeks prior to the attempted attack, intelligence from the security services was passed on to local authorities in Essonne, where Aymen lived, alerting them that he was attempting to acquire a substantial amount of weaponry.¹⁶⁰⁰ However, Amine A. is also reported to have been detained in 2013 in a terrorist-related case, and in 2016 both Aymen B. and Amine A. were arrested for praying in the emergency lane of a highway.¹⁶⁰¹ As well as having accessed a significant amount of Islamist extremist content online, the two men are also known to have produced a series of Islamic discussion and preaching videos together, and these had been posted to YouTube and the Telegram messaging app in 2017.¹⁶⁰²

Concerns about possible intentions to travel to Syria may also have led to the two men being placed on terror watch lists.¹⁶⁰³ Aymen B. is alleged to have made plans in the past to travel to Syria, and it is said that Amine A. had wished to accompany him.¹⁶⁰⁴ Information from France's national security S File is also reported to link Aymen to pro-Islamic State preaching.¹⁶⁰⁵ The press reported that Amine was previously a member of Forsane Alizza (Knights of Pride)¹⁶⁰⁶ and had previously been linked to the group's leader.¹⁶⁰⁷ This French Islamist group had been formed in 2010 and was known for its calls for France to become an Islamic Caliphate, as well as for promoting Islamist propaganda online.¹⁶⁰⁸

¹⁵⁹³ Hache, C. and Pham-Le, J., 'Les curieux suspects de la rue Chanez', *L'express*, 18 April 2018, available at: https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/justice/les-tres-curieux-suspects-de-la-rue-chanez_2000509.html, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁵⁹⁴ Chataigner, M., 'Essonne: les deux interpellés a Arpajon et Brétigny-sur-Orge ne seraient pas fichés S', *Le Républicain*, 5 October 2017.

¹⁵⁹⁵ Ganley, E., 'Three men given terror-linked charges in failed attack on Paris apartment building', *The Star*, 7 October 2017.

¹⁵⁹⁶ 'Paris bomb plot: Five arrested for gas-cylinder explosive found in upmarket apartment', *News Corp Australia Network*, 3 October 2017.

¹⁵⁹⁷ Hache, C. and Pham-Le, J., 'Les curieux suspects de la rue Chanez', *L'express*, 18 April 2018.

¹⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹⁹ Décugis, J-M. and Pelletier, E., 'Affaire des bonbonnes de gaz a Paris: trois suspects en prison et des mysteres', *Le Parisien*, 6 April 2018, available at: <http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/affaire-des-bonbonnes-de-gaz-a-paris-trois-mis-en-examen-et-des-mysteres-06-04-2018-7650786.php>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁰⁰ Politi, C. and Chevillard, T., 'Paris: L'étrange tentative d'attentat aux bonbonnes dans le 16e n'a pas livré tous ses secrets', *20 minutes*, 19 April 2018.

¹⁶⁰¹ Ganley, E., 'Three men given terror-linked charges in failed attack on Paris apartment building', *The Star*, 7 October 2017.

¹⁶⁰² Hache, C. and Pham-Le, J., 'Les curieux suspects de la rue Chanez', *L'express*, 18 April 2018.

¹⁶⁰³ 'Three charged over makeshift gas canister bomb in Paris', *The Local*, 7 October 2017.

¹⁶⁰⁴ Seelow, S. *et al.*, 'De 2013 a 2018, la France au rythme des attentats', *Le Monde*, 30 March 2018.

¹⁶⁰⁵ Politi, C. and Chevillard, T., 'Paris: L'étrange tentative d'attentat aux bonbonnes dans le 16e n'a pas livré tous ses secrets', *20 minutes*, 19 April 2018.

¹⁶⁰⁶ 'Profile: French Islamist group Forsane Alizza', *BBC News*, 30 March 2012, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17562412>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁰⁷ Boutry, T., 'Attentat manqué dans le XVIe a Paris: l'intrigant "gendarme" des bonbonnes', *Le Parisien*, 22 October 2017.

¹⁶⁰⁸ 'Profile: French Islamist group Forsane Alizza', *BBC News*, 30 March 2012.

In contrast to what has been publicised about Aymen B. and Amine A., very little information has been released about the background and ideological leanings of the third man in the group, Sami B. It is understood that he is the cousin of Aymen.¹⁶⁰⁹ A search of his home found equipment that may have been used for the attack.¹⁶¹⁰

All three men remain in pre-trial detention.¹⁶¹¹

The full nature of the motive for the attack and the reason for the specific targeting of the apartment building remains unclear. Plans to carry out some kind of attack could have emerged in the summer of 2017, when following a period of intense communication between Aymen and Amine abruptly stopped, and it appears that Amine began to take considerable measures to avoid any surveillance.¹⁶¹² It has been suggested that the attackers made a mistake about the address and that they had actually intended to target the premises of an organisation opposed to radical Islamism.¹⁶¹³ The location of the attempted attack is also a short distance from the Paris St Germain football stadium, which, it has been suggested, may have been relevant.¹⁶¹⁴ Further investigation has indicated that the assailants could have targeted the area as part of an anti-Semitic motive, believing that Jews would be resident in the area.¹⁶¹⁵ However, at the time of the attempted attack, Interior Minister Collomb suggested that the apartment building would likely have been chosen at random to cause the greatest level of fear.¹⁶¹⁶

59. Edmonton Vehicular Attack

The Attack

Date: 30 September 2017

Day: Saturday

Time: 8.15 pm

Country: Canada

Place: Edmonton

Area Type: Suburban – Residential

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Vehicular & Knife

Target: Police & Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 5

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested

¹⁶⁰⁹ Décugis, J-M. and Pelletier, E., 'Affaire des bonbonnes de gaz a Paris: trois suspects en prison et des mysteres', *Le Parisien*, 6 April 2018.

¹⁶¹⁰ Champagne-Kitetova, A., 'Un ancien aspirant gendarme au Coeur de la tentative d'attentat dans le 16eme arrondissement?', *Reflets*, 22 October 2017.

¹⁶¹¹ 'Three charged over makeshift gas canister bomb in Paris', *The Local*, 7 October 2017.

¹⁶¹² Hache, C. and Pham-Le, J., 'Les curieux suspects de la rue Chanez', *L'express*, 18 April 2018.

¹⁶¹³ Samuel, H., 'Five questioned over "primed bomb" found in plush Parisian district as France passes tough new anti-terror law', *The Telegraph*, 3 October 2017.

¹⁶¹⁴ Allen, P., 'Suspected terrorist bomb found in Paris under truck belonging to construction firm accused of funding ISIS', *The Mirror*, 5 October 2017, available at: <https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/suspected-terrorist-bomb-found-paris-11292086> visited: 6 April 2018, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶¹⁵ Politi, C. and Chevillard, T., 'Paris: L'étrange tentative d'attentat aux bonbonnes dans le 16e n'a pas livré tous ses secrets', *20 minutes*, 19 April 2018.

¹⁶¹⁶ Huet, N., 'Five arrested over homemade bomb found near Paris stadium', *Euronews*, 3 October 2017.

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Abdulahi Hasan Sharif

Age: 30

Country of Origin: Somalia

Nationality: Somali

Resident: Edmonton

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

On 30 September 2017, a set of attacks occurred in a busy district in Edmonton, Canada, in which five people were injured. A male assailant drove a Chevrolet Malibu into a police barricade and hit a policeman at 8.15pm on 107A Avenue and 92 Street.¹⁶¹⁷ The officer had been stationed there to watch over the crowds at a football game in the nearby Edmonton's Commonwealth Stadium. Following the initial ramming, the assailant proceeded to exit the car and, using a large knife,¹⁶¹⁸ attempted to stab the wounded officer, who had been thrown 15 feet by the impact of the vehicle.¹⁶¹⁹ It was judged that had it not been for the body armour that the police officer was wearing, it is unlikely he would have survived the attack.¹⁶²⁰

A surveillance video of the event shows the crash and the assault on the officer, during which the officer can be seen wrestling with the assailant and fending him off before the attacker flees on foot, leaving the vehicle behind.¹⁶²¹ Following the event, police set up checkpoints in the local area and discovered the identity of the assailant through the registration of the crashed Chevrolet Malibu.¹⁶²² The officer who had been hit by the vehicle and stabbed was taken to hospital with arm injuries as well as stab wounds on his face and head, but he was not in a critical condition and went on to make a full recovery.¹⁶²³

Just before midnight,¹⁶²⁴ the assailant was identified by a policeman at one of the checkpoints on Wayne Gretzky Drive and 112 Avenue, driving a U-Haul truck.¹⁶²⁵ The police officer who recognised the identity of the assailant called for support, at which point the man fled and was pursued by multiple police cars in a high-speed chase through downtown Edmonton.¹⁶²⁶ Given that the assailant had already used a vehicle for an attack earlier that night, the police determined that it was necessary to stop the U-Haul truck as soon as possible.¹⁶²⁷ It is reported

¹⁶¹⁷ 'Edmonton Terror Attack: Police Press Conference', *YouTube*, 1 October 2017, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N84qzZBj7Tl>, last visited: 18 January 2018; "'Acts of terrorism" in Edmonton: Officer stabbed, pedestrians run down', *Edmonton Journal*, 1 October 2017, available at: <http://edmontonjournal.com/news/crime/heavy-police-presence-near-commonwealth-stadium-officers-checking-vehicles>, last visited: 18 January 2018.

¹⁶¹⁸ 'Edmonton police, RCMP provide updated details in suspected terror attack', *YouTube*, 1 October 2017, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Q5RzMHgVZE>, last visited: 18 January 2018.

¹⁶¹⁹ 'Suspect charged in Edmonton attacks that injured five', *CNN*, 2 October 2017, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/01/americas/edmonton-vehicle-attacks-investigation/index.html>, last visited: 18 January 2018.

¹⁶²⁰ "'It was textbook": How Edmonton Police masterfully prevented a mass casualty terrorist attack', *National Post*, 4 October 2017, available at: <http://nationalpost.com/news/canada/it-was-textbook-how-edmonton-police-masterfully-prevented-a-mass-casualty-terrorist-attack>, last visited: 18 January 2018.

¹⁶²¹ '*Warning: graphic content* Edmonton police release terror attack video', *YouTube*, 1 October 2017, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=AJ-euzVL92Q, last visited: 18 January 2018.

¹⁶²² "'It was textbook": How Edmonton Police masterfully prevented a mass casualty terrorist attack', *National Post*, 4 October 2017.

¹⁶²³ 'Suspect charged in Edmonton attacks that injured five', *CNN*, 2 October 2017.

¹⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶²⁵ "'Acts of terrorism" in Edmonton: Officer stabbed, pedestrians run down', *Edmonton Journal*, 1 October 2017.

¹⁶²⁶ 'Edmonton police, RCMP provide updated details in suspected terror attack', *YouTube*, 1 October 2017.

¹⁶²⁷ *Ibid.*

that the assailant deliberately attempted to drive into pedestrians while being chased along the busy Jasper Avenue.¹⁶²⁸

Four pedestrians were injured in the course of this pursuit and were taken to hospital, with one described as being in a serious condition.¹⁶²⁹ Police stated that the vehicle had shown no signs of slowing down and so they had executed a “deliberate tactical manoeuvre” to stop the assailant,¹⁶³⁰ which involved the U-Haul being flipped on to its side. The police broke the windscreen of the attacker’s truck and used a stun grenade against the assailant before attempting to remove him.¹⁶³¹ When the man resisted, the police used a Taser and took him into custody.¹⁶³² During the course of the attack and arrest neither the police nor the assailant used any firearms.¹⁶³³

The alleged attacker was identified Abdulahi Hasan Sharif, who was 30 years old at the time of the attack. Sharif had immigrated to Canada as a Somali refugee in 2012, and is reported to have not been identified as a cause for concern by Canadian immigration officials.¹⁶³⁴ Previously, Sharif had been in the United States, having crossed the Mexican border in July 2011.¹⁶³⁵ It is reported that in November 2011¹⁶³⁶ there had been a deportation order issued to return Sharif back to his native Somalia.¹⁶³⁷ However, Sharif had been released from the immigration detention centre where he was being held in November 2011 as it appeared unlikely that it would be possible to deport him quickly enough.¹⁶³⁸ He subsequently failed to attend a scheduled immigration meeting in January 2012.¹⁶³⁹ United States officials were then unable to locate him.¹⁶⁴⁰ It has been reported that Sharif had then crossed the border into Canada, where he again sought asylum.¹⁶⁴¹ He was given refugee status there, which allowed him to stay in Canada, although this did not grant him permanent residency.¹⁶⁴² Few details have been released about the nature of Sharif’s activities once he had arrived in Canada, and many members of Edmonton’s Somali and Muslim communities stated that they did not know the man.¹⁶⁴³ However, it appears he was working in construction in 2015.¹⁶⁴⁴

With the exception of a number of traffic tickets from February 2017, Sharif is not known to have had a criminal record or to have been in trouble with the authorities prior to the attack in September.¹⁶⁴⁵ However, it is understood that he was reported to the police in 2015 over

¹⁶²⁸ ‘Suspect charged in Edmonton attacks that injured five’, *CNN*, 2 October 2017.

¹⁶²⁹ ‘Man charged with 5 counts of attempted murder for Edmonton attacks’, *CBC News*, 3 October 2017, available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/terrorism-charges-edmonton-attacks-1.4316450>, last visited: 18 January 2018.

¹⁶³⁰ ‘Edmonton police, RCMP provide updated details in suspected terror attack’, *YouTube*, 1 October 2017.

¹⁶³¹ ‘Suspect charged in Edmonton attacks that injured five’, *CNN*, 2 October 2017.

¹⁶³² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³³ ‘Canada terror attack suspect was lone wolf refugee’, *CBS News*, 2 October 2017, available at: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/canada-terror-attack-edmonton-lone-wolf-somali-refugee-police-say/>, last visited: 18 January 2018.

¹⁶³⁴ ‘Man charged with 5 counts of attempted murder for Edmonton attacks’, *CBC News*, 3 October 2017.

¹⁶³⁵ ‘Man charged in Edmonton attacks crossed into U.S. from Mexico, records show’, *CBC News*, 4 October 2017, available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/edmonton-attacks-abdulahi-sharif-hasan-attempted-murder-border-crossing-united-states-1.4330527>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶³⁷ ‘Man charged in Edmonton attacks was ordered deported from U.S. in 2011’, *CBC News*, 4 October 2017, available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/abdulahi-hasan-sharif-attack-police-jasper-1.4319245>, last visited: 18 January 2018.

¹⁶³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴² ‘Suspect in weekend attack appears in court, new questions arise about his past’, *Edmonton Journal*, 3 October 2017, available at: <http://edmontonjournal.com/news/crime/suspect-in-weekend-attack-expected-in-provincial-court-early-tuesday>, last visited: 18 January 2018.

¹⁶⁴³ ‘Edmonton attack suspect had ‘genocidal beliefs,’ says former co-worker who reported him to police’, *CBC News*, 2 October 2017, available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/abdulahi-hasan-sharif-somali-edmonton-1.4316074>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴⁵ ‘Man charged with 5 counts of attempted murder for Edmonton attacks’, *CBC News*, 3 October 2017.

concerns that he held Islamist extremist beliefs.¹⁶⁴⁶ A former co-worker of Sharif has said that the accused harboured concerning beliefs and that he was an Islamic State sympathiser long before perpetrating the attack in September 2017.¹⁶⁴⁷ The co-worker told reporters that Sharif would listen to Arabic broadcasts while on the construction site¹⁶⁴⁸ and would engage in rants, that he “definitely had genocidal beliefs”, and that he hated polytheists and said that they needed to die.¹⁶⁴⁹ The co-worker also said that Sharif had ranted to him about his hatred of Shia Muslims and voiced his support for the leaders of Islamic State.¹⁶⁵⁰

The police confirmed that Sharif had been interviewed by the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET) in 2015 following the allegations about his extremist rhetoric.¹⁶⁵¹ However, the authorities reached the conclusion that Sharif was not to be regarded as a threat at the time and that there was “insufficient evidence” to convict him.¹⁶⁵² Assistant Commissioner Marlin Degrand stated in regard to the complaint made against Sharif in 2015 that “the suspect showed no signs of active recruitment or radicalisation to violence at that time”.¹⁶⁵³ He also stated that “the suspect – up until the time of this event – had no negative interactions of a criminal nature with police”.¹⁶⁵⁴ There was no active investigation into Sharif either by local police or by intelligence services between the 2015 investigation and the 2017 attacks.¹⁶⁵⁵ The police also expressed the belief that he had been acting entirely alone on the night of the Edmonton attack.¹⁶⁵⁶

Following the attack, Sharif was arrested under multiple allegations, and initially it was indicated that two of these were terrorism-related: participation in a terrorist attack and commission of an offence for a terrorist group.¹⁶⁵⁷ However, subsequently he was not charged with terrorism-related offences.¹⁶⁵⁸ Rather, he was charged with “five counts of attempted murder, four counts of criminal flight causing bodily harm, and one count each of dangerous driving and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose”.¹⁶⁵⁹ When RCMP Superintendent Stacey Talbot was questioned as to why Sharif had not been charged with a terrorism-related offence, she responded, “The complexities of a terrorism investigation are vast. If warranted, further charges will be pursued.”¹⁶⁶⁰ In the first press conference given after the attack, police confirmed that an Islamic State flag had been found in the Chevrolet Malibu used by Sharif in the first part of his attack.¹⁶⁶¹ This is part of the evidence that led police to first investigate the attack as an act of terrorism.¹⁶⁶² Prime Minister Justin Trudeau had also stated that the incidents were indeed a “terrorist attack”.¹⁶⁶³

¹⁶⁴⁶ ‘Edmonton police, RCMP provide updated details in suspected terror attack’, *YouTube*, 1 October 2017.

¹⁶⁴⁷ ‘Edmonton attack suspect had ‘genocidal beliefs,’ says former co-worker who reported him to police’, *CBC News*, 2 October 2017.

¹⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵³ ‘Edmonton police, RCMP provide updated details in suspected terror attack’, *YouTube*, 1 October 2017.

¹⁶⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵⁷ ‘Terrorism charges pending in Edmonton attacks’, *CBC News*, 2 October 2017, available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/edmonton-don-iveson-terrorism-attack-lone-wolf-1.4315693>, last visited: 18 January 2018; ‘Edmonton police, RCMP provide updated details in suspected terror attack’, *YouTube*, 1 October 2017.

¹⁶⁵⁸ ‘Man charged with 5 counts of attempted murder for Edmonton attacks’, *CBC News*, 3 October 2017.

¹⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶¹ ‘Edmonton Terror Attack: Police Press Conference’, *YouTube*, 1 October 2017.

¹⁶⁶² ‘Edmonton terror attacks: suspect was known to Canadian security services’, *The Guardian*, 2 October 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/01/canadian-police-edmonton-van-knife-attack-terrorism>, last visited: 18 January 2018.

¹⁶⁶³ ‘Edmonton attack: Refugee arrested over “terror” incident’, *BBC News*, 2 October 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-41459237>, last visited: 18 January 2018.

In November 2017, Sharif's lawyer requested that Sharif undergo mental health examinations, and the judge agreed and ordered that Sharif receive two psychiatric assessments.¹⁶⁶⁴ The second assessment was delayed;¹⁶⁶⁵ however, both the first¹⁶⁶⁶ and second assessment found Sharif fit to stand trial.¹⁶⁶⁷ Reports in the Canadian press indicate that Sharif's trial will not take place until October 2019.¹⁶⁶⁸

60. Marseille Train Station Stabbing

The Attack

Date: 1 October 2017

Day: Sunday

Time: 1.45 pm

Country: France

Place: Marseille

Area Type: City Centre – Transport

Location: Train Station – Exterior

Type of Attack: Knife

Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate & Military

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 2

Response: Shot Dead

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Ahmed Hanachi

Age: 29

Country of Origin: Tunisia

Nationality: Tunisian

Resident: Marseille

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Dead

¹⁶⁶⁴ 'Bed shortage delays mental review for accused in Edmonton U-Haul rampage', *Global News*, 13 December 2017, available at: <https://globalnews.ca/news/3914275/bed-shortage-means-no-mental-reviews-done-yet-on-accused-edmonton-terror-attacker/>, last visited: 18 January 2018.

¹⁶⁶⁵ 'He understands what's going on: Accused Edmonton attacker fit to stand trial', *National Post*, 12 January 2018, available at: <http://nationalpost.com/pmnl/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/accused-edmonton-attacker-fit-to-stand-trial-still-undergoing-second-assessment>, last visited: 18 January 2018.

¹⁶⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶⁷ 'Man charged in Edmonton U-Haul rampage will go to trial', *Global News*, 14 March 2018, available at: <https://globalnews.ca/news/4082449/abdulahi-hasan-sharif-court-march-14/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁶⁸ 'Man accused in U-Haul truck attack going to trial in October 2019', *Edmonton Journal*, 25 May 2018, available at: <http://edmontonjournal.com/news/local-news/court-date-for-man-accused-of-attack-on-city-police-officer-pedestrians>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

NOTES:

At approximately 1.45 pm on Sunday 1 October, two women were stabbed to death by a man outside Saint-Charles Station in Marseille, France.¹⁶⁶⁹ Prior to the attack, the assailant had waited at a nearby bench outside Saint-Charles Station before then stabbing his first victim from behind with one of his two seven-inch-long butcher's knives.^{1670 1671 1672} Initially, the man fled from the scene of his attack, before he then returned and attacked another victim, at which point witnesses observed him shouting, "Allahu Akbar."¹⁶⁷³ At this point an unknown female passer-by tried to intervene, attempting to strike and knock the assailant over with a flag-holder.^{1674 1675} The assailant then ran towards soldiers patrolling the area, at which point he was shot and killed.¹⁶⁷⁶

Initially, the identity of the attacker was unclear, as police found that the individual had been using as many as seven different aliases in previous encounters with the authorities, including during a shoplifting offence in a Lyon shopping centre two days previously, where he had shown a security officer a Tunisian passport.¹⁶⁷⁷ However, the identity of the attacker was eventually confirmed as Ahmed Hanachi.¹⁶⁷⁸

Days after the incident, on Tuesday 10 October 2017, two men were arrested in connection with the attack, with police having also focused their investigations on Hanachi's family, of whom four were arrested and two then quickly released.¹⁶⁷⁹ At the time, the assailant's brothers, Anouar and Anis, were awaiting extradition for illegally entering Europe, among other crimes, after being arrested in Switzerland and Italy.¹⁶⁸⁰ Lamberto Giannini, head of the Italian state's counterterrorism team, said that Anis had "fought, waged jihad in Syrian-Iraqi territory, with military experience".¹⁶⁸¹ Giannini went on to say that "a hypothesis that remains to be verified is that it was him who indoctrinated his brother Ahmed and caused his radicalization".¹⁶⁸² Furthermore, Tunisian security officials, speaking anonymously, claimed that both Ahmed and Anouar were suspected of being "extremists".¹⁶⁸³

Islamic State claimed the attack via Amaq, its news agency, stating that Hanachi was one of its soldiers, although there does not appear to be evidence of contact between the attacker and IS.¹⁶⁸⁴ Hanachi is not known to have frequented a particular mosque and so there is little

¹⁶⁶⁹ Chazan, D., 'Man shot dead at Marseille train station after killing two women in "terror" attack', *The Telegraph*, 1 October 2017, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/01/man-shot-marseille-train-station-knife-attack/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷¹ Ma, A., 'The man who stabbed 2 cousins to death in Marseille was a Tunisian illegal immigrant', *Business Insider*, 3 October 2017, available at: <http://uk.businessinsider.com/marseille-attack-tunisian-immigrant-ahmed-hanachi-named-as-suspect-2017-10>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁷² Hartley-Parkinson, R., 'Pictured: Cousins stabbed to death by man shouting "Allahu Akbar" in Marseille', *Metro*, 3 October 2017, available at: <http://metro.co.uk/2017/10/03/pictured-cousins-stabbed-to-death-by-man-shouting-allahu-akbar-in-marseille-6972585/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁷³ Ma A., 'The man who stabbed 2 cousins to death in Marseille was a Tunisian illegal immigrant', *Business Insider*, 3 October 2017.

¹⁶⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷⁵ Chazan, D., 'Man shot dead at Marseille train station after killing two women in "terror" attack', *The Telegraph*, 1 October 2017.

¹⁶⁷⁶ Hartley-Parkinson, R., 'Pictured: Cousins stabbed to death by man shouting "Allahu Akbar" in Marseille', *Metro*, 3 October 2017.

¹⁶⁷⁷ Ma, A., 'The man who stabbed 2 cousins to death in Marseille was a Tunisian illegal immigrant', *Business Insider*, 3 October 2017.

¹⁶⁷⁸ Hartley-Parkinson, R., 'Pictured: Cousins stabbed to death by man shouting "Allahu Akbar" in Marseille', *Metro*, 3 October 2017.

¹⁶⁷⁹ 'Two men held over fatal stabbing in Marseille', *Al Jazeera*, 12 October 2017, available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/men-held-fatal-stabbing-marseille-171011204115821.html>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁸⁰ 'Marseille attacker's brother, sister held in Tunisia', *News24*, 10 October 2017, available at: <https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/marseille-attackers-brother-sister-held-in-tunisia-20171009>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸² 'Brother of Marseille attacker fought in Syria: police', *Arab News*, 10 October 2017, available at: <http://www.arabnews.com/node/1175006/world>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁸³ 'Marseille attacker's brother, sister held in Tunisia', *News24*, 10 October 2017.

¹⁶⁸⁴ Ma, A., 'The man who stabbed 2 cousins to death in Marseille was a Tunisian illegal immigrant', *Business Insider*, 3 October 2017.

indication of whether he held extreme religious beliefs.¹⁶⁸⁵ The assailant's father-in-law reported that he had not shown any interest in Islamic observance and was not an extremist.¹⁶⁸⁶

Ahmed Hanachi was 29 years old at the time of the attack and was living in France, having arrived illegally from Tunisia in 2005.¹⁶⁸⁷ He had ignored an order to leave France in 2005 and police made no effort to return him to Tunisia.¹⁶⁸⁸ From 2008, Hanachi had been living between France and Italy, where his wife at the time lived, until their separation in 2014.¹⁶⁸⁹ ¹⁶⁹⁰ His wife is believed to have returned to Tunisia and it is not clear whether the two had actually divorced.¹⁶⁹¹ Italian authorities report that Hanachi had been resident in Aprilia, close to Rome, between 2010 and May 2017.¹⁶⁹² During this time, Hanachi appears to have been unemployed and involved in drugs crime.¹⁶⁹³

Investigators had been pursuing the possibility that Aprilia was home to a possible terror network linked to Amis Anri, the Berlin Christmas Market attacker, as well as Khaled Babouri, who carried out an attack on a policeman in Belgium in 2016.¹⁶⁹⁴ The area has been linked with Islamist extremism, which had led some observers to refer to Aprilia as the "Molenbeek of Italy".¹⁶⁹⁵ At the time of the attack, however, Hanachi had been living in a studio apartment in Marseilles.¹⁶⁹⁶ During his time in France, Hanachi became known to police for drug and alcohol problems alongside petty crime.¹⁶⁹⁷ The French Interior Minister later ordered an internal inquiry, after it was revealed that, two days prior to the attack, that Hanachi had been released in Lyon after he stole a jacket from a shopping centre.¹⁶⁹⁸ According to press reports, in total, Hanachi had been arrested once for theft, once for possession of drugs and on a further four occasions for being in Europe illegally.¹⁶⁹⁹

¹⁶⁸⁵ 'Two men held over fatal stabbing in Marseille', *Al Jazeera*, 12 October 2017.

¹⁶⁸⁶ 'Video: Italy investigates "terrorist crossroads" south of Rome', *France 24*, 24 October 2017, available at: <http://www.france24.com/en/20171024-italy-investigates-jihadist-terrorist-hub-aprilia-rome-marseille-berlin>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁸⁷ Jarry, E. *et al.*, 'Police questioned suspect in Marseille knife killings prior to attack', *Reuters*, 2 October 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-security-marseille/police-questioned-suspect-in-marseille-knife-killings-prior-to-attack-idUSKCN1C70M4>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁸⁸ Sage, A., 'Marseilles killer Ahmed Hanachi "should have been deported"', *The Times*, 12 October 2017, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/marseilles-killer-ahmed-hanachi-should-have-been-deported-macron-mauranne-harel-laura-paumier-mjqhvwnj6>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁸⁹ Sage, A., 'Marseilles killer Ahmed Hanachi "should have been deported"', *The Times*, 12 October 2017.

¹⁶⁹⁰ 'Marseilles killer identified as previous Italian resident', *Italian Insider*, 4 October 2017, available at: <http://www.italianinsider.it/?q=node/5943>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁹¹ 'Aprilia e i legami col terrorismo: prima Anis Amri, or ail killer di Marsiglia', *Il Caffè*, 2 October 2017, available at: <http://www.ilcaffè.tv/articolo/37881/l-attentatore-che-ha-ucciso-due-ragazze-a-marsiglia-si-nascondeva-ad-aprilia>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁹² Bette, Ph., 'Lyon: la curieuse vie nomade d'Ahmed Hanachi', *France 3*, 4 October 2017, available at: <https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/auvergne-rhone-alpes/rhone/lyon/lyon-curieuse-vie-nomade-ahmed-hanachi-1340511.html>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁶⁹³ 'Aprilia e i legami col terrorismo: prima Anis Amri, or ail killer di Marsiglia', *Il Caffè*, 2 October 2017.

¹⁶⁹⁴ 'Video: Italy investigates "terrorist crossroads" south of Rome', *France 24*, 24 October 2017.

¹⁶⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹⁶ Bette, Ph., 'Lyon: la curieuse vie nomade d'Ahmed Hanachi', *France 3*, 4 October 2017.

¹⁶⁹⁷ 'Two men held over fatal stabbing in Marseille', *Al Jazeera*, 12 October 2017.

¹⁶⁹⁸ Sage, A., 'Marseilles killer Ahmed Hanachi "should have been deported"', *The Times*, 12 October 2017.

¹⁶⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

61. Nebraska Train Incident

The Attack

Date: 22 October 2017

Day: Sunday

Time: 2.00 am

Country: United States of America

Place: Oxford, Nebraska

Area Type: Rural – Transport

Location: Train – Interior

Type of Attack: Foiled Shooting

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Anti-Black)

Ideology: Far Right

Organisation/Affiliation: National Socialist Movement – Affiliated

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Taylor Michael Wilson

Age: 26

Country of Origin: United States of America

Nationality: American

Resident: St Charles, Missouri

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

At 2.00 am¹⁷⁰⁰ on 22 October 2017, as an Amtrak train passed the small town of Oxford¹⁷⁰¹ in Nebraska, an individual breached the secure area of the train and pulled the emergency brake, halting the train and cutting the power.¹⁷⁰² The culprit was armed with a 38-calibre revolver.¹⁷⁰³ He also had a rucksack with three speed-loaders, ammunition, a hammer, a knife and scissors.¹⁷⁰⁴ The assistant passenger conductor and others found the assailant at the engineer's seat interfering with the controls,¹⁷⁰⁵ and reportedly he asked provocatively whether or not the

¹⁷⁰⁰ Chan, M., 'Man with 'Interest in Killing Black People' Charged with Terrorism after Attempted Train Attack', *Time*, 5 January 2018, available at: <http://time.com/5089950/taylor-michael-wilson-supremacist-amtrak/>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁷⁰¹ 'White Supremacist Faces Terror Charge After Train Stopped', *U.S. News World & Report*, 5 January 2018, available at: <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/missouri/articles/2018-01-05/man-charged-with-terrorism-in-stopping-of-amtrak-train>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁷⁰² Levenson, E., 'Neo-Nazi charged with terrorism in attempt to wreck Amtrak train, complaint says', *CNN*, 9 January 2018, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/09/us/nazi-white-supremacist-amtrak-terrorism-arrest-trnd/index.html>, last visited: 26 July 2018; and 'Man Charged with Terrorism in Stopping of Amtrak Train', *U.S. News World & Report*, 5 January 2018.

¹⁷⁰³ Chappell, B., 'Alleged White Supremacist Is Charged with Terrorism After Stopping Amtrak Train', *NPR*, 5 January 2018, available at: <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/05/575960858/alleged-white-supremacist-is-charged-with-terrorism-after-stopping-amtrak-train>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁷⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

conductor was going to shoot him.¹⁷⁰⁶ The two Amtrak staff managed to detain the man and he was arrested once the local police arrived.¹⁷⁰⁷

The individual had boarded the train in Sacramento, California, heading for Missouri, before then attempting to derail the train, with the apparent intention to then attempt to shoot any number of the 175 passengers on board.¹⁷⁰⁸

The individual was identified as Taylor Michael Wilson, who was 26 years old at the time of the incident.¹⁷⁰⁹ Wilson's links with far-right and white supremacist groups are well documented and appear to have been extensive. When the suspected assailant was arrested by police, he was carrying a business card for the National Socialist Movement, the largest neo-Nazi group in the United States, and another card from William Davidson of The Covenant Nation Church,¹⁷¹⁰ which has been accused of being a white Christian identity church.¹⁷¹¹ Wilson's cousin and flatmate, Andrew Olney,¹⁷¹² said that the suspected attacker had joined an alt-right group and had attended the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, where he had donned a shield and bulletproof vest.¹⁷¹³ According to court documents, Wilson had expressed a strong desire to kill black people.¹⁷¹⁴

Prior to this incident, Taylor Michael Wilson had no formal criminal record, although it is reported that he had been a suspect in a road rage incident in which a black woman told police that a driver had pointed a gun at her.¹⁷¹⁵ The police managed to match his car from the licence plate provided.¹⁷¹⁶ When police searched Wilson's home in St. Charles in Missouri¹⁷¹⁷ they found firearms and, hidden in the kitchen, an improvised shield, as well as large amounts of ammunition and white supremacist literature.¹⁷¹⁸ His computer showed that he was a regular visitor to white supremacist sites, and his mobile phone contained documents that were common to terrorists, such as "100 Deadly Skills", "the Anarchist Cookbook" and "Poor Man's James Bond volume 5" by Kurt Saxon.¹⁷¹⁹

The court heard reports that Wilson had suffered from some mental health issues, and his attorney claimed, "It's possible he doesn't know what he was doing," when he attempted to carry out the attack.¹⁷²⁰ However, the court did not receive a medical diagnosis confirming this, and he

¹⁷⁰⁶ Levenson, E., 'Neo-Nazi charged with terrorism in attempt to wreck Amtrak train, complaint says', *CNN*, 9 January 2018.

¹⁷⁰⁷ Mikelionis, L., 'White Supremacist Accused of Terrorism in Amtrak attack', *New York Post*, 10 January 2018, available at: <https://nypost.com/2018/01/10/white-supremacist-accused-of-terrorism-in-amtrak-attack/>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁷⁰⁸ Herreira, C., 'White Supremacist Charged with Terrorism After Alleged Attempt To Derail Train', *Huffington Post*, 6 January 2018, available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/fbi-charges-white-supremacist-terrorism-derail-amtrak_us_5a4ffd9ae4b003133ec7d2cc, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁷⁰⁹ Chan, M., 'Man with 'Interest in Killing Black People' Charged with Terrorism after Attempted Train Attack', *Time*, 5 January 2018.

¹⁷¹⁰ Levenson, E., 'Neo-Nazi charged with terrorism in attempt to wreck Amtrak train, complaint says', *CNN*, 9 January 2018.

¹⁷¹¹ Kirkland, A., 'Court Docs Reveal Neo-Nazi Ties Of Man Accused Of Terrorism In Amtrak Incident', *TPM*, 5 January 2018, available at: <https://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/taylor-wilson-charged-terrorism-amtrak-incident-white-nationalist-beliefs>, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁷¹² Reilly, R., 'Neo-Nazi's Lawyer Says Train Terrorism Case 'Blown Significantly Out Of Proportion'', *Huffington Post*, 10 January 2018, available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/taylor-michael-wilson-white-supremacist-terrorism-charges_us_5a556645e4b0b117f88067d0, last visited: 26 July 2018.

¹⁷¹³ Levenson, E., 'Neo-Nazi charged with terrorism in attempt to wreck Amtrak train, complaint says', *CNN*, 9 January 2018.

¹⁷¹⁴ Butcher, R., 'White supremacist arrested over Nebraska terror attack expressed interest in 'killing black people', say FBI', *The Independent*, 5 January 2018, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/fbi-nebraska-terror-attack-taylor-michael-wilson-amtrak-train-white-supremacist-kill-black-people-a8143216.html>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁷¹⁵ Levenson, E., 'Neo-Nazi charged with terrorism in attempt to wreck Amtrak train, complaint says', *CNN*, 9 January 2018.

¹⁷¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹⁹ Cleary, T., 'Taylor Michael Wilson: 5 Facts You Need To Know', *Heavy.com*, 5 January 2018, available at: <https://heavy.com/news/2018/01/taylor-michael-wilson-nebraska-amtrak/>, last visited: 27 July 2018.

¹⁷²⁰ 'Trial set for passenger accused of stopping Amtrak train', *Fox News*, 14 February 2018, available at: <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2018/02/14/trial-set-for-passenger-accused-stopping-amtrak-train.html>, last visited: 27 July 2018.

was subsequently deemed to be mentally competent to stand trial.¹⁷²¹ The charges brought against Wilson included Nebraskan state charges of felony, criminal mischief and use of a deadly weapon.¹⁷²² He also faced federal terrorism charges relating to an attack on a mass transportation system.¹⁷²³ On 12 July 2018, Wilson plead guilty to the federal terrorism charge,¹⁷²⁴ and although his attorney said to expect a sentence of between nine and eleven years,¹⁷²⁵ it is possible that he could face up to life in prison.¹⁷²⁶

62. New York Truck Attack

The Attack

Date: 31 October 2017

Day: Tuesday

Time: 3.05 pm

Country: United States of America

Place: New York

Area Type: City Centre – Commercial

Location: Street

Type of Attack: Vehicular

Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 11

Number of Fatalities: 8

Response: Shot & Arrested

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov

Age: 29

Country of Origin: Uzbekistan

Nationality: Uzbek

Resident: New Jersey

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: Yes

Current Status: Charged

¹⁷²¹ Downs, R., 'FBI: Man with 'interest in killing black people' attempted to hijack Amtrak train', *UPI*, 5 January 2018, available at: <https://www.upi.com/FBI-Man-with-interest-in-killing-black-people-attempted-to-hijack-Amtrak-train/2151515131772/>, last visited: 27 July 2018.

¹⁷²² Cleary, T., 'Taylor Michael Wilson: 5 Facts You Need to Know', *Heavy.com*, 5 January 2018.

¹⁷²³ 'White Supremacist Faces Terror Charge After Train Stopped', *U.S. News World & Report*, 5 January 2018.

¹⁷²⁴ Elkhaoudi, S., 'Neo-Nazi Taylor Michael Wilson pleaded guilty to a federal domestic terrorism charge for pulling the emergency brakes on an Amtrak train in October 2017', *Southern Poverty Law Center*, 20 July 2018, available at: <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/07/20/taylor-michael-wilson-pleads-guilty-domestic-terrorism-federal-law-still-lacking-far-right>, last visited: 27 July 2018.

¹⁷²⁵ Riotta, C., 'Neo-Nazi pleads guilty to terrorism charge after 'trying to save train from black people'', *The Independent*, 13 July 2018, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/taylor-michael-wilson-neo-nazi-terrorist-amtrak-train-nebraska-white-supremacist-a84446611.html>, last visited: 27 July 2018.

¹⁷²⁶ Levenson, E., 'Neo-Nazi charged with terrorism in attempt to wreck Amtrak train, complaint says', *CNN*, 9 January 2018.

NOTES:

At 3.05 pm on 31 October 2017, eight people were killed and 12 injured after being hit by a truck near the World Trade Center in New York City, making it the deadliest terror attack in the city since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center.¹⁷²⁷ The assailant drove a Home Depot pick-up truck that had been rented at 2.06 pm that day in New Jersey,¹⁷²⁸ drove the vehicle down a cycle path for about 20 blocks before crashing into a school bus, then exited the truck shouting “Allahu Akbar”¹⁷²⁹ while brandishing a pellet gun, a paintball gun and a black bag. The bag was found to contain three knives and a wallet with a Florida State driver’s licence.¹⁷³⁰ Near the truck, a note written in Arabic was found, proclaiming that Islamic State would “endure forever”.¹⁷³¹ Police acted rapidly and shot the assailant in the abdomen, at which point he was taken to Bellevue Hospital to undergo surgery.¹⁷³²

The assailant was identified as 29-year-old Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov. Originally from Uzbekistan, Saipov had been living in the United States since 2010.¹⁷³³ He entered the US on a diversity visa and originally settled in Ohio, marrying his wife in Cuyahoga Falls in 2013, with the couple subsequently having three children together.¹⁷³⁴ Saipov was a commercial truck driver in Ohio and also registered two companies: Sayf Motors Inc and Bright Auto LLC, in 2011 and 2013 respectively.¹⁷³⁵ The family moved to Tampa, Florida, before moving to New Jersey, where they had lived for around six months prior to the attack.¹⁷³⁶ After moving to New Jersey, Saipov had been working as an Uber driver.¹⁷³⁷

Previous acquaintances described Saipov as nervous, but lacking signs of Islamist extremism, while his family in Uzbekistan has been described as not being “overly religious”.¹⁷³⁸ A neighbour from Tampa described Saipov as “very soft and gentle”, referencing his generosity with her, and a neighbour from New Jersey described him as a “peacemaker”.¹⁷³⁹ However, a former co-worker from Ohio remembers Saipov as more argumentative and as being in the “habit of disagreeing with everybody”.¹⁷⁴⁰ The two would sometimes argue about politics; however, he claimed they never spoke about Islamic State.¹⁷⁴¹

While in the US, Saipov’s only previous criminal offences were related to traffic violations, specifically in December 2011, April 2014 and December 2015.¹⁷⁴² New York police reported that

¹⁷²⁷ Yan, H., and Andone, D., ‘Who is New York terror suspect Sayfullo Saipov?’, *CNN*, 2 November 2017, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/01/us/sayfullo-saipov-new-york-attack/index.html>, last visited: 2 March 2018;

Hubler, D., ‘Suspect in NYC terror attack was radicalized in the USA’, in *Homeland Security*, available at: <https://inhomelandsecurity.com/new-york-suspect-radicalized-usa/>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁷²⁸ Yan, H., and Andone, D., ‘Who is New York terror suspect Sayfullo Saipov?’, *CNN*, 2 November 2017.

¹⁷²⁹ Walters, J., and Glenza, J., ‘Trump’s ‘alarming’ death penalty call threatens suspect’s chance of fair trial, experts warn’, *The Guardian*, 2 November 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/nov/02/new-york-attack-suspect-death-penalty-trump>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁷³⁰ Grinberg, E., ‘7 new details from the New York truck attack investigation’, *CNN*, 2 November 2017, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/01/us/criminal-complaint-new-york-terror-attack/index.html>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁷³¹ ‘New York Attack Suspect: Isis Will ‘Endure Forever’’, *The Jerusalem Post*, 1 November 2017, <http://www.jpost.com/American-Politics/Uzbek-immigrant-with-New-Jersey-ties-at-center-of-New-York-attack-probe-511002>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁷³² Grinberg, E., ‘7 new details from the New York truck attack investigation’, *CNN*, 2 November 2017.

¹⁷³³ Yan, H., and Andone, D., ‘Who is New York terror suspect Sayfullo Saipov?’, *CNN*, 2 November 2017.

¹⁷³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷³⁶ Walters, J., and Glenza, J., ‘Trump’s ‘alarming’ death penalty call threatens suspect’s chance of fair trial, experts warn’, *The Guardian*, 2 November 2017.

¹⁷³⁷ ‘Uzbek Sister of NYC suspect fears Saipov ‘brainwashed’, pleads for time and ‘fair trial’, *RFE/RL*, 3 November 2017, available at: <https://www.rferl.org/a/new-york-terror-attack-uzbek-saipov-sister-brainwashed-trial/28833491.html>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁷³⁸ Yan, H., and Andone, D., ‘Who is New York terror suspect Sayfullo Saipov?’, *CNN*, 2 November 2017.

¹⁷³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴⁰ McCoy, K. and James, M. ‘NYC terror attack: suspect charged; tells feds he wants ISIS flag in hospital room’, *USA Today*, 1 November 2017, available at: <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/11/01/nyc-terror-attack/820251001/>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁷⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴² Yan, H., and Andone, D., ‘Who is New York terror suspect Sayfullo Saipov?’, *CNN*, 2 November 2017.

they had no intelligence on him.¹⁷⁴³ Yet it is believed that Saipov became “radicalised domestically”.¹⁷⁴⁴ The investigation into Saipov revealed that he had been planning the attack for at least two months in advance, and had even rented a similar truck on 22 October 2017, to practise driving and turning the vehicle.¹⁷⁴⁵ He explained that he wanted to “inflict maximum damage against civilians”.¹⁷⁴⁶ His sister claimed that he must have been brainwashed, and recounted that the family had become alarmed in 2013 when, after his marriage, he appeared with a full beard in a style that they associated with extremist elements.¹⁷⁴⁷ However, his mother had just returned from visiting her son in America, and said he had been planning on returning to Uzbekistan.¹⁷⁴⁸

During the investigation, 90 videos and 3,800 pictures were found on the assailant’s phone, many of which were IS propaganda.¹⁷⁴⁹ An additional 981 audio files and 1,800 videos were submitted as evidence against Saipov.¹⁷⁵⁰ The accused attacker reported that he had become motivated to carry out his attack after watching a video of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, in which Baghdadi questioned what Muslims in the United States and other countries are doing in response to the killing of Muslims in Iraq.¹⁷⁵¹ Additionally, police have linked Saipov to social media accounts containing IS-related content.¹⁷⁵² It is suspected that Saipov followed the instructions IS had released over social media, providing instructions on how to carry out truck attacks in cities, as this attack appears to have followed those instructions closely.¹⁷⁵³ While it is not clear whether Saipov had contact with IS members prior to the attack, on 3 November 2017 Islamic State named him a “soldier of the caliphate”.¹⁷⁵⁴ After being taken to hospital, Saipov described how he had wanted to place an IS flag on the truck, but decided against it as he didn’t want to draw attention to himself.¹⁷⁵⁵ He also asked to have an Islamic State flag hung in his hospital room.¹⁷⁵⁶

Saipov has been charged with 22 federal counts: eight counts of murder, 12 counts of attempted murder, one count of providing and attempting to provide material to support for Islamic State, and one count of violence and destruction of a motor vehicle.¹⁷⁵⁷ Saipov initially submitted a plea of not guilty to all counts; however, his attorneys are offering a plea bargain of life imprisonment without parole in order to avoid the death penalty.¹⁷⁵⁸ Should the government go forward with the death penalty, the trial is unlikely to start until September 2019 and would go on for years, owing to the sheer volume of evidence in the form of social media and victim testimony, as well as potential appeals.¹⁷⁵⁹

¹⁷⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴⁵ Grinberg, E., ‘7 new details from the New York truck attack investigation’, *CNN*, 2 November 2017.

¹⁷⁴⁶ Grinberg, E., and Jorgensen, S., ‘New York terror attack suspect pleads not guilty’, *CNN*, 28 November 2017, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/28/us/new-york-terror-attack-arraignment/index.html>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁷⁴⁷ ‘Uzbek Sister of NYC suspect fears Saipov ‘brainwashed’, pleads for time and ‘fair trial’, *RFE/RL*, 3 November 2017.

¹⁷⁴⁸ Yan, H., and Andone, D., ‘Who is New York terror suspect Sayfullo Saipov?’, *CNN*, 2 November 2017.

¹⁷⁴⁹ ‘NYC terror suspect offers to plead guilty to avoid death penalty, attorneys say’, *FOX43*, 18 January 2018, available at: <http://fox43.com/2018/01/18/nyc-terror-suspect-offers-to-plead-guilty-to-avoid-death-penalty-attorneys-say/>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁷⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵¹ Grinberg, E., and Jorgensen, S., ‘New York terror attack suspect pleads not guilty’, *CNN*, 28 November 2017.

¹⁷⁵² Yan, H., and Andone, D., ‘Who is New York terror suspect Sayfullo Saipov?’, *CNN*, 2 November 2017; and ‘Uzbek Sister of NYC suspect fears Saipov ‘brainwashed’, pleads for time and ‘fair trial’, *RFE/RL*, 3 November 2017.

¹⁷⁵³ Yan, H., and Andone, D., ‘Who is New York terror suspect Sayfullo Saipov?’, *CNN*, 2 November 2017.

¹⁷⁵⁴ ‘Uzbek Sister of NYC suspect fears Saipov ‘brainwashed’, pleads for time and ‘fair trial’, *RFE/RL*, 3 November 2017.

¹⁷⁵⁵ Grinberg, E., and Jorgensen, S., ‘New York terror attack suspect pleads not guilty’, *CNN*, 28 November 2017.

¹⁷⁵⁶ Grinberg, E., ‘7 new details from the New York truck attack investigation’, *CNN*, 2 November 2017.

¹⁷⁵⁷ *United States of America v. Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov*, US District Court Southern District of New York, available at: <https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1013346/download>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁷⁵⁸ Weiser, B., ‘Bike Path Terrorism Suspect Seeks Plea Deal to Avoid Death Penalty’, *The New York Times*, 17 January 2018, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/17/nyregion/saipov-bike-path-terrorist-death-penalty.html>, last visited: 2 March 2018.

¹⁷⁵⁹ Ibid.

63. November Belfast Foiled Roadside Bomb

The Attack

Date: 1 November 2017
Day: Wednesday
Time: Unknown
Country: United Kingdom
Place: Belfast
Area Type: Suburban – Residential
Location: Street
Type of Attack: Foiled Bombing
Target: Police
Ideology: Separatist/Nationalist
Organisation/Affiliation: Arm na Poblachta
Claimed: Yes
Number of Injured: 0
Number of Fatalities: 0
Response: Not Apprehended

The Assailants

Number: Unknown
Gender: Unknown
Name: Unknown
Age: Unknown
Country of Origin: Unknown
Nationality: Unknown
Resident: Unknown
Training/Combat Experience: Unknown
Known to Authorities: Unknown
Current Status: At Large

NOTES:

On Monday 1 November 2017, police in Northern Ireland were alerted to a potentially suspicious object in the Poleglass area of West Belfast.¹⁷⁶⁰ Although an initial investigation of the area failed to locate any kind of explosive, police then received a communication from dissident Republicans stating that a roadside bomb had been placed in the area.¹⁷⁶¹ A security alert was extended in the area while police returned to search for the explosive, during which time a number of residents were evacuated from their homes.¹⁷⁶² Following this, the authorities identified an explosive device that they reported had been designed with the intention of attacking armoured vehicles.¹⁷⁶³

¹⁷⁶⁰ 'New dissident terror group says it left Belfast roadside bomb,' *Belfast Telegraph*, 1 November 2017, available at: <https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/new-dissident-terror-group-says-it-left-belfast-roadside-bomb-36278756.html>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

¹⁷⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶² 'Suspect device reported in Belfast security alert,' *BBC News*, 31 October 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-41814480>, last visited: 16 August 2017.

¹⁷⁶³ 'Bomb found in west Belfast, police confirm,' *The Irish News*, 1 November 2017, available at: <http://www.irishnews.com/paywall/tsb/irishnews/irishnews/irishnews/news/northernirelandnews/2017/11/01/news/bomb-found-in-poleglass-west-belfast-security-alert-police-confirm-1177367/content.html>, last visited: 16 August 2017.

¹⁷⁶⁴ 'New dissident terror group says it left Belfast roadside bomb,' *Belfast Telegraph*, 1 November 2017.

¹⁷⁶⁵ 'PSNI confirms new NI dissident terror group after Up Close investigation,' *ITV News*, available at: <http://www.itv.com/news/utv/2017-08-29/psni-confirms-new-ni-dissident-terror-group-after-up-close-investigation-into-ciaran-maxwell/>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

The foiled attack was claimed by a newly emerged dissident Republican group calling itself Arm na Poblachta (Army of the Republic).¹⁷⁶⁴ The new group's existence was first publicised in August 2017 when an investigation into Ciaran Maxwell – a former Royal Marine who had become a bomb-maker for dissidents – discovered that another Republican militia had formed.¹⁷⁶⁵ During his court hearing, it was stated that while Maxwell was part of a 40-man strong group involved with bomb-making for the Continuity IRA, another group had emerged, calling itself Arm na Poblachta.¹⁷⁶⁶ Although small, this group was described as being violent and under investigation by MI5.¹⁷⁶⁷ Police have indicated that they believe the organisation was responsible for the murder of a 28-year-old man in Poleglass in February 2018.¹⁷⁶⁸ The group was thought to have suffered a significant setback, however, when authorities seized one of Arm na Poblachta's weapons stockpiles in May of 2018.¹⁷⁶⁹

The attempted roadside bombing in November has some parallels with another foiled attack in the Poleglass area in January. However, that explosive device was claimed by the dissident Republican group Óglaigh na hÉireann and may predate the formation of Arm na Poblachta.

64. Illinois Health Clinic Attempted Bombing

The Attack

Date: 7 November 2017
Day: Tuesday
Time: 7.00 am
Country: United States of America
Place: Champaign, Illinois
Area Type: Suburban – Commercial
Location: Health Clinic – Interior
Type of Attack: Attempted Bombing
Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate
Ideology: Far Right
Organisation/Affiliation: White Rabbit Militia – Directed
Claimed: No
Number of Injured: 0
Number of Fatalities: 0
Response: Arrested Post Attack

The Accused Assailants

Number: 3
Gender: Male
Names: Michael Hari, Michael McWhorter, Joe Morris
Ages: 47, 29, 22
Country of Origin: United State of America
Nationality: American
Resident: Charleston, Illinois

¹⁷⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶⁸ 'Raymond Johnston murder: Police blame dissident republicans', *BBC News*, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-44563783>, last visited: 16 August 2018.

¹⁷⁶⁹ 'Weapons finds wil have major impact on dissident groups, says top detective,' *Belfast Telegraph*, available at: <https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/weapons-finds-will-have-major-impact-on-dissident-groups-says-top-detective-36898583.html>, last visited 16 August 2018.

Training/Combat Experience: No
Known to Authorities: Yes, No, No
Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

On the morning of Tuesday 7 November, staff at the Women's Health Practice in Champaign, Illinois, found a suspicious device inside the building by a broken window.¹⁷⁷⁰ They immediately evacuated the premises and called the police, who arrived shortly afterwards, at around 8.00 am, and used a robot to approach the device and ensure that it was safe to enter the building.¹⁷⁷¹ The police bomb squad determined that the object was an explosive device which had not detonated.^{1772 1773} Given that the clinic's website listed abortion as a service, it appears that opposition to abortion may have been a likely motive behind the attempted attack.¹⁷⁷⁴

Five months later, on 13 March 2018, three men were arrested in connection with both this attempted attack as well as the bombing of a mosque in Minnesota which had occurred in August. The three men in question were 47-year-old Michael Hari, 29-year-old Michael McWhorter and 22-year-old Joe Morris, all of Clarence in Illinois, and each indicted in relation to these attacks.¹⁷⁷⁵ Specifically, Hari was charged with arson and possession of machine guns, while his two alleged accomplices, McWhorter and Morris, were also charged with arson.¹⁷⁷⁶ In addition, McWhorter's 18-year-old stepson, Ellis "EJ" Mack, was arrested on a federal weapons charge, although he is not accused of participating in the bombings.¹⁷⁷⁷ Upon being arrested, all four men were judged to pose a threat to public safety and were placed in custody.¹⁷⁷⁸

The three men charged with direct participation in the bombing of the mosque and attempted bombing of the health clinic had rented a truck and driven to Minnesota, where it is alleged that Morris broke a window at the mosque by using a sledgehammer¹⁷⁷⁹ before McWhorter tossed Hari's home-made explosive into the building.¹⁷⁸⁰ The men escaped in the rental vehicle.¹⁷⁸¹ Several months later, the Clarence sheriff provided information to the FBI about Hari, which is reported to have included photos of his stockpiled weapons as well as materials and instructions for making a bomb.¹⁷⁸²

All four men are believed to be members of The White Rabbits 3 Percent Illinois Patriot Freedom Fighters, an anti-government militia group led by Hari that met regularly at a small

¹⁷⁷⁰ Ditman, T., 'UPDATED: Authorities investigating 'potential bomb' at women's health clinic', *The News Gazette*, 7 November 2017, available at: <http://www.news-gazette.com/news/local/2017-11-07/updated-authorities-investigating-potential-bomb-womens-health-clinic.html>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁷⁷¹ 'Suspicious device found at Champaign Women's Health Practice', *Fox Illinois News Team*, 7 November 2017, available at: <https://foxillinois.com/news/local/suspicious-device-found-at-champaign-womens-health-practice>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁷⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷⁷³ Brumleve, W., 'Special Report | Michael Hari: From deputy to abductor to alleged terrorist', *The News Gazette*, 16 March 2018, available at: <http://www.news-gazette.com/news/local/2018-03-16/special-report-michael-hari-deputy-abductor-alleged-terrorist.html>, last visited: 3 August 2018.

¹⁷⁷⁴ 'Suspicious device found at Champaign Women's Health Practice', *Fox Illinois News Team*, 7 November 2017.

¹⁷⁷⁵ Montemayor, S., 'How alleged Minnesota mosque bomber tried to build militia in rural Ill.', *StarTribune*, 18 March 2018, available at: <http://www.startribune.com/fbi-says-alleged-minnesota-mosque-bomber-tried-to-build-a-militia-in-rural-illinois/477182203/>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹⁷⁷⁶ Mattias, C. and Reilly, R., 'Mosque Terror Attack Suspect Put in Detailed Bid to Build Trump A 'Great' Border Wall', *Huffington Post*, 13 March 2018.

¹⁷⁷⁷ Montemayor, S., 'How alleged Minnesota mosque bomber tried to build militia in rural Ill.', *StarTribune*, 18 March 2018.

¹⁷⁷⁸ Mattias, C. and Reilly, R., 'Public dangers: Illinois bombing crew to be kept in jail', *ABC 7 Chicago*, 16 March 2018, available at: <http://abc7chicago.com/public-dangers-illinois-bombing-crew-to-be-kept-in-jail/3225486/>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹⁷⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸⁰ Phillips, K., 'He wanted to build Trump's border wall. He was just charged in the bombing of a Minnesota mosque', *The Washington Post*, 14 March 2018, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/03/14/he-wanted-to-build-trumps-border-wall-he-was-just-charged-in-the-bombing-of-a-minnesota-mosque/?utm_term=.802ee88a5c08, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹⁷⁸¹ Montemayor, S., 'How alleged Minnesota mosque bomber tried to build militia in rural Ill.', *StarTribune*, 18 March 2018.

¹⁷⁸² Ibid.

building he owned in Clarence.¹⁷⁸³ The far-right group espouses a reactionary worldview, operating under the slogan “We Want Our Old America Back”.¹⁷⁸⁴ Days before their arrest, the White Rabbits posted a video online urging assistance from other anti-government militia groups, insisting that they needed help to resist the “tyranny” of government by warning that it would “seize people’s children or haul off firearms”.¹⁷⁸⁵

Though it is unknown why the group targeted the Dar Al-Farooq Mosque specifically, McWhorter told the FBI counterterrorism unit that their intent was to “scare [Muslims] out of the country ... because they push their beliefs on everyone else”.¹⁷⁸⁶ He also said they were not intending to kill anyone but wanted to “show them hey, you’re not welcome here, get the fuck out”.¹⁷⁸⁷

Clarence is a small, rural community of about 100 residents, and while Hari claimed that half the inhabitants are sympathetic to the White Rabbits ideology, neighbours have contested this. Other members of the community are reported to have kept their distance from Hari, and one neighbour claimed the three younger men in his cell were the only people in Clarence who chose to associate with him.¹⁷⁸⁸ Hari appears to have been the leader and instigator of the group. Locals in Clarence told reporters that he “just brainwashed these kids”, referring to the younger accomplices.¹⁷⁸⁹ According to Morris, Hari had promised to pay him and McWhorter \$18,000 each for the mosque attack,¹⁷⁹⁰ despite his own poor financial situation.¹⁷⁹¹

Hari is reported to have a long history of antisocial and extremist behaviour. As a college student in Texas, Hari protested the Waco Siege in 1993 – a fatal standoff between the FBI and a religious separatist group resulting in the deaths of 76 people¹⁷⁹² – which Hari claimed “galvanized” his beliefs.¹⁷⁹³ Upon returning to Illinois, Hari worked as a deputy sheriff before being fired for what was described as “odd behaviour”.¹⁷⁹⁴ He subsequently joined an Amish-like Christian sect, then later fled to Mexico and Belize with his daughters during a custody battle with his ex-wife (for which he was charged with child abduction).¹⁷⁹⁵ In this period Hari published books on his religious views and moved to Mexico with Morris to found a religious commune.¹⁷⁹⁶ Returning to Clarence, Hari set up several questionable businesses, including one through which he submitted a \$10 billion bid to assist President Donald Trump to build a proposed wall on the border with Mexico.¹⁷⁹⁷ He was also known to the authorities for violent incidents, including holding a neighbour to the ground with an airsoft gun to his head, for which Hari still has a pending criminal case against him.¹⁷⁹⁸

Federal law enforcement has described Hari’s White Rabbits Militia as a home-grown terrorist organisation.¹⁷⁹⁹ On 21 June 2018, a federal indictment was filed against Hari, McWhorter and

¹⁷⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸⁴ Mattias, C. and Reilly, R., ‘Public dangers: Illinois bombing crew to be kept in jail’, *ABC 7 Chicago*, 16 March 2018.

¹⁷⁸⁵ Montemayor, S., ‘How alleged Minnesota mosque bomber tried to build militia in rural Ill.’, *StarTribune*, 18 March 2018.

¹⁷⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹¹ Mattias, C. and Reilly, R., ‘Public dangers: Illinois bombing crew to be kept in jail’, *ABC 7 Chicago*, 16 March 2018.

¹⁷⁹² Montemayor, S., ‘How alleged Minnesota mosque bomber tried to build militia in rural Ill.’, *StarTribune*, 18 March 2018.

¹⁷⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹⁵ Brumleve, W., ‘Special Report | Michael Hari: From deputy to abductor to alleged terrorist’, *The News Gazette*, 16 March 2018.

¹⁷⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹⁸ Montemayor, S., ‘How alleged Minnesota mosque bomber tried to build militia in rural Ill.’, *StarTribune*, 18 March 2018.

¹⁷⁹⁹ Mattias, C. and Reilly, R., ‘Public dangers: Illinois bombing crew to be kept in jail’, *ABC 7 Chicago*, 16 March 2018.

Morris for machine gun possession, hate crime, obstruction of freedom of religion, destroying religious property and use of an explosive device.¹⁸⁰⁰

For more information, see the entry for “45. Bloomington Mosque Bombing”.

65. November PASOK Office Shooting

The Attack

Date: 7 November 2017

Day: Tuesday

Time: 7.45 pm

Country: Greece

Place: Athens

Area Type: City Centre – Commercial

Location: Office – Exterior

Type of Attack: Shooting

Target: Police & Civilian – Targeted (Political)

Ideology: Far Left

Organisation/Affiliation: Revolutionary Self-Defence – Suspected

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Not Apprehended

The Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Unknown

Age: Unknown

Country of Origin: Unknown

Nationality: Unknown

Resident: Unknown

Training/Combat Experience: Unknown

Known to Authorities: Unknown

Current Status: At Large

NOTES:

On 7 November 2017, at 7.45 pm in the evening,¹⁸⁰¹ police officers guarding the PASOK office were shot at by a hooded man with a rifle.¹⁸⁰² In the course of the subsequent investigation, four bullets cases were discovered, which were established to have been fired by the same 7.62mm Kalashnikov AK-47¹⁸⁰³ that had been used in two previous attacks known to have been

¹⁸⁰⁰ Sepic, M., ‘3 Illinois men face new federal hate crime charges in Bloomington mosque bombing’, *MPR News*, 21 June 2018, available at: <https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/06/21/men-face-hate-crime-charges-in-minnesota-mosque-bombing-bloomington>, last visited: 2 August 2018.

¹⁸⁰¹ ‘Gun from Greek PASOK shooting used in past guerrilla attacks – police’, *Reuters*, 7 November 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-attack-bullets/gun-from-greek-pasok-shooting-used-in-past-guerrilla-attacks-police-idUSKBN1D71GD>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁸⁰² ‘Terrorists ‘Seeking to Spill Blood’ in Armed Attack Against Greek Police’, *The Greek Reporter*, 7 November 2017, available at: <http://greece.greekreporter.com/2017/11/07/terrorists-seeking-to-spill-blood-in-armed-attack-against-greek-police/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁸⁰³ *Ibid.*

carried out by the anarchist group Revolutionary Self-Defence, one of which was also at the PASOK office in 2014.¹⁸⁰⁴ According to a policeman at the scene, a tall, hooded man wearing black clothes walked towards the police officer and fired, missing him as the officer dropped to the ground.¹⁸⁰⁵ However, one report indicated that there were at least two assailants, while another source reported that a dark-clothed hooded man escaped with an accomplice on a motorbike.¹⁸⁰⁶ It seems probable that there was one gunman and another person who acted as the driver of the getaway vehicle.¹⁸⁰⁷ The policeman targeted during the attack reported that he believed the assailant “wanted blood ... his aim was to kill”.¹⁸⁰⁸

The above-mentioned evidence found by forensics would indicate that the attack was most likely carried out by Revolutionary Self-Defence. The timing would also appear relevant, given that one of the group’s members had been arrested only days earlier.¹⁸⁰⁹ Similarly, Greek anarchist groups have expressed particularly strong opposition to PASOK for its role in passing austerity measures.¹⁸¹⁰ Anarchist groups in Greece have also repeatedly targeted police, including those guarding political targets. At the time of the May 2014 attack, which is believed to have used the same firearm as in this attack,¹⁸¹¹ there were fears about a possible explosive device being at the scene.¹⁸¹² The same firearm is thought to have been used in an attack on the Mexican embassy in Athens in July of 2016; this attack was also claimed by Revolutionary Self-Defence.¹⁸¹³ More recently, on 10 January 2017, a shooting at the PASOK office wounded one policeman.¹⁸¹⁴ Indeed, it has been reported that the PASOK office in the Exarchia neighbourhood of Athens has become known for regular violent clashes between police and far-left protestors.¹⁸¹⁵

For more information on attacks by Revolutionary Self-Defence, see the entry for “3. January PASOK Office Shooting”.

¹⁸⁰⁴ ‘Gun from Greek PASOK shooting used in past guerrilla attacks – police’, *Reuters*, 7 November 2017.

¹⁸⁰⁵ ‘Terrorists ‘Seeking to Spill Blood’ in Armed Attack Against Greek Police’, *The Greek Reporter*, 7 November 2017.

¹⁸⁰⁶ ‘Greek Police Say Gun Fired at PASOK Hit Party Before’, *The National Herald*, 8 November 2017.

<https://www.thenationalherald.com/180996/greek-police-say-gun-fired-pasok-hit-party/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁸⁰⁷ ‘Shots at PASOK offices: “Blind hit” targeting forces of MAT! They wanted dead’, *Newsit*, 6 November 2017, available at: <https://www.newsit.gr/egklhma/pyrovolismoi-sta-grafeia-tou-pasok-tyflo-xytima-stoxo-dynameis-ton-mat-ithelan-nekrous/2281428/>, last visited: 5 September 2018; and ‘Shots were fired outside PASOK headquarters in downtown Athens’, *Keep Greece Talking*, 6 November 2017, available at: <http://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2017/11/06/pasok-shooting/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁸⁰⁸ ‘Terrorists ‘Seeking to Spill Blood’ in Armed Attack Against Greek Police’, *The Greek Reporter*, 7 November 2017.

¹⁸⁰⁹ ‘Shots were fired outside PASOK headquarters in downtown Athens’, *Keep Greece Talking*, 6 November 2017.

¹⁸¹⁰ ‘Gun from Greek PASOK shooting used in past guerrilla attacks – police’, *Reuters*, 7 November 2017.

¹⁸¹¹ ‘Left opposition leads Greece euro vote’, *Daily Mail (AP)*, 26 May 2014, available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-2639193/Left-opposition-leads-Greece-euro-vote.html>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁸¹² *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹³ ‘Tests confirm Revolutionary Self-Defense behind police hit at PASOK offices’, *Ekathimerini*, 11 January 2017, available at: <http://www.ekathimerini.com/215206/article/ekathimerini/news/tests-confirm-revolutionary-self-defense-behind-police-hit-at-pasok-offices>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁸¹⁴ ‘Greece: Policeman injured in shooting at political party’, *CNBC*, 10 January 2017; ‘Greek police sees active group behind attack at PASOK offices’, *Ekathimerini*, 10 January 2017.

¹⁸¹⁵ *Ibid.*

66. Rome Police Station Attack

The Attack

Date: 7 December 2017

Day: Thursday

Time: 5.30 am

Country: Italy

Place: Rome

Area Type: City Centre – Commercial & Residential

Location: Police Station – Exterior

Type of Attack: Bombing

Target: Military

Ideology: Far Left

Organisation/Affiliation: Informal Anarchist Federation (Santiago Maldonado Cell) – Directed

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Not Apprehended

The Assailants

Number: Unknown

Gender: Unknown

Name: Unknown

Age: Unknown

Country of Origin: Unknown

Resident: Unknown

Nationality: Unknown

Training/Combat Experience: Unknown

Known to Authorities: Unknown

Current Status: At Large

NOTES:

At 5.30 am on 7 December 2017, a small explosive device was detonated outside a police station and barracks in Rome.¹⁸¹⁶ The barracks targeted were those of the Carabinieri, Italy's military police force. The bomb had been placed directly in front of the barracks in Rome's San Giovanni neighborhood.¹⁸¹⁷ No one was outside the building at the time of the explosion and so there were no injuries; however, the blast caused damage to the doorway of the police station and shattered some of the building's front windows.¹⁸¹⁸

Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Santiago Maldonado anarchic cell, which is based in Rome.¹⁸¹⁹ In a typically lengthy and cryptic claim of responsibility released through the Informal Anarchic Federation and International Revolutionary Front following the attack,

¹⁸¹⁶ 'Anarchists claim Rome bomb', *ANSA News*, 7 December 2017, available at: http://www.ansa.it/english/news/general_news/2017/12/07/anarchists-claim-rome-bomb-3_2e9cbccd-1db9-4c6a-b271-61069228792d.html, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁸¹⁷ 'Roma, gli anarchici del Fai rivendicano bomba esplosa davanti caserma carabinieri a San Giovanni', *Repubblica*, 7 December 2017, available at: http://roma.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/12/07/news/roma_bomba_esplode_davanti_caserma_carabinieri_nessun_ferito-183339850/, last visited: 18 January 2018.

¹⁸¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹⁹ 'Explosive Attack Against a Carabinieri Police Station in San Giovanni by Santiago Maldonado Cell FAI-FRI', *Insurrection News Worldwide*, 8 December 2017, available at: <https://insurrectionnewsworldwide.com/2017/12/08/rome-italy-explosive-attack-against-a-carabinieri-police-station-in-san-giovanni-by-santiago-maldonado-cell-fai-fri/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

the group stated, “With this action we launch an international campaign of attack against men, structures and means of repression. Each with the tool that he considers most appropriate and if he wishes to contribute to the debate.”¹⁸²⁰ The Santiago Maldonado group derives its name from that of an Argentinian activist who had campaigned for the rights of the Mapuche indigenous people¹⁸²¹ and who was found dead in October 2017.¹⁸²²

On the same day as the explosion, there was a bomb scare at Rome’s Risorgimento Square.¹⁸²³ The bomb used in the police barracks attack was similar to the one used in an attack against the Post Office in Marmorata Street in May of 2017, although in that instance there was no claim of responsibility or definitive proof linking the incident to anarchists.¹⁸²⁴ An investigation into terrorism was opened;¹⁸²⁵ however, it appears that no individuals have been identified or charged in relation to the incident.

67. New York Pipe Bomb Attack

The Attack

Date: 11 December 2017

Day: Monday

Time: 7.20am

Country: United States of America

Place: New York

Area Type: City Centre – Transport

Location: Subway Station – Interior

Type of Attack: Bombing

Target: Civilian – Indiscriminate

Ideology: Islamist

Organisation/Affiliation: Islamic State – Inspired

Claimed: No

Number of Injured: 3

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Arrested

The Accused Assailant

Number: 1

Gender: Male

Name: Akayed Ullah

Age: 27

Country of Origin: Bangladesh

Nationality: Bangladeshi

¹⁸²⁰ “Cellula Santiago Maldonado/FAI-FRI rivendica l’attacco esplosivo contro caserma dei carabinieri”, *Anarhija*, 7 December 2017, available at: <https://anarhija.info/library/roma-italia-cellula-santiago-maldonado-fai-fri-rivendica-l-attacco-esplosivo-contro-c-it.html>, last visited: 18 January 2018.

¹⁸²¹ ‘Anarchists claim Rome bomb’, *ANSA News*, 7 December 2017.

¹⁸²² ‘Argentines Attend Wake of ‘Disappeared’ Santiago Maldonado’, *teleSUR English*, 25 November 2017, available at: <https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Argentines-Attend-Wake-of-Disappeared-Santiago-Maldonado-20171125-0017.html>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁸²³ “Roma, gli anarchici del Fai rivendicano bomba esplosa davanti caserma carabinieri a San Giovanni”, *Repubblica*, 7 December 2017, available at: http://roma.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/12/07/news/roma_bomba_esplodedavanti_caserma_carabinieri_nessun_ferito-183339850/, last visited: January 18, 2018.

¹⁸²⁴ ‘Roma, gli anarchici del Fai rivendicano bomba esplosa davanti caserma carabinieri a San Giovanni’, *Repubblica*, 7 December 2017.

¹⁸²⁵ *Ibid.*

Resident: New York

Training/Combat Experience: No

Known to Authorities: No

Current Status: Charged

NOTES:

At 7.20 am on Tuesday 11 December, a man attempted to detonate a pipe bomb that was strapped to his body as he stood among commuters in the subway station at Manhattan's New York Port Authority bus terminal.¹⁸²⁶ In the partial detonation of the bomb, three individuals reported minor injuries from the blast, while the assailant himself suffered burns.¹⁸²⁷ CCTV footage from the attack was reported to show the moment of the detonation when the hallway was filled with smoke, before revealing an individual (the assailant) lying on the ground.¹⁸²⁸ The assailant was taken to Bellevue Hospital and was believed to be in a serious condition.¹⁸²⁹ Shortly after the explosion, the New York Police Commissioner stated that it was being treated as a terror-related incident.¹⁸³⁰ While officials said they suspected that the assailant had pledged allegiance to Islamic State, they also said they believed he acted alone.¹⁸³¹

The man was identified as 27-year-old Akayed Ullah, a Bangladeshi immigrant living in New York's Brooklyn neighbourhood.¹⁸³² Ullah was born on Sandwip Island on the south-east coast of Bangladesh, before moving to Dakha, where his wife, son and other family members were living at the time of the attack.¹⁸³³ Following the attack, the White House confirmed that Ullah had come to the United States on an immigrant visa sponsored by a family member.¹⁸³⁴ He is known to have had a New York taxi driver's licence between 2012 and 2015.¹⁸³⁵ More recently he had taken a job as an electrician.¹⁸³⁶ At the time of the attempted pipe bombing, Ullah was living with his sister, brothers and mother.¹⁸³⁷

Investigators revealed that Ullah's move into supporting Islamic State had begun as early as 2014.¹⁸³⁸ There have been conflicting reports about his connections with local Islamic institutions. According to some accounts he prayed regularly at the Masjid Nur Al Islam Mosque in Brooklyn and was reportedly close to the imam there.¹⁸³⁹ However, at the time of the attack, a worshipper

¹⁸²⁶ Holpuch, A., Pengelly, M., Owen, P. and Lartey, J., 'Manhattan subway explosion 'was attempted terrorist attack', says mayor', *The Guardian*, 12 December 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/11/new-york-police-explosion-reports-manhattan>, last visited: 27 July 2018.

¹⁸²⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸²⁸ Gingras, B., Grinberg, E. and McLaughlin, E., 'Suspect in attempted 'terrorist attack' pledged allegiance to ISIS, officials say', *CNN*, 12 December 2017, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/11/us/new-york-possible-explosion-port-authority-subway/index.html>, last visited: 27 July 2018.

¹⁸²⁹ Winter, T., Dienst, J. and Connor, T., 'NYC blast suspect Akayed Ullah aimed to avenge Muslim deaths, sources say', *NBC News*, 11 December 2017, available at: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/akayed-ullah-nyc-explosion-suspect-identified-27-year-old-brooklyn-n828361>, last visited: 27 July 2018.

¹⁸³⁰ Gingras, B., Grinberg, E. and McLaughlin, E., 'Suspect in attempted 'terrorist attack' pledged allegiance to ISIS, officials say', *CNN*, 12 December 2017.

¹⁸³¹ Ibid.

¹⁸³² Winter, T., Dienst, J. and Connor, T., 'NYC blast suspect Akayed Ullah aimed to avenge Muslim deaths, sources say', *NBC News*, 11 December 2017.

¹⁸³³ Safi, M., 'New York attack: police in Bangladesh question Akayed Ullah's relatives', *The Guardian*, 12 December 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/12/new-york-attack-police-in-bangladesh-quiz-akayed-ullahs-relatives>, last visited: 27 July 2018.

¹⁸³⁴ Yuhas, A., 'Police name New York subway attacker - as it happened', *The Guardian*, 11 December 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/live/2017/dec/11/new-york-explosion-subway-live-updates>, last visited: 27 July 2018.

¹⁸³⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸³⁶ Winter, T., Dienst, J. and Connor, T., 'NYC blast suspect Akayed Ullah aimed to avenge Muslim deaths, sources say', *NBC News*, 11 December 2017.

¹⁸³⁷ Safi, M., 'New York attack: police in Bangladesh question Akayed Ullah's relatives', *The Guardian*, 12 December 2017.

¹⁸³⁸ Sanchez, R. and Sterling, J., 'Akayed Ullah: What we know about the Manhattan explosion suspect', *CNN*, 12 December 2017, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/11/us/ny-suspect-what-we-know/index.html>, last visited: 27 July 2018.

¹⁸³⁹ Feuer, A., 'Suspect in Times Square Bombing Leaves Trail of Mystery', *The New York Times*, 11 December 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/nyregion/akayed-ullah-port-authority-bombing-suspect.html>, last visited: 1 August 2018.

at the mosque who knew Ullah said he had not seen him at the mosque for the past five or six months.¹⁸⁴⁰ While the mosque does not appear to have links with extremism, it has been alleged that federal agents had previously questioned the imam about his “anti-government” rhetoric, and in 2004 the mosque is reported to have been on a police “Mosques of interest” list, with four members of the mosque said to be on a “most dangerous” list.¹⁸⁴¹

Following the attack it was revealed that the assailant had chosen the precise location for the attack on account of it being beside some posters for Christmas.¹⁸⁴² It is understood that he had been inspired by attacks he had seen targeting Christmas-themed places in Europe, such as the 2016 Berlin Christmas Market attack.¹⁸⁴³ He told investigators that he had attempted to carry out the attack in retaliation for American airstrikes against Islamic State in Syria.¹⁸⁴⁴ During questioning, he told police that he had researched how to make the pipe bomb online and that he had constructed it at home.¹⁸⁴⁵ It was also revealed that there is evidence that Ullah had watched Islamic State video content online.¹⁸⁴⁶ Indeed, he specifically told investigators that he had carried out the attack for Islamic State,¹⁸⁴⁷ and a passport in his name was discovered with the scrawled line, “America, die in your rage”; a phrase commonly associated with members of Islamic State.¹⁸⁴⁸

68. Athens Courthouse Bombing

The Attack

Date: 22 December 2017

Day: Friday

Time: 3.25 am

Country: Greece

Place: Athens

Area Type: City Centre – Commercial & Residential

Location: Court Building – Exterior

Type of Attack: Bombing & Shooting

Target: Civilian – Targeted (Legal)

Ideology: Far Left

Organisation/Affiliation: The People’s Fighters Group (OLA) – Directed

Claimed: Yes

Number of Injured: 0

Number of Fatalities: 0

Response: Not Apprehended

¹⁸⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴¹ Feuer, A. and Ferre-Sadurni, L., ‘For Bombing Suspect, a Life Split Between Bangladesh and Brooklyn’, *The New York Times*, 12 December 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/nyregion/subway-bombing-akayed-ullah-bangladesh.html>, last visited: 1 August 2018.

¹⁸⁴² ‘New York Port Authority attack: Akayed Ullah ‘inspired by IS’’, *BBC News*, 12 December 2017, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-42320366>, last visited: 1 August 2018.

¹⁸⁴³ Nir, S. and Rashbaum, W., ‘Bomber Strikes Near Times Square, Disrupting City but Killing None’, *The New York Times*, 11 December 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/nyregion/explosion-times-square.html>, last visited: 1 August 2018.

¹⁸⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴⁵ Feuer, A., ‘Suspect in Times Square Bombing Leaves Trail of Mystery’, *The New York Times*, 11 December 2017.

¹⁸⁴⁶ Safi, M., ‘New York attack: police in Bangladesh question Akayed Ullah’s relatives’, *The Guardian*, 12 December 2017.

¹⁸⁴⁷ Baker, A. and Weiser, B., ‘I Did It for the Islamic State,’ Bombing Suspect Told Investigators’, *The New York Times*, 12 December 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/nyregion/suicide-bomber-nyc-terrorism-subway.html>, last visited: 1 August 2018.

¹⁸⁴⁸ Sanchez, R. and Sterling, J., ‘Akayed Ullah: What we know about the Manhattan explosion suspect’, *CNN*, 12 December 2017.

The Assailants

Number: 3

Gender: Unknown

Name: Unknown

Age: Unknown

Country of Origin: Unknown

Nationality: Unknown

Resident: Unknown

Training/Combat Experience: Unknown

Known to Authorities: Unknown

Current Status: At Large

NOTES:

At around 3.25 am¹⁸⁴⁹ on 22 December, a bomb exploded at the Athens Court of Appeal, shattering the windows at the front of the building and causing significant damage to the façade of the courthouse, as well as damaging some nearby buildings.¹⁸⁵⁰ There were no fatalities or injuries in the attack; however, Greece's Justice Minister, Stavros Kontonis, told state television that assailants had fired a shot at a guard who had identified two individuals making their way up the steps to plant the bag containing the explosive.¹⁸⁵¹ According to a report given by the court guard, the two assailants fled on a motorbike.¹⁸⁵² However, other news reports have said that the two assailants escaped in a van, while it was actually a third man, the driver of the vehicle, who shot at the guard.¹⁸⁵³ It is also understood that two Greek media outlets received warning calls at around 2.50 am, in which it was stated that a bomb was to go off shortly.¹⁸⁵⁴

The attack was claimed by the People's Fighters Group, also sometimes known as the Popular Fighter's Group or OLA.¹⁸⁵⁵ In the group's statement claiming responsibility for the attack, they said, "Justice is like a snake. It will only bite those barefoot."¹⁸⁵⁶ The OLA's justification for the attack appears to be that it accuses the judiciary of serving the politicians who passed austerity measures that the group opposes.¹⁸⁵⁷ This, the group protests, included upholding laws that cut pensions and public sector salaries as part of agreements that secured international financial agreements to ease the debt crisis.¹⁸⁵⁸

¹⁸⁴⁹ 'Bomb explosion at the court of appeal in Athens – Unclear if linked to the property auctions', *Independent Balkan News Agency*, 22 December 2017, available at: <http://www.balkan.eu.com/bomb-explosion-at-the-court-of-appeal-in-athens-unclear-if-linked-to-the-property-auctions/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁸⁵⁰ 'Athens police probe explosion that rocked Greek courthouse', *The Daily Sabah*, 22 December 2017, available at: <https://www.dailysabah.com/europe/2017/12/22/athens-police-probe-explosion-that-rocked-greek-courthouse>, last visited: 5 September 2018; and 'Popular Fighters Group claims responsibility for Athens court blast', *Die Welt*, 27 December 2017, available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/popular-fighters-group-claims-responsibility-for-athens-court-blast/a-41951781>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁸⁵¹ 'Explosion outside Athens court shatters windows, no injuries', *Reuters*, 22 December 2017, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-blast/explosion-outside-athens-court-shatters-windows-no-injuries-idUSKBN1EG0BB>, last visited: 5 September 2018; and 'Powerful explosion outside Court of Appeal in Athens, attackers shot at police guard', *Keep Greece Talking*, 22 December 2017, available at: <http://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2017/12/22/athens-court-bomb-explosion/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁸⁵² 'Bomb explodes outside Greek court amid property protests', *The Daily Telegraph*, 22 December 2017, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/22/bomb-explodes-outside-greek-court-amid-property-protests/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁸⁵³ 'Bomb Explodes Outside Appeals Court in Athens', *The Greek Reporter*, 22 December 2017, available at: <http://greece.greekreporter.com/2017/12/22/bomb-explodes-outside-appeals-court-in-athens/>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁸⁵⁴ 'Athens police probe explosion that rocked Greek courthouse', *The Daily Sabah*, 22 December 2017.

¹⁸⁵⁵ 'Popular Fighters Group claims responsibility for Athens court blast', *Die Welt*, 27 December 2017

¹⁸⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵⁷ 'Greek urban guerrilla group claims responsibility for courthouse blast', *Reuters*, 27 December 2017, available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-greece-blast-claim/greek-urban-guerrilla-group-claims-responsibility-for-courthouse-blast-idUKKBN1EL1ON>, last visited: 5 September 2018.

¹⁸⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

It is believed that the group has also been responsible for a series of attacks in recent years, including setting off a small bomb outside a commercial bank earlier in 2017 and an explosive package to the Labour Ministry in Athens in 2016.¹⁸⁵⁹ The group has been accused of involvement in shootings at the German ambassador's residence in 2013, the Israeli embassy in 2014 and the Greek industry federation office in 2015.¹⁸⁶⁰

For more information on attacks by the People's Fighters Group, see the entry for "24. Eurobank Office Bombing".

¹⁸⁵⁹ 'Popular Fighters Group claims responsibility for Athens court blast', *Die Welt*, 27 December 2017.

¹⁸⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

Data Analysis


The Attacks

Attacks by Region and Country

Table 1.1 Attacks by region

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Australasia	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Europe	40	74.07%	51	75.00%	91	74.59%
North America	13	24.07%	15	22.06%	28	22.95%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Figure 1.1 Attacks by region



The study recorded a rise in the number of terror attacks across Western countries from 2016 to 2017. This includes attempted attacks that failed or were foiled, as well as those in which assailants completed their attacks as intended. As such, these figures include large-scale mass-casualty attacks – in which assailants inflicted ten or more fatalities – as well as those that failed to cause any injuries at all.

In both 2016 and 2017, Europe experienced significantly more terror attacks than the two other regions in this study. In 2016, Europe was the location of almost three-quarters (74.07%) of all attacks, and in 2017 that figure rose, in absolute terms as well as a proportion, to 75%. Similarly, North America saw a small increase in the number of terror attacks in 2017. However, in terms of the overall total across Western countries, the share of attacks that took place in North America reduced from 24.07% to 22.06%. Meanwhile, the number of terrorist incidents in Australasia remained low, despite an increase from 1.85% of the total to 2.94%. These were entirely contributed by Australia, as no attacks meeting the definition were recorded in New Zealand.

It should be noted that the European countries in this study have a combined population larger than that of North America. Equally, both of these regions have substantially larger populations

than Australasia. This partly accounts for the way in which the number of terrorist incidents have been distributed between the three continents. However, the figures recorded may also suggest a different picture in Australasia in terms of the prevalence of extremism. Research from the Combatting Terrorism Centre at West Point indicates that by 2017 the threat from Islamist terrorism had grown in Australia, with the number of jihadist plots having risen since 2014 and with the emergence of Islamic State.¹⁸⁶¹ In September of 2014, Australia raised its terror threat level for the first time since the introduction of such a system in 2002.¹⁸⁶²

Australia also appears to have seen far fewer foreign fighters compared to other countries in the study, such as France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Belgium. As of 2017, Australian security agencies estimated that there were approximately 110 Australian nationals still residing with terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, while another 68 had been killed as foreign fighters and a further 40 were reported to have returned to Australia.¹⁸⁶³

There is also some evidence to suggest the possible growth of Far Right extremist activity in Australia during the period covered by this study.¹⁸⁶⁴ Generally, however, Australia and New Zealand have seen little evidence of other forms of violent extremism during 2016 and 2017.

Table 1.2 Number of attacks by country

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Australia	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Austria	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Belgium	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Canada	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Denmark	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Finland	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
France	7	12.96%	12	17.65%	19	15.57%
Germany	8	14.81%	2	2.94%	10	8.20%
Greece	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
Italy	5	9.26%	4	5.88%	9	7.38%
Malta	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Netherlands	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Norway	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Poland	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Spain	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Sweden	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
United Kingdom	5	9.26%	13	19.12%	18	14.75%
United States	12	22.22%	12	17.65%	24	19.67%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%


¹⁸⁶¹ Zammit, A., 'Australian Jihadism in the Age of the Islamic State', *CTC Sentinel*, March 2017, Volume 10, Issue 3, available at: <https://ctc.usma.edu/australian-jihadism-in-the-age-of-the-islamic-state/>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁶² Barker, C. 'Countering terrorism and violent extremism', *Parliament of Australia*, 2016, available at: https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/ViolentExtremism, last visited: 4 October 2018.


¹⁸⁶³ 'Country Reports on Terrorism 2017. Chapter 1. Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific', *US Department of State*, 2017, available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282842.htm>, last visited: 4 October 2018.



¹⁸⁶⁴ Nathan, J., 'The Rise of Australia's Activist Far Right: How Far Will It Go?', *ABC*, 31 January 2018, available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/religion/the-rise-of-australias-activist-far-right-how-far-will-it-go/10095024>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

Figure 1.2 Number of attacks by country



Map 1.1 Europe, number of attacks by country in 2016 and 2017



Map 1.2 North America, number of attacks by country in 2016 and 2017**Map 1.3** Australasia, number of attacks by country in 2016 and 2017

Overall, 2017 witnessed a rise in the number of terrorist incidents from the previous year. There was also a small increase in the number of countries in which attacks occurred, with attacks in 14 different countries in 2016 and 15 countries in 2017. However, the degree to which there was either a rise or a decline in terror attacks varied significantly between countries.

A number of countries stood out as accounting for a high proportion of the terrorist incidents, and the countries that experienced a large number of attacks in 2016 tended to continue to see

a high figure in 2017. The countries that were found to have experienced the highest levels of terrorism in this study corresponded with the findings of the Global Terrorism Index 2017. Data from that report for attacks in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries¹⁸⁶⁵ between January 2014 to June 2017 ranked the highest-impacted countries as the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and France.¹⁸⁶⁶ Of the European countries covered in this study, between 2002 and 2016 the Global Terrorism Index recorded France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium and Greece as the countries with the most terrorism.¹⁸⁶⁷

In both years of this study the levels of terrorism in the United States were among the highest. In 2017, the United States accounted for 17.65% of the Western world's terrorist attacks, with 12 attacks that year. This ranked that country in joint second place with France, just behind the United Kingdom. While this was the same number of attacks the United States suffered in 2016, that year the United States accounted for 22.22% of terror attacks in the West, and as such the most of any Western country.

Similarly, France experienced a consistently high rate of attacks across both years, with the third highest number of attacks in 2016 and the joint second greatest number in 2017. In 2016 France suffered seven attacks, or 12.96% of the overall total, and in 2017 this not only remained high but rose significantly, with 12 attacks. As with the United States, this accounted for 17.65% of the overall total. Given that France has a significantly smaller population than the United States, the figures recorded here can be taken as an indication of a comparatively worse situation in terms of terrorism and extremism. This corresponds to figures indicating that France contributed more foreign fighters to militant groups in Iraq and Syria than any other European Union country. Data from the Center for the Analysis of Terrorism (CAT) recorded that more than 2,300 individuals from France have been involved in Syrian-Iraqi jihadist networks¹⁸⁶⁸ and around 1,300 have travelled to the area of conflict.¹⁸⁶⁹ As the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism at the US State Department noted in its annual report for 2017, since 2016 the profile of terrorism in France has been shifting towards smaller-scale attacks by lone actors, away from the larger, externally directed attacks of 2015.¹⁸⁷⁰

The data from this report appears to point to the opposite trend in the United Kingdom. There it is not only the number of attacks that has increased, but also the scale and the sophistication of these attacks. The significant rise in the number of attacks in the United Kingdom also contributed to the overall increase across Western countries. In 2016, the United Kingdom contributed 9.26% of the attacks witnessed in the West that year, with five such incidents. In 2017 this more than doubled, reaching 13 incidents, contributing 19.12% of the overall total.

Whereas the United States, the United Kingdom and France all saw a consistently high level of terrorism as the top three countries over both years, other countries experienced a consistently low level, while many experienced no attacks in either year. Canada suffered one attack in 2016, 1.85% of attacks that year, which rose to three attacks in 2017, contributing 4.41% of attacks in Western countries that year. This appears to be a continuation of terrorism trends in Canada,

¹⁸⁶⁵ Data on OECD countries referenced from the Global Terrorism Index excludes Israel and Turkey, as the Global Terrorism Index categorises those two countries separately.

¹⁸⁶⁶ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017, available at: <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶⁸ 'European Jihad Watch 11/2017', *Center for the Analysis of Terrorism*, 30 November 2017, available at: <http://cat-int.org/index.php/2017/11/30/european-jihad-watch-112017/?lang=en>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁶⁹ Bindner, L., 'Jihadists' Grievance Narratives against France', *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague*, February 2018, available at: <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Bindner-Jihadists-Grievance-Narratives-Against-France-February2018-1.pdf>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁷⁰ Country Reports on Terrorism 2017. Chapter 1. Country Reports: Europe', *US Department of State*, 2017, available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282843.htm>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

as recorded by the Global Terrorism Index 2017, which indicated an increase in terrorist activity in that country between 2002 and 2016.¹⁸⁷¹ Notably, 2017 saw Canada suffer two of its most high-profile terror attacks since Michael Zehaf-Bibeau's attack on the Canadian parliament in Ottawa in 2014: the Quebec City mosque attack and the Edmonton truck attack.

Sweden was another country that experienced attacks across both years, albeit at a consistently low level. That country suffered two attacks in 2016 and three attacks in 2017, accounting for 3.70% of the international total in 2016 and 4.41% in 2017. This rise in terrorism in Sweden corresponds to evidence of a broader growth of extremist activity there. The Swedish security services SÄPO have reported that they estimate that the number of violent extremists operating in Sweden has increased from 200 in 2010 to closer to 3,000 in 2017.¹⁸⁷²

There were countries in the study that recorded a considerable change in the number of attacks that took place between the two years. Germany particularly stands out as one such country. In 2016, Germany saw the second highest number of attacks of any Western country: eight attacks and 14.81% of the total for Western countries for that year. In 2017 this decreased considerably, falling to only two attacks, which was 2.94% of the overall figure. It is further notable that the two attacks recorded in Germany in 2017 were on a much smaller scale – one was a parcel bomb and the other a knife attack – as compared to the 2016 Berlin Christmas market attack or the suicide bombing at the music festival in Ansbach in July 2016.

As with Germany, Belgium also dropped, to 2.94% of the total with two attacks in 2017, having been hit by five attacks, or 9.26% of the total, in 2016. While one of the 2017 attacks in Belgium was an attempted station bombing, no attack that year was as ambitious as the Islamic State-directed Brussels suicide bombings of March 2016.

Greece also saw a significant change, although here the trend was upward, rising from four incidents and 7.41% of the total in 2016 to eight attacks and 11.76% of the total in 2017. This made Greece the fourth worst affected country that year. Additionally, individuals in Greece used that country as a base of operations from which to direct terrorism in other European countries, specifically through the use of mail bombs. In 2017, attacks were recorded in France and Germany that are believed to have been initiated from within Greek territory.¹⁸⁷³

As noted, the overall trend from 2016 to 2017 showed a rise in the number of attacks. Most of the countries that experienced terror attacks in those years reflected this trend, with 11 countries seeing the number of attacks in 2017 rise from the figure they experienced in 2016. However, five countries did not share in this trend and saw the number of terror attacks decrease. Equally, there was a lack of consistency in the rate at which terrorism either increased or decreased in the various countries. In this respect it is not possible to identify a single, overall trend in terrorism that is consistently reflected across the different countries.

What does appear to be more consistent as a trend across both years is that those countries that experienced the highest or lowest levels of terrorism in 2016 tended to see this replicated in 2017. France, the United States and the United Kingdom all remained among the four worst affected countries. Equally, many of those countries that experienced either no attack or one attack in 2016 experienced the same in 2017. This may be indicative of which countries have the most serious problems with terrorism and the forms of extremism that generate it. However, data is needed from a wider time period to determine whether these trends are consistent.

¹⁸⁷¹ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017.


¹⁸⁷² 'Country Reports on Terrorism 2017. Chapter 1. Country Reports: Europe', *US Department of State*, 2017.

¹⁸⁷³ 'Greek police arrest suspect behind high-profile parcel bomb attacks', *Reuters*, 28 October 2017, available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-greece-parcelbombs-arrest/greek-police-arrest-suspect-behind-high-profile-parcel-bomb-attacks-idUKKBN1CX0CG>, last visited: 4 October 2018.


Table 1.3 Number of attacks by ideology in each country

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Australia	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Islamist	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Austria	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Islamist	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Belgium	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Islamist	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Canada	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Far Right	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Islamist	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Far Right	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Denmark	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Islamist	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Finland	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Islamist	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
France	7	12.96%	12	17.65%	19	15.57%
Far Left	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Far Right	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Islamist	7	12.96%	9	13.24%	16	13.11%
Germany	8	14.81%	2	2.94%	10	8.20%
Far Left	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Islamist	8	14.81%	1	1.47%	9	7.38%
Greece	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
Far Left	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
Italy	5	9.26%	4	5.88%	9	7.38%
Far Left	4	7.41%	3	4.41%	7	5.74%
Islamist	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Malta	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Separatist/Nationalist	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Netherlands	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Far Right	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Norway	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Islamist	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Poland	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Far Left	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Spain	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Islamist	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Sweden	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
Far Right	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Islamist	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
United Kingdom	5	9.26%	13	19.12%	18	14.75%
Far Right	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Islamist	2	3.70%	6	8.82%	8	6.56%
Separatist/Nationalist	2	3.70%	6	8.82%	8	6.56%
United States	12	22.22%	12	17.65%	24	19.67%
Black Supremacist	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Far Left	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Far Right	0	0.00%	6	8.82%	6	4.92%
Islamist	9	16.67%	4	5.88%	13	10.66%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Map 1.4 Europe, number of attacks by ideology per country in 2016 and 2017



Map 1.5 North America, number of attacks by ideology per country in 2016 and 2017



Map 1.6 Australasia, number of attacks by ideology per country in 2016 and 2017

While the figures for the overall number of attacks across Western countries may not indicate a consistent underlying trend, the data can reveal more when broken down along the lines of the relevant ideologies and the regions and countries in which adherents to the different ideologies carried out their attacks.

Taking only attacks carried out by Islamist groups and Islamist-inspired individuals, we see a moderate decline in the absolute number of these attacks and as part of the overall percentage. Overall there were 36 Islamist attacks in 2016, and this reduced slightly to 33 in 2017, accounting for two-thirds (66.67%) of attacks in the first year and falling to less than half (48.53%) in the second year. This apparently declining trend in Islamist attacks, however, is only really reflective of what happened in North America, and was particularly impacted by the decline in the number of Islamist attacks in the United States.

In Europe, the number of Islamist attacks remained constant in 2017, with 25 attacks in both years, while there was one additional Islamist attack in Australasia, rising from one to two. For North America the overall number of Islamist attacks decreased, reducing from ten to six. However, in Canada, the number of Islamist attacks rose, with one occurring in 2016 and two in 2017.

In the United States the number of Islamist attacks decreased from nine in 2016 to four in 2017. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the disparity in the number of Islamist attacks in the United States between 2016 and 2017 can largely be accounted for by the actions of just one individual: Ahmad Khan Rahimi. Over two days in September 2016, Rahimi was responsible for undertaking four separate bombing attacks and attempted bombings in New York and New Jersey.

North America, and more specifically the United States, was the only region that witnessed terrorism by assailants identified with a Black Supremacist ideology. This would appear to indicate a problem with this form of extremism that may be almost entirely unique to the United States, although further research is needed to examine why Black Supremacism has not become more established in other Western countries. Recent research has documented

an increase in the number of “Black Nationalist” groups operating in the United States over the past decade, rising from 81 such groups in 2007 to 233 by 2017.¹⁸⁷⁴

In August 2017, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued an internal report on what it referred to as “Black Identity Extremism” and warned of a growing threat to law enforcement officers from those associated with this ideology.¹⁸⁷⁵ At the beginning of 2018, the United States witnessed what is believed to be the first prosecution of a Black Identity Extremist.¹⁸⁷⁶ Nevertheless, attacks from this ideology saw a downward trend between the two years featured in this study, reducing from three incidents in 2016 to one in 2017. The reduction in attacks from Black Supremacist and Islamist terrorism contributed to the United States having no overall increase in terrorism in 2017, even though other forms of terrorism saw an increase in the country during that year.

Europe was the only region to experience Separatist/Nationalist terrorism over the two-year period of the study. In terms of the number of attacks attributed to assailants or groups from this ideology, this doubled from three attacks in 2016 to six attacks in 2017. The increase was caused by a significant rise in terrorism in Northern Ireland in 2017. In 2016 two of the three attacks happened in Northern Ireland, while another happened in Malta, although this incident was related to the civil war in Libya. In 2017, however, all six of these incidents occurred in Northern Ireland.

Europol’s 2018 ‘European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report’, which details a wide range of different terrorist activity in European Union countries, noted the prevalence of incidents associated with this ideology. The United Kingdom – and specifically Northern Ireland – accounted for the largest number of these. While that report recorded these as “security-related incidents”, it also acknowledged that the dissident republican groups in question are extensively engaged in criminality involving “drug dealing, extortion, fuel laundering and murder”.¹⁸⁷⁸

The overall figure for attacks recorded from Separatist/Nationalists in this study is lower than could be expected and warrants some explanation. The primary potential sources of violence in this category across Europe would be the remnants of the Northern Ireland conflict, Basque separatism, Corsican separatism, and fighting between Turkish and Kurdish groups active in European countries such as Sweden, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland. In the case of terrorism in Corsica, the National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC) indicated in 2014 that it was renouncing violence and beginning a process of disarming.¹⁸⁷⁹

Research for this project identified two potential terrorist incidents in Corsica in 2017, both in April and both of which employed rudimentary explosive devices targeting French financial and infrastructure targets. However, with no verified claim of responsibility by a group or individual, and no further available information about culpability, the incidents could not be logged under

¹⁸⁷⁴ ‘Black Nationalist’, *Southern Poverty Law Centre*, available at: <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/black-nationalist>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁷⁵ ‘(U//FOUO) Black Identity Extremists Likely Motivated to Target Law Enforcement Officers’, *Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Assessment*, 3 August 2017, available at: <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4067711/BIE-Redacted.pdf>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁷⁶ de Bourmont, M., ‘Is a Court Case in Texas the First Prosecution of a “Black Identity Extremist”?’, *Foreign Policy*, 30 January 2018, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/30/is-a-court-case-in-texas-the-first-prosecution-of-a-black-identity-extremist/>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁷⁷ ‘European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018’, *Europol* (2018), available at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷⁹ Day, M., ‘Corsican terror group lays down arms in battle for independence from France’, *The Independent*, 27 June 2014, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/corsican-terror-group-lays-down-arms-in-battle-for-independence-from-france-9569569.html>, last visited: 17 September 2018.

the terms of this study. Furthermore, the size of the explosives used and the timing of detonation during the early hours of the morning might raise further questions about intent.

Numerous similar cases can be pointed to in the Northern Irish context, as well as incidents in Europe with either Kurdish or Turkish targets. In some cases, these incidents did not involve a level of force that would qualify them as terrorism according to the definition used in this study. In others, there was not sufficient evidence to demonstrate the necessary ideology or motive. Particularly in the case of Northern Ireland, there were violent incidents and even killings perpetrated by individuals associated with these ideologies, but these were determined to have been primarily caused by gang violence, internal feuds or vigilante activity.

It is important to note, that the research for this study did uncover the continuation of significant violence and criminal activity associated with Separatist/Nationalist ideology in Europe, even if most of it fell short of the definition of terrorism used in this report. Furthermore, the apparent lack of arrests of perpetrators, and of evidence about the identity of those behind these activities, may indicate a failing in policing that is not seen with some of the other ideologies in this study.

A similar pattern emerges with incidents of violence and potential terrorist activity suspected of being associated with the Far Left in Southern Europe. With the exception of one attack by a lone individual in the United States in 2017, all other attacks associated with the Far Left took place in European countries. In 2016 there were nine attacks from those on the Far Left, all in Europe, representing 16.67% of all attacks that year.

The following year, 14 Far Left attacks took place across Western countries, of which 13 took place in Europe, with attacks from this ideology representing one-fifth (20.59%) of all attacks that year. In both years there was a large number of possible Far Left terrorist incidents that failed to meet the criteria for inclusion set for this study. In some cases, this resulted from a lack of evidence and had more information been available about some of these incidents there may have been grounds for including a number of them. As such, it is possible that the level of Far Left terrorist activity is higher than has been recorded here.

Particularly in Greece, Italy and Spain, research for this study found incidents that had the appearance of those likely to have been undertaken by Far Left groups – as suggested by the choice of target and the means of attack used – but where there was no available evidence clearly demonstrating the identity, motive and ideology of the individuals behind these incidents. Other possible incidents were excluded from the study on account of the level of violence used being insufficient to justify inclusion. Despite this, the research indicated a considerable level of Far Left violence and possible terrorist activity in Southern Europe, but also a lack of evidence about the identities of those perpetrating these incidents being made publicly available by authorities. Arrests of suspects in these cases have been limited and often only appear to have happened for some of the most serious offences.

As with the excluded incidents suspected of being undertaken by the Far Left and Separatist/Nationalists, there was a large number of violent and criminal incidents likely perpetrated by those associated with the Far Right. Greece is a country that, in addition to having a serious problem with Far Left anarchist extremism, has a highly active Far Right, with prominent groups such as the Golden Dawn party.¹⁸⁸⁰ However, violence by right wing groups in Greece during the period of this study were not found to meet the definition of terrorism.

¹⁸⁸⁰ Smith, H., 'SS songs and antisemitism: the week Golden Dawn turned openly Nazi', *The Guardian*, 7 June 2014, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/07/greece-golden-dawn-fascism-threat-to-democracy>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

Often, right wing associated violence in Western countries has taken the form of hate crimes or vandalism targeting locations associated with migrants and Muslim communities. In many cases the level of force used was not sufficient to qualify as terrorism, and there was also often an absence of evidence establishing the identity or nature of the ideology of the perpetrators. With these events also failing to qualify for inclusion, it is possible that the number of Far Right attacks is higher than has been recorded here.

Despite these potential incidents being excluded from the study, there was an upward trend in terrorism by the Far Right. In 2016, Far Right attacks were only recorded in Europe; however, in 2017 not only did the number of these attacks increase in Europe, but also six occurred in the United States and one occurred in Canada. In 2016, 5.56% of all attacks were committed by those on the Far Right, which were accounted for by the three Far Right attacks committed in Europe.

The following year, this rose to 14 incidents – seven in Europe, six in the United States and one in Canada – making up one-fifth (20.59%) of all terrorism in 2017. The increase in the number of Far Right attacks in Europe corresponds with Europol data showing that in European Union countries arrests relating to right wing extremism almost doubled between 2016 and 2017.¹⁸⁸¹ The figures here also draw attention to the United States as the country by far the worst affected by Far Right attacks in 2017, which contrasts with the previous year when the country experienced no attacks from this ideology that met the terrorism definition.

Injuries and Fatalities

Examining the number of attacks by location and even by ideology provides only a partial insight into the terrorism trends experienced in the West during 2016 and 2017. These figures include attacks that were successful, those that were foiled and those that failed in some way. Different attacks recorded in the study were clearly committed with a range of often quite different objectives, intentions and expectations about the damage and harm they would cause.

A number of the attacks recorded were evidently intended as mass-casualty attacks in which the perpetrators set out to murder and injure as many people as they possibly could. The suicide bombings in Brussels and Manchester and the truck attacks in Nice, Berlin, London and New York would all fall into this category. Others saw individuals set out to try to kill or injure a small group, such as attacks on patrolling soldiers or members of the police force. Some were assassinations or apparent assassination attempts, which primarily sought to kill or badly injure one individual, but which showed a disregard for the potential injury of those in the immediate vicinity of the target. This was the case with the explosive parcels sent to former Greek Prime Minister Lucas Papademos and German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble in 2017, which jeopardised the safety of members of their staff as well as those working in the postal service.¹⁸⁸²

Additionally, there were a number of attacks that may not have been intended to kill anyone – such as small explosives timed to detonate at times when there were likely to be few passers-by – but which nevertheless accepted the risk of potentially causing injury to anyone who happened to be close to the device at the time. Indeed, there were a number of serious injuries sustained by those who either attempted to diffuse these explosives or disturbed them unwittingly.

Across the years 2016 and 2017, in Western countries, 280 people lost their lives to terrorism and 1,905 people sustained some level of injury. These ranged from those who were left with severe and permanent injuries to those who required only minimal medical attention. Broken down over the two years, 2017 saw a reduction in casualties from the previous year. In particular, there was a sharp decline in the number of terrorism related fatalities, with the

¹⁸⁸¹ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018', *Europol* (2018).

¹⁸⁸² 'Greek police arrest suspect behind high-profile parcel bomb attacks', *Reuters*, 28 October 2017.

number falling by more than half. This is in line with findings published by the Global Terrorism Index in 2017, which found that OECD countries witnessed a higher number of terrorism fatalities in 2016 than in any year since 2001, the year of the 9/11 attacks.¹⁸⁸³ However, the same report found that there were fewer terrorism fatalities during the first six months of 2017 than during the same period in 2016.¹⁸⁸⁴

In 2016, terror attacks caused 191 fatalities and left 987 injured in Western countries. The following year, although the overall number of attacks increased, these figures fell to 89 fatalities and left 918 injured. The number of people a terror attack was likely to directly harm was also fewer in 2017 than in 2016. During the first year there were 3.54 fatalities per attack, whereas in 2017 this reduced to 1.31 fatalities per attack. Similarly, in 2016 there were 18.28 people injured for every attack that year. In 2017, however, this decreased to 13.50 injured for every attack that occurred.

This change is in part accounted for by the fact that there were fewer mass-casualty attacks in 2017, and those that did occur that year did not manage to cause the same level of damage as some of those in 2016. In the first year there were two attacks that caused 30 or more fatalities and five attacks that caused ten or more fatalities, although it is worth noting that two of these were the connected Brussels bombings of March 2016. In 2017, no attack resulted in more than 22 fatalities, and in total there were only two attacks with ten or more fatalities. There were, however, more attacks in 2017 in which there were between five and ten fatalities than there had been in the previous year.

The mass-casualty attacks of 2016 included atrocities such as the Nice truck attack in which 86 were murdered, the Orlando nightclub shooting in which 49 were killed, and the Brussels suicide bombings which had a combined figure of 32 fatalities from two separate but coordinated attacks. By contrast, the most devastating attack of 2017 – the Manchester Arena suicide bombing – saw the murder of 22 victims. The second worst attack that year – the Barcelona truck attack – left 15 dead. Other attacks in 2017 that had lower death tolls but succeeded in having a significant impact included the Westminster Bridge and Stockholm truck attacks that each killed five, and the London Bridge and New York truck attacks in which eight were murdered in each. These still had lower fatality rates than an incident such as the Berlin Christmas Market attack of December 2016 in which 12 were killed.

The figures from 2017 were in part improved because of a number of attacks that year that failed to be as deadly as they had the potential to be. The explosive placed on the London underground subway system which partially exploded at Parsons Green Station resulted in 30 people being injured; had the bomb detonated as intended it would likely have left many dead. In New York in October 2017, Sayfullo Saipov carried out a truck attack that killed eight and injured 11. That attack was brought to an abrupt end when the truck was halted by crashing into a school bus. Had the area of the attack been more crowded and had the vehicle travelled a greater distance, it is conceivable that Saipov could have inflicted the kinds of casualties seen in Barcelona, or perhaps even in Nice the previous year.

In terms of the numbers of injuries inflicted by different attacks, the suicide bombing of the Manchester Arena in 2017 left 512 injured, the worst figure for any attack from the two years. The second worst attack for numbers injured was the Nice truck attack which injured 434 people, a figure worse than the combined total from the two suicide bombings in Brussels that year in which 340 people suffered injuries. The Barcelona truck attack of August 2017 was particularly serious in terms of injuries, leaving 131 injured. These cases would appear to indicate

¹⁸⁸³ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017.

¹⁸⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

that while a suicide bombing can be capable of inflicting a massive number of injuries, truck attacks have sometimes left a greater number of people injured than bombings. They also have the potential to cause more fatalities if an area is crowded enough and if a heavy-duty vehicle is able to travel for long enough without being halted.

Table 2.1 Number of injured and fatalities

	Injured	%	Fatalities	%
2016	987	51.81%	191	68.21%
2017	918	48.19%	89	31.79%
Total	1905	100.00%	280	100.00%

Figure 2.1 Number of injured and fatalities




Table 2.2 Number of injured and fatalities

	Injured		Fatalities		Total	
	2016	%	2016	%	2016	%
Australia	1	0.10%	0	0.00%	7	0.37%
Austria	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Belgium	346	35.06%	32	16.75%	347	18.22%
Canada	1	0.10%	0	0.00%	26	1.36%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Denmark	3	0.30%	0	0.00%	3	0.16%
Finland	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	8	0.42%
France	438	44.38%	89	46.60%	457	23.99%
Germany	79	8.00%	12	6.28%	85	4.46%
Greece	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	4	0.21%
Italy	1	0.10%	0	0.00%	5	0.26%
Malta	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Netherlands	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Norway	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Poland	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Spain	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	137	7.19%
Sweden	1	0.10%	0	0.00%	16	0.84%
United Kingdom	0	0.00%	4	2.09%	653	34.28%
United States	117	11.85%	54	28.27%	157	8.24%
Total	987	100.00%	191	100.00%	1905	100.00%
					280	100.00%

Breaking down the figures on fatalities from terror attacks by country appears to show few, if any, consistent trends between 2016 and 2017. In the first year, France had the highest number of fatalities, with 89 killed, representing 46.60% of all terrorist fatalities of that year. In 2017, however, France had one of the lowest number of fatalities, with three individuals killed, 3.37% of the total. The change in figures is largely accounted for by the absence of mass-casualty attacks in France in the second year. In 2016, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel's truck attack in Nice left 86 dead and another 434 people injured.¹⁸⁸⁵

Belgium and Germany experienced a similar significant difference in the number of fatalities recorded in each year. Belgium suffered a high fatality rate in 2016, with 32 killed that year, but it had no fatalities the following year. This is accounted for by the two coordinated suicide bombings in Brussels in March 2016. Germany also saw a significant reduction in fatalities, with 12 deaths from terrorism in 2016 and one in 2017. Comparable to the shift in Belgium's fatality rate, the 2016 deaths in Germany were all accounted for by one attack: the truck attack carried out by Anis Amri at the Berlin Christmas market.

The United States had had the second highest fatality rate in 2016, with 54 killed. This decreased to 16 killed in 2017, a significantly lower figure, although one that still left the United States in joint second place as one of the worst affected countries that year in terms of fatalities. For the most part, however, in 2017, the countries that suffered the highest casualty rates differed from those in the previous year. The worst affected country for that year was the United Kingdom. Whereas four were killed in terrorism incidents in 2016, that rose to 36 in 2017. These figures from the second year were primarily caused by the Manchester Arena suicide bombing and the Westminster and London Bridge attacks. Additionally, the partially failed bombing at Parsons Green and the attack at Finsbury Park Mosque both had the potential to cause far more fatalities had they unfolded in line with the plans of the assailants.

Along with the United States, the second worst affected country in 2017 was Spain, with 16 killed there. However, Spain did not suffer any terrorism-related fatalities the previous year, and the 2017 figures are entirely accounted for by the Barcelona and – to a lesser extent – the Cambrils attacks. Both of these were perpetrated by the same Islamist cell from Ripoll.¹⁸⁸⁶

The fatality figures have largely been driven by the countries that suffered mass-casualty attacks. Research from the Global Terrorism Index in 2017 similarly found that since 2014, the figures for terrorism fatalities in OECD countries have been heavily influenced by only a few mass-casualty attacks rather than by numerous small-scale attacks.¹⁸⁸⁷ No Western country experienced a mass-casualty attack in both 2016 and 2017. While smaller attacks did result in fatalities, these were still accumulatively less numerically significant than the impact of one mass-casualty attack. However, it is possible that the effect of numerous smaller attacks may be equally, or perhaps more, impactful for causing a sense of fear and intimidation to the public.

¹⁸⁸⁵ Samuel, H., 'Nice killer visited Italy's "Little Calais" as he was radicalised over a year before July 14 massacre', *The Telegraph*, 6 October 2016, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/06/nice-killer-visited-italys-little-calais-as-he-was-radicalised-o/>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁸⁶ Piranty, S., 'Barcelona attack: The jihadists and the hunt for a second gang', *BBC News*, 8 August 2018, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44890504>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁸⁷ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017.

Table 2.3 Number of injured and fatalities by city

	2016		2017		Total	
	Injured	% Fatalities	Injured	% Fatalities	Injured	% Fatalities
Alexandria	0	0.00%	5	0.54%	5	0.26%
Ansbach	15	1.52%	0	0.00%	15	0.79%
Athens	0	0.00%	4	0.44%	4	0.21%
Barcelona	0	0.00%	131	14.27%	131	6.88%
Belfast	0	0.00%	1	0.11%	1	0.05%
Berlin	56	5.67%	0	0.00%	56	2.94%
Birstall	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Bloomington	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Bologna	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Brussels	344	34.85%	32	16.75%	345	18.11%
Cambrils	0	0.00%	1	0.11%	6	0.31%
Campiglione	0	0.00%	6	0.65%	1	0.05%
Chalon-sur-Saone	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Champaign	0	0.00%	2	0.22%	2	0.10%
Champaign	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Charleroi	2	0.20%	0	0.00%	2	0.10%
Charlottesville	0	0.00%	19	2.07%	19	1.00%
Columbus	15	1.52%	0	0.00%	15	0.79%
Copenhagen	3	0.30%	0	0.00%	3	0.16%
Dallas	7	0.71%	5	2.62%	7	0.37%
Denver	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Dijon	0	0.00%	3	0.33%	3	0.16%
Edmonton	0	0.00%	5	0.54%	5	0.26%
Elizabeth	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Enschede	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Essen	3	0.30%	0	0.00%	3	0.16%
Fermo	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Flint	0	0.00%	1	0.11%	1	0.05%
Florence	0	0.00%	1	0.11%	1	0.05%
Fresno	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Glasgow	0	0.00%	1	0.11%	0	0.00%
Gothenburg	0	0.00%	6	0.65%	1	0.05%
Hamburg	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	6	0.31%
Hanover	1	0.10%	0	0.00%	1	0.05%
Indianapolis	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Lettershandoney	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Lido Tre Archi	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Linz	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	2	0.10%

	2016			2017			Total		
	Injured	% Fatalities	%	Injured	% Fatalities	%	Injured	% Fatalities	%
London	0	0.00%	0.00%	140	15.25%	15.73%	140	7.35%	7.35%
Londonderry	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Ludwigshafen	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Manchester	0	0.00%	0.00%	512	55.77%	24.72%	512	26.88%	26.88%
Mantes-la-Jolie	0	0.00%	1.05%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Marseille	1	0.10%	0.00%	0	0.00%	2.25%	1	0.05%	0.71%
Melbourne	0	0.00%	0.00%	3	0.33%	1.12%	3	0.16%	1
Milan	1	0.10%	0.00%	3	0.33%	0.00%	4	0.21%	0.00%
Minto	1	0.10%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.05%	0.00%
Mlada Boleslav	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
New Jersey	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
New York	31	3.14%	0.00%	14	1.53%	10.11%	45	2.36%	3.21%
Nice	434	43.97%	86	45.03%	0.00%	0.00%	434	22.78%	86
Orlando	53	5.37%	49	25.65%	0.00%	0.00%	53	2.78%	49
Oslo	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Oxford	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Paris	0	0.00%	0.00%	14	1.53%	1.12%	14	0.73%	1
Philadelphia	1	0.10%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.05%	0.00%
Portland	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.11%	2.25%	1	0.05%	0.71%
Queanbeyan	0	0.00%	0.00%	3	0.33%	1.12%	3	0.16%	1
Quebec City	0	0.00%	0.00%	19	2.07%	6.74%	19	1.00%	6
Rochdale	0	0.00%	0.52%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	1
Rome	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Saint Cloud	10	1.01%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	10	0.52%	0.00%
Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray	1	0.10%	1	0.52%	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.05%	1
Stockholm	1	0.10%	0.00%	14	1.53%	5.62%	15	0.79%	5
Strabane	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Strathroy	1	0.10%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.05%	0.00%
Toronto	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.11%	0.00%	1	0.05%	0.00%
Turin	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Turku	0	0.00%	0.00%	8	0.87%	2.25%	8	0.42%	2
Valence	2	0.20%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	2	0.10%	0.00%
Valletta	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Warsaw	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Wurzburg	4	0.41%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	4	0.21%	0.00%
Total	987	100.00%	191100.00%	918	100.00%	89100.00%	1905	100.00%	280100.00%


Cities, and particularly city centres, were among the most common areas for attacks in the study. They present terrorists with numerous civilian soft targets, crowded places, political targets and high-profile landmarks. However, the data gathered for this study does not clearly identify which cities are the most dangerous in terms of terrorism. This is because a city may stand out as having one of the worst fatality or casualty figures on account of having experienced just one mass-casualty attack. Nice stands out in this regard, with more fatalities than any other city. However, all 86 of these were caused in the same attack. By contrast, a city such as Athens experienced 12 attacks across both years, but witnessed no fatalities in any of these attacks.

A more useful measure might be to focus on those cities that demonstrate a high casualty rate caused by numerous attacks, particularly if these attacks occurred over both years of the study. One of the worst affected cities in the study was New York, which suffered a total of five attacks in 2016 and 2017. These attacks caused nine fatalities and left 45 injured, although eight of the fatalities were caused by the October 2017 truck attack. London also experienced five attacks, all of which were in 2017 rather than being across both years. While Manchester had a higher casualty rate, this was caused by a single attack. London's five attacks caused 14 fatalities and left 110 people injured.

Two other cities of note here are Brussels and Paris. There were 11 attacks in Paris, with these spread across both years. However, despite this high number of attacks, in the course of 2016 and 2017 combined, Paris suffered a lower casualty rate than many other cities, with 14 people injured and one fatality. Brussels suffered six attacks, with these also occurring across both years. Moreover, the city experienced a high casualty rate, with 32 fatalities and 345 left injured. Despite this, given that all the fatalities and 340 of the injured were caused by the twin suicide bombings of March 2016, it is still the case that the casualties for most of the cities over the two years occurred on just one date for each city.

Table 2.4 Fatalities by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	5	2.62%	3	3.37%	8	2.86%
Far Left	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Far Right	1	0.52%	11	12.36%	12	4.29%
Islamist	184	96.34%	75	84.27%	259	92.50%
Separatist/Nationalist	1	0.52%	0	0.00%	1	0.36%
Total	191	100.00%	89	100.00%	280	100.00%

Figure 2.2 Fatalities by ideology

Particularly noticeable is that all of the attacks recorded in this study that managed to inflict mass casualties were carried out by groups and individuals associated with Islamism. Breaking down the casualty figures along ideological lines rather than by location reveals some more significant trends across 2016 and 2017. The vast majority of the 191 people killed in terrorist attacks in 2016 were accounted for by Islamist attacks: 184 fatalities, representing 96.34% of the total. Of the injuries from that year, the figures are even more heavily weighted towards Islamist terrorism. In 2016, 980 of the 987 people injured, or 99.29% of the total figure, were caused in attacks by Islamists. In 2017 these numbers decreased somewhat, with Islamist assailants succeeding in killing fewer people in mass-casualty attacks. In all, 75 of the 89 fatalities that year came from Islamist attacks, representing 84.27% of the total number of fatalities. In the same year, 851 of the 918 people injured, or 92.70% of the total, were injured in attacks by Islamist terrorists.

The decrease in the overall percentage of casualties from Islamist attacks is partially accounted for by the increase in those killed or injured in Far Right and Far Left attacks. In 2016, terrorist attacks from the Far Right caused one fatality – which occurred in the United Kingdom – and no recorded injuries. In 2017, however, 11 people were killed by Far Right terrorism, accounting for 12.36% of all those killed by terrorism in Western countries that year. In 2017 there was also a sharp rise in the numbers injured in Far Right attacks, as compared to 2016 when there are no recorded injuries from Far Right terrorism: in 2017, 55 people were injured in these attacks, which accounted for 5.99% of the total number of injured for that year. These rising casualty figures from attacks carried out by the Far Right correspond not only with the rise in the number of Far Right attacks, but also with the kinds of attacks that the Far Right perpetrated in 2017. In particular, that year saw Far Right assailants seek to carry out the kinds of attacks that could inflict higher casualty rates, such as the Quebec City mosque shooting or the vehicular attacks in Finsbury Park and Charlottesville.


There was also an increase in the numbers harmed in Far Left terrorism in 2017. Although Far Left terrorism caused no fatalities in either 2016 or 2017, in 2017 the number of injured rose to 11, as opposed to no recorded injuries in the previous year. In part, the rising injury rate appears

to be linked to the rise in the absolute number of attacks by the Far Left. Given that the Far Left carried out an equal number of attacks as the Far Right in 2017 but did not manage to cause any fatalities, this appears to be accounted for by the kinds of terrorism used by the Far Left. This primarily consisted of the use of small-scale explosives or shootings in which the assailants appear to have prioritised fleeing the scene unapprehended over causing injury.

Casualties from Separatist/Nationalist terrorism remained low, with one fatality and no injuries in 2016 and no fatalities and one injury in 2017. In many cases, these attacks were of a similar small scale to those perpetrated by the Far Left. This may explain the comparably low casualty rate.

The absolute number of casualties associated with Black Supremacist terrorism decreased between the two years, although the fatalities as a percentage of the overall total increased on account of the fall in the number of fatalities caused by other ideologies. The 2017 casualty figures come from just one Black Supremacist attack: the Fresno shooting in April of that year. So while five were killed as a result of terrorism from this ideology in 2016 and three were killed in 2017, the percentage of fatalities as a result of Black Supremacist terrorism rose slightly from 2.61% in 2016 to 3.37% in 2017. However, the absolute number of injured from this ideology fell, from seven in 2016, or 0.70% of the total, to none in 2017.

Figure 2.3 Average number of injured and fatalities per attack by ideology in 2016 and 2017



Breaking down the data from both years, it is possible to compare the number of casualties caused by each ideology with the number of attacks by assailants from those ideologies. So of the 23 attacks attributed to the Far Left over 2016 and 2017, on average there was less than one injury for each of these attacks. The same was true of the nine Separatist/Nationalist attacks, which on average had fewer than one fatality or injury for each attack.

Of the 17 Far Right attacks recorded, there was on average less than one fatality for each attack. However, for the number injured by Far Right attacks, the average was 3.24 people per attack. As noted above, attacks by the Far Right have not only become more numerous, but they have also become more dangerous, causing an increased number of fatalities. While it is beyond the scope of this research, further work is required not only to ascertain why there has been an

increase in Far Right terrorism, but also to assess whether there has been a radicalisation of right wing ideology that might be encouraging adherents to seek to perpetrate more lethal attacks.

Black Supremacist attacks proved still more dangerous when they occurred, with an average of two fatalities and 1.75 injured for every attack associated with this ideology. Attacks from this ideology may have been more dangerous than those by the Far Left or Separatist/Nationalists on account of the types of attacks perpetrated by these assailants. Better understanding of this ideology might also provide greater insight into why attacks by Black Supremacist assailants have proven to be more lethal. By far the most dangerous, however, were Islamist attacks: for every Islamist attack 3.75 people were killed and 26.54 people were injured. Here there is a far more established and recognisable link between an ideology that expressly seeks to kill a large number of Westerners and attacks that, on average, manage to achieve this to a far greater extent than attacks by other ideologies.

Response by Authorities

Table 3.1 Response by authorities

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Arrested	7	12.96%	13	19.12%	20	16.39%
Arrested Post Attack	14	25.93%	23	33.82%	37	30.33%
Not Applicable	3	5.56%	2	2.94%	5	4.10%
Not Apprehended	8	14.81%	14	20.59%	22	18.03%
Shot & Arrested	3	5.56%	5	7.35%	8	6.56%
Shot & Arrested Post Attack	4	7.41%	0	0.00%	4	3.28%
Shot Dead	14	25.93%	9	13.24%	23	18.85%
Shot Dead & Shot & Arrested	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead Post Attack	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	280	100.00%

Figure 3.1 Response by authorities





Figure 3.2 Response by authorities in 2016 and 2017

The response that the authorities have taken against assailants when they have been either perpetrating terror attacks or attempting to carry out terror attacks has varied considerably. In the case of many attacks, assailants have only been apprehended sometime after the incident of which they have been accused. In total, of the 122 incidents recorded over 2016 and 2017, 37 attacks involved assailants who were arrested after the incident. A total of 23 attacks in 2017 had assailants arrested at a later time, one-third (33.82%) of the 68 attacks that occurred that year. In 2016, 14 of 54 attacks led to assailants being arrested at a later time, and in addition four attacks involved assailants who were shot and arrested at a later time. Again, in 2016, one-third (33.33%) of attacks resulted in assailants being arrested at a later time.

A large proportion of attacks involved an assailant being arrested at the time at which they were either carrying out an attack or seeking to do so. In 2017 there were 13 attacks where the assailant was arrested at the time of the attack, and another five where the assailant was shot and then arrested. These 18 attacks in which an assailant was arrested at the time represent just over one-quarter (26.47%) of all attacks that occurred in 2017. This compares to seven attacks that featured assailants being arrested at the time of attack in 2016, as well as another three in which assailants were shot at and arrested. These ten attacks in which arrests were made at the time represent 18.52% of attacks that year.

As noted, the authorities have responded to attacks by shooting and arresting assailants, both during the attack as well as after the attack. However, assailants have also been shot and killed by members of the police and military when they have been responding to attacks. In 2017, there were ten attacks during which the authorities shot and killed an assailant, as well as one attack which led to the authorities shooting and killing an assailant at a later time. These 11 attacks where the authorities responded by killing at least one assailant or more represent 16.18%

of all attacks from that year. In the previous year, there were 14 attacks which led to assailants being shot and killed, as well as another attack which involved the assailant being shot and killed at a later time after the attack. These 15 incidents represent 27.78% of all attacks that year.

There were a number of attacks for which no assailant has yet been apprehended. In 2017, there were 14 such attacks, representing one-fifth (20.59%) of attacks that year. In 2016, there were eight attacks recorded for which no assailant is known to have been apprehended, which represents 14.81% of attacks that took place that year. In addition, there were a number of attacks from both years for which no action was taken against assailants on account of the fact that they had been killed as a result of their own actions in the course of the attack. This included assailants killed in suicide bombings or by their attempt to carry out a suicide bombing. There were two such incidents in 2017 and three in 2016.

Table 3.2 Response by authorities by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Arrested	7	12.96%	13	19.12%	20	16.39%
Far Left	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Far Right	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Islamist	4	7.41%	10	14.71%	14	11.48%
Separatist/Nationalist	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Arrested Post Attack	14	25.93%	23	33.82%	37	30.33%
Black Supremacist	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Far Left	3	5.56%	5	7.35%	8	6.56%
Far Right	2	3.70%	11	16.18%	13	10.66%
Islamist	6	11.11%	6	8.82%	12	9.84%
Separatist/Nationalist	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Not Applicable	3	5.56%	2	2.94%	5	4.10%
Islamist	3	5.56%	2	2.94%	5	4.10%
Not Apprehended	8	14.81%	14	20.59%	22	18.03%
Far Left	5	9.26%	8	11.76%	13	10.66%
Islamist	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Separatist/Nationalist	1	1.85%	6	8.82%	7	5.74%
Shot & Arrested	3	5.56%	5	7.35%	8	6.56%
Islamist	3	5.56%	5	7.35%	8	6.56%
Shot & Arrested Post Attack	4	7.41%	0	0.00%	4	3.28%
Islamist	4	7.41%	0	0.00%	4	3.28%
Shot Dead	14	25.93%	9	13.24%	23	18.85%
Black Supremacist	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Far Left	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Islamist	13	24.07%	8	11.76%	21	17.21%
Shot Dead & Shot & Arrested	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Islamist	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead Post Attack	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Islamist	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

The direct response that the authorities have taken against assailants appears to vary quite substantially depending on the ideology of the perpetrators. Across both years, 22 attacks have not resulted in an assailant being apprehended by the authorities. It is notable that attacks associated with two ideologies stand out as often not having had assailants caught. Of such attacks, 13 of these, or 59.09%, are believed to have been carried out by the Far Left. Another 31.82% of these are attacks identified as having been perpetrated by Separatist/Nationalists. Indeed, of 23 Far Left attacks recorded across both years, more than half (56.52%) did not lead to an assailant being apprehended. Of the nine attacks included in this study that have been attributed to Separatist/Nationalist terrorism, seven have not seen an assailant apprehended for perpetrating these attacks.

By contrast, it is notable that where attacks have seen the assailants shot and killed or shot and arrested, these are far more likely to have been committed by Islamists or those associated with Black Supremacist extremism. Of those that led to assailants being shot and killed at the time of the attack, 22 of these were Islamist: 13 in 2016 and nine in 2017. The large majority (91.67%) of all attacks in which assailants were shot and killed were Islamist attacks. In addition to these, there were two further Islamist attacks that led to the assailant being shot and killed, albeit at a time after the attack had taken place. In total, across both years, 24 Islamist attacks resulted in an assailant being shot and killed; this accounts for more than one-third (34.78%) of all Islamist attacks featured in the study.

There were a further eight attacks in which Islamist assailants were shot and arrested at the time of the attack, and a further four Islamist attacks which led to assailants being shot and arrested sometime after the attack. In total, 36 Islamist attacks resulted in an assailant being shot, accounting for more than half (52.17%) of all such incidents associated with Islamist assailants in 2016 and 2017.

These figures stand in contrast with those for the other ideologies. In 2016 there was one Black Supremacist attack in which an assailant was shot and killed, and in 2017 there was one Far Left attack in which the assailant was shot and killed. There were no other incidents recorded in the study where attackers were shot in an effort to apprehend them or end a terror attack. While the material in this study cannot point to a conclusive explanation for why authorities are more likely to respond to Islamist attacks by shooting, there are a number of possibilities. As already seen, the data has indicated that, on average, Islamist attacks tend to cause far more injuries and fatalities than those of other ideologies. This corresponds to the high level of direct force often used by Islamist assailants, which may accordingly lead the authorities to use live fire against assailants in response.

It is noteworthy that the other instances in which assailants were shot and killed also involved the attackers using a high level of force in an apparent attempt to cause maximum casualties, as seen with the 2017 shooting attack by James T. Hodgkinson in which five were injured, and the 2016 shooting attack by Micah Johnson in which five were killed and seven were injured. These assailants were also present at the time the attacks were carried out, as has usually been the case with Islamist attacks.

Attackers from other ideologies appear to be more inclined to carry out attacks remotely, such as by placing explosive devices at a specific location, thus protecting themselves from being apprehended. It is notable too that not only have Islamist attackers been present at the time of their attacks, but they have also often targeted members of the police or military, or targeted high-profile locations where members of the security services have been present and able to use live fire against the assailants.

The targeting of armed police and soldiers by Islamist assailants may be interpreted as an effort to intentionally put themselves in harm's way, and it may not be unreasonable to assume that the

importance placed on martyrdom in Islamist ideology at least partly explains why so many Islamist assailants have been shot. Indeed, all five of the attacks in which assailants were killed through their own direct actions (in suicide bombings or attempted bombings) were Islamist attacks.

Table 3.3 Response by authorities in each country

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Australia	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Arrested	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Arrested Post Attack	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Austria	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Arrested Post Attack	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Belgium	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Not Applicable	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Not Apprehended	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shot & Arrested	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Canada	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Arrested	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Arrested Post Attack	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Arrested Post Attack	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Denmark	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Finland	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shot & Arrested	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
France	7	12.96%	12	17.65%	19	15.57%
Arrested	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Arrested Post Attack	1	1.85%	4	5.88%	5	4.10%
Not Applicable	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shot & Arrested	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Shot Dead	4	7.41%	3	4.41%	7	5.74%
Germany	8	14.81%	2	2.94%	10	8.20%
Arrested	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Arrested Post Attack	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Not Applicable	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead Post Attack	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Greece	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
Arrested Post Attack		0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Not Apprehended	4	7.41%	6	8.82%	10	8.20%
Italy	5	9.26%	4	5.88%	9	7.38%
Arrested		0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Arrested Post Attack	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Not Apprehended	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Shot Dead	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Malta	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Arrested	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%

Netherlands	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Arrested Post Attack	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Norway	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Arrested	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Poland	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Arrested	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Spain	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Shot Dead & Shot & Arrested	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead Post Attack	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Sweden	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
Arrested Post Attack	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Not Apprehended	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
United Kingdom	5	9.26%	13	19.12%	18	14.75%
Arrested	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Arrested Post Attack	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Not Applicable	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Not Apprehended	1	1.85%	6	8.82%	7	5.74%
Shot Dead	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
United States	12	22.22%	12	17.65%	24	19.67%
Arrested	0	0.00%	4	5.88%	4	3.28%
Arrested Post Attack	2	3.70%	6	8.82%	8	6.56%
Shot & Arrested	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Shot & Arrested Post Attack	4	7.41%	0	0.00%	4	3.28%
Shot Dead	5	9.26%	1	1.47%	6	4.92%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

As well as the responses from authorities appearing to vary between assailants depending on their ideological alignment, there is also some variation between the responses from the authorities in different countries. The data suggests that assailants are more likely to go unapprehended in some countries than others, and that in certain countries the authorities may be more likely to shoot assailants. However, in some cases these trends may also relate to the kinds of terrorism that different countries suffer.

The country with the most attacks for which no assailant was apprehended was Greece, with ten such attacks across both years. However, this may be reflective of a farther-reaching problem with Far Left terrorism, given that the Italian authorities also failed to apprehend assailants for three Far Left attacks there. Nevertheless, given that the largest concentration of Far Left attacks took place in Greece, it is difficult to determine whether the failure to apprehend these assailants is an issue specific to Greece or specific to Far Left terrorism. As noted by the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism at the US State Department, Greece did make two high-profile arrests of anarchist terrorists in 2017: Panagiota Roupa and Konstantinos Yiagtzoglou.¹⁸⁸⁸ Nevertheless, given the number of Far Left terrorist incidents in Greece and the number of groups that appear to be operating there, it remains to be seen how far the arrests of these two individuals will go in degrading Far Left violent extremism in Greece.

An example of a country that has a varying success rate of apprehending assailants depending on ideology is the United Kingdom. Seven attacks in the UK did not result in an assailant being

¹⁸⁸⁸ 'Country Reports on Terrorism 2017. Chapter 1. Country Reports: Europe', *US Department of State*, 2017.

apprehended. These attacks, however, were all Separatist/Nationalist attacks that occurred in Northern Ireland. This record stands in contrast to attacks by the Far Right and Islamists, for which the British authorities had a full success rate for apprehending assailants. The one partial exception was the 2016 killing of the Rochdale imam: the authorities did arrest an assailant for this attack; however, the primary attacker, Mohammed Abdul Kadir, managed to flee the country.

Assailants were more likely to be shot in certain countries. Across both years, the country with the most attacks to which the authorities responded by shooting the assailant was France. Of the 19 attacks in France over the two years, police and soldiers patrolling during the state of emergency in force in that country at the time shot assailants dead in response to seven attacks, and shot and arrested assailants from another four. This figure may partly be explained by both the volume of terrorism experienced and the level of violence used by Islamist assailants in several of those attacks. Given that more than half (57.89%) of these attacks involved the direct targeting of the police and the military, this may also explain the number of assailants shot in France.

Belgian authorities also shot assailants in a relatively high number of attacks. Of the seven attacks in Belgium, assailants were shot and killed in three, and in a further instance the authorities shot and arrested an assailant. Two other attacks in Belgium involved suicide bombings in which the assailants were killed by their own actions. As in France, the authorities may have responded with live fire both because of the level of violence used by the assailants but also given that four of the seven attacks in that country saw the direct targeting of the police and the military.

After France, the country with most attacks where the authorities responded by shooting an assailant was the United States. Over the two-year period, police there responded by shooting and killing assailants in six attacks, and shot and arrested assailants in another two attacks. Additionally, there were four attacks for which the police responded by shooting and arresting the assailant after the attack; however, these four attacks were all committed by the same assailant: Ahmad Khan Rahimi. These 12 attacks accounted for half of all attacks in the United States. It is not clear whether this rate can be explained by assailants attacking the police or the military, given that in that country three-quarters of attacks had exclusively civilian targets.

Areas of Attacks

Table 4.1 Areas of attacks

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
City Centre	17	31.48%	36	52.94%	53	43.44%
Commercial	4	7.41%	13	19.12%	17	13.93%
Commercial-Residential Mix	9	16.67%	3	4.41%	12	9.84%
Government	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Landmark	2	3.70%	8	11.76%	10	8.20%
Recreational	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Residential	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Transport	1	1.85%	6	8.82%	7	5.74%
Multiple	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Multiple locations	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Rural	0	0.00%	6	8.82%	6	4.92%
Recreational	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Residential	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Transport	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
Small Town	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Commercial-Residential Mix	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Residential	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Suburban	35	64.81%	25	36.76%	60	49.18%
Commercial	3	5.56%	4	5.88%	7	5.74%
Commercial-Residential Mix	10	18.52%	3	4.41%	13	10.66%
Education	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Landmark	1	1.85%		0.00%	1	0.82%
Recreational	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Residential	15	27.78%	13	19.12%	28	22.95%
Transport	4	7.41%	3	4.41%	7	5.74%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Attacks largely occurred in cities – either in major city centres or suburban areas of cities and large towns. A relatively small number of attacks took place in small towns or rural areas. In 2016, there were 17 attacks in city centres, accounting for 31.48% of attacks that year. The study indicates that this rose significantly, more than doubling in 2017, with 36 attacks in city centres, more than half (52.94%) of all attacks that year.

Within city centre areas, there was a noticeable increase in the number of attacks on both landmarks and transport-related targets. The targeting of transportation in city centres may relate to attempts to maximise casualties by carrying out attacks in places where large numbers of civilians are likely to be crowded together or caught in confined spaces, such as train carriages. Often, these attacks have also involved the targeting of police or members of security. Across the two years, attacks on transport in city centres increased from one incident in 2016 to six incidents in 2017, representing 8.82% of all attacks that year and 16.67% of all attacks in city centres.

In 2016 there were two attacks at landmarks in city centres, but in 2017 this rose to eight attacks at these locations, 11.76% of attacks that year. As well as representing soft urban targets where crowds of civilians are likely to be gathered, attacks at high-profile sites are likely to gain greater publicity and may carry political significance. As with other attacks at city centre locations, assailants targeting landmarks have often targeted members of the police and

military placed to guard these locations. Particularly notable in 2016 was the attempted car bombing close to Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris. Notre Dame was also the location of a further attack in June 2017, this time involving a lone assailant with a hammer. Other landmarks that witnessed attacks in 2017 included those at the Louvre and the Champs-Elysees in Paris, and at the Westminster and London Bridges.

While there continued to be a high number of attacks in suburban areas across both years, this declined from 2016 to 2017. In the first year, suburban areas were the most common locations for attacks, accounting for 64.81% of incidents that year. This decreased in 2017 to 36.76% of attacks that year. Across both years, just under half of the attacks took place in suburbs: 49.18%. Attacks in suburban areas overwhelmingly took place in residential locations. Across both years, 22.95% of all attacks happened in residential suburban areas, while a further 10.66% happened in mixed residential-commercial parts of suburban areas.

Figure 4.1 Areas of attacks




Figure 4.2 Areas of attacks in 2016 and 2017




Table 4.2 Areas of attacks by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
City Centre	17	31.48%	36	52.94%	53	43.44%
Black Supremacist	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Far Left	4	7.41%	10	14.71%	14	11.48%
Far Right	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Islamist	11	20.37%	23	33.82%	34	27.87%
Multiple	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Far Left	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Rural	0	0.00%	6	8.82%	6	4.92%
Far Right	0	0.00%	4	5.88%	4	3.28%
Separatist/Nationalist	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Small Town	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Far Left	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Islamist	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Suburban	35	64.81%	25	36.76%	60	49.18%
Black Supremacist	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Far Left	4	7.41%	3	4.41%	7	5.74%
Far Right	2	3.70%	7	10.29%	9	7.38%
Islamist	24	44.44%	10	14.71%	34	27.87%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.56%	4	5.88%	7	5.74%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

In the course of the two years covered by the study, most of the attacks that occurred in city centres were Islamist. Of the 53 attacks that occurred in city centres across both years, 34 were Islamist, representing 64.15%. This corresponds to city centres being among the primary areas where Islamist attacks were perpetrated, with 49.28% of all Islamist attacks occurring in such areas. The other ideological group that repeatedly perpetrated attacks in city centres was the Far Left, which carried out 14 attacks in city centres across 2016 and 2017, representing over one-quarter (26.42%) of all attacks recorded in these areas. More than half of attacks by the Far Left were carried out in the centres of cities: 60.87% of all the attacks from this ideology in the study.

Over half of the 60 attacks in suburban areas across 2016 and 2017 were perpetrated by Islamist assailants – 56.67% of all attacks in these areas. A further 15% of these attacks were carried out by the Far Right: nine in suburbs in total. Those from the Far Left and Separatist/Nationalist groups both carried out seven attacks in suburbs, each accounting for 11.67% of attacks in suburban areas.

The only ideologies to carry out attacks in rural areas were the Far Right and those defined as Separatist/Nationalist. There were six such attacks, all of which occurred in 2017. Two of these were caused by Separatist/Nationalists while four were perpetrated by the Far Right. However, three of these involved trains travelling through rural areas at the time of the attack.

Table 4.3 Areas of attacks by country

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
City Centre	17	31.48%	36	52.94%	53	43.44%
Belgium	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Finland	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
France	2	3.70%	9	13.24%	11	9.02%
Germany	6	11.11%	1	1.47%	7	5.74%
Greece	4	7.41%	6	8.82%	10	8.20%
Italy	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
Norway	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Spain	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Sweden	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
United Kingdom	0	0.00%	5	7.35%	5	4.10%
United States	3	5.56%	5	7.35%	8	6.56%
Multiple	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Greece	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Rural	0	0.00%	6	8.82%	6	4.92%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Sweden	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
United Kingdom	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
United States	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Small Town	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Canada	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Italy	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Suburban	35	64.81%	25	36.76%	60	49.18%
Australia	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Austria	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Belgium	4	7.41%	0	0.00%	4	3.28%
Canada	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
Denmark	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
France	5	9.26%	3	4.41%	8	6.56%
Germany	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Greece	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Italy	4	7.41%	1	1.47%	5	4.10%
Malta	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Netherlands	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Poland	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Sweden	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
United Kingdom	5	9.26%	6	8.82%	11	9.02%
United States	9	16.67%	6	8.82%	15	12.30%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Several countries in the study were found to reflect the general trend of the area type in which attacks occurred being split broadly between city centres and suburban areas. While the overall figures put suburban areas marginally ahead of city centres, in France, of 19 attacks across both years, 11 took place in city centres while only eight were in suburban areas.

In the United Kingdom there were significantly more attacks in suburban areas than anywhere else. Of the 18 attacks in the United Kingdom, five took place in city centres while 11 were in suburban areas. All the city centre attacks were carried out by Islamists in 2017, and this may be indicative of the attempt to carry out mass-casualty attacks by choosing soft urban targets

and crowded places. Far Right assailants carried out two attacks in suburban areas of the UK, while Separatist/Nationalists in Northern Ireland carried out most of their attacks in suburban areas, with the exception of two which occurred in rural areas.

Like the United Kingdom, attacks in the United States leaned more heavily towards suburban areas, with 15 of the country's 24 attacks occurring there. This contrasted with only eight attacks in city centres. Part of this trend corresponds with the ideologies that commonly carried out attacks in the United States, with a concentration of Far Right and Black Supremacist attacks in America – both ideologies that the study suggests are more inclined to carry out attacks in suburban areas and areas outside of city centres. This trend was also reflected in Europe and Canada, where across both years Far Right assailants conducted a greater number of attacks in suburban and rural areas rather than city centres. This trend appears to be driven by the kinds of locations being targeted. As well as four Far Right attacks in 2017 involving trains passing through rural or suburban areas, this ideology has targeted mosques and migrant centres which have been more likely to be situated in suburban and rural areas than in city centres.

While a number of countries tended to replicate the wider trends for the areas in which attacks occurred, others appeared to be more heavily skewed by the particular type of terrorism that they experienced. Of the 12 attacks in Greece, ten occurred in city centres. This corresponds to the tendency seen in the findings of Greek anarchist groups being likely to attack targets in city centres, specifically Athens. In addition to attacks on the police, these groups have been inclined to carry out attacks on political, financial and diplomatic targets. These are often likely to be located in city centres.

Targets of Attacks

Table 5.1 Targets of attacks

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	20	37.04%	18	26.47%	38	31.15%
Civilian – Targeted	16	29.63%	21	30.88%	37	30.33%
Military	2	3.70%	7	10.29%	9	7.38%
Military and Civilian Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police	12	22.22%	11	16.18%	23	18.85%
Police and Civilian – Indiscriminate and Civilian- Targeted	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police and Civilian – Targeted	2	3.70%	2	2.94%	4	3.28%
Police and Civilian Indiscriminate	2	3.70%	5	7.35%	7	5.74%
Unknown	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%



Figure 5.1 Targets of attacks

Figure 5.2 Targets of attacks in 2016 and 2017



The incidents recorded in this study indicate that assailants are choosing a relatively wide range of targets. Those perpetrating attacks are not only seeking to carry out violent acts against the police and the military and to attack civilians indiscriminately, but they are also selecting a range of different civilian groups to target specifically.

Across the whole study, there were 88 attacks that in some way targeted civilians; this represents almost three-quarters (72.13%) of all attacks across both years. The indiscriminate targeting of civilians appears to have remained broadly consistent. In 2016, 37.04% of all attacks involved the indiscriminate targeting of civilians. In 2017, more than one-quarter (26.47%) of all attacks targeted civilians indiscriminately. Across the two years combined, there were 47 attacks that in some way featured the indiscriminate targeting of civilians, 38.52% of the total.

Many attacks targeted specific categories of civilians. By far the most common civilian targets were those targeted for political reasons. In 2016 there were seven attacks with political targets, 12.96% of all attacks that year, and 38.88% of attacks in 2016 where a specific civilian group was targeted. This rose to nine attacks in 2017 that targeted a political civilian group, as well as three attacks that targeted the police alongside a political target. That year also saw the Portland train attack which involved the targeting of Muslims along with several civilians who were targeted for perceived political reasons. These 13 attacks represent 19.12% of attacks in 2017, and more than half (54.17%) of attacks in which a civilian group was targeted. As an overall total for both years, there were 20 incidents that included a political target, representing 16.39% of all attacks in the study.

Religious and ethnic groups were also targeted by terrorists in the course of the two years of the study. The targeting of locations and individuals associated with religion, particularly in 2016, corresponds with findings from the Global Terrorism Index 2017 which reported that since 2014, attacks on religious targets in OECD countries have almost doubled.¹⁸⁸⁹ Attacks against Christian civilian targets were particularly prominent in 2016, with four such incidents, accounting for 22.22% of all attacks that year targeting a specific civilian group. However, there were no attacks recorded that specifically targeted Christians in 2017. Three of the incidents recorded from 2016 can be accounted for by a two-man anarchist cell operating in the Fermo area of Italy. These incidents failed to cause any casualties. The fourth attack that year, however, was the far more serious Islamist attack in July 2016 in which two Islamic State linked assailants attacked a church at Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray in Normandy, murdering a Catholic Priest during Mass.

The targeting of Muslims by terrorists rose in 2017 compared to 2016. Muslims and Muslim targets were attacked four times in 2017 and only once in 2016. All of these attacks came from the Far Right and, with the exception of one incident in 2017, all involved the targeting of mosques. The first of these incidents was an attempted bombing in the Netherlands. Far more devastating were a number of the attacks in 2017, which included the shooting in January at a mosque in Quebec City, and the vehicular attack on worshippers leaving a mosque in London in June. The Portland train attack began with the harassment of two girls, one in visibly Muslim dress, and escalated to violence being directed against three non-Muslim men who intervened. As a result, attacks targeting Muslims rose from 5.56% of all attacks on a specific civilian group in 2016 to 16.67% of such attacks in 2017.

Additionally, there were two attacks in 2016 that were defined as Takfiri, involving the killing of Muslim individuals by Islamist assailants. These incidents from 2016 both occurred in the United Kingdom and both involved the killing of a specifically identified and targeted victim. Many of the violent incidents assessed for this study that involved attacks on Jewish or Muslim targets were determined to be hate crimes rather than meeting the criteria to be classed as terrorism. One attack from 2016 on a Jewish man in Marseille, France, was recorded by this study as terrorist in nature. April of that year also saw one attack on a Sikh temple in Essen, Germany.

While 2016 witnessed a high number of attacks in which civilians were attacked in relation to their religion and religious beliefs, 2017 saw a rise in attacks in which civilians appear to have been targeted in connection with their race. The figures from 2017 recorded two incidents where civilians were believed to have been the target because they were black, as opposed to no such attacks the year before. There was one attack in which civilians were targeted because they were white, also in contrast to no such attacks recorded in the previous year.

Across the two-year period there was a rise in attacks targeting the military. In 2016 there were two attacks targeting the military, accounting for 3.70% of attacks that year. In 2017, however, this rose to seven attacks against military targets, 10.29% of attacks that year. In addition to these, there was a further attack targeting both the military and civilians in 2017. In total, then, across both years, there were ten attacks involving the military, 8.20% of all attacks in the study.

Police forces were also repeatedly targeted, with 12 attacks exclusively against the police in 2016 and 11 in 2017. These accounted for more than one-fifth (22.22%) of attacks in 2016 and 16.18% of attacks in 2017. In addition to the 12 attacks in 2016 targeting the police only, there were a further four attacks that year in which the police were targeted alongside civilians. Similarly, in 2017, as well as the 11 attacks against the police, there were another eight incidents that involved attacking the police, alongside some form of targeting of civilians. For these incidents in which police were attacked alongside civilians, further research is required to

¹⁸⁸⁹ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017.

determine the degree to which police are being attacked as a primary target, or whether they have more generally been attacked as a secondary target while intervening in attacks targeting other groups. Overall, across both years of the study, there were 35 incidents in which the police were targeted or attacked, representing 28.69% of all attacks recorded in the study.

Table 5.2 Targets by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Civilian - Targeted	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police	3	5.56%	0	0.00%	3	2.46%
Far Left	9	16.67%	14	20.59%	23	18.85%
Civilian - Targeted	7	12.96%	10	14.71%	17	13.93%
Military	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Police	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Police and Civilian - Targeted	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Far Right	3	5.56%	14	20.59%	17	13.93%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	5	7.35%	5	4.10%
Civilian - Targeted	3	5.56%	9	13.24%	12	9.84%
Islamist	36	66.67%	33	48.53%	69	56.56%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	19	35.19%	13	19.12%	32	26.23%
Civilian - Targeted	6	11.11%	1	1.47%	7	5.74%
Military	1	1.85%	6	8.82%	7	5.74%
Military and Civilian Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police	7	12.96%	6	8.82%	13	10.66%
Police and Civilian - Indiscriminate and Civilian - Targeted	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police and Civilian - Targeted	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Police and Civilian Indiscriminate	1	1.85%	4	5.88%	5	4.10%
Unknown	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.56%	6	8.82%	9	7.38%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Police	1	1.85%	4	5.88%	5	4.10%
Police and Civilian Indiscriminate	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Unknown	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

The data indicates that attackers have selected varying targets depending on the ideology that they belong to. Certain ideologies appear to be more inclined to target the authorities by attacking representatives of the state, such as police or members of the armed forces. Others have only targeted specific civilian groups, such as a political group or those from a particular ethnic or religious group. It is also the case that certain ideologies have been more inclined to target civilians indiscriminately than others.

As might be expected, this range of targeting can be seen as reflecting the objectives and ideas that the different ideologies promote. So that, for instance, those with an anti-establishment message or a specific set of political grievances (such as the Far Left and Separatist/Nationalists) may be more inclined to target representatives of the state. Islamist

assailants, whose ideology radically rejects the surrounding culture and sees all those living in the West as legitimate targets, have shown a greater tendency towards mass-casualty attacks that strike civilians indiscriminately. It is, however, the case even with many of the most targeted attacks recorded in the study that the assailants clearly accepted the risk of causing serious injury to other civilian groups who may have been unintended bystanders.

Attacks by the Far Left targeted the police and the military on six occasions, more than one-quarter (26.09%) of all attacks from this ideology. However, more commonly it was civilians that were targeted by the Far Left. In contrast to most other ideologies, none of these incidents targeted civilians indiscriminately; rather, in 19 cases a specific group of civilians was targeted. Most commonly, the targets were political in nature, although there were also Far Left attacks against financial and legal civilian targets. Two anarchists were also responsible for attacking a series of Christian targets in a series of bombings in Italy in 2016.

The Far Right was the only ideology in the study that did not target the police or military. Rather, Far Right assailants have been concerned with targeting minority civilian groups. Indeed, most commonly, attacks by assailants from this ideology were against a specific civilian group, which was the case for 70.59% of attacks by the Far Right. These attacks targeted Muslims, migrants and black people, as well as those singled out as political targets. However, there was an increase in Far Right attacks that appeared to target civilians indiscriminately. In 2016, there were no such attacks. By contrast, in the following year, there were five. It is notable, however, that four of these attacks were perpetrated by assailants who carried out attacks framed to appear as attacks by Islamists in an apparent attempt to provoke negative public feeling.

Islamist attacks were most likely to target civilians indiscriminately. In all, more than half (39 of the 69) Islamist attacks in the study targeted civilians indiscriminately, 56.52% of the total. In ten Islamist attacks, assailants also targeted specific civilian groups. Several of these involved the targeting of religious groups, with Islamists in 2016 carrying out two attacks against Muslims deemed to be apostates, one against Sikhs and another with a Jewish target. That same year an Islamist attack in Belgium targeted a transgender individual. Islamists have also targeted specific civilians for political reasons, as seen with the murder of the elderly couple in Linz for their perceived political affiliations, or the Westminster Bridge attack, which combined an indiscriminate attack on civilians and a police officer with an apparent attempt to reach a civilian political target. The Global Terrorism Index observed a notable increase in attacks on civilian targets in OECD countries between 2014 and 2016,¹⁸⁹⁰ and this may correspond to the rise of Islamic State-linked attacks in these countries during this period.

Islamist attacks also repeatedly targeted the police and the military, sometimes in combination with attacks on civilians, but often exclusively. Across both years, there were eight Islamist attacks in which the military were targeted, 11.59% of attacks by this ideology. Additionally, there were 13 attacks by Islamists that exclusively targeted police, which represented 18.84% of attacks by this group of assailants. A further eight Islamist attacks targeted police along with civilians. Combined, approaching one-third (30.43%) of all Islamist attacks included the targeting of police.

As with the Far Left, Black Supremacist attacks were the only other ideology that did not target civilians indiscriminately. Primarily, this group of assailants targeted police, with three out of the four Black Supremacist attacks having police as a target. The targeting seen here corresponds with the narrative of this ideology which frames attacks on law enforcement officials as a justified retaliatory response to police brutality directed against black people in

¹⁸⁹⁰ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017.

the United States.¹⁸⁹¹ The remaining Black Supremacist attack targeted a specific civilian group – in this case white people in the 2017 Fresno shooting.

Separatist/Nationalist attacks tended to primarily target police, with five of the nine attacks targeting the police exclusively. These incidents relate to attacks by republican dissidents in Northern Ireland that see the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and prison officers as representatives of an illegitimate British presence in Ireland. Another two attacks combined the targeting of both police and civilians. These included an incident in Northern Ireland: the 2017 Londonderry car bombing that, while targeting a police officer, put the officer's family members at significant risk. The 2016 plane hijacking is the one Separatist/Nationalist attack recorded as specifically endangering civilians indiscriminately.

Table 5.3 Targets of attacks by country

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Australia	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police & Civilian Indiscriminate	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Austria	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Civilian – Targeted	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Belgium	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Military	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Police & Civilian – Targeted	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Canada	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Civilian – Targeted	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police & Civilian Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Denmark	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Police	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Finland	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
France	7	12.96%	12	17.65%	19	15.57%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
Civilian – Targeted	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Military	1	1.85%	4	5.88%	5	4.10%
Military & Civilian Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Police & Civilian – Targeted	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Germany	8	14.81%	2	2.94%	10	8.20%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	6	11.11%	1	1.47%	7	5.74%
Civilian – Targeted	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Police	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%

¹⁸⁹¹ '(U//FOUO) Black Identity Extremists Likely Motivated to Target Law Enforcement Officers', *Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Assessment*, 3 August 2017.

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Greece	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
Civilian - Targeted	4	7.41%	5	7.35%	9	7.38%
Police	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police & Civilian - Targeted	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Italy	5	9.26%	4	5.88%	9	7.38%
Civilian - Targeted	3	5.56%	2	2.94%	5	4.10%
Military	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Police	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Malta	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Netherlands	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Civilian - Targeted	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Norway	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Poland	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Police	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Spain	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Police & Civilian Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Sweden	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Civilian - Targeted	2	3.70%	2	2.94%	4	3.28%
United Kingdom	5	9.26%	13	19.12%	18	14.75%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
Civilian - Targeted	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Police	1	1.85%	5	7.35%	6	4.92%
Police & Civilian - Indiscriminate & Civilian - Targeted	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police & Civilian Indiscriminate	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Unknown		0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
United States	12	22.22%	12	17.65%	24	19.67%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	8	14.81%	3	4.41%	11	9.02%
Civilian - Targeted		0.00%	7	10.29%	7	5.74%
Police	4	7.41%	2	2.94%	6	4.92%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

The targets that terrorists attacked or attempted to attack in different countries tended to reflect the ideologies that were most prevalent in those countries. As noted, Islamist assailants appeared more inclined to carry out attacks targeting civilians indiscriminately and, as such, countries with a higher level of Islamist terrorism tended to see more attacks targeting civilians indiscriminately. This is in line with a long record of Islamist – and more specifically Salafi-jihadist – thinking that has sought to justify the indiscriminate targeting of civilians, particularly those from Western countries.¹⁸⁹² Germany is one example of a country that demonstrates this trend. During the two years covered by the study, Germany experienced ten attacks, of which nine were Islamist. This high level of Islamist attacks corresponds to the fact that seven attacks in Germany involved the indiscriminate attacking of civilians.

¹⁸⁹² Maher, S., *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea* (London: Penguin, 3 August 2017).

The targeting trends are particularly apparent in those countries that experienced terrorism from only one ideology. Both of the attacks in Spain included the indiscriminate targeting of civilians, and both of these were Islamist attacks. Greece and Poland were countries that only experienced attacks and attempted attacks from the Far Left, and accordingly experienced no incidents targeting civilians indiscriminately. While the Far Left regularly targeted civilians, at no point in the two years did Far Left assailants target civilians indiscriminately in an effort to cause a mass-casualty attack.

In some countries, however, it may be that targeting by terrorists was partly influenced by the availability of certain targets. In France and Belgium there is a particular trend of Islamists targeting members of the military. This is explained at least in part by the fact that in response to a rise in terrorism, both countries have the military patrolling in major cities. This is particularly the case in France, which declared an official state of emergency in November 2015 following the Stade De France and Bataclan attacks. Of 19 attacks recorded in France over the two years of the study, six involved the targeting of the military. However, none of these occurred after November 2017, by which point the state of emergency in that country had come to an end.

Types of Attack

Table 6.1 Types of attack

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Attempted Bombing	7	12.96%	4	5.88%	11	9.02%
Bombing	9	16.67%	12	17.65%	21	17.21%
Bombing & Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Foiled Bombing	6	11.11%	8	11.76%	14	11.48%
Foiled Knife	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Foiled Shooting	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Hammer	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Hijacking	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Hostage Taking & Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife	12	22.22%	11	16.18%	23	18.85%
Knife & Club	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Shooting	9	16.67%	8	11.76%	17	13.93%
Shooting & Knife	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Suicide Bombing	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Vehicular	2	3.70%	9	13.24%	11	9.02%
Vehicular & Knife	1	1.85%	5	7.35%	6	4.92%
Vehicular & Shooting	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Figure 6.1 Types of attack





Figure 6.2 Types of attack in 2016 and 2017



The data collected in this study reveals the diversity of the means of attack that terrorists in Western countries are using. As well as methods of attack familiar to terrorism of previous decades – such as bombings, shootings and hijackings – there has been an increase in the use of improvised household objects such as kitchen knives and hammers, as well as the use of vehicles as weapons. Europol's 2018 report on terrorist trends in European Union countries noted of jihadist (Islamist) attacks that, even as the number of these incidents have increased over recent years, their level of sophistication has decreased.¹⁸⁹³

The use and attempted use of explosives for the purpose of carrying out a bombing was a common occurrence in both years. These ranged from highly powerful and sophisticated explosives, particularly those used in suicide bombings which aimed to cause maximum casualties, to basic Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) which had a limited force and were often set to explode at times and in places where the amount of harm they were likely to cause was limited.

Attacks involving bombings and the use of explosives were the most common type of attack in the first year of this study. Of the 54 attacks and attempted attacks in 2016 there were 25 incidents which involved bombings or explosives, 46.30% of attacks that year. This rose by one to 26 of 68 attacks in 2017 involving bombings and attempted bombings, 38.24% of the total. Across both years and all the incidents in the study, 41.80% of all attacks involved bombing or the use of explosives.

Attacks involving shooting continued to represent a significant number of incidents in the two years for which data was gathered by this study. In 2016 there were nine shooting attacks as well as one attack that combined the use of a knife with shooting, and another that combined a vehicular attack with a shooting. These 11 incidents account for 20.37% of attacks that year. In 2017 there were eight shooting attacks, as well as a hostage-taking attack involving a shooting, a bombing attack combined with a shooting, and two foiled shootings. In total, then, incidents involving shootings decreased as a percentage of the overall total to 17.65% of the attacks in 2017.

The Global Terrorism Index 2017 has observed changing terrorist tactics in OECD countries since 2014, with a shift towards the use of unconventional tactics against soft targets, which the report argues can be more effective than some of the more elaborate schemes.¹⁸⁹⁴ In particular, the Global Terrorism Index noted the rise in vehicular attacks since 2014, which corresponds with Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani's call for attacks on Westerners using cars.¹⁸⁹⁵ These trends are also apparent in the findings of this study. While terrorist incidents noted above involving explosives included some of the most sophisticated forms of attacks seen in the study, relatively low-tech knife attacks were also highly prevalent. In 2016 there were 12 knife attacks, accounting for 22.22% of all attacks that year, as well as one incident that involved both a vehicular attack and a knife attack, and an attack that combined shooting with the use of a knife.

Additionally, there was one knife attack that was foiled. In total, in 2016 there were 15 incidents involving the use or attempted use of a knife, accounting for more than one-quarter (27.78%) of attacks that year. In the following year there were 11 knife attacks. Additionally, there were five attacks that involved both vehicles and the use of knives, as well as two attacks combining the use of a knife with a club. One attempted knife attack was also foiled. In all, in 2017 there were 19 incidents involving knives, representing a similar overall figure of more than one-quarter (27.94%) of the attacks that occurred that year.

¹⁸⁹³ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018', *Europol* (2018).

¹⁸⁹⁴ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017.

¹⁸⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

Vehicular attacks stood out in both years as a low-tech method of attack that has the potential to inflict a high number of casualties while also often proving difficult to detect at the planning stage. In 2016 there were two exclusively vehicular attacks, as well as one attack involving a vehicle and a knife assault, and another attack involving a vehicle and a shooting. These attacks involving vehicles accounted for 7.41% of attacks that year. The number of these attacks increased in 2017, with nine attacks which exclusively used a vehicle to attempt to cause casualties. There were also five attacks that combined the use of a vehicle with a knife attack. These 14 vehicular attacks represented one-fifth (20.59%) of attacks that year.

There was not only a rise in the use of vehicles for attacks, but also a rise in the combination of this readily available low-tech method with the equally available and low-tech use of a knife. Despite how rudimentary this form of attack may seem, it was responsible for some of the highest-profile attacks recorded in the study and included the Westminster and London Bridge attacks of 2017 and the Ohio State University attack of November 2016. This form of attack rose from one such attack in 2016 to five in 2017. This dual method of the vehicular-knife attack represented 7.35% of all attacks in 2017 and 4.92% of all attacks over the two-year period.

Another still more low-tech means of attack seen in the study was the use of blunt objects being improvised for violence, such as hammers, clubs or bats. This form of terror attack also rose from 2016 to 2017. In 2016 there was one attack involving a hammer – the murder of an imam in Northern England – accounting for 1.85% of attacks that year. In 2017, this rose to five attacks that included the use of clubs or hammers. These represented 7.35% of all incidents that year. Across both years, these six attacks accounted for 4.92% of attacks in the study. As seen with the attack on police outside Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris in June 2017, an unsophisticated form of attack can still achieve a high impact in terms of publicity. Without causing any fatalities, that incident achieved international news coverage as the Cathedral was put under lockdown and visitors were held there for up to an hour.¹⁸⁹⁶

¹⁸⁹⁶ Sephton, C., 'Notre Dame attacker shouted "this is for Syria" before being shot', *Sky News*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/paris-police-warn-public-to-stay-away-from-notre-dame-cathedral-10906298>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

Table 6.2 Types of attack by number injured and fatalities

	Injured		Fatalities		Total	
	2016	% 2017	2016	% 2017	Injured	Fatalities
Attempted Bombing	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0
Bombing	34	3.44%	1	0.52%	73	1
Bombing & Shooting	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0
Foiled Bombing	1	0.10%	0	0.00%	1	0
Foiled Knife	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0
Foiled Shooting	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	2	0
Hammer	0	0.00%	1	0.52%	6	1
Hijacking	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0
Hostage Taking & Shooting	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	3	1
Knife	28	2.84%	4	2.09%	52	13
Knife & Club	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	1	2
Shooting	66	6.69%	54	28.27%	95	65
Shooting & Knife	0	0.00%	1	0.52%	0	1
Suicide Bombing	355	35.97%	32	16.75%	867	54
Vehicular	436	44.17%	86	45.03%	502	102
Vehicular & Knife	11	1.11%	0	0.00%	247	28
Vehicular & Shooting	56	5.67%	12	6.28%	56	12
Total	987	100.00%	191	100.00%	1905	280
					100.00%	100.00%

Figure 6.3 Types of attack by number injured




Figure 6.4 Types of attack by fatalities





Figure 6.5 Types of attack by number injured and fatalities combined



Across both years, attacks involving vehicles proved to be among both the most lethal and the most dangerous in terms of the number of injuries caused. In 2016, attacks involving vehicles resulted in 98 people killed – 51.31% of all fatalities – and 503 injured, accounting for 50.96% of those injured that year. There were 24.50 fatalities for every attack involving a vehicle in 2016, and 125.75 people injured for each of these. In the following year, attacks involving vehicles caused 44 fatalities, 49.44% of all deaths caused by terrorism in 2017, and 302 injured, which was almost one-third (32.90%) of the total. While there were fewer casualties from vehicular attacks in 2017, the number of attacks involving vehicles increased significantly. As such, in 2017 there were 3.14 fatalities for every vehicular attack, and 21.57 injured for each of these attacks.

In 2016, attacks involving shootings were the second most dangerous method of attack. Incidents involving shooting that year caused 67 fatalities and left 122 injured. This includes one attack combining the use of firearms with a knife, while a gun was also used by Anis Amri to kill the driver of the truck he hijacked as part of the Berlin Christmas market truck attack. That year, attacks involving shootings caused 35.08% of all fatalities and 12.36% of all those injured. Accordingly, in 2016 there were 6.09 fatalities for every incident involving shooting, and 11.09 injured. The following year, casualties from attacks involving guns decreased significantly.

In 2017, there were 11 fatalities caused by attacks involving shooting and 29 injured. These accounted for 12.36% of all fatalities that year and 3.38% of all those injured that year. This decline in the number of fatalities and injuries from shootings compared to the previous year can be explained by the previous year’s figures having been significantly increased by the June 2016 Orlando attack in which 49 were killed and 53 were injured. While there were no

mass-casualty shooting in attacks in 2017, there were eight attacks that year with shootings, as well as another involving both a bombing and a shooting, and another two incidents with foiled shootings. As such, there was one fatality for every incident involving shooting, and 2.81 people injured.

The other form of attack that caused a high number of casualties across the two years of the study was bombing, and particularly suicide bombings. In 2016, three suicide bombings alone caused 32 of the 33 fatalities from bombings that year and injured 355 people. Other bombings that year caused one fatality and left 34 injured, as well as an incident that caused one injury in the course of the foiling of the attempted bombing attack. In 2016, there were 1.32 fatalities and 15.60 people injured for each incident in which terrorists used or attempted to use bombs.

In 2017, bombings caused fewer deaths and injuries, as Salman Abedi's attack in Manchester was the only suicide bombing, although this caused 22 fatalities and left 512 injured. Had Akayed Ullah's attempted pipe bombing in New York or Ahmed Hassan's attempted bombing at Parsons Green gone according to plan, the figures for 2017 would likely have been far higher. The Parsons Green attack still injured 30 people, and this contributed significantly to the figure of 39 injured in other bombing incidents that year. As such, in 2017 there were 0.85 fatalities for every incident in which terrorists used or attempted to use explosives, and there were 21.19 left injured.

Attacks involving knives were another commonly occurring means of attack that caused a large number of casualties. In 2016, attacks involving knives killed five and injured 39. Eleven of those injured were victims in an attack that combined the use of a knife with a vehicle: the 2016 Ohio University attack. One of the fatalities was from an attack that combined the use of a gun with a knife. Overall, this represented 2.62% of all fatalities from terrorism that year, and 3.95% of all injured. There were 14 attacks involving knives in 2016, as well as one foiled knife attack. As such, there were 0.33 fatalities for each incident involving a knife, and 2.60 injured.

In 2017, attacks involving knives and knives with clubs killed 11 and injured 25 people. In addition, five attacks that year combining the use of knives with vehicles killed 28 and injured 236. Of the overall total, incidents in 2017 that included the use of knives caused 43.82% of the fatalities and 28.43% of those injured. That year, there were 2.05 fatalities for each incident involving the use or attempted use of knives, and 13.74 injured for each of these attacks.

Table 6.3 Types of attack by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Shooting	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Far Left	9	16.67%	14	20.59%	23	18.85%
Bombing	5	9.26%	6	8.82%	11	9.02%
Bombing & Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Foiled Bombing	3	5.56%	4	5.88%	7	5.74%
Shooting	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Far Right	3	5.56%	14	20.59%	17	13.93%
Attempted Bombing	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Bombing	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Foiled Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Hammer	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Knife	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shooting & Knife	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Vehicular	0	0.00%	4	5.88%	4	3.28%
Islamist	36	66.67%	33	48.53%	69	56.56%
Attempted Bombing	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Bombing	2	3.70%	2	2.94%	4	3.28%
Foiled Bombing	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Foiled Knife	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Foiled Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Hammer	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Hostage Taking & Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife	12	22.22%	9	13.24%	21	17.21%
Knife & Club	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Shooting	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Suicide Bombing	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Vehicular	2	3.70%	5	7.35%	7	5.74%
Vehicular & Knife	1	1.85%	5	7.35%	6	4.92%
Vehicular & Shooting	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.56%	6	8.82%	9	7.38%
Attempted Bombing	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Bombing	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Foiled Bombing	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
Hijacking	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

There were clear variations between ideologies in terms of the methods of attack. For instance, the only category of assailants to use suicide bombings were Islamists. Just as noticeable was that the only means of attack used by Black Supremacists was shooting. Given that all attacks from this ideology took place in the United States, this could have been driven by the availability of firearms in that country as compared to others in the study. Both the Far Left and Separatist/Nationalists heavily favoured bombing as a means of attack. Among the first of these two ideologies, of 23 Far Left attacks and attempted attacks, 19 involved bombings. Similarly, of nine Separatist/Nationalist incidents, there were seven bombings and attempts to carry out bombing attacks. This trend may be indicative of a strategy on the part of assailants from these two ideologies by which they seek to cause injury and intimidation but wish to avoid being caught or killed in the process of their attacks. An exception to this from the Far Left would seem to be James T. Hodgkinson's June 2017 attack at the Alexandria baseball park, in which he continued to engage in a shootout with the police, suggesting he may have expected to have been killed in his attack.

Of Islamist attacks, the largest proportion involved knives, with 31 such attacks across both years. This represented 44.93% of all Islamist attacks recorded in the study. Attacks using, or attempting to use, explosives made up 27.54% of Islamist incidents, with 19 of these. The use of vehicles was one of the other most common means of attack used by Islamist assailants. There were 14 Islamist attacks using vehicles in the study; these accounted for one-fifth (20.29%) of attacks by this ideology. Shootings were a less-common means of attack for Islamists over the period of the study, with these attacks representing 14.49% of attacks by these assailants. Islamists were also the primary group of attackers to use improvised hard-edged objects as weapons, such as hammers and clubs. These items were used as weapons in the case of four Islamist attacks, representing 5.80% across both years.

Far Right assailants made use of many of the same methods of attack as Islamists. It also appears possible that the Far Right may have adopted methods of attack previously associated specifically with Islamist assailants. There were no vehicular attacks by the Far Right in 2016; however, this rose to four such attacks in 2017, 28.57% of all attacks by the Far Right recorded that year. Two of these involved driving vehicles into crowds at high speed in a manner that replicated previous Islamist attacks; with one of these attacks specifically targeting worshippers leaving a mosque. Two more involved the targeting of trains with attacks that appeared to pose as Islamist in nature, despite the perpetrator being of the Far Right. There were also two Far Right attacks involving an improvised hard-edged object - in this case a hammer - but these were also by a Far Right assailant posing as an Islamist.

There was an increase in Far Right attacks using blades across the two years. One Far Right attack in 2016 combined the use of a knife with shooting, one attack in 2017 used a sword, while a second involved stabbing. The most common means of attack by the Far Right, however, was bombing, with six completed and attempted attacks involving explosives across the two years, 35.29% of these attacks.

Table 6.4 Types of attack by country

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Australia	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Hostage Taking & Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Austria	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife & Club	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Belgium	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Attempted Bombing	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Suicide Bombing	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Canada	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Foiled Bombing	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Knife & Club	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Vehicular & Knife	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Vehicular	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Denmark	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shooting	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Finland	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
France	7	12.96%	12	17.65%	19	15.57%
Attempted Bombing	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Bombing	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Foiled Knife	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Foiled Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Hammer	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
Knife	3	5.56%	3	4.41%	6	4.92%
Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Vehicular	2	3.70%	2	2.94%	4	3.28%
Germany	8	14.81%	2	2.94%	10	8.20%
Attempted Bombing	3	5.56%	0	0.00%	3	2.46%
Bombing	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Foiled Bombing	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Suicide Bombing	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Vehicular & Shooting	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Greece	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
Bombing	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
Bombing & Shooting		0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Foiled Bombing	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Shooting	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Italy	5	9.26%	4	5.88%	9	7.38%
Bombing	3	5.56%	2	2.94%	5	4.10%
Foiled Bombing	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Knife	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shooting	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Malta	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Hijacking	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Netherlands	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Attempted Bombing	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Norway	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Foiled Bombing	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Poland	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Foiled Bombing	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Spain	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Vehicular	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Vehicular & Knife	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Sweden	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
Attempted Bombing	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Bombing	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Shooting	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Vehicular	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
United Kingdom	5	9.26%	13	19.12%	18	14.75%
Attempted Bombing	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Bombing	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Foiled Bombing	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
Foiled Knife	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Hammer	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Knife	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shooting & Knife	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Suicide Bombing	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Vehicular	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Vehicular & Knife	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
United States	12	22.22%	12	17.65%	24	19.67%
Attempted Bombing	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Bombing	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Foiled Bombing	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Foiled Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
Shooting	5	9.26%	3	4.41%	8	6.56%
Vehicular	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Vehicular & Knife	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

The types of attack experienced in different countries tended to reflect the ideologies that were most prevalent in those countries. Belgium only suffered Islamist attacks, and it is notable that four of the seven attacks there were knife attacks, which corresponds to knife attacks being the most common method of attack for Islamist assailants. In Greece, where there were only Far Left attacks recorded, nine of the 12 were bombings or attempted bombings. This similarly corresponds to bombing being the most common method of attack for assailants from the Far Left.

France was primarily affected by Islamist attacks during the course of the two years of the study. It is noticeable that seven of the 19 attacks in that country saw the use or attempted use of knives. There were also four attacks in France involving vehicles. Both of these methods were commonly used by Islamists in the two years covered by the study.

In the United Kingdom, of the 18 incidents there, bombing and attempted bombing were the most common form of attack, with eight such attacks in addition to a suicide bombing. One of the eight bombings was carried out by an Islamist. However, these were primarily accounted for by the high level of Separatist/Nationalist terrorism in Northern Ireland.

The United States experienced a wide range of terrorist methods across the two years. The most common means of attack there was shooting, with nine of the 24 incidents there involving firearms. These attacks were not specific to any one ideology, with Black Supremacist, Far Left and Islamist assailants all using guns. It is noticeable, however, that of the incidents recorded in this study, shooting was not a method of attack associated with the Far Right in the United States.

Number of Assailants

Table 7.1 Number of assailants in each attack

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
1	36	66.67%	45	66.18%	81	66.39%
2	10	18.52%	4	5.88%	14	11.48%
3	5	9.26%	7	10.29%	12	9.84%
4	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
5	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Unknown	2	3.70%	11	16.18%	13	10.66%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Figure 7.1 Number of assailants in each attack





Figure 7.2 Number of assailants in each attack in 2016 and 2017

In 2016, the majority of attacks were carried out by lone assailants. In total, 36 incidents that year were recorded as having only one attacker, two-thirds (66.67%) of all attacks that year. In 2017, this increased to 45 attacks with only one assailant, but which again accounted for two-thirds (66.18%) of all incidents that year. Across the two years in the study, there were 81 attacks or attempted attacks involving only one assailant, 66.39% of all incidents.

Other attacks tended to involve two or three assailants. In 2016, ten attacks were recorded that involved two assailants and five attacks with three assailants. The following year, four attacks with two assailants were recorded, and seven incidents with three assailants. Across both years there were 26 attacks that had two or three assailants, representing 21.31% of all incidents recorded in the study.

No attack recorded in the study is known to have had more than five individuals involved, although there were attacks connected to much larger cells, and groups of attackers larger than five responsible for carrying out several attacks, as with the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks in 2017. Similarly, the 2016 Brussels attacks were carried out by a larger cell of attackers also responsible for the 2015 Paris attacks. There was one five-person attack in 2016 and one in 2017. However, there were a number of attacks or attempted attacks where it is not known how many individuals were directly involved in executing the attack. In 2016 there were two such incidents, whereas in 2017 this rose to 11 incidents where we do not know enough about the perpetrators to determine the number of assailants.

Table 7.2 Number of assailants in each attack by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
1	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Far Left	9	16.67%	14	20.59%	23	18.85%
1	2	3.70%	5	7.35%	7	5.74%
2	4	7.41%	3	4.41%	7	5.74%
3	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Unknown	1	1.85%	5	7.35%	6	4.92%
Far Right	3	5.56%	14	20.59%	17	13.93%
1	1	1.85%	10	14.71%	11	9.02%
3	1	1.85%	4	5.88%	5	4.10%
5	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Islamist	36	66.67%	33	48.53%	69	56.56%
1	29	53.70%	29	42.65%	58	47.54%
2	5	9.26%	1	1.47%	6	4.92%
3	2	3.70%	2	2.94%	4	3.28%
5	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.56%	6	8.82%	9	7.38%
1	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
2	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Unknown	1	1.85%	6	8.82%	7	5.74%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Islamist attacks were largely conducted by lone actors, as was the case in 58 of the 69 Islamist attacks in the study, which represents 84.06% of all Islamist attacks over the two years. In the case of another six incidents, Islamists attacked in pairs: 8.70% of all Islamist attacks. Four Islamist attacks had three assailants, and one had five. The prevalence of lone-actor terrorism on the part of Islamists in the West during 2016 and 2017 corresponds with calls put out by Islamic State and other jihadists urging Muslim individuals living in the West to undertake attacks by any means available to them. Specific instructions to this effect were issued by Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani in September 2014 and May 2016.¹⁸⁹⁷ The New York bomber Ahmad Khan Rahimi directly cited al-Adnani's call.¹⁸⁹⁸ A decade earlier, in 2004, Abu Mus'ab Al Suri had promoted similar tactics in his online text: *The Global Islamic Resistance Call*.¹⁸⁹⁹

Similarly, Far Right attacks were most likely to have only one assailant, as was the case in 11 of 17 such attacks, representing 64.71% of all attacks by the Far Right. There has been a long legacy of lone-actor terrorism by the Far Right in Western countries, with prominent past cases such as Oklahoma bomber Timothy McVeigh and Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik. In the 1980s, White Supremacists in the United States pioneered a "leaderless resistance" carried out by small or one-man cells.¹⁹⁰⁰ In the mid-1990s, Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis of the White

¹⁸⁹⁷ 'Islamic State calls for attacks on the West during Ramadan in audio message', *Reuters*, 21 May 2016, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-islamicstate/islamic-state-calls-for-attacks-on-the-west-during-ramadan-in-audio-message-idUSKCNOYCOOG>, last visited: 6 October 2018.

¹⁸⁹⁸ 'Chelsea Bomber Ahmad Khan Rahimi Sentenced to Life in Prison for Executing September 2016 Bombing and Attempted Bombing in New York City', *The United States Department of Justice*, 13 February 2018, available at: <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chelsea-bomber-ahmad-khan-rahimi-sentenced-life-prison-executing-september-2016-bombing-and>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁸⁹⁹ Wright, L., "The Master Plan: For the new theorists of jihad, Al Qaeda is just the beginning", *The New Yorker*, 11 September 2006, available at: <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/09/11/the-master-plan>, last visited 15 October 2018.

¹⁹⁰⁰ Burke, J., 'The myth of the "lone wolf" terrorist', *The Guardian*, 30 March 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/mar/30/myth-lone-wolf-terrorist>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

Aryan Resistance distributed a series of instructions online for a Far Right “Lone Wolf” insurgency in America.¹⁹⁰¹ In addition to the Far Right lone-actor attacks recorded in this study, a further five Far Right attacks were carried out by groups of three assailants; however, three of these were perpetrated by the same three-man cell in Gothenburg, while the other two were carried out by the White Rabbit Militia in Illinois. Additionally, there was one Far Right attack in the Netherlands in 2016 by a five-person group.

Compared to Islamist and Far Right terrorism, Far Left attacks were more likely to be carried out by more than one assailant. Of the 23 Far Left attacks, seven are recorded as only having had one assailant: 30.43% of all such attacks. Another seven Far Left attacks had two assailants, while three are recorded as having had three assailants. In a further six Far Left attacks the number of assailants remains unknown.

Black Supremacist was the only ideology where all identified assailants acted as independent lone actors. This could be because this ideology lacks a well-established network of violent extremists who would carry out attacks in groups. However, the amount of data collected by this study on these attacks is too small to draw more far-reaching conclusions at this stage.


Based on what little is known about the assailants responsible for Separatist/Nationalist attacks recorded in this study, one attack is believed to have had one assailant, while another had two. Both of these were carried out in 2016. It is the case that a number of the Separatist/Nationalist attacks recorded here were either claimed by or linked back to Irish republican dissident organisations, which might suggest that this form of terrorism is not primarily caused by lone actors. Again, however, the data is too limited to make further claims.

Organisations

Table 8.1 Number of attacks by organisation

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Al Qaeda	0	0.00%	1	0.82%	1	0.82%
Arm na Poblachta	0	0.00%	1	0.82%	1	0.82%
Conspiracy Cells of Fire	1	0.82%	5	4.10%	6	4.92%
Independent Actors	12	9.84%	18	14.75%	30	24.59%
Informal Anarchist Federation	1	0.82%	2	1.64%	3	2.46%
Islamic State & Al Qaeda	4	3.28%	1	0.82%	5	4.10%
Islamic State	26	21.31%	24	19.67%	50	40.98%
New Al-Fateh	1	0.82%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
New IRA	1	0.82%	3	2.46%	4	3.28%
Nordic Resistance Movement	1	0.82%	2	1.64%	3	2.46%
Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH)	0	0.00%	1	0.82%	1	0.82%
Radical Allotments	1	0.82%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Revolutionary Self-Defence	2	1.64%	2	1.64%	4	3.28%
Revolutionary Struggle	0	0.00%	1	0.82%	1	0.82%
The People’s Fighters Group (OLA)	1	0.82%	2	1.64%	3	2.46%
Unknown	3	2.46%	3	2.46%	6	4.92%
White Rabbit Militia	0	0.00%	2	1.64%	2	1.64%
Total	54	44.26%	68	55.74%	122	100.00%

¹⁹⁰¹ Ibid.

Figure 8.1 Number of attacks by organisation

In terms of organisations, the attacks recorded in the study can be divided into three categories. First, those that are believed to have been carried out by a terrorist organisation, either because there was a reliable claim of responsibility by a group or because there was other evidence linking the assailant to a terrorist or extremist group. Second, those that were committed by a lone individual or a group of individuals operating independently of a terrorist organisation or extremist group. Third, those for which it is unknown whether they were carried out by lone attackers or by an organisation.

The terrorist organisation that stands out most prominently in the study is Islamic State. There were 26 attacks in 2016 that were either directed by or linked to Islamic State. These accounted for close to half (48.15%) of all attacks in the West that year. This declined in 2017 to 24 attacks, accounting for 35.29% of all attacks that year. Additionally, there were a number of attacks by assailants who are believed to have been inspired by both Al Qaeda and Islamic State, with four such attacks carried out by Ahmad Khan Rahimi in the United States in 2016, and one attack in Australia in 2017. Additionally, there was one incident in the study carried out by an individual connected with Al Qaeda; the foiled Whitehall stabbing in April 2017. The assailant – Khalid Mohammed Omar Ali – is not known to have claimed any inspiration from Islamic State.

Far Left anarchist groups operating in Greece and Italy accumulatively accounted for the next largest number of attacks. Conspiracy Cells of Fire is believed to have been responsible for one attack in Greece in 2016, and the following year members of the group are thought to have carried out three attacks in Greece, one in France and one in Germany. These five attacks represent 7.35% of all terrorism that year. This increase in violent activities by this organisation corresponds with so-called “Operation Nemesis”, by which Conspiracy Cells of Fire announced

its return to violence as of October 2016.¹⁹⁰² The second most represented Far Left group was Revolutionary Self-Defence, which was linked to two attacks in 2016 and two in 2017. All of these attacks occurred in Greece and accounted for 3.28% of attacks in the study.

With only a couple of exceptions, Far Right attacks tended to be carried out by independent lone actors. One exception to this was the White Rabbit Militia in the United States, a small cell of three or four individuals who carried out a bombing and an attempted bombing in 2017. The only other Far Right organisation that may be relevant here is the Nordic Resistance Movement in Sweden, where one attack in 2016 and two attacks in 2017 were carried out by a cell of individuals affiliated with that organisation. However, in contrast with the Far Left groups in the study, there is no evidence to indicate that this organisation in any way directed these attacks.

In 2016, 12 attacks were carried out by either an independent lone actor or groups of independent actors who did not reveal any indication of being clearly directed, affiliated or inspired by an established terrorist or extremist group. These attacks represented 22.22% of all attacks that year. The following year there were 18 attacks by independent lone actors or groups of independent actors, representing more than one-quarter (26.47%) of attacks in 2017. This increase over the two years of this study is in line with findings from the Global Terrorism Index for 2017, which noted the rise in lone-actor terrorism in OECD countries over the past decade, with a noticeable year-on-year increase running through 2014, 2015 and 2016.¹⁹⁰³


There were six attacks recorded in this study where it was not possible to determine whether or not the perpetrators were lone actors or linked to terrorist organisations.

Claims of Responsibility

Table 9.1 Number of attacks claimed by terrorist groups


	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Yes	20	37.04%	24	35.29%	44	36.07%
No	22	40.74%	26	38.24%	48	39.34%
Not Applicable	12	22.22%	18	26.47%	30	24.59%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Figure 9.1 Number of attacks claimed by terrorist groups



¹⁹⁰² Papadimitriou, J., 'A new generation of Greek terrorists', *DW*, 21 March 2017, available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/a-new-generation-of-greek-terrorists/a-38058747>, last visited: 17 September 2018.

¹⁹⁰³ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017.

Figure 9.2 Attacks claimed by terrorist groups in 2016 and 2017

Many of the attacks in the study were carried out by independent lone actors or a small number of self-directed individuals (usually three or fewer) who had no known or suspected connections with any wider network or movement. Other incidents, however, either were known to have been carried out by formalised terrorist groups or are suspected to have been carried out by such groups. These groups have sometimes publicly claimed responsibility for the attacks they have conducted, and on occasions claimed attacks that those affiliated with them have conducted in their name.

In recent years there have also been a number of attacks, specifically by Islamist assailants, that have been claimed by Islamic State – with the group often describing the attacker as one of its “soldiers” – but about which there is considerable scepticism regarding whether or not the perpetrators had any direct communication with that organisation. Islamic State put out a claim of this nature following Khalid Masood’s Westminster Bridge attack,¹⁹⁰⁴ and while police believe there was a “pro-Islamic State” element to Masood’s motive,¹⁹⁰⁵ there has so far been a lack of evidence demonstrating that he had had any direct interaction with the group. The April 2017 Champs-Élysées shooting placed further doubt on the validity of Islamic State claims, when the group appeared to name the wrong man as the assailant in that attack.¹⁹⁰⁶

The number of attacks being claimed by terrorist groups remained broadly consistent across 2016 and 2017. In 2016 there were 20 attacks for which terror groups put out claims of

¹⁹⁰⁴ Dearden, L., ‘Westminster attack: Details of jihadi manifesto sent by Khalid Masood minutes before atrocity revealed’, *The Independent*, 28 March 2018, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/westminster-attack-khalid-masood-jihadi-manifesto-report-details-message-whatsapp-a8278616.html>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹⁰⁵ Hill, M., ‘The Westminster Bridge Terrorist Attack: 22nd March 2017: Operation Classific: A Report on the use of Terrorism Legislation’, *Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation*, February 2018, available at: <https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/IRTL-Westminster-Bridge-Attack-Report-March-2018..pdf>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹⁰⁶ ‘Paris Champs Elysees attack gunman named as Karim Cheurfi’, *BBC News*, 21 April 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39671542>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

responsibility; these represented 37.04% of all attacks that year. Of the 34 incidents that year that were not claimed, 12 concerned independent lone actors and were classed as not applicable to being claimed by a group. The remaining 22 incidents, 40.74% of the total, which may have been connected to a terrorist group, are not known to have been claimed.

In 2017, the number of attacks claimed by a group rose, with 24 attacks claimed, but fell as a percentage of the annual total, to 35.29% of all incidents that year. Another 44 incidents were not recorded as being claimed by any group, 18 of which were judged to have been the work of independent lone actors rather than formal terror groups.

There were also 26 unclaimed attacks in 2017 that may have been the work of an established group, accounting for 38.24% of the total. Across both years, there were 44 incidents for which claims of responsibility are known to have been put out, 36.07% of all incidents recorded in the study.

Table 9.2 Claimed attacks by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Yes	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
No	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Applicable	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Far Left	9	16.67%	14	20.59%	23	18.85%
Yes	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
No	2	3.70%	5	7.35%	7	5.74%
Not Applicable	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Far Right	3	5.56%	14	20.59%	17	13.93%
Yes	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
No	1	1.85%	4	5.88%	5	4.10%
Not Applicable	2	3.70%	10	14.71%	12	9.84%
Islamist	36	66.67%	33	48.53%	69	56.56%
Yes	14	25.93%	11	16.18%	25	20.49%
No	18	33.33%	16	23.53%	34	27.87%
Not Applicable	4	7.41%	6	8.82%	10	8.20%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.56%	6	8.82%	9	7.38%
Yes	2	3.70%	5	7.35%	7	5.74%
No	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Not Applicable	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

The data indicates that certain ideologies are more likely to claim responsibility for an attack than others. However, to some degree this may be impacted by the extent to which an ideology has a large number of attacks perpetrated by groups as opposed to independent lone actors. Of the nine Far Left attacks in 2016, four were claimed by a group: 44.44%. In 2017 this rose, with eight of the 14 Far Left attacks that year being claimed by a group: 57.14%. The higher number of Far Left attacks being claimed may partly be explained by the fact that in the absence of an identified or apprehended assailant, a number of these attacks were determined as terrorist in nature precisely because there was a claim of responsibility establishing ideological intent.

The same applies for Separatist/Nationalist attacks, where a similar absence of identified or apprehended assailants meant that several attacks were identified as warranting inclusion precisely because there was a claim of responsibility by a terrorist group. As such, two of the

three Separatist/Nationalist attacks in 2016 were recorded as being claimed by a group, and this rose further in 2017, with five of the six attacks being claimed.

Among Islamist attacks, the number being claimed reduced over the two years. In the first year, 14 of the 36 Islamist attacks in 2016 were claimed by an organisation, accounting for 38.89% of Islamist attacks that year. In 2017, 11 of the 33 Islamist attacks were claimed, one-third of these incidents.

No attack associated with the Far Right was claimed by a group. However, many of these were carried out by individuals not affiliated to or connected with any extremist or terrorist organisation. Indeed, of 14 Far Right attacks in 2017, ten were perpetrated by independent lone actors. Equally, no Black Supremacist attack was claimed by a group in either year, and this should also be seen in the context of all four assailants from this ideology being independent lone actors.

The Assailants

Gender of Assailants

Table 10.1 Assailants by gender

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Female	3	5.36%	1	1.64%	4	3.42%
Male	53	94.64%	60	98.36%	113	96.58%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 10.1 Assailants by gender





Figure 10.2 Assailants by gender in 2016 and 2017



During both 2016 and 2017, the overwhelming majority of identified assailants were male. In 2017, all but one of the assailants recorded in the study were male. In 2016, 94.64% of the attackers were male. The 5.36% of female assailants from 2016 are accounted for by just three individuals; two from the same all-female Islamist cell that attempted to carry out a car bombing near Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris.

It is possible that some of the unknown assailants were female, although there is no evidence that would support that speculation. While the data here points to an extremely low level of female engagement with direct terrorist violence, the figures from 2017 in particular should not be taken as an indication that women have almost no involvement in terrorism. There have been numerous examples of women being arrested and imprisoned for plotting to perpetrate acts of terrorism, as well as for playing an assisting role in terror networks, or for attempting to undertake travel for terrorist purposes. In recent years, women appear to have been involved in the terrorism associated with most of the ideologies covered in this report. In Europe, terror groups on both the Far Right and Far Left have included women, and there have been high-profile cases of women occupying prominent positions within the anarchist terror groups in Southern Europe, such as Panagiota Roupa, the leader of Revolutionary Struggle in Greece.¹⁹⁰⁷

While there are plenty of examples of women being involved with terrorism, it is still the case that men appear to be consistently over-represented in all terrorist activity. Previous Henry Jackson Society research into Islamic State-associated plots and attacks in Western countries in 2014 and 2015 also found that 97% of assailants and plotters were male.¹⁹⁰⁸ To take acts of Islamist terrorism in the United Kingdom as a further example, a report by the Henry Jackson Society that gathered data on all Islamist-related offences between 1998 and 2015 found that 93% of offenders were male.¹⁹⁰⁹ The findings in this current study reflect a similar trend. Given that the present study focussed only on those who either carried out violent acts or attempted to do so, and given that this report found men to be even more heavily represented, it appears that there may be a correlation between gender and involvement with terrorist violence.

This trend of assailants being predominantly male appears to be reflected across all five ideological strands recorded in this study. According to data from Europol, in 2017 there were 1,219 terrorism-related arrests across European Union (EU) member states, of which 638 were male and 123 were female.¹⁹¹⁰ Similar trends appear in the court proceedings for these countries. In 2016, terrorism-related court proceedings were concluded against 580 individuals, of which 53 were female.¹⁹¹¹ The following year, these countries concluded terrorism-related court proceedings against 569 individuals, of which 66 were female.¹² Notably, in 2016 there were an equal number of female defendants in connection with Separatist terrorism as jihadist (Islamist) terrorism.¹⁹¹³ By 2017, however, jihadist-related cases were recorded as having overtaken Separatist cases to make up the majority of court proceedings involving female

¹⁹⁰⁷ Magra, I., 'Greece's Most-Wanted Terrorist, on Run Since 2012, Is Arrested and Charged', *The New York Times*, 5 January 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/world/europe/panagiota-roupa-arrested-athens.html>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

¹⁹⁰⁸ Simcox, R., "'We Will Conquer Your Rome": A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West', *The Henry Jackson Society*, 2015, available at: <http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ISIS-brochure-Web.pdf>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹⁰⁹ Stuart, H., 'Islamist Terrorism: Analysis of Offences and Attacks in the UK (1998–2015)', *The Henry Jackson Society*, 5 March 2017, available at: <https://henryjacksonsociety.org/publications/islamist-terrorism-analysis-of-offences-and-attacks-in-the-uk-1998-2015/>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹¹⁰ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018', *Europol* (2018).

¹⁹¹¹ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017', *Europol* (2017), available at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹¹² 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018', *Europol* (2018).

¹⁹¹³ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017', *Europol* (2017).


defendants.¹⁹¹⁴ Overall, the trends on gender appear clear, but further research would be required to ascertain why women are drastically under-represented among perpetrators of terrorist violence in Western countries.

Age of Assailants


Table 11.1 Assailants by age group

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Under 18	8	14.29%	5	8.20%	13	11.11%
18-20	6	10.71%	6	9.84%	12	10.26%
21-24	11	19.64%	8	13.11%	19	16.24%
25-29	13	23.21%	16	26.23%	29	24.79%
30-34	8	14.29%	8	13.11%	16	13.68%
35-39	0	0.00%	9	14.75%	9	7.69%
40-44	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
45 +	3	5.36%	8	13.11%	11	9.40%
Undisclosed	5	8.93%	0	0.00%	5	4.27%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 11.1 Assailants by age group



¹⁹¹⁴ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017', *Europol* (2017).

Figure 11.2 Assailants by age group in 2016 and 2017

The ages of assailants recorded in the study ranged from as young as 12, while the oldest was 70. There were also five individuals whose ages were not disclosed by the authorities and so it is possible that one of these individuals was of an age that fell outside of this range. Most assailants were relatively young. Of the 112 cases of assailants whose ages were recorded in each of the years combined, 73 of these were 29 or younger, a total of 65.18% of assailants recorded in the two years of the study.

Nevertheless, the data does not point to the assailants being primarily youths or teenagers, and indicates that many young adults and those in middle age were also responsible for committing attacks. This stands in contrast to Henry Jackson Society research on Islamic State-associated plots and attacks in the West in 2014 and 2015 which found that almost three-quarters (74%) of assailants were under 25 and 17% were teenagers.¹⁹¹⁵ Combining the data on assailants recorded in each year of the present study, only 37.61% of cases were under 25. Furthermore, more than one-third (34.82%) of the total were 30 or older. Indeed, the most commonly occurring ages for assailants were 29 and 30, with ten cases recorded as aged 29 and another eight recorded as aged 30. The most common age bracket was between 25 and 29, with 29 recorded cases of assailants in this category.

As a further indication that terrorist violence is not simply a problem that primarily concerns the very young, the study found only 13 cases of assailants recorded in 2016 and 2017 that

¹⁹¹⁵ Simcox, R., "“We Will Conquer Your Rome”: A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West”, *The Henry Jackson Society*, 2015.

were under 18 years of age, 11.61% of the total of each year combined. Another 12 instances were recorded of assailants being between 18 and 20 years of age. A total of 16.96% of assailants, or 19 individuals, were in the age bracket 21 to 24. In the age bracket 30 to 34 there were 16 individuals, or 14.29% of the total. There were nine cases recorded in the age category 35 to 39 and only three in the category 40 to 44, the least represented of any age group. This rises again in the 45 and older category, with 11 instances recorded in this age group.

Inasmuch as it is possible to talk about the average assailant, when the data from the two years is combined, the average age is 28.53. Individuals from the 2017 attacks were on average older than those in 2016. In the first year the average age of assailants was 25.82, while in 2017 this rose to an average of 30.79 years of age. What may be more useful is to consider the ages of the assailants in terms of the range within which they are more likely to be found. In this regard, when assailants recorded in each year are combined, it is possible to see a particular cluster of individuals in the age bracket between 19 and 31 years of age, with 62.50% of cases falling within this category.

Table 11.2 Age of assailants by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
22	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
25	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
39	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Far Left	5	8.93%	4	6.56%	9	7.69%
17	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
25	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
29	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
30	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
31	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
44	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
66	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Far Right	9	16.07%	14	22.95%	23	19.66%
17	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
20	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
22	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
23	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
26	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
27	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
28	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
29	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
35	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
47	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
50	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
53	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
70	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Undisclosed	5	8.93%	0	0.00%	5	4.27%

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Islamist	37	66.07%	42	68.85%	79	67.52%
12	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
15	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
16	3	5.36%	1	1.64%	4	3.42%
17	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
18	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
19	4	7.14%	1	1.64%	5	4.27%
20	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
21	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
22	2	3.57%	4	6.56%	6	5.13%
23	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
24	4	7.14%	1	1.64%	5	4.27%
25	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
26	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
27	2	3.57%	3	4.92%	5	4.27%
28	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
29	3	5.36%	5	8.20%	8	6.84%
30	2	3.57%	4	6.56%	6	5.13%
31	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
32	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
33	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
36	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
37	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
39	0	0.00%	4	6.56%	4	3.42%
40	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
43	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
49	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
52	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
54	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
25	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
45	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

There is some variation in the age of assailants between ideologies. However, it is important to note that with some ideologies having relatively few identified assailants recorded in the study, the statistics on age in those categories can be easily impacted by only one or two individuals. Equally, other ideology categories, such as Islamists, have a relatively large number of assailants identified. These have contributed more significantly to the trends.

Among known Islamist attackers, the overall trends in age were broadly replicated, with an increase in the age of these individuals over the two-year period. In 2016 there were 37 Islamist assailants with an average age between them of 23.84 years. This was moderately younger than the average age for all assailants in 2016, which was 25.83. This rose in 2017, with the average for the 42 Islamist assailants being 29.10. Again, this was only slightly younger than the overall assailant average for 2017, which was 30.79 years.

Islamist assailants did include some of the youngest attackers in the study, including the youngest; an unnamed 12-year-old responsible for two attempted bombings in Ludwigshafen, Germany in December 2016. Across both years, three 15-year-olds and four 16-year-olds were among the Islamist attackers. However, in 2017 there were a number of older Islamist assailants,

including 54-year-old Mohamed H. Khalid who murdered an elderly couple in Linz, Austria, and the 52-year-old Westminster Bridge attacker Khalid Masood.

Far Right assailants tended to be older, although the number of assailants is more limited. This is particularly the case for 2016, where the study only recorded the ages of four of nine known Far Right assailants for that year. The Far Right assailants had the widest age range and included the oldest accused assailant: a 70-year-old accused of the Czech train attacks in the summer of 2017. However, Far Right assailants also included an unnamed 17-year-old accused of a series of attacks in France's Dijon region, as well as three 20-year-olds across the two years. In 2016, the Far Right assailant had an average age of 36.50. In the following year this saw a decrease, with the 14 Far Right assailants giving an average age of 32.93 years of age.

The data about the Far Left is also limited, with only a small number of identified assailants recorded in the study. However, similar to those on the Far Right, those on the Far Left recorded quite a wide range of ages. The youngest here was a 17-year-old who was part of a Warsaw anarchist cell responsible for an attempted attack in the Polish capital in 2016. The oldest Far Left assailant was 66-year-old James T. Hodgkinson, who was responsible for attempting to assassinate a Republican congressman in June 2017. In 2016, the average age of the five recorded Far Left assailants was 29.40, higher than the average for that year. In 2017, the number of Far Left individuals recorded in the study reduced further, to four, with an average age of 39. While this figure was raised by Hodgkinson's age, the youngest Far Left individual in the study that year was 29, the Greek anarchist Constantinos Yiagtzoglou.


The number of identified assailants from the Black Supremacist and Separatist/Nationalists ideologies with a recorded age was even smaller. Of Black Supremacist attackers, both of the two 2016 individuals were in their twenties: one was 22 while the other was 25. In 2017, the one recorded Black Supremacist assailant – the suspect in the Fresno shooting – was 39. With regard to Separatist/Nationalists, a 25-year-old and a 45-year-old were recorded 2016, while no identified assailants from this ideology were recorded in 2017.

Place of Residence of Assailants

Table 12.1 Number of assailants with a different place of residence from place of attack

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Same	43	76.79%	35	57.38%	78	66.67%
Different	13	23.21%	26	42.62%	39	33.33%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 12.1 Proportion of assailants with a different place of residence from place of attack in 2016 and 2017



The data on where assailants lived and where they committed their attacks suggests that attackers are more likely to carry out terror attacks in the places in which they live, rather than travelling to another location for the purpose of perpetrating an attack. In 2016, 43 of 56 identified assailants committed their attack in the town or the city in which they were living at the time. This represents more than three-quarters (76.79%) of all assailants that year. In 2017, the figure fell moderately, with 35 of 61 assailants recorded in the study having carried out attacks in their own place of residence. This represents 57.38% of all attackers, still more than half.


Additional research would be required to gain greater insight into why the majority of attackers in Western countries perpetrated their attacks in the places where they were already resident. One possibility is that suitable targets existed in the locations where the assailants already lived, creating no necessity to travel any further. Arguably, those individuals who specifically intended to carry out attacks in high-profile locations, such as in capital cities or at landmarks, and who did not already live in one of these cities, would have had reason to travel. However, it is apparent that, for many assailants, targets such as these were not essential and they were prepared to carry out their attacks at lower-profile locations.

Country of Origin

Table 13.1 Number of assailants with a different country of origin from that of the attack

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Same	39	69.64%	33	54.10%	72	61.54%
Different	17	30.36%	28	45.90%	45	38.46%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 13.1 Proportion of assailants with a different country of origin from that of the attack in 2016 and 2017



The figures on identified assailants provide an indication of the degree to which terror attacks have occurred in Western countries either as a result of so-called “home-grown” extremism or from individuals who have travelled from overseas. The data here does not necessarily answer where an assailant was when they came to adopt more extreme beliefs, but it does provide an outline of the proportion of attackers who originally came from a country other than the one in which they perpetrated their attack. Further investigation into the period of time between an individual’s arrival in a Western country and the time that they carried out an attack could help to provide a better understanding of terrorist incidents associated with those who have travelled or migrated from overseas. However, recent research from The Heritage Foundation examining Islamist terrorism in Europe by those who had arrived in the region as asylum seekers since 2014 found that in more than half of cases radicalisation had already taken place

abroad.¹⁹¹⁶ Accordingly, that report indicated that nearly three-quarters of those recorded had either carried out their attack or had had their plot foiled within two years of arrival in Europe.¹⁹¹⁷

According to the data gathered, in 2016 there were 17 individuals from the identified assailants who committed their attacks in a country other than the one from which they originated. This represents almost one-third (30.36%) of the total for that year. By 2017, however, this had grown closer to half of all attackers identified in the study: 28 of the 61 assailants had a different country of origin, or 45.90% of the overall total for that year. Across both years, 72 out of 117 assailants carried out attacks in their own country of origin. Accordingly, more than half, or 61.54%, of assailants carried out an attack while in their own country of origin, while a significant minority of 38.46% of assailants were carrying out attacks in countries to which they had travelled or migrated to at some previous date.

Table 13.2 Number of assailants with a different country of origin by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
Same	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
Different	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Far Left	5	8.93%	4	6.56%	9	7.69%
Same	5	8.93%	4	6.56%	9	7.69%
Different	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Far Right	9	16.07%	14	22.95%	23	19.66%
Same	9	16.07%	14	22.95%	23	19.66%
Different	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Islamist	37	66.07%	42	68.85%	79	67.52%
Same	22	39.29%	14	22.95%	36	30.77%
Different	15	26.79%	28	45.90%	43	36.75%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.36%		0.00%	3	2.56%
Same	1	1.79%		0.00%	1	0.85%
Different	2	3.57%		0.00%	2	1.71%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

The degree to which an assailant is more or less likely to be committing attacks in their own country of origin varies considerably depending upon the ideological leanings of the assailant. In 2016 there was one Separatist/Nationalist attack that featured two assailants from a different country of origin. It is relevant to note, however, that this involved the hijacking of a plane, diverting it to Malta and bringing the two Libyan assailants to that country, although that was not where they were residing at the time and it was not where the attack originated from.

Another instance, this time involving a series of Far Left attacks across several countries, represents a case in which an accused assailant remained in their own country of origin while dispatching a series of letter bombs to locations in other Western countries. However, with the assailant having also carried out attacks in his own country and having not travelled to the other countries in which these attacks occurred, this has not been recorded as an example of an assailant who came from a different country of origin. Far Right and Black Supremacist assailants were far more static. All of the Far Right assailants recorded were living in and committed their attacks in their own country of origin. Two Far Right assailants in the study

¹⁹¹⁶ Simcox, R., 'The Asylum-Terror Nexus: How Europe Should Respond', *The Heritage Foundation*, 18 June 2018, available at: <https://www.heritage.org/terrorism/report/the-asylum-terror-nexus-how-europe-should-respond>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹¹⁷ Ibid.

travelled from their native Sweden to Russia to undergo paramilitary training in Russia; however, they returned to Gothenburg before carrying out their attacks. There have also been reports of Far Right groups and activists from Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, being increasingly active in the UK.¹⁹¹⁸ No assailant in this study was linked back to those circles, however. This same trend of Far Right assailants committing attacks in their own country of origin was true of the small number of known assailants associated with Black Supremacism.

Among the Islamist assailants, however, a significant number in both years had an alternative country of origin to the country in which they carried out their attacks. In 2016, of 37 recorded Islamist assailants, 15 had travelled from a different country of origin. Accordingly, 40.54% of all known Islamist assailants in 2016 had come from another country of origin prior to committing an attack. In the following year, the study recorded a higher number of identified Islamist assailants. In total, 42 Islamist assailants were identified in the study for that year. Of these, 28 had a different country of origin from the one in which they carried out their attack. This means that well over half (66.67%) of these assailants had travelled from overseas before committing their attacks.

This is not to detract from the importance of so-called “home-grown” radicalisation of Islamist terrorists in the West. Previous Henry Jackson Society research on Islamic State-linked plots and attacks in the West in 2014 and 2015 found that two-thirds (66%) of assailants were citizens of the countries in which they carried out attacks, although that work did not detail whether any of these had originated from a different country prior to gaining citizenship.¹⁹¹⁹ The significance of terrorism carried out by individuals in their own country of origin has also been made apparent by Henry Jackson Society research on Islamist terrorist offences in the UK between 1998 and 2015. That work found that a majority (67%) of Islamist terrorism offenders were born or raised in the UK.¹⁹²⁰

Nevertheless, the research from The Heritage Foundation cited previously noted the considerable impact that just 44 individuals from overseas have had on Islamist terrorism in Europe since 2014.¹⁹²¹ Significantly, that research found that the majority of plots and attacks in Europe involving individuals who had come to the region as asylum seekers in that time period had some direct link to Islamic State.¹⁹²² As that work observed, this ties into a wider phenomenon since 2015 by which Islamic State has acted to exploit the refugee routes between Syria and Europe to allow its members to travel back and forth.¹⁹²³

Assailants and terrorism offenders in the United States have also had their ranks bolstered by individuals who have travelled from overseas. A report released at the beginning of 2018 by the Departments for Justice and Homeland Security reported that three out of four individuals convicted of “international terrorism” in the United States between 2001 and 2016 had been born in another country.¹⁹²⁴ It should be noted, however, that it has been suggested that as many as 90 of the 549 convictions in the report were of individuals who had been arrested overseas and brought to the United States to stand trial.¹⁹²⁵

¹⁹¹⁸ Collins, M. and N. Lowels, ‘Polish Extremists Active in the UK’, *Hope Not Hate*, 2018, available at:

<https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/research/state-of-hate-2018/violence/polish-extremists/>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹¹⁹ Simcox, R., “‘We Will Conquer Your Rome’: A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West”, *The Henry Jackson Society*, 2015.

¹⁹²⁰ Stuart, H., ‘Islamist Terrorism: Analysis of Offences and Attacks in the UK (1998–2015)’, *The Henry Jackson Society*, 5 March 2017.

¹⁹²¹ Simcox, R., ‘The Asylum-Terror Nexus: How Europe Should Respond’, *The Heritage Foundation*, 18 June 2018.

¹⁹²² *Ibid.*


¹⁹²³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹²⁴ ‘Departments of Homeland Security and Justice Release Data for the First Time on Terrorism-Related Activity’, *Homeland Security*, 16 January 2018, available at: <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/01/16/dhs-doj-report-three-out-four-individuals-convicted-international-terrorism-and>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹²⁵ Ainsley, J. and R. Windrem, ‘New report says most U.S. terrorists foreign born, but check the fine print’, *NBC News*, 16 January 2018, available at: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-report-says-most-u-s-terrorists-foreign-born-check-n838041>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

Table 13.3 Number of assailants by country of origin

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Afghanistan	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Algeria	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
Australia	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
Bangladesh	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Belgium	4	7.14%	0	0.00%	4	3.42%
Bosnia	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Canada	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Egypt	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
France	5	8.93%	7	11.48%	12	10.26%
Germany	6	10.71%	0	0.00%	6	5.13%
Greece	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Guinea	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Iraq	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Italy	2	3.57%	3	4.92%	5	4.27%
Kenya	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Libya	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
Morocco	1	1.79%	10	16.39%	11	9.40%
Netherlands	5	8.93%	0	0.00%	5	4.27%
Pakistan	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
Poland	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Russia	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Somalia	1	1.79%	4	6.56%	5	4.27%
Spain	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Sweden	4	7.14%	3	4.92%	7	5.98%
Syria	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
Tunisia	4	7.14%	3	4.92%	7	5.98%
Turkey	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
United Arab Emirates	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
United Kingdom	5	8.93%	4	6.56%	9	7.69%
United States	4	7.14%	10	16.39%	14	11.97%
Uzbekistan	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 13.2 Number of assailants by country of origin

The data on the countries of origin of identified assailants broadly reflects the countries that experienced terror attacks, further indicating that Western countries have been more likely to experience terror attacks carried out by those born and raised within that country. For example, in 2016 Germany saw one of the highest levels of terrorism, and accordingly Germany particularly stands out in the 2016 figures as a country of origin for assailants, with 10.71% of assailants originating from Germany that year. This was the largest of any country of origin group for that year.

By contrast, terrorism reduced considerably in Germany in 2017 and so it is noticeable that in that year no assailants had Germany as their country of origin. Another country that demonstrates this trend is France. That country also experienced a comparatively high level of terrorism in 2016, and accordingly 8.93% of assailants had France as their country of origin. This was the joint second largest country of origin group in 2016. Terrorism in France rose in 2017 and so did the number of individuals with France as their country of origin, increasing from five individuals to seven, or 11.48% of the total that year. Similarly, in Belgium there was a high level of terrorism in 2016, and in 2017 this decreased noticeably. As such, in 2016 7.14% of assailants originated in Belgium, but this fell to zero in 2017.

Nevertheless, there are countries that appear in the data as the place of origin for several of those who have gone on to commit terror attacks in a different country. In a limited number of instances this includes people who have originated in one Western country and have travelled and committed an attack in another. For instance, in 2016 Osama Krayem directly participated

in the bombing of the Brussels subway system and has also been linked to the November 2015 Paris attacks.¹⁹²⁶ Krayem was of Syrian–Palestinian ancestry and was born and raised in the Swedish city of Malmö before later travelling to join Islamic State in Syria and then returning again to Europe posing as a refugee or migrant.¹⁹²⁷

There was also the case of Youssef Zaghba, who was an assailant in the 2017 London Bridge attacks. Zaghba possessed Italian citizenship and had spent time living in Italy; however, he was born in Morocco, from where his father originated, and this is where he spent much of his life.¹⁹²⁸ As such, even though Youssef Zaghba had been living in Italy before coming to the United Kingdom, Morocco is recorded in this study as having been his country of origin.

There were several non-Western countries, and accordingly not included in this study, that produced a number of the assailants responsible for the attacks recorded. In particular, a number of North African countries, as well as Somalia, stand out as places from which several attackers originated. In 2017 Morocco was the place of origin for a particularly high number of assailants. Indeed, no other single country contributed a higher number of assailants that year. Whereas in 2016 only one assailant originated in Morocco, in 2017 this figure rose to ten, representing 16.39% of all assailants for that year. This high number is partly accounted for by the cell that carried out the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks, with five of these individuals having originated in Morocco. Additionally, two of the assailants in the 2017 London Bridge attack originated from Morocco. Attacks that year in Paris, Brussels and Turku also all featured assailants who originated from Morocco.

Another North African country, Tunisia, was the place of origin for seven attackers across both years. In 2016, four individuals accused of carrying out attacks originated in Tunisia. At 7.14% of the total for 2016, this is the same figure as number who originated from Sweden, the United States, and Belgium. In 2017, three individuals originated in Tunisia, 4.92% of the total that year. Two of the highest-profile and most devastating attacks of 2016 were carried out by individuals of Tunisian origin: Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel who carried out the Nice Bastille Day truck attack and Anis Amri who carried out the Berlin Christmas Market truck attack. The attacks in 2017 by assailants of Tunisian origin tended to be smaller and included such incidents as the stabbing attack at Flint airport, the killing of an elderly couple in Austria and the Marseille train station stabbing attack. Ismail Hosni, accused of the Milan train station attack, was of Italian origin but possessed dual Tunisian–Italian nationality and had spent time living in Tunisia.

Other assailants originating from North African countries included three individuals from Algeria: one in 2016 and two in 2017. In 2016, two assailants had originated from Libya as part of a hijacking that brought them to Malta. In 2017, one assailant had originated from Egypt. In total, eight assailants originated from North Africa in 2016, and 16 originated from this region in 2017, more than one-quarter (26.23%) of assailants that year. Accordingly, taking only the Islamist assailants in 2017, it is the case that 38.10% of these individuals originated from just four North African countries. As an overall figure, combining the data on all identified assailants recorded in 2016 and 2017, 24 of these assailants came from North African countries, 20.51% of the cases recorded from the two years.

¹⁹²⁶ 'Brussels suspect Osama Krayem reportedly charged over Paris attacks', *The Guardian*, 20 April 2016, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/20/brussels-suspect-osama-krayem-reportedly-charged-over-paris-attacks>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

¹⁹²⁷ Alexander, H., 'Brussels terrorist suspect featured in Swedish documentary about integration', *The Telegraph*, 15 April 2016, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/15/brussels-terrorist-suspect-featured-in-swedish-documentary-about/>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

¹⁹²⁸ Booth, R., V. Dodd, L. Tondo and S. Kirchgassner, 'London Bridge: third attacker named as Youssef Zaghba', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/06/london-bridge-attack-third-attacker-named-in-italy-as-youssef-zaghba>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

Another non-Western country that stands out as having been the place of origin for multiple assailants is Somalia. One assailant was identified from Somalia in 2016, while four individuals had that country as their place of origin in 2017, 6.56% of all assailants that year. This was the same as the number of assailants originating from the United Kingdom that year. The one Somali assailant of 2016 was 19-year-old student Abdul Razak Ali Artan, who was killed while carrying out a vehicular and knife attack at Ohio State University in which 11 people were injured.¹⁹²⁹

In 2017, all of the individuals of Somali origin who perpetrated or attempted attacks were lone actors undertaking smaller-scale attacks. However, several had previously been part of wider terrorist or extremist networks. Yacqub Khayre, who carried out a hostage-taking in Melbourne, had previously been part of an extremist network accused of plotting a major attack.¹⁹³⁰ Similarly, Khalid Mohammed Omar Ali, the attempted Whitehall attacker, had been an Al-Qaeda bomb maker operating from a base in Afghanistan prior to his attack. Haashi Ayaanle, who attempted a machete attack in Brussels, is believed to have been connected to a wider network of Somali Islamists operating in Europe.¹⁹³¹ In addition to the five individuals in the study originating from Somalia, Dahir Ahmed Adan, the St Cloud shopping mall attacker, had come to the United States from the neighbouring East African country of Kenya, but was of Somali ancestry and possessed dual Somali-American nationality.

In terms of assailants originating from Middle Eastern countries, two assailants in the study originated in Syria, while Iraq and Turkey accounted for one assailant each. Another assailant in the 2017 Hamburg attack was of Palestinian ancestry and had been born in the United Arab Emirates, but had spent a period of his life living in Gaza. Additionally, Abdullah Reda al-Hamamy, accused of the Louvre machete attack, originated from Egypt and possessed Egyptian nationality, but had been living in Dubai, from where he travelled to France. Another potential area of interest in terms of places of origin might be the Caucasus and Central Asia, with two assailants in 2017 coming from Uzbekistan and another from the North Caucasus. Additionally, over the two-year period, one assailant originated in Afghanistan, two from Pakistan and another from Bangladesh.

While it might be possible to point to certain types of extremism or ongoing conflicts in the above-mentioned countries as potential explanations for why those places were the countries of origin for a number of assailants, the data does not allow for this. More information would be required for a significantly wider time period to ascertain whether these trends are consistent before it would be possible to draw any wider conclusions about causation.


¹⁹²⁹ 'Ohio attack: Possible terror link being investigated, say police', *BBC News*, 29 November 2016, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-38136658>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

¹⁹³⁰ Rintoul, S., 'Two cleared but three convicted over army base terror attack plan', *The Australian*, 23 December 2010, available at: <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/two-cleared-but-three-convicted-over-army-base-terror-attack-plan/news-story/06921bd333ba0ad2c4eb445a42a7c7fc?sv=545fed2beed20fa1898875a4e0b6521d>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

¹⁹³¹ J. C., 'Bruxelles : l'assaillant était en contact avec des islamistes', *La Capitale*, 28 August 2017, available at: <http://www.lacapitale.be/118591/article/2017-08-28/bruxelles-lassaillant-etait-en-contact-avec-des-islamistes>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

Table 14.1 Number of assailants by nationality

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Algerian	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
American	4	7.14%	10	16.39%	14	11.97%
American-Afghan	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
American-Somali	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Australian	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
Australian-Somali	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Bangladeshi	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Belgian	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Belgian-Moroccan	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
Belgian-Somali	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
British	5	8.93%	5	8.20%	10	8.55%
British-Pakistani	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Canadian-Syrian	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Canadian-Tunisian	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
Canadian-Tunisian	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Czech	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Danish	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Dutch	5	8.93%	0	0.00%	5	4.27%
Egyptian	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
French	5	8.93%	7	11.48%	12	10.26%
French-Moroccan	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
French-Tunisian	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
German	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
German-Iraqi	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
German-Moroccan	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
Greek	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Guinean	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Iraqi	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Italian	2	3.57%	2	3.28%	4	3.42%
Italian-Moroccan	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Italian-Tunisian	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Libyan	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
Moroccan	0	0.00%	3	4.92%	3	2.56%
Pakistani	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Palestinian	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Polish	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Russian	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Somali	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
Spanish-Moroccan	0	0.00%	6	9.84%	6	5.13%
Swedish	4	7.14%	3	4.92%	7	5.98%
Syrian	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Tunis	3	5.36%	2	3.28%	5	4.27%
Turkish	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Uzbek	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 14.1 Number of assailants by nationality

The data on nationality reflects some of the same trends as the information about the country of origin of identified assailants. However, in some respects this data reveals less about the background of the attackers, given that some of those with a different country of origin had subsequently gained nationality in the country where the attack was carried out. Equally, the matter of dual nationality may further obscure the picture, particularly where an individual may have inherited the nationality of a country that they had not lived in or otherwise had few connections with.

In certain cases, the data on nationality reflects those countries that had the most terrorism. France and the United States, which each experienced a high level of terrorism across the two


years, tended to have a higher level of assailants of French and American nationality respectively than other countries. However, with such a small number of assailants coming from any one country, the picture can easily be skewed by just one attack or one cell of individuals. In 2016, no nationality in the study recorded more than five individuals as assailants. One of the nationalities that recorded five assailants that year was Dutch, making this one of the most common nationalities. However, this appears to be an anomaly, as all these individuals were from the same attack and involved the same Far Right group. Similarly, in 2017, one of the most common nationality groups was Moroccan-Spanish, which accounted for 9.84% of assailants that year. However, all of the Moroccan-Spanish individuals recorded in the study were assailants from the same cell behind the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks.

Assailants Known to the Authorities

Table 15.1 Number of assailants known to the authorities

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Known	24	42.86%	25	40.98%	49	41.88%
Not Known	18	32.14%	30	49.18%	48	41.03%
Unknown	14	25.00%	6	9.84%	20	17.09%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 15.1 Number of assailants known to the authorities



The data in this study indicates that a large proportion of the attackers were already known to the authorities in some way prior to the attacks occurring. While this study was not primarily concerned with the foiling of plots, good intelligence on the identities of extremist individuals and networks should theoretically assist counterterrorism policing with the disruption of terrorist violence in advance of it occurring. Cases recorded in this study demonstrate that this knowledge can be extremely useful, even allowing police to foil attacks just as they are about to be carried out, as seen with the foiling of Aron Driver's 2016 attempted bombing in Strathroy, Canada, or Khalid Mohamed Omar Ali's attempted stabbing attack on London's Whitehall in 2017.

Nevertheless, it is concerning that so many individuals who were known to the authorities in relation to extremism were able to carry out attacks. In his review of the four major terror attacks in London and Manchester between March and June of 2017, David Anderson Q.C. drew attention to the fact that three of the assailants were known to the British intelligence services.¹⁹³² In that review he highlighted some of the procedures used by MI5 to determine the level of threat posed by different known extremists and for deciding which should be monitored most closely.¹⁹³³ It remains an open question whether or not alternative policies would have led to different outcomes for any of these attacks.

In 2016, of the 56 individuals in the study for that year, it is recorded that at least 24 were already known for their links with extremism or terrorism. This represents 42.86% of assailants that year. These can be further broken down by region. Of the 46 assailants who carried out attacks in Europe, 19 were already known to the authorities, while of nine assailants in North America, four were already known to the authorities. There was one assailant recorded in Australasia that year, and he was also already known to the authorities.

A number of other assailants are believed to have been unknown to the authorities prior to the time at which their attack occurred. In 2016, these included 13 individuals from attacks in Europe and five from attacks in North America. In the cases of a further 14 assailants it has not been possible to determine whether or not the authorities were aware of the assailant as someone linked to extremism prior to the attack.

In 2017, a slightly larger number of assailants were known to the authorities. However, these 25 cases represented a smaller proportion of the total, at 40.98% of assailants. As with 2016, 19 of the known assailants were in Europe, one was in Australasia and five were in North America. In 2017, 30 of the assailants were recorded as being unknown to authorities, 17 of whom were in Europe, 11 in North America and two in Australasia. In the cases of six assailants there was not enough information about the assailants to determine whether the authorities knew of them in connection with extremism prior to the attacks. All of these were assailants connected to attacks in Europe.

¹⁹³² Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester between March and June 2017', *HM Government*, 5 December 2017, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/attacks-in-london-and-manchester-between-march-and-june-2017>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹³³ *Ibid.*

Table 15.2 Number of assailants known to the authorities by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Known	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Far Left	5	8.93%	4	6.56%	9	7.69%
Known	3	5.36%	1	1.64%	4	3.42%
Not Known	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
Unknown	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
Far Right	9	16.07%	14	22.95%	23	19.66%
Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Not Known	1	1.79%	10	16.39%	11	9.40%
Unknown	8	14.29%	3	4.92%	11	9.40%
Islamist	37	66.07%	42	68.85%	79	67.52%
Known	21	37.50%	23	37.70%	44	37.61%
Not Known	13	23.21%	18	29.51%	31	26.50%
Unknown	3	5.36%	1	1.64%	4	3.42%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

The likelihood that an individual will have been known to authorities in connection with extremism in part corresponds with the ideology that they are associated with. Certain ideologies appear to be better known and are potentially monitored more closely by the police and intelligence services.

Of the 24 assailants in 2016 already known to the authorities, 21 were Islamist, while the remaining three were from the Far Left. Assailants from other ideologies were all unknown to the authorities that year. In all, more than half (56.76%) of all Islamist assailants in 2016 were already known to the authorities in connection with extremism or terrorism.

In 2017, 25 assailants from the Far Left, the Far Right and Islamists were already known to the authorities. Of these 25 individuals, 23 were Islamists, one was from the Far Left and one was from the Far Right. Once again, more than half of Islamist individuals were known to the authorities in advance: 54.76%. Across both years, then, more than half (55.70%) of Islamist individuals were already known to authorities, compared with 44.44% of Far Left assailants and only 4.35% of Far Right individuals. Europol's Terrorism Situation and Trend report for 2018 – which included data on plotters as well as actual attackers – stated that while a substantial number of jihadist (Islamist) terrorists in the European Union countries were already known to authorities, often this was only in relation to a criminal past, or alternatively they had not been considered to be a significant terrorist threat.¹⁹³⁴

It is important to note that in the cases of 20 individuals in the study, too little is known to determine whether or not the authorities had been aware of them prior to their attacks.

¹⁹³⁴ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018', *Europol* (2018).

However, the figures here would indicate that the police and intelligence services are far more advanced in their monitoring of Islamists than they are with other ideologies. In particular, the data suggests a possible lack of intelligence about Far Right circles. Equally, the failure to identify and arrest assailants for a number of the Far Left and Separatist/Nationalist incidents might also suggest a failing in intelligence.

Table 15.3 Number of assailants known to the authorities by country of attack

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Australia	1	1.79%	3	4.92%	4	3.42%
Known	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
Not Known	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Austria	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Belgium	7	12.50%	2	3.28%	9	7.69%
Known	6	10.71%	0	0.00%	6	5.13%
Not Known	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Canada	1	1.79%	3	4.92%	4	3.42%
Known	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
Not Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Denmark	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Known	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Finland	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
France	9	16.07%	12	19.67%	21	17.95%
Known	5	8.93%	6	9.84%	11	9.40%
Not Known	4	7.14%	6	9.84%	10	8.55%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Germany	9	16.07%	1	1.64%	10	8.55%
Known	4	7.14%	1	1.64%	5	4.27%
Not Known	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
Unknown	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Germany & Greece & France	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Italy	2	3.57%	3	4.92%	5	4.27%
Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Known	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
Unknown	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
Malta	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
Netherlands	5	8.93%	0	0.00%	5	4.27%
Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	5	8.93%	0	0.00%	5	4.27%
Norway	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Poland	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Known	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Spain	0	0.00%	6	9.84%	6	5.13%
Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Known	0	0.00%	6	9.84%	6	5.13%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Sweden	3	5.36%	4	6.56%	7	5.98%
Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	3	5.36%	3	4.92%	6	5.13%
United Kingdom	5	8.93%	9	14.75%	14	11.97%
Known	0	0.00%	7	11.48%	7	5.98%
Not Known	4	7.14%	1	1.64%	5	4.27%
Unknown	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
United States	8	14.29%	13	21.31%	21	17.95%
Known	3	5.36%	3	4.92%	6	5.13%
Not Known	5	8.93%	10	16.39%	15	12.82%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

The variations among ideologies with regard to the likelihood that the authorities will already be aware of an assailant in connection with terrorism or extremism can also be seen in the variations among countries. In France, where a large proportion of the attacks were perpetrated by Islamists, the authorities had a relatively high level of familiarity with the assailants' identities. Several of the individuals in this study were reported to have been on France's S File, which keeps track of individuals deemed to be a potential risk to national security, in addition to the File for the Prevention of Terrorist Radicalisation (FSPRT), which in February 2018 was reported to include almost 20,000 individuals.¹⁹³⁵ In this study, 11 individuals,

¹⁹³⁵ 'Terror threat: How does France track 20,000 potentially dangerous extremists', *The Local*, 26 March 2018, available at, <https://www.thelocal.fr/20180326/how-does-france-track-20000-potential-terror-threats>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

or just over half of the 21 assailants recorded for attacks in France, were already known to the police and intelligence services.

Similar to France, in the United Kingdom, of 14 identified assailants, half were known to the authorities, with these findings particularly pertaining to Islamist assailants. This compares to previous Henry Jackson Society research on specifically Islamist terrorism-related offences in the UK from 1998 to 2015, which found that almost half (48%) of offenders were already known to security services.¹⁹³⁶

Belgium and Germany were countries that also experienced a high level of Islamist attacks, with six of the nine assailants in Belgium already being known to the authorities, and five of the ten assailants in Germany already being known. Spain stood outside this trend, with all six of its assailants being Islamist but unknown to authorities. This, however, is accounted for by the fact that these assailants were all members of the Ripoll cell responsible for the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks which had gone undiscovered by the Spanish authorities.

Over the two years covered by the study, the United States experienced a high level of Islamist terrorism, and also of Far Right terrorism. As such, of the 21 identified assailants involved in attacks in the United States, only six were already known to the authorities in connection with extremism. While several of the identities of the Islamist individuals were already known to the authorities, Far Right assailants in the US tended not to be known about in advance of the attacks. The same is true of the Black Supremacist assailants and of the one Far Left attacker in America, who were not known or being monitored by security services at the time of their attacks.

¹⁹³⁶ Stuart, H., 'Islamist Terrorism: Analysis of Offences and Attacks in the UK (1998-2015)', *The Henry Jackson Society*, 5 March 2017.

Training and Combat Experience

Table 16.1 Number of assailants with training or combat experience

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
With Training	9	16.07%	8	13.11%	17	14.53%
Without Training	36	64.29%	52	85.25%	88	75.21%
Unknown	11	19.64%	1	1.64%	12	10.26%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 16.1 Number of assailants with training or combat experience





Table 16.2 Proportion of assailants with training and combat experience in 2016 and 2017

	Total
With Training	17
Without Training	88
Unknown	12
	117

Figure 16.2 Proportion of assailants with training and combat experience in 2016 and 2017

Combining the data on assailants recorded from attacks in 2016 and 2017, a minority had received some form of military training or combat experience, either with the military of a recognised nation state or with a terrorist non-state actor. Between the two years, there was a slight decline in the number of cases where the assailants had received training or combat experience, as well as a decline in the overall proportion, from 16.07% of the total of assailants in 2016 to 13.11% of the total in 2017.

In total, then, combining the data from each year, there was evidence that 14.53% of identified assailants had received training or combat experience. In a further 10.26% of cases, however, it was not possible to adequately determine from the assailants' movements whether or not they had received training or combat experience.

Table 16.2 Number of assailants with training or combat experience by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
With Training	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Without Training	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Far Left	5	8.93%	4	6.56%	9	7.69%
With Training	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Without Training	5	8.93%	4	6.56%	9	7.69%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Far Right	9	16.07%	14	22.95%	23	19.66%
With Training	2	3.57%	4	6.56%	6	5.13%
Without Training	2	3.57%	10	16.39%	12	10.26%
Unknown	5	8.93%		0.00%	5	4.27%
Islamist	37	66.07%	42	68.85%	79	67.52%
With Training	6	10.71%	4	6.56%	10	8.55%
Without Training	28	50.00%	37	60.66%	65	55.56%
Unknown	3	5.36%	1	1.64%	4	3.42%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
With Training	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Without Training	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

From the incidents recorded in this study, the data indicates that whether assailants are likely to have received training and combat experience depends on which ideology they are aligned with. Those assailants with training or combat experience were primarily from Islamist or Far Right attacks, although even among these groups of attackers they constituted the minority. The degree and type of experience clearly differed between assailants, and some of this followed ideological lines. Islamist assailants with training or combat experience in the study are more likely to have received this from foreign terrorist groups than those on the Far Right, who are more likely to have received training from having served as part of a national military. The exception to this is two Far Right assailants from Sweden who received training from a paramilitary group in Russia.

Of the 37 identified Islamist assailants in 2016, six are believed to have received training or combat experience. Comparably, two of the nine Far Right assailants recorded in that year also had this experience. Additionally, one of the two Black Supremacist assailants from 2016 had had training and possible combat experience, with Micah Johnson having been a reservist in the United States military.¹⁹³⁷

None of the five Far Left assailants from that year are believed to have had training or to have experienced combat prior to their attacks, nor is there evidence that the three Separatist/Nationalist assailants had had any such experience. While the numbers of identified assailants from these two ideologies is small, the trend of not having received training may not be unexpected, given that one of the primary means for gaining training or combat experience

¹⁹³⁷ Allen, N., 'Dallas shooting: Who was Micah Johnson? Everything we know about the attacker', *The Telegraph*, 9 July 2016, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/08/dallas-shooting-who-is-micah-johnson/>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

is from service with a national military. Both of these ideologies can be said to be hostile to the militaries of the states within which they reside.

In the following year, four of the 42 Islamist assailants were identified as having received combat training or military experience, while four of the 14 Far Right assailants who carried out attacks in 2017 were known to have had such experience or training. None of the assailants associated with Far Left, Separatist/Nationalist or Black Supremacist terrorism were known to have had training or combat experience in 2017.

Combining the figures from 2016 and 2017, the only ideologies that had a noticeable minority with training or combat experience were Islamist and Far Right. Of the data on Far Right assailants recorded from attacks in the two years combined, there is evidence of six cases of training or combat experience. Among the 79 Islamist attackers recorded in the study, ten are believed to have had training or combat experience. This reflects findings from previous Henry Jackson Society research investigating Islamic State plots and attacks in Western countries in 2014 and 2015 which found that only a minority of assailants had received training or fought in a combat zone.¹⁹³⁸ That study suggested that most Islamic State-associated terrorists in the West have been “self-starters” with little training or expertise.¹⁹³⁹

Further analysis of the information gathered for this study would be needed to determine which assailants only received training and which took part in active combat. Equally, more analysis of the data would be required to better assess the differing characteristics of assailants who served with a national military as opposed to those who gained their experience from terrorist non-state actors.


Training by Number of Casualties, Injured and Fatalities

Table 16.3 Number of attacks with an assailant with training or combat experience

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
With Training	7	12.96%	8	11.76%	15	12.30%
Without Training	31	57.41%	46	67.65%	77	63.11%
Unknown	16	29.63%	14	20.59%	30	24.59%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

¹⁹³⁸ Simcox, R., ““We Will Conquer Your Rome”: A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West”, *The Henry Jackson Society*, 2015.

¹⁹³⁹ Ibid.

Figure 16.3 Number of attacks with an assailant with training or combat experience**Table 16.4** Number of injured, fatalities and casualties by attacks with assailants with training or combat experience**Injured**

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
With Training	365	36.98%	535	58.28%	900	47.24%
Without Training	588	59.57%	349	38.02%	937	49.19%
Unknown	34	3.44%	34	3.70%	68	3.57%
Total	987	100.00%	918	100.00%	1905	100.00%

Fatalities

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
With Training	37	19.37%	26	29.21%	63	22.50%
Without Training	153	80.10%	63	70.79%	216	77.14%
Unknown	1	0.52%	0	0.00%	1	0.36%
Total	191	100.00%	89	100.00%	280	100.00%

Casualties

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
With Training	402	34.13%	561	55.71%	963	44.07%
Without Training	741	62.90%	412	40.91%	1153	52.77%
Unknown	35	2.97%	34	3.38%	69	3.16%
Total	1178	100.00%	1007	100.00%	2185	100.00%

Table 16.4 Casualties by attacks with assailants with training or combat experience





Figure 16.5 Casualties by attacks with assailants with training or combat experience



The data gathered indicates that those assailants who have had military training or who have experienced combat tend to be far more dangerous than assailants who have not. Of the 280 fatalities caused by attacks recorded in the study, 63 were from attacks perpetrated by an assailant who had had training or combat experience, or by a group with one or more assailants with such experience.

The nine attackers from 2016 and eight from 2017 recorded with training or combat experience represented 14.53% of assailants recorded in each year combined, but the attacks they were responsible for caused 22.50% of all fatalities. Equally, of the 1,905 people injured in the attacks covered by this study, 900 happened in attacks carried out by one or more trained assailant. As such, this relatively small minority of assailants were responsible for causing almost half of all those injured, 47.24% of all those across the two years of the study.

Broken down differently, there were 15 attacks in the two years in which one or more of the assailants had training or combat experience. This rose slightly from seven such attacks in 2016 to eight in 2017. On average, an attack with at least one assailant with training or combat experience caused far more casualties, with 60 people injured for each of these attacks and 4.20 fatalities. By contrast, there were 77 attacks across the two years in which it was recorded that no assailant had training or combat experience. This rose from 31 such attacks in 2016 to 46 in 2017. On average, then, attacks without any assailants with training or combat experience left 12.17 injured each, while there were 2.81 fatalities for every attack recorded as not having any trained assailants.

That trained and experienced assailants have perpetrated the most dangerous attacks might be regarded as expected. However, it should be noted that the figures here have in part been increased by the fact that the three suicide bombings recorded in the study were perpetrated by individuals who are believed to have had training and combat experience. It is clearly the case that assailants who have not had either training or combat experience can also carry out extremely lethal and devastating attacks. Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, who was responsible for the Nice truck attack which killed more than any other in the study, is not known to have had military training or combat experience.

Conclusion

Conclusion

The findings in this study indicate that in the West, both the degree and the nature of the terror threat varies greatly among countries. Overall, however, the study documented an increase in the number of terrorist attacks in 2017 as compared to 2016. The increase was particularly driven by political violence by those on the Far Right, as well as to a lesser degree an increase in the number of attacks from Far Left groups in Southern Europe, and Separatist/Nationalist terrorism in Northern Ireland.

Despite the growth in the number of attacks from these ideologies, the greatest number of attacks continue to be perpetrated by Islamists. These attacks are also far more deadly, with Islamists responsible for the vast majority of attacks that caused fatalities in both 2016 and 2017. The high number of deaths caused by Islamists is not simply because they carry out more attacks than any other ideology, but rather that only Islamists successfully carried out attacks with large numbers of fatalities. The high death toll from Islamist terrorists came despite the fact that there were fewer Islamist attacks in in 2017.

While bombings and shootings were still some of the deadliest forms of attack, low-tech vehicular attacks have also proven to have a devastating impact and both years saw vehicles used as weapons in combination with the use of knives. The findings from this study suggest there is a connection between mass-casualty attacks and those who have had training or combat experience. On average, assailants with training have been responsible for attacks that have killed and injured far more than those without such a background. The figures here, however, have been particularly shaped by the Islamist suicide bombers in the study who had travelled from conflict zones overseas.

The relationship between travel and terrorism is a complex one. Most of those who committed attacks did so in their own country. However, among Islamist attackers in 2017, more than half had a different country of origin from the one in which they carried out their attack. This should not detract from concerns about so-called “home-grown” extremism, particularly given that many assailants with a different country of origin were living in the West for some years prior to carrying out their attack.

Few of the attackers travelled to a country exclusively for the purpose of conducting an attack there, although there were exceptions, as seen with the February 2017 attempted attack at the Louvre in Paris, or the attack in Flint in the United States in June of that year. Equally, Greek anarchists attempted to perpetrate attacks in other European countries, but did so remotely with the use of letter bombs.

There were also high-profile cases of individuals who had travelled overseas – particularly to conflict zones – for the purpose of receiving training or instruction before returning to their country of residence with the direct intention of perpetrating an attack. Most prominent were several members of the group behind the March 2016 Brussels bombings who had returned to Europe from Syria for the purpose of carrying out attacks in France and Belgium. Similarly, the Manchester Arena bomber had travelled back to the UK from Libya to perpetrate his attack. With regard to the Far Right, it was shortly after returning to Sweden from paramilitary training in Russia that members of a right wing group began planting bombs in their hometown of Gothenburg.

From the cases recorded in this study, it appears that most terrorists carry out attacks in their own town or city of residence. Nevertheless, there were significant examples of individuals travelling to higher-profile locations. In the UK in 2017, both the Westminster Bridge attacker

and the assailant in the Finsbury Park Mosque attack travelled from other parts of the country so that they could conduct their attacks in London. The objective here, it would seem, was to hit more high-profile and politically sensitive targets.

It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate why some people become terrorists. However, the findings from the research do allow for some observations that could potentially be useful. For instance, the study found that assailants were overwhelmingly male. If there is work to be done on gender and terrorism, then it appears that determining why certain men are particularly drawn to ideological violence could be an important area of study.

Assailants also had a very wide age range. There were many young people who were responsible for attacks, including teenagers, some of whom were under 18. However, assailants were often older, with a particularly large contingent in their late twenties and early thirties. Far Right assailants tended to be noticeably older than Islamists, although here too there was a wide range. The findings on age indicate a need to correct perceptions that terrorists are often simply impressionable, naïve or misguided youths.

From the profiles and biographies of the assailants, it appears that many of the individuals recorded in the study moved into violent extremism at a point in their life when radical beliefs and personal issues converged. But disentangling these two factors would be a difficult, if not impossible task. A large number of the assailants in the study were clearly very isolated and quite troubled. Their attacks often followed periods of family breakdown, depression, difficulties adapting to a new country, unemployment, or trouble settling down. A number also had a history of domestic violence, mental illness and alcoholism.


None of this should downplay the crucial role of extremist beliefs. Without the impact of ideology, it may be assumed that even those with the most troubled backgrounds would have simply remained antisocial characters, at worst inclined towards criminal violence. Yet, there were also people in the study who, it appears, had been living otherwise normal lives prior to becoming convinced of a worldview that advanced their path into political or religious violence. The process appears extremely varied among the many cases recorded.

This study did not undertake a comprehensive assessment of the extremist ideas and movements that the assailants were associated with or inspired by. However, some general observations can be attempted here too. Particularly apparent is the way in which many of the ideologies that featured in this study involve what can be seen as extreme forms of identity politics. Often these manifested through a dramatised and conspiratorial “Us versus Them” mentality. The narratives involved repeatedly featured elements of supremacism, be it ethnic or religious. Even in the cases of the Far Left forms of extremism recorded here, it appears that these movements provide adherents with a strong sense of identity and group belonging. More than that, all of these ideologies can be said to offer meaning, purpose and a cause to be fought for.

Violent extremism undeniably advances hatred, division, fear and destruction. Yet, paradoxically, it has the potential to flourish in those parts of Western democracies where people with a need for meaning, identity and belonging are not finding it in the model offered by the surrounding liberal society.

'An important piece of analysis that correctly highlights the disturbing rise of extreme right and extreme left wing terrorism in Western countries in recent years alongside the existing challenge of Islamist terrorism. This report will undoubtedly assist policy makers to understand the extent of the challenge of extremism and terrorism and help the intelligence agencies and counter-terrorism police to shape their operational responses'.

Richard Walton, former Head of SO15 (2011-2016)



**Title: "TERRORISM IN THE WEST:
AN AGE OF EXTREMES"**

By: Tom Wilson

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