Date: 17:00 – 18:00, 17th October 2017
Location: The Henry Jackson Society, Millbank Tower
21-24 Millbank, London, SW1P 4QP
Speaker: Professor Kerry Brown
Author of What does China Want?, Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of Lau China Institute.
Event Chair: John Hemmings, Director of the Asia Studies Centre at the Henry Jackson Society
John Hemmings
Ladies and gentlemen, if I can start us off tonight; it is an extraordinarily interesting event, a topical question. My name is Dr John Hemmings; I am director here of the Asia Studies Centre at the Henry Jackson Society, and we do have regular book features, and many of them have been on this subject today on China and what China thinks. But we are very fortunate to have not just one but two of Britain’s sharpest minds on China here today. Professor Kerry Brown is the director of the Lau Institute at King’s College; he has a very interesting background for a UK academic because he has also been in government (which is not always the case) as the first political secretary at the FCO’s Beijing embassy. So he has been a practitioner as well as an academic, which I think means we should listen to him even more. James Miles is the China editor at The Economist, so again you must have been very busy this week, I am sure, with everything happening in Beijing. We will start off addressing the primary question of this foreign policy book, which is: What does China want? Does it want to engage with the world on its own terms? Does it want to make the world in its own design? Is it going to restructure the global system to its own authoritarian bent within the realm of a one-party state, or will it be a more benign partner to many countries? So, with that, I will cease and desist; I will turn to our two very reputable speakers. I think we will have fifteen minutes with Professor Brown, and then we will go to five-to-seven minutes with Mr Miles.
Kerry Brown
Thanks very much for arranging this. It’s great to be here today. So I think I’ll say a little about the structure issues of Chinese foreign policy.
The congress that is going to happen this week in Beijing on 18 October: How is it different to the ones which have gone before? I think it is legitimately the first global congress. Usually when Xi Jinping or the party secretary stands up, their report is 95 percent domestic and 5 percent international relations; and I suspect this time it will be much more about international relations. That is because Chinese domestic issues are intrinsically global — its environmental issues, its economic issues, as never before, because of the opportunities which have been opened up around it by Trump and by Brexit and by other things, have made it a global power more quickly and willingly than anticipated. So, whether it is wanted or not, this is a global congress. I think it is partly wanted, because one of the principal characteristics of Xi Jinping in the last five years has been this real effort to be very vocal about international relations and to tell the “Chinese story.” Part of those stories are domestic, about the “China Dream” — the creation of a bourgeois China with a middle class, urbanized, high-consuming service sector-oriented related story, very aspirational and very emotional — and part of it is of course the way China speaks to the world about its legitimate space. This is obviously in Asia, but it is also in global governance in areas where it feels it has a direct interest; and those are increasing. These stories (the domestic and the external) are intimately linked because the tenor of politics in China is increasingly about China’s moment of modernity: The achievement of a powerful and strong rich country with high status that is restored to its central role in the world. It is an old dream, but now it is actually very realisable, and the first centennial goal is, I believe, about the realisation of that part of that dream — that of a Chinese renaissance in which it has been restored as a great power. Of course, that is a great mobiliser for the Party, but the Party is intimately involved in that story. With the Party in control, it is able to guide the nation towards this great moment. So the Party and the nation are almost as one; it is this kind of inextricable link. And a great nation assumes it is going to be with one party in control. Xi Jinping’s mandate, with the leaders around him, is to create a sustainable one-party system; the outcome will be a powerful strong country which therefore will have a global role. So the driving forces of domestic politics are geared towards an achievement that is incredibly associated with international relations.
What is specific about this moment for us, and for people outside of China? I think there are three things. First, it is historically that we — outside of China — never dealt with a strong China before, but we are dealing with a strong China now. Our mind sets are comfortable with a China which is a victim and an underdog and is struggling to develop, but we are certainly not looking at that now; we are looking at a China which is more powerful economically and militarily. We are therefore having to change our mind sets. The second is that historically, certainly since the Ming dynasty, we had never dealt with China as a sea power. Since the 1980s, China has built up significant sea power; we dealt with China as a land power, but China is now present as a sea power, and that is profoundly new. Third, and the greatest issue, is that we do not know what a region — and indeed a world — run on Chinese values is. Their leaders talk about their country as very exceptionist; it is according to Chinese characteristics. And China has rejected under Xi Jinping ideas about Westernization. It is a very unique and hybrid model that China now has, but certainly not one that looks like it is on a comfortable trajectory toward a multiparty democracy any time soon. That was fine at the time China was a self-contained power; as a global power, we do have these issues of where we find the common language and discourse and values. How do we deal with that? And what would a world, in which China takes a greater role in global governance, look like, when it does not subscribe to the underlying values of the largely-American-led system?
I suppose the final thing is about the world according to Beijing: What does that world look like? I think Chinese foreign policy is very spatial: A series of zones, at the heart of which is the US relationship and all the strategic issues — one in which you work, but simultaneously compete, with your most important partner to develop that legitimate space, without going to war. The US relationship is at the centre of it, the “Belt and Road” initiative second, the European Union and the idea of a civilizational European partner at third, and then the world beyond (the fourth zone). China is a truly global power: it is active in Latin America; it is active in Africa; it is active in the Arctic and the Antarctic — it is everywhere. We have this sudden extraordinary emergence of an old power (an old civilization, at least), but having this new authority and position. It is a transformative moment, potentially very exciting, but also slightly scary, for us. Thank you very much.
[Applause]
James Miles
Thank you very much for those observations, Kerry, and I look forward to reading your book. I entirely agree that this Congress will go further beyond the domestic agenda than we have seen previously. The policies of Xi Jinping, and more specifically the propaganda machines working around Xi Jinping, have been focussed on the task of presenting him as a global leader.
There was a wonderful television series, broadcast sometime in late August or early September — each episode lasting 45 minutes — which emphasised how Chinese foreign policy revolves around Xi Jinping in a way unseen since the era of Mao in the Cold War. The series portrays Xi Jinping and his wife as images of calm in a turbulent and troubled global environment. In episode six, which I believe to be the most telling of all, we focus exclusively on the Chinese president, and the personal diplomacy that he and his wife have brought over the past five years. The episode is very illuminating in its attempt to demonstrate what Xi Jinping is trying to achieve. In my opinion, the message is primarily a domestic one: Xi Jinping is going out there to grab the low-hanging fruit and there is plenty of it. The collapse of faith in many quarters, and in globalization; the rise of Trump in the United States and the retreat of American global engagement (in a way we have not seen for a very long time), and the spread of populism across the international stage, reflects a turbulent world unprecedented in modern history.
Xi Jinping will not take risks for those objectives outlined in Davos, when he was seen as upholding the rules-based free trade economy underpinning the liberal international order. Even despite the rise of Trump, in particular, there is — in the back of the minds of the Chinese political elite — a reluctance to engage too much; it makes much more sense for China to bide its time, and not take risks. I also think it is very important to bear in mind that, for all the importance of the foreign-policy rhetoric of Xi Jinping, we should not be overly focussed on a historical connection between what China is doing today, and the way it has behaved in the distant past; crucially, as Kerry points out, there are other great powers: the US is one of them, as is the European Union. But the Chinese worldview does accommodate coexistence with those other powers, and does not see the world as a space in which tributary powers pay homage to the central authority of Beijing. There is, however, an important question that Kerry raised on how Chinese values can interact with ours. I do not think that China has developed a clear strategy to attempt to change how the world thinks; I think primarily it is still about trying to get the world to accept what China is: an authoritarian state that wants our silence, and so does not want to necessarily export its values.
John Hemmings
Thank you very much, James. I think before we go out to the audience, I thought I’d tag on a little question to what James said before, and then you [to Kerry Brown] can dip in. There seem to be five worlds of hegemony that China supposedly dreams about, and I just wonder if I could add to some of the cogent observations James made: Given events in Beijing, where do you see Xi Jinping hoping to go in the future?
Kerry Brown
Xi Jinping is very important, but he is only the player, not the plot. Without the Party, Xi has no power; Party authority is the only thing that matters in modern China. The world has to be predictable because Chins has major domestic issues; there are all sorts of traps. It has issues with its environment, and it has to build a welfare system looking after an aging population. In the South China Sea, China wants predictability; it is not keen on all the volatility Trump offers. Xi is a storyteller, and he is telling America that there is a need for a new model of power relations, requiring parity, and not hegemony. It wants flexibility, but parity is key. With the European Union, it wants a civilizational partnership; parity, not lecturing. We are talking mostly about moral parity, with a subliminal message: If you pick a fight, we have the largest economy in the region (and maybe even the world), so do not mess with us. All sorts of questions are raised by this moment, and China is desperate for parity in a predictable world.
John Hemmings
I think we have a great bedrock for discussion. You can make statements, but please make it less than a minute. If you go over, I will wave at you or just cut you off [laughter].
Question One
How do you think the model of policy formation might change after the Congress this week?
Kerry Brown
One of the anomalies of the Chinese system at the moment is that no one — with perhaps the exception of Xi — has singular power on foreign-policymaking. I would not be surprised if there were an elevation of someone into the Politburo, and even into the Standing Committee, who might hold a vice premiership on foreign policy. It would make sense, and make foreign policy more rational. I think if you have a figure with a patronage over a specific policy area, we might expect to see a clearer structure. But policymaking is very complex, and there are obviously enormous degrees of negotiation before policies are implemented.
One other point on policymaking: the Party ultimately sets the agenda. Now we have a China that is a global power but is noninterventionist in the internal affairs of other states — which makes no sense, given it has lots of national interests and so will need to intervene to protect and defend them. It is slightly self-contradictory. I wonder where or not now is the moment in which China will develop a global approach; the framework does not quite work, which perhaps is why we struggle to understand the prerogatives of Chinese foreign policy. I do not think they will want to be super transparent unless it suits their national interests.
James Miles
Do we know exactly how much Party interests matter? Does the Politburo really matter?
Kerry Brown
I suspect that the Politburo is there to say “no,” not to say “yes.” They are not there to initiate, but discuss where foreign policy is going. When the Politburo meets once a fortnight, they will not talk about administrative matters, but instead broad and abstract strategic issues. They are talking about how to make one-party rule sustainable; and they have to make the judgment on the pursuit of Chinese foreign policy preferences. A massive think tank — it is terrifying to believe that Beijing is being run by a think tank [laughter].
John Hemmings
Let’s take three questions; I will start with you, sir.
Question Two
Do we know real Chinese attitudes toward North Korea?
John Hemmings
Perfect question. Sir, in the back.
Question Three
What are the potential obstacles to Chinese soft power?
John Hemmings
And, finally, sir.
Question Four
How might China attempt to translate its presence into power?
Kerry Brown
First, on North Korea: Xi Jinping has been to about fifty countries since 2012, but not to North Korea. I think that shows a real disdain, and that North Korea has blackmailed China frequently. After this Congress, I suspect that weariness will force them to intervene, politically or otherwise (but it is unlikely Xi wants China to militarily intervene).
On soft power: They have Confucian institutes, but the world outside does not know what China truly is. Basic understanding in the UK and Europe is one of ignorance; Australia may have a better understanding, as China is so prevalent in public discourse Down Under — but most Brits “blank over.” China will not succeed in exporting its unique and exclusive nationalist agenda with soft-power techniques, because people will not buy into its underlying values. American soft power works because democratic states are linked by Western norms.
And finally, on the issue of global presence: As I do not have the answer to this question, I would only be answering a different question [laughter].
James Miles
Kerry has nailed it, on all of his answers; but the final question raises a whole set of issues [laughter]. Delivering justice for peddling opium and subjecting China to a century of humiliation? Do we have to worry about that? What form does justice take?
Kerry Brown
Restoring China to its rightful place. Chinese foreign policy has taken a moral dimension. It wants to make up for losses made in a century of humiliation by the Western powers; it feels it deserves prestige and power in this period of modernization. Having said that, the Chinese do not necessarily want to convert the world to a type of Sino Marxist-Leninism.
John Hemmings
Ladies and gentlemen, I think we have taken a fascinating dip into a wonderful topic. Professor Brown will be signing copies of his books outside, so please do purchase one or both of them. Thank you to both gentlemen for their thoughts.
[Applause]