


TERRORISM IN THE WEST: AN AGE OF EXTREMES

BY TOM WILSON

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Published in 2018 by The Henry Jackson Society

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Title: "TERRORISM IN THE WEST: AN AGE OF EXTREMES"

ISBN: 978-1-909035-48-5
£49.50 where sold

Cover Images (from top to bottom): Armed police at Manchester Arena after reports of an explosion at the venue during an Ariana Grande concert on 22 May 2017 (Picture by: Peter Byrne/PA Archive/PA Images), 31 October 2017 - NYPD and other law enforcement at the scene where the van was halted at the Manhattan terror attack in New York. The driver in the Manhattan attack that killed eight people had been planning for weeks and appeared to have ties to terror suspects, officials said. (Credit Image: © Bryan Smith via ZUMA Wire); and Neo Nazis, Alt-Right, and White Supremacists encircle counter protestors at the base of a statue of Thomas Jefferson after marching through the University of Virginia campus with torches in Charlottesville, Va., USA, on 11 August 2017 (Photo by Shay Horse/NurPhoto).

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BY TOM WILSON

October 2018



About the Author

Tom Wilson is a Research Fellow in the Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism at the Henry Jackson Society. Tom specialises in the study of extremist groups and counter-terrorism strategy. His research has focused on the growth of extremism in the UK as well as terrorist organisations in the Middle East. He regularly appears on broadcast media including the BBC, Sky and CNN, offering his analysis on issues of extremism and terrorism. He has been published in the *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, the *Telegraph*, the *Spectator* and *Standpoint* among others.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to give special thanks to Katie Parrett for all of the time, expertise and guidance she contributed to this project.

With gratitude for research assistance from; Benjamin Rudolf, Genevieve Hull, Ilinca Bogaciov, Jacob Kishere, Julian James, Katarzyna Pogorzelska, Mirko Giordani, Naman Habtom, Nora O'Connor, Ross Paton, Talia Jessener, Tom Furse and Virginia Sanchez-Herrero.



About The Henry Jackson Society

The Henry Jackson Society is a think-tank and policy-shaping force that fights for the principles and alliances which keep societies free, working across borders and party lines to combat extremism, advance democracy and real human rights, and make a stand in an increasingly uncertain world.

CENTRE ON RADICALISATION & TERRORISM

About the Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism

The Centre on Radicalisation & Terrorism (CRT) is unique in addressing violent and non-violent extremism. By coupling high-quality, in-depth research with targeted and impactful policy recommendations, we aim to combat the threat of radicalisation and terrorism in our society.

“Terrorism in the West is a comprehensive and useful survey of terrorist attacks in Western democracies during 2017, combining granular descriptions of individual attacks with overall mapping of trends. A rigorous and readable record of terrorist acts that is essential for serious students and security policy makers.”

Michael Chertoff

Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2005 to 2009)

‘An important piece of analysis that correctly highlights the disturbing rise of extreme right and extreme left wing terrorism in Western countries in recent years alongside the existing challenge of Islamist terrorism. This report will undoubtedly assist policy makers to understand the extent of the challenge of extremism and terrorism and help the intelligence agencies and counter-terrorism police to shape their operational responses’.

Richard Walton

Former Head of SO15 (2011-2016)

“This interesting study illustrates that in 2017 Islamist terrorism remained a significant threat to Western democracies and that Far Right extremism – with associated violence – was on the rise. The ideological mix was therefore becoming more complex to counter, and preventing attacks more challenging for security services and police. It seems likely that the terrorist and extremist threat will continue to evolve.”

The Rt. Hon. The Baroness Neville-Jones DCMG PC

Chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee (1993-4)

Minister of State for Security and Counter Terrorism (2010-11)

“This report is an enormously valuable resource that both comprehensively documents the major terror attacks that took place across the world and skilfully draws out the often overlapping factors which influence those who carry them out. Policy makers and the public will find the data compiled here and the underpinning analysis sobering and very helpful in helping understand the diverse and growing threats from those who would use violent terror to disrupt our way of life.”

John Woodcock MP

Member, Home Affairs Select Committee

“This is an interesting and useful compendium of the terrorist attacks perpetrated in the West during the past two years. Sadly, the UK suffered more attacks than any other Western country during 2017 - an important reminder of the need to resource our police and security agencies adequately to respond to the threat and also to ensure that they have the appropriate powers to act where they need to. It is also significant that in the West as a whole, whilst the greatest share of attacks continues to be carried out by Islamist extremists, there is a sharp rise in the number of domestic extremist attacks from the Far Right but also the Far Left.”

Lord Toby Harris of Haringey

Reviewer, Independent Review of London’s Preparedness to deal with a Major Terrorist Attack

Member, National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)

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Executive Summary

Western countries have experienced a rise in terrorist activity and terrorist attacks over recent years. The threat is increasingly generated not by a single form of extremism but by multiple extremist ideologies. This phenomenon is being perpetuated by a wide range of individuals who come from diverse backgrounds but who are all willing to act upon the violent ideas promoted by their respective belief systems. They have employed numerous types of weapons and have had varying degrees of success at inflicting casualties and fear.

Despite their divergent worldviews, there are signs of commonalities between the extremists driving terrorism. Those who perpetrate these attacks have chosen to step outside of the democratic system as a means to achieve their objectives. Instead, they have resorted to force, violence and intimidation. Almost invariably they adhere to ideologies that fundamentally reject the liberal way of life that the Western democracies have sought to maintain.

This report provides detailed information and a statistical analysis of terrorism in the West in 2017, measured against comparative data from the previous year. The Executive Summary presented here sets out some of the key findings of this research, splitting the information between what is known about the attacks, and what is known about the assailants.

Attacks

Attacks by Regions and Countries

- The amount of terrorist violence in Western countries increased in 2017 compared to 2016. There were 68 terrorist attacks recorded in 2017. This had risen from 54 attacks in the previous year.
- Europe was worst impacted in 2017, with 75% of terrorism in the West occurring in European countries. A further 22.06% of attacks took place in North America, while 2.94% happened in Australasia.
- The United Kingdom (UK) witnessed more attacks than any other Western country, with 19.12% of all incidents in 2017 occurring there. This was a significant increase from 2016, when 9.26% of all terrorism in the West occurred in the UK.
- The United States (US) and France saw the next highest number of attacks in 2017, with 17.65% of incidents occurring in each of these countries.

Attacks by Ideology

- The greatest share of attacks continue to be carried out by Islamists. In 2017, 48.53% of all attacks recorded in the West were Islamist, which had however decreased from 2016 when 66.67% of these incidents were perpetrated by Islamists.
- The ideology that saw the greatest increase in the number of attacks was the Far Right. In 2017, 20.59% of all attacks recorded in the West were perpetrated by assailants from that ideology. This was a near fourfold increase from 2016 when just 5.56% of all terrorism was from this group. As an absolute number, Far Right terrorist attacks rose from 3 to 14, more than quadrupling.
- Along with the rise in attacks from the Far Right, 2017 saw the same proportion of attacks coming from the Far Left, also representing 20.59% of attacks that year. This was a more modest rise from 2016 when 16.67% of attacks were carried out by the Far Left. As an absolute number, attacks from this ideology rose from 9 to 14.

Fatalities and Injuries Overall

- In 2017, the UK suffered more fatalities from terrorism than any other Western country. In all, 40.45% of terrorism fatalities occurred in the UK that year. The next worst affected were the US and Spain with 17.98% of terrorism fatalities occurring in each of these countries.
- Despite the higher number of attacks and attempted attacks in 2017, the number of casualties across the West fell. In 2017 there were 89 fatalities and 918 people injured by terrorism. In 2016 there were 191 fatalities and 987 injured.
- The change is partly accounted for by the reduction in mass-casualty attacks in 2017. In 2016 there were 3.54 fatalities per attack, whereas in 2017 this decreased to 1.31 fatalities for every attack.

Fatalities and Injuries by Ideology

- The largest share of fatalities from terrorism were caused in Islamist attacks. In 2017, 84.27% of all fatalities were caused by Islamist attacks. In 2016 this had been even higher, with 96.34% of fatalities from terrorism caused by Islamist attacks.
- The combined data from both 2016 and 2017 shows that 3.75 people were killed and 26.54 people were injured for every Islamist attack.
- The second largest share of fatalities were caused by Far Right terrorism. In 2017, these attacks accounted for 12.36% of fatalities. This was a significant increase from 2016 when 0.52% of fatalities were caused by Far Right terrorism.
- Combining the data from both 2016 and 2017 shows that 0.71 people were killed and 3.24 people were injured for every Far Right attack.

Responses by Authorities

- In 2017, terrorist assailants were often not apprehended until sometime after their attack, with 33.82% of incidents seeing assailants arrested post attack. Another 26.47% of attacks involved an assailant being arrested at the time. However, 18.03% of attacks that year did not see an assailant apprehended.
- Authorities have at times responded to terror attacks by shooting assailants, sometimes fatally. In 2017, 16.18% of attacks saw at least one assailant shot and killed by the authorities. This was a decrease from 2016, when 27.78% of attacks saw at least one assailant shot and killed by the authorities.
- Islamist attacks were more likely to see an assailant shot and killed than those connected with other ideologies. Across both 2016 and 2017, 34.78% of Islamist attacks resulted in at least one assailant being shot and killed. Adding the number of Islamist attacks in which an assailant was shot and arrested, 52.17% of all Islamist attacks saw at least one assailant shot.

Area Types and Targets

- In 2017, the most common areas for terror attacks were city centres, where 52.94% of attacks occurred. The second most common area for attacks that year were suburban areas, where 36.76% of attacks occurred.

- The areas where terror attacks took place in 2017 contrasted with 2016. That year, suburban areas were more common areas for attacks, seeing 64.81% of these incidents. City centres saw 31.48% of all attacks that year.
- Civilians were among the most common targets of terrorism, with many incidents being indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Across both 2016 and 2017, 38.52% of attacks targeted civilians indiscriminately.
- There was a rise in the proportion of attacks targeting the military in 2017, with 10.29% of all attacks in Western countries having a military target. This figure stood at just 3.70% of attacks in 2016.
- Attacks exclusively targeting police declined in 2017, with 16.18% of attacks that year having police as the only target, compared to 22.22% of all attacks in 2016. Combining these figures in which police were attacked alongside a civilian target, across both 2016 and 2017, 28.69% of attacks featured attacks on police.

Type of Attack

- There has been a significant increase in the share of vehicular attacks. In 2016, 7.41% of attacks involved vehicles as weapons. This almost tripled to 20.59% of attacks, in 2017 being vehicular in nature.
- In 2017, 38.24% of all attacks involved the use of explosives in either bombings or attempted bombings. This was a reduction from 2016, when 46.30% of all attacks involved bombings or attempted bombings.
- Vehicular attacks and bombings consistently caused a significant proportion of the fatalities across both years in the study. In 2017, vehicular attacks accounted for 49.44% of all fatalities from terrorism that year, while in 2016 vehicles caused 51.31% of fatalities. Bombings were responsible for 24.72% of fatalities in 2017 and 17.28% of fatalities in 2016.
- Knives featured in 27.94% of all attacks in 2017, which is consistent with 2016, when knives featured in 27.78% of all attacks that year. The proportion of attacks using firearms decreased, however, from 20.37% of attacks in 2016 to 17.65% of attacks in 2017.
- The most common form of attack for Islamists was knife attacks. Across 2016 and 2017, 44.93% of Islamist attacks featured knives.
- The most common form of attack by the Far Right involved explosives. Across 2016 and 2017, 35.29% of attacks from this ideology took the form of bombings and attempted bombings. However, the Far Right has also increasingly used vehicles as weapons, with four such attacks in 2017 compared with none in 2016.

Organisation

- Islamic State was the most represented terrorist organisation in the study, although this declined over the two years. In 2016, 48.15% of all attacks were connected with Islamic State. While this decreased to 35.29% of all attacks in 2017, it was still far higher than any other group.
 - In 2017, the second most represented terrorist organisation was the Far Left group, Conspiracy Cells of Fire, which was linked to 7.35% of terror attacks that year.
-

- The proportion of attacks carried out by attackers not affiliated to a terrorist organisation increased across the study. In 2017, 26.47% of attacks were carried out by independent actors. This was a rise from 22.22% of attacks in 2016.

Assailants

Gender

- The assailants recorded in the study were overwhelmingly male. Of the 61 assailants identified in 2017, only one was female. In 2016, three of the 56 assailants were female.
- All four of the known female assailants recorded in the study were connected with Islamist attacks.

Age

- The average age of an assailant in 2017 was 30.79 years of age. This was older than in 2016 when the average assailant was 25.82 years old. Combining the data recorded from each year, there is a cluster of assailants with ages between 19 and 31, with 62.50% of ages recorded falling into this category.
- Islamist assailants tended to be younger than the overall average age for assailants. In 2017, the average age of an Islamist assailant was 29.10 years, while in 2016 the average age for an Islamist assailant was 23.84 years.
- Far Right assailants tended to be older than Islamist assailants. In 2017, Far Right assailants had an average age of 32.93 years. This was higher still in 2016 when 36.50 was the average age of Far Right assailants.

Place of Residence and Country of Origin

- In 2017, 45.90% of assailants had a different country of origin from the one where they committed an attack. This marked a rise from 2016, when 30.36% of assailants had a different country of origin from the one in which they carried out an attack.
- Assailants with a different country of origin were predominantly Islamist. In 2017, 66.67% of Islamist assailants had a different country of origin from the place of the attack. This had risen from 2016, when 40.54% of Islamist assailants had a different country of origin.
- Assailants were more likely to carry out an attack in their own town or city of residence, rather than travelling to a different location to perpetrate an attack. In 2017, 57.38% of assailants carried out an attack in their location of residence. This figure was higher in 2016, when 76.79% of assailants carried out attacks in their place of residence.

Known to Authorities

- A significant share of assailants were known to the authorities in connection with extremism or terrorism, prior to perpetrating an attack. In 2017, 40.98% of assailants are recorded as already being known individuals. This had reduced as a percentage from 2016, when 42.86% of assailants are believed to have been known to the authorities.

- This trend is more pronounced with Islamist terrorists. In both 2016 and 2017, more than half of Islamist assailants were already known to the authorities. In 2017, 54.76% of Islamist assailants were already known to the authorities in connection with extremism, while in 2016, 56.76% of this group of assailants were recorded as known.
- In contrast to Islamists, of Far Right assailants recorded in 2016 and 2017, only 4.35% of these individuals were recorded as having been known to the authorities in advance.

Training or Combat Experience

- A minority of attacks involved an assailant with training or combat experience. In 2017, 11.76% of attacks featured at least one assailant with training. As a percentage this was down from 2016 when 12.96% of attacks included at least one assailant with training or combat experience.
- While assailants with training or combat experience were a small minority, this group tended to cause more injuries and fatalities. Across both years, 47.24% of all people injured were victims of an attack involving a trained assailant, while 22.50% of fatalities were caused by these attacks.
- Combining the data from 2016 and 2017, on average an attack with at least one assailant with training or combat experience caused 4.20 fatalities and left 60 people injured. By contrast, attacks where no assailant had training or combat experience caused an average of 2.81 fatalities and left 12.17 people injured in each.

Introduction

This report documents the terrorist attacks that occurred in Western countries in 2017. It provides detailed accounts of these attacks and outlines what is known about those who perpetrated them. The report combines qualitative analysis of the individual attacks with a quantitative and statistical overview of aspects of the data that was collected in the course of this research. The data from 2017 is presented alongside comparable data from 2016, which has been gathered according to the same methodology and definitions used to research the 2017 attacks. In this way the study provides a degree of context for the 2017 data and a snapshot of terrorism trends as they have unfolded in the West over the previous two years.

This research comes during a period when terrorist activity has been on the rise in a number of Western countries. In addition to attacks by formally organised terrorist cells, both 2016 and 2017 witnessed multiple violent incidents perpetrated by independent, lone-acting individuals improvising with vehicles, hammers and household knives for the purpose of inflicting mass casualty attacks. There has been confusion about the nature of these incidents, with much disagreement about the extent to which these attacks can be regarded as terrorism. Better comprehension of the evolution of this phenomenon and assessment of its relation to more familiar forms of highly networked terrorism is likely to remain a core challenge for those seeking to counter terrorism in Western countries over the coming years.

This study seeks to provide greater insight into the nature of the terror threat in the West, giving further details on the places from which this threat emanates, what forms that threat takes and which targets of terrorism have been most at risk. It provides information on the kinds of attacks assailants have perpetrated, where they have carried out these attacks and the nature of the damage they have been able to inflict. It also includes analysis on the backgrounds of assailants and accused assailants, assessing such basic indicators as age, gender, place of residence, country of origin, level of combat experience and whether or not they were known to the authorities at the time of the attacks they committed. In this way the study aims to give a better indication of who has been committing terror attacks and where attention might be focussed to try to prevent terrorism in the future.

A number of other ongoing surveys of contemporary terrorism exist, and continue to be published. The research presented here differs from these surveys in a number of ways. Firstly, other projects covering this subject have tended to take either a global view or one exclusively focussed on Europe. This study is concerned with terrorism in Western liberal democracies, including North America and Australasia, as well as Europe. Secondly, whereas many other studies have exclusively focussed on providing a statistical analysis of terrorism over the course of a given year, this study gives added weight by providing a qualitative assessment of the terror attacks and includes a degree of profiling of the relevant assailants and accused assailants. Thirdly, some studies have favoured a relatively broad definition of terrorism, logging a high number of incidents that may be assumed to have had some degree of terrorist motivation or possible terrorist connection. This report intentionally seeks to avoid including more obscure or questionable cases that might not be widely recognised as being terrorist in nature.

Determining how terrorism should be defined is a contentious and increasingly politicised matter. The definition of terrorism used in this study (see Methodology) defines terrorism narrowly and sets a high bar for determining which events should be included. Specifically, the report is only concerned with attacks that employed – or attempted to employ – a significant level of violence. Of equal importance is the availability of evidence indicating that the assailants acted out of a conscious ideological motivation and intent. Incidents that do not meet both of these criteria have not been included.

This study is not an exhaustive survey of all terrorist activity in the West. While it does include failed and foiled terrorist attacks, it does not cover terror plots foiled by the security services. Nor does it seek to comprehensively document the wider networks of extremists who support terrorists either ideologically or practically. Similarly, there are any number of acts of criminal violence committed by people who may also be terrorists but which do not meet the threshold for inclusion in this study as terror attacks. Furthermore, there are other types of violence that may carry some degree of ideological motivation – such as certain hate crimes and incidents of honour-based violence – that are not included here as terror attacks.

The account provided here is restricted to terrorist attacks and attempted attacks in Western countries in 2017, presented alongside the data from 2016. Considerable debate continues about the nature of that terrorist threat and its causes, as well as the extent of its impact. This study seeks to be a modest step towards documenting the current state and ongoing trends of terrorism in the West.

Methodology and Definitions

This report uses both quantitative and qualitative research methods for documenting and assessing terror attacks in Western countries during 2017. Statistical data is also provided for attacks that occurred in the same countries during 2016.¹ The report includes terrorist attacks executed as the assailants intended, as well as attempted attacks that failed to be executed as planned.

The first section of the report gives an account of each attack from 2017 in the form of a full profile. The profiles include data fields with the available information about the attack itself as well as about the assailant or accused assailant. This is the data that forms the basis for the statistical analysis in the second part of the report. Each profile also includes a written section detailing the events of the attack, what is known about the attacker or accused attacker, and what is known about any relevant terrorist or extremist organisation that may have been linked to the attack.

The second section of the report provides a detailed statistical analysis of the data from the terror attacks that occurred in 2017. This data is compared alongside the same information from terror attacks in the previous year. This section also includes a statistical analysis of the data gathered on the individuals who have been identified as having perpetrated these attacks, or who have been convicted or charged with doing so. The information in this section includes an assessment of what kinds of terrorism have occurred over the previous two years, which ideologies have been most prevalent, what methods of attack have been used, where these attacks have occurred and what kinds of casualties these attacks have caused. Similarly, the analysis of assailants includes information on gender, age and nationality of these individuals. Where known, data is provided on those assailants who were known to authorities in connection with extremism or terrorism, and those who received training or combat experience overseas.

Defining Terrorism

There is no universally-accepted definition of terrorism. The various countries included in this research have both a wide range of government definitions for terrorism, as well as varying legal systems by which the state prosecutes and confronts wider activities associated with terrorism. There is neither agreement between international bodies, nor among the nations that belong to these institutions about how terrorism should be defined. In many instances, signatories to United Nations conventions, or members of the European Union, maintain their own distinct definitions of terrorism in addition to endorsing the definitions used by these international bodies.

The need for countries to have a concrete and workable legal definition of terrorism became particularly relevant following the attacks on 11 September 2001, with many countries updating and strengthening the counter-terror legislation on their statute books. This trend was encouraged, in part, by UN Resolution 1373 (2001) in which the Security Council mandated national governments to criminalise terrorism in their domestic laws as a serious offence.² However, the development of legislation in Western countries undoubtedly also arose in response to a growing sense on the part of governments and publics that there was a real and formidable threat – and that existing laws were not sufficiently able to confront it.

¹ Research for this report continued to collect data on 2016 and 2017 until September 2018.

² 'Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) on Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts', *United Nations and the Rule of Law*, 2001, available at: <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/security-council-resolution-1373-2001-on-threats-to-international-peace-and-security-caused-by-terrorist-acts/>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

Some have questioned the necessity of a specific law defining and criminalising terrorism, given that most activity associated with a terror attack would already be criminalised under existing laws. In his 2007 review of the subject, Lord Carlile of Berriew, at the time the United Kingdom's Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, argued for the necessity of a distinct definition of terrorism and a specific set of laws to prosecute terrorist activity, making the case on account of the severity of the threat that the UK faces from terrorists.³

Specific counter-terror legislation can be particularly crucial not simply for the purpose of prosecuting those who have committed terrorist violence, but also for the disruption of terror activity in advance of terrorists being able to carry out an attack. However, Lord Carlile also conceded that there is a great difficulty in creating a satisfactory and comprehensive definition of terrorism.⁴ In particular, there is a difficulty in finding a definition that is neither so narrow that it excludes some activities that would widely be regarded as terrorist, nor so broad as to unintentionally include acts that are not terrorism, and may not even be illegal or illegitimate.

Lord Carlile's investigation highlighted the ongoing contentions about whether violence undertaken in an allegedly just cause against oppression should be defined as terrorist in nature, or whether attacks motivated by religion, or those that seek only to damage property, should be classed as such.⁵ Other debates have focussed on what might be referred to as 'state terrorism' or terrorism by governments. As the International Law professor Ben Saul observed, "Terrorism laws make most sense when protecting a democracy from violent adversaries; less sense when they shield authoritarian states from those who rightly resist them."⁶ These are difficult to resolve questions that will necessarily challenge anyone seeking to establish a comprehensive definition of terrorism.

For the purposes of this report, a number of legal and academic definitions of terrorism were reviewed, with the need to find a narrow but robust definition. Particularly significant for this work was that any definition needed to emphasise the importance of ideological motives and avoid including violence undertaken for reasons that would be regarded as beyond the bounds of terrorism as it is commonly understood. Equally, a definition was required that would not unwittingly frame many incidents of vandalism or violent public disorder as terrorism. For the purposes of this report then, terrorism is defined as:

Acts which seek to cause fear through the use, or attempted use, of potentially lethal force or severe violence by a non-state group or individual, when seeking to further a political or religious ideological cause.

In this context "potentially lethal force or severe violence" is defined as "the intentional and direct use of weapons or improvised objects in a manner capable of killing, maiming, or causing serious lasting injury to a person". There are numerous instances where this level of force may be used in association with extremism and ideological violence, or by those groups and individuals involved with terrorism, but which nevertheless do not qualify as terror attacks for the purposes of this study. Hate crime being one of the most obvious examples.

Also excluded are incidents of non-terror related criminal acts, even when committed by terrorist groups or individuals. Similarly excluded are incidents of vigilantism by terrorist groups and individuals, violence associated with gang fighting and feuds, organised crime, violence

³ Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, 'The Definition of Terrorism', March 2007, available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228856/7052.pdf, last visited: 3 September 2018.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Saul, B., 'Terrorism as a Legal Concept', in Lennon, G. and C. Walker, *Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism* (Routledge, 2015), p. 19.

involving rioting and public disorder, violent acts of personal revenge, and incidents of so-called 'honour-based violence'.

Furthermore, the report only includes incidents where assailants have attempted to cause direct harm to human life. Accordingly, acts of arson and vandalism are not included if there are grounds to believe that the perpetrators only intended to cause damage to property, and not risk causing serious physical injuries to people in the process.

As such, incidents were included in this study if they met all of the following three criteria:

- Evidence of the use, or the attempted use, of force intended to directly cause, or risk causing, fatal or severe injuries to persons.
- Evidence of a political or religious ideology adhered to by the assailants that would serve as the motive for the act, or attempted act, of violence.
- The absence of a motive that would disqualify terrorist intent, such as: criminal activity; personal vendetta; gang feud; vigilante activity; or, severe mental illness.

Geographic Remit

This study records and analyses terror attacks that occurred and were attempted in Western countries in 2017, as well as including comparable data for 2016. For the purposes of this study, Western countries are understood as being located in three separate regions – North America, Europe and Australasia. The countries included within North America are the United States and Canada, while those in Australasia are Australia and New Zealand. Not all countries in Europe are included in this study. The European countries covered by this report are the member states of the European Union, as well as any non-member states in Western Europe, such as Norway and Switzerland.⁷

Ideology

Establishing ideological motivation, either political or religious, is a crucial element of determining whether or not an act of violence meets the criteria set for inclusion. For an attack to be recorded as terrorism in this study, there must be evidence that the assailant was associated with a particular extremist worldview and that they acted primarily out of ideological conviction derived from this worldview – it being accepted that individuals may become involved in terrorist activity for a combination of reasons or motives.

The attacks and attempted attacks recorded in this study fell within five ideological strands. These were categorised as: Far Right; Far Left; Islamist; Separatist/Nationalist; and, Black Supremacist. Acts of extremist violence and terrorism have been committed by those associated with other ideologies in previous years, such as Christian Fundamentalism, Animal Rights, Environmentalism and others. However, no incidents associated with these ideologies that met the criteria for inclusion were recorded during the two-year period covered by this report. This system of categorisation is not intended to suggest that any of these ideologies are homogenous movements or that an individual who commits a violent act on behalf of one of these ideologies will necessarily be in agreement with, or supportive of, other assailants who

⁷ The countries and territories that data was gathered for are as follows: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Denmark (and Greenland), Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, The Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The United Kingdom (and the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and Gibraltar), The United States, Vatican City.

carry out attacks under the same ideology. It is well documented that individuals and groups within these various ideological strands can often be in fierce and even violent disagreement with one another.

- **Far Right** in this study refers to a broad and diverse set of political beliefs that can be placed at the extreme end of the political spectrum, beyond mainstream conservatism, patriotism and traditionalist points of view. It encompasses various strands of authoritarianism, neo-fascism, white supremacist racism, extreme nationalism, illiberalism, extreme social conservatism, anti-Jewish conspiracies, violently anti-migrant sentiments and hatred of those from a Muslim background. Terrorist acts by the Far Right recorded in this study include those by individuals who have been inspired by aspects of Far Right belief systems, as well as by those from organisations with a consciously formulated Far Right ideology. The contemporary Far Right continues to consist of traditional nativist, white supremacist and neo-Nazi elements. However, in recent years there has also been the emergence and growth of the identitarian Alt-Right: as well as what is sometimes referred to as the counter-jihad movement; a non-unified milieu of groups and individuals who particularly focus their animosity towards Muslims and the perceived Muslim world as a whole.
- **Far Left** refers to a wide range of political perspectives that are associated with socialist, anti-capitalist and anti-establishment beliefs. It includes those who may ascribe to hardline versions of traditional socialist, Marxist, anarchist and left-libertarian worldviews, as well as individuals belonging to such campaign movements as those for anti-globalisation, anti-war, open borders and others promoting anti-Western sentiments. Individuals aligned with this part of the political spectrum may also be supportive of causes that could be defined as distinct ideologies in their own right, including extreme environmentalism, radical feminism, militant anti-racism and so-called anti-Zionism. Acts of terrorism defined as Far Left in this study include those by individuals who acted out of adherence to any combination of the political ideas outlined above, as well as attacks carried out by groups that openly identify as militant left wing or anarchist organisations that embrace violence as a fundamental or even defining element of their activities.
- **Islamism** is a political and religious worldview which holds that Islam provides an all-encompassing programme for the organising of society, and promotes government in accordance with Islamic principles. As such, Islamists advocate for the establishment of Islamic theocracy governed by Sharia law and support the eventual or immediate creation of an expansionist Caliphate. Many Islamists are non-violent in practice; however, others may support or actively participate in violence to achieve their objectives, justifying such acts through a particular interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence. To the further extremes of this ideology are versions of Salafi-Jihadism that promote a particularly literalist understanding of Islamic piety while also emphasising the importance of armed jihad and martyrdom in its cause. Acts of terrorism described as Islamist in this study refer to violence motivated by any form of religious or political extremism derived from an interpretation of the Islamic religion. This includes individuals who may have been loosely inspired by their understanding of this ideology, all the way through to those who acted as part of a tightly organised cell closely directed by a well-established Islamist terrorist group.
- **Separatist/Nationalist** refers to any non-state individual, organisation or movement acting in the cause of self-determination for a national or ethnic group, or as part of a sectarian conflict associated with one or more of these causes. Those falling into this

category do not align as one clearly definable ideology but rather are supporters of causes that all share certain fundamental commonalities. Historically, and in recent years, Europe has been impacted by incidents relating to Irish Republicans, Basque separatists, Corsican nationalists, Palestinian militants, Kurdish nationalists and those acting in connection with the conflict in Kashmir. Attacks carried out on behalf of these causes and others like them would be included under this category, as would violent acts carried out by those opposing these movements as part of associated sectarian conflicts. As such, any terrorist acts carried out by, for example, Northern Irish Unionists or Turkish groups attacking Kurdish targets would be included under this category.

- **Black Supremacist** is a term used in this study to refer to acts of terrorist violence carried out by individuals motivated by political beliefs that fall within an extreme form of Black Nationalism or anti-white hatred. Worldviews in this category have often featured a particular animosity towards Jewish people, as well as towards the authorities, primarily the police force. In the past, versions of this ideology have been promoted by those associated with Black Panther groups, the Nation of Islam and elements within the Black Hebrew Israelites. The term Black Supremacist is not intended to imply an exact parallel with White Supremacism. The two persuasions are distinctly different in both origin and character.

Hate Crime

The study makes a distinction between hate crimes and terrorism. This has become an increasingly complicated undertaking in the era of independent, lone-actor terrorism, where individuals unconnected with any formalised terrorist group are inspired by hateful ideologies to carry out small-scale and low-tech attacks. In this way, some terror attacks may share elements of the appearance of a hate crime. At the same time, hate crimes have often been influenced by wider belief systems and may include the use of lethal force, without qualifying as acts of terrorism.

As part of the research for this study, three primary points of distinction were drawn between hate crimes and terrorism so as to determine which incidents would be recorded in this report:

1. Terrorist acts are associated with a more advanced ideological or religious worldview, whereas hate crimes may merely be the result of unthinking prejudice or reflexive bigotry.
2. Terrorist acts are undertaken with some intention of fulfilling a wider ideological objective, whereas a hate crime may not be conceived of as having any intended objective beyond simply serving as an immediate outlet for personal bigotry.
3. Terrorist acts usually have some degree of premeditation, whereas hate crimes may occur spontaneously.

Determining Assailant Identity and Motive

During the time period covered by this study, a large number of unexplained violent incidents occurred which may have had the initial appearance of terrorism and might have been widely reported to the public as being terrorist acts. However, for this study, a lack of evidence for a non-terrorist motive is not proof of a terrorist one. Rather, indication of an ideological motive behind a violent act is a necessary requirement for establishing whether an attack is an act of terrorism.

In each case, determining whether an incident can be included as a terror attack requires an assessment of the nature of the assailant's motive at the time of the attack. As such, those

incidents where the identity of the perpetrator is in such doubt that an ideological motive cannot be determined or reasonably assumed have not been included in this study.

On its own, the nature of the target of an attack is not taken as sufficient evidence to determine that an incident was terrorism related. For example, the violent targeting of a particular minority may initially have the appearance of terrorism perpetrated by extremists from outside that community. In the past, however, there have been cases of incidents that were initially assumed to be terror or hate-crime related, but were later revealed to have resulted from intra-community conflicts or personal vendettas.

This study puts particular emphasis on the categorisation of the ideological nature of attacks. In 2016, a number of violent attacks were suffered by Muslims which it was initially suspected might have been carried out by those on the Far Right.⁸ In several of these cases, further investigation determined that the attacks had been carried out by Islamist terrorists or by other sectarian militants. For this reason, the target on its own cannot be assumed as definitive evidence of a terrorist motive, nor to be indicating association with a particular ideology. However, where what is regarded as an authentic claim of responsibility has been released by a known terrorist or extremist group, in most cases this would be classed as sufficient to meet the threshold for inclusion. Similarly, where law enforcement authorities are in possession of specific evidence linking an attack to a known terror group or extremist movement, this would also be taken as sufficient grounds for inclusion.

Mental Health

During the two-year period covered by this report, multiple violent incidents were perpetrated by individuals known to suffer from mental health problems. Some of these cases were terror attacks perpetrated by individuals who had a less-serious mental health issue, while others were carried out by individuals who were not primarily acting out of ideological conviction but rather who appear to have been driven by psychological issues.

Drawing a distinction between these two categories of violence is a problematic task that confronts any investigation in this area of study. Mental health issues and ideological motivation for violence are not mutually exclusive. There have been numerous cases of individuals who became involved in terrorist acts on account of a complex combination of ideological beliefs and psychological issues. Research published by the Combatting Terrorism Centre at West Point has suggested that among lone-actor Islamic State (IS) assailants in the West, a higher percentage of those merely inspired by IS - rather than those being directed by the group - had mental health problems.⁹ However, evidence presented in the same study indicated that among possible IS assailants in the West overall, a history of psychological instability was reported in 27.6% of cases; this is consistent with the levels believed to exist in the general population.¹⁰

Earlier research into mental health and far-right terrorism outlined similar trends among Islamic State-linked assailants, although these appeared to be still more pronounced. Research published in 2013 in the journal *Criminology and Public Policy* found that while 7.6% of those on the extreme right who offended had mental health issues, among lone offenders this rose to 40%.¹¹

⁸ 'Racist Motive Not Ruled Out In Rochdale Killing', *Sky News*, 19 February 2016 available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/racist-motive-not-ruled-out-in-rochdale-killing-10173279>, last visited: 10 October 2018.

⁹ Corner, E. and P. Gill, 'Is There a Nexus Between Terrorist Involvement and Mental Health in the Age of the Islamic State?', *CTC Sentinel*, January 2017.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Gruenewald, J., S. Chermak and J. D. Freilich, 'Distinguishing "loner" attacks from other domestic extremist violence: A comparison of far-right homicide. Incident and offender characteristics', *Criminology and Public Policy*, February 2013, Volume 12, Issue 1.

A further area of terrorist activity in which mental health and genuine terrorist intent are not mutually exclusive is where those with mental health issues or severe learning difficulties might be exploited by those seeking to mastermind and direct terror attacks. The Metropolitan Police in the United Kingdom have previously warned that Islamic State has actively sought to recruit those with mental health issues.¹² Examples of this tactic have been more explicitly seen in cases of suicide bombings in conflict zones in Middle Eastern countries. However, no such instances are believed to have occurred in the time period or geographic remit of this report.

Research for this project did not offer the opportunity to carry out any kind of psychological assessment of those accused of carrying out the attacks recorded in the study. Where questions around the mental health of an accused assailant have arisen, judgement on inclusion has largely relied upon independent assessments carried out by the authorities regarding the individual's capacity to stand trial and the degree to which they were culpable for their actions at the time at which the attack happened. These assessments, along with any publicly available information about the mental health history of an individual, have been taken into account when determining whether an attack can be classed as terrorism. In a substantial number of cases the perpetrators of these attacks are either dead or yet to be identified and apprehended. This necessarily represents a further limitation with regard to assessment of mental health.

Data Collection

The information in this study was collected from open-source material. This primarily consisted of reporting from online news sites as well as material found through the Nexis online archive. Some of the data in the study was sourced from publicly available government reports documenting and investigating terror attacks. The incidents documented were also cross referenced against other databases of terror attacks that have been published, such as the annual Country Reports on Terrorism released by the US State Department,¹³ or by research institutions such as the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START) led by the University of Maryland.¹⁴

The data has been collected by a team of researchers who closely monitored news reports throughout 2016, 2017 and 2018. Researchers with fluency in numerous relevant European languages collected news stories from both the British and international press, cataloguing all incidents that had the potential to meet the study's criteria for inclusion. As noted above, a high proportion of these incidents were disqualified on account of not falling within the study's definition of terrorism.

As with any database of this nature, it is not possible to guarantee that no events that qualify for inclusion have gone undocumented. As well as the possibility that the research for this study missed reports of certain attacks, it is also possible that some minor incidents were not reported or known to the press. The authorities in the different countries covered by this report have varying policies as to how much information they release about foiled plots, and about the arrested and convicted assailants in the successful attacks. It is a limitation of this research that the full information could not be found or adequately verified for several attacks and assailants recorded in this report. It is also possible that some of the incidents excluded from this report, owing to lack of evidence sufficiently demonstrating that they were terrorist in nature, would have met the threshold for inclusion had more evidence been available.

¹² Whitehead, T., 'Jihadi John and Isis "trying to inspire terrorist cult of misfits and mentally ill to commit atrocities"', *The Telegraph*, 21 April 2015, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11553271/Jihadi-John-and-Isil-trying-to-inspire-terrorist-cult-of-misfits-and-mentally-ill-to-commit-atrocities.html>, last visited: 10 October 2018

¹³ 'Country Reports on Terrorism 2016', *US Department of State*, available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

¹⁴ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism And Responses To Terrorism, *University of Maryland*, available at: <http://www.start.umd.edu/>, last visited: 3 September 2018.

Profile Structure

The Attack

Date: The date on which the attack took place.

Day: The day of the week on which the attack took place.

Time: The time of day at the location where the attack happened.

Country: The nation state in which the attack took place.

Place: The city, town or other nearest settlement in which a terror attack took place.

Area Type: A basic description of the area in which an attack was carried out. This is broken down first as to whether the attack took place in a built up urban centre (referred to as City Centre in the study), a Suburban Area, a smaller or more isolated community (referred to as a Small Town in the study), or if the attack took place outside any significant settlement then this is recorded as being in a Rural Area. This data field provides an additional subcategory giving further details on the nature of the area of the attack. Included is information about whether the district is primarily residential or commercial, whether it is a government district, associated with education such as a university campus, or whether the vicinity could be described as a familiar landmark, particularly if the attack took place at a location with iconic international status.

Location: Further information on the premises where the attack took place. This specifically concerns the type of institution, building or means of transport that may have been targeted as part of the terror attack. Additionally, a subcategory of information is provided where relevant, specifying whether the attack took place inside the building or to the building's exterior.

Type of Attack: Specifying the category of force or weaponry employed by assailants as part of the attack, detailing whether the attack included the use of firearms, a bladed weapon, the use of a vehicle as a weapon or a form of explosive, including rudimentary Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and, where appropriate, types of petrol bombs and bombs featuring gas canisters. Suicide bombings are listed as a separate form of attack under this category. Entries under this data field also specify whether an attack was attempted but failed to come to fruition, or if the attack was foiled by the authorities or members of the public. Disrupted plots are not included in the study.

Target: The type of person or people towards which the terrorist violence was directed, or who are believed to have been the intended target, as part of the attack. This is broken down into whether those being targeted were police, military or civilians. Additionally, it is specified whether or not the attack was directed towards civilians indiscriminately or whether specific types of civilians were targeted. Where required, this section also provides a subcategory of information detailing the group of civilians being intentionally targeted. This may be a minority religious group or a particular ethnicity or community. In other cases, there is specification as to whether a civilian, group of civilians or civilian institution was targeted on account of their political views and associations, or because of a particular position of office that they might have held.

Ideology: The worldview that inspired those who committed the attack or sought to commit the attack. This is broken down into five primary ideologies that have driven the documented incidents of terrorism. These include Far Right, Far Left, Islamist, Black Supremacist and Separatist/Nationalist.

Organisation/Affiliation: Any known terrorist or extremist organisation connected to the assailant and believed to be relevant to the assailant's decision to carry out the attack. The nature of the relationship between the assailant and the organisation is also specified as a subcategory.

The term "Directed" is used to indicate where an assailant is believed to have been in communication with a terrorist group that has knowingly been involved with preparations for the attack or its execution. In some instances, this will have involved an individual having been dispatched by the group to carry out a specific and carefully organised attack. In other cases, an assailant may have been provided with instructions for carrying out the attack, or they may have been in communication with a member of a terrorist organisation who was providing general guidance and encouragement to carry out the attack.

The relationship will be listed as "Affiliated" in those instances where an assailant has membership or some other connection with an extremist or a terrorist group without that group having been directly involved in carrying out or assisting with the attack.

The assailant is described as "Inspired" when they have carried out an attack in the name of a particular organisation, or are otherwise believed to have acted upon the general encouragement of a terror group, without actually receiving direction, support or communication from that group. Evidence that an assailant supported a terror group and carried out an attack in line with that group's promoted methods and targets can also be taken as grounds for describing an attack as being "Inspired".

The relationship is listed as "Suspected" where there is a lack of further evidence confirming the nature of the relationship with a group, but where there are nevertheless reasonable grounds for believing that such a connection exists.

Claimed: Confirmation of whether or not a terrorist group has publicly released a claim of responsibility for a specific attack. Not all of these claims may be truthful. Terrorist groups – such as Islamic State – may claim attacks and specifically release statements naming assailants as their "soldiers" when there is no known evidence of the individual having any communications or interactions with that group. These claims are still recorded in this report. However, the study does seek to avoid inauthentic claims, such as any statement by a third party claiming responsibility for an attack on behalf of a group of which they are not a member.

Number of Injured: The number of individuals injured in the course of the terror attack. This figure includes both those who may have been hospitalised with severe injuries and those who may have only required minimal medical attention. The figure does not include any assailants who may have been injured during the attack or by security forces responding to the attack.

Number of Fatalities: The number of individuals killed in the course of the terror attack, as well as those who may have later died of injuries sustained during the attack. The figure does not include any assailants who may have been killed during the attack or by security forces responding to the attack.

Response: The action taken against the assailant by the authorities in reaction to the attack or attempted attack. It details the immediate action taken at the first point at which the authorities were able to apprehend the assailant or would-be assailant, rather than providing information on whether the assailant was prosecuted or is currently serving a prison sentence.

The (Accused) Assailant(s)

Number: The number of individuals accused of being directly involved with carrying out the attack.

Gender: Detailing whether the individual accused of carrying out the attack is male or female.

Name(s): The name of the individual accused of carrying out the attack.

Age(s): The age of the individual accused of carrying out the attack, at the time at which the attack occurred.

Country of Origin: The country of birth and original place of nationality of the individual accused of the attack. In most cases this is also the country in which the individual was raised for at least the early part of childhood.

Nationality: The nationality of the individual accused of the attack at the time at which the attack occurred.

Resident: The city, town or community inhabited by the individual accused of the attack at the time at which the attack occurred.

Training/Combat Experience: Detailing whether or not the accused assailant received military, combat or bomb making training and instruction, or was involved in armed conflict, either at home or overseas. This would include those who served in a conventional military force of a nation state. It would not include those who might have trained themselves, such as those accessing online instructions for bomb making purposes.

Known to Authorities: Detailing whether an accused assailant was known to the authorities in the country where they carried out an attack, in connection with terrorism or extremism. This might include those being actively monitored by intelligence services as part of a live terror investigation, those who were previously monitored as part of a terror investigation, those known to the authorities but not under active surveillance, and those reported to the authorities over concerns about terrorism or extremism.

Current Status: The legal status of the accused assailant at the time at which this study was undertaken.

Pages 25 to 196 are omitted from this preview

Data Analysis


The Attacks

Attacks by Region and Country

Table 1.1 Attacks by region

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Australasia	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Europe	40	74.07%	51	75.00%	91	74.59%
North America	13	24.07%	15	22.06%	28	22.95%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Figure 1.1 Attacks by region



The study recorded a rise in the number of terror attacks across Western countries from 2016 to 2017. This includes attempted attacks that failed or were foiled, as well as those in which assailants completed their attacks as intended. As such, these figures include large-scale mass-casualty attacks – in which assailants inflicted ten or more fatalities – as well as those that failed to cause any injuries at all.

In both 2016 and 2017, Europe experienced significantly more terror attacks than the two other regions in this study. In 2016, Europe was the location of almost three-quarters (74.07%) of all attacks, and in 2017 that figure rose, in absolute terms as well as a proportion, to 75%. Similarly, North America saw a small increase in the number of terror attacks in 2017. However, in terms of the overall total across Western countries, the share of attacks that took place in North America reduced from 24.07% to 22.06%. Meanwhile, the number of terrorist incidents in Australasia remained low, despite an increase from 1.85% of the total to 2.94%. These were entirely contributed by Australia, as no attacks meeting the definition were recorded in New Zealand.

It should be noted that the European countries in this study have a combined population larger than that of North America. Equally, both of these regions have substantially larger populations

than Australasia. This partly accounts for the way in which the number of terrorist incidents have been distributed between the three continents. However, the figures recorded may also suggest a different picture in Australasia in terms of the prevalence of extremism. Research from the Combatting Terrorism Centre at West Point indicates that by 2017 the threat from Islamist terrorism had grown in Australia, with the number of jihadist plots having risen since 2014 and with the emergence of Islamic State.¹⁸⁶¹ In September of 2014, Australia raised its terror threat level for the first time since the introduction of such a system in 2002.¹⁸⁶²

Australia also appears to have seen far fewer foreign fighters compared to other countries in the study, such as France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Belgium. As of 2017, Australian security agencies estimated that there were approximately 110 Australian nationals still residing with terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, while another 68 had been killed as foreign fighters and a further 40 were reported to have returned to Australia.¹⁸⁶³

There is also some evidence to suggest the possible growth of Far Right extremist activity in Australia during the period covered by this study.¹⁸⁶⁴ Generally, however, Australia and New Zealand have seen little evidence of other forms of violent extremism during 2016 and 2017.

Table 1.2 Number of attacks by country

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Australia	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Austria	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Belgium	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Canada	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Denmark	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Finland	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
France	7	12.96%	12	17.65%	19	15.57%
Germany	8	14.81%	2	2.94%	10	8.20%
Greece	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
Italy	5	9.26%	4	5.88%	9	7.38%
Malta	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Netherlands	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Norway	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Poland	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Spain	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Sweden	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
United Kingdom	5	9.26%	13	19.12%	18	14.75%
United States	12	22.22%	12	17.65%	24	19.67%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%


¹⁸⁶¹ Zammit, A., 'Australian Jihadism in the Age of the Islamic State', *CTC Sentinel*, March 2017, Volume 10, Issue 3, available at: <https://ctc.usma.edu/australian-jihadism-in-the-age-of-the-islamic-state/>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁶² Barker, C. 'Countering terrorism and violent extremism', *Parliament of Australia*, 2016, available at: https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/ViolentExtremism, last visited: 4 October 2018.


¹⁸⁶³ 'Country Reports on Terrorism 2017. Chapter 1. Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific', *US Department of State*, 2017, available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282842.htm>, last visited: 4 October 2018.



¹⁸⁶⁴ Nathan, J., 'The Rise of Australia's Activist Far Right: How Far Will It Go?', *ABC*, 31 January 2018, available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/religion/the-rise-of-australias-activist-far-right-how-far-will-it-go/10095024>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

Figure 1.2 Number of attacks by country



Map 1.1 Europe, number of attacks by country in 2016 and 2017



Map 1.2 North America, number of attacks by country in 2016 and 2017**Map 1.3** Australasia, number of attacks by country in 2016 and 2017

Overall, 2017 witnessed a rise in the number of terrorist incidents from the previous year. There was also a small increase in the number of countries in which attacks occurred, with attacks in 14 different countries in 2016 and 15 countries in 2017. However, the degree to which there was either a rise or a decline in terror attacks varied significantly between countries.

A number of countries stood out as accounting for a high proportion of the terrorist incidents, and the countries that experienced a large number of attacks in 2016 tended to continue to see

a high figure in 2017. The countries that were found to have experienced the highest levels of terrorism in this study corresponded with the findings of the Global Terrorism Index 2017. Data from that report for attacks in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries¹⁸⁶⁵ between January 2014 to June 2017 ranked the highest-impacted countries as the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and France.¹⁸⁶⁶ Of the European countries covered in this study, between 2002 and 2016 the Global Terrorism Index recorded France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium and Greece as the countries with the most terrorism.¹⁸⁶⁷

In both years of this study the levels of terrorism in the United States were among the highest. In 2017, the United States accounted for 17.65% of the Western world's terrorist attacks, with 12 attacks that year. This ranked that country in joint second place with France, just behind the United Kingdom. While this was the same number of attacks the United States suffered in 2016, that year the United States accounted for 22.22% of terror attacks in the West, and as such the most of any Western country.

Similarly, France experienced a consistently high rate of attacks across both years, with the third highest number of attacks in 2016 and the joint second greatest number in 2017. In 2016 France suffered seven attacks, or 12.96% of the overall total, and in 2017 this not only remained high but rose significantly, with 12 attacks. As with the United States, this accounted for 17.65% of the overall total. Given that France has a significantly smaller population than the United States, the figures recorded here can be taken as an indication of a comparatively worse situation in terms of terrorism and extremism. This corresponds to figures indicating that France contributed more foreign fighters to militant groups in Iraq and Syria than any other European Union country. Data from the Center for the Analysis of Terrorism (CAT) recorded that more than 2,300 individuals from France have been involved in Syrian-Iraqi jihadist networks¹⁸⁶⁸ and around 1,300 have travelled to the area of conflict.¹⁸⁶⁹ As the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism at the US State Department noted in its annual report for 2017, since 2016 the profile of terrorism in France has been shifting towards smaller-scale attacks by lone actors, away from the larger, externally directed attacks of 2015.¹⁸⁷⁰

The data from this report appears to point to the opposite trend in the United Kingdom. There it is not only the number of attacks that has increased, but also the scale and the sophistication of these attacks. The significant rise in the number of attacks in the United Kingdom also contributed to the overall increase across Western countries. In 2016, the United Kingdom contributed 9.26% of the attacks witnessed in the West that year, with five such incidents. In 2017 this more than doubled, reaching 13 incidents, contributing 19.12% of the overall total.

Whereas the United States, the United Kingdom and France all saw a consistently high level of terrorism as the top three countries over both years, other countries experienced a consistently low level, while many experienced no attacks in either year. Canada suffered one attack in 2016, 1.85% of attacks that year, which rose to three attacks in 2017, contributing 4.41% of attacks in Western countries that year. This appears to be a continuation of terrorism trends in Canada,

¹⁸⁶⁵ Data on OECD countries referenced from the Global Terrorism Index excludes Israel and Turkey, as the Global Terrorism Index categorises those two countries separately.

¹⁸⁶⁶ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017, available at: <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶⁸ 'European Jihad Watch 11/2017', *Center for the Analysis of Terrorism*, 30 November 2017, available at: <http://cat-int.org/index.php/2017/11/30/european-jihad-watch-112017/?lang=en>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁶⁹ Bindner, L., 'Jihadists' Grievance Narratives against France', *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague*, February 2018, available at: <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Bindner-Jihadists-Grievance-Narratives-Against-France-February2018-1.pdf>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁷⁰ Country Reports on Terrorism 2017. Chapter 1. Country Reports: Europe', *US Department of State*, 2017, available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282843.htm>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

as recorded by the Global Terrorism Index 2017, which indicated an increase in terrorist activity in that country between 2002 and 2016.¹⁸⁷¹ Notably, 2017 saw Canada suffer two of its most high-profile terror attacks since Michael Zehaf-Bibeau's attack on the Canadian parliament in Ottawa in 2014: the Quebec City mosque attack and the Edmonton truck attack.

Sweden was another country that experienced attacks across both years, albeit at a consistently low level. That country suffered two attacks in 2016 and three attacks in 2017, accounting for 3.70% of the international total in 2016 and 4.41% in 2017. This rise in terrorism in Sweden corresponds to evidence of a broader growth of extremist activity there. The Swedish security services SÄPO have reported that they estimate that the number of violent extremists operating in Sweden has increased from 200 in 2010 to closer to 3,000 in 2017.¹⁸⁷²

There were countries in the study that recorded a considerable change in the number of attacks that took place between the two years. Germany particularly stands out as one such country. In 2016, Germany saw the second highest number of attacks of any Western country: eight attacks and 14.81% of the total for Western countries for that year. In 2017 this decreased considerably, falling to only two attacks, which was 2.94% of the overall figure. It is further notable that the two attacks recorded in Germany in 2017 were on a much smaller scale – one was a parcel bomb and the other a knife attack – as compared to the 2016 Berlin Christmas market attack or the suicide bombing at the music festival in Ansbach in July 2016.

As with Germany, Belgium also dropped, to 2.94% of the total with two attacks in 2017, having been hit by five attacks, or 9.26% of the total, in 2016. While one of the 2017 attacks in Belgium was an attempted station bombing, no attack that year was as ambitious as the Islamic State-directed Brussels suicide bombings of March 2016.

Greece also saw a significant change, although here the trend was upward, rising from four incidents and 7.41% of the total in 2016 to eight attacks and 11.76% of the total in 2017. This made Greece the fourth worst affected country that year. Additionally, individuals in Greece used that country as a base of operations from which to direct terrorism in other European countries, specifically through the use of mail bombs. In 2017, attacks were recorded in France and Germany that are believed to have been initiated from within Greek territory.¹⁸⁷³

As noted, the overall trend from 2016 to 2017 showed a rise in the number of attacks. Most of the countries that experienced terror attacks in those years reflected this trend, with 11 countries seeing the number of attacks in 2017 rise from the figure they experienced in 2016. However, five countries did not share in this trend and saw the number of terror attacks decrease. Equally, there was a lack of consistency in the rate at which terrorism either increased or decreased in the various countries. In this respect it is not possible to identify a single, overall trend in terrorism that is consistently reflected across the different countries.

What does appear to be more consistent as a trend across both years is that those countries that experienced the highest or lowest levels of terrorism in 2016 tended to see this replicated in 2017. France, the United States and the United Kingdom all remained among the four worst affected countries. Equally, many of those countries that experienced either no attack or one attack in 2016 experienced the same in 2017. This may be indicative of which countries have the most serious problems with terrorism and the forms of extremism that generate it. However, data is needed from a wider time period to determine whether these trends are consistent.

¹⁸⁷¹ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017.


¹⁸⁷² 'Country Reports on Terrorism 2017. Chapter 1. Country Reports: Europe', *US Department of State*, 2017.

¹⁸⁷³ 'Greek police arrest suspect behind high-profile parcel bomb attacks', *Reuters*, 28 October 2017, available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-greece-parcelbombs-arrest/greek-police-arrest-suspect-behind-high-profile-parcel-bomb-attacks-idUKKBN1CX0CG>, last visited: 4 October 2018.


Table 1.3 Number of attacks by ideology in each country

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Australia	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Islamist	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Austria	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Islamist	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Belgium	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Islamist	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Canada	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Far Right	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Islamist	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Far Right	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Denmark	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Islamist	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Finland	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Islamist	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
France	7	12.96%	12	17.65%	19	15.57%
Far Left	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Far Right	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Islamist	7	12.96%	9	13.24%	16	13.11%
Germany	8	14.81%	2	2.94%	10	8.20%
Far Left	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Islamist	8	14.81%	1	1.47%	9	7.38%
Greece	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
Far Left	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
Italy	5	9.26%	4	5.88%	9	7.38%
Far Left	4	7.41%	3	4.41%	7	5.74%
Islamist	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Malta	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Separatist/Nationalist	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Netherlands	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Far Right	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Norway	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Islamist	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Poland	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Far Left	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Spain	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Islamist	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Sweden	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
Far Right	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Islamist	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
United Kingdom	5	9.26%	13	19.12%	18	14.75%
Far Right	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Islamist	2	3.70%	6	8.82%	8	6.56%
Separatist/Nationalist	2	3.70%	6	8.82%	8	6.56%
United States	12	22.22%	12	17.65%	24	19.67%
Black Supremacist	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Far Left	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Far Right	0	0.00%	6	8.82%	6	4.92%
Islamist	9	16.67%	4	5.88%	13	10.66%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Map 1.4 Europe, number of attacks by ideology per country in 2016 and 2017



Map 1.5 North America, number of attacks by ideology per country in 2016 and 2017



Map 1.6 Australasia, number of attacks by ideology per country in 2016 and 2017

While the figures for the overall number of attacks across Western countries may not indicate a consistent underlying trend, the data can reveal more when broken down along the lines of the relevant ideologies and the regions and countries in which adherents to the different ideologies carried out their attacks.

Taking only attacks carried out by Islamist groups and Islamist-inspired individuals, we see a moderate decline in the absolute number of these attacks and as part of the overall percentage. Overall there were 36 Islamist attacks in 2016, and this reduced slightly to 33 in 2017, accounting for two-thirds (66.67%) of attacks in the first year and falling to less than half (48.53%) in the second year. This apparently declining trend in Islamist attacks, however, is only really reflective of what happened in North America, and was particularly impacted by the decline in the number of Islamist attacks in the United States.

In Europe, the number of Islamist attacks remained constant in 2017, with 25 attacks in both years, while there was one additional Islamist attack in Australasia, rising from one to two. For North America the overall number of Islamist attacks decreased, reducing from ten to six. However, in Canada, the number of Islamist attacks rose, with one occurring in 2016 and two in 2017.

In the United States the number of Islamist attacks decreased from nine in 2016 to four in 2017. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the disparity in the number of Islamist attacks in the United States between 2016 and 2017 can largely be accounted for by the actions of just one individual: Ahmad Khan Rahimi. Over two days in September 2016, Rahimi was responsible for undertaking four separate bombing attacks and attempted bombings in New York and New Jersey.

North America, and more specifically the United States, was the only region that witnessed terrorism by assailants identified with a Black Supremacist ideology. This would appear to indicate a problem with this form of extremism that may be almost entirely unique to the United States, although further research is needed to examine why Black Supremacism has not become more established in other Western countries. Recent research has documented

an increase in the number of “Black Nationalist” groups operating in the United States over the past decade, rising from 81 such groups in 2007 to 233 by 2017.¹⁸⁷⁴

In August 2017, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued an internal report on what it referred to as “Black Identity Extremism” and warned of a growing threat to law enforcement officers from those associated with this ideology.¹⁸⁷⁵ At the beginning of 2018, the United States witnessed what is believed to be the first prosecution of a Black Identity Extremist.¹⁸⁷⁶ Nevertheless, attacks from this ideology saw a downward trend between the two years featured in this study, reducing from three incidents in 2016 to one in 2017. The reduction in attacks from Black Supremacist and Islamist terrorism contributed to the United States having no overall increase in terrorism in 2017, even though other forms of terrorism saw an increase in the country during that year.

Europe was the only region to experience Separatist/Nationalist terrorism over the two-year period of the study. In terms of the number of attacks attributed to assailants or groups from this ideology, this doubled from three attacks in 2016 to six attacks in 2017. The increase was caused by a significant rise in terrorism in Northern Ireland in 2017. In 2016 two of the three attacks happened in Northern Ireland, while another happened in Malta, although this incident was related to the civil war in Libya. In 2017, however, all six of these incidents occurred in Northern Ireland.

Europol’s 2018 ‘European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report’, which details a wide range of different terrorist activity in European Union countries, noted the prevalence of incidents associated with this ideology. The United Kingdom – and specifically Northern Ireland – accounted for the largest number of these. While that report recorded these as “security-related incidents”, it also acknowledged that the dissident republican groups in question are extensively engaged in criminality involving “drug dealing, extortion, fuel laundering and murder”.¹⁸⁷⁸

The overall figure for attacks recorded from Separatist/Nationalists in this study is lower than could be expected and warrants some explanation. The primary potential sources of violence in this category across Europe would be the remnants of the Northern Ireland conflict, Basque separatism, Corsican separatism, and fighting between Turkish and Kurdish groups active in European countries such as Sweden, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland. In the case of terrorism in Corsica, the National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC) indicated in 2014 that it was renouncing violence and beginning a process of disarming.¹⁸⁷⁹

Research for this project identified two potential terrorist incidents in Corsica in 2017, both in April and both of which employed rudimentary explosive devices targeting French financial and infrastructure targets. However, with no verified claim of responsibility by a group or individual, and no further available information about culpability, the incidents could not be logged under

¹⁸⁷⁴ ‘Black Nationalist’, *Southern Poverty Law Centre*, available at: <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/black-nationalist>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁷⁵ ‘(U//FOUO) Black Identity Extremists Likely Motivated to Target Law Enforcement Officers’, *Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Assessment*, 3 August 2017, available at: <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4067711/BIE-Redacted.pdf>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁷⁶ de Bourmont, M., ‘Is a Court Case in Texas the First Prosecution of a “Black Identity Extremist”?’, *Foreign Policy*, 30 January 2018, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/30/is-a-court-case-in-texas-the-first-prosecution-of-a-black-identity-extremist/>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁷⁷ ‘European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018’, *Europol* (2018), available at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷⁹ Day, M., ‘Corsican terror group lays down arms in battle for independence from France’, *The Independent*, 27 June 2014, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/corsican-terror-group-lays-down-arms-in-battle-for-independence-from-france-9569569.html>, last visited: 17 September 2018.

the terms of this study. Furthermore, the size of the explosives used and the timing of detonation during the early hours of the morning might raise further questions about intent.

Numerous similar cases can be pointed to in the Northern Irish context, as well as incidents in Europe with either Kurdish or Turkish targets. In some cases, these incidents did not involve a level of force that would qualify them as terrorism according to the definition used in this study. In others, there was not sufficient evidence to demonstrate the necessary ideology or motive. Particularly in the case of Northern Ireland, there were violent incidents and even killings perpetrated by individuals associated with these ideologies, but these were determined to have been primarily caused by gang violence, internal feuds or vigilante activity.

It is important to note, that the research for this study did uncover the continuation of significant violence and criminal activity associated with Separatist/Nationalist ideology in Europe, even if most of it fell short of the definition of terrorism used in this report. Furthermore, the apparent lack of arrests of perpetrators, and of evidence about the identity of those behind these activities, may indicate a failing in policing that is not seen with some of the other ideologies in this study.

A similar pattern emerges with incidents of violence and potential terrorist activity suspected of being associated with the Far Left in Southern Europe. With the exception of one attack by a lone individual in the United States in 2017, all other attacks associated with the Far Left took place in European countries. In 2016 there were nine attacks from those on the Far Left, all in Europe, representing 16.67% of all attacks that year.

The following year, 14 Far Left attacks took place across Western countries, of which 13 took place in Europe, with attacks from this ideology representing one-fifth (20.59%) of all attacks that year. In both years there was a large number of possible Far Left terrorist incidents that failed to meet the criteria for inclusion set for this study. In some cases, this resulted from a lack of evidence and had more information been available about some of these incidents there may have been grounds for including a number of them. As such, it is possible that the level of Far Left terrorist activity is higher than has been recorded here.

Particularly in Greece, Italy and Spain, research for this study found incidents that had the appearance of those likely to have been undertaken by Far Left groups – as suggested by the choice of target and the means of attack used – but where there was no available evidence clearly demonstrating the identity, motive and ideology of the individuals behind these incidents. Other possible incidents were excluded from the study on account of the level of violence used being insufficient to justify inclusion. Despite this, the research indicated a considerable level of Far Left violence and possible terrorist activity in Southern Europe, but also a lack of evidence about the identities of those perpetrating these incidents being made publicly available by authorities. Arrests of suspects in these cases have been limited and often only appear to have happened for some of the most serious offences.

As with the excluded incidents suspected of being undertaken by the Far Left and Separatist/Nationalists, there was a large number of violent and criminal incidents likely perpetrated by those associated with the Far Right. Greece is a country that, in addition to having a serious problem with Far Left anarchist extremism, has a highly active Far Right, with prominent groups such as the Golden Dawn party.¹⁸⁸⁰ However, violence by right wing groups in Greece during the period of this study were not found to meet the definition of terrorism.

¹⁸⁸⁰ Smith, H., 'SS songs and antisemitism: the week Golden Dawn turned openly Nazi', *The Guardian*, 7 June 2014, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/07/greece-golden-dawn-fascism-threat-to-democracy>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

Often, right wing associated violence in Western countries has taken the form of hate crimes or vandalism targeting locations associated with migrants and Muslim communities. In many cases the level of force used was not sufficient to qualify as terrorism, and there was also often an absence of evidence establishing the identity or nature of the ideology of the perpetrators. With these events also failing to qualify for inclusion, it is possible that the number of Far Right attacks is higher than has been recorded here.

Despite these potential incidents being excluded from the study, there was an upward trend in terrorism by the Far Right. In 2016, Far Right attacks were only recorded in Europe; however, in 2017 not only did the number of these attacks increase in Europe, but also six occurred in the United States and one occurred in Canada. In 2016, 5.56% of all attacks were committed by those on the Far Right, which were accounted for by the three Far Right attacks committed in Europe.

The following year, this rose to 14 incidents – seven in Europe, six in the United States and one in Canada – making up one-fifth (20.59%) of all terrorism in 2017. The increase in the number of Far Right attacks in Europe corresponds with Europol data showing that in European Union countries arrests relating to right wing extremism almost doubled between 2016 and 2017.¹⁸⁸¹ The figures here also draw attention to the United States as the country by far the worst affected by Far Right attacks in 2017, which contrasts with the previous year when the country experienced no attacks from this ideology that met the terrorism definition.

Injuries and Fatalities

Examining the number of attacks by location and even by ideology provides only a partial insight into the terrorism trends experienced in the West during 2016 and 2017. These figures include attacks that were successful, those that were foiled and those that failed in some way. Different attacks recorded in the study were clearly committed with a range of often quite different objectives, intentions and expectations about the damage and harm they would cause.

A number of the attacks recorded were evidently intended as mass-casualty attacks in which the perpetrators set out to murder and injure as many people as they possibly could. The suicide bombings in Brussels and Manchester and the truck attacks in Nice, Berlin, London and New York would all fall into this category. Others saw individuals set out to try to kill or injure a small group, such as attacks on patrolling soldiers or members of the police force. Some were assassinations or apparent assassination attempts, which primarily sought to kill or badly injure one individual, but which showed a disregard for the potential injury of those in the immediate vicinity of the target. This was the case with the explosive parcels sent to former Greek Prime Minister Lucas Papademos and German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble in 2017, which jeopardised the safety of members of their staff as well as those working in the postal service.¹⁸⁸²

Additionally, there were a number of attacks that may not have been intended to kill anyone – such as small explosives timed to detonate at times when there were likely to be few passers-by – but which nevertheless accepted the risk of potentially causing injury to anyone who happened to be close to the device at the time. Indeed, there were a number of serious injuries sustained by those who either attempted to diffuse these explosives or disturbed them unwittingly.

Across the years 2016 and 2017, in Western countries, 280 people lost their lives to terrorism and 1,905 people sustained some level of injury. These ranged from those who were left with severe and permanent injuries to those who required only minimal medical attention. Broken down over the two years, 2017 saw a reduction in casualties from the previous year. In particular, there was a sharp decline in the number of terrorism related fatalities, with the

¹⁸⁸¹ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018', *Europol* (2018).

¹⁸⁸² 'Greek police arrest suspect behind high-profile parcel bomb attacks', *Reuters*, 28 October 2017.

number falling by more than half. This is in line with findings published by the Global Terrorism Index in 2017, which found that OECD countries witnessed a higher number of terrorism fatalities in 2016 than in any year since 2001, the year of the 9/11 attacks.¹⁸⁸³ However, the same report found that there were fewer terrorism fatalities during the first six months of 2017 than during the same period in 2016.¹⁸⁸⁴

In 2016, terror attacks caused 191 fatalities and left 987 injured in Western countries. The following year, although the overall number of attacks increased, these figures fell to 89 fatalities and left 918 injured. The number of people a terror attack was likely to directly harm was also fewer in 2017 than in 2016. During the first year there were 3.54 fatalities per attack, whereas in 2017 this reduced to 1.31 fatalities per attack. Similarly, in 2016 there were 18.28 people injured for every attack that year. In 2017, however, this decreased to 13.50 injured for every attack that occurred.

This change is in part accounted for by the fact that there were fewer mass-casualty attacks in 2017, and those that did occur that year did not manage to cause the same level of damage as some of those in 2016. In the first year there were two attacks that caused 30 or more fatalities and five attacks that caused ten or more fatalities, although it is worth noting that two of these were the connected Brussels bombings of March 2016. In 2017, no attack resulted in more than 22 fatalities, and in total there were only two attacks with ten or more fatalities. There were, however, more attacks in 2017 in which there were between five and ten fatalities than there had been in the previous year.

The mass-casualty attacks of 2016 included atrocities such as the Nice truck attack in which 86 were murdered, the Orlando nightclub shooting in which 49 were killed, and the Brussels suicide bombings which had a combined figure of 32 fatalities from two separate but coordinated attacks. By contrast, the most devastating attack of 2017 – the Manchester Arena suicide bombing – saw the murder of 22 victims. The second worst attack that year – the Barcelona truck attack – left 15 dead. Other attacks in 2017 that had lower death tolls but succeeded in having a significant impact included the Westminster Bridge and Stockholm truck attacks that each killed five, and the London Bridge and New York truck attacks in which eight were murdered in each. These still had lower fatality rates than an incident such as the Berlin Christmas Market attack of December 2016 in which 12 were killed.

The figures from 2017 were in part improved because of a number of attacks that year that failed to be as deadly as they had the potential to be. The explosive placed on the London underground subway system which partially exploded at Parsons Green Station resulted in 30 people being injured; had the bomb detonated as intended it would likely have left many dead. In New York in October 2017, Sayfullo Saipov carried out a truck attack that killed eight and injured 11. That attack was brought to an abrupt end when the truck was halted by crashing into a school bus. Had the area of the attack been more crowded and had the vehicle travelled a greater distance, it is conceivable that Saipov could have inflicted the kinds of casualties seen in Barcelona, or perhaps even in Nice the previous year.

In terms of the numbers of injuries inflicted by different attacks, the suicide bombing of the Manchester Arena in 2017 left 512 injured, the worst figure for any attack from the two years. The second worst attack for numbers injured was the Nice truck attack which injured 434 people, a figure worse than the combined total from the two suicide bombings in Brussels that year in which 340 people suffered injuries. The Barcelona truck attack of August 2017 was particularly serious in terms of injuries, leaving 131 injured. These cases would appear to indicate

¹⁸⁸³ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017.

¹⁸⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

that while a suicide bombing can be capable of inflicting a massive number of injuries, truck attacks have sometimes left a greater number of people injured than bombings. They also have the potential to cause more fatalities if an area is crowded enough and if a heavy-duty vehicle is able to travel for long enough without being halted.

Table 2.1 Number of injured and fatalities

	Injured	%	Fatalities	%
2016	987	51.81%	191	68.21%
2017	918	48.19%	89	31.79%
Total	1905	100.00%	280	100.00%

Figure 2.1 Number of injured and fatalities




Table 2.2 Number of injured and fatalities

	Injured		Fatalities		Total	
	2016	% 2017	2016	% 2017	2016	% 2017
Australia	1	0.10%	0	0.00%	7	0.37%
Austria	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Belgium	346	35.06%	32	16.75%	347	18.22%
Canada	1	0.10%	0	0.00%	26	1.36%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Denmark	3	0.30%	0	0.00%	3	0.16%
Finland	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	8	0.42%
France	438	44.38%	89	46.60%	457	23.99%
Germany	79	8.00%	12	6.28%	85	4.46%
Greece	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	4	0.21%
Italy	1	0.10%	0	0.00%	5	0.26%
Malta	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Netherlands	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Norway	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Poland	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Spain	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	137	7.19%
Sweden	1	0.10%	0	0.00%	16	0.84%
United Kingdom	0	0.00%	4	2.09%	653	34.28%
United States	117	11.85%	54	28.27%	157	8.24%
Total	987	100.00%	191	100.00%	1905	100.00%
					280	100.00%

Breaking down the figures on fatalities from terror attacks by country appears to show few, if any, consistent trends between 2016 and 2017. In the first year, France had the highest number of fatalities, with 89 killed, representing 46.60% of all terrorist fatalities of that year. In 2017, however, France had one of the lowest number of fatalities, with three individuals killed, 3.37% of the total. The change in figures is largely accounted for by the absence of mass-casualty attacks in France in the second year. In 2016, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel's truck attack in Nice left 86 dead and another 434 people injured.¹⁸⁸⁵

Belgium and Germany experienced a similar significant difference in the number of fatalities recorded in each year. Belgium suffered a high fatality rate in 2016, with 32 killed that year, but it had no fatalities the following year. This is accounted for by the two coordinated suicide bombings in Brussels in March 2016. Germany also saw a significant reduction in fatalities, with 12 deaths from terrorism in 2016 and one in 2017. Comparable to the shift in Belgium's fatality rate, the 2016 deaths in Germany were all accounted for by one attack: the truck attack carried out by Anis Amri at the Berlin Christmas market.

The United States had had the second highest fatality rate in 2016, with 54 killed. This decreased to 16 killed in 2017, a significantly lower figure, although one that still left the United States in joint second place as one of the worst affected countries that year in terms of fatalities. For the most part, however, in 2017, the countries that suffered the highest casualty rates differed from those in the previous year. The worst affected country for that year was the United Kingdom. Whereas four were killed in terrorism incidents in 2016, that rose to 36 in 2017. These figures from the second year were primarily caused by the Manchester Arena suicide bombing and the Westminster and London Bridge attacks. Additionally, the partially failed bombing at Parsons Green and the attack at Finsbury Park Mosque both had the potential to cause far more fatalities had they unfolded in line with the plans of the assailants.

Along with the United States, the second worst affected country in 2017 was Spain, with 16 killed there. However, Spain did not suffer any terrorism-related fatalities the previous year, and the 2017 figures are entirely accounted for by the Barcelona and – to a lesser extent – the Cambrils attacks. Both of these were perpetrated by the same Islamist cell from Ripoll.¹⁸⁸⁶

The fatality figures have largely been driven by the countries that suffered mass-casualty attacks. Research from the Global Terrorism Index in 2017 similarly found that since 2014, the figures for terrorism fatalities in OECD countries have been heavily influenced by only a few mass-casualty attacks rather than by numerous small-scale attacks.¹⁸⁸⁷ No Western country experienced a mass-casualty attack in both 2016 and 2017. While smaller attacks did result in fatalities, these were still accumulatively less numerically significant than the impact of one mass-casualty attack. However, it is possible that the effect of numerous smaller attacks may be equally, or perhaps more, impactful for causing a sense of fear and intimidation to the public.

¹⁸⁸⁵ Samuel, H., 'Nice killer visited Italy's "Little Calais" as he was radicalised over a year before July 14 massacre', *The Telegraph*, 6 October 2016, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/06/nice-killer-visited-italys-little-calais-as-he-was-radicalised-o/>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁸⁶ Piranty, S., 'Barcelona attack: The jihadists and the hunt for a second gang', *BBC News*, 8 August 2018, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44890504>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

¹⁸⁸⁷ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017.

Table 2.3 Number of injured and fatalities by city

	2016			2017			Total		
	Injured	% Fatalities	%	Injured	% Fatalities	%	Injured	% Fatalities	%
Alexandria	0	0.00%	0.00%	5	0.54%	0.00%	5	0.26%	0.00%
Ansbach	15	1.52%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	15	0.79%	0.00%
Athens	0	0.00%	0.00%	4	0.44%	0.00%	4	0.21%	0.00%
Barcelona	0	0.00%	0.00%	131	14.27%	16.85%	131	6.88%	5.36%
Belfast	0	0.00%	0.52%	1	0.11%	0.00%	1	0.05%	0.36%
Berlin	56	5.67%	6.28%	0	0.00%	0.00%	56	2.94%	4.29%
Birstall	0	0.00%	0.52%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.36%
Bloomington	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Bologna	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Brussels	344	34.85%	16.75%	1	0.11%	0.00%	345	18.11%	11.43%
Cambrils	0	0.00%	0.00%	6	0.65%	1.12%	6	0.31%	0.36%
Campiglione	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Chalon-sur-Saone	0	0.00%	0.00%	2	0.22%	0.00%	2	0.10%	0.00%
Champaign	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Charleroi	2	0.20%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	2	0.10%	0.00%
Charlottesville	0	0.00%	0.00%	19	2.07%	1.12%	19	1.00%	0.36%
Columbus	15	1.52%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	15	0.79%	0.00%
Copenhagen	3	0.30%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	3	0.16%	0.00%
Dallas	7	0.71%	2.62%	0	0.00%	0.00%	7	0.37%	1.79%
Denver	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.36%
Dijon	0	0.00%	0.00%	3	0.33%	0.00%	3	0.16%	0.00%
Edmonton	0	0.00%	0.00%	5	0.54%	0.00%	5	0.26%	0.00%
Elizabeth	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Enschede	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Essen	3	0.30%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	3	0.16%	0.00%
Fermo	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Flint	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.11%	0.00%	1	0.05%	0.00%
Florence	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.11%	0.00%	1	0.05%	0.00%
Fresno	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	3.37%	0	0.00%	1.07%
Glasgow	0	0.00%	0.52%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.36%
Gothenburg	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.11%	0.00%	1	0.05%	0.00%
Hamburg	0	0.00%	0.00%	6	0.65%	1.12%	6	0.31%	0.36%
Hanover	1	0.10%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.05%	0.00%
Indianapolis	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Lettershandoney	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Lido Tre Archi	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Linz	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	2.25%	0	0.00%	0.71%

	2016			2017			Total		
	Injured	% Fatalities	%	Injured	% Fatalities	%	Injured	% Fatalities	%
London	0	0.00%	0.00%	140	15.25%	15.73%	140	7.35%	7.35%
Londonderry	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Ludwigshafen	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Manchester	0	0.00%	0.00%	512	55.77%	24.72%	512	26.88%	26.88%
Mantes-la-Jolie	0	0.00%	1.05%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Marseille	1	0.10%	0.00%	0	0.00%	2.25%	1	0.05%	0.71%
Melbourne	0	0.00%	0.00%	3	0.33%	1.12%	3	0.16%	1.03%
Milan	1	0.10%	0.00%	3	0.33%	0.00%	4	0.21%	0.00%
Minto	1	0.10%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.05%	0.00%
Mlada Boleslav	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
New Jersey	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
New York	31	3.14%	0.00%	14	1.53%	10.11%	45	2.36%	3.21%
Nice	434	43.97%	86	45.03%	0.00%	0.00%	434	22.78%	30.71%
Orlando	53	5.37%	49	25.65%	0.00%	0.00%	53	2.78%	17.50%
Oslo	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Oxford	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Paris	0	0.00%	0.00%	14	1.53%	1.12%	14	0.73%	1.03%
Philadelphia	1	0.10%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.05%	0.00%
Portland	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.11%	2.25%	1	0.05%	0.71%
Queanbeyan	0	0.00%	0.00%	3	0.33%	1.12%	3	0.16%	1.03%
Quebec City	0	0.00%	0.00%	19	2.07%	6.74%	19	1.00%	2.14%
Rochdale	0	0.00%	0.52%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.36%
Rome	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Saint Cloud	10	1.01%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	10	0.52%	0.00%
Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray	1	0.10%	0.52%	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.05%	0.36%
Stockholm	1	0.10%	0.00%	14	1.53%	5.62%	15	0.79%	1.79%
Strabane	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Strathroy	1	0.10%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.05%	0.00%
Toronto	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.11%	0.00%	1	0.05%	0.00%
Turin	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Turku	0	0.00%	0.00%	8	0.87%	2.25%	8	0.42%	0.71%
Valence	2	0.20%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	2	0.10%	0.00%
Valletta	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Warsaw	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Wurzburg	4	0.41%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%	4	0.21%	0.00%
Total	987	100.00%	191100.00%	918	100.00%	89100.00%	1905	100.00%	280100.00%


Cities, and particularly city centres, were among the most common areas for attacks in the study. They present terrorists with numerous civilian soft targets, crowded places, political targets and high-profile landmarks. However, the data gathered for this study does not clearly identify which cities are the most dangerous in terms of terrorism. This is because a city may stand out as having one of the worst fatality or casualty figures on account of having experienced just one mass-casualty attack. Nice stands out in this regard, with more fatalities than any other city. However, all 86 of these were caused in the same attack. By contrast, a city such as Athens experienced 12 attacks across both years, but witnessed no fatalities in any of these attacks.

A more useful measure might be to focus on those cities that demonstrate a high casualty rate caused by numerous attacks, particularly if these attacks occurred over both years of the study. One of the worst affected cities in the study was New York, which suffered a total of five attacks in 2016 and 2017. These attacks caused nine fatalities and left 45 injured, although eight of the fatalities were caused by the October 2017 truck attack. London also experienced five attacks, all of which were in 2017 rather than being across both years. While Manchester had a higher casualty rate, this was caused by a single attack. London's five attacks caused 14 fatalities and left 110 people injured.

Two other cities of note here are Brussels and Paris. There were 11 attacks in Paris, with these spread across both years. However, despite this high number of attacks, in the course of 2016 and 2017 combined, Paris suffered a lower casualty rate than many other cities, with 14 people injured and one fatality. Brussels suffered six attacks, with these also occurring across both years. Moreover, the city experienced a high casualty rate, with 32 fatalities and 345 left injured. Despite this, given that all the fatalities and 340 of the injured were caused by the twin suicide bombings of March 2016, it is still the case that the casualties for most of the cities over the two years occurred on just one date for each city.

Table 2.4 Fatalities by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	5	2.62%	3	3.37%	8	2.86%
Far Left	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Far Right	1	0.52%	11	12.36%	12	4.29%
Islamist	184	96.34%	75	84.27%	259	92.50%
Separatist/Nationalist	1	0.52%	0	0.00%	1	0.36%
Total	191	100.00%	89	100.00%	280	100.00%

Figure 2.2 Fatalities by ideology

Particularly noticeable is that all of the attacks recorded in this study that managed to inflict mass casualties were carried out by groups and individuals associated with Islamism. Breaking down the casualty figures along ideological lines rather than by location reveals some more significant trends across 2016 and 2017. The vast majority of the 191 people killed in terrorist attacks in 2016 were accounted for by Islamist attacks: 184 fatalities, representing 96.34% of the total. Of the injuries from that year, the figures are even more heavily weighted towards Islamist terrorism. In 2016, 980 of the 987 people injured, or 99.29% of the total figure, were caused in attacks by Islamists. In 2017 these numbers decreased somewhat, with Islamist assailants succeeding in killing fewer people in mass-casualty attacks. In all, 75 of the 89 fatalities that year came from Islamist attacks, representing 84.27% of the total number of fatalities. In the same year, 851 of the 918 people injured, or 92.70% of the total, were injured in attacks by Islamist terrorists.

The decrease in the overall percentage of casualties from Islamist attacks is partially accounted for by the increase in those killed or injured in Far Right and Far Left attacks. In 2016, terrorist attacks from the Far Right caused one fatality – which occurred in the United Kingdom – and no recorded injuries. In 2017, however, 11 people were killed by Far Right terrorism, accounting for 12.36% of all those killed by terrorism in Western countries that year. In 2017 there was also a sharp rise in the numbers injured in Far Right attacks, as compared to 2016 when there are no recorded injuries from Far Right terrorism: in 2017, 55 people were injured in these attacks, which accounted for 5.99% of the total number of injured for that year. These rising casualty figures from attacks carried out by the Far Right correspond not only with the rise in the number of Far Right attacks, but also with the kinds of attacks that the Far Right perpetrated in 2017. In particular, that year saw Far Right assailants seek to carry out the kinds of attacks that could inflict higher casualty rates, such as the Quebec City mosque shooting or the vehicular attacks in Finsbury Park and Charlottesville.


There was also an increase in the numbers harmed in Far Left terrorism in 2017. Although Far Left terrorism caused no fatalities in either 2016 or 2017, in 2017 the number of injured rose to 11, as opposed to no recorded injuries in the previous year. In part, the rising injury rate appears

to be linked to the rise in the absolute number of attacks by the Far Left. Given that the Far Left carried out an equal number of attacks as the Far Right in 2017 but did not manage to cause any fatalities, this appears to be accounted for by the kinds of terrorism used by the Far Left. This primarily consisted of the use of small-scale explosives or shootings in which the assailants appear to have prioritised fleeing the scene unapprehended over causing injury.

Casualties from Separatist/Nationalist terrorism remained low, with one fatality and no injuries in 2016 and no fatalities and one injury in 2017. In many cases, these attacks were of a similar small scale to those perpetrated by the Far Left. This may explain the comparably low casualty rate.

The absolute number of casualties associated with Black Supremacist terrorism decreased between the two years, although the fatalities as a percentage of the overall total increased on account of the fall in the number of fatalities caused by other ideologies. The 2017 casualty figures come from just one Black Supremacist attack: the Fresno shooting in April of that year. So while five were killed as a result of terrorism from this ideology in 2016 and three were killed in 2017, the percentage of fatalities as a result of Black Supremacist terrorism rose slightly from 2.61% in 2016 to 3.37% in 2017. However, the absolute number of injured from this ideology fell, from seven in 2016, or 0.70% of the total, to none in 2017.

Figure 2.3 Average number of injured and fatalities per attack by ideology in 2016 and 2017



Breaking down the data from both years, it is possible to compare the number of casualties caused by each ideology with the number of attacks by assailants from those ideologies. So of the 23 attacks attributed to the Far Left over 2016 and 2017, on average there was less than one injury for each of these attacks. The same was true of the nine Separatist/Nationalist attacks, which on average had fewer than one fatality or injury for each attack.

Of the 17 Far Right attacks recorded, there was on average less than one fatality for each attack. However, for the number injured by Far Right attacks, the average was 3.24 people per attack. As noted above, attacks by the Far Right have not only become more numerous, but they have also become more dangerous, causing an increased number of fatalities. While it is beyond the scope of this research, further work is required not only to ascertain why there has been an

increase in Far Right terrorism, but also to assess whether there has been a radicalisation of right wing ideology that might be encouraging adherents to seek to perpetrate more lethal attacks.

Black Supremacist attacks proved still more dangerous when they occurred, with an average of two fatalities and 1.75 injured for every attack associated with this ideology. Attacks from this ideology may have been more dangerous than those by the Far Left or Separatist/Nationalists on account of the types of attacks perpetrated by these assailants. Better understanding of this ideology might also provide greater insight into why attacks by Black Supremacist assailants have proven to be more lethal. By far the most dangerous, however, were Islamist attacks: for every Islamist attack 3.75 people were killed and 26.54 people were injured. Here there is a far more established and recognisable link between an ideology that expressly seeks to kill a large number of Westerners and attacks that, on average, manage to achieve this to a far greater extent than attacks by other ideologies.

Response by Authorities

Table 3.1 Response by authorities

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Arrested	7	12.96%	13	19.12%	20	16.39%
Arrested Post Attack	14	25.93%	23	33.82%	37	30.33%
Not Applicable	3	5.56%	2	2.94%	5	4.10%
Not Apprehended	8	14.81%	14	20.59%	22	18.03%
Shot & Arrested	3	5.56%	5	7.35%	8	6.56%
Shot & Arrested Post Attack	4	7.41%	0	0.00%	4	3.28%
Shot Dead	14	25.93%	9	13.24%	23	18.85%
Shot Dead & Shot & Arrested	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead Post Attack	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	280	100.00%

Figure 3.1 Response by authorities





Figure 3.2 Response by authorities in 2016 and 2017

The response that the authorities have taken against assailants when they have been either perpetrating terror attacks or attempting to carry out terror attacks has varied considerably. In the case of many attacks, assailants have only been apprehended sometime after the incident of which they have been accused. In total, of the 122 incidents recorded over 2016 and 2017, 37 attacks involved assailants who were arrested after the incident. A total of 23 attacks in 2017 had assailants arrested at a later time, one-third (33.82%) of the 68 attacks that occurred that year. In 2016, 14 of 54 attacks led to assailants being arrested at a later time, and in addition four attacks involved assailants who were shot and arrested at a later time. Again, in 2016, one-third (33.33%) of attacks resulted in assailants being arrested at a later time.

A large proportion of attacks involved an assailant being arrested at the time at which they were either carrying out an attack or seeking to do so. In 2017 there were 13 attacks where the assailant was arrested at the time of the attack, and another five where the assailant was shot and then arrested. These 18 attacks in which an assailant was arrested at the time represent just over one-quarter (26.47%) of all attacks that occurred in 2017. This compares to seven attacks that featured assailants being arrested at the time of attack in 2016, as well as another three in which assailants were shot at and arrested. These ten attacks in which arrests were made at the time represent 18.52% of attacks that year.

As noted, the authorities have responded to attacks by shooting and arresting assailants, both during the attack as well as after the attack. However, assailants have also been shot and killed by members of the police and military when they have been responding to attacks. In 2017, there were ten attacks during which the authorities shot and killed an assailant, as well as one attack which led to the authorities shooting and killing an assailant at a later time. These 11 attacks where the authorities responded by killing at least one assailant or more represent 16.18%

of all attacks from that year. In the previous year, there were 14 attacks which led to assailants being shot and killed, as well as another attack which involved the assailant being shot and killed at a later time after the attack. These 15 incidents represent 27.78% of all attacks that year.

There were a number of attacks for which no assailant has yet been apprehended. In 2017, there were 14 such attacks, representing one-fifth (20.59%) of attacks that year. In 2016, there were eight attacks recorded for which no assailant is known to have been apprehended, which represents 14.81% of attacks that took place that year. In addition, there were a number of attacks from both years for which no action was taken against assailants on account of the fact that they had been killed as a result of their own actions in the course of the attack. This included assailants killed in suicide bombings or by their attempt to carry out a suicide bombing. There were two such incidents in 2017 and three in 2016.

Table 3.2 Response by authorities by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Arrested	7	12.96%	13	19.12%	20	16.39%
Far Left	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Far Right	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Islamist	4	7.41%	10	14.71%	14	11.48%
Separatist/Nationalist	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Arrested Post Attack	14	25.93%	23	33.82%	37	30.33%
Black Supremacist	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Far Left	3	5.56%	5	7.35%	8	6.56%
Far Right	2	3.70%	11	16.18%	13	10.66%
Islamist	6	11.11%	6	8.82%	12	9.84%
Separatist/Nationalist	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Not Applicable	3	5.56%	2	2.94%	5	4.10%
Islamist	3	5.56%	2	2.94%	5	4.10%
Not Apprehended	8	14.81%	14	20.59%	22	18.03%
Far Left	5	9.26%	8	11.76%	13	10.66%
Islamist	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Separatist/Nationalist	1	1.85%	6	8.82%	7	5.74%
Shot & Arrested	3	5.56%	5	7.35%	8	6.56%
Islamist	3	5.56%	5	7.35%	8	6.56%
Shot & Arrested Post Attack	4	7.41%	0	0.00%	4	3.28%
Islamist	4	7.41%	0	0.00%	4	3.28%
Shot Dead	14	25.93%	9	13.24%	23	18.85%
Black Supremacist	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Far Left	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Islamist	13	24.07%	8	11.76%	21	17.21%
Shot Dead & Shot & Arrested	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Islamist	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead Post Attack	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Islamist	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

The direct response that the authorities have taken against assailants appears to vary quite substantially depending on the ideology of the perpetrators. Across both years, 22 attacks have not resulted in an assailant being apprehended by the authorities. It is notable that attacks associated with two ideologies stand out as often not having had assailants caught. Of such attacks, 13 of these, or 59.09%, are believed to have been carried out by the Far Left. Another 31.82% of these are attacks identified as having been perpetrated by Separatist/Nationalists. Indeed, of 23 Far Left attacks recorded across both years, more than half (56.52%) did not lead to an assailant being apprehended. Of the nine attacks included in this study that have been attributed to Separatist/Nationalist terrorism, seven have not seen an assailant apprehended for perpetrating these attacks.

By contrast, it is notable that where attacks have seen the assailants shot and killed or shot and arrested, these are far more likely to have been committed by Islamists or those associated with Black Supremacist extremism. Of those that led to assailants being shot and killed at the time of the attack, 22 of these were Islamist: 13 in 2016 and nine in 2017. The large majority (91.67%) of all attacks in which assailants were shot and killed were Islamist attacks. In addition to these, there were two further Islamist attacks that led to the assailant being shot and killed, albeit at a time after the attack had taken place. In total, across both years, 24 Islamist attacks resulted in an assailant being shot and killed; this accounts for more than one-third (34.78%) of all Islamist attacks featured in the study.

There were a further eight attacks in which Islamist assailants were shot and arrested at the time of the attack, and a further four Islamist attacks which led to assailants being shot and arrested sometime after the attack. In total, 36 Islamist attacks resulted in an assailant being shot, accounting for more than half (52.17%) of all such incidents associated with Islamist assailants in 2016 and 2017.

These figures stand in contrast with those for the other ideologies. In 2016 there was one Black Supremacist attack in which an assailant was shot and killed, and in 2017 there was one Far Left attack in which the assailant was shot and killed. There were no other incidents recorded in the study where attackers were shot in an effort to apprehend them or end a terror attack. While the material in this study cannot point to a conclusive explanation for why authorities are more likely to respond to Islamist attacks by shooting, there are a number of possibilities. As already seen, the data has indicated that, on average, Islamist attacks tend to cause far more injuries and fatalities than those of other ideologies. This corresponds to the high level of direct force often used by Islamist assailants, which may accordingly lead the authorities to use live fire against assailants in response.

It is noteworthy that the other instances in which assailants were shot and killed also involved the attackers using a high level of force in an apparent attempt to cause maximum casualties, as seen with the 2017 shooting attack by James T. Hodgkinson in which five were injured, and the 2016 shooting attack by Micah Johnson in which five were killed and seven were injured. These assailants were also present at the time the attacks were carried out, as has usually been the case with Islamist attacks.

Attackers from other ideologies appear to be more inclined to carry out attacks remotely, such as by placing explosive devices at a specific location, thus protecting themselves from being apprehended. It is notable too that not only have Islamist attackers been present at the time of their attacks, but they have also often targeted members of the police or military, or targeted high-profile locations where members of the security services have been present and able to use live fire against the assailants.

The targeting of armed police and soldiers by Islamist assailants may be interpreted as an effort to intentionally put themselves in harm's way, and it may not be unreasonable to assume that the

importance placed on martyrdom in Islamist ideology at least partly explains why so many Islamist assailants have been shot. Indeed, all five of the attacks in which assailants were killed through their own direct actions (in suicide bombings or attempted bombings) were Islamist attacks.

Table 3.3 Response by authorities in each country

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Australia	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Arrested	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Arrested Post Attack	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Austria	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Arrested Post Attack	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Belgium	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Not Applicable	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Not Apprehended	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shot & Arrested	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Canada	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Arrested	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Arrested Post Attack	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Arrested Post Attack	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Denmark	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Finland	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shot & Arrested	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
France	7	12.96%	12	17.65%	19	15.57%
Arrested	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Arrested Post Attack	1	1.85%	4	5.88%	5	4.10%
Not Applicable	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shot & Arrested	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Shot Dead	4	7.41%	3	4.41%	7	5.74%
Germany	8	14.81%	2	2.94%	10	8.20%
Arrested	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Arrested Post Attack	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Not Applicable	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead Post Attack	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Greece	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
Arrested Post Attack		0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Not Apprehended	4	7.41%	6	8.82%	10	8.20%
Italy	5	9.26%	4	5.88%	9	7.38%
Arrested		0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Arrested Post Attack	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Not Apprehended	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Shot Dead	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Malta	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Arrested	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%

Netherlands	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Arrested Post Attack	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Norway	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Arrested	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Poland	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Arrested	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Spain	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Shot Dead & Shot & Arrested	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shot Dead Post Attack	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Sweden	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
Arrested Post Attack	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Not Apprehended	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
United Kingdom	5	9.26%	13	19.12%	18	14.75%
Arrested	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Arrested Post Attack	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Not Applicable	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Not Apprehended	1	1.85%	6	8.82%	7	5.74%
Shot Dead	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
United States	12	22.22%	12	17.65%	24	19.67%
Arrested	0	0.00%	4	5.88%	4	3.28%
Arrested Post Attack	2	3.70%	6	8.82%	8	6.56%
Shot & Arrested	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Shot & Arrested Post Attack	4	7.41%	0	0.00%	4	3.28%
Shot Dead	5	9.26%	1	1.47%	6	4.92%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

As well as the responses from authorities appearing to vary between assailants depending on their ideological alignment, there is also some variation between the responses from the authorities in different countries. The data suggests that assailants are more likely to go unapprehended in some countries than others, and that in certain countries the authorities may be more likely to shoot assailants. However, in some cases these trends may also relate to the kinds of terrorism that different countries suffer.

The country with the most attacks for which no assailant was apprehended was Greece, with ten such attacks across both years. However, this may be reflective of a farther-reaching problem with Far Left terrorism, given that the Italian authorities also failed to apprehend assailants for three Far Left attacks there. Nevertheless, given that the largest concentration of Far Left attacks took place in Greece, it is difficult to determine whether the failure to apprehend these assailants is an issue specific to Greece or specific to Far Left terrorism. As noted by the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism at the US State Department, Greece did make two high-profile arrests of anarchist terrorists in 2017: Panagiota Roupa and Konstantinos Yiagtzoglou.¹⁸⁸⁸ Nevertheless, given the number of Far Left terrorist incidents in Greece and the number of groups that appear to be operating there, it remains to be seen how far the arrests of these two individuals will go in degrading Far Left violent extremism in Greece.

An example of a country that has a varying success rate of apprehending assailants depending on ideology is the United Kingdom. Seven attacks in the UK did not result in an assailant being

¹⁸⁸⁸ 'Country Reports on Terrorism 2017. Chapter 1. Country Reports: Europe', *US Department of State*, 2017.

apprehended. These attacks, however, were all Separatist/Nationalist attacks that occurred in Northern Ireland. This record stands in contrast to attacks by the Far Right and Islamists, for which the British authorities had a full success rate for apprehending assailants. The one partial exception was the 2016 killing of the Rochdale imam: the authorities did arrest an assailant for this attack; however, the primary attacker, Mohammed Abdul Kadir, managed to flee the country.

Assailants were more likely to be shot in certain countries. Across both years, the country with the most attacks to which the authorities responded by shooting the assailant was France. Of the 19 attacks in France over the two years, police and soldiers patrolling during the state of emergency in force in that country at the time shot assailants dead in response to seven attacks, and shot and arrested assailants from another four. This figure may partly be explained by both the volume of terrorism experienced and the level of violence used by Islamist assailants in several of those attacks. Given that more than half (57.89%) of these attacks involved the direct targeting of the police and the military, this may also explain the number of assailants shot in France.

Belgian authorities also shot assailants in a relatively high number of attacks. Of the seven attacks in Belgium, assailants were shot and killed in three, and in a further instance the authorities shot and arrested an assailant. Two other attacks in Belgium involved suicide bombings in which the assailants were killed by their own actions. As in France, the authorities may have responded with live fire both because of the level of violence used by the assailants but also given that four of the seven attacks in that country saw the direct targeting of the police and the military.

After France, the country with most attacks where the authorities responded by shooting an assailant was the United States. Over the two-year period, police there responded by shooting and killing assailants in six attacks, and shot and arrested assailants in another two attacks. Additionally, there were four attacks for which the police responded by shooting and arresting the assailant after the attack; however, these four attacks were all committed by the same assailant: Ahmad Khan Rahimi. These 12 attacks accounted for half of all attacks in the United States. It is not clear whether this rate can be explained by assailants attacking the police or the military, given that in that country three-quarters of attacks had exclusively civilian targets.

Areas of Attacks

Table 4.1 Areas of attacks

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
City Centre	17	31.48%	36	52.94%	53	43.44%
Commercial	4	7.41%	13	19.12%	17	13.93%
Commercial-Residential Mix	9	16.67%	3	4.41%	12	9.84%
Government	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Landmark	2	3.70%	8	11.76%	10	8.20%
Recreational	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Residential	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Transport	1	1.85%	6	8.82%	7	5.74%
Multiple	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Multiple locations	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Rural	0	0.00%	6	8.82%	6	4.92%
Recreational	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Residential	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Transport	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
Small Town	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Commercial-Residential Mix	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Residential	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Suburban	35	64.81%	25	36.76%	60	49.18%
Commercial	3	5.56%	4	5.88%	7	5.74%
Commercial-Residential Mix	10	18.52%	3	4.41%	13	10.66%
Education	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Landmark	1	1.85%		0.00%	1	0.82%
Recreational	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Residential	15	27.78%	13	19.12%	28	22.95%
Transport	4	7.41%	3	4.41%	7	5.74%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Attacks largely occurred in cities – either in major city centres or suburban areas of cities and large towns. A relatively small number of attacks took place in small towns or rural areas. In 2016, there were 17 attacks in city centres, accounting for 31.48% of attacks that year. The study indicates that this rose significantly, more than doubling in 2017, with 36 attacks in city centres, more than half (52.94%) of all attacks that year.

Within city centre areas, there was a noticeable increase in the number of attacks on both landmarks and transport-related targets. The targeting of transportation in city centres may relate to attempts to maximise casualties by carrying out attacks in places where large numbers of civilians are likely to be crowded together or caught in confined spaces, such as train carriages. Often, these attacks have also involved the targeting of police or members of security. Across the two years, attacks on transport in city centres increased from one incident in 2016 to six incidents in 2017, representing 8.82% of all attacks that year and 16.67% of all attacks in city centres.

In 2016 there were two attacks at landmarks in city centres, but in 2017 this rose to eight attacks at these locations, 11.76% of attacks that year. As well as representing soft urban targets where crowds of civilians are likely to be gathered, attacks at high-profile sites are likely to gain greater publicity and may carry political significance. As with other attacks at city centre locations, assailants targeting landmarks have often targeted members of the police and

military placed to guard these locations. Particularly notable in 2016 was the attempted car bombing close to Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris. Notre Dame was also the location of a further attack in June 2017, this time involving a lone assailant with a hammer. Other landmarks that witnessed attacks in 2017 included those at the Louvre and the Champs-Elysees in Paris, and at the Westminster and London Bridges.

While there continued to be a high number of attacks in suburban areas across both years, this declined from 2016 to 2017. In the first year, suburban areas were the most common locations for attacks, accounting for 64.81% of incidents that year. This decreased in 2017 to 36.76% of attacks that year. Across both years, just under half of the attacks took place in suburbs: 49.18%. Attacks in suburban areas overwhelmingly took place in residential locations. Across both years, 22.95% of all attacks happened in residential suburban areas, while a further 10.66% happened in mixed residential-commercial parts of suburban areas.

Figure 4.1 Areas of attacks




Figure 4.2 Areas of attacks in 2016 and 2017




Table 4.2 Areas of attacks by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
City Centre	17	31.48%	36	52.94%	53	43.44%
Black Supremacist	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Far Left	4	7.41%	10	14.71%	14	11.48%
Far Right	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Islamist	11	20.37%	23	33.82%	34	27.87%
Multiple	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Far Left	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Rural	0	0.00%	6	8.82%	6	4.92%
Far Right	0	0.00%	4	5.88%	4	3.28%
Separatist/Nationalist	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Small Town	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Far Left	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Islamist	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Suburban	35	64.81%	25	36.76%	60	49.18%
Black Supremacist	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Far Left	4	7.41%	3	4.41%	7	5.74%
Far Right	2	3.70%	7	10.29%	9	7.38%
Islamist	24	44.44%	10	14.71%	34	27.87%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.56%	4	5.88%	7	5.74%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

In the course of the two years covered by the study, most of the attacks that occurred in city centres were Islamist. Of the 53 attacks that occurred in city centres across both years, 34 were Islamist, representing 64.15%. This corresponds to city centres being among the primary areas where Islamist attacks were perpetrated, with 49.28% of all Islamist attacks occurring in such areas. The other ideological group that repeatedly perpetrated attacks in city centres was the Far Left, which carried out 14 attacks in city centres across 2016 and 2017, representing over one-quarter (26.42%) of all attacks recorded in these areas. More than half of attacks by the Far Left were carried out in the centres of cities: 60.87% of all the attacks from this ideology in the study.

Over half of the 60 attacks in suburban areas across 2016 and 2017 were perpetrated by Islamist assailants – 56.67% of all attacks in these areas. A further 15% of these attacks were carried out by the Far Right: nine in suburbs in total. Those from the Far Left and Separatist/Nationalist groups both carried out seven attacks in suburbs, each accounting for 11.67% of attacks in suburban areas.

The only ideologies to carry out attacks in rural areas were the Far Right and those defined as Separatist/Nationalist. There were six such attacks, all of which occurred in 2017. Two of these were caused by Separatist/Nationalists while four were perpetrated by the Far Right. However, three of these involved trains travelling through rural areas at the time of the attack.

Table 4.3 Areas of attacks by country

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
City Centre	17	31.48%	36	52.94%	53	43.44%
Belgium	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Finland	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
France	2	3.70%	9	13.24%	11	9.02%
Germany	6	11.11%	1	1.47%	7	5.74%
Greece	4	7.41%	6	8.82%	10	8.20%
Italy	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
Norway	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Spain	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Sweden	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
United Kingdom	0	0.00%	5	7.35%	5	4.10%
United States	3	5.56%	5	7.35%	8	6.56%
Multiple	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Greece	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Rural	0	0.00%	6	8.82%	6	4.92%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Sweden	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
United Kingdom	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
United States	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Small Town	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Canada	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Italy	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Suburban	35	64.81%	25	36.76%	60	49.18%
Australia	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Austria	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Belgium	4	7.41%	0	0.00%	4	3.28%
Canada	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
Denmark	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
France	5	9.26%	3	4.41%	8	6.56%
Germany	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Greece	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Italy	4	7.41%	1	1.47%	5	4.10%
Malta	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Netherlands	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Poland	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Sweden	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
United Kingdom	5	9.26%	6	8.82%	11	9.02%
United States	9	16.67%	6	8.82%	15	12.30%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Several countries in the study were found to reflect the general trend of the area type in which attacks occurred being split broadly between city centres and suburban areas. While the overall figures put suburban areas marginally ahead of city centres, in France, of 19 attacks across both years, 11 took place in city centres while only eight were in suburban areas.

In the United Kingdom there were significantly more attacks in suburban areas than anywhere else. Of the 18 attacks in the United Kingdom, five took place in city centres while 11 were in suburban areas. All the city centre attacks were carried out by Islamists in 2017, and this may be indicative of the attempt to carry out mass-casualty attacks by choosing soft urban targets

and crowded places. Far Right assailants carried out two attacks in suburban areas of the UK, while Separatist/Nationalists in Northern Ireland carried out most of their attacks in suburban areas, with the exception of two which occurred in rural areas.

Like the United Kingdom, attacks in the United States leaned more heavily towards suburban areas, with 15 of the country's 24 attacks occurring there. This contrasted with only eight attacks in city centres. Part of this trend corresponds with the ideologies that commonly carried out attacks in the United States, with a concentration of Far Right and Black Supremacist attacks in America – both ideologies that the study suggests are more inclined to carry out attacks in suburban areas and areas outside of city centres. This trend was also reflected in Europe and Canada, where across both years Far Right assailants conducted a greater number of attacks in suburban and rural areas rather than city centres. This trend appears to be driven by the kinds of locations being targeted. As well as four Far Right attacks in 2017 involving trains passing through rural or suburban areas, this ideology has targeted mosques and migrant centres which have been more likely to be situated in suburban and rural areas than in city centres.

While a number of countries tended to replicate the wider trends for the areas in which attacks occurred, others appeared to be more heavily skewed by the particular type of terrorism that they experienced. Of the 12 attacks in Greece, ten occurred in city centres. This corresponds to the tendency seen in the findings of Greek anarchist groups being likely to attack targets in city centres, specifically Athens. In addition to attacks on the police, these groups have been inclined to carry out attacks on political, financial and diplomatic targets. These are often likely to be located in city centres.

Targets of Attacks

Table 5.1 Targets of attacks

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	20	37.04%	18	26.47%	38	31.15%
Civilian – Targeted	16	29.63%	21	30.88%	37	30.33%
Military	2	3.70%	7	10.29%	9	7.38%
Military and Civilian Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police	12	22.22%	11	16.18%	23	18.85%
Police and Civilian – Indiscriminate and Civilian- Targeted	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police and Civilian – Targeted	2	3.70%	2	2.94%	4	3.28%
Police and Civilian Indiscriminate	2	3.70%	5	7.35%	7	5.74%
Unknown	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%



Figure 5.1 Targets of attacks

Figure 5.2 Targets of attacks in 2016 and 2017

The incidents recorded in this study indicate that assailants are choosing a relatively wide range of targets. Those perpetrating attacks are not only seeking to carry out violent acts against the police and the military and to attack civilians indiscriminately, but they are also selecting a range of different civilian groups to target specifically.

Across the whole study, there were 88 attacks that in some way targeted civilians; this represents almost three-quarters (72.13%) of all attacks across both years. The indiscriminate targeting of civilians appears to have remained broadly consistent. In 2016, 37.04% of all attacks involved the indiscriminate targeting of civilians. In 2017, more than one-quarter (26.47%) of all attacks targeted civilians indiscriminately. Across the two years combined, there were 47 attacks that in some way featured the indiscriminate targeting of civilians, 38.52% of the total.

Many attacks targeted specific categories of civilians. By far the most common civilian targets were those targeted for political reasons. In 2016 there were seven attacks with political targets, 12.96% of all attacks that year, and 38.88% of attacks in 2016 where a specific civilian group was targeted. This rose to nine attacks in 2017 that targeted a political civilian group, as well as three attacks that targeted the police alongside a political target. That year also saw the Portland train attack which involved the targeting of Muslims along with several civilians who were targeted for perceived political reasons. These 13 attacks represent 19.12% of attacks in 2017, and more than half (54.17%) of attacks in which a civilian group was targeted. As an overall total for both years, there were 20 incidents that included a political target, representing 16.39% of all attacks in the study.

Religious and ethnic groups were also targeted by terrorists in the course of the two years of the study. The targeting of locations and individuals associated with religion, particularly in 2016, corresponds with findings from the Global Terrorism Index 2017 which reported that since 2014, attacks on religious targets in OECD countries have almost doubled.¹⁸⁸⁹ Attacks against Christian civilian targets were particularly prominent in 2016, with four such incidents, accounting for 22.22% of all attacks that year targeting a specific civilian group. However, there were no attacks recorded that specifically targeted Christians in 2017. Three of the incidents recorded from 2016 can be accounted for by a two-man anarchist cell operating in the Fermo area of Italy. These incidents failed to cause any casualties. The fourth attack that year, however, was the far more serious Islamist attack in July 2016 in which two Islamic State linked assailants attacked a church at Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray in Normandy, murdering a Catholic Priest during Mass.

The targeting of Muslims by terrorists rose in 2017 compared to 2016. Muslims and Muslim targets were attacked four times in 2017 and only once in 2016. All of these attacks came from the Far Right and, with the exception of one incident in 2017, all involved the targeting of mosques. The first of these incidents was an attempted bombing in the Netherlands. Far more devastating were a number of the attacks in 2017, which included the shooting in January at a mosque in Quebec City, and the vehicular attack on worshippers leaving a mosque in London in June. The Portland train attack began with the harassment of two girls, one in visibly Muslim dress, and escalated to violence being directed against three non-Muslim men who intervened. As a result, attacks targeting Muslims rose from 5.56% of all attacks on a specific civilian group in 2016 to 16.67% of such attacks in 2017.

Additionally, there were two attacks in 2016 that were defined as Takfiri, involving the killing of Muslim individuals by Islamist assailants. These incidents from 2016 both occurred in the United Kingdom and both involved the killing of a specifically identified and targeted victim. Many of the violent incidents assessed for this study that involved attacks on Jewish or Muslim targets were determined to be hate crimes rather than meeting the criteria to be classed as terrorism. One attack from 2016 on a Jewish man in Marseille, France, was recorded by this study as terrorist in nature. April of that year also saw one attack on a Sikh temple in Essen, Germany.

While 2016 witnessed a high number of attacks in which civilians were attacked in relation to their religion and religious beliefs, 2017 saw a rise in attacks in which civilians appear to have been targeted in connection with their race. The figures from 2017 recorded two incidents where civilians were believed to have been the target because they were black, as opposed to no such attacks the year before. There was one attack in which civilians were targeted because they were white, also in contrast to no such attacks recorded in the previous year.

Across the two-year period there was a rise in attacks targeting the military. In 2016 there were two attacks targeting the military, accounting for 3.70% of attacks that year. In 2017, however, this rose to seven attacks against military targets, 10.29% of attacks that year. In addition to these, there was a further attack targeting both the military and civilians in 2017. In total, then, across both years, there were ten attacks involving the military, 8.20% of all attacks in the study.

Police forces were also repeatedly targeted, with 12 attacks exclusively against the police in 2016 and 11 in 2017. These accounted for more than one-fifth (22.22%) of attacks in 2016 and 16.18% of attacks in 2017. In addition to the 12 attacks in 2016 targeting the police only, there were a further four attacks that year in which the police were targeted alongside civilians. Similarly, in 2017, as well as the 11 attacks against the police, there were another eight incidents that involved attacking the police, alongside some form of targeting of civilians. For these incidents in which police were attacked alongside civilians, further research is required to

¹⁸⁸⁹ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017.

determine the degree to which police are being attacked as a primary target, or whether they have more generally been attacked as a secondary target while intervening in attacks targeting other groups. Overall, across both years of the study, there were 35 incidents in which the police were targeted or attacked, representing 28.69% of all attacks recorded in the study.

Table 5.2 Targets by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Civilian - Targeted	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police	3	5.56%	0	0.00%	3	2.46%
Far Left	9	16.67%	14	20.59%	23	18.85%
Civilian - Targeted	7	12.96%	10	14.71%	17	13.93%
Military	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Police	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Police and Civilian - Targeted	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Far Right	3	5.56%	14	20.59%	17	13.93%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	5	7.35%	5	4.10%
Civilian - Targeted	3	5.56%	9	13.24%	12	9.84%
Islamist	36	66.67%	33	48.53%	69	56.56%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	19	35.19%	13	19.12%	32	26.23%
Civilian - Targeted	6	11.11%	1	1.47%	7	5.74%
Military	1	1.85%	6	8.82%	7	5.74%
Military and Civilian Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police	7	12.96%	6	8.82%	13	10.66%
Police and Civilian - Indiscriminate and Civilian - Targeted	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police and Civilian - Targeted	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Police and Civilian Indiscriminate	1	1.85%	4	5.88%	5	4.10%
Unknown	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.56%	6	8.82%	9	7.38%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Police	1	1.85%	4	5.88%	5	4.10%
Police and Civilian Indiscriminate	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Unknown	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

The data indicates that attackers have selected varying targets depending on the ideology that they belong to. Certain ideologies appear to be more inclined to target the authorities by attacking representatives of the state, such as police or members of the armed forces. Others have only targeted specific civilian groups, such as a political group or those from a particular ethnic or religious group. It is also the case that certain ideologies have been more inclined to target civilians indiscriminately than others.

As might be expected, this range of targeting can be seen as reflecting the objectives and ideas that the different ideologies promote. So that, for instance, those with an anti-establishment message or a specific set of political grievances (such as the Far Left and Separatist/Nationalists) may be more inclined to target representatives of the state. Islamist

assailants, whose ideology radically rejects the surrounding culture and sees all those living in the West as legitimate targets, have shown a greater tendency towards mass-casualty attacks that strike civilians indiscriminately. It is, however, the case even with many of the most targeted attacks recorded in the study that the assailants clearly accepted the risk of causing serious injury to other civilian groups who may have been unintended bystanders.

Attacks by the Far Left targeted the police and the military on six occasions, more than one-quarter (26.09%) of all attacks from this ideology. However, more commonly it was civilians that were targeted by the Far Left. In contrast to most other ideologies, none of these incidents targeted civilians indiscriminately; rather, in 19 cases a specific group of civilians was targeted. Most commonly, the targets were political in nature, although there were also Far Left attacks against financial and legal civilian targets. Two anarchists were also responsible for attacking a series of Christian targets in a series of bombings in Italy in 2016.

The Far Right was the only ideology in the study that did not target the police or military. Rather, Far Right assailants have been concerned with targeting minority civilian groups. Indeed, most commonly, attacks by assailants from this ideology were against a specific civilian group, which was the case for 70.59% of attacks by the Far Right. These attacks targeted Muslims, migrants and black people, as well as those singled out as political targets. However, there was an increase in Far Right attacks that appeared to target civilians indiscriminately. In 2016, there were no such attacks. By contrast, in the following year, there were five. It is notable, however, that four of these attacks were perpetrated by assailants who carried out attacks framed to appear as attacks by Islamists in an apparent attempt to provoke negative public feeling.

Islamist attacks were most likely to target civilians indiscriminately. In all, more than half (39 of the 69) Islamist attacks in the study targeted civilians indiscriminately, 56.52% of the total. In ten Islamist attacks, assailants also targeted specific civilian groups. Several of these involved the targeting of religious groups, with Islamists in 2016 carrying out two attacks against Muslims deemed to be apostates, one against Sikhs and another with a Jewish target. That same year an Islamist attack in Belgium targeted a transgender individual. Islamists have also targeted specific civilians for political reasons, as seen with the murder of the elderly couple in Linz for their perceived political affiliations, or the Westminster Bridge attack, which combined an indiscriminate attack on civilians and a police officer with an apparent attempt to reach a civilian political target. The Global Terrorism Index observed a notable increase in attacks on civilian targets in OECD countries between 2014 and 2016,¹⁸⁹⁰ and this may correspond to the rise of Islamic State-linked attacks in these countries during this period.

Islamist attacks also repeatedly targeted the police and the military, sometimes in combination with attacks on civilians, but often exclusively. Across both years, there were eight Islamist attacks in which the military were targeted, 11.59% of attacks by this ideology. Additionally, there were 13 attacks by Islamists that exclusively targeted police, which represented 18.84% of attacks by this group of assailants. A further eight Islamist attacks targeted police along with civilians. Combined, approaching one-third (30.43%) of all Islamist attacks included the targeting of police.

As with the Far Left, Black Supremacist attacks were the only other ideology that did not target civilians indiscriminately. Primarily, this group of assailants targeted police, with three out of the four Black Supremacist attacks having police as a target. The targeting seen here corresponds with the narrative of this ideology which frames attacks on law enforcement officials as a justified retaliatory response to police brutality directed against black people in

¹⁸⁹⁰ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017.

the United States.¹⁸⁹¹ The remaining Black Supremacist attack targeted a specific civilian group – in this case white people in the 2017 Fresno shooting.

Separatist/Nationalist attacks tended to primarily target police, with five of the nine attacks targeting the police exclusively. These incidents relate to attacks by republican dissidents in Northern Ireland that see the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and prison officers as representatives of an illegitimate British presence in Ireland. Another two attacks combined the targeting of both police and civilians. These included an incident in Northern Ireland: the 2017 Londonderry car bombing that, while targeting a police officer, put the officer's family members at significant risk. The 2016 plane hijacking is the one Separatist/Nationalist attack recorded as specifically endangering civilians indiscriminately.

Table 5.3 Targets of attacks by country

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Australia	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police & Civilian Indiscriminate	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Austria	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Civilian – Targeted	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Belgium	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Military	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Police & Civilian – Targeted	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Canada	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Civilian – Targeted	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police & Civilian Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Denmark	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Police	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Finland	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
France	7	12.96%	12	17.65%	19	15.57%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
Civilian – Targeted	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Military	1	1.85%	4	5.88%	5	4.10%
Military & Civilian Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Police & Civilian – Targeted	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Germany	8	14.81%	2	2.94%	10	8.20%
Civilian – Indiscriminate	6	11.11%	1	1.47%	7	5.74%
Civilian – Targeted	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Police	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%

¹⁸⁹¹ '(U//FOUO) Black Identity Extremists Likely Motivated to Target Law Enforcement Officers', *Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Assessment*, 3 August 2017.

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Greece	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
Civilian - Targeted	4	7.41%	5	7.35%	9	7.38%
Police	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police & Civilian - Targeted	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Italy	5	9.26%	4	5.88%	9	7.38%
Civilian - Targeted	3	5.56%	2	2.94%	5	4.10%
Military	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Police	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Malta	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Netherlands	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Civilian - Targeted	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Norway	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Poland	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Police	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Spain	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Police & Civilian Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Sweden	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Civilian - Targeted	2	3.70%	2	2.94%	4	3.28%
United Kingdom	5	9.26%	13	19.12%	18	14.75%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
Civilian - Targeted	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Police	1	1.85%	5	7.35%	6	4.92%
Police & Civilian - Indiscriminate & Civilian - Targeted	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Police & Civilian Indiscriminate	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Unknown		0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
United States	12	22.22%	12	17.65%	24	19.67%
Civilian - Indiscriminate	8	14.81%	3	4.41%	11	9.02%
Civilian - Targeted		0.00%	7	10.29%	7	5.74%
Police	4	7.41%	2	2.94%	6	4.92%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

The targets that terrorists attacked or attempted to attack in different countries tended to reflect the ideologies that were most prevalent in those countries. As noted, Islamist assailants appeared more inclined to carry out attacks targeting civilians indiscriminately and, as such, countries with a higher level of Islamist terrorism tended to see more attacks targeting civilians indiscriminately. This is in line with a long record of Islamist – and more specifically Salafi-jihadist – thinking that has sought to justify the indiscriminate targeting of civilians, particularly those from Western countries.¹⁸⁹² Germany is one example of a country that demonstrates this trend. During the two years covered by the study, Germany experienced ten attacks, of which nine were Islamist. This high level of Islamist attacks corresponds to the fact that seven attacks in Germany involved the indiscriminate attacking of civilians.

¹⁸⁹² Maher, S., *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea* (London: Penguin, 3 August 2017).

The targeting trends are particularly apparent in those countries that experienced terrorism from only one ideology. Both of the attacks in Spain included the indiscriminate targeting of civilians, and both of these were Islamist attacks. Greece and Poland were countries that only experienced attacks and attempted attacks from the Far Left, and accordingly experienced no incidents targeting civilians indiscriminately. While the Far Left regularly targeted civilians, at no point in the two years did Far Left assailants target civilians indiscriminately in an effort to cause a mass-casualty attack.

In some countries, however, it may be that targeting by terrorists was partly influenced by the availability of certain targets. In France and Belgium there is a particular trend of Islamists targeting members of the military. This is explained at least in part by the fact that in response to a rise in terrorism, both countries have the military patrolling in major cities. This is particularly the case in France, which declared an official state of emergency in November 2015 following the Stade De France and Bataclan attacks. Of 19 attacks recorded in France over the two years of the study, six involved the targeting of the military. However, none of these occurred after November 2017, by which point the state of emergency in that country had come to an end.

Types of Attack

Table 6.1 Types of attack

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Attempted Bombing	7	12.96%	4	5.88%	11	9.02%
Bombing	9	16.67%	12	17.65%	21	17.21%
Bombing & Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Foiled Bombing	6	11.11%	8	11.76%	14	11.48%
Foiled Knife	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Foiled Shooting	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Hammer	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Hijacking	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Hostage Taking & Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife	12	22.22%	11	16.18%	23	18.85%
Knife & Club	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Shooting	9	16.67%	8	11.76%	17	13.93%
Shooting & Knife	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Suicide Bombing	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Vehicular	2	3.70%	9	13.24%	11	9.02%
Vehicular & Knife	1	1.85%	5	7.35%	6	4.92%
Vehicular & Shooting	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Figure 6.1 Types of attack





Figure 6.2 Types of attack in 2016 and 2017



The data collected in this study reveals the diversity of the means of attack that terrorists in Western countries are using. As well as methods of attack familiar to terrorism of previous decades – such as bombings, shootings and hijackings – there has been an increase in the use of improvised household objects such as kitchen knives and hammers, as well as the use of vehicles as weapons. Europol's 2018 report on terrorist trends in European Union countries noted of jihadist (Islamist) attacks that, even as the number of these incidents have increased over recent years, their level of sophistication has decreased.¹⁸⁹³

The use and attempted use of explosives for the purpose of carrying out a bombing was a common occurrence in both years. These ranged from highly powerful and sophisticated explosives, particularly those used in suicide bombings which aimed to cause maximum casualties, to basic Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) which had a limited force and were often set to explode at times and in places where the amount of harm they were likely to cause was limited.

Attacks involving bombings and the use of explosives were the most common type of attack in the first year of this study. Of the 54 attacks and attempted attacks in 2016 there were 25 incidents which involved bombings or explosives, 46.30% of attacks that year. This rose by one to 26 of 68 attacks in 2017 involving bombings and attempted bombings, 38.24% of the total. Across both years and all the incidents in the study, 41.80% of all attacks involved bombing or the use of explosives.

Attacks involving shooting continued to represent a significant number of incidents in the two years for which data was gathered by this study. In 2016 there were nine shooting attacks as well as one attack that combined the use of a knife with shooting, and another that combined a vehicular attack with a shooting. These 11 incidents account for 20.37% of attacks that year. In 2017 there were eight shooting attacks, as well as a hostage-taking attack involving a shooting, a bombing attack combined with a shooting, and two foiled shootings. In total, then, incidents involving shootings decreased as a percentage of the overall total to 17.65% of the attacks in 2017.

The Global Terrorism Index 2017 has observed changing terrorist tactics in OECD countries since 2014, with a shift towards the use of unconventional tactics against soft targets, which the report argues can be more effective than some of the more elaborate schemes.¹⁸⁹⁴ In particular, the Global Terrorism Index noted the rise in vehicular attacks since 2014, which corresponds with Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani's call for attacks on Westerners using cars.¹⁸⁹⁵ These trends are also apparent in the findings of this study. While terrorist incidents noted above involving explosives included some of the most sophisticated forms of attacks seen in the study, relatively low-tech knife attacks were also highly prevalent. In 2016 there were 12 knife attacks, accounting for 22.22% of all attacks that year, as well as one incident that involved both a vehicular attack and a knife attack, and an attack that combined shooting with the use of a knife.

Additionally, there was one knife attack that was foiled. In total, in 2016 there were 15 incidents involving the use or attempted use of a knife, accounting for more than one-quarter (27.78%) of attacks that year. In the following year there were 11 knife attacks. Additionally, there were five attacks that involved both vehicles and the use of knives, as well as two attacks combining the use of a knife with a club. One attempted knife attack was also foiled. In all, in 2017 there were 19 incidents involving knives, representing a similar overall figure of more than one-quarter (27.94%) of the attacks that occurred that year.

¹⁸⁹³ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018', *Europol* (2018).

¹⁸⁹⁴ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017.

¹⁸⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

Vehicular attacks stood out in both years as a low-tech method of attack that has the potential to inflict a high number of casualties while also often proving difficult to detect at the planning stage. In 2016 there were two exclusively vehicular attacks, as well as one attack involving a vehicle and a knife assault, and another attack involving a vehicle and a shooting. These attacks involving vehicles accounted for 7.41% of attacks that year. The number of these attacks increased in 2017, with nine attacks which exclusively used a vehicle to attempt to cause casualties. There were also five attacks that combined the use of a vehicle with a knife attack. These 14 vehicular attacks represented one-fifth (20.59%) of attacks that year.

There was not only a rise in the use of vehicles for attacks, but also a rise in the combination of this readily available low-tech method with the equally available and low-tech use of a knife. Despite how rudimentary this form of attack may seem, it was responsible for some of the highest-profile attacks recorded in the study and included the Westminster and London Bridge attacks of 2017 and the Ohio State University attack of November 2016. This form of attack rose from one such attack in 2016 to five in 2017. This dual method of the vehicular-knife attack represented 7.35% of all attacks in 2017 and 4.92% of all attacks over the two-year period.

Another still more low-tech means of attack seen in the study was the use of blunt objects being improvised for violence, such as hammers, clubs or bats. This form of terror attack also rose from 2016 to 2017. In 2016 there was one attack involving a hammer – the murder of an imam in Northern England – accounting for 1.85% of attacks that year. In 2017, this rose to five attacks that included the use of clubs or hammers. These represented 7.35% of all incidents that year. Across both years, these six attacks accounted for 4.92% of attacks in the study. As seen with the attack on police outside Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris in June 2017, an unsophisticated form of attack can still achieve a high impact in terms of publicity. Without causing any fatalities, that incident achieved international news coverage as the Cathedral was put under lockdown and visitors were held there for up to an hour.¹⁸⁹⁶

¹⁸⁹⁶ Sephton, C., 'Notre Dame attacker shouted "this is for Syria" before being shot', *Sky News*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://news.sky.com/story/paris-police-warn-public-to-stay-away-from-notre-dame-cathedral-10906298>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

Table 6.2 Types of attack by number injured and fatalities

	Injured		Fatalities		Total	
	2016	% 2017	2016	% 2017	Injured	Fatalities
Attempted Bombing	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0
Bombing	34	3.44%	1	0.52%	73	1
Bombing & Shooting	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0
Foiled Bombing	1	0.10%	0	0.00%	1	0
Foiled Knife	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0
Foiled Shooting	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	2	0
Hammer	0	0.00%	1	0.52%	6	1
Hijacking	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0
Hostage Taking & Shooting	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	3	1
Knife	28	2.84%	4	2.09%	52	13
Knife & Club	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	1	2
Shooting	66	6.69%	54	28.27%	95	65
Shooting & Knife	0	0.00%	1	0.52%	0	1
Suicide Bombing	355	35.97%	32	16.75%	867	54
Vehicular	436	44.17%	86	45.03%	502	102
Vehicular & Knife	11	1.11%	0	0.00%	247	28
Vehicular & Shooting	56	5.67%	12	6.28%	56	12
Total	987	100.00%	191	100.00%	1905	280
					100.00%	100.00%

Figure 6.3 Types of attack by number injured




Figure 6.4 Types of attack by fatalities





Figure 6.5 Types of attack by number injured and fatalities combined



Across both years, attacks involving vehicles proved to be among both the most lethal and the most dangerous in terms of the number of injuries caused. In 2016, attacks involving vehicles resulted in 98 people killed – 51.31% of all fatalities – and 503 injured, accounting for 50.96% of those injured that year. There were 24.50 fatalities for every attack involving a vehicle in 2016, and 125.75 people injured for each of these. In the following year, attacks involving vehicles caused 44 fatalities, 49.44% of all deaths caused by terrorism in 2017, and 302 injured, which was almost one-third (32.90%) of the total. While there were fewer casualties from vehicular attacks in 2017, the number of attacks involving vehicles increased significantly. As such, in 2017 there were 3.14 fatalities for every vehicular attack, and 21.57 injured for each of these attacks.

In 2016, attacks involving shootings were the second most dangerous method of attack. Incidents involving shooting that year caused 67 fatalities and left 122 injured. This includes one attack combining the use of firearms with a knife, while a gun was also used by Anis Amri to kill the driver of the truck he hijacked as part of the Berlin Christmas market truck attack. That year, attacks involving shootings caused 35.08% of all fatalities and 12.36% of all those injured. Accordingly, in 2016 there were 6.09 fatalities for every incident involving shooting, and 11.09 injured. The following year, casualties from attacks involving guns decreased significantly.

In 2017, there were 11 fatalities caused by attacks involving shooting and 29 injured. These accounted for 12.36% of all fatalities that year and 3.38% of all those injured that year. This decline in the number of fatalities and injuries from shootings compared to the previous year can be explained by the previous year’s figures having been significantly increased by the June 2016 Orlando attack in which 49 were killed and 53 were injured. While there were no

mass-casualty shooting in attacks in 2017, there were eight attacks that year with shootings, as well as another involving both a bombing and a shooting, and another two incidents with foiled shootings. As such, there was one fatality for every incident involving shooting, and 2.81 people injured.

The other form of attack that caused a high number of casualties across the two years of the study was bombing, and particularly suicide bombings. In 2016, three suicide bombings alone caused 32 of the 33 fatalities from bombings that year and injured 355 people. Other bombings that year caused one fatality and left 34 injured, as well as an incident that caused one injury in the course of the foiling of the attempted bombing attack. In 2016, there were 1.32 fatalities and 15.60 people injured for each incident in which terrorists used or attempted to use bombs.

In 2017, bombings caused fewer deaths and injuries, as Salman Abedi's attack in Manchester was the only suicide bombing, although this caused 22 fatalities and left 512 injured. Had Akayed Ullah's attempted pipe bombing in New York or Ahmed Hassan's attempted bombing at Parsons Green gone according to plan, the figures for 2017 would likely have been far higher. The Parsons Green attack still injured 30 people, and this contributed significantly to the figure of 39 injured in other bombing incidents that year. As such, in 2017 there were 0.85 fatalities for every incident in which terrorists used or attempted to use explosives, and there were 21.19 left injured.

Attacks involving knives were another commonly occurring means of attack that caused a large number of casualties. In 2016, attacks involving knives killed five and injured 39. Eleven of those injured were victims in an attack that combined the use of a knife with a vehicle: the 2016 Ohio University attack. One of the fatalities was from an attack that combined the use of a gun with a knife. Overall, this represented 2.62% of all fatalities from terrorism that year, and 3.95% of all injured. There were 14 attacks involving knives in 2016, as well as one foiled knife attack. As such, there were 0.33 fatalities for each incident involving a knife, and 2.60 injured.

In 2017, attacks involving knives and knives with clubs killed 11 and injured 25 people. In addition, five attacks that year combining the use of knives with vehicles killed 28 and injured 236. Of the overall total, incidents in 2017 that included the use of knives caused 43.82% of the fatalities and 28.43% of those injured. That year, there were 2.05 fatalities for each incident involving the use or attempted use of knives, and 13.74 injured for each of these attacks.

Table 6.3 Types of attack by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Shooting	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Far Left	9	16.67%	14	20.59%	23	18.85%
Bombing	5	9.26%	6	8.82%	11	9.02%
Bombing & Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Foiled Bombing	3	5.56%	4	5.88%	7	5.74%
Shooting	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Far Right	3	5.56%	14	20.59%	17	13.93%
Attempted Bombing	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Bombing	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Foiled Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Hammer	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Knife	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shooting & Knife	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Vehicular	0	0.00%	4	5.88%	4	3.28%
Islamist	36	66.67%	33	48.53%	69	56.56%
Attempted Bombing	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Bombing	2	3.70%	2	2.94%	4	3.28%
Foiled Bombing	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Foiled Knife	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Foiled Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Hammer	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Hostage Taking & Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife	12	22.22%	9	13.24%	21	17.21%
Knife & Club	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Shooting	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Suicide Bombing	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Vehicular	2	3.70%	5	7.35%	7	5.74%
Vehicular & Knife	1	1.85%	5	7.35%	6	4.92%
Vehicular & Shooting	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.56%	6	8.82%	9	7.38%
Attempted Bombing	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Bombing	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Foiled Bombing	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
Hijacking	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

There were clear variations between ideologies in terms of the methods of attack. For instance, the only category of assailants to use suicide bombings were Islamists. Just as noticeable was that the only means of attack used by Black Supremacists was shooting. Given that all attacks from this ideology took place in the United States, this could have been driven by the availability of firearms in that country as compared to others in the study. Both the Far Left and Separatist/Nationalists heavily favoured bombing as a means of attack. Among the first of these two ideologies, of 23 Far Left attacks and attempted attacks, 19 involved bombings. Similarly, of nine Separatist/Nationalist incidents, there were seven bombings and attempts to carry out bombing attacks. This trend may be indicative of a strategy on the part of assailants from these two ideologies by which they seek to cause injury and intimidation but wish to avoid being caught or killed in the process of their attacks. An exception to this from the Far Left would seem to be James T. Hodgkinson's June 2017 attack at the Alexandria baseball park, in which he continued to engage in a shootout with the police, suggesting he may have expected to have been killed in his attack.

Of Islamist attacks, the largest proportion involved knives, with 31 such attacks across both years. This represented 44.93% of all Islamist attacks recorded in the study. Attacks using, or attempting to use, explosives made up 27.54% of Islamist incidents, with 19 of these. The use of vehicles was one of the other most common means of attack used by Islamist assailants. There were 14 Islamist attacks using vehicles in the study; these accounted for one-fifth (20.29%) of attacks by this ideology. Shootings were a less-common means of attack for Islamists over the period of the study, with these attacks representing 14.49% of attacks by these assailants. Islamists were also the primary group of attackers to use improvised hard-edged objects as weapons, such as hammers and clubs. These items were used as weapons in the case of four Islamist attacks, representing 5.80% across both years.

Far Right assailants made use of many of the same methods of attack as Islamists. It also appears possible that the Far Right may have adopted methods of attack previously associated specifically with Islamist assailants. There were no vehicular attacks by the Far Right in 2016; however, this rose to four such attacks in 2017, 28.57% of all attacks by the Far Right recorded that year. Two of these involved driving vehicles into crowds at high speed in a manner that replicated previous Islamist attacks; with one of these attacks specifically targeting worshippers leaving a mosque. Two more involved the targeting of trains with attacks that appeared to pose as Islamist in nature, despite the perpetrator being of the Far Right. There were also two Far Right attacks involving an improvised hard-edged object - in this case a hammer - but these were also by a Far Right assailant posing as an Islamist.

There was an increase in Far Right attacks using blades across the two years. One Far Right attack in 2016 combined the use of a knife with shooting, one attack in 2017 used a sword, while a second involved stabbing. The most common means of attack by the Far Right, however, was bombing, with six completed and attempted attacks involving explosives across the two years, 35.29% of these attacks.

Table 6.4 Types of attack by country

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Australia	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Hostage Taking & Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Austria	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife & Club	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Belgium	5	9.26%	2	2.94%	7	5.74%
Attempted Bombing	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Suicide Bombing	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Canada	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Foiled Bombing	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Knife & Club	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Vehicular & Knife	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Vehicular	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Denmark	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shooting	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Finland	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
France	7	12.96%	12	17.65%	19	15.57%
Attempted Bombing	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Bombing	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Foiled Knife	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Foiled Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Hammer	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
Knife	3	5.56%	3	4.41%	6	4.92%
Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Vehicular	2	3.70%	2	2.94%	4	3.28%
Germany	8	14.81%	2	2.94%	10	8.20%
Attempted Bombing	3	5.56%	0	0.00%	3	2.46%
Bombing	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Foiled Bombing	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Suicide Bombing	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Vehicular & Shooting	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Greece	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
Bombing	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
Bombing & Shooting		0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Foiled Bombing	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Shooting	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Italy	5	9.26%	4	5.88%	9	7.38%
Bombing	3	5.56%	2	2.94%	5	4.10%
Foiled Bombing	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Knife	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shooting	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Malta	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Hijacking	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Netherlands	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Attempted Bombing	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Norway	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Foiled Bombing	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Poland	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Foiled Bombing	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Spain	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Vehicular	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Vehicular & Knife	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Sweden	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
Attempted Bombing	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Bombing	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Shooting	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Vehicular	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
United Kingdom	5	9.26%	13	19.12%	18	14.75%
Attempted Bombing	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Bombing	1	1.85%	3	4.41%	4	3.28%
Foiled Bombing	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
Foiled Knife	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Hammer	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Knife	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Shooting & Knife	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Suicide Bombing	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Vehicular	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Vehicular & Knife	0	0.00%	3	4.41%	3	2.46%
United States	12	22.22%	12	17.65%	24	19.67%
Attempted Bombing	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Bombing	1	1.85%	2	2.94%	3	2.46%
Foiled Bombing	2	3.70%	0	0.00%	2	1.64%
Foiled Shooting	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Knife	2	3.70%	3	4.41%	5	4.10%
Shooting	5	9.26%	3	4.41%	8	6.56%
Vehicular	0	0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Vehicular & Knife	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

The types of attack experienced in different countries tended to reflect the ideologies that were most prevalent in those countries. Belgium only suffered Islamist attacks, and it is notable that four of the seven attacks there were knife attacks, which corresponds to knife attacks being the most common method of attack for Islamist assailants. In Greece, where there were only Far Left attacks recorded, nine of the 12 were bombings or attempted bombings. This similarly corresponds to bombing being the most common method of attack for assailants from the Far Left.

France was primarily affected by Islamist attacks during the course of the two years of the study. It is noticeable that seven of the 19 attacks in that country saw the use or attempted use of knives. There were also four attacks in France involving vehicles. Both of these methods were commonly used by Islamists in the two years covered by the study.

In the United Kingdom, of the 18 incidents there, bombing and attempted bombing were the most common form of attack, with eight such attacks in addition to a suicide bombing. One of the eight bombings was carried out by an Islamist. However, these were primarily accounted for by the high level of Separatist/Nationalist terrorism in Northern Ireland.

The United States experienced a wide range of terrorist methods across the two years. The most common means of attack there was shooting, with nine of the 24 incidents there involving firearms. These attacks were not specific to any one ideology, with Black Supremacist, Far Left and Islamist assailants all using guns. It is noticeable, however, that of the incidents recorded in this study, shooting was not a method of attack associated with the Far Right in the United States.

Number of Assailants

Table 7.1 Number of assailants in each attack

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
1	36	66.67%	45	66.18%	81	66.39%
2	10	18.52%	4	5.88%	14	11.48%
3	5	9.26%	7	10.29%	12	9.84%
4	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
5	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Unknown	2	3.70%	11	16.18%	13	10.66%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Figure 7.1 Number of assailants in each attack





Figure 7.2 Number of assailants in each attack in 2016 and 2017

In 2016, the majority of attacks were carried out by lone assailants. In total, 36 incidents that year were recorded as having only one attacker, two-thirds (66.67%) of all attacks that year. In 2017, this increased to 45 attacks with only one assailant, but which again accounted for two-thirds (66.18%) of all incidents that year. Across the two years in the study, there were 81 attacks or attempted attacks involving only one assailant, 66.39% of all incidents.

Other attacks tended to involve two or three assailants. In 2016, ten attacks were recorded that involved two assailants and five attacks with three assailants. The following year, four attacks with two assailants were recorded, and seven incidents with three assailants. Across both years there were 26 attacks that had two or three assailants, representing 21.31% of all incidents recorded in the study.

No attack recorded in the study is known to have had more than five individuals involved, although there were attacks connected to much larger cells, and groups of attackers larger than five responsible for carrying out several attacks, as with the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks in 2017. Similarly, the 2016 Brussels attacks were carried out by a larger cell of attackers also responsible for the 2015 Paris attacks. There was one five-person attack in 2016 and one in 2017. However, there were a number of attacks or attempted attacks where it is not known how many individuals were directly involved in executing the attack. In 2016 there were two such incidents, whereas in 2017 this rose to 11 incidents where we do not know enough about the perpetrators to determine the number of assailants.

Table 7.2 Number of assailants in each attack by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
1	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Far Left	9	16.67%	14	20.59%	23	18.85%
1	2	3.70%	5	7.35%	7	5.74%
2	4	7.41%	3	4.41%	7	5.74%
3	2	3.70%	1	1.47%	3	2.46%
Unknown	1	1.85%	5	7.35%	6	4.92%
Far Right	3	5.56%	14	20.59%	17	13.93%
1	1	1.85%	10	14.71%	11	9.02%
3	1	1.85%	4	5.88%	5	4.10%
5	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Islamist	36	66.67%	33	48.53%	69	56.56%
1	29	53.70%	29	42.65%	58	47.54%
2	5	9.26%	1	1.47%	6	4.92%
3	2	3.70%	2	2.94%	4	3.28%
5	0	0.00%	1	1.47%	1	0.82%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.56%	6	8.82%	9	7.38%
1	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
2	1	1.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Unknown	1	1.85%	6	8.82%	7	5.74%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Islamist attacks were largely conducted by lone actors, as was the case in 58 of the 69 Islamist attacks in the study, which represents 84.06% of all Islamist attacks over the two years. In the case of another six incidents, Islamists attacked in pairs: 8.70% of all Islamist attacks. Four Islamist attacks had three assailants, and one had five. The prevalence of lone-actor terrorism on the part of Islamists in the West during 2016 and 2017 corresponds with calls put out by Islamic State and other jihadists urging Muslim individuals living in the West to undertake attacks by any means available to them. Specific instructions to this effect were issued by Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani in September 2014 and May 2016.¹⁸⁹⁷ The New York bomber Ahmad Khan Rahimi directly cited al-Adnani's call.¹⁸⁹⁸ A decade earlier, in 2004, Abu Mus'ab Al Suri had promoted similar tactics in his online text: *The Global Islamic Resistance Call*.¹⁸⁹⁹

Similarly, Far Right attacks were most likely to have only one assailant, as was the case in 11 of 17 such attacks, representing 64.71% of all attacks by the Far Right. There has been a long legacy of lone-actor terrorism by the Far Right in Western countries, with prominent past cases such as Oklahoma bomber Timothy McVeigh and Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik. In the 1980s, White Supremacists in the United States pioneered a "leaderless resistance" carried out by small or one-man cells.¹⁹⁰⁰ In the mid-1990s, Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis of the White

¹⁸⁹⁷ 'Islamic State calls for attacks on the West during Ramadan in audio message', *Reuters*, 21 May 2016, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-islamicstate/islamic-state-calls-for-attacks-on-the-west-during-ramadan-in-audio-message-idUSKCNOYCOOG>, last visited: 6 October 2018.

¹⁸⁹⁸ 'Chelsea Bomber Ahmad Khan Rahimi Sentenced to Life in Prison for Executing September 2016 Bombing and Attempted Bombing in New York City', *The United States Department of Justice*, 13 February 2018, available at: <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chelsea-bomber-ahmad-khan-rahimi-sentenced-life-prison-executing-september-2016-bombing-and>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁸⁹⁹ Wright, L., "The Master Plan: For the new theorists of jihad, Al Qaeda is just the beginning", *The New Yorker*, 11 September 2006, available at: <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/09/11/the-master-plan>, last visited 15 October 2018.

¹⁹⁰⁰ Burke, J., 'The myth of the "lone wolf" terrorist', *The Guardian*, 30 March 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/mar/30/myth-lone-wolf-terrorist>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

Aryan Resistance distributed a series of instructions online for a Far Right “Lone Wolf” insurgency in America.¹⁹⁰¹ In addition to the Far Right lone-actor attacks recorded in this study, a further five Far Right attacks were carried out by groups of three assailants; however, three of these were perpetrated by the same three-man cell in Gothenburg, while the other two were carried out by the White Rabbit Militia in Illinois. Additionally, there was one Far Right attack in the Netherlands in 2016 by a five-person group.

Compared to Islamist and Far Right terrorism, Far Left attacks were more likely to be carried out by more than one assailant. Of the 23 Far Left attacks, seven are recorded as only having had one assailant: 30.43% of all such attacks. Another seven Far Left attacks had two assailants, while three are recorded as having had three assailants. In a further six Far Left attacks the number of assailants remains unknown.

Black Supremacist was the only ideology where all identified assailants acted as independent lone actors. This could be because this ideology lacks a well-established network of violent extremists who would carry out attacks in groups. However, the amount of data collected by this study on these attacks is too small to draw more far-reaching conclusions at this stage.


Based on what little is known about the assailants responsible for Separatist/Nationalist attacks recorded in this study, one attack is believed to have had one assailant, while another had two. Both of these were carried out in 2016. It is the case that a number of the Separatist/Nationalist attacks recorded here were either claimed by or linked back to Irish republican dissident organisations, which might suggest that this form of terrorism is not primarily caused by lone actors. Again, however, the data is too limited to make further claims.

Organisations

Table 8.1 Number of attacks by organisation

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Al Qaeda	0	0.00%	1	0.82%	1	0.82%
Arm na Poblachta	0	0.00%	1	0.82%	1	0.82%
Conspiracy Cells of Fire	1	0.82%	5	4.10%	6	4.92%
Independent Actors	12	9.84%	18	14.75%	30	24.59%
Informal Anarchist Federation	1	0.82%	2	1.64%	3	2.46%
Islamic State & Al Qaeda	4	3.28%	1	0.82%	5	4.10%
Islamic State	26	21.31%	24	19.67%	50	40.98%
New Al-Fateh	1	0.82%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
New IRA	1	0.82%	3	2.46%	4	3.28%
Nordic Resistance Movement	1	0.82%	2	1.64%	3	2.46%
Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH)	0	0.00%	1	0.82%	1	0.82%
Radical Allotments	1	0.82%	0	0.00%	1	0.82%
Revolutionary Self-Defence	2	1.64%	2	1.64%	4	3.28%
Revolutionary Struggle	0	0.00%	1	0.82%	1	0.82%
The People’s Fighters Group (OLA)	1	0.82%	2	1.64%	3	2.46%
Unknown	3	2.46%	3	2.46%	6	4.92%
White Rabbit Militia	0	0.00%	2	1.64%	2	1.64%
Total	54	44.26%	68	55.74%	122	100.00%

¹⁹⁰¹ Ibid.

Figure 8.1 Number of attacks by organisation

In terms of organisations, the attacks recorded in the study can be divided into three categories. First, those that are believed to have been carried out by a terrorist organisation, either because there was a reliable claim of responsibility by a group or because there was other evidence linking the assailant to a terrorist or extremist group. Second, those that were committed by a lone individual or a group of individuals operating independently of a terrorist organisation or extremist group. Third, those for which it is unknown whether they were carried out by lone attackers or by an organisation.

The terrorist organisation that stands out most prominently in the study is Islamic State. There were 26 attacks in 2016 that were either directed by or linked to Islamic State. These accounted for close to half (48.15%) of all attacks in the West that year. This declined in 2017 to 24 attacks, accounting for 35.29% of all attacks that year. Additionally, there were a number of attacks by assailants who are believed to have been inspired by both Al Qaeda and Islamic State, with four such attacks carried out by Ahmad Khan Rahimi in the United States in 2016, and one attack in Australia in 2017. Additionally, there was one incident in the study carried out by an individual connected with Al Qaeda; the foiled Whitehall stabbing in April 2017. The assailant – Khalid Mohammed Omar Ali – is not known to have claimed any inspiration from Islamic State.

Far Left anarchist groups operating in Greece and Italy accumulatively accounted for the next largest number of attacks. Conspiracy Cells of Fire is believed to have been responsible for one attack in Greece in 2016, and the following year members of the group are thought to have carried out three attacks in Greece, one in France and one in Germany. These five attacks represent 7.35% of all terrorism that year. This increase in violent activities by this organisation corresponds with so-called “Operation Nemesis”, by which Conspiracy Cells of Fire announced

its return to violence as of October 2016.¹⁹⁰² The second most represented Far Left group was Revolutionary Self-Defence, which was linked to two attacks in 2016 and two in 2017. All of these attacks occurred in Greece and accounted for 3.28% of attacks in the study.

With only a couple of exceptions, Far Right attacks tended to be carried out by independent lone actors. One exception to this was the White Rabbit Militia in the United States, a small cell of three or four individuals who carried out a bombing and an attempted bombing in 2017. The only other Far Right organisation that may be relevant here is the Nordic Resistance Movement in Sweden, where one attack in 2016 and two attacks in 2017 were carried out by a cell of individuals affiliated with that organisation. However, in contrast with the Far Left groups in the study, there is no evidence to indicate that this organisation in any way directed these attacks.

In 2016, 12 attacks were carried out by either an independent lone actor or groups of independent actors who did not reveal any indication of being clearly directed, affiliated or inspired by an established terrorist or extremist group. These attacks represented 22.22% of all attacks that year. The following year there were 18 attacks by independent lone actors or groups of independent actors, representing more than one-quarter (26.47%) of attacks in 2017. This increase over the two years of this study is in line with findings from the Global Terrorism Index for 2017, which noted the rise in lone-actor terrorism in OECD countries over the past decade, with a noticeable year-on-year increase running through 2014, 2015 and 2016.¹⁹⁰³


There were six attacks recorded in this study where it was not possible to determine whether or not the perpetrators were lone actors or linked to terrorist organisations.

Claims of Responsibility

Table 9.1 Number of attacks claimed by terrorist groups


	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Yes	20	37.04%	24	35.29%	44	36.07%
No	22	40.74%	26	38.24%	48	39.34%
Not Applicable	12	22.22%	18	26.47%	30	24.59%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

Figure 9.1 Number of attacks claimed by terrorist groups



¹⁹⁰² Papadimitriou, J., 'A new generation of Greek terrorists', *DW*, 21 March 2017, available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/a-new-generation-of-greek-terrorists/a-38058747>, last visited: 17 September 2018.

¹⁹⁰³ Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017.

Figure 9.2 Attacks claimed by terrorist groups in 2016 and 2017

Many of the attacks in the study were carried out by independent lone actors or a small number of self-directed individuals (usually three or fewer) who had no known or suspected connections with any wider network or movement. Other incidents, however, either were known to have been carried out by formalised terrorist groups or are suspected to have been carried out by such groups. These groups have sometimes publicly claimed responsibility for the attacks they have conducted, and on occasions claimed attacks that those affiliated with them have conducted in their name.

In recent years there have also been a number of attacks, specifically by Islamist assailants, that have been claimed by Islamic State – with the group often describing the attacker as one of its “soldiers” – but about which there is considerable scepticism regarding whether or not the perpetrators had any direct communication with that organisation. Islamic State put out a claim of this nature following Khalid Masood’s Westminster Bridge attack,¹⁹⁰⁴ and while police believe there was a “pro-Islamic State” element to Masood’s motive,¹⁹⁰⁵ there has so far been a lack of evidence demonstrating that he had had any direct interaction with the group. The April 2017 Champs-Élysées shooting placed further doubt on the validity of Islamic State claims, when the group appeared to name the wrong man as the assailant in that attack.¹⁹⁰⁶

The number of attacks being claimed by terrorist groups remained broadly consistent across 2016 and 2017. In 2016 there were 20 attacks for which terror groups put out claims of

¹⁹⁰⁴ Dearden, L., ‘Westminster attack: Details of jihadi manifesto sent by Khalid Masood minutes before atrocity revealed’, *The Independent*, 28 March 2018, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/westminster-attack-khalid-masood-jihadi-manifesto-report-details-message-whatsapp-a8278616.html>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹⁰⁵ Hill, M., ‘The Westminster Bridge Terrorist Attack: 22nd March 2017: Operation Classific: A Report on the use of Terrorism Legislation’, *Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation*, February 2018, available at: <https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/IRTL-Westminster-Bridge-Attack-Report-March-2018..pdf>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹⁰⁶ ‘Paris Champs Elysees attack gunman named as Karim Cheurfi’, *BBC News*, 21 April 2017, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39671542>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

responsibility; these represented 37.04% of all attacks that year. Of the 34 incidents that year that were not claimed, 12 concerned independent lone actors and were classed as not applicable to being claimed by a group. The remaining 22 incidents, 40.74% of the total, which may have been connected to a terrorist group, are not known to have been claimed.

In 2017, the number of attacks claimed by a group rose, with 24 attacks claimed, but fell as a percentage of the annual total, to 35.29% of all incidents that year. Another 44 incidents were not recorded as being claimed by any group, 18 of which were judged to have been the work of independent lone actors rather than formal terror groups.

There were also 26 unclaimed attacks in 2017 that may have been the work of an established group, accounting for 38.24% of the total. Across both years, there were 44 incidents for which claims of responsibility are known to have been put out, 36.07% of all incidents recorded in the study.

Table 9.2 Claimed attacks by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Yes	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
No	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Applicable	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Far Left	9	16.67%	14	20.59%	23	18.85%
Yes	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
No	2	3.70%	5	7.35%	7	5.74%
Not Applicable	3	5.56%	1	1.47%	4	3.28%
Far Right	3	5.56%	14	20.59%	17	13.93%
Yes	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
No	1	1.85%	4	5.88%	5	4.10%
Not Applicable	2	3.70%	10	14.71%	12	9.84%
Islamist	36	66.67%	33	48.53%	69	56.56%
Yes	14	25.93%	11	16.18%	25	20.49%
No	18	33.33%	16	23.53%	34	27.87%
Not Applicable	4	7.41%	6	8.82%	10	8.20%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.56%	6	8.82%	9	7.38%
Yes	2	3.70%	5	7.35%	7	5.74%
No	1	1.85%	1	1.47%	2	1.64%
Not Applicable	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

The data indicates that certain ideologies are more likely to claim responsibility for an attack than others. However, to some degree this may be impacted by the extent to which an ideology has a large number of attacks perpetrated by groups as opposed to independent lone actors. Of the nine Far Left attacks in 2016, four were claimed by a group: 44.44%. In 2017 this rose, with eight of the 14 Far Left attacks that year being claimed by a group: 57.14%. The higher number of Far Left attacks being claimed may partly be explained by the fact that in the absence of an identified or apprehended assailant, a number of these attacks were determined as terrorist in nature precisely because there was a claim of responsibility establishing ideological intent.

The same applies for Separatist/Nationalist attacks, where a similar absence of identified or apprehended assailants meant that several attacks were identified as warranting inclusion precisely because there was a claim of responsibility by a terrorist group. As such, two of the

three Separatist/Nationalist attacks in 2016 were recorded as being claimed by a group, and this rose further in 2017, with five of the six attacks being claimed.

Among Islamist attacks, the number being claimed reduced over the two years. In the first year, 14 of the 36 Islamist attacks in 2016 were claimed by an organisation, accounting for 38.89% of Islamist attacks that year. In 2017, 11 of the 33 Islamist attacks were claimed, one-third of these incidents.

No attack associated with the Far Right was claimed by a group. However, many of these were carried out by individuals not affiliated to or connected with any extremist or terrorist organisation. Indeed, of 14 Far Right attacks in 2017, ten were perpetrated by independent lone actors. Equally, no Black Supremacist attack was claimed by a group in either year, and this should also be seen in the context of all four assailants from this ideology being independent lone actors.

The Assailants

Gender of Assailants

Table 10.1 Assailants by gender

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Female	3	5.36%	1	1.64%	4	3.42%
Male	53	94.64%	60	98.36%	113	96.58%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 10.1 Assailants by gender





Figure 10.2 Assailants by gender in 2016 and 2017



During both 2016 and 2017, the overwhelming majority of identified assailants were male. In 2017, all but one of the assailants recorded in the study were male. In 2016, 94.64% of the attackers were male. The 5.36% of female assailants from 2016 are accounted for by just three individuals; two from the same all-female Islamist cell that attempted to carry out a car bombing near Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris.

It is possible that some of the unknown assailants were female, although there is no evidence that would support that speculation. While the data here points to an extremely low level of female engagement with direct terrorist violence, the figures from 2017 in particular should not be taken as an indication that women have almost no involvement in terrorism. There have been numerous examples of women being arrested and imprisoned for plotting to perpetrate acts of terrorism, as well as for playing an assisting role in terror networks, or for attempting to undertake travel for terrorist purposes. In recent years, women appear to have been involved in the terrorism associated with most of the ideologies covered in this report. In Europe, terror groups on both the Far Right and Far Left have included women, and there have been high-profile cases of women occupying prominent positions within the anarchist terror groups in Southern Europe, such as Panagiota Roupa, the leader of Revolutionary Struggle in Greece.¹⁹⁰⁷

While there are plenty of examples of women being involved with terrorism, it is still the case that men appear to be consistently over-represented in all terrorist activity. Previous Henry Jackson Society research into Islamic State-associated plots and attacks in Western countries in 2014 and 2015 also found that 97% of assailants and plotters were male.¹⁹⁰⁸ To take acts of Islamist terrorism in the United Kingdom as a further example, a report by the Henry Jackson Society that gathered data on all Islamist-related offences between 1998 and 2015 found that 93% of offenders were male.¹⁹⁰⁹ The findings in this current study reflect a similar trend. Given that the present study focussed only on those who either carried out violent acts or attempted to do so, and given that this report found men to be even more heavily represented, it appears that there may be a correlation between gender and involvement with terrorist violence.

This trend of assailants being predominantly male appears to be reflected across all five ideological strands recorded in this study. According to data from Europol, in 2017 there were 1,219 terrorism-related arrests across European Union (EU) member states, of which 638 were male and 123 were female.¹⁹¹⁰ Similar trends appear in the court proceedings for these countries. In 2016, terrorism-related court proceedings were concluded against 580 individuals, of which 53 were female.¹⁹¹¹ The following year, these countries concluded terrorism-related court proceedings against 569 individuals, of which 66 were female.¹² Notably, in 2016 there were an equal number of female defendants in connection with Separatist terrorism as jihadist (Islamist) terrorism.¹⁹¹³ By 2017, however, jihadist-related cases were recorded as having overtaken Separatist cases to make up the majority of court proceedings involving female

¹⁹⁰⁷ Magra, I., 'Greece's Most-Wanted Terrorist, on Run Since 2012, Is Arrested and Charged', *The New York Times*, 5 January 2017, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/world/europe/panagiota-roupa-arrested-athens.html>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

¹⁹⁰⁸ Simcox, R., "'We Will Conquer Your Rome": A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West', *The Henry Jackson Society*, 2015, available at: <http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ISIS-brochure-Web.pdf>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹⁰⁹ Stuart, H., 'Islamist Terrorism: Analysis of Offences and Attacks in the UK (1998–2015)', *The Henry Jackson Society*, 5 March 2017, available at: <https://henryjacksonsociety.org/publications/islamist-terrorism-analysis-of-offences-and-attacks-in-the-uk-1998-2015/>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹¹⁰ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018', *Europol* (2018).

¹⁹¹¹ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017', *Europol* (2017), available at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹¹² 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018', *Europol* (2018).

¹⁹¹³ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017', *Europol* (2017).


defendants.¹⁹¹⁴ Overall, the trends on gender appear clear, but further research would be required to ascertain why women are drastically under-represented among perpetrators of terrorist violence in Western countries.

Age of Assailants


Table 11.1 Assailants by age group

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Under 18	8	14.29%	5	8.20%	13	11.11%
18-20	6	10.71%	6	9.84%	12	10.26%
21-24	11	19.64%	8	13.11%	19	16.24%
25-29	13	23.21%	16	26.23%	29	24.79%
30-34	8	14.29%	8	13.11%	16	13.68%
35-39	0	0.00%	9	14.75%	9	7.69%
40-44	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
45 +	3	5.36%	8	13.11%	11	9.40%
Undisclosed	5	8.93%	0	0.00%	5	4.27%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 11.1 Assailants by age group



¹⁹¹⁴ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017', *Europol* (2017).

Figure 11.2 Assailants by age group in 2016 and 2017

The ages of assailants recorded in the study ranged from as young as 12, while the oldest was 70. There were also five individuals whose ages were not disclosed by the authorities and so it is possible that one of these individuals was of an age that fell outside of this range. Most assailants were relatively young. Of the 112 cases of assailants whose ages were recorded in each of the years combined, 73 of these were 29 or younger, a total of 65.18% of assailants recorded in the two years of the study.

Nevertheless, the data does not point to the assailants being primarily youths or teenagers, and indicates that many young adults and those in middle age were also responsible for committing attacks. This stands in contrast to Henry Jackson Society research on Islamic State-associated plots and attacks in the West in 2014 and 2015 which found that almost three-quarters (74%) of assailants were under 25 and 17% were teenagers.¹⁹¹⁵ Combining the data on assailants recorded in each year of the present study, only 37.61% of cases were under 25. Furthermore, more than one-third (34.82%) of the total were 30 or older. Indeed, the most commonly occurring ages for assailants were 29 and 30, with ten cases recorded as aged 29 and another eight recorded as aged 30. The most common age bracket was between 25 and 29, with 29 recorded cases of assailants in this category.

As a further indication that terrorist violence is not simply a problem that primarily concerns the very young, the study found only 13 cases of assailants recorded in 2016 and 2017 that

¹⁹¹⁵ Simcox, R., "“We Will Conquer Your Rome”: A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West", *The Henry Jackson Society*, 2015.

were under 18 years of age, 11.61% of the total of each year combined. Another 12 instances were recorded of assailants being between 18 and 20 years of age. A total of 16.96% of assailants, or 19 individuals, were in the age bracket 21 to 24. In the age bracket 30 to 34 there were 16 individuals, or 14.29% of the total. There were nine cases recorded in the age category 35 to 39 and only three in the category 40 to 44, the least represented of any age group. This rises again in the 45 and older category, with 11 instances recorded in this age group.

Inasmuch as it is possible to talk about the average assailant, when the data from the two years is combined, the average age is 28.53. Individuals from the 2017 attacks were on average older than those in 2016. In the first year the average age of assailants was 25.82, while in 2017 this rose to an average of 30.79 years of age. What may be more useful is to consider the ages of the assailants in terms of the range within which they are more likely to be found. In this regard, when assailants recorded in each year are combined, it is possible to see a particular cluster of individuals in the age bracket between 19 and 31 years of age, with 62.50% of cases falling within this category.

Table 11.2 Age of assailants by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
22	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
25	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
39	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Far Left	5	8.93%	4	6.56%	9	7.69%
17	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
25	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
29	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
30	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
31	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
44	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
66	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Far Right	9	16.07%	14	22.95%	23	19.66%
17	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
20	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
22	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
23	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
26	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
27	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
28	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
29	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
35	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
47	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
50	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
53	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
70	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Undisclosed	5	8.93%	0	0.00%	5	4.27%

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Islamist	37	66.07%	42	68.85%	79	67.52%
12	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
15	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
16	3	5.36%	1	1.64%	4	3.42%
17	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
18	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
19	4	7.14%	1	1.64%	5	4.27%
20	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
21	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
22	2	3.57%	4	6.56%	6	5.13%
23	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
24	4	7.14%	1	1.64%	5	4.27%
25	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
26	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
27	2	3.57%	3	4.92%	5	4.27%
28	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
29	3	5.36%	5	8.20%	8	6.84%
30	2	3.57%	4	6.56%	6	5.13%
31	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
32	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
33	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
36	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
37	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
39	0	0.00%	4	6.56%	4	3.42%
40	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
43	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
49	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
52	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
54	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
25	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
45	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

There is some variation in the age of assailants between ideologies. However, it is important to note that with some ideologies having relatively few identified assailants recorded in the study, the statistics on age in those categories can be easily impacted by only one or two individuals. Equally, other ideology categories, such as Islamists, have a relatively large number of assailants identified. These have contributed more significantly to the trends.

Among known Islamist attackers, the overall trends in age were broadly replicated, with an increase in the age of these individuals over the two-year period. In 2016 there were 37 Islamist assailants with an average age between them of 23.84 years. This was moderately younger than the average age for all assailants in 2016, which was 25.83. This rose in 2017, with the average for the 42 Islamist assailants being 29.10. Again, this was only slightly younger than the overall assailant average for 2017, which was 30.79 years.

Islamist assailants did include some of the youngest attackers in the study, including the youngest; an unnamed 12-year-old responsible for two attempted bombings in Ludwigshafen, Germany in December 2016. Across both years, three 15-year-olds and four 16-year-olds were among the Islamist attackers. However, in 2017 there were a number of older Islamist assailants,

including 54-year-old Mohamed H. Khalid who murdered an elderly couple in Linz, Austria, and the 52-year-old Westminster Bridge attacker Khalid Masood.

Far Right assailants tended to be older, although the number of assailants is more limited. This is particularly the case for 2016, where the study only recorded the ages of four of nine known Far Right assailants for that year. The Far Right assailants had the widest age range and included the oldest accused assailant: a 70-year-old accused of the Czech train attacks in the summer of 2017. However, Far Right assailants also included an unnamed 17-year-old accused of a series of attacks in France's Dijon region, as well as three 20-year-olds across the two years. In 2016, the Far Right assailant had an average age of 36.50. In the following year this saw a decrease, with the 14 Far Right assailants giving an average age of 32.93 years of age.

The data about the Far Left is also limited, with only a small number of identified assailants recorded in the study. However, similar to those on the Far Right, those on the Far Left recorded quite a wide range of ages. The youngest here was a 17-year-old who was part of a Warsaw anarchist cell responsible for an attempted attack in the Polish capital in 2016. The oldest Far Left assailant was 66-year-old James T. Hodgkinson, who was responsible for attempting to assassinate a Republican congressman in June 2017. In 2016, the average age of the five recorded Far Left assailants was 29.40, higher than the average for that year. In 2017, the number of Far Left individuals recorded in the study reduced further, to four, with an average age of 39. While this figure was raised by Hodgkinson's age, the youngest Far Left individual in the study that year was 29, the Greek anarchist Constantinos Yiagtzoglou.


The number of identified assailants from the Black Supremacist and Separatist/Nationalists ideologies with a recorded age was even smaller. Of Black Supremacist attackers, both of the two 2016 individuals were in their twenties: one was 22 while the other was 25. In 2017, the one recorded Black Supremacist assailant – the suspect in the Fresno shooting – was 39. With regard to Separatist/Nationalists, a 25-year-old and a 45-year-old were recorded 2016, while no identified assailants from this ideology were recorded in 2017.

Place of Residence of Assailants

Table 12.1 Number of assailants with a different place of residence from place of attack

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Same	43	76.79%	35	57.38%	78	66.67%
Different	13	23.21%	26	42.62%	39	33.33%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 12.1 Proportion of assailants with a different place of residence from place of attack in 2016 and 2017



The data on where assailants lived and where they committed their attacks suggests that attackers are more likely to carry out terror attacks in the places in which they live, rather than travelling to another location for the purpose of perpetrating an attack. In 2016, 43 of 56 identified assailants committed their attack in the town or the city in which they were living at the time. This represents more than three-quarters (76.79%) of all assailants that year. In 2017, the figure fell moderately, with 35 of 61 assailants recorded in the study having carried out attacks in their own place of residence. This represents 57.38% of all attackers, still more than half.


Additional research would be required to gain greater insight into why the majority of attackers in Western countries perpetrated their attacks in the places where they were already resident. One possibility is that suitable targets existed in the locations where the assailants already lived, creating no necessity to travel any further. Arguably, those individuals who specifically intended to carry out attacks in high-profile locations, such as in capital cities or at landmarks, and who did not already live in one of these cities, would have had reason to travel. However, it is apparent that, for many assailants, targets such as these were not essential and they were prepared to carry out their attacks at lower-profile locations.

Country of Origin

Table 13.1 Number of assailants with a different country of origin from that of the attack

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Same	39	69.64%	33	54.10%	72	61.54%
Different	17	30.36%	28	45.90%	45	38.46%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 13.1 Proportion of assailants with a different country of origin from that of the attack in 2016 and 2017



The figures on identified assailants provide an indication of the degree to which terror attacks have occurred in Western countries either as a result of so-called “home-grown” extremism or from individuals who have travelled from overseas. The data here does not necessarily answer where an assailant was when they came to adopt more extreme beliefs, but it does provide an outline of the proportion of attackers who originally came from a country other than the one in which they perpetrated their attack. Further investigation into the period of time between an individual’s arrival in a Western country and the time that they carried out an attack could help to provide a better understanding of terrorist incidents associated with those who have travelled or migrated from overseas. However, recent research from The Heritage Foundation examining Islamist terrorism in Europe by those who had arrived in the region as asylum seekers since 2014 found that in more than half of cases radicalisation had already taken place

abroad.¹⁹¹⁶ Accordingly, that report indicated that nearly three-quarters of those recorded had either carried out their attack or had had their plot foiled within two years of arrival in Europe.¹⁹¹⁷

According to the data gathered, in 2016 there were 17 individuals from the identified assailants who committed their attacks in a country other than the one from which they originated. This represents almost one-third (30.36%) of the total for that year. By 2017, however, this had grown closer to half of all attackers identified in the study: 28 of the 61 assailants had a different country of origin, or 45.90% of the overall total for that year. Across both years, 72 out of 117 assailants carried out attacks in their own country of origin. Accordingly, more than half, or 61.54%, of assailants carried out an attack while in their own country of origin, while a significant minority of 38.46% of assailants were carrying out attacks in countries to which they had travelled or migrated to at some previous date.

Table 13.2 Number of assailants with a different country of origin by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
Same	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
Different	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Far Left	5	8.93%	4	6.56%	9	7.69%
Same	5	8.93%	4	6.56%	9	7.69%
Different	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Far Right	9	16.07%	14	22.95%	23	19.66%
Same	9	16.07%	14	22.95%	23	19.66%
Different	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Islamist	37	66.07%	42	68.85%	79	67.52%
Same	22	39.29%	14	22.95%	36	30.77%
Different	15	26.79%	28	45.90%	43	36.75%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.36%		0.00%	3	2.56%
Same	1	1.79%		0.00%	1	0.85%
Different	2	3.57%		0.00%	2	1.71%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

The degree to which an assailant is more or less likely to be committing attacks in their own country of origin varies considerably depending upon the ideological leanings of the assailant. In 2016 there was one Separatist/Nationalist attack that featured two assailants from a different country of origin. It is relevant to note, however, that this involved the hijacking of a plane, diverting it to Malta and bringing the two Libyan assailants to that country, although that was not where they were residing at the time and it was not where the attack originated from.

Another instance, this time involving a series of Far Left attacks across several countries, represents a case in which an accused assailant remained in their own country of origin while dispatching a series of letter bombs to locations in other Western countries. However, with the assailant having also carried out attacks in his own country and having not travelled to the other countries in which these attacks occurred, this has not been recorded as an example of an assailant who came from a different country of origin. Far Right and Black Supremacist assailants were far more static. All of the Far Right assailants recorded were living in and committed their attacks in their own country of origin. Two Far Right assailants in the study

¹⁹¹⁶ Simcox, R., 'The Asylum-Terror Nexus: How Europe Should Respond', *The Heritage Foundation*, 18 June 2018, available at: <https://www.heritage.org/terrorism/report/the-asylum-terror-nexus-how-europe-should-respond>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹¹⁷ Ibid.

travelled from their native Sweden to Russia to undergo paramilitary training in Russia; however, they returned to Gothenburg before carrying out their attacks. There have also been reports of Far Right groups and activists from Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, being increasingly active in the UK.¹⁹¹⁸ No assailant in this study was linked back to those circles, however. This same trend of Far Right assailants committing attacks in their own country of origin was true of the small number of known assailants associated with Black Supremacism.

Among the Islamist assailants, however, a significant number in both years had an alternative country of origin to the country in which they carried out their attacks. In 2016, of 37 recorded Islamist assailants, 15 had travelled from a different country of origin. Accordingly, 40.54% of all known Islamist assailants in 2016 had come from another country of origin prior to committing an attack. In the following year, the study recorded a higher number of identified Islamist assailants. In total, 42 Islamist assailants were identified in the study for that year. Of these, 28 had a different country of origin from the one in which they carried out their attack. This means that well over half (66.67%) of these assailants had travelled from overseas before committing their attacks.

This is not to detract from the importance of so-called “home-grown” radicalisation of Islamist terrorists in the West. Previous Henry Jackson Society research on Islamic State-linked plots and attacks in the West in 2014 and 2015 found that two-thirds (66%) of assailants were citizens of the countries in which they carried out attacks, although that work did not detail whether any of these had originated from a different country prior to gaining citizenship.¹⁹¹⁹ The significance of terrorism carried out by individuals in their own country of origin has also been made apparent by Henry Jackson Society research on Islamist terrorist offences in the UK between 1998 and 2015. That work found that a majority (67%) of Islamist terrorism offenders were born or raised in the UK.¹⁹²⁰

Nevertheless, the research from The Heritage Foundation cited previously noted the considerable impact that just 44 individuals from overseas have had on Islamist terrorism in Europe since 2014.¹⁹²¹ Significantly, that research found that the majority of plots and attacks in Europe involving individuals who had come to the region as asylum seekers in that time period had some direct link to Islamic State.¹⁹²² As that work observed, this ties into a wider phenomenon since 2015 by which Islamic State has acted to exploit the refugee routes between Syria and Europe to allow its members to travel back and forth.¹⁹²³

Assailants and terrorism offenders in the United States have also had their ranks bolstered by individuals who have travelled from overseas. A report released at the beginning of 2018 by the Departments for Justice and Homeland Security reported that three out of four individuals convicted of “international terrorism” in the United States between 2001 and 2016 had been born in another country.¹⁹²⁴ It should be noted, however, that it has been suggested that as many as 90 of the 549 convictions in the report were of individuals who had been arrested overseas and brought to the United States to stand trial.¹⁹²⁵

¹⁹¹⁸ Collins, M. and N. Lowels, ‘Polish Extremists Active in the UK’, *Hope Not Hate*, 2018, available at:

<https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/research/state-of-hate-2018/violence/polish-extremists/>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹¹⁹ Simcox, R., ‘“We Will Conquer Your Rome”: A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West’, *The Henry Jackson Society*, 2015.

¹⁹²⁰ Stuart, H., ‘Islamist Terrorism: Analysis of Offences and Attacks in the UK (1998–2015)’, *The Henry Jackson Society*, 5 March 2017.

¹⁹²¹ Simcox, R., ‘The Asylum-Terror Nexus: How Europe Should Respond’, *The Heritage Foundation*, 18 June 2018.

¹⁹²² *Ibid.*


¹⁹²³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹²⁴ ‘Departments of Homeland Security and Justice Release Data for the First Time on Terrorism-Related Activity’, *Homeland Security*, 16 January 2018, available at: <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/01/16/dhs-doj-report-three-out-four-individuals-convicted-international-terrorism-and>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹²⁵ Ainsley, J. and R. Windrem, ‘New report says most U.S. terrorists foreign born, but check the fine print’, *NBC News*, 16 January 2018, available at: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-report-says-most-u-s-terrorists-foreign-born-check-n838041>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

Table 13.3 Number of assailants by country of origin

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Afghanistan	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Algeria	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
Australia	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
Bangladesh	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Belgium	4	7.14%	0	0.00%	4	3.42%
Bosnia	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Canada	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Egypt	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
France	5	8.93%	7	11.48%	12	10.26%
Germany	6	10.71%	0	0.00%	6	5.13%
Greece	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Guinea	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Iraq	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Italy	2	3.57%	3	4.92%	5	4.27%
Kenya	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Libya	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
Morocco	1	1.79%	10	16.39%	11	9.40%
Netherlands	5	8.93%	0	0.00%	5	4.27%
Pakistan	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
Poland	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Russia	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Somalia	1	1.79%	4	6.56%	5	4.27%
Spain	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Sweden	4	7.14%	3	4.92%	7	5.98%
Syria	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
Tunisia	4	7.14%	3	4.92%	7	5.98%
Turkey	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
United Arab Emirates	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
United Kingdom	5	8.93%	4	6.56%	9	7.69%
United States	4	7.14%	10	16.39%	14	11.97%
Uzbekistan	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 13.2 Number of assailants by country of origin

The data on the countries of origin of identified assailants broadly reflects the countries that experienced terror attacks, further indicating that Western countries have been more likely to experience terror attacks carried out by those born and raised within that country. For example, in 2016 Germany saw one of the highest levels of terrorism, and accordingly Germany particularly stands out in the 2016 figures as a country of origin for assailants, with 10.71% of assailants originating from Germany that year. This was the largest of any country of origin group for that year.

By contrast, terrorism reduced considerably in Germany in 2017 and so it is noticeable that in that year no assailants had Germany as their country of origin. Another country that demonstrates this trend is France. That country also experienced a comparatively high level of terrorism in 2016, and accordingly 8.93% of assailants had France as their country of origin. This was the joint second largest country of origin group in 2016. Terrorism in France rose in 2017 and so did the number of individuals with France as their country of origin, increasing from five individuals to seven, or 11.48% of the total that year. Similarly, in Belgium there was a high level of terrorism in 2016, and in 2017 this decreased noticeably. As such, in 2016 7.14% of assailants originated in Belgium, but this fell to zero in 2017.

Nevertheless, there are countries that appear in the data as the place of origin for several of those who have gone on to commit terror attacks in a different country. In a limited number of instances this includes people who have originated in one Western country and have travelled and committed an attack in another. For instance, in 2016 Osama Krayem directly participated

in the bombing of the Brussels subway system and has also been linked to the November 2015 Paris attacks.¹⁹²⁶ Krayem was of Syrian–Palestinian ancestry and was born and raised in the Swedish city of Malmö before later travelling to join Islamic State in Syria and then returning again to Europe posing as a refugee or migrant.¹⁹²⁷

There was also the case of Youssef Zaghba, who was an assailant in the 2017 London Bridge attacks. Zaghba possessed Italian citizenship and had spent time living in Italy; however, he was born in Morocco, from where his father originated, and this is where he spent much of his life.¹⁹²⁸ As such, even though Youssef Zaghba had been living in Italy before coming to the United Kingdom, Morocco is recorded in this study as having been his country of origin.

There were several non-Western countries, and accordingly not included in this study, that produced a number of the assailants responsible for the attacks recorded. In particular, a number of North African countries, as well as Somalia, stand out as places from which several attackers originated. In 2017 Morocco was the place of origin for a particularly high number of assailants. Indeed, no other single country contributed a higher number of assailants that year. Whereas in 2016 only one assailant originated in Morocco, in 2017 this figure rose to ten, representing 16.39% of all assailants for that year. This high number is partly accounted for by the cell that carried out the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks, with five of these individuals having originated in Morocco. Additionally, two of the assailants in the 2017 London Bridge attack originated from Morocco. Attacks that year in Paris, Brussels and Turku also all featured assailants who originated from Morocco.

Another North African country, Tunisia, was the place of origin for seven attackers across both years. In 2016, four individuals accused of carrying out attacks originated in Tunisia. At 7.14% of the total for 2016, this is the same figure as number who originated from Sweden, the United States, and Belgium. In 2017, three individuals originated in Tunisia, 4.92% of the total that year. Two of the highest-profile and most devastating attacks of 2016 were carried out by individuals of Tunisian origin: Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel who carried out the Nice Bastille Day truck attack and Anis Amri who carried out the Berlin Christmas Market truck attack. The attacks in 2017 by assailants of Tunisian origin tended to be smaller and included such incidents as the stabbing attack at Flint airport, the killing of an elderly couple in Austria and the Marseille train station stabbing attack. Ismail Hosni, accused of the Milan train station attack, was of Italian origin but possessed dual Tunisian–Italian nationality and had spent time living in Tunisia.

Other assailants originating from North African countries included three individuals from Algeria: one in 2016 and two in 2017. In 2016, two assailants had originated from Libya as part of a hijacking that brought them to Malta. In 2017, one assailant had originated from Egypt. In total, eight assailants originated from North Africa in 2016, and 16 originated from this region in 2017, more than one-quarter (26.23%) of assailants that year. Accordingly, taking only the Islamist assailants in 2017, it is the case that 38.10% of these individuals originated from just four North African countries. As an overall figure, combining the data on all identified assailants recorded in 2016 and 2017, 24 of these assailants came from North African countries, 20.51% of the cases recorded from the two years.

¹⁹²⁶ 'Brussels suspect Osama Krayem reportedly charged over Paris attacks', *The Guardian*, 20 April 2016, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/20/brussels-suspect-osama-krayem-reportedly-charged-over-paris-attacks>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

¹⁹²⁷ Alexander, H., 'Brussels terrorist suspect featured in Swedish documentary about integration', *The Telegraph*, 15 April 2016, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/15/brussels-terrorist-suspect-featured-in-swedish-documentary-about/>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

¹⁹²⁸ Booth, R., V. Dodd, L. Tondo and S. Kirchgaessner, 'London Bridge: third attacker named as Youssef Zaghba', *The Guardian*, 6 June 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/06/london-bridge-attack-third-attacker-named-in-italy-as-youssef-zaghba>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

Another non-Western country that stands out as having been the place of origin for multiple assailants is Somalia. One assailant was identified from Somalia in 2016, while four individuals had that country as their place of origin in 2017, 6.56% of all assailants that year. This was the same as the number of assailants originating from the United Kingdom that year. The one Somali assailant of 2016 was 19-year-old student Abdul Razak Ali Artan, who was killed while carrying out a vehicular and knife attack at Ohio State University in which 11 people were injured.¹⁹²⁹

In 2017, all of the individuals of Somali origin who perpetrated or attempted attacks were lone actors undertaking smaller-scale attacks. However, several had previously been part of wider terrorist or extremist networks. Yacqub Khayre, who carried out a hostage-taking in Melbourne, had previously been part of an extremist network accused of plotting a major attack.¹⁹³⁰ Similarly, Khalid Mohammed Omar Ali, the attempted Whitehall attacker, had been an Al-Qaeda bomb maker operating from a base in Afghanistan prior to his attack. Haashi Ayaanle, who attempted a machete attack in Brussels, is believed to have been connected to a wider network of Somali Islamists operating in Europe.¹⁹³¹ In addition to the five individuals in the study originating from Somalia, Dahir Ahmed Adan, the St Cloud shopping mall attacker, had come to the United States from the neighbouring East African country of Kenya, but was of Somali ancestry and possessed dual Somali-American nationality.

In terms of assailants originating from Middle Eastern countries, two assailants in the study originated in Syria, while Iraq and Turkey accounted for one assailant each. Another assailant in the 2017 Hamburg attack was of Palestinian ancestry and had been born in the United Arab Emirates, but had spent a period of his life living in Gaza. Additionally, Abdullah Reda al-Hamamy, accused of the Louvre machete attack, originated from Egypt and possessed Egyptian nationality, but had been living in Dubai, from where he travelled to France. Another potential area of interest in terms of places of origin might be the Caucasus and Central Asia, with two assailants in 2017 coming from Uzbekistan and another from the North Caucasus. Additionally, over the two-year period, one assailant originated in Afghanistan, two from Pakistan and another from Bangladesh.

While it might be possible to point to certain types of extremism or ongoing conflicts in the above-mentioned countries as potential explanations for why those places were the countries of origin for a number of assailants, the data does not allow for this. More information would be required for a significantly wider time period to ascertain whether these trends are consistent before it would be possible to draw any wider conclusions about causation.


¹⁹²⁹ 'Ohio attack: Possible terror link being investigated, say police', *BBC News*, 29 November 2016, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-38136658>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

¹⁹³⁰ Rintoul, S., 'Two cleared but three convicted over army base terror attack plan', *The Australian*, 23 December 2010, available at: <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/two-cleared-but-three-convicted-over-army-base-terror-attack-plan/news-story/06921bd333ba0ad2c4eb445a42a7c7fc?sv=545fed2beed20fa1898875a4e0b6521d>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

¹⁹³¹ J. C., 'Bruxelles : l'assaillant était en contact avec des islamistes', *La Capitale*, 28 August 2017, available at: <http://www.lacapitale.be/118591/article/2017-08-28/bruxelles-lassaillant-etait-en-contact-avec-des-islamistes>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

Table 14.1 Number of assailants by nationality

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Algerian	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
American	4	7.14%	10	16.39%	14	11.97%
American-Afghan	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
American-Somali	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Australian	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
Australian-Somali	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Bangladeshi	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Belgian	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Belgian-Moroccan	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
Belgian-Somali	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
British	5	8.93%	5	8.20%	10	8.55%
British-Pakistani	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Canadian-Syrian	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Canadian-Tunisian	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
Canadian-Tunisian	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Czech	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Danish	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Dutch	5	8.93%	0	0.00%	5	4.27%
Egyptian	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
French	5	8.93%	7	11.48%	12	10.26%
French-Moroccan	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
French-Tunisian	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
German	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
German-Iraqi	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
German-Moroccan	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
Greek	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Guinean	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Iraqi	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Italian	2	3.57%	2	3.28%	4	3.42%
Italian-Moroccan	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Italian-Tunisian	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Libyan	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
Moroccan	0	0.00%	3	4.92%	3	2.56%
Pakistani	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Palestinian	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Polish	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Russian	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Somali	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
Spanish-Moroccan	0	0.00%	6	9.84%	6	5.13%
Swedish	4	7.14%	3	4.92%	7	5.98%
Syrian	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Tunis	3	5.36%	2	3.28%	5	4.27%
Turkish	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Uzbek	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 14.1 Number of assailants by nationality

The data on nationality reflects some of the same trends as the information about the country of origin of identified assailants. However, in some respects this data reveals less about the background of the attackers, given that some of those with a different country of origin had subsequently gained nationality in the country where the attack was carried out. Equally, the matter of dual nationality may further obscure the picture, particularly where an individual may have inherited the nationality of a country that they had not lived in or otherwise had few connections with.

In certain cases, the data on nationality reflects those countries that had the most terrorism. France and the United States, which each experienced a high level of terrorism across the two


years, tended to have a higher level of assailants of French and American nationality respectively than other countries. However, with such a small number of assailants coming from any one country, the picture can easily be skewed by just one attack or one cell of individuals. In 2016, no nationality in the study recorded more than five individuals as assailants. One of the nationalities that recorded five assailants that year was Dutch, making this one of the most common nationalities. However, this appears to be an anomaly, as all these individuals were from the same attack and involved the same Far Right group. Similarly, in 2017, one of the most common nationality groups was Moroccan-Spanish, which accounted for 9.84% of assailants that year. However, all of the Moroccan-Spanish individuals recorded in the study were assailants from the same cell behind the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks.

Assailants Known to the Authorities

Table 15.1 Number of assailants known to the authorities

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Known	24	42.86%	25	40.98%	49	41.88%
Not Known	18	32.14%	30	49.18%	48	41.03%
Unknown	14	25.00%	6	9.84%	20	17.09%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 15.1 Number of assailants known to the authorities



The data in this study indicates that a large proportion of the attackers were already known to the authorities in some way prior to the attacks occurring. While this study was not primarily concerned with the foiling of plots, good intelligence on the identities of extremist individuals and networks should theoretically assist counterterrorism policing with the disruption of terrorist violence in advance of it occurring. Cases recorded in this study demonstrate that this knowledge can be extremely useful, even allowing police to foil attacks just as they are about to be carried out, as seen with the foiling of Aron Driver's 2016 attempted bombing in Strathroy, Canada, or Khalid Mohamed Omar Ali's attempted stabbing attack on London's Whitehall in 2017.

Nevertheless, it is concerning that so many individuals who were known to the authorities in relation to extremism were able to carry out attacks. In his review of the four major terror attacks in London and Manchester between March and June of 2017, David Anderson Q.C. drew attention to the fact that three of the assailants were known to the British intelligence services.¹⁹³² In that review he highlighted some of the procedures used by MI5 to determine the level of threat posed by different known extremists and for deciding which should be monitored most closely.¹⁹³³ It remains an open question whether or not alternative policies would have led to different outcomes for any of these attacks.

In 2016, of the 56 individuals in the study for that year, it is recorded that at least 24 were already known for their links with extremism or terrorism. This represents 42.86% of assailants that year. These can be further broken down by region. Of the 46 assailants who carried out attacks in Europe, 19 were already known to the authorities, while of nine assailants in North America, four were already known to the authorities. There was one assailant recorded in Australasia that year, and he was also already known to the authorities.

A number of other assailants are believed to have been unknown to the authorities prior to the time at which their attack occurred. In 2016, these included 13 individuals from attacks in Europe and five from attacks in North America. In the cases of a further 14 assailants it has not been possible to determine whether or not the authorities were aware of the assailant as someone linked to extremism prior to the attack.

In 2017, a slightly larger number of assailants were known to the authorities. However, these 25 cases represented a smaller proportion of the total, at 40.98% of assailants. As with 2016, 19 of the known assailants were in Europe, one was in Australasia and five were in North America. In 2017, 30 of the assailants were recorded as being unknown to authorities, 17 of whom were in Europe, 11 in North America and two in Australasia. In the cases of six assailants there was not enough information about the assailants to determine whether the authorities knew of them in connection with extremism prior to the attacks. All of these were assailants connected to attacks in Europe.

¹⁹³² Anderson, D., 'Attacks in London and Manchester between March and June 2017', *HM Government*, 5 December 2017, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/attacks-in-london-and-manchester-between-march-and-june-2017>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

¹⁹³³ *Ibid.*

Table 15.2 Number of assailants known to the authorities by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Known	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Far Left	5	8.93%	4	6.56%	9	7.69%
Known	3	5.36%	1	1.64%	4	3.42%
Not Known	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
Unknown	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
Far Right	9	16.07%	14	22.95%	23	19.66%
Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Not Known	1	1.79%	10	16.39%	11	9.40%
Unknown	8	14.29%	3	4.92%	11	9.40%
Islamist	37	66.07%	42	68.85%	79	67.52%
Known	21	37.50%	23	37.70%	44	37.61%
Not Known	13	23.21%	18	29.51%	31	26.50%
Unknown	3	5.36%	1	1.64%	4	3.42%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

The likelihood that an individual will have been known to authorities in connection with extremism in part corresponds with the ideology that they are associated with. Certain ideologies appear to be better known and are potentially monitored more closely by the police and intelligence services.

Of the 24 assailants in 2016 already known to the authorities, 21 were Islamist, while the remaining three were from the Far Left. Assailants from other ideologies were all unknown to the authorities that year. In all, more than half (56.76%) of all Islamist assailants in 2016 were already known to the authorities in connection with extremism or terrorism.

In 2017, 25 assailants from the Far Left, the Far Right and Islamists were already known to the authorities. Of these 25 individuals, 23 were Islamists, one was from the Far Left and one was from the Far Right. Once again, more than half of Islamist individuals were known to the authorities in advance: 54.76%. Across both years, then, more than half (55.70%) of Islamist individuals were already known to authorities, compared with 44.44% of Far Left assailants and only 4.35% of Far Right individuals. Europol's Terrorism Situation and Trend report for 2018 – which included data on plotters as well as actual attackers – stated that while a substantial number of jihadist (Islamist) terrorists in the European Union countries were already known to authorities, often this was only in relation to a criminal past, or alternatively they had not been considered to be a significant terrorist threat.¹⁹³⁴

It is important to note that in the cases of 20 individuals in the study, too little is known to determine whether or not the authorities had been aware of them prior to their attacks.

¹⁹³⁴ 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018', *Europol* (2018).

However, the figures here would indicate that the police and intelligence services are far more advanced in their monitoring of Islamists than they are with other ideologies. In particular, the data suggests a possible lack of intelligence about Far Right circles. Equally, the failure to identify and arrest assailants for a number of the Far Left and Separatist/Nationalist incidents might also suggest a failing in intelligence.

Table 15.3 Number of assailants known to the authorities by country of attack

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Australia	1	1.79%	3	4.92%	4	3.42%
Known	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
Not Known	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Austria	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Belgium	7	12.50%	2	3.28%	9	7.69%
Known	6	10.71%	0	0.00%	6	5.13%
Not Known	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Canada	1	1.79%	3	4.92%	4	3.42%
Known	1	1.79%	2	3.28%	3	2.56%
Not Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Czech Republic	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Denmark	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Known	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Finland	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
France	9	16.07%	12	19.67%	21	17.95%
Known	5	8.93%	6	9.84%	11	9.40%
Not Known	4	7.14%	6	9.84%	10	8.55%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Germany	9	16.07%	1	1.64%	10	8.55%
Known	4	7.14%	1	1.64%	5	4.27%
Not Known	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
Unknown	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Germany & Greece & France	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Italy	2	3.57%	3	4.92%	5	4.27%
Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Known	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
Unknown	0	0.00%	2	3.28%	2	1.71%
Malta	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	2	3.57%	0	0.00%	2	1.71%
Netherlands	5	8.93%	0	0.00%	5	4.27%
Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	5	8.93%	0	0.00%	5	4.27%
Norway	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Poland	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Known	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Spain	0	0.00%	6	9.84%	6	5.13%
Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Not Known	0	0.00%	6	9.84%	6	5.13%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Sweden	3	5.36%	4	6.56%	7	5.98%
Known	0	0.00%	1	1.64%	1	0.85%
Not Known	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	3	5.36%	3	4.92%	6	5.13%
United Kingdom	5	8.93%	9	14.75%	14	11.97%
Known	0	0.00%	7	11.48%	7	5.98%
Not Known	4	7.14%	1	1.64%	5	4.27%
Unknown	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
United States	8	14.29%	13	21.31%	21	17.95%
Known	3	5.36%	3	4.92%	6	5.13%
Not Known	5	8.93%	10	16.39%	15	12.82%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

The variations among ideologies with regard to the likelihood that the authorities will already be aware of an assailant in connection with terrorism or extremism can also be seen in the variations among countries. In France, where a large proportion of the attacks were perpetrated by Islamists, the authorities had a relatively high level of familiarity with the assailants' identities. Several of the individuals in this study were reported to have been on France's S File, which keeps track of individuals deemed to be a potential risk to national security, in addition to the File for the Prevention of Terrorist Radicalisation (FSPRT), which in February 2018 was reported to include almost 20,000 individuals.¹⁹³⁵ In this study, 11 individuals,

¹⁹³⁵ 'Terror threat: How does France track 20,000 potentially dangerous extremists', *The Local*, 26 March 2018, available at, <https://www.thelocal.fr/20180326/how-does-france-track-20000-potential-terror-threats>, last visited: 5 October 2018.

or just over half of the 21 assailants recorded for attacks in France, were already known to the police and intelligence services.

Similar to France, in the United Kingdom, of 14 identified assailants, half were known to the authorities, with these findings particularly pertaining to Islamist assailants. This compares to previous Henry Jackson Society research on specifically Islamist terrorism-related offences in the UK from 1998 to 2015, which found that almost half (48%) of offenders were already known to security services.¹⁹³⁶

Belgium and Germany were countries that also experienced a high level of Islamist attacks, with six of the nine assailants in Belgium already being known to the authorities, and five of the ten assailants in Germany already being known. Spain stood outside this trend, with all six of its assailants being Islamist but unknown to authorities. This, however, is accounted for by the fact that these assailants were all members of the Ripoll cell responsible for the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks which had gone undiscovered by the Spanish authorities.

Over the two years covered by the study, the United States experienced a high level of Islamist terrorism, and also of Far Right terrorism. As such, of the 21 identified assailants involved in attacks in the United States, only six were already known to the authorities in connection with extremism. While several of the identities of the Islamist individuals were already known to the authorities, Far Right assailants in the US tended not to be known about in advance of the attacks. The same is true of the Black Supremacist assailants and of the one Far Left attacker in America, who were not known or being monitored by security services at the time of their attacks.

¹⁹³⁶ Stuart, H., 'Islamist Terrorism: Analysis of Offences and Attacks in the UK (1998-2015)', *The Henry Jackson Society*, 5 March 2017.

Training and Combat Experience

Table 16.1 Number of assailants with training or combat experience

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
With Training	9	16.07%	8	13.11%	17	14.53%
Without Training	36	64.29%	52	85.25%	88	75.21%
Unknown	11	19.64%	1	1.64%	12	10.26%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

Figure 16.1 Number of assailants with training or combat experience





Table 16.2 Proportion of assailants with training and combat experience in 2016 and 2017

	Total
With Training	17
Without Training	88
Unknown	12
	117

Figure 16.2 Proportion of assailants with training and combat experience in 2016 and 2017

Combining the data on assailants recorded from attacks in 2016 and 2017, a minority had received some form of military training or combat experience, either with the military of a recognised nation state or with a terrorist non-state actor. Between the two years, there was a slight decline in the number of cases where the assailants had received training or combat experience, as well as a decline in the overall proportion, from 16.07% of the total of assailants in 2016 to 13.11% of the total in 2017.

In total, then, combining the data from each year, there was evidence that 14.53% of identified assailants had received training or combat experience. In a further 10.26% of cases, however, it was not possible to adequately determine from the assailants' movements whether or not they had received training or combat experience.

Table 16.2 Number of assailants with training or combat experience by ideology

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Black Supremacist	2	3.57%	1	1.64%	3	2.56%
With Training	1	1.79%	0	0.00%	1	0.85%
Without Training	1	1.79%	1	1.64%	2	1.71%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Far Left	5	8.93%	4	6.56%	9	7.69%
With Training	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Without Training	5	8.93%	4	6.56%	9	7.69%
Unknown	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Far Right	9	16.07%	14	22.95%	23	19.66%
With Training	2	3.57%	4	6.56%	6	5.13%
Without Training	2	3.57%	10	16.39%	12	10.26%
Unknown	5	8.93%		0.00%	5	4.27%
Islamist	37	66.07%	42	68.85%	79	67.52%
With Training	6	10.71%	4	6.56%	10	8.55%
Without Training	28	50.00%	37	60.66%	65	55.56%
Unknown	3	5.36%	1	1.64%	4	3.42%
Separatist/Nationalist	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
With Training	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Without Training	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Unknown	3	5.36%	0	0.00%	3	2.56%
Total	56	100.00%	61	100.00%	117	100.00%

From the incidents recorded in this study, the data indicates that whether assailants are likely to have received training and combat experience depends on which ideology they are aligned with. Those assailants with training or combat experience were primarily from Islamist or Far Right attacks, although even among these groups of attackers they constituted the minority. The degree and type of experience clearly differed between assailants, and some of this followed ideological lines. Islamist assailants with training or combat experience in the study are more likely to have received this from foreign terrorist groups than those on the Far Right, who are more likely to have received training from having served as part of a national military. The exception to this is two Far Right assailants from Sweden who received training from a paramilitary group in Russia.

Of the 37 identified Islamist assailants in 2016, six are believed to have received training or combat experience. Comparably, two of the nine Far Right assailants recorded in that year also had this experience. Additionally, one of the two Black Supremacist assailants from 2016 had had training and possible combat experience, with Micah Johnson having been a reservist in the United States military.¹⁹³⁷

None of the five Far Left assailants from that year are believed to have had training or to have experienced combat prior to their attacks, nor is there evidence that the three Separatist/Nationalist assailants had had any such experience. While the numbers of identified assailants from these two ideologies is small, the trend of not having received training may not be unexpected, given that one of the primary means for gaining training or combat experience

¹⁹³⁷ Allen, N., 'Dallas shooting: Who was Micah Johnson? Everything we know about the attacker', *The Telegraph*, 9 July 2016, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/08/dallas-shooting-who-is-micah-johnson/>, last visited: 18 September 2018.

is from service with a national military. Both of these ideologies can be said to be hostile to the militaries of the states within which they reside.

In the following year, four of the 42 Islamist assailants were identified as having received combat training or military experience, while four of the 14 Far Right assailants who carried out attacks in 2017 were known to have had such experience or training. None of the assailants associated with Far Left, Separatist/Nationalist or Black Supremacist terrorism were known to have had training or combat experience in 2017.

Combining the figures from 2016 and 2017, the only ideologies that had a noticeable minority with training or combat experience were Islamist and Far Right. Of the data on Far Right assailants recorded from attacks in the two years combined, there is evidence of six cases of training or combat experience. Among the 79 Islamist attackers recorded in the study, ten are believed to have had training or combat experience. This reflects findings from previous Henry Jackson Society research investigating Islamic State plots and attacks in Western countries in 2014 and 2015 which found that only a minority of assailants had received training or fought in a combat zone.¹⁹³⁸ That study suggested that most Islamic State-associated terrorists in the West have been “self-starters” with little training or expertise.¹⁹³⁹

Further analysis of the information gathered for this study would be needed to determine which assailants only received training and which took part in active combat. Equally, more analysis of the data would be required to better assess the differing characteristics of assailants who served with a national military as opposed to those who gained their experience from terrorist non-state actors.


Training by Number of Casualties, Injured and Fatalities

Table 16.3 Number of attacks with an assailant with training or combat experience

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
With Training	7	12.96%	8	11.76%	15	12.30%
Without Training	31	57.41%	46	67.65%	77	63.11%
Unknown	16	29.63%	14	20.59%	30	24.59%
Total	54	100.00%	68	100.00%	122	100.00%

¹⁹³⁸ Simcox, R., ““We Will Conquer Your Rome”: A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West”, *The Henry Jackson Society*, 2015.

¹⁹³⁹ Ibid.

Figure 16.3 Number of attacks with an assailant with training or combat experience**Table 16.4** Number of injured, fatalities and casualties by attacks with assailants with training or combat experience**Injured**

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
With Training	365	36.98%	535	58.28%	900	47.24%
Without Training	588	59.57%	349	38.02%	937	49.19%
Unknown	34	3.44%	34	3.70%	68	3.57%
Total	987	100.00%	918	100.00%	1905	100.00%

Fatalities

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
With Training	37	19.37%	26	29.21%	63	22.50%
Without Training	153	80.10%	63	70.79%	216	77.14%
Unknown	1	0.52%	0	0.00%	1	0.36%
Total	191	100.00%	89	100.00%	280	100.00%

Casualties

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
With Training	402	34.13%	561	55.71%	963	44.07%
Without Training	741	62.90%	412	40.91%	1153	52.77%
Unknown	35	2.97%	34	3.38%	69	3.16%
Total	1178	100.00%	1007	100.00%	2185	100.00%

Table 16.4 Casualties by attacks with assailants with training or combat experience





Figure 16.5 Casualties by attacks with assailants with training or combat experience



The data gathered indicates that those assailants who have had military training or who have experienced combat tend to be far more dangerous than assailants who have not. Of the 280 fatalities caused by attacks recorded in the study, 63 were from attacks perpetrated by an assailant who had had training or combat experience, or by a group with one or more assailants with such experience.

The nine attackers from 2016 and eight from 2017 recorded with training or combat experience represented 14.53% of assailants recorded in each year combined, but the attacks they were responsible for caused 22.50% of all fatalities. Equally, of the 1,905 people injured in the attacks covered by this study, 900 happened in attacks carried out by one or more trained assailant. As such, this relatively small minority of assailants were responsible for causing almost half of all those injured, 47.24% of all those across the two years of the study.

Broken down differently, there were 15 attacks in the two years in which one or more of the assailants had training or combat experience. This rose slightly from seven such attacks in 2016 to eight in 2017. On average, an attack with at least one assailant with training or combat experience caused far more casualties, with 60 people injured for each of these attacks and 4.20 fatalities. By contrast, there were 77 attacks across the two years in which it was recorded that no assailant had training or combat experience. This rose from 31 such attacks in 2016 to 46 in 2017. On average, then, attacks without any assailants with training or combat experience left 12.17 injured each, while there were 2.81 fatalities for every attack recorded as not having any trained assailants.

That trained and experienced assailants have perpetrated the most dangerous attacks might be regarded as expected. However, it should be noted that the figures here have in part been increased by the fact that the three suicide bombings recorded in the study were perpetrated by individuals who are believed to have had training and combat experience. It is clearly the case that assailants who have not had either training or combat experience can also carry out extremely lethal and devastating attacks. Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, who was responsible for the Nice truck attack which killed more than any other in the study, is not known to have had military training or combat experience.

Conclusion

Conclusion

The findings in this study indicate that in the West, both the degree and the nature of the terror threat varies greatly among countries. Overall, however, the study documented an increase in the number of terrorist attacks in 2017 as compared to 2016. The increase was particularly driven by political violence by those on the Far Right, as well as to a lesser degree an increase in the number of attacks from Far Left groups in Southern Europe, and Separatist/Nationalist terrorism in Northern Ireland.

Despite the growth in the number of attacks from these ideologies, the greatest number of attacks continue to be perpetrated by Islamists. These attacks are also far more deadly, with Islamists responsible for the vast majority of attacks that caused fatalities in both 2016 and 2017. The high number of deaths caused by Islamists is not simply because they carry out more attacks than any other ideology, but rather that only Islamists successfully carried out attacks with large numbers of fatalities. The high death toll from Islamist terrorists came despite the fact that there were fewer Islamist attacks in in 2017.

While bombings and shootings were still some of the deadliest forms of attack, low-tech vehicular attacks have also proven to have a devastating impact and both years saw vehicles used as weapons in combination with the use of knives. The findings from this study suggest there is a connection between mass-casualty attacks and those who have had training or combat experience. On average, assailants with training have been responsible for attacks that have killed and injured far more than those without such a background. The figures here, however, have been particularly shaped by the Islamist suicide bombers in the study who had travelled from conflict zones overseas.

The relationship between travel and terrorism is a complex one. Most of those who committed attacks did so in their own country. However, among Islamist attackers in 2017, more than half had a different country of origin from the one in which they carried out their attack. This should not detract from concerns about so-called “home-grown” extremism, particularly given that many assailants with a different country of origin were living in the West for some years prior to carrying out their attack.

Few of the attackers travelled to a country exclusively for the purpose of conducting an attack there, although there were exceptions, as seen with the February 2017 attempted attack at the Louvre in Paris, or the attack in Flint in the United States in June of that year. Equally, Greek anarchists attempted to perpetrate attacks in other European countries, but did so remotely with the use of letter bombs.

There were also high-profile cases of individuals who had travelled overseas – particularly to conflict zones – for the purpose of receiving training or instruction before returning to their country of residence with the direct intention of perpetrating an attack. Most prominent were several members of the group behind the March 2016 Brussels bombings who had returned to Europe from Syria for the purpose of carrying out attacks in France and Belgium. Similarly, the Manchester Arena bomber had travelled back to the UK from Libya to perpetrate his attack. With regard to the Far Right, it was shortly after returning to Sweden from paramilitary training in Russia that members of a right wing group began planting bombs in their hometown of Gothenburg.

From the cases recorded in this study, it appears that most terrorists carry out attacks in their own town or city of residence. Nevertheless, there were significant examples of individuals travelling to higher-profile locations. In the UK in 2017, both the Westminster Bridge attacker

and the assailant in the Finsbury Park Mosque attack travelled from other parts of the country so that they could conduct their attacks in London. The objective here, it would seem, was to hit more high-profile and politically sensitive targets.

It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate why some people become terrorists. However, the findings from the research do allow for some observations that could potentially be useful. For instance, the study found that assailants were overwhelmingly male. If there is work to be done on gender and terrorism, then it appears that determining why certain men are particularly drawn to ideological violence could be an important area of study.

Assailants also had a very wide age range. There were many young people who were responsible for attacks, including teenagers, some of whom were under 18. However, assailants were often older, with a particularly large contingent in their late twenties and early thirties. Far Right assailants tended to be noticeably older than Islamists, although here too there was a wide range. The findings on age indicate a need to correct perceptions that terrorists are often simply impressionable, naïve or misguided youths.

From the profiles and biographies of the assailants, it appears that many of the individuals recorded in the study moved into violent extremism at a point in their life when radical beliefs and personal issues converged. But disentangling these two factors would be a difficult, if not impossible task. A large number of the assailants in the study were clearly very isolated and quite troubled. Their attacks often followed periods of family breakdown, depression, difficulties adapting to a new country, unemployment, or trouble settling down. A number also had a history of domestic violence, mental illness and alcoholism.


None of this should downplay the crucial role of extremist beliefs. Without the impact of ideology, it may be assumed that even those with the most troubled backgrounds would have simply remained antisocial characters, at worst inclined towards criminal violence. Yet, there were also people in the study who, it appears, had been living otherwise normal lives prior to becoming convinced of a worldview that advanced their path into political or religious violence. The process appears extremely varied among the many cases recorded.

This study did not undertake a comprehensive assessment of the extremist ideas and movements that the assailants were associated with or inspired by. However, some general observations can be attempted here too. Particularly apparent is the way in which many of the ideologies that featured in this study involve what can be seen as extreme forms of identity politics. Often these manifested through a dramatised and conspiratorial “Us versus Them” mentality. The narratives involved repeatedly featured elements of supremacism, be it ethnic or religious. Even in the cases of the Far Left forms of extremism recorded here, it appears that these movements provide adherents with a strong sense of identity and group belonging. More than that, all of these ideologies can be said to offer meaning, purpose and a cause to be fought for.

Violent extremism undeniably advances hatred, division, fear and destruction. Yet, paradoxically, it has the potential to flourish in those parts of Western democracies where people with a need for meaning, identity and belonging are not finding it in the model offered by the surrounding liberal society.

'An important piece of analysis that correctly highlights the disturbing rise of extreme right and extreme left wing terrorism in Western countries in recent years alongside the existing challenge of Islamist terrorism. This report will undoubtedly assist policy makers to understand the extent of the challenge of extremism and terrorism and help the intelligence agencies and counter-terrorism police to shape their operational responses'.

Richard Walton, former Head of SO15 (2011-2016)



**Title: "TERRORISM IN THE WEST:
AN AGE OF EXTREMES"**

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