Preventing Prevent?
Challenges to Counter-Radicalisation Policy On Campus

By Rupert Sutton
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This paper is written in the author’s personal capacity and the views expressed are theirs alone.
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About Student Rights

Student Rights is a non-partisan project of The Henry Jackson Society dedicated to supporting equality, democracy and freedom from extremism on university campuses. Set up in June 2009, Student Rights monitors extremism on UK university campuses - focusing on a range of different groups including, but not limited to, fascist or racist organisations, Islamist groups, and extreme political parties.

About The Henry Jackson Society

The Henry Jackson Society is a think tank and policy-shaping force that fights for the principles and alliances which keep societies free - working across borders and party lines to combat extremism, advance democracy and real human rights, and make a stand in an increasingly uncertain world.
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Executive Summary

Extremism and Higher Education in the UK

- The terrorist threat to the UK has predominantly stemmed from individuals born and raised in this country, and the government’s counter-radicalisation strategy, Prevent, has sought to identify sectors in society in which people could be vulnerable to radicalisation.

- Higher Education has been identified as one of those vulnerable sectors on a number of occasions – including by the 2011 review of the Prevent strategy, the Home Affairs Select Committee, and by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT).

- Terrorism offences have been committed by students studying at UK universities, and it has been suggested that a number of graduates of UK universities involved in terrorism-related offences were partly radicalised during their studies. Individuals enrolled at UK universities have also travelled to Syria, to fight for terrorist groups.

- There is also evidence that a culture conducive to the promotion of non-violent extremism has developed on a number of UK university campuses. This manifests itself in:
  - The invitation of extreme or intolerant speakers onto campuses, to give lectures or sermons;
  - The sharing of extremist material with students, via the social media pages of student societies;
  - The targeting of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), by extremist activists from Islamist or far-right groups.

On-Campus Events: 2012-14

- The most frequent incidents in which students are exposed to extremism are when speakers with a history of extreme or intolerant views, or with a history of involvement with extremist organisations, are invited onto campuses.

- Student Rights logged 132 of these events in 2012, 145 in 2013, and 123 in 2014. The speakers featured have suggested that there is a Western war against Islam; supported individuals convicted of terrorism offences; expressed intolerance of non-believers and/or minorities; and espoused religious law as a method of socio-political governance – opposing democracy in the process.

- Events were most likely to be held in February or March, were most likely to discuss issues of religious jurisprudence or history, and were most likely to take place in London. While 84 different venues and 82 different speakers were logged, a small number of both appeared repeatedly.

Delivery of Prevent in UK Higher Education

- Since the 7/7 attacks on the London transport network in 2005, a number of governmental departments; the police; and several sector-specific NGOs, have produced guidance on challenging extremism in the Higher Education sector.
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Challenges to Counter-Radicalisation Policy On Campus

- Such efforts have included informing internal policies on speaker events, providing case studies for institutions, and producing training materials for university and student union staff. From 1 July, public bodies including universities have also become subject to a statutory duty to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, making the delivery of Prevent a legal requirement.

- Delivery of the Prevent strategy has focused on implementing existing institutional policies; training university staff and student union officials in identifying extremism; increasing awareness of the issues that extremism can raise on campus; and, in the most serious cases, referring vulnerable individuals to Channel, the UK government’s de-radicalisation programme.

- However, this process has been beset with difficulty, as a poor reputation among students and staff has hampered efforts to stimulate Prevent engagement. Student groups have attempted to deliberately evade scrutiny, or have actively worked to hinder Prevent delivery, and a number of student unions – including the National Union of Students (NUS) – have even pledged to oppose counter-radicalisation work.

**Addressing Student Criticisms of Prevent**

- The student criticisms of Prevent which have driven this opposition must be identified by policymakers if on-campus delivery is to be as effective as possible. Where misunderstandings exist and malicious narratives have been created or encouraged by the very extremists whom Prevent exists to counter, these arguments must be challenged.

- These criticisms have predominantly focused on the claims that Prevent is a racist policy which portrays Muslims as a suspect community; that lecturers are forced to spy on students; that Prevent will see vulnerable people stigmatised; and that the strategy inhibits the expression of controversial ideas on campus and targets those who dissent from mainstream opinion.

- Many of these criticisms appear to have been directly influenced by extremist groups, which have made opposition to the Prevent strategy a significant campaigning platform. This influence has been particularly powerful with regard to accusations of racism; the creation of a suspect community; misuses of power; and the suppression of Muslim dissent.

- As well as echoing these malicious and misleading criticisms, some student groups have also pledged to work alongside the extremist groups which promote these narratives. For example, the NUS has voted to work with the pro-terrorist prisoner lobby group CAGE, and the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) has worked with CAGE on a number of occasions.

**Recommendations**

- The Home Office; OSCT; and Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) should ensure that guidance produced addresses the concerns raised by HEI staff and students, paying particular attention to assisting the identification of those vulnerable to extremism. It should also focus on providing information about the processes once an individual deemed to be vulnerable to extremism is identified – including highlighting the importance of welfare and pastoral-care provision.

- The extent to which student criticism of Prevent has been influenced by extremist narratives shows how vital it is to effectively oppose them. A support plan for actors who challenge extremist attacks on Prevent must be developed, and should focus on: identifying the relevant narratives which work to undermine the strategy, producing information on Prevent's delivery and successes, and developing forums in which these challenges can take place.
• Providing universities and student unions with guidance on existing regulatory frameworks in place to challenge extremism (such as charitable law) is also important. The Charity Commission should expand on existing guidance and continue on-campus engagement to ensure HEI staff and students are aware of how to report concerns. It should also ensure it accounts for the increased use of social-networking sites to share material which may bring student unions’ charitable reputations into disrepute, developing further its existing guidance and providing examples of how online activity could lead to regulatory problems.

• The perception that Prevent is a police-led programme which criminalises dissent has damaged engagement. Diversifying Prevent-delivery processes, through the increased role of partner agencies in on-campus delivery (potentially as part of bespoke local Prevent teams), could address this issue, as could updating guidance on the role that community policing has to play in higher education.

• As universities have traditionally taken on pastoral-care duties, faculty members may come into contact with students expressing extreme views both inside and outside of the classroom. Universities must ensure, therefore, that all members of academic staff are aware of their responsibilities to public safety, and of their public-sector-equality duty to foster good relations between different groups of people.

• The evidence that some student unions have sought to undermine Prevent, or have simply failed to engage with its delivery, suggests that there are vital misperceptions about the strategy; these must be challenged. However, if student-union officials fail to attend training, this will be extremely difficult. As such, universities and student unions should make Prevent training compulsory for elected student officials and should encourage them to put their criticisms of the programme to delivery staff as part of and during this training.

• Efforts must be made to ensure that an atmosphere is fostered on campus which encourages and supports students who seek to challenge extremist speakers and material. Complementing this should be adherence to a standardised, sector-wide speaker policy; the increased use of institutional equality and diversity policies as part of any speaker guidelines which are developed; and training for student union and HEI staff, in recognising extremist topics; tropes; or practices.
Introduction

A number of students enrolled at British universities who have committed terrorism offences, travelled to Syria to fight in the conflict there, or committed similar offences after graduation - are alleged to have been radicalised during their studies. The UK government has identified its Higher Education sector as one of a number of areas in society which is vulnerable to extremist misuse, and has sought to challenge this as part of its Prevent strategy, which seeks to stop people being drawn into terrorism. There is also evidence that extremist sentiments have been prevalent on campuses, with extremist speakers and material regularly promoted to students.

This report provides evidence of the situation, detailing those students involved in violent extremism and cataloguing the promotion of extremist speakers on campuses across the UK. Using material collected between 2012 and 2014, it explores the extent of the problem and analyses annual; geographical; institutional; and speaker trends. It also addresses how the government has sought to challenge this issue, by outlining the development of the Prevent strategy's approach to the Higher Education sector - through its practices, successes, and failures.

Given the presence of intolerant ideologies being endorsed on campuses, it would be expected that students would welcome government efforts to counter the problem. Yet, not only has this not proven to be so, some students are actively opposing these endeavours. The report also highlights this significant issue, showing how students have opposed the implementation of counter-radicalisation policy in the UK’s universities, and identifying and detailing the specific themes which drive their criticism. It then addresses these themes in turn and examines how many are influenced by misunderstandings or misperceptions, or are driven by extremist narratives. It also demonstrates that, on occasion, students have compounded this problem by working alongside the very groups that Prevent seeks to oppose.

Finally, the report seeks to provide the various stakeholders, including government departments; universities; and student unions, with recommendations on how to both challenge the extremist threat facing universities and improve Prevent engagement. Focusing on the provision of guidance and support for those who seek to challenge the narratives which have hindered Prevent delivery, these recommendations aim to be practical in addressing student concerns, while also ensuring that universities are able to address this problem without damaging their responsibility to protect freedom of expression on campus.
The ongoing threat posed to the UK by Islamism-inspired terrorism has predominantly stemmed from individuals born and raised in this country. This has been recognised by the government, in its counter-terrorism strategy. The government has developed the Prevent strategy, which is operated as part of CONTEST, the UK’s wider plan to protect itself from terrorism, and works to “respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism”; “prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”; and “work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation”. Revised in 2011, it seeks to challenge all forms of violent and non-violent extremism, though it accepts that “the greatest threat to the UK as a whole is from Al Qa’ida and groups and individuals who share the violent Islamist ideology associated with it.”

A significant goal of the Prevent strategy has been the identification of sectors in society which may be open to extremist misuse, or in which people could be vulnerable to radicalisation. These “priority areas” include “education, faith, health, criminal justice and charities”, as well as the internet. A key tenet of the strategy is that these sectors are not allowed to become “ungoverned spaces’ in which extremism is allowed to flourish”. This extremism is defined, in Prevent, as:

Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.

Higher education has been identified as one of those sectors considered to be vulnerable to extremism since as early as August 2005, when a working group convened by the Home Office in August 2005 found that “the dissemination of extremist propaganda in universities” was of particular cause for concern, and that “universities are a major recruiting ground for extremists”. The revised Prevent strategy declared, in 2011, that:

There is unambiguous evidence to indicate that some extremist organisations [...] target specific universities and colleges (notably those with a large number of Muslim students) with the objective of radicalising and recruiting students.

A year later, the Home Affairs Select Committee’s 2012 report into the roots of violent radicalisation found that “some universities may have been complacent” in challenging extremism, and was “not

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4 Ibid., p. 6.
5 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
6 Ibid., p. 107.
8 Ibid., p. 73.
convincing that extremists on campus are always subject to equal and robust challenge.” This was supported by testimony given to the Committee by Charles Farr, Director General of the government’s Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), who argued that those who speak “against core UK values and whose ideology incidentally is also shared by terrorist organisations” were able to address students regularly and without challenge at UK universities.10

More recently, the government’s Extremism Task Force, set up following the murder of Lee Rigby by Islamist extremists in May 2013, stated that “[e]xtremist preachers use some higher education [sic] institutions as a platform for spreading their messages.”11 Following this, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act passed in February 2015 mandated that universities must “have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”, making the delivery of Prevent a legal requirement.12

1.1 Violent Extremism and UK Higher Education

1.1.1 Islamism-Inspired Extremism

Since 1999, there have been a number of acts of Islamism-inspired terrorism, or terrorism-related offences, committed by students studying at a UK university at the time of their offence. These individuals have included:

- **Amer Mirza** – a student at the University of Humber (now called the University of Lincoln), who was convicted in 1999, for a petrol-bomb attack on a Territorial Army base in West London;13
- **Mohammed Naveed Bhatti** – convicted in June 2007, of conspiracy to cause explosions. Bhatti was studying at Brunel University when he was arrested;14
- **Omar Abdur Rehman** – convicted alongside Bhatti, for conspiracy to cause explosions. At the time of his arrest, Rehman was studying at the University of Westminster;15
- **Jawad Akbar** – convicted in April 2007, of conspiring to cause explosions. Akbar had suggested attacking the *Ministry of Sound* nightclub in London. He was a student at Brunel University when he was arrested, where he had “been attending a militant Islamist political group”;16
- **Waseem Mughal** – admitted, in July 2007, to inciting murder for terrorist purposes overseas. He had been studying at the University of Leicestershire when he was arrested;17
- **Adel Yahya** – was studying at London Metropolitan University when he became involved in the 21 July 2005 bomb plot. He was convicted in November 2007, of collecting information useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism;18
- **Waheed Zaman** – in 2008, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit public nuisance; in 2010, he was found guilty of conspiracy to murder, as part of the transatlantic ‘liquid bomb’ plot. Zaman was a student at London Metropolitan University when arrested in 2006, and, after his detention, cassettes and literature relating to the proscribed terrorist organisation al-Muhajiroun were found;19

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11 Ibid., p. 15.
15 Ibid., p. 3.
16 Ibid.
• **Mohammed Gul** - jailed in February 2011, on five counts of disseminating terrorist publications between March 2008 and January 2009 while a student at Queen Mary University of London;⁶

• **Khobaib Hussain** - a law student at the University of Wolverhampton, who pleaded guilty, in 2012, to travelling abroad for terrorist training.⁷ Prior to his arrest, the Islamic Society at the university had written that “[t]he reality is Muslim lands have been invaded and each land will retaliate and rightly so”, and that “[n]othing is more honourable then dying for the cause of Islam”;⁸

• **Erol Incédal** - a law student at London South Bank University (LSBU), who was found guilty of possession of a bomb-making manual, in November 2014;⁹

• **Afşana Kayum** - sentenced, in March 2015, to 18 months in jail, for possession of a record containing information useful in the commission of terrorism contrary to the Terrorism Act. Kayum was a law student at the University of East London (UEL) at the time of her arrest.¹⁰

Meanwhile, there have also been a significant number of graduates from UK universities convicted of involvement in terrorism, and whom, it has been plausibly suggested, were at least partially radicalised during their studies. These have included:

• **Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh** - found guilty, in 2002, of the kidnap and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan earlier that year. He is believed to have been radicalised whilst studying at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in the early 1990s;¹¹

• **Anthony Garcia** - convicted in 2007, of multiple offences in relation to a planned fertiliser bomb attack, and allegedly radicalised between 1998 and 2003, after attending talks at UEL (despite not being enrolled as a student);¹²

• **Omar Sharif** - found dead after his suicide device failed to detonate during an attack in Tel-Aviv, in 2003, which killed three. He was reported to have become increasingly radical while studying at King’s College London (KCL), including attending meetings held by Omar Bakri Muhammad;¹³

• **Kafeel Ahmed** - died of severe burns sustained during an attempted attack on Glasgow airport in June 2007. Security sources suggested that he had been radicalised while studying at Anglia Ruskin University;¹⁴

• **Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab** - convicted in 2012, of attempted murder and terrorism, after trying to bomb a passenger flight to Detroit in 2009. During his time at UCL, he had repeatedly contacted extremists who were under MI5 surveillance,¹⁵ and had also hosted on-campus events with extreme speakers;¹⁶

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¹²Ibid., p. 3.

¹³Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 1.


• **Roshonara Choudhry** – tried to assassinate the Labour MP Stephen Timms, in May 2010, just weeks after dropping out of KCL because of its work with Israeli institutions and its research centre studying radicalisation.11

Finally, several individuals who have enrolled at British universities are believed to have travelled to Syria, to work with extremist groups; or to be fighting for armed Islamist groups in Syria; or to have been killed in action during such activities. These include:

• **Mohammad Qadi Riha** – had been studying electrical engineering at UEL when he travelled to Syria in 2012;11

• **Anil Khalil Raoufi** – killed in February 2014 and had been studying mechanical engineering at university in Liverpool when he travelled to Syria.12 Raoufi is believed to have been accompanied by Mohammed Javeed, who had also studied at the same university, though it is unclear if Javeed was a student when the two men travelled;12

• **Aqsa Mahmood** – a radiography student at Glasgow Caledonian University, who dropped out of her course and travelled to Syria in late 2013;16

• **David Souaan** – convicted, in December 2014, of preparing for terrorist acts. Souaan was a student at Birkbeck, University of London when he was arrested in May 2014 as he attempted to travel to Syria for a second time;16

• **Rashed Amani** – believed to have travelled to Syria in March 2014. Amani had been enrolled on a Business Studies course at Coventry University.17 On 11 December 2014, it was reported that he had been killed in a US drone strike;16

• **Zubair Nur** – reported to have travelled to Syria in March 2015, after it emerged that Royal Holloway, University of London had contacted his parents to inform them he had not attended lectures since January.16

1.1.2 Far-Right Extremism

Far-right extremists convicted of terrorism-related offences in the UK appear much less likely to be students, or even graduates, of UK universities. Though the Prevent strategy has described them as often “poorly educated”,4 the limited evidence around convictions for far-right terrorism-related offences shows that the perpetrators can be students. For example, Pavlo Lapshyn, a Ukrainian student on a work placement in the UK, killed a Muslim man and bombed three mosques between April and July 2013, but

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was not enrolled at a UK institution. There has also been at least one case in which a student enrolled at a UK university was convicted of an offence which could be linked to violent, racist, or far-right views:

- **Vladimir Aust** - convicted, in October 2014, of manufacturing an explosive substance in his student accommodation, while a student at Newcastle University.

### 1.2 Non-violent Extremism and Higher Education

There is also evidence that suggests that a culture conducive to the promotion of non-violent extremism has been allowed to develop on a number of UK university campuses. This manifests itself in a number of ways and presents institutions with a wide range of challenges. Given the number of students convicted of offences or partially radicalised on campus (as highlighted in the previous section), and the conclusion within the Prevent strategy that a number of students “appear to have been attracted to and influenced by extremist ideology while at university and engaged in terrorism-related activity after they had left”, this should clearly be of concern.

#### 1.2.1 On Campus

Students can be exposed to extremism by the invitation of extreme or intolerant speakers onto campuses, to give lectures or sermons. This is usually as a result of an invitation from a student society, with a number of third-party organisations providing speaker-booking services to facilitate this process. However, these events can also be organised by off-campus organisations which seek to use the conference facilities that a university can provide. Events are often advertised on social media and can be promoted to students at more than one institution, particularly in areas with a high concentration of universities (such as London). The majority of such events host just one orator, and rarely act as debates. Instead, they tend to function as unchallenged platforms where extreme or intolerant speakers are presented as religious or political authorities.

In addition to the appearance of extreme or intolerant speakers, there have also been isolated incidents in which Islamist activists have targeted UK universities. This has included individuals linked to the proscribed organisation al-Muhajiroun appearing outside institutions (including LSE and Queen Mary University of London). Islamist activists have also sought to disrupt academic events. For example, Muslim Brotherhood supporters stormed a function at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), in November 2013, over its inclusion of a secularist Egyptian politician on the panel, and atheist

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Footnotes:

students at Queen Mary University were violently threatened in 2012, while holding an event on Sharia law.\textsuperscript{58}

There have also been a number of unsuccessful attempts, by non-violent far-right groups, to organise on campuses. The neo-Nazi party National Action, co-founded by University of Warwick student Alex Davies and University of Essex graduate Benjamin Raymond,\textsuperscript{56} has targeted universities on a number of occasions. Activists have appeared on campuses in Coventry; Leeds; London; Nottingham; and Sunderland, and Warwick, posing for photographs; carrying out banner-drops; and distributing leaflets and stickers.\textsuperscript{57}

In October 2012, Student Rights also highlighted how a British National Party (BNP) ‘front group’ with ties to the Alliance of European National Movements (AENM) was based at the University of Liverpool. This group aimed to target students for recruitment into nationalist politics – though, with little success, and it had dissolved by the end of the 2012-13 academic year.\textsuperscript{59} A similar effort, led by BNP Youth Organiser and Manchester Metropolitan University student Jack Renshaw, has also been unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{60} Renshaw is currently under investigation by the university, after multiple online anti-Semitic comments.\textsuperscript{61}

1.2.2 Online

There is also evidence that extremist material has regularly been shared with students at a number of UK universities via the social-media pages of their affiliated student societies. This has ranged from material which could potentially breach the law, including the sharing of video containing speeches by convicted terrorists or specially designated terrorist individuals,\textsuperscript{62} to clips taken from relatively inoffensive lectures given by clerics with a history of extreme or intolerant views.\textsuperscript{63} Student Rights regularly logs examples of promotional material for charities which have been linked to extremist individuals/groups, or have expressed extreme views, being shared with students,\textsuperscript{64} as well as evidence of students being encouraged to raise money for these charities by student societies.\textsuperscript{65}


\textsuperscript{63} Screenshots of all activity archived by Student Rights.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
2. On-Campus Events: 2012-14

Students are potentially exposed to extremism most frequently when speakers with a history of extreme or intolerant views, or a history of involvement with extremist organisations, are invited onto campuses. Student Rights has logged 400 events featuring such speakers, using open-source social-media information to catalogue events in the three calendar years between 2012 and 2014 with speakers whose views have shown “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”. Of these 400, 132 on-campus events took place in 2012; 145 in 2013; and 123 in 2014. While this research does not purport to show all events which took place on UK campuses in this time, nor to have catalogued all instances in which such speakers with a history of extreme views or affiliations have been advertised as appearing, it does provide a comprehensive account of events promoted via student social media featuring such speakers, and provides evidence of the scale of the issue.

While the majority of the speakers at these events do not explicitly endorse violent action (though some have a history of support for proscribed terrorist organisations such as Hamas and Hezbollah)\(^{39}\), they have expressed views which: promote the idea that there is a Western war against Islam; support individuals convicted of terrorism offences; express intolerance or opposition to non-believers and/or minorities; and espouse religious law as a method of socio-political governance – opposing democracy and pluralism in the process. It is also important to note that, while the majority of these speakers are Islamist extremists, this is not true in every case; a small number come from Christian or European Nationalist backgrounds.\(^{40}\)

Student Rights recorded and sorted these events by date, the UK region into which the university where they were due to occur falls, and the institution at which they were scheduled to take place. The speakers advertised have also been logged, as have the advertised topics of the events (where this was available). These topics have then been sorted into eight different categories, outlined below. It is also important to note that there is some crossover between these categories (for example, geopolitical issues can also be presented as a grievance).\(^{41}\)

1. **Dawah Training** – Lectures or workshops which sought to teach students the fundamentals of preaching to others.
2. **Geopolitics** – Events focused on international political issues, including the Israel–Palestine conflict; the Syrian Civil War; and the Arab Spring.
3. **Grievances** – Lectures or workshops which addressed grievances, such as perceived attacks on Muslims and Islam in the UK and the arrest and detention of terrorism suspects.
4. **Personal Stories** – Events where speakers outlined their personal experiences, including journeys to religion.
5. **Religious Apologetics** – Lectures which aimed to challenge ideas such as atheism and scepticism, and highlight the rational reasons for religious belief.

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*These categories are intentionally broad to ensure that events are not misclassified, though in most cases identification of the category an event topic fell into was straightforward. In the rare case of crossover between categories, such as where a subject could potentially be presented as a grievance, it has been included in subject category rather than grievance category.*
6. **Religious Governance** – Lectures which examined the details of religious socio-economic governance, focusing on the role of religion in fields such as legislation; justice; and finance.

7. **Religious Jurisprudence/Exegesis/History** – Lectures where religious rulings or interpretations, religious verses or other texts, or important historical or scriptural figures were discussed.

8. **Unknown** – Events with no topic, or at which a vague topic title made clear categorisation difficult.

### 2.1 On-Campus Events

**2012**

During 2012, Student Rights logged 132 on-campus events featuring extreme speakers being promoted to students. Of these, ten were cancelled or moved off-campus before taking place. These events were most common in February and March, with November seeing the third-highest total. In addition, five events featuring such speakers were organised by students at off-campus venues.

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<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![On-Campus Events: 2012](chart.png)
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The most common topic of the events in 2012, including the off-campus ones and those which were ultimately cancelled, focused on religious jurisprudence, exegesis, and history. This was followed by religious apologetics, with events focusing on geopolitical issues coming third. Of the 20 exploring geopolitical issues, 11 addressed the Israel-Palestine conflict, while three looked at the civil war in Syria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Topics</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dawah Training</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitics</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievances</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Stories</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Apologetics</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Governance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Jurisprudence/Exegesis/History</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>137</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2013 saw an increase in events logged, with 13 more on-campus functions being advertised to students than in 2012. However, a significantly larger number were cancelled or moved off-campus before taking place: 27 (nearly a fifth of the on-campus events advertised), up from 10. This is likely to have been affected by the cancellation of six events featuring Mufti Ismail Menk, in November 2013. As with 2012, the most common months for events to be logged were February and March, with November again being the third-most popular. A small number of off-campus events organised by student societies and featuring

---

extreme or intolerant speakers were also noted, though there was no significant increase or decrease on 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>On-Campus</th>
<th>Off-Campus Student-Run</th>
<th>Cancelled/Moved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>145</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Event topics in 2013 followed the same pattern as the previous year; religious jurisprudence, exegesis, and history was, again, the most popular theme for extreme or intolerant speakers to discuss. However, the proportion of events (regardless of whether they went ahead or not) focusing on these issues was higher than in 2012; rising from 33.8%, to 46.4%. Geopolitical issues remained the third-most common topic, headlining 11 events; yet, it fell from 14.6%, to just 7.3% of the total. These meetings also addressed a much wider range of subjects, with Israel–Palestine; the conflict in Syria; and the Arab Spring being the only issues to feature more than once.
Preventing Prevent?
Challenges to Counter-Radicalisation Policy On Campus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Topics</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dawah Training</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitics</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievances</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Stories</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Apologetics</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Governance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Jurisprudence/Exegesis/History</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2014 saw the lowest number of on-campus events logged of the three years studied, with 123 - a fall of 22 on the previous year. It also saw a drop in the number of events cancelled (down from 27, to 14 - a fall to 11.4% of the total). While February and March remained the two months with the highest number of events recorded, there was a significant decrease in the number logged in March when compared to previous years: falling from 42 in 2012, and 45 in 2013, to just 24 in 2014. November remained the month with the third-highest number of meetings booked - a consistent pattern across all three years. Throughout 2014, there was also a small number of off-campus events featuring extreme or intolerant speakers run; however, the total figure was not too dissimilar from that of 2012 or 2013.
The topics logged during 2014 followed the same sequence as the two previous years, with religious jurisprudence, exegesis, and history being the most common issue discussed. However, it did fall as a proportion of the total number of events, to 39.8% (in comparison to 2013’s figure). Religious apologetics remained the second-most common subject; but 2014 also saw an increase in the proportion of events focusing on Dawah training, which grew from 6.6% in 2012, and just 4.6% in 2013, to 12.5% of the total number of events in 2014. This made the topic the third-most discussed for the first time in the three years during which events were recorded, suggesting that these particular functions may be something for institutions to be aware of in future. It also supplanted geopolitical issues, which fell year on year.
Event Topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Topics</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dawah Training</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitics</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievances</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Stories</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Apologetics</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Governance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Jurisprudence/Exegesis/History</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>128</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Event Topics: 2014

![Event Topics: 2014 Graph]

2012-14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>On-Campus</th>
<th>Off-Campus Student-Run</th>
<th>Cancelled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>400</td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Event Topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Topics</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dawah Training</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitics</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievances</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Stories</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Apologetics</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Governance</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Jurisprudence/Exegesis/History</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>416</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

#### 2.2 On-Campus Events by Region 2012-14

In all three years during which events were recorded, London was the region to feature the greatest number. This is likely due to the large number of institutions in the capital, as well as the fact that many of the extreme groups and activists invited appear to be based in the capital. In addition to this, it is also important to note the high number of events in the East Midlands, which saw the third-highest total of events recorded despite having only nine universities, with only the North East (5), the East of England (6), and Wales (8) having less.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East of England</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Midlands</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire and Humberside</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>132</strong></td>
<td><strong>145</strong></td>
<td><strong>123</strong></td>
<td><strong>400</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Map 1: On Campus Events by Region, 2012

- SCOTLAND: 4 EVENTS
- NORTH WEST: 3 EVENTS
- WALES: 6 EVENTS
- WEST MIDLANDS: 12 EVENTS
- SOUTH WEST: 4 EVENTS
- NORTH EAST: 2 EVENTS
- YORKSHIRE AND HUMBERSIDE: 12 EVENTS
- EAST MIDLANDS: 12 EVENTS
- EAST: 5 EVENTS
- LONDON: 65 EVENTS
- SOUTHEAST: 7 EVENTS
Map 2: On Campus Events by Region, 2013

- **SCOTLAND**: 4 EVENTS
- **NORTH EAST**: 3 EVENTS
- **NORTH WEST**: 8 EVENTS
- **YORKSHIRE AND HUMBERSIDE**: 6 EVENTS
- **WALES**: 7 EVENTS
- **EAST MIDLANDS**: 10 EVENTS
- **EAST**: 6 EVENTS
- **WEST MIDLANDS**: 11 EVENTS
- **LONDON**: 67 EVENTS
- **SOUTH EAST**: 19 EVENTS
Map 3: On Campus Events by Region, 2014

- SCOTLAND: 2 EVENTS
- NORTH WEST: 6 EVENTS
- WALES: 2 EVENTS
- WEST MIDLANDS: 9 EVENTS
- SOUTH WEST: 7 EVENTS
- NORTH EAST: 1 EVENT
- YORKSHIRE AND HUMBERSIDE: 10 EVENTS
- EAST MIDLANDS: 16 EVENTS
- EAST: 5 EVENTS
- LONDON: 51 EVENTS
- SOUTH EAST: 14 EVENTS
Map 4: On Campus Events by Region, 2012-14

- SCOTLAND: 10 EVENTS
- NORTH WEST: 17 EVENTS
- WALES: 15 EVENTS
- WEST MIDLANDS: 32 EVENTS
- SOUTH WEST: 15 EVENTS
- NORTH EAST: 6 EVENTS
- YORKSHIRE AND HUMBERSIDE: 28 EVENTS
- EAST MIDLANDS: 38 EVENTS
- EAST: 16 EVENTS
- LONDON: 183 EVENTS
- SOUTH EAST: 40 EVENTS
2.3 On-Campus Events by Institution

Student Rights logged events at 82 different institutions over the period between 2012 and 2014;\(^6\) as well as at Senate House, the central library of the University of London.\(^7\) However, as the previous section shows, a large number of these functions took place in London - with a significant proportion being held at a small number of institutions. The following tables demonstrate this, as they show the five universities across the UK at which the most events were logged in each year, as well as over the full period studied. In these tables it can be seen that a small number of the 82 institutions repeatedly hosted events featuring extreme speakers or organisations, with only seven different institutions making up the 20 places available and the top five making up nearly a third of events logged each year.

### 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Total Events</th>
<th>Cancelled Events</th>
<th>Proportion of Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Westminster</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston University</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen Mary University of London</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston University</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King’s College London</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top Five/Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>38/132</strong></td>
<td><strong>0/132</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Total Events</th>
<th>Cancelled Events</th>
<th>Proportion of Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Westminster</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King’s College London</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston University</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston University</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen Mary University of London</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top Five/Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>44/145</strong></td>
<td><strong>5/145</strong></td>
<td><strong>30.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Total Events</th>
<th>Cancelled Events</th>
<th>Proportion of Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Queen Mary University of London</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School of Oriental and African Studies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston University</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Nottingham</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King’s College London</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top Five/Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>36/123</strong></td>
<td><strong>1/123</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^6\) Events took place at venues at UCL and the UCL School of Pharmacy, which have been counted as different venues but the same institution.

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Challenges to Counter-Radicalisation Policy On Campus

### 2012-14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Total Events</th>
<th>Cancelled Events</th>
<th>Proportion of Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Westminster</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen Mary University, London</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston University</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King’s College London</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston University</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top Five/Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>109/400</strong></td>
<td><strong>6/400</strong></td>
<td><strong>27.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.4 Event Speakers

The events logged by Student Rights, between 2012 and 2014, featured 82 different speakers, as well as featuring unidentified speakers from CAGE; the Islamic Education and Research Academy (IERA); and the Muslim Public Affairs Committee UK (MPACUK). However, as was the case with the institutions at which the events took place, there are certain speakers and organisations which were logged more frequently than others.

#### 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Total Events</th>
<th>Off-Campus Events</th>
<th>Cancelled Events</th>
<th>Proportion of Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamza Tzortzis</td>
<td>IERA</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitham al-Haddad</td>
<td>MRDF</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnan Rashid</td>
<td>Hittin Institute/IERA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yusuf Chambers</td>
<td>IERA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uthman Lateef</td>
<td>Hittin Institute</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>67/137</strong></td>
<td><strong>2/5</strong></td>
<td><strong>4/137</strong></td>
<td><strong>48.9</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Tzortzis is a senior member of IERA. He has been criticised for stating that apostates who “fight against the community [...] should be killed”, and that: “we as Muslims reject the idea of freedom of speech, and even the idea of freedom”. IERA is currently barred from operating at University College London (UCL), after attempting to segregate students by gender, and at least two members of the group’s “team from Portsmouth” have since been killed fighting for Islamic State, in Syria. The group has also admitted that the aim of its on-campus Dawah training is to recruit...

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*While the University of Westminster tops the table for 2012-14, on release of this report (July 2015) the university with the highest number of events logged since January 2012 was Queen Mary University.*


students, with one speaker saying of an event: “I was looking for good volunteers.” Speakers from the organisation made up 40.3% of the 149 speaker appearances logged in 2012.  

2. Haddad has expressed virulent homophobia, referring to the “scourge” of homosexuality as well as misogyny, stating that “a man should not be questioned why he hit his wife” and has also justified the death penalty for apostates.  

3. Rashid has worked with IERA and is also a senior member of the Hittin Institute (HI), an Islamist organisation ideologically close to the revolutionary Islamst group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) which, in 2009, hosted the al-Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. Rashid supports the implementation of religious governance and has also claimed that there is an “ongoing global persecution of the Muslims”.  

4. Chambers is a senior member of IERA. He has expressed support for brutal punishments, including execution for sex outside of marriage.  

5. Lateef, director of the HI, was advertised as speaking alongside Anwar al-Awlaki at the HI event held with the cleric in 2009. He has also espoused homophobia and communal division, warning against “a democratic Islam [...] a redefined, repackaged Islam”.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Total Events</th>
<th>Off-Campus Events</th>
<th>Cancelled Events</th>
<th>Proportion of Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hamza Tzortzis</td>
<td>IERA</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adnan Rashid</td>
<td>Hittin Institute/IERA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haitham al-Haddad</td>
<td>MRDF</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uthman Lateef</td>
<td>Hittin Institute</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jalal ibn Sacked</td>
<td>Al Fitrah</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>82/151</td>
<td>3/6</td>
<td>9/151</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2 The number of appearances is larger than the number of events logged, due to the fact that some events featured more than one speaker.
8 ‘Hittin Institute presents Imam Anwar Awlaki, abu mujahid: Glad tidings to the stranger’, Islamic Awakening, 14 November 2008.
1. Jalal ibn Saeed has disparaged other religions, in sermons, on a number of occasions, referring to “the Jews, who only care about themselves and call the rest a goyim”. He has also said of the Taliban that it “doesn’t mean they’re false just because they didn’t succeed. As far as I am concerned the Mujahideen are successful whether they lose or win. They’re successful. But if they succeed we also become successful”.

### 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Total Events</th>
<th>Off-Campus Events</th>
<th>Cancelled Events</th>
<th>Proportion of Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamza Tzortzis</td>
<td>IERA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uthman Lateef</td>
<td>Hittin Institute</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alomgir Ali</td>
<td>MRDF</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IERA Speakers</td>
<td>IERA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imran ibn Mansur</td>
<td>Dawah Man/IERA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamza Tzortzis</td>
<td>IERA</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uthman Lateef</td>
<td>Hittin Institute</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitham al-Haddad</td>
<td>MRDF</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnan Rashid</td>
<td>Hittin Institute/IERA</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yusuf Chambers</td>
<td>IERA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Ali has claimed that “for a woman, it is best for her to stay in her home, because her home is a natural form of a hijab”, and has spoken in support of convicted terrorists at the 2012 ‘Belmarsh Iftar’. It should be noted that he replaces Haitham Al-Haddad, the founder of the MRDF, in the top five during 2014, suggesting that he may be being invited in his place as a less controversial MRDF speaker.

### 2012-14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
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<td>Haitham al-Haddad</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>IERA</td>
<td>18</td>
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</table>


The extent to which IERA speakers are represented in the top five shows the group’s efforts to target campuses, making up 31% of the 191 on-campus events logged featuring the most prolific speakers. When other speakers involved with the group are taken into account, and the off-campus events at which they featured are included, this rises to 39.4%. However, in 2014, the number of recorded events featuring the group’s speakers dropped – falling from a high of 62 in 2013, to 42. Speakers connected to the HI (including Adnan Rashid) appeared on 74 occasions (17.8% of the total), with 18 events in 2012 growing to 29 in 2013 and 27 in 2014. Other organisations which supplied speakers for on-campus events included Haitham al-Haddad’s Muslim Research and Development Foundation (MRDF), with 52 events (12.5% of the total); HT (6.5%); and CAGE (3.8%).

![Organisational Appearances 2012-14](chart)
Institutions responsible for the delivery of counter-radicalisation policy have attempted to ensure that the higher education sector is able to respond to the risk posed. Since the 7/7 attacks on the London transport network in 2005, a number of governmental departments; the police; and several sector-specific NGOs have provided guidance to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and have detailed work that should be carried out to deliver Prevent on university campuses.

3.1 The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS)

In January 2008, the government office responsible for the administration of higher education in the UK – the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) or, the Department for Innovation, Universities & Skills (IUS), as it was then – released ‘Promoting good campus relations, fostering shared values and preventing violent extremism in Universities and Higher Education Colleges’.’ This sought to provide HEIs with “Practical Advice on Delivering Key Objectives” that were identified as important in challenging extremism,” and provided a number of issues for HEIs to consider which could improve their ability to deal with extremism and radicalisation. These included advising institutions to create clear policies relating to free-speech codes of practice and external-speaker invites, as well as in relation to harassment; intimidation; and discrimination. The guidance also included potential scenarios which universities and student unions could face, including the discovery of extremist literature on campus; the invitation of an extremist speaker by students; and students voicing concerns about the misuse of prayer facilities or about extreme societies/groups.

However, these scenarios did not offer concrete solutions – and often simply urged institutions to ensure that policies were in place to address the issues, rather than advising on their specific content. BIS is also yet to release an updated set of guidelines for HEIs, leaving its position on the issue increasingly outdated. The scenarios were also reused in BIS’s 2008 consultation document, ‘The Role of Further Education Providers in Promoting Community Cohesion, Fostering Shared Values and Preventing Violent Extremism’. This guidance stressed the importance of sharing information on extremist speakers and organisations between the Higher Education and Further Education sectors, and detailed the need to improve police liaison, suggesting that institutions could share “a network of identified university neighbourhood policing officers”.

3.2 The Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG)

The Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) produced two reports which highlighted its concerns about the growth of extremism and detailed proposed activity. In April 2007, ‘Preventing violent extremism – Winning hearts and minds’ was released and described the UK response to the problems posed by radicalisation. It divided this response into four main areas: “promoting shared
values, supporting local solutions, building civic capacity and leadership, and strengthening the role of faith institutions and leaders.\textsuperscript{20} This was followed, in 2008, by ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Next Steps For Communities’, which laid out the extent of the threat and an assessment of why people were drawn towards these activities, before detailing methods to be used to challenge such behaviour.\textsuperscript{21} CLG was also instrumental in producing ‘Delivering the Prevent Strategy: An Updated Guide for Local Partners’, in August 2009. This followed and summarised several other publications to which CLG had contributed in the previous year (including “The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England”)\textsuperscript{22} and provided: information on the strategy itself, advice on how to develop Prevent delivery, and details of practical support which could be given to practitioners.

\textbf{3.3 The Home Office and OSCT}

While Prevent delivery was the responsibility of CLG between 2006 and 2011, the Home Office remained closely involved with Prevent policy and continued to be involved in the production of material for practitioners and policymakers during this period. In 2007, the Home Office founded the Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU), to provide information to potential Prevent partners (including HEIs) in order to “generate challenge to terrorist ideology”.\textsuperscript{23} In 2011, Prevent became the responsibility of the Home Office, through its OSCT department, and a revised strategy was produced. This detailed the activity to be carried out in dealing with extremism in the UK’s universities, and included:

- Identifying HEIs where radicalisation or recruitment on campus was considered to be a significant risk, and inviting these HEIs to assess this threat and their capacity to deal with it;
- Targeting HEIs identified as ‘at risk’, with intelligence briefings and grants for Prevent work and training, and also providing a Prevent police officer to certain institutions;
- Supporting projects which advised HEI staff on how to identify students vulnerable to radicalisation, as well as funding a position to “develop training materials for staff”;
- Encouraging local government to involve HEI staff in Prevent working groups.\textsuperscript{24}

It also laid out planned activities which would improve Prevent delivery in higher education. This focused on the concern that “some universities and colleges have failed to engage in Prevent”, declaring that “this lack of engagement must be addressed”.\textsuperscript{25} Measures proposed by the revised strategy included:

- The provision of support for institutions to train staff in recognising radicalisation, and improving awareness of existing support structures and material - as well as of the risks posed by radicalisation - in order to gain increased and consistent engagement;
- The provision of funding for student bodies, including the National Union of Students (NUS), to train full-time and sabbatical officers, to ensure that they are able to adhere to the responsibilities mandated by charitable law and NUS guidance;


\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., pp. 74-75.

\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., pp. 75-76.
Prior to being replaced by the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) on 1 April 2015, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) produced material relating to HEI policing and Prevent delivery. In May 2008, it released guidance entitled 'The Application of Neighbourhood Policing to Higher Education Institutions', which provided officers with operational guidance and good-practice advice. While this did not actively address violent or non-violent extremism (the importance of establishing high levels of hate-crime reporting was the closest parallel), it did provide significant advice for officers on establishing relationships with university staff; student unions; and “hard to reach [sic] student groups”. This underpins much of the work now carried out by Prevent Engagement Officers (PEOs).

Following the passage of a motion opposing Prevent, at the NUS Conference in April 2012, ACPO and the Police Association of Higher Education Liaison Officers (PAHELO) also released guidance for officers on how this opposition could be addressed. This document identified that the passage of the motion “may have an adverse affect [sic] on policing on campus”, and sought to address each point raised by the NUS in turn, instructing officers in how to allay student fears about Prevent activity on campuses. Several months after the publication of this briefing note, ACPO also released ‘Prevent, Police and Universities’, which sought to provide comprehensive guidance for officers involved with Prevent delivery on UK campuses.

3.4 The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)

Universities UK (UUK) has released advice on the issue of extremism, for the Higher Education sector. However, it was also involved on the launching of the ‘Safe Campus Communities’ (in May 2013), a website designed to provide a repository of information and be a networking forum for HEI practitioners. Following Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s abortive attack in 2009, UUK convened a working group to examine the issue of extremism on university campuses and to produce guidance. This led to the publication, in February 2011, of ‘Freedom of speech on campus: rights and responsibilities in UK universities’, which explored the contesting interests facing university staff involved in challenging extremism.

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These included defining the parameters of academic freedom, highlighting the specific obligations that universities are under to protect it, and detailing how the regulations to which universities are subject compete with this duty to protect said academic freedom. In addition, the guidance provided examples from UUK's 2010 survey of universities and their policies and experiences, with a number of the issues relevant to challenging extremism on university campuses. The document also gave recommendations for HEIs and government, including ensuring that staff members involved in decision-making were aware of the legal requirements detailed in the report; ensuring that institutions have policies on speaker events and information sharing; and that named individuals have clearly-defined responsibilities regarding dealing with the issues arising from extremism.

In November 2013, UUK released further guidance, entitled 'External speakers in higher education institutions'. This summarised the legal provisions which apply to universities and provided advice on the creation of “[e]ffective external speaker [sic] processes”, including provisions that HEIs could to incorporate into policy at stages – such as speaker request, speaker review, and decision communication. It also included case studies relating to speaker invites which could cause problems. However, the document attracted controversy, as a case study justified segregation by gender, on religious grounds, advising that HEIs “should be mindful to ensure that the freedom of speech of the religious group or speaker is not curtailed unlawfully” by a failure to provide segregated seating. UUK referred the guidance to the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), which declared that it was not permissible for universities to segregate by gender in academic meetings.

The guidance was withdrawn and subsequently reissued in March 2014, referring those concerned about segregation to the EHRC ruling, ‘Gender Segregation at Events and Meetings: Guidance for Universities and Students' Unions'.

3.6 The Equality Challenge Unit (ECU)

An NGO funded by the UK’s Higher Education Funding Council and UUK, the Equality Challenge Unit (ECU) produced several documents which outlined on-campus intolerance and detailed existing legislation; principles; and case studies that could be used by HEIs to challenge such issues. These publications included ‘Promoting good campus relations: dealing with hate crimes and intolerance’ (2005) and ‘Promoting good campus relations: an institutional imperative’ (2007). These have since been replaced by ‘Promoting good relations on campus: a guide for higher and further education’ (2013). The 2013 document outlines the existing legal provisions which apply to HEIs, with regard to the promotion of ‘good relations’ (defined, by the guidance, as achieving equality; respect; security; unity; and cooperation on campus), and identifies three key themes for institutions to take into account: protecting HEIs’ special legal status regarding freedom of speech; the promotion of equality and anti-discrimination; and the qualification of individual rights to ensure that behaviour does not breach criminal law (including hate speech or incitement offences). It also summarised the key drivers behind threats to campus relations

111 Ibid.
114 ‘External speakers in higher education institutions’, UUK (March 2014).
- including racial, religious, and political intolerance - aiming to provide institutions with “an understanding of the spectrum of intolerance”.

However, only violent extremism was included as a specific extremism-related issue, with the limited guidance stating that “the government has recommended that institutions should be aware of the risk of radicalisation and the challenges posed by violent extremism”.

Though the report failed to note the risk posed by non-violent extremism on university campuses, it did provide detailed advice for institutions on how to develop the policies necessary to challenge on-campus intolerance. In doing this, the guidance stresses the “importance of reasonableness and proportionality” and lists potential checks which institutions should make before curtailing freedom of expression, including that decisions be evidence based and taken with the relevant legislation in mind.

### 3.7 Delivery of Prevent on Campus

The provision of guidance is only one element of Prevent delivery, however; the on-campus implementation of the strategy’s three strands is where it has the most effect. On university campuses, those responsible for delivery find themselves fulfilling all three of these strands during their work, including:

- **Challenging extremist ideology** - managing the dissemination of extremist ideas and countering extremist narratives (such as those presented at speaker events), as well as dealing with misconceptions about Prevent;
- **Supporting vulnerable individuals** - casework which identifies those vulnerable to extremism and attempts to prevent radicalisation. This can range from informal discussions, to a full referral to Channel (the government’s de-radicalisation programme);
- **Supporting sectors** - delivering training and providing material for staff in sectors identified as at risk, as well as engaging with local communities in these sectors.

The majority of Prevent delivery on campus does not involve external intervention, and, instead, takes the form of university staff and student-union officials implementing existing institutional policies which have been informed by the guidance provided. These policies include those relating to the invitation of external extreme speakers, as well as others connected to an institution’s ‘duty of care’ to its students. In some cases, policies may have been developed in conjunction with Prevent police officers or civilian staff; but the day-to-day responsibility for compliance lies with on-campus personnel. Ensuring that internal policies are in place to deal with speaker events is important, given that it is an issue which affects institutions across the country. UUK says that half of the HEIs which participated in its 2010 survey of universities “had experienced challenges in relation to speaker meetings.”

Speaker policies, while not consistently in place across the sector, are therefore used to deal with the issue without the need for external involvement – and, in some cases, have been adopted by student groups as well. These policies often call for:

- Written notice of an event – as well as the identity of the speaker, expected attendee numbers, and event details - to be provided to the university authorities up, to 10 days in advance;

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118 Ibid.

119 Ibid.


Research by university staff to ascertain if there is a risk of hate speech, incitement, or support for terrorism posed by the speaker;
• Event-request decisions and any provisions imposed on the event to be communicated clearly to students and speaker;
• Event preparations and conduct to be monitored, to ensure that there are no breaches of the law – including criminal offences relating to content – or breaches of equality guidance.  

In addition to events, efforts to challenge extremism may also extend to dealing with the posting of extreme material on social-media pages operated by student societies affiliated to the student union. In this case, a number of institutions have put into place strategies which deal with the responsible use of such social media. One institution, for example, stated in the 2010 UUK survey that it has implemented a policy which “provides a framework for managing electronic communications”, and a “procedure for confirming through the Registrar’s Office what meetings, events, etc. can be publicised and/or endorsed through the official institutional channels of communication”. However, these policies often fail to mention extremist material, and the extent to which such material is still posted highlights the ongoing difficulties that institutions face in enforcing compliance.

While the majority of this work is carried out by university staff, Prevent-delivery officers (or, coordinators) play a number of roles when universities are faced with invitations to extremist speakers. One of these is the development of relationships with HEIs; institutions in the UUK 2010 survey have commented that “PREVENT team members regularly visit campus and develop working relationships with appropriate colleagues”, and that they have “[t]very helpful relationships with Police Special Branch and [a] new agreement for monthly informal updates”. One HEI even has a police “Terrorism Prevention Officer [as] a member of a working group on the University that meets periodically to review risk of terrorist activities”; such close relationships with the police help to ensure that staff are regularly briefed on the risks posed by violent extremism.

However, the most common duty of Prevent-delivery officers is the training of university staff and student-union officials in identifying extremism. Engagement exercises such as Operation Bachelor and Operation Graduate seek to encourage the formation of on-campus, independent advisory groups; to have students and staff role-play potential scenarios; and to develop ideas about referral mechanisms for vulnerable students. More general training is also available to HEI staff, through the ‘Workshop to Raise

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124 Ibid., p. 22.

123 Ibid., p. 21.

Awareness of Prevent’ (WRAP) sessions, which exist to provide an introduction to Prevent delivery and develop their knowledge of the threat posed by extremism.  

Prevent-delivery co-ordinators also have responsibility for supplying HEI personnel with information and advice for events featuring extreme or intolerant speakers. In most cases, this consists of aiding HEIs in identifying extreme or intolerant past statements made by speakers and suggesting possible safeguards to enable the event to go ahead with the lowest level of risk. Co-ordinators are also able to assist universities in cases where extreme material is shared on affiliated social-media pages, helping to identify such material should it be referred to them and advising on action. These activities can also extend to the provision of advice when a particular event or speaker may be at risk of violent protest – particularly if this protest stems from other groups subject to Prevent scrutiny.

### 3.8 Referrals and Intervention

A more significant intervention by Prevent-delivery staff can occur if an individual is deemed to be vulnerable to radicalisation. This could be triggered by the discovery of extreme material on an individual’s social media or person, or by a report from a concerned tutor or pastoral-care staff member over expressions of violent extremism. Should a potential breach of the law be involved, the individual would be arrested and charged with an offence, rather than referred for intervention, to ensure that counter-radicalisation efforts and criminal justice efforts do not become connected. However, if this is not the case, and pastoral-care staff deem the trigger to be of sufficient concern, then an individual can be referred to a Prevent Case Management (PCM) team. Should the situation be considered serious enough, it can then be escalated to the local-authority chair, in order to make a case for a formal intervention as part of the government’s de-radicalisation programme, Channel. A collaborative effort involving the police; agencies, including social services; and local community resources, Channel aims to “assess the nature and extent” of the risk to individuals referred and to “develop the most appropriate support” for them.

When an individual is referred to the programme, a multi-agency panel is assembled, in order to develop a personalised support package. This includes input from police; social services; and medical staff, and can also feature bespoke members relevant to the individual concerned (for example, teachers or probation staff). Intervention could involve a range of practices, including:

- **Counselling** – the provision of advice and support, to enable the individual referred to deal successfully with any personal issues that could lead to increased vulnerability;
- **Theological guidance** – discussions with an individual, to develop religious knowledge, with the aim of improving their ability to challenge the narratives expressed by violent extremists;
- **Civic engagement** – attempts to encourage an individual to become more involved in political engagement; human rights; and social-justice work, and to foster a sense of citizenship;
- **Support-network engagement** – the involvement an individual’s family and peers in the process of turning them away from extremism;

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Mainstream services – the involvement of agencies responsible for an individual’s welfare, to stabilise personal circumstances which may be leading to increased vulnerability (for example, a housing intervention in order to prevent eviction).

3.9 Oversight of On-Campus Delivery of Prevent

Given Prevent’s focus on protecting vulnerable people, and the legal duty of HEIs to protect freedom of expression, it is vital that on-campus delivery is properly regulated. Where delivery is in the hands of student-union and university staff, this regulation is often built into HEIs’ internal policies, which demand that staff be mindful of the importance of freedom of speech in relation to campuses. These policies also require staff to be transparent about any decisions taken. For instance, Loughborough University mandates that, after any cancellation of an event, it “will clearly state the grounds on which permission is being denied and cite all the evidence that has been taken into account”. Similarly, at the University of Hull, policy promises that “[a]n annual report on referred speakers will be produced by the Student Activities Co-ordinator”, in order to review decisions taken. An extra level of oversight is available whenever personal data may be shared, as, in those instances, institutions must comply with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998; the Act gives them the right to “insist that a court order is obtained by the police compelling disclosure”, to ensure the request is a proportionate one. Other institutions have taken a less formal route, but still enforced information-sharing boundaries, with one stating: “We have informally articulated the circumstances in which we would not release information to the CTU [Counter-Terrorism Unit].”

When a Channel intervention has taken place, the regulation becomes more stringent: a PCM team is required to carry out a screening process, to ensure that allegations are not malicious or misinformed. Guidance produced for PCM teams also states that “all information and decision making [sic] should be recorded throughout each stage of the process.” A PCM officer’s line manager, as well as “senior statutory partners (such as the local authority, the police, […] and the education sector)”, also collectively assess if the individual referred should be taken into the Channel programme. Interventions are subject to regular review, with the PCM team responsible for each case assessing the ongoing level of vulnerability and either moving to close the file or reconsidering the support package. Those involved in the original assessment also review interventions at six months and again at twelve months after the process ends, to measure progress. There are also safeguards in place to make sure that the well-being of individuals referred, or the risk posed by individuals to the public, is not increased by a referral to Channel.

3.10 Engagement in On-Campus Delivery of Prevent

3.10.1 Positives

Since its inception, Prevent has received a mixed reaction from both institutions and students. However, there have been some positives, with some universities appearing ready to at least engage with the programme. The 2010 UUK survey saw over 60% of the institutions which responded state that they had engaged with Prevent delivery on-campus in the past; some even highlighted the positive aspects that Prevent engagement had, with one stating that it had enabled them “to have a constructive dialogue by
including a number of parties from our diverse institution.”

The programme has also engaged student bodies, to an extent, as BIS provided grants to the NUS. There is also evidence that, in some areas, the police-led element of Prevent delivery has been adapted by local officers, to make it more accessible. This was demonstrated in the 2012 ACPO guidance, ‘Prevent, Police and Universities’, through a case study of a liaison officer at the University of Brighton who had been embedded on-campus since 2009 and built extensive relationships with student union and student services staff.

Respondents to the 2010 UUK survey also expressed enthusiasm for “[g]ood relationships and open communications with local beat officer[s]” and “regular contact with campus police officers”; one even spoke of how the “local community officer will shortly be provided with a room on campus so that better communication with staff and students can take place.”

3.10.2 Resistance

While these successes are important, Prevent delivery on campuses has been beset with difficulties. One of the most notable has been a poor reputation among students and staff, which has hampered engagement efforts. This negative image has been fuelled by several incidents where individual officers have demonstrated poor communication or operational decisions. The most significant example of this is the arrest and detention of the University of Nottingham student Rizwaan Sabir, in May 2008, after concern was raised about al-Qaeda-related material which he had been using as part of his PhD research (Sabir later brought a civil case against Nottinghamshire Police, which was settled out of court). Other, less serious, instances have involved student-union political posters being photographed by officers, and the investigation of a left-wing activist from the University of Birmingham, which led to accusations that Prevent investigations were being used as a “political move”. These issues have also been highlighted by universities, with one respondent to the 2010 UUK survey claiming that “Special [B]ranch have no idea how to communicate. They have all sorts of strange ideas about what and how people will report what they think of as suspicious, but which are far from abnormal in a university.”

3.10.3 Lack of Engagement

Such criticisms and ill feeling make it hardly surprising that Prevent officers report that it can be difficult to arrange meetings and training sessions, and that those which do go ahead are often set up on an ad-hoc basis. Furthermore, these sessions are sometimes seen as a low priority by university and union staff, something which has been suggested to Student Rights in the past; staff see dealing with other safeguarding issues, such as alcohol and drug abuse, as more prominent concerns. As student-union officials and staff cannot be forced to attend training sessions, there is room for individuals who oppose Prevent policy to avoid any involvement with it. In addition to this lack of engagement, some student groups have attempted to deliberately evade scrutiny, as Student Rights has uncovered events which were not reported to university authorities. This problem has been highlighted by institutions: one has complained that

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15 Prevent, Police, and Universities, ACPO, May 2012, pg. 33.
20 Freedom of speech on campus: rights and responsibilities in UK universities, UUK (February 2011), p. 22.
21 Interview with Prevent officers, December 2014.
22 Interview with Student Services staff at Loughborough University, December 2012.
“Ensuring that University student clubs and societies properly inform the University and other relevant authorities of events [...] can be a challenge.” There is also substantial recent evidence of student unions actively working to hinder Prevent delivery, in line with a NUS resolution passed in April 2015 to “not engage with the PREVENT strategy”; to “encourage Unions and institutions to not comply with or legitimise PREVENT”; and to “investigate, [identify] and block/cease accepting any PREVENT funding for any NUS activities or departments.”

3.10.4 Structural Problems

It has also been suggested, by officers, that Prevent delivery has not fully succeeded in developing as an integrated model and that, while delivery is supposed to be multi-agency, in practice, it is often overly police-led – potentially leading to further identification of Prevent as a heavy-handed policing programme. Such a perception can be due to something as simple as poor personal relationships between representatives of different agencies, or as far-reaching as mistrust of Prevent delivery within a local authority administration, which can – in turn – affect day-to-day operations. However, it can also be down to the limits of the networks responsible for delivery. In one case, a police team responsible for delivery told Student Rights that, with only one BIS Higher Education/Further Education co-ordinator covering its region (which consists of multiple police forces across several counties), it is doing a significant proportion of the engagement and Prevent casework alone. This could also be as a result of civilian staff not being sufficiently linked in to intelligence-led engagement and intervention with vulnerable individuals; as such, they can be only minimally involved in any referral process, further giving the impression that Prevent interventions are solely a police initiative and part of the criminal-justice system.

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150 ‘Freedom of speech on campus: rights and responsibilities in UK universities’, UUK (February 2011), p. 27.
4. Student Criticisms of Prevent

While Prevent has been able to engage within the Higher Education sector to an extent, it is the failure to gain student support which has been the most damaging. There is evidence that, since the 7/7 attacks, a number of student unions and organisations have actively worked to hinder the strategy’s attempts to counter radicalisation. Student union organisations have pledged to oppose the strategy, as demonstrated in at least three motions passed by the National Union of Students (NUS) since 2010. This includes one from April 2013, which resolved to “not engage with the PREVENT strategy”; to “encourage Unions and institutions to not comply with or legitimise PREVENT” and to “investigate, [identify] and block/cease accepting any PREVENT funding for any NUS activities or departments”. The NUS Black Students’ Campaign has also passed motions opposing Prevent policies on campus and has an ongoing commitment to “encourage SU/Universities to condemn/disassociate” from Prevent, while, in June 2013, the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) Annual Conference hosted a “Preventing Prevent fringe event”.

This opposition to engagement has also been demonstrated at union level, and was highlighted in two almost identical motions submitted in relation to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, by student unions at King’s College London (KCL) and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in January and February 2015. These declared that the student unions and their officers “will not engage with the Prevent strategy unless legally required to do so”, and that they would “educate students on the dangers of the counter terrorism [sic] and security bill and the Prevent Strategy.” Similar motions submitted to the Cardiff University Students’ Union (CUSU) and Queen Mary Students’ Union (QMSU), in January and February 2015, also stated that the unions would educate students on the dangers of Prevent and would “not engage with the Prevent strategy and [would] cut any links it indirectly has with the programme via the university”. In October 2012, meanwhile, the Friends of Palestine Society at the University of East London (UEL) claimed that the passage of a union motion against the Prevent strategy would ensure that “when any society request[s] invites for external speakers the information [...] will not be passed on to [the] university.” This opposition has also been demonstrated on an individual level, with the General Secretary of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) tweeting about her work “preventing Prevent”, in July 2012. More recently, the then-President of University of the Arts Student Union (SUARTS) tweeted in February 2015 that “the Counter Terrorism Bill will extend the powers of the despicable PREVENT agenda; the student movement must unite to #StopTheBill”.

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135 @BilkisAkhter', Twitter, 28 June 2013, deleted and archived by Student Rights.
137 Tuesday 3rd February 2015 - Agenda’, Cardiff University Student Senate (February 2015), available at: http://www.cardiffstudents.co.uk/pageassets/your-voice/senate/meetings/Agenda/03.02.15.pdf; see also: ‘Student Council Agenda’, Queen Mary University Student Union, 27 January 2015, p. 55, last visited: 15 June 2015.
With this open opposition to the programme hindering successful implementation, it is important that the ways in which students see Prevent and the reasons they have for failing to engage with it are identified by policymakers and addressed, if on-campus delivery is to be effective. Motions passed by student unions, as well as social-media posts and online articles, show four broad themes within student rhetoric opposing the strategy. These themes highlight criticism which can be addressed in order to improve engagement, misapprehensions which could be corrected with successful engagement, and malicious narratives promoted by those politically opposed to the Prevent strategy (including those extremists whose activities are targeted by its delivery) which need to be exposed and challenged.

4.1 Islamophobia and Racial Stereotyping in Delivering Prevent

One of the key arguments which can be identified from analysis of student material relating to the Prevent strategy is the idea that the policy is deliberately targeted at the UK’s Muslim communities and, as a result, is prejudiced and racist.

Evidence of this belief can be seen in the following examples:

- Motions passed in 2012, by the NUS Black Students’ Campaign (which sees the Prevent strategy as a malicious policy). These motions have claimed that Prevent “attempts to demonise and isolate Islamic Societies” and promotes the “racist scapegoating of the Muslim community”, concluding that the programme must be stopped from “stigmatising Islamic societies and Muslim students.” The group also stated, in 2010, that the arrest of 11 Pakistani students in 2009 was evidence that “the government is targeting international and Muslim students with anti-terror legislation”;

- Two motions originally passed in 2010, by the NUS, containing similar sentiments that Prevent had resulted in “a racist witch-hunt in the tradition of McCarthyism”;

- Online posts from May 2013, by the then-editor of Redbrick, the University of Birmingham’s student newspaper, which claimed that the “Prevent agenda is racist and islamophobic. It has no place on our campuses”;

- An online statement published in January 2015, by SUARTS – in conjunction with the institution’s University and College Union (UCU) representatives – which stated that elements of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill relating to Prevent on campuses were “racist”;

- A Guardian interview with NUS Black Students’ Officer Malia Bouattia, in January 2015, in which she described Prevent as “an incredibly Islamophobic package being adopted by spaces of education”;

- A motion submitted to the London South Bank University (LSBU) student union, in February 2015, which claimed that the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill and its public-sector requirement to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism has “the potential to promote racism and Islamophobia”;

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"Ibid.

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• A speech given by Ibrahim Ali, the outgoing Vice President Student Affairs at FOSIS, at a CAGE event in March 2015, in which he declared that “Prevent in itself is a racist agenda; it’s an Islamophobic agenda”; 178

• A motion passed at the NUS Conference in April 2015, which pledged to oppose Prevent delivery on campus because it is part of an attempt to “attack Muslim and Muslim-background people” and is “attempting to monitor and control Muslim students”. 179

In addition to these open claims of racism or anti-Muslim bigotry, student opposition can also be seen criticising Prevent delivery on the grounds that it positions Muslim students, as well as the wider Muslim community, as a suspect population which is uniquely vulnerable to radicalisation or extremism. Examples of this include:

• The University of Warwick Student Union (UWSU) policy on CONTEST (the government strategy to protect the UK from terrorism), first passed in November 2006 and last renewed in February 2014, which declares that the plan “constructs the Muslim population as a ‘suspect community’”. 180

• A motion passed by the UEL Students’ Union (UELSU) in October 2012, and renewed in April 2013, targeting the strategy. It claimed that Prevent “targets Muslim students in particular”, 181 and this appears to have been copied directly from a motion passed by the NUS in 2012. 182 Claims within both the NUS and UELSU motions also suggest that Prevent “reinforces crude stereotypes of young Muslim people that will only feed prejudice and discrimination”; 183

• A response to a Draft Police and Crime Plan for North Yorkshire, released in 2013, from the University of York Students’ Union (YUSU), stating that “Muslim students in particular have felt victimised by the University and Police as a result of ‘Prevent’ investigations in the past”; 184

• An assertion in the NUS motion, and in a similar one submitted to the Leeds Metropolitan University Students’ Union (LMUSU) 185 on 15 May 2012, which claimed that Prevent has “implicated certain students as being ‘vulnerable to radicalisation’, such as Muslim students” and has “issued information that is by nature prejudice[d] against these groups”; 186

• A motion submitted to the LSBU student union in January 2015, which declared that Prevent delivery can “cause some students to feel like suspect communities, particularly students from Muslim communities.” 187

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183 See ‘National Conference 2012: Minutes, Resolutions and Election Results’, NUS (2012); see also ‘Union Policies – Prevent’, UEL Students’ Union.
185 Leeds Metropolitan University changed its name to Leeds Beckett University, on 22 September 2014, but is referred to here by the name used at the time the motion was submitted. See: ‘Leeds Beckett University drops “Metropolitan” name’, BBC News, 22 September 2014, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leeds-29310405, last visited: 15 June 2015.
4.2 Misuses of Power and Poor Engagement in Delivering Prevent

A second theme which is frequently identified by students and lecturers as reason to oppose the Prevent strategy and its delivery on campus is that the policy abuses the power which it has been given to target students and is also open to further abuse. One of these claims is that the policy provides a justification for the security services to spy on Muslim students, and that it co-opts university authorities – and even lecturers – into this process. Examples of these ideas can be seen in:

- The UWSU CONTEST motion renewed in 2014, which implies that the strategy is “urging lecturers to spy on their students” and states that it is not the place of universities “to spy on students or act as an arm of the UK Home Office”; [187]
- A Facebook post by the University of Manchester Islamic Society, in November 2011, which referred to “the prevent programme – which promotes spying on Muslim students”; [188]
- The motion passed by UELSU, in October 2012, which claims: “Universities and Students’ Unions have been approached by local authorities and by the police and have been asked to inform them about Muslim students who are depressed or isolated under the new guidance for countering Islamist radicalism”. This motion goes on to suggest that Prevent “asks university staff including lecturers, chaplains, porters and student union to pass information about students to Prevent officials to investigate with a detective in Scotland Yard”; [189]
- The NUS motion passed against Prevent, in 2012, which also references the fears expressed in the UELSU motion and resolves to “oppose any spying on students”; [190]
- An event hosted at University College London (UCL), in January 2015, entitled, ‘Am I an Extremist’, which purported to teach students how to “protect” themselves from Prevent at a time when their lecturers were being asked to become spies; [191]
- A statement from SUARTS, which claimed, in January 2015, that Prevent “aims to spy on students”; [192]
- Malia Bouattia’s interview with The Guardian, in January 2015, in which she declared that “academics are being trained to spy on students – particularly those of Muslim background”; [193]
- Ibrahim Ali’s March 2015 speech, which claimed that students were “seeing prayer rooms being fitted with cameras and audio-recording equipment. We’re seeing prayer rooms being fitted with finger printing in some cases, in one case”. [194] Ali also claimed that there was “complicity by staff members as well. Academics, teachers, lecturers, support services – the people who are there to support students at the most vulnerable moment in their lives – being complicit in the Prevent agenda”; [195] and
- The motion passed at the NUS Conference in April 2015, which claimed that Prevent has “been used to create an expansive surveillance architecture” and stated that “[a]ny expectation by the state for academic staff to be involved in monitoring their students is deeply worrying”. [196]
Criticisms of Prevent delivery which highlight the potential for misuse of the powers given to practitioners also detail a number other issues alongside the fear of oppressive surveillance. These include the possibility of discriminatory or illegal activity during delivery (which reflects the concerns around racism raised in the previous section), as well as apprehension about data confidentiality - for both individuals and groups – which the sharing of information inherent in Prevent delivery raises, as well as concerns that those with mental health issues may be stigmatised. These can be seen in examples such as:

- The claim by the UELSU, in 2012, that the strategy “does not provide adequate safeguards against misuse and discrimination based on race, religion or state of mental health”;[196]
- Concerns around implementation, raised by the LMUSU motion in 2012, which stressed that Prevent “could well be open to discriminatory interpretations”;[197]
- The motion passed by the NUS during its 2012 conference, which used the same wording as that in the LMUSU motion;[198]
- The UWSU policy, renewed in 2014, which claims that CONTEST “facilitates violations of privacy”. The union document also references the alleged sharing of UCL student information with the CIA following Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s attempted bombing of Flight 253 over Detroit;[199]
- Motions opposing the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, submitted to student-union meetings at Cardiff University; KCL; Queen Mary University of London; and SOAS, in January and February 2015, all of which suggested that the inclusion of “Relevant mental health issues” as a potential indicator of radicalism could see students “victimised for suffering from mental health [sic] issues”. These motions also touched upon the fear that adequate safeguards would not be put in place following the passage of the bill, arguing that “rushed laws are often ill thought out and poorly scrutinised”;[200]
- Ibrahim Ali’s claim in March 2015, that there was evidence of “Muslim students being blackmailed by security services to spy on their own Islamic societies, on their own Muslim clubs, their groups”;[201]
- The motion passed at the NUS Conference in April 2015, which claimed that Prevent is “open to abuse for political ends”, and that “with increased security measures come[s] the risk of increased abuse of those measures.” This motion also suggested that the misuse of powers within Prevent was part of a deliberate government policy “manipulating public perceptions and current global events to scale back civil liberties and freedoms as part of a political agenda”.[202]

In addition to these claims, those attempting to challenge the practice of Prevent delivery also suggest that this openness for misuse and discrimination has been accompanied by a failure to engage with the Higher Education sector and to be transparent with students. This includes claims that students; student groups; and institutions have been left unaware of their responsibilities, and that this lack of engagement is used

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[200] ‘009 Contest, Unions, and Universities’, Warwick SU.
[201] ‘Tuesday 3rd February 2015 – Agenda’, Cardiff University Student Senate (February 2015); see also: “Students not Suspects” Motion’, King’s College London Students’ Union, see also: ‘Student Council Agenda’, Queen Mary University Student Union, 27 January 2015, p. 54; see also: ‘SOAS Union General Meeting’, SOAS Students’ Union (January 2015).
[202] Ibid.
[205] Ibid.
by Prevent practitioners and policymakers to punish those who oppose the strategy or have failed to fully adhere to expectations. (These accusations of poor engagement and communication have also been echoed in recent criticism of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill.) Examples include:

• Evidence given to the Home Affairs Select Committee, in December 2011, during the research phase of its report into the roots of violent radicalisation. Then-NUS Vice President for Welfare, Pete Mercer, was quoted as saying that “[t]he Government expected organisations to behave in a certain way but did not issue any guidance. For example, there was no guidance as to which speakers should be banned”;

• The 2012 motion passed by the NUS, which claims that the strategy “does not offer sufficient advice and guidance for institutions, Student Unions, or any other student organisation, on how to implement a strategy for dealing with hate speech, non-violent extremism or those with radical views on campuses in a positive way”;

• The motion submitted to LMUSU, which uses identical wording to criticise the strategy’s implementation;

• The 2012 NUS motion again, which criticises both Prevent’s “refusal to work with and engage in dialogue with student groups”, as well as its “condemnation of these groups on the grounds of so-called non-compliance”.

These final reproaches are implicitly levelled at universities, rather than at the government, as the Cardiff University; KCL; Queen Mary; and SOAS motions opposing the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill each called for student officers to lobby their institutions to be “more open and transparent about how they are engaging with PREVENT, CHANNEL and other similar initiatives”. A similar point has been raised to Student Rights, with a postgraduate student at LSE saying that they “had “never had anything from the university [providing information on Prevent], as a student; student society; and as an employee”.

4.3 Definitions of Extremism in the Prevent Strategy

A third subject which often appears in student opposition to Prevent delivery is that the strategy itself is methodologically unsound, and that the definitions used for many of the key concepts within it are flawed. This includes claims that Prevent lacks clarity on how to identify hate speech or extremism, and that it defines political dissent or even progressivism as evidence of potential extremist sympathies. Criticism using this approach has also suggested that these issues have led to counter-radicalisation policy blurring the line between violent and non-violent extremism. By suggesting that the strategy does not recognise other forms of radicalism, it also reflects claims that Prevent is a racist policy. Examples of this argument include:

• Testimony to the Home Affairs Select Committee by Pete Mercer, in December 2011, which claimed that “Prevent appeared unhelpfully to conflate violent and non-violent extremism and the Strategy did not adequately define its terms, which was unhelpful for those trying to implement it”.

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199 ‘Roots of violent radicalisation’, Home Affairs Select Committee (February 2012), p. 36.
203 ‘Tuesday 3rd February 2015 – Agenda’, Cardiff University Student Senate (February 2015); see also: “Students not Suspects” Motion’, King’s College London Students’ Union, see also: ‘Student Council Agenda’, Queen Mary University Students’ Union, 27 January 2015, p. 54; see also: ‘SOAS Union General Meeting’, SOAS Students’ Union (January 2015).
204 Interview with anonymous individual from LSE, 30 October 2014.
205 ‘Roots of violent radicalisation’, Home Affairs Select Committee (February 2012), p. 36.
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- The NUS motion passed in 2012, which focuses on the definitions issue when claiming that the “language, concepts and unspecific terms of definition used in the Prevent strategy are unhelpfully generalist”. It also identifies “a direct link between the Prevent strategy [...] its inability to properly define its terms [...and its] poorly conceived implementation”, suggesting that this is considered to be one of the more serious issues with the strategy;
- A motion passed by the UELSU, in October 2012, which claimed that “the Prevent strategy blurs the distinction between violent terrorist groups with those that are neither violent nor terrorist.” This motion also references the accusation that Prevent definitions of extremism are weighted away from other forms of extremism, claiming that the strategy “makes barely any reference to combating other violent extremists, such as the far right”;  
- The motion against the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill submitted to the LSBU student union, in January 2015, which also addressed this concern (declaring that “[t]he PREVENT definition of terrorism is so broad that it includes anything that is constituted as vocal opposition of British values”). It also claimed that Prevent “[p]oses a danger to freedom of speech due to its definition of terrorism and radicalism”;  
- Four motions opposing the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, which were submitted to student-union meetings at Cardiff University; KCL; Queen Mary; and SOAS, in January and February 2015. These criticised “the current Prevent Strategy” for its vague “indicators of ‘radicalism’ or ‘extremism’” – such as “[a] need for identity, meaning and belonging” and “[a] desire for political or moral change”;  
- Claims made in a motion passed at the NUS Conference in April 2015, which suggested that the policy’s “operant concepts of ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalism’ are ill-defined”.

4.4 The Prevent Strategy as a Counterproductive Policy

A final, major theme which appears in student criticism of Prevent is that the strategy has been unsuccessful in engaging campus communities due to its marginalisation of the very people with whom it is most important for it to engage. A key claim is that the programme creates a culture of fear among students, about what can and can’t be said in universities, and that this has been particularly obvious by the suppression Muslim dissent on campuses. It is also claimed that this element of Prevent has increased resentment among the Muslim community, and that it is this which has the effect of damaging government efforts to challenge extremism and terrorism. Examples of this can be seen in:

- The 2012 UELSU Prevent motion, which suggested that the strategy will result in students being “in fear that their speech is being monitored and passed onto [sic] the police”. This motion also states that Prevent “has engendered mistrust and fear between Muslim communities and the Government”, and that this will “undermine the co-operation that is needed between all communities to fight terrorism”;

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*a* National Conference 2012; Minutes, Resolutions and Election Results’, NUS (2012).  
a Union Policies - Prevent’, UEL Students’ Union.  
b Ibid.  
c ‘Challenging the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill’, LSBU Students’ Union, February 2015.  
d Ibid.  
e ‘Tuesday 3rd February 2015 – Agenda’, Cardiff University Student Senate (February 2015); see also: “Students not Suspects” Motion’, King’s College London Students’ Union see also: ‘Student Council Agenda’, Queen Mary University Student Union, 27 January 2015, p. 54; see also ‘SOAS Union General Meeting’, SOAS Students’ Union (January 2015).  
g ‘Union Policies - Prevent’, UEL Students’ Union.  
h Ibid.  

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• Policies passed by the NUS since 2012, which have claimed that Prevent aims “to clamp down on Muslim students’ freedom of expression”;\(^{215}\)

• The 2013 YUSU response to the North Yorkshire Police Draft Police and Crime Plan. The student union wrote that “a heavy-handed ‘Prevent’ approach is likely to discourage some of our Muslim members from accessing the police”;\(^{216}\)

• The UWSU policy renewed in 2014, which claimed that CONTEST and Prevent will stop students “from expressing their opinions in lectures or tutorials” if these “may seem out of line with the government”.\(^{217}\) This is also demonstrated in this motion’s claim that the strategy is “counter-productive [sic] in reducing [...] political violence”:\(^{218}\)

• The claim by SUARTS, in January 2015, that Prevent “is about curtailing freedom of speech” and has “a particular impact on Muslim students who engage in any kind of political activity”;\(^{219}\)

• A motion submitted to QMSU, in January 2015, which opposed the proposed Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill and declared that Prevent delivery on campus would “isolate Muslim students” and lead to “further alienation and disaffection”\(^{220}\). In addition, these submissions declared that any expectation, by the state, for academic staff to be involved in monitoring their students could have a detrimental effect on relations between students and staff;\(^{221}\)

• The speech by FOSIS’s Ibrahim Ali, in March 2015, in which he claimed that Muslim students who spoke out were seen as “the ‘Bad Muslim’”, and that he had dealt with “the intimidation, the tactics, and the methods that are used to, you know, silence Muslims, to create the ‘Good Muslim’”\(^{222}\)

• The motion passed at the NUS Conference in April 2015, which claimed that the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act “isolates many students who already feel that the only avenue through which the Government will engage them is ‘anti-radicalisation’ initiatives, resulting in further alienation and disaffection”.\(^{224}\)

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\(^{216}\) ‘Official University of York Students’ Union (YUSU) Response to the Draft Police and Crime Plan for North Yorkshire and the City of York’, University of York Students’ Union.

\(^{217}\) ‘009 Contest, Unions, and Universities’, Warwick SU.

\(^{218}\) Ibid.

\(^{219}\) ‘Counter-“Terrorism” Bill: Joint Unions statement’, SUARTS President: Shelly, January 2015.

\(^{220}\) ‘Student Council Agenda’, Queen Mary University Student Union, 27 January 2015, p. 55.

\(^{221}\) ‘Tuesday 3rd February 2015 – Agenda’, Cardiff University Student Senate (February 2015); see also: “Students not Suspects” Motion’, King’s College London Students’ Union; see also: ‘SOAS Union General Meeting’, SOAS Students’ Union (January 2015).

\(^{222}\) Ibid.

\(^{223}\) Speech given at CAGE event ‘Accountability: Understanding Ways to Stop the Cycle of Violence’, attended by Henry Jackson Society researcher, 6 March 2015.

5. Addressing Student Criticisms of Prevent

The identification of these four key themes in student criticism of the Prevent strategy and its on-campus delivery provides a starting point when seeking to understand why it is that the policy has met with the resistance that it has. Addressing each of the issues raised within these themes individually shows areas where misunderstandings exist, as well as where malicious narratives have been created or encouraged, often by the very extremists whom Prevent exists to counter.

5.1 Islamophobia and Racial Stereotyping in Delivering Prevent

The charge that Prevent itself is a racist policy which deliberately targets the UK's Muslim communities as part of a prejudiced campaign is perhaps the most damaging to its on-campus effectiveness, and the one which appears to elicit the strongest emotions from students. The policy is portrayed as a malevolent attack on the Muslim community which is being carried out for its own bigoted sake. Despite the frequency of this criticism, in none of these cases was there wider evidence to support these extremely serious accusations.

It remains important to distinguish between rhetoric which portrays Prevent as a deliberately racist policy and criticism which suggests that the policy’s delivery has resulted in the Muslim community being or feeling targeted disproportionately. This criticism, such as that which claims that “Muslim students in particular have felt victimised [...] as a result of ‘Prevent’ investigations”,\(^\text{225}\) likely stems from the perception that the majority of individuals arrested under terrorism legislation in the UK in recent years have been Muslim; this should be addressed. The 2011 Prevent review does focus more heavily on the threat level posed by Islamist-inspired terrorism, stressing that “the greatest threat to the UK as a whole is from Al Qa’ida and groups and individuals who share the violent Islamist ideology associated with it.”\(^\text{226}\) Furthermore, referrals to the Channel de-radicalisation programme have also primarily been of Muslims, with figures from the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) showing that, between April 2012 and March 2014, 56% of referrals to Channel were for Muslim individuals.\(^\text{227}\) In contrast, in March 2013, it was reported that only around 10% of referrals were in relation to far-right extremism.\(^\text{228}\) Much of the public debate around campus extremism, meanwhile, has also focused on the issues caused by Islamism-inspired activism, such as events with extremist clerics or organisations, with little visible focus on other forms of extremism.

Claims that this is evidence of racism ignore the fact that “[e]xtreme right-wing terrorism in the UK has been much less widespread, systematic or organised than terrorism associated with Al Qa’ida.”\(^\text{229}\) It is also important to note that of the 2,297 arrests on suspicion of terrorism offences, between September 2001 and August 2012, 1,066 were listed as “Muslim” and 1,231 were listed as “Other or no religion” or “Unknown Religion”.

\(^{225}\) ‘Official University of York Students’ Union (YUSU) Response to the Draft Police and Crime Plan for North Yorkshire and the City of York’, University of York Students’ Union.


related or other) shows that 41% of Muslims were charged, compared to 37% of those listed as “Other or no religion” and 32% as “Unknown Religion”.238

In other cases, it can be shown that accusations of racism and discrimination over counter-terrorism arrests are completely unjustified. Policy passed in 2010, by the NUS Black Students’ Campaign, attacking the arrests of 11 Pakistani students and resolving to support them, was kept as “Campaign Policy” for 2012-15.239 This is despite a Special Immigration Appeals Commission judge finding one student, Abid Naseer, to be “an al-Qaeda operative who posed [...] a serious threat to [...] the United Kingdom” and someone whose cell’s arrests had been personally reported to Osama bin Laden - by al-Qaeda’s Head of External Operations, Saleh al-Somali.240 Naseer has since been convicted of providing material support to al-Qaeda and involvement in a conspiracy to target the Arndale shopping centre with multiple suicide bombers.241

These erroneous accusations are, instead, reflective of language and strategy used by extremists to deflect and silence criticism of their activities, such as the pro-terrorist prisoner lobby group CAGE. The organisation - which attracted significant censure in February 2015, after research director Asim Qureshi described the Islamic State executioner Mohammed Emwazi as a “beautiful young man” and blamed Emwazi’s radicalisation on the British security services -242 has claimed that Prevent “only targets Muslim, and feels from a Muslim perspective like racist legislation”.243 This view is echoed by an article on Islam21c, the online platform of the Muslim Research and Development Foundation (MRDF), which refers to “the discriminatory PREVENT Strategy”.244

More directly, the March 2015 speech by Ibrahim Ali, in which he attacked Prevent as racist, was given at a CAGE event. The content of his address highlights the group’s malign influence on this discourse, as Ali stated: “what CAGE does is we actually create a broad coalition of organisations, of activists on campuses, to say that Prevent in itself is a racist agenda; it’s an Islamophobic agenda; an agenda that’s based on no evidence”.245 That Ali, a high-ranking representative of the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS), uses the word ‘we’ shows the closeness of his (and his organisation’s) relationship with CAGE,246 further cementing the ties between student opponents of on-campus Prevent delivery and the extremist groups working to undermine it. That these extremist groups have also called Prevent targeting other forms of extremism “a tokenistic effort to appease criticism” further highlights the bad faith in which accusations of racism are made.247

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A second strand of student criticism similar to the idea that Prevent is an anti-Muslim policy, is the claim that its formulation and subsequent delivery has led to Muslims being seen, by both Prevent officials and university staff, as a suspect community which is uniquely vulnerable to radicalisation. These claims are informed by perceptions that there is greater focus on who Muslim students invite onto campuses than there is for other student groups.\textsuperscript{245} However, it is important to note that this is in part due to the fact that the presence of right-wing extremism on campuses is an extremely rare occurrence. Despite this, Prevent-delivery staff should seek to make clearer why it is that certain speakers are seen as being of concern, and be consistent in the application of this process – regardless of the speaker’s background. It is also important that both Prevent and institutional staff regularly explain that being scrutinised for inviting extremists onto campus is being treated as any other society would, particularly as students from one Islamic society who were criticised for inviting a homophobic speaker onto campus have complained that they should simply be “extended the same respect as all [other] faith societies”.\textsuperscript{246}

It should also be stressed that the Prevent strategy has repeatedly sought to highlight the importance of challenging other forms of extremism in the UK, as well as to provide examples of where this has been the case. For example, the programme’s review in 2011 drew attention to the “serious and persistent threat from terrorist groups in Northern Ireland”,\textsuperscript{247} as well as ways in which Prevent projects had “addressed the threat posed by extreme right-wing groups”.\textsuperscript{248} This was followed, in March 2013, by the then-Security Minister, James Brokenshire, giving a major speech emphasizing the importance of “firm and clear opposition by central and local government, and effective policing” to challenge “far-right appeals to people who share many of the same vulnerabilities as those exploited by Al Qaeda-inspired extremism”.\textsuperscript{249} Similarly, this commitment to a greater focus on far-right extremism was set out in the 2013 report of the government’s Extremism Task Force, which declared – in point 1.1 – that “the Islamophobia and neo-Nazi espoused by the murderer of Mohammed Saleem to justify his terrorist attacks against mosques in the West Midlands” must be dealt with.\textsuperscript{250}

However, as with the accusations of overt racism, it is also important to note that the student view of Prevent defining Muslims as a suspect community also appears to have been heavily influenced by the narratives of extremist groups such as CAGE, the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), and Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). CAGE has claimed that the strategy has an “overemphasis [...] on Muslims and Islam [which] has blinkered Europe into a position where it has not only ignored, but some might say encouraged the tendencies of far right [sic] movements”,\textsuperscript{251} and that the programme “still only effectively applies to Muslims and fails to look into links between extremism and violence amongst other communities”.\textsuperscript{252} It has also suggested that Prevent policy targets “almost all aspects of Muslim life”.\textsuperscript{253} The IHRC, meanwhile, has declared that efforts aimed at countering radicalisation, in fact, “scapegoat the whole Muslim community”,\textsuperscript{254} while, in 2008, HT argued that those developing counter-radicalisation
policies “cast the Muslim community as a suspect community”\textsuperscript{525}—using virtually identical language to the University of Warwick Student Union (UWSU) policy on CONTEST. Meanwhile, a motion submitted to the National Union of Students (NUS) Conference in 2015 claimed that the Charity Commission was in “collusion with the government’s PREVENT initiative”\textsuperscript{526} and was “attempting to further restrict [student] unions”, as well as “targeting Muslim charities”.\textsuperscript{527} To support its position, this motion cited work by Claystone,\textsuperscript{528} a group which is “closely linked to extremists, including Haitham al-Haddad”, according to a report in The Telegraph.\textsuperscript{529}

\textbf{5.2 Misuses of Power and Poor Engagement in Delivering Prevent}

The suggestion that Prevent delivery on-campus will lead to lecturers and other university staff being forced to spy on students is the more prevalent condemnation aimed at the strategy in relation to alleged misuses of power. This often focuses on the fear that lecturers will be required to report radical views, with Ibrahim Ali arguing that faculty members were becoming “complicit in the Prevent agenda”,\textsuperscript{530} and Malia Bouattia stating that “academics are being trained to spy on students”.\textsuperscript{531} From 1 July 2015, the statutory duty for public-sector bodies “to have due regard” to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism (passed as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015) has also been extended to universities,\textsuperscript{532} though it is believed that this will “not apply until the issue of managing external speakers is settled” in autumn 2015.\textsuperscript{533} This imposition has led to the University and College Union (UCU) passing policy arguing that this duty will lead to “the monitoring of Muslim students [and] will destroy the trust needed for a safe and supportive learning environment”\textsuperscript{534} a view which is likely to affect the way in which students see on-campus Prevent delivery.

However, there is no evidence that students have been, or are being, spied on by lecturers. This has also been reflected off-campus, with reviews by both the Home Office and the Communities and Local Government Select Committee finding “little or no evidence to support” allegations of spying and suggesting that these claims were “based on a misunderstanding about the process for supporting vulnerable people”.\textsuperscript{535} This has not be helped by poorly informed commentary — such as that from the co-founder of the Quilliam Foundation, Ed Husain, who, in 2009, wrongly claimed that Prevent was “gathering intelligence on people not committing terrorist offences.”\textsuperscript{536}

In fact, there have been cases on campus in which lecturers or teachers have been reluctant to raise concerns about students. This was highlighted with Mohammed Atif Siddique, convicted of terrorism offences in 2007, who was seen by staff at Glasgow Metropolitan College accessing violent extremist material, but whose lecturers “were reluctant to do anything for fear of some accusation of racist

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\textsuperscript{527} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{528} “Terror link” charities get British millions in Gift Aid’, The Telegraph, 29 November 2014.
\textsuperscript{529} Ibid.
conduct."\(^{262}\) More tragically, Hasib Hussain’s “exercise books were littered with references to al-Qaeda [and] supportive comments about al-Qaeda”.\(^{263}\) Despite this evidence of extremism, there was no intervention from his teachers, and he would later kill 13 people on board a bus at Tavistock Square, during the 7/7 attacks.\(^{264}\) Yet, that lecturers have, in the past, been reluctant to report concerns has not stopped some students from viewing Prevent as an intrusive surveillance programme (nor is this surprising, perhaps, given that this is an idea supported by lecturers).\(^{265}\) This perception is also a key part of the extremist narrative against Prevent’s role in higher education: CAGE has claimed that “pressure is being applied to Universities to spy on their Muslim students and restrict their political activities”,\(^{266}\) and that “PREVENT has legitimised the idea of spying on Muslims to monitor their ideas and thoughts”.\(^{267}\)

The inflammatory rhetoric that Prevent is premised on spying on Muslim students ignores the duty of care that faculty members have to students, and shows ignorance of the processes in place when concerns are raised. The safeguarding element of challenging extremism, dismissed by UCU,\(^{268}\) is a vital part of delivery. Students vulnerable to radicalisation may be turned away from violent extremism by intervention, which can mitigate the chances of them later being dealt with by the criminal-justice system. This can be suggested in the case of Roshonara Choudhry, who told police after her arrest for the attempted murder of Labour MP Stephen Timms that she had dropped out of King’s College London (KCL) prior to her attack because “King’s College is involved in things where they work against Muslims.”\(^{269}\) This included giving an “award to Shimon Peres”, the Israeli politician, and running “a department for tackling radicalisation”.\(^{270}\) Choudhry also stated in her interview that the university had been aware of her plans to drop out,\(^{271}\) and this raises the question of whether staff who came into contact with her before she left university and carried out her attack could have been better trained to identify her increasing radicalism.

The same could also be true of David Souaan, convicted of preparing for terrorist acts in Syria and sentenced to three and a half years in prison in February 2015. Souaan was described in court as “an ‘emotionally immature and naive’ man who was vulnerable because of the ‘loneliness and isolation’ he felt as a foreign student in London”, and was eventually arrested after images in which he posed with guns were reported by students.\(^{272}\) While it is always easy to suggest that more could be done in hindsight, had Souaan’s extreme views and vulnerability been spotted earlier, it is possible that he could have been referred to the Channel programme before he had first travelled to Syria in December 2013.

The ignorance of the processes involved in Prevent delivery when it leads to intervention is another element that informs the inflammatory rhetoric about spying. This criticism often implies that lecturers will be expected to keep notes on students’ views, and that those who express radical opinions will be arrested or become the subject of criminal investigations. The motion passed by the University of East London (UEL)’s student union, in October 2012, demonstrates this, claiming that Prevent “asks university staff [...] to pass information about students to Prevent officials to investigate with a detective in Scotland Yard”.\(^{273}\) However, this is simply not how the processes within Prevent work following a referral. While it


\(^{265}\) Campaigning against the counter-terrorism and security bill (paragraphs 3.1-3.3), UCU, 24 May 2015.


\(^{268}\) Campaigning against the counter-terrorism and security bill (paragraphs 3.1-3.3), UCU, 24 May 2015.


\(^{270}\) Ibid.

\(^{271}\) Ibid.

\(^{272}\) ‘Union Policies - Prevent’, UEL Students’ Union.
is important to highlight this confusion, the fact that it exists in the first place does suggest that there has been a failure to effectively communicate what is expected of university staff and what will happen in the case of a referral - something that future delivery should seek to rectify, in order to challenge misunderstandings or wilful misinterpretation.

These misunderstandings also address the perception that Prevent delivery involves an abuse of government or police power. Student criticism has often cited incidents which it claims reflects this, such as the arrest of Rizwan Sabir or reports that, after Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s attempted attack, University College London (UCL) provided police officers with the details of students who had been members of the Islamic Society between September 2005 and June 2009.274 This shows how examples of poor engagement are highlighted as evidence of systemic failure and used to portray Prevent as a failed policy. This is despite the fact that both of these incidents were carried out as criminal investigations under the Prevent strategy, not Prevent. Although Prevent police and civilian staff regularly interact with Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), the fact that these Pursue-led incidents are being used in this way indicates that they have seriously affected perceptions of Prevent.

Student opposition to Prevent delivery has also regularly invoked the fear that the misuse of its powers would see students “victimised for suffering from mental health [sic] issues”.275 As with many of the other arguments reflected in student opposition to Prevent, however, these allegations appear to be the result of misconceptions about Prevent. These include the widespread allegations that Prevent identifies mental-health issues as an indicator of extremism, and that students will be “victimised for suffering from mental health [sic] issues”.276 In fact, the only references to mental health in the Prevent strategy highlight that “people with mental health [sic] issues or learning disabilities [...] may be more easily drawn into terrorism”, giving examples of vulnerable individuals exploited by extremists in this way.277 They then go on to suggest that mental-health workers may hear such people expressing extreme views. The phrase supposedly taken from the Prevent strategy, and which subsequently appears in many student motions opposing the programme (on the basis that it stigmatises those with mental-health issues), does not actually originate from or appear in there at all; instead, it is listed in a Channel guidance document as one of thirteen reasons why an individual may be susceptible to “engagement with a group, cause or ideology” related to extremism.278

That this misleading information has been used to form the basis of such a significant strand of on-campus opposition to Prevent highlights the extent to which such misunderstandings can drive the agenda. It should also be noted that CAGE devoted a whole section of its 2011 report ‘Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A response to the revised Prevent strategy’ to attacking the “gross generalisation of [...] people who are already stigmatised and marginalised” in government advice around mental health and extremism.279 That this narrative has since surfaced within student criticism is another example of how extremist viewpoints
have influenced student opposition to Prevent. On occasion, such misinformation has also revealed a deeply conspiratorial mindset, with the motion passed by the NUS in April 2015, suggesting that there is a government plot “manipulating public perceptions and current global events to scale back civil liberties and freedoms as part of a political agenda”.280 Outgoing FOSIS Vice President Ibrahim Ali’s claim, in March 2015, that “Muslim students [are] being blackmailed by security services to spy on their own Islamic societies, on their own Muslim clubs” also demonstrates the extent to which such thinking informs opposition to Prevent.281

This is further reflected in the way that extremists have misrepresented the reasons behind Prevent-delivery outcomes, to claim that a misuse of power has occurred. In December 2014, a Prevent adviser warned Birkbeck, University of London of the high threat level posed by far-right groups which planned to target an on-campus function hosted by the IHRC. Following the event being moved to a different venue, CAGE published an attack on Birkbeck, ignoring the far-right element and, instead, framing the story as an abuse of Prevent power – claiming that the event had been shut down as part of “a social engineering [sic] programme to legitimise the government sponsored [sic] version of Islam”.282 The IHRC, meanwhile, suggested that Birkbeck “may even have Islamophobic motives itself for cancelling the booking”.283 These false claims can be shown to have influenced student criticism, as they were later repeated in an open letter signed by students from the Universities of Exeter; Leeds; Sheffield; Strathclyde; and Sussex, and from KCL; London Metropolitan University; Queen Mary University of London; the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS); and UCL. The letter claimed that the “cancellation […] suggests that the refusal to host the conference had political motifs [sic]”, that “the work by PREVENT to cancel events by Muslim organisations indicates a desire to shut down conversations about the demonisation of Muslims”, and that Prevent’s intervention showed “the troublesome collusions between Islamophobic agendas of far-right groups, the government and some of the top academic institutions in this country”.284 The extent of this deception highlights how groups such as CAGE have no interest in improving processes, and are willing to bend the truth to create division and undermine counter-radicalisation policy.

5.3 Definitions of Extremism in the Prevent Strategy

The claims that Prevent as a strategy is hampered by its poor terminology are also prevalent in student criticism; Student Rights has identified many comments suggesting that the definitions used by the scheme are too broad and include political radicalism rather than extremism or terrorism. The NUS claim of “a direct link between the Prevent strategy […] its inability to properly define its terms […]and its] poorly conceived implementation” highlights this,285 as does testimony to the Home Affairs Select Committee by Pete Mercer, in December 2011, which stated that “Prevent appeared unhelpfully to conflate violent and non-violent extremism and the Strategy did not adequately define its terms, which was unhelpful for those trying to implement it”.286 These criticisms were also made in a motion submitted to the London South Bank University (LSBU) student union, in January 2015, which argued: “The PREVENT definition of

286 ‘Roots of violent radicalisation’, Home Affairs Select Committee (February 2012), p. 36.
terrorism is so broad that it includes anything that is constituted as vocal opposition of British values,” and this was echoed by the motion passed at the NUS Conference in April 2015, which suggested that the policy’s “operant concepts of ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalism’ are ill-defined”. Given the frequency of these criticisms, it is clear that the current definitions are of concern for students and are either not clear or sufficiently publicised.

However, it can also be argued that these accusations either have their birth in misapprehensions or deliberate misinformation. In the case of the Cardiff University; KCL; Queen Mary; and SOAS motions against the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, which highlighted evidence that Prevent considered a “desire for political or moral change” to be evidence of extremism, it is clear that those drafting the proposals were either mistaken or deliberately attempting to mislead students. This guideline does not, in fact, appear in the Prevent strategy as an indicator of extremism, but, instead, in a Channel document identifying reasons why individuals may seek “engagement with a group, cause or ideology". These reasons (or characteristics) span a number of other factors, including a “need to dominate and control others”; “[f]amily or friends [sic] involvement in extremism”; and “[b]eing influenced or controlled by a group”. In addition, the Channel document cautions that it “should not be assumed that the characteristics set out below necessarily indicate that a person is either committed to terrorism or may become a terrorist.” It is also worth noting that many, if not all, safeguarding strategies, regardless of whether they aim to protect those vulnerable to extremism or any other form of abuse, are likely to have a list of characteristics of which fitting one alone would not be considered enough to label a subject as vulnerable.

The same is also true of the criticism in the motion submitted to the LSBU student union in January 2015. Its claim about the extent of Prevent’s definition of terrorism is simply not true; the definition of terrorism used by Prevent is actually that in the Terrorism Act 2000:

An action that endangers or causes serious violence to a person/people; causes serious damage to property; or seriously interferes [with] or disrupts an electronic system. The use or threat must be designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public and is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.

Extremists have similarly and frequently used the argument that Prevent does not define its terms well enough; in recent months, they have even made it the cornerstone of opposition to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (and the Prevent strategy more widely). IERA claims that ‘extremism’ is “an ambiguous term which is frequently used by the media with little regard to the wider impact it has on society, forging an ill-informed perspective on Muslims”, and “has become a political tool to demonise and censor normative Islamic beliefs”. CAGE also regularly focuses on the problems allegedly caused by definitions, arguing that Prevent “uses, loosely defined labels” and its terms are “problematic” and should be clarified. While this suggests that such definitions are simply poorly thought out, HT is clearer in its view that this is a malicious policy and that the terms “have intentionally been broadly defined in order that it can now mean to censor Islamic ideas as part of the ‘preventive strategy’.” In a recent speech at LSE, the current chair of HT, Dr Abdul Wahid, was reported to have claimed that “[w]ith ‘Prevent’,
as with much anti-terrorism law – vague definitions are applied in a politicised and discriminatory manner.”

Meanwhile, a sample khutbah (sermon, in particular for Friday prayer) formulated by the extremist-run ‘Stop the CTS Bill’ campaign; promoted by the Islamist website Islam21c; and opposing the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill also focused on definitions, arguing that the proposed legislation sought to maliciously target Muslims:

“Under the pretext of extremism, a loosely coined term which includes anything that goes against British values (though there is no definition of what British values are) [...]”

This is despite the fact that Prevent repeatedly declares that, by ‘British values’, it means “democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.” These attacks on definitions are instead designed to suggest that the extreme Islamist beliefs being targeted are in fact normative Muslim views, and that by defining them as extremism the government is targeting the beliefs of the UK’s Muslim communities rather than the political ideology of a small minority. Nevertheless, the focus on the looseness of the current definition of extremism in student criticism shows that this is an issue which has resonated with students, and as such should be a priority in any future work on the strategy.

5.4 The Prevent Strategy as a Counter-productive Policy

The difficulty that the Prevent strategy has had in engaging students is also held up as a criticism of the policy, with this feeding into claims that it has been counter-productive in challenging radicalisation alongside accusations that it suppresses Muslim dissent. This criticism has included suggestions that Prevent has ignored or overlooked student input during delivery. However, a 2013 NUS impact assessment document makes it clear that there has, in fact, been significant engagement between the organisation and the Prevent strategy and its practitioners since 2009. This states that, between April 2012 and March 2013, the NUS received £115,000 from BIS, for Prevent-related activities which aimed to increase support for student unions and enable them to “make informed and reasoned decisions about Hate Speakers invited to student-led events (using the guidance produced)”. It also shows that the body provided student unions with training materials related to the guidance produced and supported up to 35 of them in implementing said advice. The NUS also hosted events which the BIS regional co-ordinators attended, which, it claims, “enabled direct links to be made between [the co-ordinators] and their relevant universities”. The NUS’s other activities under this funding sought to boost co-operation between universities and unions, in order to “improve[ ] the procedures for making decisions about external speakers” and ensure that “lessons learnt from implementation of the guidance” produced would be captured.

Moreover, feedback from a number of institutions suggested that these events had enabled students to gain an understanding of their responsibilities as part of Prevent, regarding extreme speakers. This included delegates from Kingston University, who wrote that “[t]he training was much needed” and “[i]mportant to understand the impact of risk on [student unions] and safeguarding duty”; from London

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88 ‘Stop the CTS Bill’, Stop the Bill, available at: http://stopthebill.co.uk/, last visited: 15 June 2015. This website, which echoed extremist narratives about Prevent and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, is owned by Jamil Rashiid, a senior member of the MRDF.


91 Preventing Violent Extremism at universities and colleges through increasing students’ unions knowledge and capacity’, NUS (March 2013).

92 Ibid., p. 2.

93 Ibid., p. 3.

94 Ibid., p. 2.
Metropolitan University, who stated that they had “learnt how to better implement guest speakers and manage some of the problems”; and from the University of Salford, who said that they had “learnt how to plan and prepare for events with external speakers more effectively”. As a result of this funding, the NUS has been able to state that it has: “taken a clear leadership role in delivering its responsibilities of supporting students’ unions to: Understand the risks posed by some external speakers and how to mitigate against [...] these risks” and to “[u]nderstand their responsibilities in relation to the Prevent agenda”.

As a result, it is disingenuous to lay the blame for poor engagement with Prevent solely at the hands of the government and practitioners charged with its delivery. With Prevent previously not a statutory duty on campuses, staff and student-union officials could not be forced to attend training sessions, thereby enabling those students who opposed the scheme to avoid engagement. Given that the NUS’s most recently passed motion against Prevent includes pledges to “investigate, [identify] and block/cease accepting any PREVENT funding for any NUS activities or departments”; to “not engage with the PREVENT strategy”; to “encourage Unions [...] to not comply with or legitimize PREVENT”; and to “develop guidelines for Unions on effective non-cooperation”, this is unlikely to change in the future. This also risks creating an environment, on campus, in which students who have no particular opposition to Prevent but may have responsibilities in relation to it, such as postgraduate students who teach undergraduate classes, are not provided with the necessary information; such a situation is highlighted by a PhD student at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), who stated that they had “never really come into contact with Prevent”.

Meanwhile, examples of student activism against the programme may also have damaged trust between institutions and their student unions. A student-union official at the University of Birmingham, for example, leaked a university document on engagement with Prevent - and claimed that the process was part of an “Islamophobic” attempt to “secretly pass policy to help spy on Muslim students” - which is likely to leave many institutions reluctant to involve students. There has also been student criticism of government “condemnation of these groups on the grounds of so-called non-compliance [with Prevent] potentially a reference to the refusal of the government to work with FOSIS. In November 2011, the then-Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, had cancelled FOSIS involvement in a Home Office recruitment fair, after stating that it had “failed to challenge sufficiently terrorist and extremist ideologies”.

However, the government’s refusal to work with FOSIS over that group’s failure to effectively challenge extremism has been increasingly justified. In 2013, the group invited Shady Alsuleiman and Muhammad al-Arif to speak at its Annual Conference, despite serious concerns about the extreme nature of their views. Al-Arif has since been banned from entering the UK.

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60 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
61 NUS National Conference 2015 - Motion 517; Counter-Terrorism and Security Act’, NUS (April 2015).
62 Interview with anonymous individual from LSE, 30 October 2014.
64 Ibid.
67 Shady Al-Suleiman to speak at FOSIS Conference’, Student Rights, 6 June 2013, available at: http://www.studentrights.org.uk/article/2100/shady_al_suleiman_to_speak_at_fosis_conference; see also: ‘Controversial cleric to address
likely due to his inflammatory anti-Shia rhetoric and calls for jihad in Syria.\textsuperscript{313} Al-Suleiman, meanwhile, has claimed that “[t]he one that neglects jihad, the prophet called him a hypocrite”, and that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is a jihad (and that Muslims should support this, both financially and spiritually).\textsuperscript{314} Throughout 2014, FOSIS also hosted several lectures and webinars which featured extreme or intolerant speakers, including Haitham al-Haddad.\textsuperscript{315}

Another theme prevalent in criticism that Prevent has been counterproductive is that it inhibits the expression of controversial ideas in academic spaces and targets those who dissent from mainstream opinion, alienating them from British society. Policy passed by the NUS since 2012 has claimed that Prevent aims “to clamp down on Muslim students’ freedom of expression”,\textsuperscript{316} and this was followed, in 2013, by the claim that Prevent has “been used to create an expansive surveillance architecture […] in order to police dissent”.\textsuperscript{317} Meanwhile, UWSU policy claims that Prevent will stop students “from expressing their opinions in lectures or tutorials” if these “may seem out of line with the government” - a clear exaggeration, given the extent of criticism of government policy presented in the motion itself alone. These fears have also been expressed by many lecturers, with an open letter from February 2015, signed by over 500 academics, declaring the provisions that public bodies (including universities) prevent vulnerable people from being drawn into extremism to be “[d]raconian crackdowns on the rights of academics and students” which risked compromising academic freedom.\textsuperscript{318} Responding to this same decision to give universities a statutory duty to prevent students from being drawn into extremism, \textit{Universities UK (UUK)} has written that students and staff must be able to continue to “speak freely on controversial issues including terrorism”, and that “[t]hese freedoms need to be maintained such that students and staff can have open discussions without fear of being referred […] or feeling they have to refer others” to Channel.\textsuperscript{319}

Given the pervasiveness of this criticism across the campus environment, it is clear that this is an issue which has resonated in universities. It is also one which has prompted government figures oppose further efforts to challenge campus extremism. Senior Liberal Democrats, including then-Business Secretary Vince Cable and then-Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, blocked proposed legislation, over fears that it would damage freedom of expression -\textsuperscript{320} despite the fact that it has been addressed, by consecutive governments, through the guidance detailed in the second section of this report. However, as highlighted previously, this guidance has not offered concrete solutions to date, while an updated set of guidelines for HEIs has yet to be released by BIS. Meanwhile, advice from the Home Office has only referred institutions to guidance provided by UUK and the NUS,\textsuperscript{321} leaving some confusion about what official policy consists of on this issue.

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\textsuperscript{314} ‘Shady Al-Suleiman to speak at FOSIS Conference’, Student Rights, 6 June 2013.


\textsuperscript{319} ‘Preventing Prevent?’ Challenges to Counter-Radicalisation Policy on Campus


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As such, it should be accepted that government messaging on this subject has not been sufficient, and that documentation should be produced which addresses this. However, it is also important to note the extent to which this charge is one which reflects extremist narratives to the greatest degree, with groups focusing much of their opposition to Prevent on this single matter. HT, for instance, has argued that Prevent is part of a strategy which seeks to “westernise Muslims, so that their absolute loyalty would be to Britain and that they would adopt liberal secular values”, and that it represses Islamic viewpoints in order to do this. CAGE, meanwhile, wrote in 2011 that “Prevent is clearly about dealing with the political views of Muslims”, and returned to the theme in 2013, claiming that the strategy was a “clear attempt in our view to outlaw Muslim political ideas and beliefs” that will “give rise to further restrictions on Muslim freedom of speech”. It also alleged that the programme was aimed at “silencing Muslim political opposition to western foreign policy, occupation of Muslim lands and promotion of Islamic political ideas of governance.” Similar sentiments have been raised in other claims – though, at times, it can be seen that there are ulterior political motivations behind such opposition to Prevent. A motion submitted to the University of East Anglia (UEA)’s student union, in March 2010, claimed that Prevent aimed to “discourage anti-war meetings”; however, it was, in fact, submitted by supporters of the Stop the War Coalition (StWC), who appear to have sought to harness anti-Prevent feeling as part of an effort to re-affiliate the university to their group.

326 Ibid.
327 ‘Meeting of Union Council to be Held at 7.00 pm on Thursday 4 March 2010 in Lecture Theatre 2’, UEA Students’ Union (March 2010), available at: http://ueastudent.hcoms.co.uk/image_uploads/council-agenda-4-marchfinal-xp.pdf, last visited: 15 June 2015.
Policy Recommendations

1. For Government Departments

Department: Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), Home Office

Issue: Criticism of Prevent as a public-sector duty for universities

Recommendation: Ensure statutory guidance produced addresses concerns raised by Higher Education Institution (HEI) staff and students during consultation

Two key student concerns facing Prevent delivery on campus focus on the fears that lecturers will be required to ‘spy’ on students who express radical political opinions, and that the legal duty for institutions to prevent people from being drawn into extremism will see a curtailing of freedom of speech. With many lecturers also concerned about these issues, it is important that the planned guidance “on the interaction of the Prevent duty with universities’ existing duties to secure freedom of speech” pays particular attention to:

- Expanding on the advice provided in the 2014-15 consultation document ‘Prevent duty guidance: a consultation’, about providing information on pathways to extremism, in order to assist faculty members in identifying those vulnerable to extremism;

- Providing faculty members with information on the processes which exist once an individual deemed to be at risk from extremism is identified, on the role they can play following any referral, and on the safeguarding nature of this process;

- Outlining ways in which faculty members can ensure that difficult issues related to extremism and radicalisation are discussed in class in a way which encourages debate and maintains the sanctity of the student–teacher relationship;

- Ensuring that guidance is accompanied with a programme of mandatory Prevent training for both existing staff and new appointments.

Department: OSCT, Home Office

Issue: The influence of extremist narratives on student perceptions of Prevent

Recommendation: Support civil-society actors in addressing extremist criticisms of Prevent

A significant finding of this report was the extent to which student criticisms of Prevent which were used to justify non-participation appear to have been influenced by the narratives of extremists. The Prime Minister’s Extremism Task Force, set up following the murder of Lee Rigby, outlined that countering extremist narratives should be a priority of challenging extremism, and that effectively addressing

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extremist attacks on Prevent must be a part of this. However, this process cannot simply be driven by government, and, as such, support must be provided to those civil-society actors who seek to help.

The OSCT should work to develop a support plan for sector-specific civil-society actors who challenge extremist attacks on Prevent. It should pay particular attention to:

- Identifying the relevant narratives of groups which specifically work to undermine Prevent and other counter-radicalisation and counter-extremism policies, and being uncompromising in its opposition to such ideas;
- Providing detailed information on those aspects of Prevent delivery which appear to be the most frequently misunderstood on campus, and producing material highlighting the programme’s successes;
- Identifying and accepting that there have been elements of Prevent delivery in the Higher Education sector which have not been successful, and outlining how these aspects will be addressed to ensure that they are more effective in future;
- Developing forums in which any challenge made by these civil-society actors can be promoted to students and HEI staff, and encouraging engagement from those on-campus groups opposed to Prevent.

Department: Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS)

Issue: Statutory public-sector duty to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism

Recommendation: Ensure that any Prevent toolkit for HEIs addresses student/lecturer criticisms of Prevent

With universities being one of a number of public bodies which have become subject to a statutory duty to challenge extremism from 1 July, it is important that any guidance produced for HEIs addresses the unique challenges which they face. Doing so would provide the Department with an opportunity to address many of the criticisms of on-campus Prevent delivery which stem from misunderstandings about the strategy. As such, any toolkit produced by BIS should seek to:

- Expand on previous guidance, to address further how HEIs can reconcile competing public-sector duties (i.e. to challenge extremism and to protect academic freedom) while ensuring that campuses remain a place where dissent can be heard and debate can exist. It should take the suggestions made by the 2011 Prevent review and the 2012 Home Affairs Select Committee report into the roots of radicalisation into account;
- Echo the guidance produced with the input of BIS co-ordinators for Further Education Institutions (FEIs), in April 2015, by focusing on the safeguarding elements of Prevent – particularly in relation to vulnerability assessments, welfare and pastoral-care provision, and online safety,\(^{330}\)

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- Use case studies of successful best practice, from HEIs across the UK, in order to both advise institutions and challenge misperceptions about Prevent delivery;

- Ensure that guidance is accompanied with a programme of presentations from BIS Higher Education/Further Education co-ordinators, for the benefit of HEI staff who are subject to the statutory duty, in order to ensure that any questions are addressed.

Department: The Charity Commission

Issue: Using all regulatory powers available to fully challenge extremism

Recommendation: Provide student unions with improved guidance and contact avenues for regulatory processes

Since June 2010, student unions at UK universities have been regulated under charity law, by the Charity Commission. As a result, these unions must not allow their premises “to be used by groups or individuals who may damage the reputation or integrity of the student union or act against the public benefit.”

However, given the evidence in this report that extremist speakers have appeared regularly on campuses, it appears that student unions need more help in addressing this issue. As such, the Charity Commission should seek to:

- Expand on existing guidance for student unions on their responsibilities under charitable law, detailing how those with concerns can approach the Commission, and including examples of extremist speech or material which could damage their charitable reputation and integrity should it be hosted by an affiliated student society;

- Develop contact avenues through which students unions concerned about invited speakers or hosted material can receive advice or alert the Commission to potential regulatory breaches, and continue existing engagement processes – focusing on training student union staff to recognise material which may breach charity law;

- Ensure that any guidance produced accounts for the increased use of social-networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, by affiliated student societies, and highlight how this can be used to share material which may bring student unions’ charitable reputations into disrepute. Existing guidance should be adapted to recognise this, and provide examples of material which could be of concern.

2. For Prevent Practitioners

Unit: UK police forces and partner agencies

Issue: The association of Prevent delivery with police work

Recommendation: Diversify Prevent-delivery processes and promote the importance of community policing

While Prevent delivery is supposed to be multi-agency, in practice, it is often police-led, leading to many students forming an erroneous association between police activity; criminal-justice processes; and the effects of a referral to Prevent. This has coincided with the growth of a wider campaign against the presence of police officers on campus. The ‘Cops off Campus’ campaign can be seen in the passage of motions – including one at University College London (UCL) which claims that “the presence of police can be intimidating to students and makes many students feel unsafe on campus” – and in marches supporting these calls. As such, it is important that:

- Partnership agencies (such as local authorities) which, from 1 July, will be given a statutory role to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism play a greater part in on-campus Prevent delivery, to take some of the burden of responsibility off of the police and present a more civilian-focused Prevent strategy. This could include the formation of bespoke local delivery teams in which teachers/lecturers, mental-health and social-services practitioners, and other support agencies work alongside police officers to provide training and guidance;

- Training about Prevent, for HEI staff and student unions, provided by these teams focuses on detailing the civilian elements of the programme and emphasises that the main aim of the strategy is a safeguarding one which seeks to identify those at risk of extremism before they commit criminal offences;

- The value of community policing with regard to universities, including the regular presence of police officers on campus, is promoted to HEIs and student unions. Further guidance should also be developed to help police officers integrate into the campus environment, building on previous work carried out by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Police Association of Higher Education Liaison Officers (PAHELO).

3. For Higher Education Institutions

**Issue: Students exhibiting extremist behaviour**

**Recommendation: Ensure that all members of academic staff are aware of their responsibilities to public safety**

The case of Rizwaan Sabir (the University of Nottingham student wrongly detained for downloading an al-Qaeda manual) and the reluctance of lecturers to report Mohammed Atif Siddique’s extremist activity show the difficulties facing lecturers in challenging extremism. Even though almost all students are aged 18 or above, universities have traditionally taken on pastoral-care duties – including appointing personal tutors as a point of contact for welfare issues – meaning that faculty members may come into contact with students expressing extreme views, both inside and outside of the classroom.

The university governing body should affirm that:

- University staff should never be treated as a substitute for policing; however, if a staff member is concerned that a student is engaged – or imminently about to engage – in terrorism, then there is a legal duty, under Section 19 (‘Disclosure of information: duty’) and Section 38B (‘Information

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about acts of terrorism’) of the Terrorism Act 2000, to report the behaviour to the relevant authorities;

- Universities are subject to the legal duty (passed as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill) for public bodies to have due regard of their responsibility to prevent individuals from being drawn into terrorism which came into force on 1 July – and will have to take this into account once the issue of how this applies to external speaker events is settled in autumn 2015;

- If a student exhibits repeated behaviour suggesting support for violent extremism, then appropriate pastoral-care procedures are in place. The concern could be raised with the student’s personal tutor, who, after liaising with the student and all relevant staff, would decide whether to escalate the issue (for example, to the university chaplain or the government’s de-radicalisation project, Channel).

**Issue: Staff/students/student groups affiliating with extremist organisations and/or promoting extremist material**

**Recommendation: Ensure that all members of staff are aware of their public-sector-equality duty to foster good relations between different groups of people**

The legal protection of academic freedom at UK universities is integral to ensuring that freedom of expression is maintained. However, the employment of members of extremist organisations as faculty staff – such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) member Reza Pankhurst by the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) – and the regular use of university facilities to host individuals with extreme and intolerant views demonstrate that educational institutes must balance the right of expression with the duty of care to their students, as well as with requirements under discrimination and charitable law.

Higher Education and Further Education providers should:

- Be aware that members of academic staff have a legal right to be affiliated with any organisation which is not proscribed, including extreme organisations;

- Where necessary, affirm the legal duty of academic staff to promote race relations and community cohesion, and provide guidance on responsible teaching compared to advocating a partisan view;

- Consider disciplinary measures for sustained abuse of academic freedom which may breach anti-harassment measures under discrimination law.

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4. For Student Unions

Issue: Poor student-union engagement with Prevent

Recommendation: Compulsory engagement and training sessions for elected student-union officials

While union officials should not be expected to become involved in Prevent delivery, a key issue highlighted in this report has been the opposition the strategy has faced from within student democratic structures. This is demonstrated most aptly by the comment made by the then-General Secretary of the London School of Economics (LSE) about her work “preventing Prevent” in July 2012. Since then, the NUS pledge to “encourage Unions and institutions to not comply with or legitimise PREVENT” suggests these problems will only get worse. Given the importance of challenging the misinformation about Prevent which has driven this disengagement, delivery teams must have access to student union officials.

- Universities must accept that challenging extremism relies on student union staff and officials understanding both the Prevent strategy itself and their roles in it.

- Student unions are “accountable to the higher education [sic] institution as supervisor (under the 1994 Education Act) and principal funder”. The memoranda of understanding which govern this accountability exist to ensure that the unions observe the obligations imposed by institutional codes of practice (which would include the statutory duty to prevent people from being drawn into extremism in universities, applicable from 1 July 2015).

- The extension of the statutory duty to universities could provide a basis for institutions to mandate Prevent training for elected student-union officials, at which they should be encouraged to challenge those responsible for delivery with any criticisms of Prevent. These sessions might therefore become a space where misperceptions about the processes involved can be dispelled.

- Student-union trustees should also be encouraged to develop sanctions for elected officials who refuse to undertake relevant training.

Issue: Extremist speakers and organisations on university campuses

Recommendation: Develop policies and training to assist staff responsible for implementing speaker policies

This report demonstrates the extent to which extremist individuals or organisations have access to students through the unchallenged platforms provided by on-campus events. This is despite successive governments regularly identifying the issue as one which is of serious concern, and despite nearly 10 years of Prevent activity. Action should include:

- The creation of a standardised speaker policy across the UK HEI sector, in order to ensure a more consistent approach to the issue. This should be based on previous recommendations proposed in the Henry Jackson Society/Student Rights report ‘Challenging Extremists: Practical
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frameworks for our universities; be developed in consultation with Universities UK (UUK) and the NUS; and should take into account HEIs’ legal duty to protect academic freedom;

- The increased use of institutional Equality and Diversity Policy as part of any speaker guidance developed, with visiting speakers having to sign up to it before events being a condition on the event going ahead;

- A commitment to applying the NUS ‘No Platform’ policy more consistently across the UK. An existing framework for challenging extremist groups, the policy should be extended to include external or student organisations which act as ‘front groups’ for banned organisations;

- Training for student-union and HEI staff, to enable them to recognise extremist speakers likely to be invited onto campus and to identify typical extremist topics; tropes; or practices. This should also focus on giving staff the confidence to challenge extremists who do appear at the university, either during events or for recruiting on its grounds.

Issue: The lack of challenge faced by extremists on campus

Recommendation: Ensure that an atmosphere is fostered which encourages students to challenge lawful intolerance

In addition to addressing extremist criticism of Prevent, a vital part of challenging extremism, for universities and student unions, is ensuring that students are part of the solution. Higher Education and Further Education institutions should be the best places to challenge extremist ideas; yet, too many of them simply assume that this will take place and fail to ensure that students who do seek to question intolerant or extreme beliefs are not ostracised or intimidated. Student journalists have been accused of trying to “provoke an antagonistic atmosphere”, for opposing homophobic speakers, while one student-union official who spoke out against an invited speaker who praised a suicide bombing was accused of taking part in a “shamelessly racist attack”, showing the opprobrium that can be faced by those seeking to bring extremists to account.

As a result, student unions should seek to:

- Recognise the similarities between the intolerance of extreme Islamist speakers/organisations and that of the far-right, and promote an on-campus environment in which challenging the two are seen as analogous;

- Hold events in open settings and avoid the promotion and endorsement of off-campus events involving extremist speakers. If extremist speakers do feature, then a significant effort should be made to ensure that they appear as part of a balanced platform;

- Ensure that student-union staff are present at events featuring speakers with a history of extreme or intolerant views, and that an environment exists at these events in which students feel safe challenging the speaker;

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• Consider sanctions, including eventual disaffiliation, for student societies which consistently hold events featuring extremist speakers without attempting to provide balance (with these terms defined in the institutional speaker policy), or at which those who challenge the speakers are subject to intimidation.

**Issue: The promotion of extremist material on student social media**

**Recommendation: Produce a Social Media Policy to challenge unlawful or extremist material on student social media**

In addition to the appearance of extremist speakers on campuses across the UK, this report also highlights that student social media has been used to promote extremist material. While the Facebook pages and Twitter profiles of individual students should not be monitored by HEIs, universities and student unions should have oversight of student-society web pages hosted by the student-union website, and of official student-society Facebook groups or Twitter accounts. As such, student unions must be mindful of:

• The fact that potentially unlawful material should be reported to the Home Office Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU). Examples of unlawful material which could be promoted on social media should be included in any Prevent training/guidance provided;

• Their responsibility to ensure that the social media of any affiliated society or group does not promote extremist material. This could include making societies aware that such use of social media may damage the integrity and charitable reputation of the student union and asking new societies to sign up to a social-media policy which includes guidance on the posting of extreme material;

• The difficulty of preventing off-campus extremists from uploading extremist material to student-society social media. Those societies likely to be targeted by extremists could potentially begin pre-moderating material, or could monitor problematic material posted, in order to take disciplinary action against students involved in such activity.
Conclusion

The ongoing threat posed to the UK by Islamism-inspired terrorism has mostly stemmed from individuals born and raised in this country. In response, the Prevent strategy has sought to identify sectors in society which may be open to misuse by extremist groups or individuals, or in which people could be vulnerable to radicalisation. In addition to these examples of violent extremism, there is also evidence to suggest that a culture conducive to the promotion of non-violent extremism has been allowed to develop on a number of UK university campuses. This manifests itself in several ways, including the invitation of extreme or intolerant speakers onto campuses; the promotion of extremist material via social media; and the targeting of campuses by extremist activists. The most frequent example of this is when speakers with a history of extreme or intolerant views, or with a history of involvement with extremist organisations, are invited to universities.

Since the 7/7 attacks, a number of governmental departments; the police; and several sector-specific NGOs have produced publications which have sought to provide guidance to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), or have detailed ongoing work carried out as an element of Prevent delivery. However, while Prevent has been able to engage within the Higher Education sector to an extent, it has failed to gain widespread student support, and there is substantial evidence that student unions and organisations have actively worked to hinder attempts to counter extremism through the Prevent strategy. When this student opposition to the scheme is examined, it can be seen to focus on a number of key themes, including the charge that Prevent itself is a racist policy which leads to the creation of a suspect community; that it encourages ‘spying’ on students and misuses of power; that it has been poorly implemented and its terms have been poorly defined; and that it seeks to stifle dissent. However, it can be shown that many of these criticisms have been influenced by misunderstandings or misperceptions, or driven by extremist narratives – and, in some cases, have led to students working alongside extremists.

As such, it is vital that the government seeks to support those who work to challenge extremist rhetoric about Prevent. At the same time, it must ensure that guidance outlining the responsibility that university staff have to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism/extremism addresses the fears which these narratives propagate. This should accompany attempts to: diversify Prevent-delivery processes, demonstrate the role played by agencies other than the police, and improve training; policymaking; and regulatory access for universities and student unions. Universities should be the best places to challenge extremist ideas; yet, at present, this does not happen enough. As a result, institutions should aim to foster an environment conducive to debate, in order to support students seeking to challenge lawful intolerance.
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