SURVEILLANCE AFTER SNOWDEN

Effective Espionage in an Age of Transparency

Robin Simcox
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About The Henry Jackson Society

The Henry Jackson Society is a think tank and policy-shaping force that fights for the principles and alliances which keep societies free – working across borders and party lines to combat extremism, advance democracy and real human rights, and make a stand in an increasingly uncertain world.
Acronyms

**CSP**: Communication Service Provider  
**DoJ**: Department of Justice  
**DIA**: Defense Intelligence Agency  
**DNI**: Director of National Intelligence  
**FBI**: Federal Bureau of Investigation  
**FISA**: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act  
**GC&CS**: Government Code and Cypher School  
**GCHQ**: Government Communications Headquarters  
**IPT**: Investigatory Powers Tribunal  
**ISC**: Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament  
**OLC**: Office of Legal Counsel  
**NSA**: National Security Agency  
**ODNI**: Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
**PCLOB**: Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board  
**PSP**: President's Surveillance Program  
**RIPA**: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act  
**SIGINT**: Signals Intelligence  
**SPoC**: Single Point of Contact
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Executive Summary

In the spring of 2013, former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden used his government security clearance to steal a large quantity of classified government files. Via select journalists, Snowden alleged that intelligence agencies were tapping into fibre-optic cables containing telephony and internet-traffic data; intercepting and storing webcam images; and carrying out ‘warrantless’ surveillance. In terms of national security; diplomacy; privacy perceptions; media–state relations; citizens’ trust in government; technology company–state relations; and many other ways, his actions have had a profound impact.

Despite the support that Snowden has received from certain sections of society, the expectation that intelligence agencies should stop terrorist attacks and serious crimes remains. Yet, at the same time, there are calls for them to reform and be more transparent in order to rebuild trust. The intelligence agencies are in a particularly unenviable position: asked to be less intrusive; more transparent; and yet, just as effective.

This report – which is informed, in part, by interviews with senior intelligence officers – studies the variety of ways in which Snowden’s actions have impacted the US and the UK (particularly in terms of national security) and what lessons may be learned for the future.

US

PATRIOT Act Section 215

The US government carries out bulk collection of telephony metadata, which relates to the date and time of the call; the duration of the call; the calling number; and the number that has been dialled. The metadata is taken from Communication Service Providers (CSPs) and contained in a ‘virtual lockbox’ operated by the NSA. The agency can query the metadata when there is a ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ that the number is connected to a foreign terrorist group.

Section 215 helps government agencies ‘connect the dots’ for potential terrorist plots with both a foreign and domestic component. It is best understood as a safety measure designed to be part of the intelligence mosaic concerning attack plans that have a foreign and domestic component.

A Presidential task force assigned to investigate potential reform to government surveillance programmes stated that, with regard to Section 215, ‘the use of […] telephony meta-data was not essential to preventing attacks’. However, one analysis noted that this may merely reflect its value in disrupting activities at an early stage; furthermore, thwarting terrorist attacks occurs by integrating various streams of the intelligence community’s work, rather than relying on one programme alone.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Section 702

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) governs the interception of communications – for the specific purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information – of those based outside the US. It is widely considered to be more integral to the NSA’s work than that of Section 215.

The Section 702 programme is aimed at foreign nationals; no US citizen or anyone known to be in the US can be intentionally targeted.
Despite this, incidental – or accidental – collection of US citizens’ communications occurs as part of the process of acquiring those of a foreign intelligence target, as it is not feasible to separate the two out. This data is retained, though oversight procedures from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC, or FISA Court); the Executive Branch; and Congress are designed to ‘minimize the acquisition, retention and dissemination of incidentally acquired information about US persons.’

There are two distinct types of data acquisition that take place under Section 702 authority: Upstream collection and PRISM collection.

**PRISM**

PRISM collection can capture the content of e-mails and instant messages. It takes place with the compelled assistance of electronic CSPs. For example, if the NSA discovered that a foreign national, based outside the US, used a US CSP e-mail address to contact his associates about a planned terrorist attack, it would request that the account be queried, as well as request access to the data collected (for example, e-mails sent and received from that address).

**Upstream**

Upstream collection refers to the NSA tapping into the underwater fibre-optic cable networks (the internet backbone) that carry telephone and internet data going into and out of the US. This type of collection takes place as communications flow between CSPs, and allows for the collection of communications not available via PRISM.

**Executive Order 12333**

Executive Order (EO) 12333 outlines the goals, direction, duties, responsibilities, and conduct of 17 intelligence agencies in the US. It is considered a foundational authority.

FISA does not apply if communications are being routed through servers or satellites without a US end. As long as it is for a ‘valid foreign intelligence purpose’, collection in these circumstances takes place under EO 12333. Therefore, EO 12333 is the Executive Branch’s primary authority for foreign-intelligence gathering that takes place outside the US and is not governed by FISA.

EO 12333 targets foreign networks; yet, the information from these foreign networks may contain packets of data containing US citizens’ communications. EO 12333 allows for the retention of these US citizens’ communications, including content, as part of a foreign-intelligence investigation. As this collection occurs outside the US, the oversight that is applicable to Section 702 does not exist. Instead, oversight is provided by Attorney General-approved procedures; a variety of Inspectors general; oversight boards; general counsels; compliance officers; and privacy officers.

**UK**


The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) provides the statutory framework for the government’s use of covert techniques, including the interception of communications, in order to ensure their proportionality and the necessity of their use.

**Section 8(4) of RIPA**

Section 8(4) of RIPA is a vital piece of legislation that underpins the Government Communications
Headquarters’ (GCHQ’s) work. Under Section 8(4), the UK intercepts communications by tapping fibre-optic communication cables carrying both external (i.e. communications sent or received outside the UK) and internal communications (i.e. communications sent and received inside the UK, where the sender and recipient are both based in the UK).

Section 8(4) warrants, which apply to external communications, have proved controversial because of the volume of communications being swept up and because communications are being intercepted using a general warrant from the relevant Secretary of State, which does not require a specific named subject to be on it. This type of collection also scoops up internal communications, as even they may be transmitted via internet-service providers in foreign nations (and the two cannot feasibly be separated out during the initial collection).

Sir Iain Lobban – when speaking as head of GCHQ, in November 2013 – explained the need for such data to be collected in bulk: ‘[i]f you think of the internet as an enormous hay field, what we are trying to do is to collect hay from those parts of the field that we can get access to […] containing the needles or the fragments of the needles that we might be interested in’.

Section 16 of RIPA

Under provisions in Sections 16 of RIPA, the communications of somebody in the UK which have been collected under Section 8(4) can be looked at; listened to; or read, but in limited circumstances.

Section 16(3) allows for their examination if they are ‘referable to an individual’ currently in the British Islands and the Secretary of State has certified that examination is being carried out for a national-security or serious-crime purpose. Sections 16(4) and (5) allow for their examination if the individual was believed, ‘on reasonable grounds’, to be abroad at time of interception, or if there has been ‘a relevant change of circumstances’. For example, collection under Section 16 can continue for a very limited period if the individual visits the UK.

The exceptions that exist under Section 16 have also been deemed controversial, with privacy and civil-liberty groups raising concerns over the ambiguity of its wording.

Reform of RIPA

There has been significant discussion around the use of RIPA and its modern-day applicability to the new types of data being generated (for example, from social media). There have been calls for reform or for redrafting the legislation entirely.

Yet, RIPA is about oversight and preventing intrusions into civil liberties, not technology. It was drafted to be technologically neutral, which has helped to ensure its continued applicability. Even new RIPA legislation would still need to be technologically neutral. Referencing specific technology and communication methods would mean that the legislation becomes quickly outdated and would need constantly revising; it could also overly restrict the state’s ability to gather certain types of intelligence. Yet there is also the possibility that critics of RIPA and intelligence agencies’ supposed intrusiveness would discover that reform of the legislation would end up strengthening the agencies’ powers, rather than diminishing them.
**DAMAGE DONE BY SNOWDEN**

**Changes in target behaviour and communication methods**

Snowden’s disclosures about the NSA and GCHQ have led to changes in suspects’ behaviour, as terrorists and criminals better understand the scope and scale of Western intelligence capacity. For example:

- At least three al-Qaeda affiliates are known to have altered their communication methods.
- Online jihadist platforms released new encryption tools, and at a quicker pace, following the Snowden leaks. According to one analysis, three significant encryption tools were released ‘within a three to five month time frame of the leaks’. For example, the *Global Islamic Media Front* released a new mobile-encryption program in September 2013, while the *al-Fajr Technical Committee* has released multiple versions of an encryption program for e-mails; text messages; and instant messages.
- In January 2015, a video was released onto a jihadist platform, outlining what jihadists had learned from the Snowden disclosures. It provided advice that included tips on how to avoid detection and listed software packages that protect against surveillance, as well as where this software could be acquired.
- The Section 702 program was particularly impacted, as foreign terror suspects now not only realised that their communications potentially passed through the US (even if the individuals themselves were not based there); but also which CSPs were allowing the NSA to access these communications. Terror suspects subsequently stopped using these CSPs to send emails or even stopped using electronic communications entirely.

Intelligence sources have attempted to provide an insight into the day-to-day impact that Snowden has had on their work:

- In June 2014, one British intelligence source said that GCHQ’s ability to track domestic and foreign crime gangs – including those relating to people trafficking and drugs – had been reduced by approximately 25%.
- In October 2014, a top GCHQ spy tasked with cracking the communications of high-value national-security targets stated that it can take him three times as long to do so now (taking six weeks instead of two).
- By revealing information concerning intelligence-gathering techniques, Snowden has polluted ongoing operations. As they can no longer be run safely, due to fear of discovery and/or attribution, such intelligence gathering has had to stop.
- There is also a fear that hostile states will read and adapt the methodologies that are displayed in the Snowden files: China and Russia, for example, deploying GCHQ’s or the NSA’s own cyber strategies against them.

**Damaging military capabilities**

Snowden created digital keys which allowed him to access a wealth of classified data. Considering the contact that he has had with the Russian security service, the FSB, this is an obvious cause of concern. The US government fears that the cyber capabilities of Russian and Chinese intelligence agencies are such that they could have accessed Snowden’s files even without his knowledge.
These files are not limited to material relating to communications interception, either; Snowden created digital keys which allowed him into a variety of intelligence and military systems.

- According to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), of the information that Snowden accessed, approximately 'less than 10 percent has to do with domestic surveillance.'
- General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has also testified that the 'vast majority' of what Snowden accessed was about 'military capabilities, operations, tactics, techniques and procedures.'
- Mike Rogers, former Chairman of the US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, has said that ‘Snowden’s actions are likely to have lethal consequences for our troops in the field.’

**Examples of non-domestic surveillance revealed by Snowden:**

- The NSA had received permission to spy on groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
- The Norwegian Intelligence Service assisted the NSA in collecting intelligence regarding Russian energy policy and military activities.
- The Swedish Defence Radio Establishment works with the NSA, to gain intelligence on Russia.
- The NSA was considering forming an intelligence-sharing partnership with Vietnam.
- GCHQ intended to target Turkish and South African diplomats.
- The location of NSA offices, bases, and analysts across the world.
- US attempts to spy on China and Hong Kong.
- The NSAs’s interception of then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s communications.
- President Obama had asked for a list of potential foreign targets for US cyber attacks.

**Damaging relations between Communication Service Providers and the state**

Following the Snowden disclosures, a significant divide has emerged between the government and the CSPs, who were outraged at the intelligence agencies’ ability to access their data. Furthermore, this created a perception that they had collaborated with the state in allowing them access to their customers’ data. According to Brad Smith, the Executive Vice President and General Counsel at Microsoft, ‘government snooping potentially now constitutes an “advanced persistent threat,” alongside sophisticated malware and cyber attacks.’

The backlash in response has been significant. For example, US-based CSPs are now claiming that the UK has no jurisdiction over them and that they are bound by US law. Therefore, if the UK government wants to access content data (for example, e-mails), then it must use the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) process. This is an unsuitable tool, as it is primarily used in cases where a crime has already been committed, whereas agencies such as the NSA and GCHQ aim to be pre-emptive – disrupting possible criminal activity in the planning stages.

Intelligence officials view the CSP's stance as being unreasonable, as other foreign companies wishing to deliver a service in the UK are obliged to comply with UK law. This was partially why the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA) 2014 was introduced, in order to
clarify that CSPs were required to provide data if served with a UK warrant. One senior British intelligence official said that the public would be ‘shocked’ if it was aware of how little the state could do because of the actions of major technology companies, while GCHQ Director Robert Hannigan has said that some of the CSPs were ‘in denial’ about the problem.

CSPs’ use of ubiquitous encryption has also increased exponentially since Snowden’s leaks, meaning that companies are automatically providing encryption for users, rather than the user having to encrypt the data themselves. Hannigan has explained that ‘[t]echniques for encrypting messages […] which were once the preserve of the most sophisticated criminals or nation states now come as standard’.

Escalation is inevitable, as the NSA and GCHQ step up their efforts to break into these networks. As General Keith Alexander, former NSA Director, has said, ‘[w]hen the government asks [the] NSA to collect intelligence on terrorist X, and he uses publicly available tools to encode his messages, it is not acceptable for a foreign intelligence agency like [the] NSA to respond, “Sorry we cannot understand what he is saying”.’

**SELECT CONCLUSIONS**

**There is no evidence that mass surveillance is taking place**

That mass surveillance is occurring is central to Edward Snowden’s accusations; yet, it is untrue. US and UK intelligence agencies are not spying on the phone calls of ordinary citizens or brazenly looking at their e-mails; they are legally intercepting communications in order to prevent attacks from terrorists, cyber criminals, and a host of other state and non-state actors. That mass surveillance and bulk collection of communications have become virtually synonyms is regrettable.

**State access to data may actually be insufficient, rather than excessive**

There is an ongoing problem regarding the UK government’s ability to access communications data (the context, i.e. the ‘who, when, where and how’ of a communication).

Whereas telephone communications and access to the internet traditionally took place via a fixed landline, they now increasingly take place through mobile networks and broadband. This has been accompanied by a flourishing in communications methods: SMS messages, video messaging, instant messaging, Skype, and social-network platforms.

Furthermore, a single telephone line with a single service provider previously needed to monitor who was called; for what duration; and the geographic location, for billing purposes. Yet, increasing numbers of people pay a fixed-price monthly direct debit or, alternatively, a pay-as-you-go fee to their provider. A consequence of this has been that CSPs no longer retain – or, sometimes, even generate – communications data.

This is a concern. Communications data is an invaluable weapon in safeguarding national security and fighting crime – this includes the prevention of child abuse and exploitation (including the prosecution of its perpetrators); identifying and locating suicide risks; identifying rapists, kidnappers, or threatening callers; and murder investigations.
Judicial oversight over every data application is neither the norm nor necessarily effective

The US has a level of judicial oversight in its communications-interception regime, via the FISA Court. The fact that, in the UK, warrants are issued by a Secretary of State rather than a judge has been used to criticise its interception authorisation regime.

However, the extent to which judges and magistrates are better qualified to, for example, approve or reject warrants is highly contentious. Providing judicial oversight is only potentially a positive when there are enough well-trained, high quality magistrates and judges who understand the legislation; so far, this has not been proved to be the case.

Furthermore, applications for warrants may be legally sound – and, therefore, approvable – but politically unwise. Ministers can also assess the political context and wider public interest in a way that judges cannot.

Ultimately, a non-judicial system in which there is accountability and a rigorous approval process is worth more than ill-trained magistrates or judges carrying out the task. This is reflected in the fact that comparable democracies (Canada; Australia; and France, for example) also have relatively minimal judicial involvement in its interception authorisation regime.

Incidental collection of our everyday communications is a new reality

There must be a greater societal acceptance of the risk of incidental collection of everyday communications during the NSA’s and GCHQ’s intelligence work.

It was previously the case that the infrastructure used for foreign communications was distinct from that used for domestic; however, data streams have now become entangled. Even internal communications may travel via foreign servers and there is no reasonable way for the state to separate what are internal, rather than external, communications when initially scooping this data up. As a result, intelligence agencies on the lookout for foreign communications inevitably end up capturing some belonging to their own citizens.

Sir Iain Lobban, when speaking as GCHQ Director, has commented that ‘[y]ou can’t pick and choose the components of a global interception system that you like (catching terrorists and paedophiles), and those you don’t (incidental collection of data at scale); it’s one integrated system.’ A similar point was made by General Keith Alexander: ‘if all the […] bad guys […] would go to one sector of the network, call it badguys.com, then all we would have to do is monitor that area and everybody else’s communications would flow freely. But the reality is, they use the same devices we do’.

As long as the correct oversight is in place to ensure that access to this data is not abused – and, so far, there is very little to suggest that it is being – this should not be the cause for concern that some have attempted to portray it as.

Public concern should not be about capacity, but oversight and culture

The NSA’s and GCHQ’s intelligence-gathering capacities – which are massive – should not be confused with their legal authorities, which are also strong (even in comparison to other Western democracies).

Western citizens are generally happy for the state to have an army with sophisticated weaponry because they know that it will not be misused; there is faith in the culture of the system and that
the checks and balances are sufficient to ensure public safety. This same principle should apply to the weaponry given to our spy agencies.

With this being the case, the questions for the future should not necessarily revolve around the capacity of intelligence agencies. These debates should, instead, be about the people; the culture of the institution; and the systems in place to safeguard privacy.

Intelligence agencies must aspire for translucency, not transparency

States need secrets, for intelligence and military purposes; for criminal investigations; and for a host of other reasons. Yet, they also need public consent, in order to operate with credibility.

The intelligence agencies may have been overly secretive, and some within these agencies do accept the need to be more open with regard to their work. However, even those officials who are receptive to the idea of more transparency warn of an ‘irreducible core’ of methods that cannot be revealed; that could be quite broad; and which will be defended, by them, to the hilt.

The concept of ‘translucency, not transparency’ has been suggested by Mike Leiter, the former head of the National Counterterrorism Center. With this, ‘you can see through the thick glass. You get the broad outline of the shapes. You get the broad patterns of movements. But you don’t get the fine print.’ This is a realistic and workable concept by which to balance security and privacy concerns for the future.

This means agencies opening up further than they have in the past and providing greater translucency. Yet, it also means civil society accepting that unalloyed transparency is not always a positive and that there are good reasons for some state secrets.
It’s not just a US problem. The UK has a huge dog in this fight. [GCHQ] are worse than the US.

Edward Snowden, June 2013

The conduct of intelligence is premised on the notion that we can do it secretly, and we don’t count on it being revealed in the newspaper.

Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, October 2013

We do not spend our time listening to the telephone calls or reading the e-mail […] of the vast majority. That would not be proportionate, it would not be legal. We do not do it.

Former GCHQ Director, Sir Iain Lobban, November 2013
Introduction

In the spring of 2013, former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee Edward Snowden used his government security clearance to steal a huge quantity of classified government files. While the exact amount taken is unknown—and, according to recently retired Director of the NSA, General Keith Alexander, unknowable—anywhere between 50,000 and 200,000 of the files are thought to have been passed to journalists.1

For Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper, it was “potentially the most massive and most damaging theft of intelligence information in [US] history”,2 while General Michael Hayden, the former head of both the NSA and the CIA, called it the “most serious hemorrhaging of American secrets in the history of American espionage”.3 For the UK, at least 58,000 documents relating to its Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) were stolen.4

Stories emerged, in the press, of intelligence agencies tapping fibre-optic cables containing telephone and internet traffic; carrying out alleged “warrantless” surveillance; monitoring phone calls made by foreign leaders; and intercepting, then storing, webcam images.5 In terms of national security; diplomacy; privacy perceptions; media–state relations; citizens’ trust in government; technology company–state relations; and many other ways, Snowden’s actions have had a profound impact. This impact continues to unfold today, in a variety of ways that are, arguably, still yet to be fully understood. As Sir John Sawers, the former head of MI6, said in January 2015, “Snowden threw a massive rock in the pool and the ripples haven’t stopped yet”.9

Snowden claimed that he stole the files because he wanted to “inform the public as to that which is done in their name and that which is done against them”;10 he generated support from sections of the public, the political class, the media, the arts, and from NGOs by doing so. He also succeeded in gaining enormous amounts of media coverage: 26 million blogs and news articles mentioned him in the year after he stole the documents.11

Despite the support that Snowden received from certain sections of society, the expectation

remains that intelligence agencies should stop terrorist attacks and serious crimes.\textsuperscript{12} Yet, at the same time, there are calls for them to reform and be more transparent in order to rebuild trust. The intelligence agencies are in a particularly unenviable position: asked to be less intrusive; more transparent; and yet, just as effective.

This report explores this and related questions. It studies the programmes used by the NSA and GCHQ that caused such controversy; the laws that govern them; the adequacy of their oversight; the impact that their existence being revealed has had, particularly with regard to national security; the lessons that could be learned; and the issues which we must consider for the future.

\textsuperscript{12} For example, see some of the fallout to either the Boston-marathon bombings in April 2013, or extremists stabbing a soldier to death in London in May 2013: 'The Boston Bombing Intelligence Failure', \textit{The Daily Beast}, 16 April 2013, available at: http://w..dailymail.co.uk/articles/2013/04/16/the-boston-bombing-intelligence-failure.html; see also: 'Boston bombing investigation reveals intelligence failures', \textit{The Washington Times}, 23 April 2013, available at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/23/boston-bombing-investigation-reveals-intelligence-
\hspace{1cm}page=all; see also: 'Woolwich attack: why was suspect Michael Adebolajo free to kill?', \textit{The Telegraph}, 23 May 2013, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/1007439/Woolwich-attack-why-was-suspect-Michael-Adebolajo-free-to-kill.html; see also: 'Could MI5 have stopped Lee Rigby’s murder?', \textit{The Guardian}, 19 December 2013, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/19/mi5-lee-
hspace{1cm}rigby-murder-adebolajo-adebowale, last visited: 16 March 2015.
UNITED STATES

SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) governs the interception of communications of foreign nationals based outside the US, for the specific purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information relating to national security; foreign affairs; and national defence. This includes a focus on terrorism, espionage, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\(^{13}\)

Under Section 702, the government provides Communication Service Providers (CSPs) — such as Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft, and Facebook — with “selectors” (for example, telephone numbers or e-mail addresses) and compels them to acquire communications on its behalf.\(^{14}\)

The NSA has stated that collection which occurs under Section 702 “is the most significant tool in the NSA collection arsenal for the detection, identification, and disruption of terrorist threats to the US and around the world.”\(^{15}\)

ORIGINS

Section 702’s origins lie in the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), formulated after al-Qaeda’s attacks against the US on 11 September 2001. The TSP enabled the NSA to intercept foreign nationals’ communications, if they were of suspected intelligence value and the nationals were located abroad (or “reasonably” suspected of being abroad at the point that their communication was intercepted).\(^{16}\)

Under a Presidential authorisation which stated that an extraordinary emergency existed due to the ongoing terrorist threat, the TSP also permitted this electronic surveillance to be carried out without a warrant or court order, for a “limited” number of days, within the US — as long as there was a counterterrorism purpose.\(^{17}\)

President George W. Bush renewed the authorisation for these activities (with certain modifications) approximately every one to two months, until 2007. After this, the government sought authorisation from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC, or FISA Court), a

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14. In this report, CSPs are defined as companies that provide a service enabling information to be transported electronically. This is a definition based upon the UK government’s understanding, as outlined in: ‘Report on the intelligence relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby’, Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2014), available at: https://b1ca6f83-a-566311d4-sites.googlegroups.com/ta-independent.gocuk/ic/files/20141123_ISR_WoodrowReport%20website%20pdf.pdf?attiechaute=AoX5Y7cePamYBsodD06gEeHYPY1psn57z7WpAmMEDG_Y2KHos5EgCscN5Z5NFGj9SfHsczy09ylJLp3B0NgY16GWt0q6kqP7hReqjRdN1yjY9f6es-g1P0j9WMHtz6x7l2Kum9hKt1O66gN6NgEIKتاtuflh4eH0RteweCdVrzn77U57G37-8G7qtk6VoNvDpGhWv77-pTY9M4tvyPrE67sway6mYw6Q3Qf786XdQ83d_schZGVNcKvU5_BHFaattredirtexes=0, last visited: 16 March 2015, p. 139.


secret intelligence court which consists of 11 federal judges.\textsuperscript{19} In January 2007, FISC authorised electronic surveillance of telephone and internet communications, provided that the government had, for example, “probable cause” regarding the activities of one of the communicants and the telephone numbers and e-mail addresses involved were reasonably suspected of being used by someone located outside the US.\textsuperscript{20} 21 This was altered in May 2007, when another FISC judge ruled that the ‘probable cause’ determination needed to take place in court, rather than be decided by the government (although it could still add new e-mail addresses and telephone numbers of interest, without requiring a court order).\textsuperscript{22}

The government was also using FISA to obtain court orders compelling private companies to acquire the communications of foreign terror suspects using US CSPs.\textsuperscript{23} These court orders were predicated on probable cause; however, difficulties in meeting this probable-cause standard led to a degradation in acquiring foreign intelligence communications.\textsuperscript{24} Following concerns in the Bush administration over this, it was proposed, in spring 2007, that FISA be modified. Therefore, in August of that year, Congress enacted the Protect America Act of 2007.\textsuperscript{25} Among the measures that this introduced was the removal of the need for the government to seek individual court orders showing probable cause. The Protect America Act was eventually replaced with the Congress-approved FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which placed the programme on a longer-term statutory footing. Section 702 was among the provisions enacted in the amendments.

The Attorney General and DNI approve yearly certifications which give authorisation to target foreign intelligence information without specifying to the FISA Court a specific, named individual to be targeted.\textsuperscript{26} Instead of having to show probable cause, Section 702 certifications must collect intelligence regarding certain issues: such as international terrorism and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{27}

A reform introduced in 2015 states that the NSA must now produce a written statement showing that a query is “reasonably likely” to produce foreign intelligence.\textsuperscript{28}

**ACQUISITION**

There are two separate types of data acquisition that take place under Section 702 authority: PRISM collection and Upstream collection.

**PRISM**

PRISM collection takes place with the compelled assistance of CSPs, from whom it can capture the content of e-mails and instant messages.\textsuperscript{29} This collection is carried out when the NSA

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\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 16.

\textsuperscript{20} Defined as probable cause that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power (including international terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda), and that “minimization” procedures — i.e. that these queries are “reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information” — are met (Ibid., pp. 8 & 24).

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 17.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., pp. 17-18.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 18.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 19.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 6.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.


sends a ‘selector’ (for example, an e-mail address) to a CSP. This CSP is required to provide communications sent to or from this ‘selector’ back to the NSA. Parts can also be disseminated to the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the UK government has also confirmed that GCHQ has received intelligence via PRISM.31

The data and content collected under Section 702, via PRISM, can be stored for up to five years.32

**How PRISM can work in practice**

The NSA discovers that a foreign national based outside the US uses a US CSP e-mail address (for example, a Google Mail account) to contact his associates about a planned terrorist attack. The NSA would request that this e-mail address be queried, under Section 702 authority. The FBI would then contact Google and compel it to provide all communications from this Google Mail account. The NSA would receive all data collected via PRISM, and a copy of the raw data could be sent to the CIA and/or FBI.33

**UPSTREAM**

Upstream collection refers to the NSA tapping into the underwater fibre-optic cable networks (also referred to as “the Internet backbone”) that carry telephone and internet data into and out of the US.34 This type of collection is done under FISA and takes place as communications flow between CSPs.35

Raw upstream collection cannot be shared with the CIA or FBI and is retained by the NSA; the data can be stored for up to two years.36 Approximately 9% of the e-mails that the NSA obtains occur via upstream collection.37 According to Rajesh De, former General Counsel at the NSA, “upstream fills a particular gap of allowing us to collect communications that are not available under PRISM collection.”38

**How Upstream collection can work in practice**

**Telephony collection**

The NSA discovers that a foreign national, reasonably thought to be based outside the US, is using a certain telephone line to contact his associates about a planned terrorism attack. The NSA sends – under a Section 702 certification – this phone number to a US CSP, which is compelled

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**Notes:**

34. Ibid., p. 37.
35. Ibid., p. 35.
to provide telephone communications from or to that particular number.\textsuperscript{41}

\textbf{Internet collection}

The NSA targets foreign nationals by tasking specific ‘selectors’ (i.e. e-mail addresses) and compels CSPs to intercept communications transiting through internet fibre-optic cable networks.

Upstream collection acquires information concerning the ‘to’ and ‘from’ communications (i.e. as the sender or recipient will have been targeted under Section 702, this potentially means all e-mails sent from a specific account and all the e-mails that it has received). However, it can also concern the ‘about’, which means capturing a communication in which the ‘selector’ is referenced but is not a participant in either end of the communication (for example, a targeted e-mail address referred to in the body of an intercepted e-mail message).\textsuperscript{42}

\textbf{WHO IS TARGETED?}

The Section 702 programme is aimed at foreign nationals; no US citizen or anyone known to be in the US can be intentionally targeted.\textsuperscript{43} The NSA is also not allowed to ‘reverse target’: namely, target a foreign national based outside the US in order to gather intelligence on an individual known to be based in the US.\textsuperscript{44}

However, incidental collection of US citizens’ communications occurs as part of the process of acquiring actual targeted communications, as it is not feasible to initially separate out the two. It is possible that a US citizens’ communications will be swept up while carrying out legitimate collection on a foreign intelligence target; for example, if an al-Qaeda leader in Pakistan was contacting a US citizen.\textsuperscript{45} [There are, though, “extensive procedures, specifically approved by the [FISA] court”, in place, to “minimize the acquisition, retention and dissemination of incidentally acquired information about US persons.”\textsuperscript{46}]

If evidence of a possible crime is discovered, the NSA is able to disseminate this information to federal law enforcement.\textsuperscript{47} The NSA may also inform the FBI if a target enters the US – enabling it (the FBI) to carry out electronic surveillance, for example.\textsuperscript{48} A reform introduced in 2015 stated that evidence acquired this way could not be introduced as evidence in court unless it had approval from the Attorney General or was related to a serious crime or national-security issue.\textsuperscript{49}

Section 702 collection does not occur in bulk. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), an independent agency within the Executive Branch, concluded that the Section 702 programme “consists entirely of targeting specific persons” – the definition of which the PCLOB accepts is as broad as “corporations, associations, and entities as well as individuals”\textsuperscript{50} – and that the government “acquires only those communications involving [a] particular selector”, such as a

\textsuperscript{42.} Ibid., p. 37.
\textsuperscript{43.} ‘Facts on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act’, Director of National Intelligence (2013).
\textsuperscript{46.} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48.} Ibid., p. 50.
\textsuperscript{49.} ‘New Privacy Protections for Information Collected under Section 702’, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2015.
telephone number or e-mail address.30

A NOTE ON TERRORISM AND THE INTERNET

In November 2013, Sir Iain Lobban, former Director of GCHQ, commented that the internet had facilitated “a myriad of ways to communicate covertly. It gives [terrorists] a platform, to fund-raise, to radicalise, to spread propaganda. It gives them the means to plan, to command and control, to spread lethal ideas, to exhort violence.”51 The scale of tracking this type of threat is enormous. In a single year, 2.4 trillion e-mails are sent (with more sent in four days than letters are delivered in a whole year), as are 160 billion instant messages; 145 billion text messages; and 1 billion ‘tweets’. A further 70 billion Facebook views and 23 billion Google searches take place,52 and over 100 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube every minute.53

Many of its early users hoped that the internet would be a space free from government control; yet, as Sir Iain Lobban has said, “[f]rom what we know of ungoverned spaces in the real world, do we really believe that the world would be a better place if the internet becomes an ungoverned space where anybody can act freely with impunity?”54

SECTION 702 CONTROVERSIES

The controversy that existed around Section 702 and the type of collection that occurs under its authority revolved around the facts that:

(a) US citizens’ communications incidentally picked up while intercepting foreign communications could be stored. One former official, speaking to The New York Times stated, ‘This is really a sea change […] It’s almost a mainstay of this country that the N.S.A. only does foreign searches.’55

(b) Collection took place without obtaining a FISA Court warrant against a specific individual; rather, it occurred under a broader warrant enabling collection to take place regarding certain foreign-intelligence topics.

It had been speculated that the lack of a warrant against a specific individual during Section 702 collection would make the programme unconstitutional;56 however, the PCLOB came to a “unanimous bottom-line conclusion that the core Section 702 program is clearly authorized by Congress, reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and an extremely valuable and effective intelligence tool.”57 Similarly, PRISM collection was described as “clearly authorized” under

Section 702.\textsuperscript{58}

General Hayden has cast doubt on the impact of PRISM on the public debate; he said that the use of PRISM was “softball” and did not “incur much of a ripple in the United States at all.”\textsuperscript{59}

**WHO PROVIDES OVERSIGHT?**

*The Executive*

The Executive’s independent inspectors general provide oversight for the Section 702 legislation.\textsuperscript{60}
In addition, every 60 days (at minimum), the Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) perform on-site reviews of the NSA’s “targeting, minimization, and dissemination” procedures.\textsuperscript{61}

*The Legislature*

The DNI and the Attorney General provide Congress with reports on the programme and with FISA Court opinions twice a year. The reports include directives issued under Section 702 (and details of the judicial review of these) and a description of any incidents of non-compliance. The Senate’s and House of Representatives’ Committees on Intelligence and on the Judiciary are also given briefings on the programme.\textsuperscript{62}

*The Judiciary*

Section 702 collection is carried out with FISA Court approval. The targeting procedures are subject to judicial review by the Court, though individual targeting decisions are not (instead being covered by the DoJ and ODNI reviews).\textsuperscript{63}

The FISA Court has been criticised for “rubber stamping” government requests to carry out electronic surveillance.\textsuperscript{64} For example, in 2013, the government made 1,588 such applications for authority; all were approved, with only 34 of them being subjected to modifications to the original application. It had similar success in previous years.\textsuperscript{65} However, this accusation has been rejected by some officials. Carrie Cordero, a former DoJ official, has said:

> The FISC is not at all the rubber stamp it has been periodically purported to be. The judges, after all, are sitting federal court judges, and any prosecutor or defense attorney will tell you that federal district court judges do not hesitate to demand information, accuracy and explanation when needed. FISC judges do not abandon their judicial sensibilities and responsibilities when they sit on the FISC. They bring all of their attention, consideration,
and exacting requirements to their meaningful role on the Court.  

General Alexander has described them in a similar way:

I’m on the other end of that table with federal judges […] They want to make sure that what we’re doing comports with the Constitution and the law. And they are dead serious on it. […] These are tremendous judges […] I’ve been in front of that court a number of times. I can tell you from the wirebrushings that I received, they are not a rubber stamp.

The success that the government has had in obtaining approval from the FISA Court is likely down to familiarity with the process and what it is possible to achieve approval for, rather than court subservience. This is certainly the case in the UK, where a Secretary of State would not be asked to even consider an application until government lawyers are satisfied that it has met legal requirements.

NSA VIOLATIONS

The NSA violated privacy rules 2,776 times during its surveillance activities between April 2011 and March 2012. These violations included mistyping (for example, of a phone number or e-mail address) and capturing communications of a foreign national who had physically moved his or her location (for example, being temporarily based in the US and therefore protected by the Fourth Amendment – prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure – for that period).

When these violations were flagged up, the collection was stopped. Any data gained during the period in which the violation took place was deleted, and none of the violations were known to be deliberate.

There are concerns that such an issue arose in the first place, and that noticing it relied on the goodwill of the agency that was carrying out the wrongdoing. Yet, as Benjamin Wittes, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution has said, “when nobody was watching, the NSA caught big mistakes, reported them and had a significant dialogue with the FISA […] Court on fixing them. The process is not perfect, but it has integrity”.

One instance of this occurred in 2011, when the NSA uncovered a technological problem meaning that it was retaining an unnecessary volume of communications – for example, a screenshot of e-mails on a web page, even if only one message was being sought. It subsequently reported this to the FISA Court.

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68. ‘Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework’, Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2015), available at: https://hizaha9b3-a.5e6363fd-sites.googleusercontent.com/a/indpe64 collegiate .g.co.uk/e/files/20150312_BSC_FISA%2BP%2BBP%2Bweb%229.pdf?attachauh=ANoX7qfWvEaQz7vQ4f8h9cWSjWzUAXQgtMkA4vrb3Fr1izm7wvR6b6RHVvsemQlZyCHEY0s37vzRt6CTI6h6bXHEP htv65v7p2v3Rj6gCXshQWv5%255Ejarp6x8cXg7E7lM_xHcFHcsDF9g6gEyV8V8o4kIcN10W06ekk27VnmsQeRL2ecenuvWw5gaz33yjXMDvzPkJ56c1nKvWz70U08x925h3-fhh-FF4ZGk&attredirects=0, last visited: 23 March 2015, p. 74.
71. ‘Transcript: NSA Deputy Director John Inglis’, APR, 10 January 2014.
to FISC, leading to the court ruling that its Section 702 collection was “in some respects, deficient on statutory and constitutional grounds.” This ruling meant that, between 2008 and 2011, the NSA was not taking sufficient steps to protect the privacy of its incidentally collected domestic communications. The NSA subsequently created a new way of handling the internet traffic that enhanced the protections afforded to American citizens.

BULK METADATA COLLECTION & SECTION 215

The bulk collection of metadata from telephony and internet communications, authorised under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, has its roots in the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The US government now only collects telephony metadata. This relates to the date and time of the call, its duration, the calling number, and the number that has been dialled; it does not include the content of calls, subscriber information, or the geographical location of the caller.

The metadata is taken from CSPs and contained in a “virtual lockbox” operated by the NSA. This was the programme that caused the most domestic controversy following Snowden’s leaks.

ORIGINS

Three days after the 9/11 attacks, the then-NSA Director, General Michael Hayden, approved the targeting of “terrorist-associated” overseas telephone numbers. This collection was pertaining to communication between the US and countries where terrorists were known to operate. Only specific and pre-approved numbers could have their data collected and checked against links originating in the US. By 26 September, this had been broadened so that any Afghan phone number in contact with a US phone number was, from then on, “presumed to be of foreign intelligence value” and could be passed to the FBI.

The NSA undertook these activities under Executive Order (EO) 12333, which concerns foreign-intelligence gathering that is not governed by FISA (for more information, see pages 33-35). This was because targeting e-mail accounts hosted on a US webmail server and belonging to non-US-based foreign nationals required a FISA Court order (the approval process for which could take between four and six weeks or – with an emergency FISA Court order – on average, a day and a half). Along with the volume of terrorist suspects using e-mails, and the regularity with which they changed their phone numbers or e-mail addresses, the existing FISA authorisation was seen to be

81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., p. 3.
not allowing sufficient flexibility; yet, early efforts to amend it stalled.

Therefore, on 4 October 2001, President Bush issued a Presidential Authorization for “Specified Electronic Surveillance Activities during a Limited Period to Detect and Prevent Acts of Terrorism within the United States”. This would become known as the ‘President’s Surveillance Program’ (PSP), and the data collected in it: a security compartment named ‘Stellar Wind’. The legality of the programme was approved by the Attorney General and the DoJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) – whose Deputy Assistant Attorney General, John Yoo, would write the initial legal memoranda in support of the PSP.

The NSA was now able to acquire, retain, and store content and metadata from telephony and internet communications if there was “probable cause” to believe either that (a) at least one end of the communication came from abroad, or (b) a communicant was “engaged in or preparing for acts of international terrorism.” These conditions therefore allowed for the collection of US citizens’ data if their communications involved a communicant outside the US, or one not known to be a US citizen.

This was a significant change. Previously, the NSA did not have the legal authority to collect communications if one end was based in the US; it could now do so without a judicial warrant or a court order. The metadata collected, though, could only be queried if there was a “reasonable suspicion” that the individual whose records were being checked was connected to certain foreign terrorist groups.

In October 2001, the PATRIOT Act was passed. Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act amended Title V, Section 501 of FISA (‘Access to Certain Business Records for Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism Investigations’ (50 U.S.C. § 1861)). Section 215 allowed the government to obtain a FISA Court order which would require third-party companies to provide records relevant to international-terrorism investigations. The use of such a power is not unusual in an array of domestic investigations, with prosecutors usually able to gain business records via a subpoena; yet, prior to the Section 215 amendment, national-security officials were restricted in their abilities to investigate the activities of foreign suspects on US soil. Even if they could get a court order to do so, they could only access records from businesses registered as a “common carrier, public

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83. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
84. Ibid., p. 6.
85. Ibid., p. 3.
86. Ibid., pp. 3 & 10.
88. There was initially a provision limiting this collection to Afghanistan; but this was dropped in January 2002, when the Taliban was perceived as having been expelled from power.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid., p. 13.
accommodation facility, physical storage facility or vehicle rental facility”. According to Kenneth L. Wainstein, former Homeland Security Advisor to President Bush:

Section 215 authorized the FISA Court to issue orders for the production of the same kind of records and other tangible things that [domestic] law enforcement officers and prosecutors have historically been authorized to acquire through grand jury subpoenas […] Before, it was easier for prosecutors to secure records in a simple assault prosecution than for national security investigators to obtain records that may help prevent the next 9/11.97

In 2003, the OLC began a reassessment of the legal foundations for the PSP. In March 2004, it found that the internet metadata component was prohibited.98 In July 2004, the FISA Court approved the collection of internet metadata if it travelled through particular communication channels likely to contain messages related to a counterterrorism purpose (the collection was terminated in 2011, with the NSA deciding that it was only of limited value).99 Gradually, what were previously programmes only operating under the authority of the President were brought into the remit of the FISA Court.100

WHY IS TELEPHONY METADATA COLLECTED UNDER SECTION 215 POTENTIALLY USEFUL?

The state’s collection of metadata – for example, a telephone number – is a vital component in the fight against terrorism. According to one former intelligence official, “[i]n every major terrorist operation or capture operation, metadata has played a huge role.”101

Regarding the use of Section 215 specifically, to collect metadata, this is essentially about government agencies being able to “connect the dots” for potential terrorist plots with both a foreign and domestic component.102 General Keith Alexander has said that “[t]he metadata queries are all about the foreign intelligence nexus. So we’re trying to find out if there are terrorists amongst us, and if so, we give that data to the FBI.”103 The US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence explained that Section 215 helped “connect the dots between foreign terrorists and domestic operatives […] This program is specifically focused on detecting terrorist plots that cross the seam between foreign terrorist organizations and the US homeland.”104


97. Ibid., p. 3.

98. ‘Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (2014), p. 38. This led to a huge amount of infighting within the Bush administration, and almost to the resignation of the head of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC); the Director of the FBI; and the Deputy Attorney General. All were prepared to quit, in response to the White House threatening that the President would re-authorise the programme despite the new OLC assessment that the e-mail-metadata part of the programme was legally unsupportable (see: Baker, P., Days of Fire: Bush and Cheney in the White House (Anchor, 2014), pp. 315-319).


100. ‘(U) Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program’, Offices of Inspectors General of the Department of Defense; Department of Justice; Central Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2009), p. 30.


103. Ibid.

The speed with which this can be done under Section 215 is also of relevance, being explained by President Obama in the following way:

[Section 215] was designed to map the communications of terrorists so we can see who they may be in contact with as quickly as possible […] if a bomb goes off in one of our cities and law enforcement is racing to determine whether a network is poised to conduct additional attacks, time is of the essence.\(^{105}\)

\section*{WHY DOES COLLECTION NEED TO TAKE PLACE IN BULK?}

Metadata collection is only effective if done in bulk. The US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence described it thus:

[Y]ou are looking for a needle, in this case a number, in a haystack […] You want to make a focused query against a body of data that returns only those numbers that are connected to the one you have reasonable suspicion is connected to a terrorist group. But unless you have […] all the records of who called whom – you cannot answer the question. The confidence you will have in any answers returned by your query is necessarily tied to whether the haystack constitutes a reasonably complete set of records and whether those records look back a reasonable amount of time […] Hence “all” the records are necessary […] even if only an extremely small fraction of them is ever determined to be the match you’re looking for.\(^{106}\)

As Judge William Pauley commented in a US District Court, when considering the metadata programme, “[t]his blunt tool only works because it collects everything.”\(^{107}\)

\section*{WHEN CAN THE METADATA BE QUERIED?}

The NSA can query metadata when there is a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that the number that they wish to query is associated with a foreign terrorist group.\(^{108}\) This query can only be sanctioned by 2 out of 20 line personnel, and then one of two supervisors authorised to do so.\(^{109}\)

If the NSA discovers terrorism-related communications, it then issues an intelligence report to the FBI or other federal agencies.\(^{110}\)

\section*{HOW SECTION 215 CAN WORK IN PRACTICE}

An NSA analyst has a ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ that telephone number ‘X’ is associated with a foreign terrorist group and wishes to query the number. This is approved by NSA line personnel and a supervisor.

\textbf{The ‘first hop’}

The NSA analyst can now access a breakdown of all the numbers (‘list A’) that have either called or been called by telephone number ‘X’ in the past five years. They then attempt to determine

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{105} ‘Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence’, The White House – Office of the Press Secretary, 17 January 2014.
\end{thebibliography}
whether any of these newly acquired numbers are associated with a foreign terrorist group.

The ‘second hop’

The NSA analyst can query their database, in order to obtain every phone number (‘list B’) that has called or been called by those in ‘list A’.

The ‘third hop’

Previously, on rare occasions, the NSA analyst could query the database in order to obtain every phone number (‘list C’) that has called or been called by those in ‘list B’.111

The level of intrusiveness that exists with the ‘third hop’ has been criticised.112 In 2014 President Obama barred all such searches.113

HOW OFTEN HAS THIS POWER BEEN USED?

In 2012, the NSA queried 288 ‘selectors’ – meaning a telephone number; e-mail address; or some form of electronic identifier, but not necessarily an individual user – from its metadata collection, leading them to look at a total of approximately 6,000 telephone numbers.114 In 2013, the NSA queried 423 ‘selectors’.115

WHO PROVIDES OVERSIGHT?

The powers contained in Section 215 have been approved by all branches of the US government. According to General Alexander, Section 215 “probably has the most oversight of any program that [the] NSA utilises.”116

The Judiciary

The government files a report with the FISA Court, every 30 days, outlining how the programme is being used (for example, providing the number of metadata queries submitted and how often such queries had led to information about US suspects being shared with other departments). The FISA Court must review and re-authorise this programme every 90 days.117

The Executive

The basis for the each of the metadata queries is audited by the DoJ. The DoJ is required to meet with the NSA Office of the Inspector General every 90 days (minimum), to ensure that the NSA is complying with the courts. Compliance is also assessed, in the same period, during a meeting between representatives from the DoJ; ODNI; and NSA.118

112. For example, an article in The New Yorker commented that the NSA “can look closely at the communications of anyone who has been in touch with a person who’s been in touch with a person whose [sic] been in touch with another person the agency thinks is a suspicious foreigner. That’s called not targeting the person you’re spring on” (Davidson, A., ‘Are the N.S.A. and G.C.H.Q Trading Webcam Pictures?’ The New Yorker, 28 February 2014, available at: http://www.newyorker.com/arts/amy-davidson/are-the-n-s-a-and-g-c-h-q-trading-webcam-pictures).
118. Ibid.
**The Legislature**

Congress must be informed, by the Attorney General, on how Section 215 has been implemented, every six months.119

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**THE 9/11 METADATA DEBATE**

According to President Obama, the collection of telephone records in bulk began to occur “out of a desire to address a gap identified after 9/11.”120 One of the hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar, had made a call to an al-Qaeda safe house in Yemen, before the attack, which had been seen by the NSA. However, the NSA did not have the authority to check whether al-Mihdhar was actually making the call from within the US itself.121 (It was not permitted to check records on calls made from the US to an international number.) Yet, under the Section 215 programme, the NSA would have been able to use al-Mihdhar’s phone number to map out his other connections, potentially leading them to the other 9/11 hijackers.122

However, it has been argued that it was not a dearth of intelligence that led to the attacks on 9/11, but a lack of intelligence sharing between government departments such as the CIA; NSA; and FBI, and an inability to effectively use the authority available to them.123 For example, from 2000, the CIA was aware that al-Mihdhar was a part of al-Qaeda and had a multi-entry visa to the US; yet, it did not disclose this to the FBI until shortly before 9/11. It also knew that Nawaf al-Hazmi, a known al-Mihdhar associate and a future 9/11 hijacker, was in the US.124

Marshall Erwin of the *Hoover Institution* notes that the *9/11 Commission Report* lists “ten operational opportunities related to al-Mihdhar and […] Nawaf al-Hazmi, that could have allowed intelligence and law enforcement officials to disrupt the attack. Problems associated with NSA’s collection of al-Mihdhar’s communications did not make the list.”125

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**CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES SURROUNDING METADATA COLLECTION**

In December 2013, two federal judges reached two different conclusions on the constitutionality of Section 215, within days of each other.

Judge Richard Leon ruled that it violated the Fourth Amendment, with citizens’ privacy being “violated when the Government, without any basis whatsoever to suspect them of any wrongdoing, collects and stores for five years their telephony metadata for purposes of subjecting it to high-

120. ‘Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence’, *The White House – Office of the Press Secretary*, 17 January 2014.
121. Ibid.
125. Ibid., p. 6.
The programme was deemed “likely” unconstitutional.\footnote{126} Furthermore, Leon pointed out that the government could “not cite a single instance in which analysis of the NSA’s bulk metadata collection actually stopped an imminent attack, or otherwise aided the government in achieving any objective that was time-sensitive in nature.”\footnote{121} The PCLOB also raised concerns on the constitutional soundness of this metadata gathering.\footnote{129}

However, Judge William Pauley disagreed, concluding that the programme did not violate the Fourth Amendment and was lawful. Pauley commented that “[t]he right to be free from searches and seizures is fundamental, but not absolute […] Whether the Fourth Amendment protects bulk telephony metadata is ultimately a question of reasonableness.”\footnote{130} A Supreme Court precedent (Smith v. Maryland, 1979) ruled that citizens cannot have a “legitimate expectation of privacy” when making phone calls,\footnote{131} as it is known that service providers store customer information for legitimate business purposes – meaning that expectations of privacy are voluntarily being surrendered. Pauley declared that the bulk collection of metadata was “relevant to an authorized investigation” as outlined in Section 215 and that, “without all the data points, the government cannot be certain it connected the pertinent ones […] Armed with all the metadata, NSA can draw connections it might otherwise never be able to find.”\footnote{132}

Justice Scalia, who sits on the US Supreme Court, has stated that if the action meets the standards of reasonableness when balanced against the risk, then the intrusion is not in violation of the Constitution:

There are very few freedoms that are absolute […] your person is protected by the Fourth Amendment; but, […] when you board a plane, somebody can pass his hands all over your body – that’s a terrible intrusion – but, given the danger that it’s guarding against, it’s not an unreasonable intrusion. And it can be the same thing with acquiring this data….\footnote{133}

Therefore, it could be argued that the government’s decision on what is relevant is based on their perception of what is reasonably required to protect national security.

Yet, in May 2015, a federal appeals court ruled that the government’s telephony meta-data collection was illegal. Bulk collection of this data was ruled not to be a valid interpretation of the collection of business records relevant to a counterterrorism investigation, which is permitted under Section 215. Clearly, there is no consensus and lots of issues surrounding this program remain contentious.\footnote{134}
DOES SECTION 215 STOP TERRORISM?

As the information that Snowden revealed began to hit the press, the US tried to highlight the role that Sections 215 and 702 played in counterterrorism activities. President Obama stated that “[w]e know of at least 50 threats that have been averted because of this information […] lives have been saved.”

One example that has been provided concerns an al-Shabaab network in San Diego, California. In October 2007, the NSA provided the FBI with information gained from metadata which proved a connection between a foreign operative linked to al-Shabaab (al-Qaeda’s Somali franchise) and an unknown number based in San Diego. The FBI subsequently began an investigation, which led to the February 2013 convictions of Basaaly Moalin; Issa Doreh; Mohamed Mohamed Mohamud; and Ahmed Nasiri Taalil Mohamud, for conspiring to provide material support to al-Shabaab.

However, a former Deputy Director of the NSA, Chris Inglis, has referred to Section 215 as “an insurance policy” and “not a silver bullet in and of itself”. A Presidential task force assigned to investigate potential reform to government surveillance programmes stated that, with regard to Section 215, “telephony meta-data was not essential to preventing attacks”. The PCLOB was also sceptical of its worth, concluding that the telephone programme had not provided any warning about attacks that were being planned against the US (such as the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula ‘underwear bomb’ plot of Christmas Day 2009, or the attempted Times Square car-bombing of 1 May 2010). It went on to report “little reason to expect that [Section 215] is likely to provide significant value, much less essential value, in safeguarding the nation in the future.” Michael Morell, the former deputy director of the CIA, has also stated that Section 702 is a “much more important program” than the telephony metadata collection.

However, the lack of evidence of telephony metadata collection under Section 215 specifically stopping attacks is not necessarily as significant as it sounds. Professor Matthew Waxman, co-chair of the Roger Hertog Program on Law and National Security at Columbia Law School, has suggested that:

  a low number might reflect a program’s value, too, in helping to disrupt or interdict terrorist groups’ […] activities in their early stages. […] Given that the intelligence community is supposed to be bringing together multiple tools and information streams in support of each other […] it would be remarkable if the government could point to many plots that were foiled singlehandedly by the NSA, let alone a particular NSA program.

Therefore, Section 215 is best understood as a safety measure designed to be part of the intelligence mosaic concerning terrorist activity with a foreign and domestic component. Considering the


138. ‘Transcript: NSA Deputy Director John Inglis’, NPR, 10 January 2014.


controversy that Section 215 has caused, some may consider this unsatisfactory. Yet, governments around the world use this type of data for a range of security and serious-crime issues; the US should be no different just because it has an especially advanced capacity to capture these communications.

**SECTIONS 215 & 702 WORKING TOGETHER: A CASE STUDY**

Under Section 702 authority, the NSA intercepted e-mails on 6 and 7 September 2009. The messages were from an al-Qaeda terrorist in Pakistan to a then-unknown individual in the US, discussing (in code) a recipe for explosives and where to obtain them. This lead was passed to the FBI, which identified the US-based individual as a Colorado resident called Najibullah Zazi. Zazi was planning an imminent, major, terrorist operation to bomb the New York City Subway.

On 9 September, the NSA ran Zazi’s number against telephony metadata, issuing a Business Records FISA Metadata report on his foreign and domestic contacts, which was passed to the FBI. This unearthed a previously unknown telephone number for Adis Medunjanin, a US-based extremist known to the FBI, who was also connected to the bombing scheme. Zazi and Medunjanin were eventually convicted of a variety of terrorism charges relating to the plot and their support of al-Qaeda.

Marshall Erwin, though, has called into question the role that the NSA played in disrupting this conspiracy beyond the initial interception under Section 702. For example, it is thought that the FBI had Zazi under surveillance from 7 September and had been following him, as he travelled across the country, for the two days preceding his phone records being queried. Erwin also argues that travel records and an informant had already linked Zazi to Medunjanin prior to the NSA metadata report.

This led Erwin to speculate that “[a]t the point when NSA utilized its bulk phone records collection program, the FBI was well on its way to disrupting Zazi’s plot, appears to have had sufficient information to do so, and had already linked Zazi to Medunjanin.”

**WHAT IS EXECUTIVE ORDER (EO) 12333?**

Executive Order (EO) 12333 is the Executive Branch’s primary authority for foreign-intelligence gathering that (a) takes place outside the US and (b) is not governed by FISA. It was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan, in December 1981, and updated by President Bush, in 2008. A former legal counsel for the CIA and the Senate’s Intelligence Committee has described it as an intelligence agent’s “Bible”; the NSA has described it as a “foundational authority”.

EO 12333 outlines the goals, direction, duties, responsibilities, and conduct of the US's

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143. ‘54 Attacks in 20 Countries Thwarted By NSA Collection’, U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
146. Ibid.
147. ‘54 Attacks in 20 Countries Thwarted By NSA Collection’, U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
17 intelligence agencies. According to the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, it “specifies the missions and authorities of each element of the Intelligence Community; sets forth the principles designed to strike an appropriate balance between the acquisition of information and the protection of personal privacy; and governs the collection, retention, and dissemination of information about United States Persons”.

EO 12333 also outlines what activities the intelligence community is not allowed to engage in domestically – for example, preventing the CIA from carrying out electronic surveillance, or preventing agencies other than the FBI from conducting physical searches.

**WHY COLLECTION COULD TAKE PLACE UNDER EO 12333**

FISA does not apply if communications targeted by Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) are being routed through servers or satellites without a US end. Therefore, as long as it is for a “valid foreign intelligence purpose”, collection in these circumstances would take place under EO 12333.

**WHY IS IT CONTROVERSIAL?**

**It has a US collection component**

EO 12333 targets foreign networks. However, the data that is being swept up from these networks, as part of the NSA’s bulk collection, may contain fragments and packets of information containing communications from US citizens. EO 12333 allows for the retention of these US citizens’ communications, including content, as part of a foreign-intelligence investigation.

Communications from US citizens can be kept for up to five years, unless the NSA Director determines that a national-security imperative means that they must be kept longer (a potentially broad loophole). If an American citizen is deemed, by the Attorney General, to be an agent of a foreign power, or if they are part of a foreign-intelligence investigation, these stored communications can then be searched. However, individuals cannot be targeted without a court order, and inspecting content would still require a warrant.

**As the collection does not take place under FISA, there is a different level of oversight**

As EO 12333 collection occurs outside the US, the oversight that is applicable to Section 702 does not exist. For example, there is no FISA Court oversight; instead, EO 12333 has Attorney

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154. Ibid., p. 70.

155. Ibid., p. 268.


161. Ibid. (both sources).
General-approved procedures in place, regarding how the information is collected; retained; or disseminated. Further oversight is provided by a variety of inspectors general; oversight boards; general counsels; compliance officers; and privacy officers, at the various departments to which EO 12333 relates.\textsuperscript{162}

United Kingdom

The first piece of media coverage concerning GCHQ’s activities followed two days after the initial Guardian story revealing the NSA’s collection of telephone records. This story focused on the access that GCHQ had to PRISM.  

Other allegations followed:

- that GCHQ was able to attach intercept probes to the fibre-optic cables which carry internet and phone traffic, in order to set up internet buffers (this would enable it to store and analyse data (Operation Tempora)), including e-mail content; phone calls; and internet-user history, which was shared with the NSA; and
- that GCHQ was intercepting and storing webcam images (Operation Optic Nerve).

Such stories led to calls for greater transparency and potential reform of the intelligence services – including from then-Deputy Prime Minister and Shadow Home Secretary.

GCHQ: ORIGINS

The UK’s first SIGINT efforts date back over 100 years, to the First World War and the interception and subsequent analysis of encrypted German communications. The best known SIGINT success story from this conflict occurred in January 1917, when the UK intercepted a telegram from the German Foreign Minister, Count Zimmermann. In this telegram to Mexico, Zimmermann stated that Germany was about to begin attacks against submarines trading with Britain, including those belonging to the then-neutral US. As this would potentially draw the US into the war, on Britain’s side, Zimmermann offered Mexico its former territory in Texas; Arizona; and New Mexico, if it agreed to join the German war effort. The British interception and release of this telegram proved influential in the US’ eventual decision to join the fighting.

Following the war, the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) was created. GC&CS moved to Bletchley Park in 1939, where the cracking of the Enigma machine’s code allowed it to decipher German military strategy, playing a key part in the Allied powers’ victory.


REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT (RIPA) 2000 AND ITS INTERPRETATION

The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 is a core piece of legislation, due to the powers which it contains and the oversight that it offers. According to the Home Office, RIPA “provides the statutory framework which governs the interception of communications.”

Part I of RIPA is split into two chapters. Part I, Chapter 1 relates to the interception of communications content and the obtaining of related communications data. It replaced the Interception of Communications Act 1985, and was intended to regulate the government’s use of covert surveillance techniques (in order to ensure the proportionality and necessity of their application). This came into force in 2000.

Part I, Chapter 2 concerns the state’s ability to acquire and disclose communications data – though it does not regulate what must be retained. It was designed to replace voluntary communications data disclosure arrangements under the Data Protection Act and came into force in 2004.

Charles Farr, the Director General of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, has stated that “[i]nterception under RIPA provides tactical information […] and real time intelligence on the plans and actions of individual terrorists, criminals and other targets […] and facilitates their arrest by law enforcement agencies.” According to Farr, intelligence gathered in this way has “led directly to the prevention of terrorist attacks and serious crime, the success of operations aimed at countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the saving of lives.”

WHAT IS COMMUNICATIONS DATA?

Communications data is about the context of a communication – the “who, when, where, how” (i.e. context). However, it is not about the ‘what’ (i.e. content).

There are three specific types of communications data that are of particular importance to the government.

Subscriber Data

‘Subscriber data’ relates to information held by a CSP about the services which it provides to
its customers when that relevant data is held by the company. It enables the state to carry out reverse look-ups, such as finding out who is the owner of a particular phone number; the account holder of a certain e-mail address; or, potentially, those who can post on a certain website. Other information that could be gained includes billing information or the make, model, and serial number of a device used on the account. This data is held by the provider, not the government.

Service Use Data

‘Service-use data’ relates to postal and telephony communications, and includes telephone call records; connections to internet services; the duration of calls; and/or connections and information relating to data downloads and uploads. However, this is an area in which intelligence agencies are finding it hard to access: if telephone companies provide their customers with unlimited-call packages, for example, they may not need to generate service-use data for billing purposes. Such companies are not obliged to create communications data that they would not need to use themselves; hence, why the government’s access to such data has diminished.

Traffic Data

To the extent to which it is retained or even generated, ‘traffic data’ enables the state to find out, for example, information relating to the origin or destination of a transmitted communication; the location of a mobile phone when a communication was made or received; the address on a letter that has been sent; and internet-browsing history (up to the first ‘slash’ - for more details, see pages 40-41).

IS COMMUNICATIONS DATA DIFFERENT FROM METADATA?

In a speech delivered by then-Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, the terms ‘communications data’ and ‘metadata’ were used interchangeably. Yet, there is a specific legal definition used in the UK, regarding ‘communications data’ – as opposed to a broader US interpretation of ‘metadata’, which can include data gathered by tools that undertake data mining from the internet and social media. This type of metadata mining is not just carried out by the state, but also by the private sector (which sells on the data, for marketing purposes).

An Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) report clarified that metadata “has no legal definition in RIPA and therefore no bearing on the UK system of interception. For example, in the UK a record of a website visited […] is treated as [communications data], whereas the full web address […] is treated as content. Both of these, however, might be referred to as ‘metadata’.”

WHY IS ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS DATA IMPORTANT?

Communications data is, according to a Parliamentary Joint Committee, “an invaluable weapon” in safeguarding national security and protecting the UK from crime. Home Secretary Theresa May has stated that it “has played a significant role in every Security Service counter-terrorism operation over the last decade”, and that “it has been used as evidence in 95 per cent of all serious organised crime cases handled by the Crown Prosecution Service” (being particularly useful in

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reconstructing organised-crime networks, for example).\(^{181}\)

Indeed, the usefulness of communications data extends beyond even this. Communications data is also relevant in identifying and locating suicide risks; identifying rapists, kidnappers, or threatening callers; and in murder investigations.\(^{182}\) For example, it was used to implicate Ian Huntley and Maxine Carr during the investigation into the killings of the schoolgirls Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman; the communications data from girls’ mobile phones demonstrated that they were in close geographical proximity to Huntley, and that his alibi was likely false.\(^{183}\)

It is also vital in preventing child abuse and exploitation (including the prosecution of its perpetrators). According to Keith Bristow, Director General of the National Crime Agency, “[c]ommunications data is still overwhelmingly the most powerful tool available to those investigating child sexual exploitation and identifying and safeguarding its victims and potential victims.”\(^{184}\)

Sir Anthony May, the Interception of Communications Commissioner, summarised communication data’s use in the following way:

[Communications data] revealed suspects movements and tied them to crime scenes. It often led to other key evidence being identified or retrieved. Links to previously unidentified offenders and offences were revealed. Dangerous offenders were located and offences were disrupted with the assistance of communications data. Patterns of communication provided evidence of conspiracy between suspects. The data highlighted inconsistencies in accounts given by suspects and corroborated the testimony of victims. The data determined the last known whereabouts of victims and persons they had been in contact with. Similarly, communications data assisted to eliminate key suspects or highlighted inconsistencies in accounts given by victims.\(^{185}\)

**WHY DOES COMMUNICATIONS DATA COLLECTION UNDER PART I, CHAPTER 1 OF RIPA NEED TO TAKE PLACE IN BULK?**

British security officials have provided a similar explanation to their American counterparts regarding the need for communications data collection to take place in bulk. Sir Iain Lobban, when speaking, in November 2013, as head of GCHQ, explained it – and the constraints that GCHQ face – in the following terms:

If you think of the internet as an enormous hay field, what we are trying to do is to collect hay from those parts of the field that we can get access to and which might be lucrative in terms of containing the needles or the fragments of the needles that we might be interested in, that might help our mission.

When we gather that haystack, and remember it is not a haystack from the whole field, it is a haystack from a tiny proportion of that field, we are very, very well aware that within that haystack there is going to be plenty of hay which is innocent communications from

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innocent people […] And so we design our queries against that data, to draw out the needles and we do not intrude upon […] the surrounding hay.\textsuperscript{186}

Another intelligence source stated that “we have a process that allows us to select a small number of needles in a haystack. We are not looking at every piece of straw. There are certain triggers that allow you to discard or not examine a lot of data so you are just looking at needles.”\textsuperscript{187}

\textbf{COMMUNICATIONS DATA v. CONTENT}

The access of communications data or content data by a public body needs to be shown to be both necessary and proportionate. Traditionally, it has been thought to be less intrusive to look at the former as opposed to the latter. However, the information that can be gained via communications data has become more comprehensive and, therefore, more potentially intrusive. If the data has been generated and can then be acquired, then reasonably detailed personal information can be gathered; it could be possible to piece together a comprehensive picture of people’s lives, from a variety of sources revealing and monitoring their movements; habits; social networks; and interests. As former Information Commissioner Richard Thomas has noted, communication records “can be highly intrusive even if no content is collected.”\textsuperscript{188} This has led to accusations that what is revealed by communications data is now, in many ways, equal to that of content.\textsuperscript{189}

Differing levels of authorisation for various types of communications data (depending on the level of intrusiveness) means that this might be an area that the state examines for potential reform in the future. The ISC has suggested the creation of a ‘Communications Data Plus’ category for communications data that “has the potential to reveal a great deal about a person’s private life – his or her habits, tastes and preferences – and [about which] there are therefore legitimate concerns as to how that material is protected.”\textsuperscript{190}

When it comes to internet searches, the UK currently defines communications data as everything up to the ‘first slash’ (e.g. \texttt{http://www.google.co.uk/}); anything past the ‘first slash’ – e.g. typing in ‘chemical weapons’ on Google \texttt{[http://www.google.co.uk/#q=chemical+weapons]} – then becomes content data.\textsuperscript{191} Accessing this content would only be possible with a Secretary of State-signed warrant. Therefore, theoretically, only websites visited would classify as communications data, not what was searched for within (e.g. that someone had shopped at Amazon, but not what type of books they had searched for, or that someone had shopped online at Tesco, but not what they had bought there).

However, a December 2014 submission to the Investigatory Powers Review from the Interception of Communications Commissioner’s office highlighted potential ambiguity over this:

\begin{quote}
https://accounts.google.com/ServiceLogin?service=mail&continue=https://mail.google.com/mail/ (which is the log-in webpage to activate access to webmail) goes well beyond the ‘first slash’ and may, at first appearance, be considered to be content of a communications. However, section 21(6)(b) explains that traffic data […] may include data identifying or selecting or purporting to identify or select, apparatus through which, or by means of which, the communications is or may be transmitted. This then begs the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{186} ‘Uncorrected transcript of Evidence Given by Sir Iain Lobban, Director, Government Communication Headquarters; Mr Andrew Parker, Director General, Security Service; Sir John Sawers, Chief, Secret Intelligence Service’, Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2013), p. 13.

\textsuperscript{187} ‘GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world’s communications’, \textit{The Guardian}, 21 June 2013.


\textsuperscript{189} These arguments are outlined in: ‘Privacy and Security’, Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2015), pp. 50-51.


\textsuperscript{191} Private conversation.

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question whether the log-in webpage (no matter how many ‘slashes’ there are within the web addresses) is communications data or the content of a communication. 192

Therefore, while the Codes of Practice (CoP) state that communications data should only be up to the first slash, there is ambiguity over this in RIPA itself. This ambiguity may allow the police or security services to go beyond the first slash in certain circumstances (such as a log-in webpage).

RIPA PART I, CHAPTER 1

OPERATION TEMPOРА AND SECTION 8(4) OF RIPA

Under Section 8(4) of RIPA, the UK intercepts communications by tapping fibre-optic cables carrying both external (i.e. sent or received outside the UK) and internal (i.e. sent and received inside the UK) communications, though the collection of the latter is incidental. Using internet buffers, this data can allegedly be stored and analysed (for three days, with content, and 30 days, for communications data). 193

This is known as the alleged ‘Tempora’ interception operation. Its primary purpose is as an intelligence-gathering tool, and, according to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), Section 8(4) powers have played a “pre-eminent role” in identifying “threats to UK national security from abroad”. 194

Despite this, Section 8(4) warrants have proved controversial. This is not only because of the volume of communications being swept up, but also because communications are being intercepted using general warrants from the relevant Secretary of State (and therefore do not require specific named subjects to be on them). This is in contrast to interception warrants issued under Section 8(1) of RIPA – which, while also approved by the relevant Secretary of State, must specify the name or describe the individual who is the subject of interception, or the premises to which the interception relates. 195

Instead, the 8(4) warrant must be for a specific purpose: in the interests of national security; for the purposes of preventing or detecting serious crime; or for the purposes of safeguarding the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom. 196 As Charles Farr has explained, there is a reason for the difference:

Within the British Islands, the government has sufficient control and considerable resources to investigate individuals and organisations, and it is feasible to adopt an interception regime that requires either a particular person, or a set of premises, to be identified before interception can take place. Outside the British Islands, the government does not have the same ability […] 197

This is vital in attempting to discover overseas terrorist-attack planning, for example. The government is often unaware of the precise geographic location of foreign terrorists or cyber criminals, and is therefore unlikely to have “the same practical ability to identify the apparatus over which these communications [are being] carried; nor the same practical power to obtain


messages from that apparatus”. This has been expanded upon in a recent ISC report, which commented that:

Within the UK, the Agencies and police have far greater capacity, capability and coverage, and they are therefore more likely to be able to discover threats in the first place. (For example, MI5 may be provided with leads by the public or law enforcement.) However, outside the UK, the Agencies simply do not have the same resources and coverage available to discover the identity and location of individuals and organisations who pose a threat to the UK.

While Section 8(4) targets the interception of external communications, it actually scoops up internal ones as well. For the government to be able to obtain what Farr refers to as “at least a fraction of the type of communication in which it is interested”, it must intercept the communications in bulk and then select “a small fraction […] for examination”. As a result, internal communications are inevitably also swept up. According to Sir Anthony May, there are “no other reasonable means” for the state to separate, or filter out, what are internal rather than external communications when initially scooping this data up; even internal communications may be transmitted via internet-service providers in foreign nations. To access any of the content of what has been collected, though, GCHQ would still need a warrant.

There have been accusations that the government, by utilising Section 8(4), may be acting “unlawfully or to the outer limits of legality”. However, Sir Anthony May concluded that the collection; storage; and access of communications data under Section 8(4) is legal, and that this process did not have “any significant risk of undue invasion of privacy.” This is an important conclusion for the Interception of Communications Commissioner to come to because, as one senior intelligence official has said, “Section 8(4) of RIPA underpins GCHQ’s work”, and those trying to change this risk “undermining everything.”

**WHEN CAN COMMUNICATIONS BE EXAMINED UNDER SECTION 8(4)?**

Communications of somebody in the British Islands and collected under Section 8(4) can be looked at; listened to; or read, in limited circumstances, under provisions in Sections 16 of RIPA. Section 16(3) allows for their examination if they are “referable to an individual who is known to be […] in the British Islands” (essentially making it the same as a Section 8(1) warrant) and the Secretary of State has certified that the examination is being carried out for a national-security or serious-crime purpose. ‘Referable to an individual’, in this context, could mean a ‘+44’ phone number or a UK postal address. The communications can be examined over a six-month period.

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198. Ibid., p. 44.
205. Ibid., p. 52.
206. Private conversation.
for national-security investigations, and for three months for serious-crime and economic-wellbeing investigations.\textsuperscript{208}

Sections 16(4) and (5) allow for their examination if the individual was believed, “on reasonable grounds,” to be abroad at time of interception, or if there has been “a relevant change of circumstances”\textsuperscript{209} (such as, it has just been discovered that the individual has actually just entered the British Islands).\textsuperscript{209} If it is for a national-security purpose, these communications can be examined for a period of five working days after this discovery; for a serious-crime or economic-wellbeing purpose, one working day.\textsuperscript{210} This then allows coverage to continue — for a short time — over targets who are, for example, visiting the UK. Essentially, the Section 16 provisions primarily relate to external communications with one end in the UK.

These exceptions that exist under Section 16 have also been deemed controversial, with privacy and civil-liberty groups raising concerns over the ambiguity of what ‘referable to an individual’ actually means. For example:

What constitutes “a factor referable to an individual”? A person’s name, address or date of birth may obviously do so. But would such material […] be suitable for inspection if the ‘factor’ was slightly broader than by reference to an individual: e.g. people who were interested in a particular book? Or mentioned a specific mosque; or ate at a restaurant?\textsuperscript{211}

The ambiguities over this are reflected in the comments of Tom Watson, the Labour Party MP, who has described Section 16 as “probably the single most confusing and complex drafting ever put on the statute book”.\textsuperscript{211} The Interception of Communications Commissioner has also conceded that “[p]arts of section 16 are in convoluted language and style.”\textsuperscript{213}

### WHY IS THERE CONFUSION OVER EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS?

It was previously the case that the infrastructure used for foreign communications was distinct from that used for domestic. Yet, technological advances have led to this distinction becoming more contentious; CSPs have ‘mirror’ servers holding customer information across the world. Communications – e-mails from a certain account, say – can travel to either a UK server or any of these mirror servers abroad. Data streams have become entangled, with e-mails potentially passing through mirror servers in the US; Europe; or Asia – even if they are being sent to the computer next door.\textsuperscript{214}

In the UK, an external communication is currently interpreted as one that has a foreign end. E-mails, including personal e-mail messages sent via social-media platforms such as Facebook, are defined as internal communications as long as the sender and recipient are based in the UK. This


is the case even if the servers used by webmail services (such as Hotmail) are based abroad.215

Yet, Google and YouTube searches; Twitter ‘tweets’; and Facebook ‘posts’ are all defined as ‘external communications’. The government’s argument is that Google’s data centres and Twitter’s, YouTube’s; and Facebook’s web servers are based outside the UK (usually in the US), and, as there is not a known recipient of the search or the post, it cannot be shown to be an internal communication.216 Similarly, accessing a website which has its web server located abroad, or uploading files to a cloud storage system overseas (for example, Dropbox) would also be treated as external communications.217

If the collection of such communications takes place under the general warrant used with Section 8(4), those based in the British Islands can only have their communications searched under the limited circumstances referred to in Section 16(3), (4), and (5).

This has proven controversial among privacy campaigners. For example, Eric King, deputy director of Privacy International, has said that the “distinction drawn by the government between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ communications no longer has any practical meaning. The safeguards provided by RIPA pertaining to the interception of ‘internal’ communications do not in fact result in any meaningful protections [...] when applied to the modern communications system.”218

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216. Ibid., pp. 40-41.


RIPA PART I, CHAPTER 2

WHO IS AUTHORISED TO ACQUIRE COMMUNICATIONS DATA, AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE?

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<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Statutory Purpose</th>
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Public Authority Group

- [21] RIPA PART I, CHAPTER 2

- [22] WHO IS AUTHORISED TO ACQUIRE COMMUNICATIONS DATA, AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE?

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219. Taken from: May, A., ‘Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner: March 2015 (covering the period January to December 2014)’, Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office (2015), pp. 89-90. (As one intelligence official has stated, “The concern here is not about the number of authorities that have access to communications data, but that the ones who do only have access to the data that they strictly need.”)
HOW IS IT ACCESSED?

In order for any public authority to acquire communications data, the following must occur:

- The applicant from the government body has to complete an application.
- A Designated Person (DP) within that same body has to assess whether the request for data is lawful, proportionate, and necessary. Following the revised Code of Practice which came into force in March 2015, DPs must be independent from the investigation or operation that the application is pertaining to.  
- The Single Point of Contact (SPoC), a trained and accredited individual who acts as a facilitator between CSPs and the authority making the request, must advise the DP and the applicant whether the request is appropriate and its granting lawful.
- A Senior Responsible Officer within the requesting authority must ensure compliance with Part I, Chapter 2 of RIPA and its Code of Practice, as well as the overall integrity of the procedure.

OVERSIGHT

Secretaries of State

One of the methods to intercept communications in the course of transmission is to apply for an interception warrant. This would allow access to the content of an email, for example. An application for an interception warrant must be governed by RIPA and be made by, or on behalf of one of the following:

- the Director General of the Security Service (MI5);
- the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6);
- the Director of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ);
- the Director General of the National Crime Agency;
- the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police;
- the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI);
- the Police Service of Scotland;
- the Commissioners of HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC); and
- the Chief of Defence Intelligence, Ministry of Defence.

The interception warrants have to be issued by a Secretary of State (usually the Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary, Defence Secretary, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, or the Cabinet Secretary for Justice for Scotland).


221. Ibid., p. 20.


223. Ibid.
Sir Anthony May has concluded that “the Secretaries of State and the agencies that undertake interception operations under RIPA 2000 Chapter I Part I do so lawfully, conscientiously, effectively and in the national interest”, and that they were “entirely conscientious in undertaking their RIPA 2000 Part I Chapter I duties. They do not rubber stamp applications. On the contrary, they sometimes reject applications or require more information.”222 As a 2015 ISC report stated, a “warrant application would not reach the Home Secretary’s desk unless it was considered necessary, proportionate and legal”,226 and Sir Malcolm Rifkind has confirmed that:

These applications are no mere formality. The Agencies must make a detailed case, normally running to several pages. Warrants are subject to retrospective examination by Commissioners, who are, or have been, very senior judges, to check that applications are lawful and that the subsequent use of any warrant was consistent with those applications.227

### Intelligence and Security Committee

The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) was created by the Intelligence Services Act 1994. It is the all-party, parliamentary oversight body relating to GCHQ; MI5; and MI6,228 and the principal way in which the agencies can be scrutinised by Parliament.

Initially, the ISC existed largely to examine expenditure and other administrative functions of the Agencies over which it had jurisdiction. While it did have access to sensitive material, it only had what a former Chair of the ISC has described as “seriously restricted” powers to act as an effective oversight body.229

However, the Justice and Security Act 2013 enhanced the scope of the ISC’s investigatory powers – giving it more access to operational activity and correspondence, as opposed to just policy and performance.230 For example:

- the Chair of the ISC is now appointed by the Committee, rather than by the Prime Minister;
- if the ISC requests information from the intelligence services, these services now have a legal requirement to supply it. The ISC staff can even go into the office of intelligence agencies and, with agency staff, pick the files that they wish to see;231 before, the ISC could only ‘request’ such information. Only a Secretary of State can now choose to withhold the information, as opposed to a head of one of the intelligence services;232
- there has been a doubling in budget and a rise in staffing; and

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227. Rifkind, M., ‘Intelligence Agencies in the Internet Age - Public Servants or Public Threat?’, Wadham Lecture – Wadham College, Oxford, 8 May 2014, available at: https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-sites.googleusercontent.com/s/independent.gov.uk/sec/files/20140508_ISC_Wadham_lecture.pdf?attachhash=ANOY7cpeqJLzNj3xLv4cVilvKzKgOPOHqYVhVhYv4hNzNjWvA0hjJuNCHhJhZ_WmVhghkZiZiZiK87fV9kA7V1R-8G2NqHjBSb2E3X4KAhBjOw5x/335A485Y57Y5Y59fVnM5y5U_5bivhiz9E-a3Ygf9Ys7oew4My7TvQ276hRaD4csw/14mZ2Un/wev20/0D98_THNjvNjT3Yc50h8yBUU-OC4hKnuCIPumn7EzKt1%3D&attredirects=2, last visited: 17 March 2015.
the ISC has statutory responsibility for the oversight of Agency operations. MI5; MI6; and GCHQ now have to provide detailed information on their operations, on a quarterly basis.\footnote{Rifkind, M., ‘Intelligence Agencies in the Internet Age’, Wadham Lecture – Wadham College, Oxford, 8 May 2014.}

One senior intelligence official has commented that the ISC is now “maxed out”, in terms of its powers, and is much more interventionist and intrusive than ever before, including on operational details.\footnote{Private conversation.} However, Lord Carlile, the government’s former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, has commented that, while the ISC is “probably fit for purpose, in an ideal world, you would have an ISC that was treated as fully vetted [and] was able to see absolutely anything, and there would be no discretion […] to say, ‘Sorry, we are not giving you that’”.\footnote{Interview with Lord Carlile, September 2014.}

\section*{Independent Commissioners}

The UK has no FISA Court equivalent; however, quasi-judicial oversight is provided by a variety of individuals who have held high judicial office and now serve as Independent Commissioners and report directly to the Prime Minister. Two Independent Commissioners have oversight over GCHQ: the Intelligence Services Commissioner and the Interception of Communications Commissioner.\footnote{‘The law’, Government Communications Headquarters.}


Hazel Blears MP, a member of the ISC, has praised the Commissioners’ work, particularly regarding the scrutiny that they offer and their ability to meet any public-awareness issues that have arisen since Snowden’s disclosures.\footnote{Telephone interview with Hazel Blears MP, September 2014.} Yet, there has been some suggestion that their roles may have to be modified in order to help provide a more public voice on the state’s part in interception. For example, one official has described the Commissioners as not “select-committee friendly”, and has said that their discomfort with operating in the public eye has made the work of British intelligence agencies “vulnerable”.\footnote{Private conversation.} Yvette Cooper, speaking as the Shadow Home Secretary, has suggested that the Commissioners are performing inadequately and that what the government may need is one inspector general who has oversight over all intelligence agencies.\footnote{‘Labour to overhaul spy agency controls in response to Snowden files’, The Guardian, 02 March 2014.} Others have questioned whether so many commissioners are needed, and feel that the absence
of any enforcement powers and financial clout mean that they lack the authority to perform their oversight tasks adequately.

Julian Huppert, a Liberal Democrat MP who sat on the Joint Committee on the Communications Data Bill, has also voiced concerns about the relationship between the Commissioners and the intelligence agencies, calling it “far, far too cosy”. However, Sir Anthony May, the current Interception of Communications Commissioner, has been described, by one official, as “not instinctively pro-establishment”. (May was one of the senior judges who ruled against the government when it attempted to redact information regarding MI5 knowledge of the alleged torture of former Guantánamo Bay detainee Binyam Mohamed.) In addition, the Commissioners have no enforcement powers and no direct impact on setting the policy. As Sir Malcolm Rifkind says, their roles are “like an accountant looking at a tax return; he doesn’t look to see if tax policy is right or wrong”.

**Investigatory Powers Tribunal**

One further level of quasi-judicial oversight is provided by the IPT, a body formed as part of RIPA (in 2000) that consists of judges and lawyers. The IPT is responsible for investigating complaints regarding the use of RIPA (including the collection, storage, and use of data by the intelligence agencies) and for ensuring that the authorities’ activities comply with the Human Rights Act. A public authority has acted unlawfully if “it fails to obtain lawful authority or there is no lawful authority possible for infringing your human rights”, or “if it breaches your rights by incorrectly balancing them against the public interest.” However, at present, these cases can only be appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, in Strasbourg; there is no domestic right of appeal – something that the ISC now recommends be rectified. Furthermore, this mechanism can only be referred to retrospectively, after potential mistakes or wrongdoing by the state have already occurred.

**A culture of self-regulation?**

When speaking as GCHQ Director, Sir Iain Lobban was keen to stress his agency’s “strong culture and ethos of personal accountability.” He has stated, “I don’t employ the type of people who would [delve into innocent e-mails and phone calls]. My people are motivated by saving the lives of British forces on the battlefield. They’re motivated by finding terrorists and serious criminals. If they were asked to snoop I wouldn’t have the workforce, they’d leave the building.” Similarly, former GCHQ Director Sir David Omand has commented that “self-regulation is the most important form of regulation […] You can have all the rules and all the oversight, but when they are out of your sight, you have to rely on the fact that [your staff] have internalised a code of values.”

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244. Telephone interview with Julian Huppert MP, August 2014.

245. Private conversation.


This does not mean, though, that there have not been mistakes or occasional wrongdoing – this in inevitable in such large organisations. For example, there has been a case where GCHQ fired a staff member for inappropriate use of its systems, and MI5 and MI6 have both disciplined or dismissed staff for “inappropriately accessing personal information”. Furthermore, administrative errors – officers typing in e-mail addresses and phone numbers incorrectly – can also lead to data being collected on individuals of no relevance to an investigation. In 2014, according to the Interception of Communications Commissioner, there were 998 errors relating to communications data, out of a total of 517, 208 notices and authorisations; and 60 interception errors.

PUBLIC OPINION

Public response to the Snowden leaks has differed in both the US and the UK.

A poll from the Pew Research Center and The Washington Post, in June 2013, found that 56% of Americans believed that “getting secret court orders to track telephone calls of millions of Americans in an effort to investigate terrorism” was “acceptable”. In contrast, 58% of people surveyed in a CBS News poll that same month disapproved of the government “collecting phone records of ordinary Americans”. A Gallup poll – also in June 2013 – saw 44% of respondents approving of Snowden’s actions, whereas 42% disapproved.

A more recent Pew poll, in November 2014, found that 80% of Americans believed that the public “should be concerned about the government’s monitoring of phone calls and internet communications.” As Congressman Peter King has said, “Cynicism is spreading, and it’s taking away support for the government.”

The UK response has also been ambivalent. A June 2013 poll by YouGov found that only 27% thought that Snowden was wrong “to give information on how the US government was monitoring telephone calls and emails to the press.” Yet, an October 2013 poll by the same company showed that Snowden’s disclosures had not led to clamour for reining in the British security services’ powers; only 19% believed that the authorities had too many powers, with 42% believing that the balance was about right, and 22% believing that they had insufficient powers. By then, more people also regarded the Snowden leaks as a bad thing (43%) than a good thing (35%).

Prime Minister David Cameron has commented that he believes that the public was “unmoved” by the disclosures, and that “the public reaction has not been one of shock horror. It has been much more one of ‘intelligence agencies carry out intelligence work, good’.”

254. Ibid., p. 46.
255. Ibid., p. 58.
260. Interview with Congressman Peter King, July 2014.
Therefore, while Snowden himself may poll well, the consequence is not a call to rein in the state’s powers; there appears to be sympathy for the notion that safeguarding national security is a challenging task and that the police and security services require relatively broad powers in order to do so.
The Impact of the Snowden Leaks

Government officials from both the US and the UK have stressed the significant national-security impact of Snowden's actions.

Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), has suggested that “Snowden’s disclosures have done grave damage to the Department of Defense”. 264 James Clapper, the DNI, has said that they have caused “profound damage […] putting the lives of members or assets of the intelligence community at risk, as well as those of our armed forces, diplomats, and our citizens”.265 David Omand, a former Director of GCHQ, has commented that “substantial damage to UK security has been caused by the Snowden revelations”; 266 and, in October 2013, the MI5 Director General, Andrew Parker, labelled disclosures about GCHQ’s work a “gift” for terrorists. 267

The precise impact that Snowden’s leaks have made is not always easy to quantify. A DIA assessment of his disclosures was that “[t]he scope of the compromised knowledge related to US intelligence capabilities is staggering.”268 However, this was based on the assumption that Snowden’s master file contained data from every network he scanned, and that America’s adversaries either possess this file or will do so eventually. The DIA is working to a worst-case scenario: the assumption that everything which Snowden touched was stolen; 269 we still do not know if this was the case.

Nevertheless, certain trends have emerged. The following section attempts to summarise the tangible impact that Snowden has had on intelligence agencies’ work.

Revealing capacity

The public airing of certain intelligence-gathering techniques has polluted ongoing operations, due to fear of discovery and/or attribution.270 As they can no longer be run safely, such intelligence gathering has had to stop.271 With state actors, there is also a fear that the West’s adversaries will read and adapt the methodologies that are displayed in the Snowden files: China and Russia, for example, deploying the NSA’s and GCHQ’s own cyber strategies against them.272

For terror suspects, the disclosures have enabled them to “now understand the scope and scale of...
Western collection capabilities”.

In January 2015, a seven-and-a-half-minute video was released onto a jihadist platform, outlining some of what had been discerned from Snowden’s disclosures about spy agencies’ activities. For example, the video stated that:

All mobile phone providers use the same software, your device continuously is in contact with the nearest tower […] As you are moving around your different coordinates are tracked and stored. All your calls, messages and internet history are stored in this same place […] spies have access to these files and can know your daily routine, friends and what you are planning to do tomorrow night at that tall building […] Every Mujahed that does not take the right precautions can be a tool in the hand of the enemy. With his phone, tablet or laptop the enemy can listen/record all conversations and meetings.

The video also stated that governments work with internet companies in order to obtain the information. It then provided advice on how to avoid detection, listing software packages that protect against surveillance and from where they can be acquired.

There are other ways in which Western intelligence agencies’ capacities have been revealed. To give former Deputy Director of the NSA Chris Inglis’s example, “[i]t might be surprising to someone that a communication that makes its way from, say, some ungoverned space in the north of southwest Asia to a place like Yemen sometimes transits through the United States of America.”

According to the former deputy director of the CIA, Michael Morell, the Section 702 program was particularly impacted by this, as foreign terror suspects now not only realised that their electronic communications often passed through the US (even if the individuals themselves were not based there), but also which CSPs were allowing the NSA to access these communications. These suspects subsequently stopped using these CSP’s services to send emails, for example, or even stopped using electronic communications entirely.

Morell has gone as far as to state that it was “clear” that Snowden’s leaks also “played a role in the rise” of the Islamic State. Morell said the group had “learned from Snowden”. However, this is not a consensus view within the intelligence community. Some have suggested that the Islamic State was already aware its communications were being targeted having been the subject of major NSA and military surveillance and hacking campaign during the 2007-08 period of the Iraq war.

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275. Ibid.

276. ‘Transcript: NSA Deputy Director John Inglis’, NPR, 10 January 2014.

277. ‘CIA’s Ex-No. 2 Says ISIS “Learned From Snowden”’, The Daily Beast, 6 May 2015.

278. Ibid.
THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OMNIPOTENCE MYTH

The NSA’s capacity is impressive; but it has also been exaggerated. In a 2013 report, the agency stated that “the Internet carries 1,826 Petabytes of information per day […] The NSA touches about 1.6% of that […] and, of the 1.6% of the data, only 0.025% is actually selected for review. The net effect is that NSA analysts look at 0.00004% of the world’s traffic […] less than one part in a million.” 279 The same is true of GCHQ: one intelligence official was particularly withering of the idea that “5,000 people in Cheltenham can process the Internet”. 280

Changes in target behaviour and communication methods

Snowden’s disclosures have led to changes in the way that suspects communicate. One senior US intelligence official said that, post-Snowden, the shift in communication methods was the “most significant change” that had taken place. 281 Other senior individuals have corroborated that this change in communication methods took place, including Matt Olsen, the former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center; 282 Dutch Ruppersberger, a former Ranking Member on the House of Representatives’ intelligence committee; 283 Michael Morell; 284 and Admiral Michael S. Rogers, the head of the NSA. 285 Speaking in November 2013, while still Chair of the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Mike Rogers (not to be confused with Michael S. Rogers) said that Snowden’s disclosures had allowed “three different terrorist organizations, affiliates of al Qaeda to change the way they communicate”. 286

This communications shift has impacted the UK as well. In December 2014, a senior UK security official suggested that intelligence agencies “have specific evidence of where key targets have changed their communication behaviour as a direct result of what they have read”, adding that “because we only focus on the most serious, the top end networks, then the impact they have in the mean time is multiplied.” 287

It is not easy to prove that security agencies losing track of a certain target, for example, is specifically down to the information that Snowden passed to journalists; yet, intelligence sources have attempted to provide an insight into the day-to-day impact that Snowden has had on their work:

- In June 2014, one British intelligence source said that GCHQ’s ability to track domestic and foreign crime gangs – including those relating to people trafficking and drugs – had been reduced by approximately 25%. 288 The same number was cited by intelligence sources, including a former head of the National Security Agency, to explain the impact of the leaks. 279

280. Private conversation.
281. Private conversation.
7931081343479310813434790045, last visited: 18 March 2015.
284. ‘CIA’s Ex-No. 2 Says ISIS “Learned From Snowden”’, The Daily Beast, 6 May 2015.
sources, in December 2014.  

➤ In October 2014, a top GCHQ spy tasked with cracking the communications of high-value national-security targets stated that his work sometimes take three times as long now, when compared to before the Snowden disclosures (six weeks instead of two). Another spy, tasked with hacking terrorist activities on the internet, stated that Snowden had made the job “a thousand times more difficult”.

➤ In the same month, Olsen said that, in the US, “people that we were concerned about, we are no longer collecting their communications. We lost insight into what they were doing.”

Ultimately, according to Clapper, that “[t]errorists and other adversaries of this country are going to school on […] intelligence sources, methods, and tradecraft. And the insights they’re gaining are making our job […] much, much harder.”

Encryption

Further significant shifts by terrorist groups have been the development of new encryption technology and even greater caution regarding being detected electronically. This has been confirmed by several serving, as well as former, intelligence officials.

Online jihadist platforms released new encryption tools at a quicker pace following the Snowden revelations. According to one analysis, three significant encryption tools were released “within a three to five month time frame of the leaks.” For example, the Global Islamic Media Front released a new mobile-encryption program in September 2013. Similarly, the al-Fajr Technical Committee, which distributes al-Qaeda propaganda, has released multiple versions of an encryption programs for e-mails; text messages; and instant messages.

There has also been an exponential increase in the use of encryption by CSPs (for further details, see p. 56 – 57).

289. ‘GCHQ warns serious criminals have been lost in wake of Edward Snowden leaks’, The Telegraph, 21 December 2014.

290. ‘GCHQ: “This is not Blitz Britain. We sure as hell can’t lick terrorism on our own”’, The Telegraph, 11 October 2014, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11154322/GCHQ-This-is-not-Blitz-Britain-We-sure-as-hell-cant-lick-terrorism-on-our-own.html, last visited: 18 March 2015.

291. Ibid.


295. This consensus has been challenged by Flashpoint Global Partners. See ‘Snowden Leaks Didn’t Make Al Qaeda Change Tactics, Says Report’, ABC News, 16 September 2014.


297. Ibid.

Operational consequences

Snowden created digital keys which allowed him to access various intelligence and military systems. Considering the contact that he has had with the Russian security service, the FSB, this is an obvious cause of concern, particularly given that his access was not limited to material relating to communications interception. US fears are that, such are the cyber capabilities of Russian and Chinese intelligence agencies, they could have accessed this and similar information from Snowden’s files, even without his knowledge.  

Lieutenant General Michael Flynn has called this a prospect “very serious”, warning that even “if [the Russians] don’t have access, you have to assume that they are going to try to”.  

Furthermore, James Clapper, has stated that “what [Snowden] did, what he took, what he has exposed, goes way, way, way beyond the so-called domestic surveillance programs.”  

(Congressman Peter King appears to concur, claiming that the “overwhelming percentage of what Snowden took was military and military-countermeasures” information.)  

According to Clapper, of the files that Snowden had access to – and, therefore, potentially took – approximately “less than 10 percent has to do with domestic surveillance.”  

Certainly, it is hard to make the civil-liberties case for disclosing:

- that the NSA had received permission to spy on groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood;
- that the Norwegian Intelligence Service assisted the NSA in collecting intelligence regarding Russian energy policy and military activities;
- that the Swedish Defence Radio Establishment works with the NSA to gain intelligence on Russia;
- that the NSA was considering forming an intelligence-sharing partnership with Vietnam;
- that GCHQ intended to target the communications of Turkish and South African diplomats;
- the location of NSA offices, bases, and analysts across the world;  
- US attempts to spy on China and Hong Kong.

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302. Interview with Congressman Peter King, July 2014.


the NSA's interception of then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's communications;\textsuperscript{307}

- that President Obama had asked for a list of potential foreign targets for a US cyber attack;\textsuperscript{308} and

- portions of the US-intelligence budget.\textsuperscript{309}

Indeed, when General Martin Dempsey (the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) testified before the House Armed Services Committee, in March 2014, he explained that the “vast majority of the documents that Snowden […] exfiltrated […] were related to our military capabilities, operations, tactics, techniques and procedures.”\textsuperscript{310}

As a result, it is Flynn’s opinion that Snowden “has placed the men and women of our armed services at risk […] and that his disclosures will cost lives on our future battlefields.”\textsuperscript{311} This was seconded by Mike Rogers, former Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, who said that “Snowden’s actions are likely to have lethal consequences for our troops in the field.”\textsuperscript{312} Rogers has gone as far as to say that Snowden should be charged with murder as a result.\textsuperscript{313}

\section*{Communication Service Provider Backlash}

Interception of communications has historically been carried out in liberal democracies, without significant tension arising between the government and communication carriers. The NSA and GCHQ perceive themselves to be carrying out the same kind of long-standing forms of state interception that they always have: for example, intercepting an envelope, which shows an address and a postmark containing a date and geographic location (the equivalent of communications data), and studying the letter inside the envelope (the equivalent of content).

Yet, following the Snowden disclosures, a significant divide has emerged between the government and the CSPs.\textsuperscript{314} Google’s chief legal officer has stated that the company was “outraged at the lengths to which the government seems to have gone to intercept data from our private fibre networks”.\textsuperscript{315} In December 2013, the Executive Vice President and General Counsel at Microsoft, Paul Alito, said that “Snowden’s actions are likely to have lethal consequences for our troops in the field.”\textsuperscript{316} It is Flynn’s opinion that Snowden “has placed the men and women of our armed services at risk […] and that his disclosures will cost lives on our future battlefields.”\textsuperscript{317} This was seconded by Mike Rogers, former Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, who said that “Snowden’s actions are likely to have lethal consequences for our troops in the field.”\textsuperscript{318} Rogers has gone as far as to say that Snowden should be charged with murder as a result.\textsuperscript{319}

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Brad Smith, said that “government snooping potentially now constitutes an ‘advanced persistent threat,’ alongside sophisticated malware and cyber attacks.”316

One senior British security official said that the biggest impact of Snowden’s actions were that technology companies were now “disengaging from the security apparatus after years of being helpful within the law”.317 Another said that the public would be “shocked” if it was aware of how little the state could do because of the actions of major technology companies,318 and GCHQ Director Robert Hannigan went as far as to say that some of the companies were “in denial” about the problem.319

This CSP backlash has manifested itself in different ways. Admiral Rogers has commented that CSPs are now telling government that “you are going to have to compel us” to provide data, so that they can prove to their customers that this is not a voluntary arrangement.320 In theory, this is not necessarily a huge shift; the response of one CSP to the first story ever published about so-called ‘warrantless surveillance’ – in the New York Times, in December 2005 –321 was to ask the government to compel them to provide the information via court order, rather than it be a voluntary arrangement.322 The difference now is that there is a mood of greater intransigence from CSPs towards governments because Snowden exposed the extent of their interaction. This is a severe problem, because co-operation is needed: the usual way for the government to access the content of communications is by serving an interception warrant against a CSP, which, in turn, provides the information.323

Arguments used by one major US-based technology company in refusing to respond to a UK-government request for content data are now said to be as follows:

- that they are a software platform, not a CSP, and should not be legally bound as if they were;
- even if they are a CSP, they are primarily based in the US and are, therefore, bound by US law;
- it would be illegal, under US law, to provide the data, as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 1968 (the Wiretap Act) “prohibits the unauthorized, nonconsensual interception of ‘wire, oral, or electronic communications’ by government agencies as well as private parties”,324 and
- they cannot obey the laws of all other jurisdictions – i.e. Russia – so why should they follow UK law?

To intelligence officials, this is unreasonable: “if financial or pharmaceutical services want to deliver a service, they have to comply with UK law; why not the CSPs?” asked one.325 A US official

317. Private conversation.
318. Private conversation.
325. Private conversation.
explained that the “trade-off” for a telecommunications company entering a foreign country is that they may be compelled, by that country, to give direct access to call records. Yet, the US companies remain adamant that the UK has no jurisdiction on requests for content in intelligence investigations.

One example of the fault lines that are developing on this emerged in January 2014, when Microsoft announced that it would allow foreign customers to have their personal data stored on various servers outside the US; this included a data centre based in Dublin, Republic of Ireland. Storing data on different servers in different countries further obscures jurisdictional lines.

Microsoft challenged a US attempt to access this data; however, a US judge rejected its argument, comparing the request for stored data as analogous to a subpoena — under which information must be provided, regardless of location. The likes of Apple, eBay, Verizon, and Amazon have since filed letters in support of Microsoft.

Some of the CSPs’ concerns on these issues are understandable; they have not only been made to appear as if they cannot protect private data, one report has also argued that they have suffered financially. In 2014, it was suggested that Verizon had lost a contract to run telecommunications services in Germany because of the “ties revealed between foreign intelligence agencies” and such companies. After he retired from the NSA, General Alexander said that it could have done “more to set the record straight sooner on companies’ commitment to protecting privacy, the lengths to which companies go to do this, the legally compelled nature of these programs, and that these companies comply with the law.”

Intelligence officials in both the US and the UK also feel that tech companies in Silicon Valley contain an anti-establishment culture, in which any government interference with the internet must be a negative. Part of this is down to fears about the tech companies’ brand in the US, where they perceive themselves to be on the wrong side of public opinion.

While one senior employee at a technology company said that there had not “been a conscious decision in the company to say, ‘We’re going to push back on more requests with governments’, there has been a conscious effort to say, ‘We think that government surveillance regimes need reform’.” A Facebook chief security officer has acknowledged that “[c]ompanies certainly have become more comfortable standing up and showing their commitment to the people who use their services.”

326. Private conversation.
333. ‘New N.S.A. Chief Calls Damage From Snowden Leaks Manageable’, The New York Times, 29 June 2014. For countries such as Germany, this type of move may ultimately be counterproductive, as the NSA is less legally restrained when it comes to tapping into data being stored overseas (see: Byman, D. and Benjamin Wittes, ‘Reforming the NSA: How to Spy after Snowden’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014).
335. Private conversation.
One manifestation of this occurred in December 2013, when Google, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, AOL, Microsoft, LinkedIn, and Yahoo! formed the ‘Reform Government Surveillance’ coalition.337 Another, in July 2014, saw seven (albeit very minor) internet-service providers file legal complaints against GCHQ.338 US telecommunication companies such as Sprint, Verizon, and AT&T have also now begun to push back.339

**CSP encryption and the government response**

Companies’ use of ubiquitous encryption has also increased exponentially since Snowden’s leaks, meaning that CSPs are automatically providing encryption for users – rather than the users encrypting data themselves.340 Those to have done this include Google, Microsoft, Apple, Yahoo!, and WhatsApp;341 such companies say that this is in response to customers’ demand.342

This has potential benefits for those in authoritarian regimes. A Chinese citizen typing ‘Tiananmen Square’ into Google, for example, would not necessarily fall foul of their authorities’ censorship programme. (However, the Chinese government likely has ways around this: such as using a proxy, so that those who think that they are communicating with Google are actually running into China’s ‘Great Firewall’.) This increase in encryption, a Google spokesperson confirmed, has come in response to the Snowden revelations that “underscored our need to strengthen our networks.”343

This has had a major impact on US and UK security agencies’ work. As GCHQ Director Robert Hannigan has said:

> Techniques for encrypting messages or making them anonymous which were once the preserve of the most sophisticated criminals or nation states now come as standard. These are supplemented by freely available programs and apps adding extra layers of security, many of them proudly advertising that they are “Snowden approved”.

FBI Director James B. Comey has said that this means, for example, that even the “companies themselves won’t be able to unlock phones, laptops, and tablets to reveal photos, documents, e-mail, and recordings stored within.”345 According to a recent ISC report, “[t]he effect of increased privacy controls has been to place some of the communications of [companies’] users beyond the reach of law enforcement and intelligence officers and even, in some cases, beyond the reach of the law courts.”346

340. Private conversation.
The existence of a ‘data cloud’, such as that used by Apple, is not a solution. Not everyone backs up their phones regularly, or even chooses to upload to the ‘cloud’, meaning that law-enforcement and intelligence agencies could be unable to access data of relevance. Furthermore, it is Apple that has the keys to the ‘cloud’; as Comey says: “[e]ncryption isn’t just a technical feature; it’s a marketing pitch.”

Escalation is inevitable with the NSA and GCHQ being forced to step up their efforts to break into these networks. As General Alexander has said:

[w]hen the government asks NSA to collect intelligence on terrorist X, and he uses publicly available tools to encode his messages, it is not acceptable for a foreign intelligence agency like NSA to respond, “Sorry we cannot understand what he is saying”. Our job is to break the codes [...].

He continued:

To ask NSA not to look for weaknesses in the technology that we use, and to not seek to break the codes our adversaries employ to encrypt their messages is, I think, misguided. I would love to have all the terrorists just use that one little sandbox over there so that we could focus on them. But they don’t. They use the same technology products and the same web services that we’ve all got.

The status quo cannot be allowed to continue. As GCHQ Director Robert Hannigan recently stated, “[h]owever much they may dislike it, [technology companies] have become the command-and-control networks of choice for terrorists and criminals, who find their services as transformational as the rest of us.” Better co-operation between the government and CSPs is needed urgently.

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties

The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) process is a “system of bilateral and multilateral agreements by which nation states commit to assist one another in criminal investigations and prosecutions.”

As CSPs place jurisdictional boundaries on data sharing, they tend to favour the use of the MLAT process when it comes to data sharing between nations. One official from a major tech corporation has said that, at present, if UK authorities are attempting to access content from that company’s servers, that type of request would be pushed to an MLAT and could not be fulfilled until approval was received from a US court. This is not something that the UK government accepts, as it claims that RIPA has extraterritorial jurisdiction.

In addition, the MLAT process is extremely slow. The same tech official acknowledged that some MLATs can take months or even years; on average, it takes the DoJ 10 months to process
If a terrorist plot is unfolding and data is needed immediately, relying on this system is clearly unrealistic. This is something that even MLAT defenders acknowledge, recognising that the system needs reform and the appointment of more judges. However, that is still not a satisfactory fix because MLATs are essentially focused on data sharing for crimes that have already been committed. Agencies such as the NSA and GCHQ, on the other hand, aim to be pre-emptive; they need to carry out interception in order to disrupt possible criminal activity in its planning stages, not after it has already been performed.

Charles Farr is sceptical about their use, saying, “MLATs have not been designed […] to facilitate ongoing investigations on a day to day basis […] Neither we nor the Department of Justice can easily see how an MLAT can be transformed into an almost real-time tool for the exchange of data.”

Furthermore, MLATs can cost around £10,000 a case; a law-enforcement agency with a small budget is unlikely to use it if this continues to be the cost. While reform to the MLAT system may be worthwhile on its own merits, it is unlikely to be the answer to the current data-sharing issues.

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Future Considerations

POLICY ISSUES

1. State access to data may actually be insufficient, rather than excessive

There is a significant problem regarding governments’ diminishing ability to access communications data.

Issue A: An evolution in communication methods

SIGINT, the interception of foreign communications and information systems, has historically occurred via telegram; telephone; fax; or e-mail. Local calls were carried by wire, and international calls by microwave towers which were used to transmit signals via radio; however, most communications today travel through fibre-optic cables. Similarly, telephone communications and access to the internet used to mainly take place via a fixed landline; they now increasingly use broadband and mobile networks. This has been accompanied by a flourishing in communications methods: SMS messages, video messaging, instant messaging (such as WhatsApp and Blackberry Messenger), Skype, and social-network platforms.

Issue B: A decline in the need for companies to generate communications data

Service providers previously needed to know who was called; where; and for how long, for billing reasons. However, increasing numbers of people pay a fixed-price monthly direct debit or, alternatively, a pay-as-you-go fee, making these factors increasingly irrelevant to CSPs; communications data does not need to be held in order to ensure that customers are paying their bills. Therefore, businesses’ rationale for communications data retention, or even generation, is declining. If it is not generated and then retained, then networks of interest to intelligence agencies cannot be reconstructed.

The UK government’s response

In April 2012, the UK government announced that the Home Secretary was attempting to introduce legislation requiring CSPs to store a small number of additional datasets relating to communications data. However, the bill faced significant political opposition – including from Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg – for infringing on civil liberties, and was dubbed a ‘Snoopers’ Charter’. Upon scrutiny by a Parliamentary joint committee, it was concluded that this draft Communications Data Bill paid “insufficient attention to the duty to respect the right to privacy, and [went] much further than it need[ed] or should for the purpose of providing necessary and justifiable official access to communications data.” The ISC also encouraged more work to be done.

After this essentially removed any prospect of the Bill passing, the government was forced to the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA) 2014, emergency legislation passed in July.


2014. The EU’s Data Retention Directive (DRD) of March 2006 – a directive which the UK government played a large role – required telecommunications and internet-service providers to retain communications data for a minimum of six months and a maximum of 24 (Britain kept its data for 12 months). However, in April 2014, the European Union Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the DRD was invalid, as it threatened “the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data.” This not only made the UK’s legal position unclear; it meant that while the CSPs could still retain some types of data for their own business purposes, they did not have a clear legal basis for retaining it for the length of time that the UK government wished.

The UK responded by passing DRIPA. The bill removed ambiguity by defining telecommunications services as “the provision of access to, and of facilities for making use of, a telecommunication system include any case where a service consists in or includes facilitating the creation, management or storage of communications transmitted, or that may be transmitted, by means of such a system.” DRIPA made clear that even those CSPs which hold data abroad and are based abroad were subject to UK law if there was a warrant or notice served on them compelling them to intercept communications or disclose data (although there is also an important provision in DRIPA outlining that “regard is to be had […] to any requirements or restrictions under the law of that country or territory” in doing so).

DRIPA also required CSPs to retain communication data for up to 12 months. As this ensured the data’s retention, this latter requirement was essentially about keeping existing powers, rather than extending them.

Then, in November 2014, the government introduced the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, which, among other measures, contained provisions requiring CSPs to retain data used to help identify which Internet Protocol (IP) address belonged to a certain individual. This received Royal Assent in February 2015.

However, there is still more that needs to be done legislatively. For example, there is still no legislation which requires the creation of communications data if the CSPs are not doing so for their own purposes; internet browsing, for example, is not always available retrospectively. This will need to be addressed in the future.

Further data challenges

Additional problems that shifts in technology have presented for law-enforcement agencies have been outlined in a recent speech by James B. Comey. He said that he faced two specific, overlapping, challenges: one concerned “real-time court-ordered interception of […] phone calls, e-mail, and live chat sessions”; the other, “court-ordered access to data stored on our devices, such

361. Private conversation.
364. Private conversation.
366. Ibid., p. 5.
367. Ibid., p. 2.
as e-mail, text messages, photos, and videos.” The fact that this data was increasingly encrypted was only exacerbating these problems.

Previously, a target against whom the FBI was carrying out surveillance would have had a phone with a single carrier. Now, however, as Comey said, there are “countless providers, countless networks, and countless means of communicating” these include mobile phones, tablets, and laptops, which use a variety of networks and contain numerous different apps. A suspect switching from using their mobile coverage to Wi-Fi – or from a voice service to a messaging app, or from one app to another – could mean that law enforcement loses coverage of their target’s communications, giving all manner of national-security threats and criminals a potential edge.

From a US perspective, while telecommunication and internet-service providers are required, by law, to install interception capabilities into their networks (under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 1994 (CALEA)), new means of communication are not always covered and some companies do not comply with a court order because they do not have the interception capabilities required (even if they want to help, these capabilities take time – and money – to be constructed). Furthermore, some companies which provide some form of communications service are not necessarily covered by CALEA – an issue which the US government may look to address.

2. RIPA’s Codes of Practice should continue to be tweaked in the short-term; but any wholesale reform of the legislation must be considered carefully

There has been significant discussion about reform of RIPA, its modern-day applicability, and the concerns that it is being used incorrectly and disproportionately. For example:

- In 2004, an Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) review of RIPA concluded that “the legislation had several ambiguities and deficiencies and had been implemented poorly”.
- Shadow Home Secretary Yvette Cooper has stated that a “full review of RIPA” is needed;
- a Home Affairs Select Committee review into RIPA declared it “not fit for purpose”;
- Deputy Chief Constable Jon Boutcher has commented that RIPA “isn’t fit for the way we now live our lives and the communications challenges that we have”; and
- a 2015 ISC report concluded that “serious reforms” to RIPA were required.

One particularly common criticism is that levelled by Lord Macdonald, the former Director of Public Prosecutions, who has argued that, as social media did not exist when RIPA was enacted,
by default, it must be incapable of dealing with modern communication-interception issues.\textsuperscript{379}

Yet, RIPA is not about technology; it is about oversight and preventing intrusions into civil liberties. It was drafted to be technologically neutral (because, according to Sir David Omand, the Home Office “did not want to have to keep coming back to Parliament every time somebody developed a new app”),\textsuperscript{380} something which has ensured its continued applicability. Even if RIPA legislation was to be redrafted, it would still need to be technologically neutral; referencing specific technology and communication methods would mean that the legislation not only becomes quickly outdated and invites constant revision, but could overly restrict the state’s ability to gather certain types of intelligence.

Therefore, RIPA’s age is not necessarily relevant. As Sir Malcolm Rifkind has said, “the fact it’s a few years old is not automatically a problem: see the US constitution.”\textsuperscript{381} Home Secretary Theresa May has also said that she continues to regard RIPA as “good legislation that is still working well”.\textsuperscript{382}

Root-and-branch reform of RIPA is a high-risk strategy that would likely see demands for changes to sections of the legislation which are fundamental to the work of intelligence agencies and law-enforcement agencies, and could be contrary to the public interest. There is also the possibility that critics of RIPA and intelligence agencies’ supposed intrusiveness would discover that reform of the legislation would end up strengthening the agencies’ powers, rather than diminishing them; as one intelligence official commented, “this is one of the ironies of Snowden”\textsuperscript{383} This is something that David Omand, former head of GCHQ, has also hinted at.\textsuperscript{384}

Certain concerns about RIPA’s modern day applicability can be resolved by focusing on its CoP. As Omand has said, these codes:

\begin{quote}
could […] give Parliamentarians, the media, and the interested public a much clearer view of the purposes for which interception is authorised […] more could have been done over the last few years of rapid technological change to explain these matters to the public, and the Codes of Practice could provide an authoritative vehicle for filling this gap.\textsuperscript{385}
\end{quote}

Progress has been made on this front already. A revised communications data CoP came into force in March 2015, while a revised interception CoP has also gone out for public consultation, but has not yet been enacted.

\section*{3. Judicial oversight over every data application is neither the norm nor necessarily effective}

The fact that, in the UK, warrants are issued by a Secretary of State, rather than a judge, is often used to criticise its interception authorisation regime. Human rights organisations have lamented the lack of formal judicial oversight for surveillance and have criticised the power that rests with

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{379} ‘Social media mass surveillance is permitted by law, says top UK official’, \textit{The Guardian}, 17 June 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{381} Telephone interview with Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP, August 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{382} ‘Privacy and Security’, Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2015), p. 102.
\item \textsuperscript{383} Private conversation.
\end{enumerate}
the Secretaries of State. There are those who believe that an individual judge examining each warrant is required.

However, the extent to which judges and magistrates are better qualified to, for example, approve or reject warrants is highly contentious. In the latest Chief Surveillance Commissioner report, Sir Christopher Rose comments:

What has become clear is that the knowledge and understanding of RIPA among magistrates and their staff varies widely. Adequate training of magistrates is a matter for others, but I highlight the need. The public is not well served if, through lack of experience or training, magistrates are not equipped effectively to exercise the oversight responsibility which the legislation requires. I am aware, for example, of one magistrate having granted an approval for activity retrospectively, and another having signed a formal notice despite it having been erroneously completed by the applicant with details of a different case altogether.

Therefore, simply providing more judicial approval is not necessarily an unalloyed good without having well-trained, high-quality judges.

There is another reason why legal bodies are not necessarily best placed to make these decisions: politics. Applications for warrants may be legally sound – and, therefore, approvable – but, at the same time, politically unwise. As a recent ISC report pointed out:

Ministers can [...] apply an additional test in terms of the diplomatic and political context and the wider public interest. This additional test would be lost if responsibility were transferred to judges and might result in more warrant applications being authorised. Furthermore, judges are not held accountable, or asked to justify their decisions to Parliament and the public, as Ministers are.

In the US, judicial oversight is carried out by federal judges appointed to the FISA Court. However, the two countries’ systems cannot be easily compared, as there is not the same political connect between the elected civilian leadership and the security agencies. The NSA operates within the Secretary of Defense’s broad remit, but is also answerable to the DNI – neither of whom are politicians/affiliated with the governing political party; GCHQ operates directly under a Foreign Secretary who is part of an elected political party (and who will be held to account for any warrants that they choose to sign).

Not even all members of the Supreme Court believe that judges are best placed to rule on issues such as domestic surveillance. In March 2014, Justice Antonin Scalia commented that “[t]he Supreme Court does not know diddly about the nature and the extent of the threat. It’s truly stupid that my court is going to be the last word on it.” In a UK context, the ISC has agreed, saying that ministers are “well informed about the current nature of the threat and are therefore best placed to assess national security considerations.”

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Ultimately, a non-judicial system in which there is accountability and a rigorous approval process is worth more than ill-trained magistrates or judges carrying out the task.

This situation is, by no means, unique to the UK; comparable democracies also have a lack of strong judicial approval. For example, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Act 1979 grants access to target computers if a government minister is “satisfied there are reasonable grounds” for ASIO to believe that the data on a certain computer will “substantially assist the collection of intelligence” in a security matter. Similarly, the Telecommunications Act 1997 compels carriers to disclose “specified information or specified documents” if an ASIO officer is “satisfied that the disclosure would be in connection with the performance by [ASIO] of its functions.”

In Canada, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) – “Canada’s national cryptologic agency” – can intercept foreign-intelligence communications without judicial approval, also only requiring ministerial approval.

In Germany, intelligence agencies are permitted to carry out searches on electronic communications made online, without a prior court order – with permission being given by the Federal Ministry or Federal State Authority.

In France, government bulk collection can take place in “defense of national interests” and without oversight. Once this collection has identified a potential threat, authorisation for targeted interception is approved by the Prime Minister’s office, which also gives permission for the government to obtain any “information or documents that are necessary for the implementation or use of the interceptions authorized by law,” there is no judicial oversight, but, instead, a three-man security commission which evaluates the warrant’s necessity and reports back to the Prime Minister. In addition, CSPs are obliged to retain user-identification information, including e-mail addresses; passwords; payment details; geolocation data; and traffic logs. A December 2013 law also now allows metadata collection in real time, without a court order. Furthermore, interception is allowed in order to protect France’s “economic and scientific potential”, not just security concerns.

PRIVACY AND LIBERTY

1. Neither GCHQ nor the NSA are carrying out mass - potentially illegal - surveillance on ordinary citizens

The allegation that mass surveillance is occurring is central to Edward Snowden’s accusations, yet is untrue.

With regard to the NSA, there are procedural constraints in place, internally, to prevent rule-breaking, and no evidence suggests that such a culture exists. As has been previously noted,
fact that inspectors general and all branches of the US government have some form of review means that there would need to be a concerted; co-ordinated; government-wide conspiracy to be able to carry out any kind of sustained, illegal breach of citizens’ privacy.

There have also been attempts to argue that GCHQ’s surveillance programmes are unethical, or even illegal. Representatives from the government and independent oversight mechanisms – even those critical of overextending the government’s powers on communications data and surveillance, such as Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg have refuted such accusations:

- In July 2013, the ISC issued a statement saying that GCHQ conformed to its statutory duties and did not break the law in regard to its interception of communications.

- In his 2013 report, Interception of Communications Commissioner Sir Anthony May said that “[u]nlawful and unwarranted intercept intrusion of any kind, let alone ‘massive unwarranted surveillance’, is not and, in my judgment could not be carried out institutionally within the interception agencies themselves.”

- In March 2014, Sir Mark Waller, the Intelligence Services Commissioner, commented that GCHQ “know perfectly well that they have to make out their case and the legality of their cases and so on and I have absolutely, clearly, accepted that [they do].”

- In October 2014, then-GCHQ Director Sir Iain Lobban stated that, “of all the communications out there globally – the e-mails, the texts, the images – only a small percentage are within reach of our sensors. Of that, we only intercept a small percentage. Of that, we store a minuscule percentage for a limited period of time. Of that, only a small percentage is ever viewed or listened to, as permitted by our legal framework, and self-evidently, constrained by resource.”

It is also important to consider that the UK and the US do not have an historical culture of suppression. That does not mean that there can be complacency about such things in the future; but it is still significant. The state may never have had such an extensive technological capacity to be able to breach the civil liberties of its citizens as it does now; but that does not mean that it is doing so.

Furthermore, the NSAs and GCHQ’s intelligence-gathering capacities – which are massive – should not be confused with their legal authorities, which are also strong (even in comparison to other Western democracies). We are generally happy for the state to have an army with sophisticated weaponry because there is faith in the system and that the checks and balances are sufficient. With this being the case, the questions for the future should not necessarily revolve around the capacity of intelligence agencies; instead, these debates should be about the people; the culture of the institution; and the systems in place to safeguard privacy.

Consider a non-democratic alternative: Russia, the country to which Snowden fled. Its surveillance
system, the System of Operative-Investigative Measures (SORM), allows the FSB and seven other security agencies access to all telephone and mobile data and internet traffic (including social-media platforms). CSPs operating in the country are required to buy and install SORM probes that allow the state to monitor these communications.

According to the New York University Professor Mark Galeotti, “the FSB and other agencies can access metadata through SORM freely, so long as it is ‘in pursuit of their operational duties’ (which, of course, means anything they want).” 407 While they need a court warrant to access content, they are allowed to start monitoring as soon as they apply, and Galeotti has never heard of an application being refused. Presidential decrees can also give blanket access to data, in certain circumstances (as happened recently in Sochi, with the Winter Olympics). 406 Furthermore, Putin took advantage of Snowden’s disclosures to launch further attempts at gaining a tighter control over the internet and telecommunications. 407

2. The NSA’s and GCHQ’s intelligence-gathering methods are the international norm, not the exception

It was reported by a Norwegian newspaper, Dagbladet, in November 2013, that the NSA had logged information from 33.19 million Norwegian phone calls between 10 December 2012 and 8 January 2013. 408 However, the head of the Norwegian Intelligence Service was subsequently forced to admit that this collection had actually been carried out by Norwegian intelligence and then shared with the NSA in order to assist in military operations abroad. 409

Similarly, Spain’s El Mundo and France’s Le Monde have accused the NSA of collecting 60.5 million and over 70 million phone records, respectively, between December 2012 and January 2013. Again, this was actually Spanish and French collection subsequently shared with the NSA in support of military operations. 410

Another interesting example comes from Germany.

In the same month that Snowden’s disclosures became known to the press, a German lorry driver was arrested, having carried out at least 762 shootings against other drivers on the autobahn over the previous five years. 411 To catch him, German authorities had used technology which allowed for the logging of the number plates of millions of vehicles.

As well as being generated by CSPs, metadata is also produced by the likes of Radio-frequency Identification (RFID) chips – such as those used in passports and turnstiles in car parks. It can be used to analyse how many of a certain type of vehicle may be on a certain road, 412 or be embedded in licence plates – in order to allow for real-time vehicle identification. These ‘e-plates’ have an embedded tag with a specific, encrypted identification number that can be detected by RFID

405. Email exchange with Mark Galeotti, 11 February 2015.

406. Ibid.


readers. This number can be matched to a central database containing data about the vehicle (such as the registration number, make, model, insurance details, etc.). The DoJ has also built a database capable of tracking US vehicle movements, which can scan and store license plates. German authorities subsequently reconstructed the journeys that the victims shot at had taken, and analysis of the bulk data eventually helped lead to the shooter. Clearly, Germany felt that the lives of its citizens were at threat and used the legal means at its disposal. Yet, it can hardly be said that this use of bulk data was especially less intrusive than that of the NSA or GCHQ: German and US perceptions of privacy clearly just differ.

3. Incidental collection of our everyday communications is a new reality

The tangling of data streams and external and internal communications means that there must be a public acceptance of the risk of incidental collection of our everyday communications during the NSA’s and GCHQ’s intelligence work. As General Alexander said:

[If] all the terrorists – the bad guys – would go to one sector of the network, call it badguys.com, then all we would have to do is monitor that area and everybody else’s communications would flow freely. But the reality is, they use the same devices we do, the same networks and platforms we use, and, as a consequence, the communications are intermingled.

Referring to the need for this collection to take place in bulk, Lobban has commented that “[y]ou can’t pick and choose the components of a global interception system that you like (catching terrorists and paedophiles), and those you don’t (incidental collection of data at scale): it’s one integrated system.” He went on to say, “It would be very nice if terrorists or serious criminals used a particular method of communication and everybody else used something else. That is not the case.”

As a result, intelligence agencies on the lookout for foreign communications from terrorists inevitably end up capturing domestic communications from innocent citizens. Yet, as long as the correct oversight is in place to ensure that access to this data is not abused — and, so far, there is very little to suggest that it is being — this should not be the cause for huge concern that some have attempted to portray it as.

4. Private corporations also have access to large amounts of personal data

So much emphasis has been placed on the government’s collection of data that the activities of private companies have been given insufficient attention. As President Obama has stated, it is not just the government which is trying to access data: “[c]orporations of all shapes and sizes track what you buy, store and analyze our data, and use it for commercial purposes; that’s how those targeted ads pop up on your computer and your smartphone periodically.”

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418. ‘Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence’, The White House – Office of the Press Secretary, 17 January 2014. Sir Iain Lobban has also commented, “Who has the info on you? It’s the commercial companies, not us, who know everything – a massive sharing of data. The other day I bought a watch for my wife. Soon there were lots of pop-up watches advertising themselves on our computer” (GCHQ: “This is not Blitz Britain. We sure as hell can’t lick terrorism on our own”), The Telegraph, 11 October 2014.
Jamie Bartlett, *Demos*’s Director of the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media, recently asked:

[D]o you ever wonder why it is that we get all these amazing internet services – Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Gmail – for free? […] it costs an awful lot of money to run these platforms: the server space, the highly skilled engineers, the legal teams. We are paying all right […] We pay with our data and our privacy.419

A US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation outlined, in a December 2013 report, how exactly companies use this sort of data:

a wide range of companies known as “data brokers” collect and maintain data on hundreds of millions of consumers, which they analyze, package, and sell generally without consumer permission or input. […] Consumers have no means of knowing the extent and nature of information that data brokers collect about them and share with others for their own financial gain.420

Data brokers sell this information for marketing purposes; credit-risk assessment; and fraud prevention, mining enormous levels of personal data from hundreds of millions of people. This can include addresses, phone numbers, medical conditions, what types of item they shop for online, even the type of car that consumers own.421 Meanwhile, ‘third-party cookies’ are issued by advertising companies to follow consumer browsing habits when surfing the internet. This helps explain why you can search for a product on Amazon, for example, and then be inundated with adverts selling the same product when you visit another website.

Michael Hayden has offered two reasons as to why, despite these aggressive data-mining policies, corporations have not received the same level of scrutiny as the government:

One is habit. We in the western world […] are accustomed to our privacy being threatened by government […] That instinct of “distrust the government, trust these guys” may not be an appropriate response to the modern world. The other thing is more concrete […] Google, Yahoo and Microsoft may squeeze my privacy; they’re not going to put me in jail. The government can put you in jail. And so there’s also a real concern that you really do want your government more limited than what the private sector may be able to do for profit.422

Despite this, concern about how data is being used has been reflected in public polling in the UK. A 2014 Deloitte Data Nation report showed that 24% of respondents did not trust any organisation with personal data, while an Ipsos MORI and Royal Statistics Society poll showed just 6% of respondents felt that companies had their best interests at heart when using data (compared to 11% for the government).423

5. What ‘privacy’ means is more contentious than ever424

These data issues tie in to our perceptions of privacy. As citizens are increasingly choosing to share

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421. Ibid.


424. This is a subject tackled thoroughly by Bartlett, in: *Orwell versus the Terrorists* (2015).
vast amounts of their private details online, using various social-media platforms, the meaning of privacy is increasingly ambiguous.

Brad Smith, the Executive Vice President and General Counsel at Microsoft, has commented that, “consumers want to share their personal information, but […] they actually want to decide who they share that information with and they want to determine how this information will be used.”

This may be accurate; it is also, ultimately, unrealistic.

Donald Kerr, one of the top intelligence officials within the George W. Bush administration, made perceptive comments on this front in November 2007, saying that “[t]oo often, privacy has been equated with anonymity; and it’s an idea that is deeply rooted in American culture […] but in our interconnected and wireless world, anonymity – or the appearance of anonymity – is quickly becoming a thing of the past”. He posited a controversial understanding of what privacy today actually means: “a system of laws, rules, and customs with an infrastructure of inspectors general, oversight committees, and privacy boards on which our intelligence community commitment is based and measured […] it is that framework that we need to grow and nourish and adjust as our cultures change.”

If this shift in accepting that both state and non-state actors will inevitably have access to certain private details is not underway yet, then it must begin. Governments have access to all kind of information about citizens – including financial and medical data – and it is far from clear whether the public would be happy to hand over less data or have more transparency if it meant more terrorist attacks or a higher crime rate.

6. There could be another Snowden – and the impact may actually harm press freedom

There has been much discussion, and some attempts at reform, in order to “stop the next Edward Snowden”. At the NSA, 42 changes have been implemented for example, the introduction of a “two-person rule” – likely meaning that those copying data from a government network, onto portable storage media, must do so in the company of a second employee.

Yet, over five million US-government employees have security clearances, with over 1.5 million having “Top Secret” clearance. This helps to explain James Clapper’s comment that “we will never ever be able to guarantee that there will not be another Edward Snowden” – namely, “because this is a large enterprise composed of human beings with all their idiosyncrasies” and why Admiral Michael Rogers has said, “Am I ever going to sit here and say […] with 100 percent certainty no one can compromise our systems from the inside? […] Nope. Because I don’t

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427. Ibid.
432. ‘Spy Chief James Clapper: We Can’t Stop Another Snowden’, The Daily Beast, 23 February 2014.
believe that in the long run.”

With this being the case, governments must consider how they would respond next time around. Clearly, there needs to be a free press and there are occasions when whistle-blowing on state wrongdoing can be a public good; yet, the activities that Snowden exposed were not illegal and were, often, not even related to domestic surveillance. In fact, they arguably showed the depth of intelligence agencies’ attempts to safeguard security and their advanced capacity to do so. However, this was not a universally accepted interpretation. To some extent (and it differs from country to county), Snowden has eroded public trust in the intelligence agencies’ work. Another intelligence dump into the public domain would likely damage security and, potentially (albeit, unfairly), erode trust in our democratically elected governments even further.

In the UK, so far, there has been a reluctance to issue injunctions or Defence Advisory Notices (DA-Notices – the requests by the government, to editors, not to publish a story, out of concerns for national security); Prime Minister David Cameron stated that he preferred that the government appealed to “newspapers’ sense of social responsibility.” However, he has also warned that, if media outlets “don’t demonstrate some social responsibility it would be very difficult for government to stand back and not to act.”

If there were to be the threat of another Snowden-style leak, governments may take a significantly more aggressive approach in the future. The breakdown in trust between press and government that could follow would be an unhealthy one for a democratic society to suffer, and one that would only benefit those actors seeking to undermine the US; the UK; and its allies.

DIPLOMACY

1. Reining in spying on our allies may be counterproductive

Espionage regarding state-on-state relations is a relatively simple equation: nations spy on each other. The Snowden disclosures showed that the US was exceptionally good at spying on other nations – including its allies – and this was a cause of severe embarrassment to many.

To the extent that it has existed, the post-Snowden backlash from Europe has been led by Germany. The country’s vigour on this issue is partly because of recent memories of the East Germany security agency, the Stasi, although also due to domestic outrage at the fact that Angela Merkel herself was subject to surveillance from the NSA.

In response, the German government extended its surveillance and counter-espionage operations to all foreign-intelligence agencies operating on German soil, including those from Britain and America. This was the first time that this had occurred since 1945 – effectively subjecting both countries’ intelligence operations to the same counter-espionage measures as China, Russia, and Iran. The German government also requested that the CIA station chief leave the country.


435. Ibid.


October 2013, Merkel said that “spying on friends is not on at all”\textsuperscript{430} by February 2014, she had even proposed the creation of a European communications network – “so that one shouldn’t have to send emails and other information across the Atlantic [to the US]”.\textsuperscript{439}

Part of this is for show. Germany has gained significantly from NSA intelligence in the past and continues to work with the agency;\textsuperscript{440} this co-operation has been stepped up even further with the rise to power of the Islamic State.\textsuperscript{441} This is also relevant to the UK; one German intelligence official has been quoted as saying that, when it comes to tracking returning fighters from Iraq and Syria, “[w]ithout the information from British signals intelligence we would be blind.”\textsuperscript{442} Furthermore, a parliamentary inquiry in Berlin concluded that Germany had actually been spying on other EU member states and sharing this intelligence with the US for over a decade.\textsuperscript{443} There has clearly been a great deal of hypocrisy and feigned outrage from Germany following the Snowden disclosures.

However, Chris Inglis has acknowledged that not all of the NSA’s work has “withstood […] the above the fold […] of the newspaper test”, and that people might perceive certain aspects of it as causing “more damage than good”.\textsuperscript{444} This means that, in the future, there may be greater emphasis placed on whether certain types of intelligence gathering – on allies, for example – is worthwhile carrying out if it were to be exposed.\textsuperscript{445}

Yet, it is not just the US that has an aggressive spying strategy. In January 2014, President Obama said that “the intelligence services of other countries – including some who feign surprise over the Snowden disclosures – are constantly probing our government and private sector networks, and accelerating programs to listen to our conversations, and intercept our emails, and compromise our systems.”\textsuperscript{446} This includes not only adversaries such as China and Russia, but allies as well: consider the recent stories that emerged of Israel and the US spying on each other with regard to the latter’s negotiations with Iran.\textsuperscript{447}

2. **NSA and GCHQ interest in state-run corporations is understandable, but will be returned in kind**

There is a careful surveillance line to navigate when what is a state-run and what is a privately run corporation begins to blur.

An example of this is the NSA’s monitoring of the Brazilian petrol giant, Petrobras, which is majority-owned by the state. When the story broke, there were accusations that the US was attempting to


\textsuperscript{444} ‘Transcript: NSA Deputy Director John Inglis’, NPR, 10 January 2014.

\textsuperscript{445} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{446} ‘Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence’, The White House – Office of the Press Secretary, 17 January 2014.

gain economic advantage for its own companies, and one commentator declared that “[t]he only ones scrutinizing Petrobras should be its investors, analysts at Wall Street’s banks, credit rating agencies, and the people of Brazil who implicitly own the company”, not a US spy agency.\footnote{448}

Yet, as James Clapper has said, the US wants “early warning of international financial crises which could negatively impact the global economy”, and “insight into other countries’ economic policy or behavior which could affect global markets.”\footnote{449} On that front, monitoring a seemingly corrupt, state-run company to which the US has loaned billions of dollars and whose performance has a significant impact on the stability of Brazil and, subsequently, all of South America was defensible.\footnote{450}

The logic behind this was proved when \textit{Petrobras} became embroiled in the centre of a major corruption scandal towards the end of 2014. Brazilian authorities have alleged that \textit{Petrobras} has funnelled money earned on inflated contracts into the coffers of domestic political parties, including the governing Workers’ Party.\footnote{451} Dozens of Brazilian politicians have been accused of accepting large cash sums in payments, and huge protests have taken place demanding the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff.\footnote{452}

It is likely that the NSA applies a broad remit as to the kind of state-owned companies which it monitors. With that being the case, there cannot be much surprise if other nations take an interest in the communications of Wall Street banks, for example; they likely already have done so.

## A Way Forward

### Translucency, not transparency

States need secrets, for intelligence and military purposes; criminal investigations; and a host of other reasons. Yet, they also need public consent, in order to operate with credibility, and the intelligence agencies may have been overly secretive. As Michael Hayden has said, “the sum of individually defensible classification decisions is creating a lack of public confidence in the intelligence community’s lawfulness”;\footnote{453} something defensible in isolation is, perhaps, indefensible when taken in totality.

Hayden has also commented that the intelligence community “has got to show a lot more leg […] otherwise we won’t get to do \textit{any} of what we want to do, because the public support will be so withdrawn, that politically, no one is going to give us the authorisation.”\footnote{454} Similar sentiments were voiced by Sir David Omand, in a paper that he co-authored with Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller of \textit{Demos}: “Democratic legitimacy demands that where new methods of intelligence gathering and use are to be introduced they should be on a firm legal basis and rest on parliamentary and public

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\footnote{454}{‘Getting Counterterrorism Right: A Transatlantic Conversation’, \textit{The Henry Jackson Society}, 30 September 2013.}
understanding of what is involved”. Since Snowden’s disclosures, James Clapper has stated that the US government should have made the Section 215 programme public.

Yet, as Shane Harris, the journalist and author of @War, recently commented, such statements are “very easy […] to say in hindsight”. There is little precedent for intelligence agencies seeking the opportunity to disclose large amounts of important information (and, arguably, correctly so). Harris severely doubted that if the next NSA Director or DNI was given the opportunity, “unprompted by a leak, [to disclose] some significant level of detail about a domestic intelligence-gathering programme, that he or she will actually do it”.

Finding the balance on knowing when and where intelligence agencies can open up is not easy. One UK official commented that the right time to talk about aspects of the intelligence agencies’ work is “before things become contentious”, and that the problem with the Snowden leaks was that the public’s broad understanding of state capacity had not caught up with what that actual capacity was. However, even those officials who are open to more transparency warn of an “irreducible core” of methods that cannot be revealed; could be quite broad; and will be defended, by them, to the hilt.

There must always be a level of diffusiveness as to how intelligence is gathered, and the concept of ‘translucency, not transparency’ has been coined by Michael Leiter, the former head of the National Counterterrorism Center. As explained by Michael Hayden, with “[t]ranslucent, you can see through the thick glass. You get the broad outline of the shapes. You get the broad patterns of movements. But you don’t get the fine print.”

This is a vital distinction. There must be broad public consent for the work being done by intelligence agencies; yet, clearly, the public cannot be given the operational details. Making this translucency approach a reality is a vital task for intelligence agencies in the future.


458. Ibid., 10:14.

459. Private conversation.

460. Private conversation.

Conclusion

Snowden has kick-started a debate on surveillance that otherwise may not have happened. However, this is only a positive to the extent that, as Chris Inglis puts it, “somebody who burned my house down has given me the opportunity to perhaps build it in a way that I would prefer.”

Even if, for the sake of argument, we accept that The Guardian and The Washington Post have been responsible with what they have disclosed, Snowden stole huge amounts of data – including military and intelligence capabilities – and left it to their discretion as to what to publish. It was wildly reckless and irresponsible.

From certain sections of civil society, through to technology giants, the Snowden disclosures have shaken trust in intelligence agencies. This is an ill-deserved outcome after decades of vital work. Furthermore, the media has begun to use ‘mass surveillance’ and ‘bulk collection’ as synonyms; it is entirely inaccurate to do so. Analysts at the NSA, GCHQ, and such agencies are looking to distil the relevant information and set aside the extraneous; they want to discard irrelevant data, not explore it. With GCHQ, even when it can confirm that communications are relevant to a known target, it still does not have the capacity to read all of them; it is constantly prioritising on a case-by-case basis.

Ultimately, Snowden only exposed that our agencies are essentially doing what we ask: they are not spying on the phone calls of ordinary citizens or brazenly looking at our e-mails; they are legally intercepting certain communications, in an attempt to advance the national interest. We may not like components of how it is done – sweeping up bulk data, for example – and we may be surprised at the methods used; but it is done for a good reason, and the state giving up these powers invites attack from terrorists; cyber criminals; or a host of other state and non-state actors.

However, the system is not perfect. Tweaks to legislation and oversight have already been made and will continue to be made. It is vital that this process persists. For intelligence agencies to be effective, there must be a broad public consensus about the types of work that they are understood to be carrying out; otherwise, politicians will be unwilling to give them the authorisation to carry out the kind of work that they currently are. Therefore, agencies may have to open up further than they have in the past. Equally, however, civil society has to accept that unalloyed transparency is not always a positive, and that there are good reasons for certain state secrets.

Such is the scale of security threats facing the West, building this consensus cannot wait any longer.

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462. ‘Transcript: NSA Deputy Director John Inglis’, NPR, 10 January 2014.


464. Private conversation.

In the spring of 2013, former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden stole a large quantity of classified government files. Via select journalists, Snowden revealed how intelligence agencies were tapping into fibre-optic cables containing telephony and internet-traffic data; intercepting and storing webcam images; and carrying out alleged ‘warrantless’ surveillance.

His actions have had a profound impact. There are calls for intelligence agencies to reform and be more transparent in order to rebuild trust. Yet the expectation that they stop terrorist attacks and serious crimes remains. Intelligence agencies are in a particularly unenviable position: asked to be less intrusive; more transparent; and yet, just as effective.

_Surveillance After Snowden: Effective Espionage in an Age of Transparency_ studies the ways in which Snowden’s actions have impacted the US and the UK (particularly in terms of national security) and what lessons may be learned for the future.

‘If you believe in the cause of freedom, then proclaim it, live it and protect it, for humanity’s future depends on it.’

Henry M ‘Scoop’ Jackson
(May 31, 1912 – September 1, 1983)
US Congressman and Senator for Washington State from 1941 – 1983