EVENT TRANSCRIPT: Global Britain and Japan
DATE: 6:00 pm – 7:00 pm, 7 March 2019
VENUE: Committee Room 1, House of Lords, Westminster, London, SW1A 0AA United Kingdom
SPEAKERS: Minister Takashi Okada, Dr. Sidarth Kaushal, Tomohiko Satake, James Rogers
EVENT CHAIR: Lord Alan West
Lord Alan West: Right, ladies and gentlemen, I think we will kick off then. Welcome to this Henry Jackson Society event. We are very very grateful for the Minister Takashi Okada to be here. It’s a delight to welcome you here. I think there are some really fascinating things going on at the moment in terms of the relationship between ourselves and Japan and I hope that will be exposed in as the discussion goes on. I think speaking as a military man, the significance of the joint declaration on strategic partnership between Prime Minister May and uh Prime Minister Abe in August of 2017 was really a very key thing and interestingly last year of course the visits of HMS Sutherland, um, HMS Albion, I think reinforce the positive aspects of that and the need for more positive engagement. So I found that very, very exciting, and there is greater defence cooperation there is no doubt about that. Why, why do we get on so well with Japan? Well I think clearly there are shared values: democracy, um, sustainable development, rule, belief in the rules based national order. I could go on but there are an awful lot of things we share in common. We are both little islands stuck of the continent. And the continents like us or dislike us to varying degrees. I won’t, I’m not going to mention Brexit myself. There we are, that’s it. That is the last that is the last bit. I think there is a need for common analysis of the changing global security issues. I mean out in that area particularly there are a number of things that, you know, are, I think, cause for concern. I think we need further cooperation in a whole number of areas. I would say, for example, cybersecurity, defence technology transfer, a maritime cooperation. I think that is very interesting. The Chinese, for example, you know why are they building a base in Bagratid. What’s going on in the South Pacific. Really quite interesting stuff. The whole issue of AI which I luckily at the moment we are in a couple of our universities we are way ahead of some other people, some very useful links there. Issues of drone technology. And then more broadly things like climate change, disaster relief, migration, non-proliferation, organised crime, and reform perhaps of the UN Security Council. That is almost totally impossible. Anyone who says they are going to do that has got quite a job in there. So if you are trying to change the permanent members my god that is going to be difficult. So an interesting thing. So I think with all of that as a background, I think we can kick off our first speaker today. I don’t you would have seen with your invitations you actually the speakers are on the back um Tomihiko Satake. I know that is alright to pronounce, is that alright? Or is that uh, didn’t you know you are first?
Tomihiko Satake: I didn’t know that no,”laughs”
Lord West: No it’s Viktorija who changed it, blame her, she gave me a different list first as well. International Women’s Day tomorrow so they can do what they like. It’s one of those, it’s one of those things. He was a senior research fellow at the National Institute for Defence Studies, which is of course in Tokyo. He specialised in Asia Pacific security, Japan’s joint regional security policy and US-Australia-Japan security cooperation. I didn’t mention actually, I think the issue of Japan-UK-US linkages in defence are very important and that is something that needs to be talked about. I won’t go through the whole list of wonderful qualifications you’ve got. Basically, each speaker will have about seven minutes, seven to ten minutes speaking. If they get to ten minutes that’s when I say stop. And uh once everyone’s spoken then we’ll open up for Q and A. So if I may ask you.
James Rogers: Perhaps the Ministers, sorry, would like to make a few comments first.
Lord West: Ah so it’s changed again. “laughter”
James Rogers: I do apologize.
Lord West: So the Henry Jackson Society works rather flexibly so they never win a war. Ah that’s what happens. So maybe Minister would you like to say a few words first.
Minister Takashi Okada: Yes.
Lord West: Now is this words first that is what he is saying so that’s the same lot.
James Rodgers: Yes.
Lord West: Minister would you like to speak first, I am terribly sorry. I will shoot Viktorija later. “laughter” Okay?
Minister Takashi Okada: No thank you all the rest. Ah, for the the kind introduction and I also like to thank the Henry Jackson Society for organizing this event and giving me and opportunity to say a few words. And I’d like to briefly discuss the importance and challenges of the Indo-Pacific region and the state of the cooperation between Japan and the UK in this area of strategic importance. The Indo-Pacific region is a vast area which connects the present engine of global economic growth, the Asia Pacific region, to the future the engine of global economic growth, that is Africa, and this area accommodates for over half of the world’s population, and according to the IMF countries in the Indo-Pacific accounts for roughly 40% of the global GDP. Tenfold peace, stability and prosperity in the region is essential to the wider global community. However, the region also faces a number of challenges the most pressing of which being security. The maritime order in the area is facing a variety of threats in the form of piracy, terrorism, illegal fishing, and perhaps, most concerning unilateral attempts to change the status quo, including the militarization of disputed marine features in the region. Japan has announced its vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. This vision consists of three pillars, fast is the promotion and establishment of fundamental rules such as the rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade. The second is the promotion of economic prosperity through improved connectivity and the third is the commitment to peace and stability. The reason is the graphical invest and in order to cope with those challenges countries with shared values and interests need to work together. That is high that the UK engagement in the region is extremely highly valued. (inaudible) defence (inaudible) Mr. Williamson recently laid out his vision for the UK which included the announcement that one of the two new (inaudible) would be deployed to the Indo-Pacific and that the fast operational mission of the earthcraft carrier Reginald Queen Elizabeth will cover the Mediterranean and the Middle East and the Pacific. I’ll show you, the UK has only been increasing its’ prisons in the Indo-Pacific region. Last year three of the Royal Navy’s vessels were deployed to the region and took part in joint training and exercises with regional allies including Japan. The Royal Navy has also conducted freedom of navigation of operations in the South China Sea. I am also pleased to mention that HMS is the fourth Royal Navy vessel to visit Japan in the last twelve months and she has also monitored (inaudible) legal ship to ship transpass in the region.
The UK and Japan are also discussing (inaudible) strengthening of co-operation on maritime to make a (inaudible). We are also discussing operations in the quality infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance economic prosperity. Japan and the UK share much in common. As Lord West said, we are both maritime nations we owe our existence to the sea economically and for our security. And we share fundamental values such as democracy, human rights and rule of law and the free market system. We both have the will and capability to make our hostile contribution to international order. The UK and Japan, we are the closest of friends and partners in order to maintain the rule of international order and to promote global and regional security and free trade. And Japan and the UK have been already outlift security co-operations through bilateral exercises.
In addition to the naval co-operation already mentioned the Royal Air Force sent four Eurofighters Tayfun jets for exercise with Japanese Defence Forces fighter jets in 2016. In October 2018 we saw that very fast joint training exercise with the British Army and Japanese Defence Forces on Japanese soil. So I believe and hope that the UK continues to play an important role in the Indo-Pacific region and in the world. The UK and Japan can work together to make this world a safer place to live in. So today I think we are really fortunate to have excellent experts and I hope that today’s discussion will help us with our understanding of (inaudible) operations in the Indo-Pacific Ocean, excuse me if I said region. Thank you very much.
Lord West: Thank you very much indeed. Now the sequence of speakers is the original? The semi-mortified or the much mortified?
James Rogers: The semi-mortified.
Lord West: If I could just pick up on a couple of points that you made which I… fascinating issue (inaudible) important. The carrier which is this wonderful ship (inaudible) the struggle, I can tell you. I think that it’s important that it deploys out there, it has probably US-Marine corps, aircraft as well as Navy, but I am not sure if the way of presenting going out there (inaudible).
So having introduced you once I am now looking forward to hear what you have to say.
Tomohiko Satake: First of all I would like to thank the Henry Jackson Society to invite me to this event, I very wanted to be here. I was actually going to talk about Japan’s free and open passive strategy but now Mr. (inaudible) covered this topic, so we have little things to do that. But since the Prime Minister Abe announced his concept (inaudible) in August 2016 many people discussed what (inaudible) means and some people say it is completely exclusive concept but try to contain China with other democracies in the region. Well as I said none of them is a very inclusive concept that can incorporate China to a framework. Also some people stressed some competitive aspect against China’s BRI, well as I said none of them are very neutral (inaudible) between (inaudible). And also some people say this is a pure military concept (inaudible). I think neither of you captured the reality of what (inaudible) actually means and then to me I think (inaudible) is kind of Japans vision for a desirable regional order. It fits all countries are free from (inaudible) total principles such as peaceful (inaudible). And that regional order based on free trade, market economy and (inaudible). And that is (inaudible). So to some extend it is nothing new, you know, Japan has this kind of freedom for many years since the end of WW2 especially since (inaudible). Japan is supporting free trade through FTA’s, APAC, CPTBP and so on. Japan has also supported some economy (inaudible) infrastructure development way before China’s (inaudible) projects in areas including South Asia and Africa. Japan has also supported democracy in numerous diplomatic and economic means. So this is nothing new and the (inaudible) relation of this policies that Japan has pursuit in the region, but what is new is I think is the number of stakeholders. One formal high rank officer (inaudible) being open to the Pacific is (inaudible) the United States will never be capable of archiving and securing the future (inaudible) for this region. And I think that is true. And even the Trump (inaudible) takes sometimes opposite policy to the freedom in the Indo-Pacific such as the result of (inaudible) and policy agreement and so on and that is why Japan is trying to assume greater partnerships in order to maintain this (inaudible) international order in the Indo-Pacific. Recently as lightminded partners especially Indonesia, Australia and (inaudible). And Australia is a (inaudible) ally of Japan we have territorial (inaudible) exercises we have some arrangements such as (inaudible) and so on. India is also very important (inaudible). Last year we had a ground to ground military exercise, bilateral exercise with India and we are going to have a jet fight exercise with India quite soon so (inaudible) we also encourage (inaudible) buildings and defence equipment co-operation. Which means the regional order in Asia is increasingly becoming manageable if not (inaudible) international order. So Asia (inaudible) more or less dominate by the United States a US (inaudible) in the region while Indo-Pacific (inaudible) including India (inaudible) including the UK. So not only the (inaudible) regional powers play important roles in shaping political security as you can see from the establishment from the CPTBP. And I think we are creating a kind of multiple powerhouse is important for the time when the (inaudible) rival intensifies. So if the region is simply dominated by US and China then a conflict is most likely to come as China is trying to challenge the US. And so I think expanding the region from Indo-Pacific is kind of a measure to create broader strategic (inaudible) that can (inaudible) rising power (inaudible). And that is a reason why Japan has encouraged many actors involved in the Indo-Pacific so that we can (inaudible) regional order. I think that is why Japan is seeking a co-operation with Europe and this is very important and as (inaudible) already mentioned the co-operation with European partners including the UK has rapidly developed over the past years. I don’t want to go into details but as (inaudible) ground to ground exercise. (inaudible)
Lord West: Thank you very much indeed. And now I think we are going on to Dr. Sidarth and then you are lost, is that alright? So Dr. Sidarth Kaushal who is a RUSI Research Fellow he is looking in particular at the impact of technology in this coming century and takes part in the States (inaudible). I have seen the UK and we are very poor, we haven’t decided when it comes to a (inaudible) strategy which I have no doubt we need (inaudible) on this very issue.
Dr. Sidarth Kaushal: Thank you for coming, thank you Lord West and the Henry Jackson Society for having me, so as mentioned I am a researcher and fellow of the (inaudible). I was asked today to talk about how regional powers will react to a growing UK-Japanese bilateral relationship and you can see why this might me a topic of interest. Both states are in some way in an inflection point for Japan this is the, not abandonment but certainly the movement away from the Yoshida-doctrine which is guided in foreign security policy upon this point and for the UK as we know it from the secretary of defence it is very much a case of a return to the east of the Suez. There is a case of a genuine congruence of interest between these two states and it needs a congruence of values. So what we are talking about today is three sort of sub-topics. The regional sort architecture, the security in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific it’s ways and it what ways it differs from for example the European context and how perhaps alliance strategies need to be altered to accommodated (inaudible). Geo-economics and how economics need a strategy means that the two states cannon should be coordinated (inaudible) security postures and finally the ways in which you know, coming a bit closer to my own work in RUSI. (inaudible) changes in the 21st century empower in a military context to defence seat empowers more (inaudible) in some ways and make a fruitful co-operation between UK and Japan through for example partnership, capacity building, perhaps the most fruitful sort of (inaudible) for progress in the Indo-Pacific region. So starting with the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. When you look across the region on of the things you realise is not just that there is a difference in the security architecture between for example the Indo-Pacific and European for decades, the US maintains a sort of bilateral (inaudible) spoke relationship with the states of the Indo-Pacific. (inaudible) but also the purpose that multilateralism has served in the Indo-Pacific differs quite from the role it played in Europe (inaudible). It was very much a case of engaging actors to produce a positive (inaudible) and when you look at organisations like ASIA and it is often noted in the scholarship that they are much more process rather than outcome driven, they are much more about engaging states into an epoch of consultation as opposed to necessarily produced specific outcomes and that is because the world they serve is not surrendering elements of state sovereignty to its’ economy. Of course like NATO but we are forcing the sovereignty of smaller states that felt that it might be jeopardise. So in the middle of the heart of the Indo-Pacific little South China Sea region you have something, if I use it approximate, historical analogy to the Roman Empire, something that has a bit more than the (inaudible) of states less than a copy of multilateral organisations. To the North you have of course Japan which is as we have talked about it from the Yoshida-doctrine and in the Indian Ocean region you have other ambivilents like India, which on the one hand is clearly committed with its’ (inaudible) policy with a larger role in the Indo-Pacific and the Asia-Pacific sort of sub-region in particular but has shown certain ambivalence to it is being seen as a part of it (inaudible). We have seen the (inaudible) where India invited them, conducted them in its’ annual (inaudible) exercises with Japan but turned down the… Australia requested to be part of this frame because it didn’t want to be seen as part of the containment framework. I think the first sort of (inaudible) withdraw from this is when the UK and Japan co-operate with each other and their partners, co-operation will largely be carried out on a region-wide basis and in congruence with specific values. My problem is rather than co-operation perhaps should be segmented both by issue and actor because certain narratives and certain values are more saleable in certain parts of the region than others. So to give you an example in the case of economics you know a good number of the states in the Indo-Pacific are worried about the loss of sovereignty with the death-trap they fall into the narrative (inaudible) particularly in the region of the states of South East Asia is (inaudible), we heard it from the President of the Philippines (inaudible) China and is now seen to be pulling back (inaudible). But when it comes to socialising into other aspects of the (inaudible) for example escape into (inaudible) in their own economy or liberalisation states of this region on some base perhaps are closer to China than they are to the open societies of let’s say the UK and Japan. We saw this with difficulty in coupling together (inaudible) we saw this in terms of the relative success China had with what once was called low value (inaudible) usually conducted on the bilateral basis and rather to progress the less demanding sort of RPC (inaudible) work, China has pushed forward. So (inaudible) issues focusing on helping the (inaudible) rather than bringing them towards a liberal sort of economic system that might be more valuable than pushing a greater sort of overarching regional narrative. Similarly in the case of India you know on co-operation in some regions for example in the Indian Ocean is easier to archive than operations across the Pacific Rim. So finding out what your partner can or can’t do finding out which values for example sovereignty in the case of South East Asia. (inaudible)
I’ll round up this speech, this part of the speech by saying that selectivity on, showing a degree of selection on (inaudible) would be useful going forward. The second part of my talk which is on the issue of military to military co-operation.
Lord West: You have two minutes.
Dr. Sidarth Kaushal: I’ll try to go through it quickly, so like for my fellow speakers this is a great deal of co-operation between the UK and Japan in terms of how do I (inaudible) in terms of joint production of acids such as anti-air missiles. Simple demonstrations of interest don’t go far enough. Rather the question is developing a substantive (inaudible) to resist cohesion. Smaller states capability to resist (inaudible) because it is difficult to commit resources (inaudible). The good news is that anti access denial as anti-military starting to work in both ways. The same sort of tools (inaudible) submarines make it very difficult for even extraordinary powerful maritime powers such as the US that operates safely within. China (inaudible) the first island. Also it makes it quite easy for weaker regional actors to resist (inaudible) cohesion by China. To give you one example a recent study has concluded (inaudible) anti-ship missiles.
In the defence sector perhaps we should empathise more as the UK is already (inaudible) coming to focus, with more strategic focused buildings (inaudible) submarines that actors in these parts of the world can buy (inaudible) coast guard vessels and which would empower local actors to do it for themselves because right now the credibility of the great powers to commit to conflict in (inaudible) anti-access areas is something that we haven’t really questioned. So to summarise basically (inaudible) the case for picking ones battle, collecting areas for investment and empathising rather on a broad base (inaudible) if one could archive them all that would be excessive and with that I hope (inaudible).
Lord West: Thank you very much indeed. I can see interest where we were talking about NATO, 74 years ago this week Winston Churchill held a speech in (inaudible) Missouri about cross Europe from stating the Baltic (inaudible) the iron curtain is falling down it is quite interesting how times change. Changes and no change as well. Our final speaker is James Rogers who is the director of the Global Britain program at the Henry Jackson Society (inaudible) Baltic Defence Conference in Estonia so he is obviously an expert on cyber.
James Rogers: Okay thank you for that very kind introduction. I was going to try to focus a little bit on the idea of Global Britain given I run the Global Britain program and to some extend perhaps also Global Japan. Now the idea of Global Britain is often associated of course with the speech of, a post-Brexit idea, a speech that Theresa May gave in the autumn of 2016 followed on by the series of speeches given by the former foreign secretary Boris Johnson during his time here, looking at the role of Britain in a post-Brexit world but the point I want to make here is that the relationship between Britain and Japan has been building up for some years and predates Brexit also by some years. So I am not entirely sure if this captures the idea of Global Britain necessarily captures something that is happening because of Brexit or something that is happening despite Brexit and goes back some time into the recent past. As I said the relationship is developing for many years in fact as a (inaudible) the defence co-operation memorandum between Britain and Japan was signed first in 2012 many years before Brexit. Than a series of events occurred between now and then but the most important being in terms of declarations, treaties and memorandums of course the 2017 joint operation on security co-operation between the two powers and they both recognised in this in the preamble section that the closest US-allies in both Asia and Europe respectively of course Japan in Asia and Britain in Europe. They also recognise in addition to this proximity or closeness to the United States that they were each other’s closest security partners respectively in Asia and in Europe. They recognised that the security challenges for both were now increasingly on point requiring further coordination actions between Japan and the UK on traditional and on new types of threat so we’ll come to that a little bit in a moment because you could say to some extend would be considered now to be the traditional threats become the new threats and the new threats become in a way the old threats. They have firmed the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific and free and open access to the Oceans to space and to cyberspace and particularly on the importance for the room of laws the foundation of access to those open spaces. Particularly in relation to the Into-Pacific region and both countries also committed themselves to exercising a leadership potential within the (inaudible) international system. And that was one thing that was mentioned earlier, the importance of this international system of rules based international order. In the United States it is often called the liberal order. Nevertheless it captures the same idea of an international system is not ruled by the rules of the jungle but is instead ruled by the rules of law. So those two important security and defence memorandums and declarations have helped to crystallise British and Japanese co-operation over the last few years but in addition to that as Lord West mentioned there have been a series of military exchanges and military co-operations between the two countries going back in 2013 and (inaudible) visited Japan and Tokyo then 2016 RAF Tayfuns joined the Japanese Air Self-Defence Force in Japan for joined drills. (inaudible) in 2018 went to Tokyo then there was a series of drills in the Indian Ocean and the UK has mentioned as one of the key partners in Japans defence planning guidelines in 2019 alongside France in relation to Europe. And there have been a (inaudible) of different meetings in recent years between Ministers from both Japan and the UK in Japan and the UK. So the point is it has certainly to do with Brexit and it has everything to do with closing relations between the two countries and also importantly from a strategic ankle changes within the global balance of power in relation to the Indo-Pacific region and even to some extend in relation to Europe. So the two countries in recent years have recognised a rise of the Indo-Pacific region and I think there is a growing understanding that the refocus of the US the way from exclusively or primarily the North Atlantic and Europe towards the Indo-Pacific has been growing both under President Obama who announced the shift and also under President Trump who has to some extend followed the shift on. And in addition to that it understood the rise of new centres of power particularly Russia but also and increasingly China may lead to a less orderly world order and other facts we are seeing the re-emergence of competition between major powers and I believe both Britain strategic documents that have been release since 2015 again in 2018 have announced this shift and empathised it over what was considered to be in the past the new security threats by extremists and (inaudible) states and terrorists operating around the world. In addition to this Japan has also developed increasingly om the rose of the strategic competition between the major powers. So to understand these (inaudible) we have also to understand what is happening in the wider world. The important thing and this is eluded to earlier is that Britain and Japan are clearly not super-powers. They are relatively small islands located at the coast of very respective continents Asia and Europe, but nevertheless they are still very influential countries and they nevertheless manage to manifest enormous economic, technological, cultural and other forms of power. So this means it makes sense to the countries to continue to co-operate because they invested into this rules based international system they lack the means the US and in the future China have to protect their own interest autonomously and they need to depend on wider system in order to archive success. The point I would like to make tough briefly is that perhaps the rules based system and the area of focus (inaudible) even further in the Indo-Pacific and we are moving increasingly even to a kind of Atlantic-Pacific which growth both in Europe and Asia, a much broader arena and I think this is something that we have to develop on increasingly in the future and this will effect both Japan and the UK. So what could be done to facilitate further co-operation between Japan and the UK? Well I think the two countries will have to work recently closely to understand the developments in the Indo-Pacific region particularly in relation to China’s rise will affect other’s interest as well as the interest of the common ally and of course the pre-ally, the US. In particular the UK should understand more coherently how Japans concerns in relation to China and the security in the Indo-Pacific region will affect Japanese interests and intern how Japan understands how British interest will be affected by Russia’s actions and relations to NATO and in relation to Europe, because it also affects the United States. In addition to that and it has also been mentioned I think the UK and Japan can work more closely together through a range of different (inaudible) to help to assert the freedom and openness of the public spaces around the world particularly in relation to the maritime space. To challenge those you have excessive (inaudible) claims over parts of the sea particularly in the South China Sea. Of course there is room for more diplomatic coordination in relation to the development of the international development assistance and in relation to maritime collaboration and it makes sense I think for both countries to continue to do that. Now final point I would like to make. Moving forward to the future one of the things that an economist commentary said a few weeks ago citing a named British official was the prospect of financial British pan-alliance. Now I think to some extend that might be some way off but nevertheless something that might brought together a number of countries in the Indo-Pacific region with the common interests in the freedom and openness of that region, such as a kind of maritime league could be something that could be considered and I point on the fact that the Japanese Prime Minister appointed in a 2012 article that perhaps Japan should join one day the five powers defence arrangements so it does draw towards the idea that this might become more institutionalized and more coordinated in the future and I would say that is somewhere that we have to think about and somewhere we might need to go. Thank you.
Lord West: Thank you James, thank you. We had a pretty amazing set of presentations and a lot of stuff there to get one (inaudible). I will just mention quickly although we have seen a lot more than (inaudible) now we have had (inaudible) years and I am not going back to first war times. In 89 I took part at the sign up of the first intelligence agreement since the First World War with Japan in terms of sharing national intelligence that was in 89 and I took a battle group of 22 ships to the Pacific and primarily to South China Sea for the withdraw from Hong Kong in 1997 and we have visited Japan, I took the carrier to Tokyo, we went to (inaudible) around Japan so these things have gone long but I think there is now a growth again which is rather (inaudible). Anyway I would like to open to any questions. When you are picked to ask a question could you please say who you are from, what you are representing and who you are and than we (inaudible) keen to go.
Audience Man: (inaudible)
Lord West: Okay so your question is could this be expanding on much more using the army than the air force rather than just the royal navy? Who would like to rick off.
Dr. Sidarth Kaushal: I can say that that seems to be (inaudible) because when you look at Japan owns security posture you know the role of the army is in creating zones of sea denial around Japans sort of using the same approaches I mean is used to shut the Western (inaudible) to a stronger US (inaudible) missiles (inaudible) across an island a while ago. (inaudible)
Lord West: (inaudible) Another question, yes please.
Audience Man: (inaudible)
Lord West: I didn’t plan this chapter about war zones (inaudible). I think what I would like to ask you what the key of that one is which is (inaudible)
James Rogers: I would like to agree this is not just about economy it’s about logistics and about shaping and influencing and to some extend literally drawing the map of not just the Indo-Pacific region but also Eurasia and I think it doesn’t just stop there it has ultimately extend it’s destination to Africa, the Middle East and Europe and we need to be aware of that and to that extend that we will be fundamentally balanced power in the world and that relates to some extend to your point and I just want to (inaudible) statistic here because I love statistics and then I think there is the case that the average Chinese warship weights up to 5.000 or 6.000 tons. The average British warship weights about 16.000 tons and the average American warship weights up to 25.000 tons so that tells you very much as what these navies are geared for. Now I would like to see or at least (inaudible) the average British or American warship maintains the heavy weight and the average Chinese ship maintains the light weight because that means that we control the ocean still.
Lord West: I am afraid I have to call a hold there. I think what I would say when I think about the UK involved (inaudible) in what I was told (inaudible) with Japan we have a lot of friends there, Japan is a friend, Australia is very close friend, New Zealand, India are friends. And one thing you do learn, I fought in three wars is you either hang together or you hang separately. If you hang separately you are really hanging. (inaudible)
So we need to work together and the US (inaudible) a lot in the position they were as a power that absolutely ensured Japanese security and what happened there. (inaudible) For many years they have been a power house for NATO, for many years they and the UK effectively ensured Europe’s security from the threat of the Soviet Union to the collapse of that and I think that we owe it to them and I am a great believer in when you owe something than you do it and we got lots of friends there that work together. But I think you will agree it has been fascinating a round of applause for all of our speakers.