

AL-QAEDA IN THE UNITED STATES

A Complete Analysis of Terrorism Offenses

Robin Simcox | Emily Dyer

Foreword by Gen. Michael Hayden

AL-QAEDA IN THE UNITED STATES

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Al-Qaeda in the United States: A Complete Analysis of Terrorism Offenses
By Robin Simcox and Emily Dyer

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FOREWORD

In the summer of 2011 the Henry Jackson Society published a compendium of Islamist terrorism in the United Kingdom. This study has become the “well thumbed” encyclopedia for anyone in Great Britain committed to preserving both the liberty and the safety of British citizens. The study’s statistical findings and analytic insights have provided invaluable tools to governments, security services and academics worldwide. Now the Henry Jackson Society has turned its eye toward the same phenomena in the United States and we are blessed that it has.

Testifying before the American Congress during the later years of the Bush Administration, Charles Allen (Chief of intelligence for the Department of Homeland Security) and I were asked about the “homegrown” threat here in the United States. Without any pre-coordination between us, we both quickly answered that--although the American historical experience perhaps gave us certain advantages with regard to assimilating immigrant communities-- we were not immune from this danger and were likely to see it grow.

As indeed it has. A drive-by shooting in Little Rock, a massacre at Fort Hood, a car bomb in Times Square, explosives en route to the New York City subway--all done in the name of God and all done by long term American citizens and residents.

As America responds to these new realities and dangers, it needs to do so in a way that does not change its character as a people or as a free society. It needs to protect itself in a manner that is least disruptive to its national values and its national life.


And that is why this report--with its objectivity, its comprehensiveness, its care--is so important. A study of this scale, of this ambition and of this meticulousness has never before been attempted in the United States and its findings will allow those responsible for our security and our liberty to make judgments based on fact rather than on hyperbole, fear or prejudice.

Have we, to date, been more threatened by native born Americans or immigrants? By converts or by those born into Islam? By the well educated or those with limited schooling? By those who have been trained abroad or by the truly self radicalized?

The answers matter. And now we in the United States have historic profiles and data which we can employ to guide our actions.

On entering the iconic grand concourse at CIA, the visitor cannot help but notice the passage from the gospel of John carved on the wall: “And ye shall know the truth, and the truth will make you free.” The truths, the facts, the data that the Henry Jackson Society has provided us in this volume will help keep Americans free while also helping to make them safe.

This is a remarkable work. The Henry Jackson Society is to be commended not just for its diligence but also for its sense of a shared future between the people of the United States and of Great Britain. If we but make prudent use of the material they have provided, that shared future will be safer for us all.



Michael V. Hayden (General, USAF, retired)

Principal, The Chertoff Group

Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Former Director, National Security Agency

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For over a decade, al-Qaeda (AQ) and al-Qaeda inspired terrorism has posed the most significant threat to U.S. national security. This manifested itself most devastatingly on September 11, 2001. Since then, a number of AQ's key leaders have been either killed or captured. However, the group is adaptable, and its threat has diversified. AQ and its various franchises still aspire to attack U.S. interests and, significantly, are still able to recruit U.S. citizens to its cause.

Al-Qaeda in the United States shows how the terrorist threat within the U.S. has developed, by profiling all AQ or AQ-inspired terrorists who were convicted in U.S. courts (federal and military) or who participated in suicide attacks against the U.S. homeland between 1997 and 2011.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Al-Qaeda in the United States profiles 171 individuals who were convicted for al-Qaeda related offenses (AQROs) or committed suicide attacks between 1997 and 2011. It provides statistical analysis on their background (such as age, nationality, occupation, education and whether they were a religious convert); data relating to types of offenses, type of charge and their subsequent sentence; outlines individual connections to other known terrorists or designated terrorist organizations; and studies whether these individuals had received terrorist training or had combat experience.

One individual was convicted of offenses on two separate occasions; another individual was convicted on three separate occasions. In each of these cases, the convictions have been counted separately. As a result, there was a combined total of 174 convictions and attacks.

Year on year threat

The date of charge (or attack), rather than date of conviction has been used as a standard measure of the year of offense. The year with the highest number of AQROs was 2009.

- There was a clear rise in AQROs in 2001 – largely caused by the attacks of September 11. This number then declined until a slight rise in 2005. There was a significant drop in AQROs in 2008 (with AQRO levels dropping to the pre-9/11 period), followed by a spike in 2009 – the year when the highest number of AQROs (13% of the total) occurred.

Age and gender

AQROs are primarily – though not exclusively – committed by young men.

- The overwhelming majority (95%) of terrorist offenses were committed by men.
- Eight women have been convicted. Two of these were convicted for their roles in supporting their partners commit AQROs. The remaining six women were convicted of charges that included ; Attempted Identity Theft; Attempted Murder; Armed Assault; Conspiracy to Kill; Discharge of a Firearm; Conspiring to Provide and Providing Material Support to Terrorists or a Terrorist Organization (specifically al-Shabaab); and False Statements.
- Over half (57%) of AQROs were committed by those aged under 30. One third of AQROs were committed by those aged 20 to 24.
- The mean average was 29.6 years, and the modal age was 24.
- The age at time of charge ranged from 19 to 63.

Nationality, origin and place of residence

AQRO analysis shows that the majority of the AQ and AQ-inspired threat to the U.S. homeland comes from 'home-grown' terrorism, with U.S. citizens, including U.S. born citizens, featuring prominently among AQRO perpetrators.

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Nationality

- Over half (54%) of AQROs were committed by U.S. citizens. The second most common nationality of AQRO perpetrators was Saudi Arabian (9%); with Pakistanis the third most common (6%).
- Over a third (36%) of the total number of individuals who committed an AQRO were born in the U.S.
- In total, individuals of twenty eight different nationalities committed AQROs.
- As a proportion of their overall involvement, U.S. citizens committed more AQROs than foreign nationals in eight of the fifteen years studied. These were: 1999, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010.

Origin

- Over a third (36%) of individuals who committed AQROs had some kind of American ancestry, either by ethnicity of birth. The most frequent ancestry category was African American (10% of AQROs) followed by American white Caucasians (8%).
- Individuals of Western Asian ancestry comprise a quarter (25%) of those who committed AQROs. Those of Saudi Arabian ancestry account for 11% of this total.

Place of residence

- 82% of AQROs were committed by individuals residing in the U.S. (including three individuals already incarcerated at time of charge) at the time of charge or attack. The individuals resided in 26 different states, spread among all four regions in the U.S.
- Among those residing in the U.S., the state of New York featured most prominently, with 14% of individuals living there. Outside of New York, the two most common states of residence were Florida (11%) and New Jersey (9%).
- The most common region of residence was the South, where over one third (36%) of AQROs perpetrators resided. The Northeast followed with 30%.
- The most common place of residence of AQROs committed by those born in the U.S. was New York (20%), followed by California and Virginia (9%).
- Two of the three most common states – Florida and New Jersey – were the place of residence for a significantly high amount of non-U.S. born individuals (18% and 14% respectively). Conversely, the most common state, New York, had a higher proportion of U.S. born AQRO perpetrators residing there than non-U.S. born individuals.

Education and employment

Those who committed AQROs were mainly well educated. A small majority were in employment or education at the time of charge or attack.

- Over half (52%) of the individuals who committed an AQRO had attended some form of college.
- Nearly a quarter (23%) of AQRO perpetrators had been educated to between college graduate and doctorate level.
- 44% of AQRO perpetrators were in employment at the time of charge or attack. A further 13% were full time students. Therefore, 57% of AQRO perpetrators were in employment or education.
- Over a quarter (28%) of AQRO perpetrators were unemployed.
- 60% of U.S. citizens who committed AQROs had received a college education.
- Of U.S. born offenders, 49% were employed and 18% were students. Therefore, 67% of all U.S. born

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individuals were in employment or education.

Religious converts

While AQROs are mainly carried out by those raised as Muslim, a significant proportion of the AQ and AQ-inspired threat comes from religious converts.

- Nearly a quarter (24%) of all AQROs were committed by converts to Islam.
- Where known, all were converts from Christianity.
- The most common (modal) age at time of charge amongst religious converts (32 years) was significantly higher than among non-converts and among all AQROs (both 24 years).
- 41% of U.S. citizens were religious converts.
- Over half (54%) of individuals born in the U.S. were religious converts.
- Converts were most likely to reside in the South (36%), and most commonly resided in Virginia at time of charge (12%).
- 83% of religious converts had some kind of American ancestry. 40% of religious converts had African American ancestry; and a quarter were of American white Caucasian ancestry.
- As a proportion of their overall involvement, religious converts committed more AQROs than non-converts in eight of the fifteen years studied. These were: 1998, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011.
- The years 2003, 2007 and 2010 saw the joint highest levels of AQROs committed by converts (17% in both years).

Diversity of threat and type of activity

The AQ and AQ-inspired terrorism threat to the U.S. can be placed into five distinct categories of offenders: Active Participants, Aspirants, Trained Aspirants, Facilitators and Ideologues.

- The total of 174 AQROs vary in the type of offense, immediacy of the threat and intent of the perpetrator, and are divided into five distinct categories.
 - **Active Participants** – Individuals who committed or were imminently about to commit acts of terrorism – were responsible for 37% of AQROs.
 - **Aspirants** – Individuals who demonstrated an interest in terrorism but whose plans were not advanced enough to pose an imminent threat or whose role was limited – were responsible for 25% of AQROs.
 - **Facilitators** – Individuals involved in the preparation for acts of terrorism, either operationally; by fundraising; or by transferring documentation, material goods or finances – were responsible for 21% of AQROs.
 - **Trained Aspirants** – Individuals who demonstrated an interest in terrorism whose plans were not advanced enough to pose an imminent threat or whose role was limited, but who had received terrorist training at camps abroad – were responsible for 15% of AQROs.
 - **Ideologues** – Individuals involved in the preparation for acts of terrorism by incitement or by encouraging terrorist acts – were responsible for 2% of AQROs.
- Over two thirds of Active Participant AQROs (68%) were committed by those aged under 30. Furthermore, between 62% and 67% of Aspirant, Trained Aspirant and Ideologue AQROs were aged under 30. In contrast, only 25% of Facilitator AQROs were under 30.

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- Almost half (48%) of non-U.S. born individuals were Active Participants – over double the proportion of U.S. born Active Participants (21%).
- U.S. born individuals were much more likely to be Aspirants (43% of all U.S. born) than non-U.S. born (16%).
- When combining both trained and non-trained, 62% of all U.S. born AQROs are committed by some type of Aspirant – compared to only 28% of non-U.S. born citizens.
- A third (33%) of religious converts were Aspirants, and just under a third (31%) were Active Participants (31%).
- The numbers of Active Participants, Facilitators, Trained Aspirants and Aspirants charged rose sharply in 2009, before levelling off to numbers consistent with 2002 – 2007 in 2010.

Charges, sentences and undercover investigations

19 AQROs were committed by suicide attackers. Analysis of the remaining 155 separate AQRO convictions reveals a spread of severity of charges and length of sentence. Almost all convictions were gained in federal courts, with Material Support charges most commonly used.

- The vast majority (97%) of the 155 AQROs resulting in successful convictions were prosecuted in federal courts. Just 3% of all convictions took place in a military court.
- 65% of defendants pleaded guilty.
- A total of 415 separate charges were successfully prosecuted between 1997 and 2011.
- In this report, charges have been split into ten separate categories. Offenses are categorised as follows: Material Support; Mass Casualty; Kill, Kidnap, Maim or Injure; Firearms; False Information; General Conspiracy; Aiding the Enemy; Financial; Facilitation; and Rhetoric.
- Material Support was the largest category, comprising nearly a quarter of the overall total (24%). The two most common individual charges from any category are in Material Support: Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists (8% of the total charges) and Providing Material Support to Terrorists (6%).
- The second most common category was Mass Casualty, which contained nearly a quarter (22%) of all successful charges. The most common charge in this category was Conspiracy to Damage or Destroy Buildings, Property or Public Transport of the United States (4%).
- The most common sentence received for an AQRO, given 24 times, was between 10 – 14 years (16% of all sentences). The second most common sentence length was life imprisonment (14%). One individual was sentenced to death (a sentence that has, at time of writing, not been carried out). 18% of all AQRO convictions are still awaiting sentence.
- An undercover investigation – the state placing informants or undercover officers into an AQRO case – took place in over a quarter (29%) of AQROs.
- The majority of undercover investigations (64%) were against Aspirants, who make up 25% of all AQROs. Therefore, undercover investigations were disproportionately focused on Aspirants.
- Of the 44 Aspirant AQROs, nearly three quarters (73%), were the subject of an undercover investigation. This is over four times as high as the next most common offender role: Active Participant AQROs, 17% of which were the subject of an undercover investigation.
- Undercover investigations have tended to focus on slightly younger AQRO perpetrators. The mean average age of those subject to undercover investigations is 28.6 (compared to 30 for AQROs not involving an undercover investigation), and the median age is 26 (as opposed to 28).

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Links to Designated Terrorist Organizations (DTOs)

Those who committed AQROs were usually linked to a DTO, the most popular of which was AQ. The majority of those who were linked to a DTO were non-U.S. citizens, not religious converts and not the subject of an undercover investigation.

- The majority of individuals (57%) were directly linked to a DTO.
- The most prevalent group was AQ, with 38% of individuals directly linked to either AQ or al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 9% were linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT); and 5% to al-Shabaab.
- 43% of those linked to a DTO were U.S. citizens, a lower proportion than U.S. citizens overall (54%).
- 70% of those with no known links to a DTO were U.S. citizens.
- Only 10% of those AQROs subject to undercover investigations were committed by individuals linked to a DTO.
- Two thirds of converts were not linked to a DTO.
- There were nine individual actors whose offenses were not reliant or connected to any kind of network, cell or DTO. Overall, individual actors comprised 4% of all AQRO perpetrators.

Terrorist training

Nearly half of AQRO perpetrators had attended training camps for terrorist purposes. Of those who did, Afghanistan was the most popular location.

- 47% of individuals attended training camps for terrorist purposes.
- Of those who received terrorist training, 68% attended camps in Afghanistan; 29% in Pakistan and 5% in Somalia. Therefore, the overwhelming majority (97%) of trained individuals had trained in either Afghanistan, or Pakistan, or both.
- The most popular camp was al-Qaeda's al-Farouq, responsible for nearly a third of all incidences of training (30%). Al-Matar followed with 19%, and the third most common was Khalden (9%). All three camps were based in Afghanistan.
- A third of U.S. citizens had attended a training camp for terrorist purposes.
- Over a third (39%) of those who had received terrorist training were U.S. citizens.
- Of those AQROs subject to undercover investigations, 10% were committed by individuals who had received terrorist training. In comparison, of those AQROs not subject to an undercover investigation, 63% were committed by individuals who had received training.

Combat experience

A high percentage of AQRO perpetrators had no experience of combat in warzones. Of those who did, Afghanistan was the most popular location.

- The majority (82%) of individuals who committed AQROs had no combat experience.
- Of the 30 individuals who had fought abroad, Afghanistan was the most common location, responsible for 63% of incidences of training. The next two most common countries were Bosnia and Somalia, with 10% each.
- All but one (97%) of those with combat experience had also received terrorist training.
- One third of individuals with combat experience were U.S. citizens.
- 87% of those who had combat experience were linked to a DTO.

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Mass Casualty Operatives (MCOs)

Mass casualty operatives refer to those individuals who were also part of a major plot. There have been ten major plots against the U.S. since 2000, involving 36 individuals. The MCOs were primarily terrorist trained, college educated individuals from Western Asia.

- The majority of MCOs are Western Asian (56%), mainly from Saudi Arabia (44% of all MCOs). 17% of MCOs are American, the second most common nationality.
- 58% of MCOs were educated to college level or above.
- One third of MCOs were in employment or education at the time of charge or attack, a significantly lower proportion than among all AQRO perpetrators (57%).
- While 89% of MCOs had terrorist training (of which 78% occurred in Afghanistan), only 17% had known combat experience.
- Of those with combat experience, 83% of the incidences of combat experience occurred in Afghanistan. The remaining 17% took place in Bosnia.
- The vast majority (94%) of MCOs were linked to DTOs. Only two MCOs had no links to DTOs.
- 11% of MCOs were religious converts.

Suicide attacks

19 hijackers launched a series of four co-ordinated suicide attacks upon New York City and Washington, D.C., the only AQ or AQ-inspired suicide attacks that have occurred on the U.S. homeland. These attackers were primarily young, Saudi Arabian nationals with a college education and terrorist training

- 11% of all AQROs were the suicide attacks of September 11, 2001.
- 95% of suicide attackers were Western Asian, with Saudi Arabians comprising 79% of this number.
- 58% of suicide attackers had been educated up to college level or above.
- The mean average age of the suicide attackers (23.9) was significantly younger than that of those convicted in federal or military courts (30.3).
- All of the suicide attackers had received terrorist training, yet only one (5%) had known combat experience.

SIGNIFICANT PRECEDENTS

Al-Qaeda in the United States details several significant precedents:

- In 1997, Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl became the first member of AQ to plead guilty in the U.S. to offenses relating to involvement with the group. Following his confession, al-Fadl subsequently became a witness for the state.
- In October 2000, Ali A. Mohamed became the first member of AQ to be successfully convicted as part of a trial in a U.S. federal court. Mohamed was a former member of the U.S. Army.
- In May 2001, Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-'Owhali, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, Wadih el-Hage and Khalfan Khamis Mohammed became the first individuals convicted in a U.S. federal court for an act of terrorism perpetrated by AQ – namely the 1998 East African U.S. Embassy bombings. A convert to Islam from Christianity, el-Hage was the first American citizen to be convicted of an AQRO.
- In September 2001, 19 foreign nationals hijacked four planes and attacked targets in New York and Washington, D.C., killing 2,996 and becoming the only individuals to conduct a successful suicide operation

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on the U.S. homeland to date. Attempted follow-up AQ attacks against aviation led to convictions in U.S. courts for Richard Reid (October 2002) and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (October 2011).

- In July 2002, John Walker Lindh became the first U.S. born citizen to be convicted of an AQRO. He had assisted the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, and had previously trained at al-Farouq.
- In August 2002, Imran Mandhai became the first individual convicted of an AQRO following a Federal Bureau of Investigation undercover investigation.
- In March 2003, Sergeant Hasan Akbar became the first U.S. citizen convicted of an AQ-inspired murder when he killed two soldiers and injured fourteen others at a U.S. Army camp in Kuwait.
- In April 2003, Earnest James Ujaama became the first individual to be convicted of attempting to establish a terrorist training camp on U.S. soil.
- In September 2003, October Martinique Lewis became the first female to be convicted of an AQRO. Lewis laundered money to her ex-husband Jeffrey Battle, knowing that it would be used in his efforts to join the Taliban.
- In August 2003, Khwaja Mahmood Hasan became the first individual to be convicted for actions in support of the designated terrorist organization LeT.
- In April 2005, Zacarias Moussaoui became the only individual to have been convicted in connection with the September 11, 2001 attacks.
- In August 2007, José Padilla became the first individual previously designated as an enemy combatant by the U.S. Government to be convicted of an AQRO.
- In November 2007, Derrick Shareef became the first individual to be convicted of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction within the U.S., relating to a plot to set off several grenades in a shopping mall in Rockford, Illinois.
- In February 2009, Wesam al-Delaema became the only individual to date convicted of conspiring to murder U.S. soldiers in Iraq.
- In February 2009, Kamal Said Hassan became the first individual who had fought and trained with the designated terrorist organization al-Shabaab in Somalia to be convicted of an AQRO.
- In November 2010, Ahmed Ghailani became the first former Guantánamo Bay detainee to be convicted in a U.S. civilian court. He was convicted for his role in the 1998 East African U.S. Embassy bombings.
- In February 2010, AQ facilitator Aafia Siddiqui became the only female to be convicted of attempted murder as part of an AQRO, after she attacked U.S. officers and employees in Afghanistan.
- In February 2011, Colleen LaRose became the first white Caucasian female to be convicted of an AQRO.
- In October 2011, Hawo Hassan became the oldest individual convicted of an AQRO, having been found guilty of offenses which included conspiring to provide material support to al-Shabaab. She was 63 at the time of charge, and 64 at the time of conviction.

METHODOLOGY

STRUCTURE

The report is structured as follows:

- Section 1(1): Federal Convictions: A comprehensive list of AQ and AQ-inspired terrorism convictions in U.S. federal courts.
- Section 1(2): Military Convictions: A complete list of AQ convictions in U.S. military courts.
- Section 1(3): Suicide attacks: All AQ suicide attacks in the U.S.
- Section 2(1): Statistics: Statistical analysis of trends found in section 1(1); 1(2); and 1(3), including background information; charges and sentences; connections to designated terrorist organizations; combat experience; the frequency with which the individuals profiled received terrorist training; the frequency with which the individuals profiled received terrorist training, and, where applicable, the country of location. Also integrated into the statistics is a map indicating the distribution of places of residence for all individuals in sections 1(1), 1(2), and 1(3).

CRITERIA

In order to be included in this report, individuals must have been convicted for terrorism-related offenses in a U.S. federal or military court, or have committed suicide attacks in the U.S.

In addition, they must have been a member of AQ, or motivated primarily by a belief in AQ ideology, as detailed below.

DEFINITIONS

Acknowledging that there are no universally-accepted definitions for what constitutes AQ ideology or terrorism, the authors have used the following definitions as working criteria for inclusion:

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AQ is a transnational terrorist network that aspires to unite Muslim nations, in order to establish a global *caliphate* which would be governed by *Sharia* law; to expel Western presence and influence in Muslim-majority countries; and to initiate terrorist attacks and kidnappings against its perceived enemies. It is comprised of a core leadership (headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri) based in Pakistan and a number of regional franchises, each with varying degrees of autonomy from the central leadership.

AL-QAEDA'S IDEOLOGY

AQ's ideology is partly political, and partly grounded in a radical interpretation of Islamic theology.

AQ views Islam, as laid down in the Koran, as an all-encompassing socio-political system, of which the imposition of *Sharia* law and violent jihad (struggling for God via military battle) is an integral part. As stated in an AQ training manual, their key tenets are: 'Religion and government, worship and Jihad [...], ethics and dealing with people, and the Koran and sword'.¹

AQ also supports the creation of an expansionist, Islamic state – a *caliphate* extending from Indonesia to Morocco – which can be brought about by the formation of one Muslim *ummah*, a single global identity that transcends all other affiliations such as nationalism and tribalism. The AQ leadership regards the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 as a cataclysmic event for Muslim governance. The need to re-establish a *caliphate* – as well as key Islamist theologian Abul Ala Mawdudi's classification of all Muslim and non-Muslim societies not governed according to *Sharia* law as *jahaliyyah* (a state of ignorance concerning divine law) – is mixed with references to contemporary political issues in order to justify violent jihad and, ultimately, mass casualty attacks.

¹ Al-Qaeda Training Manual, The Al-Qaeda Documents – downloadable from the United States Department of Justice, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf

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AQ also cites local and national political grievances affecting Muslims, in an attempt to recruit new supporters. These grievances are aired in a religious context, and within a religiously ideological framework. Muslim suffering in the likes of Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, or Kashmir is commonly evoked. Current rulers in Muslim-majority countries are portrayed as Western proxies and, therefore, unwilling and unable to resolve these issues. Consequently, Muslim suffering and foreign grievances are interlinked with religious concerns. A narrative is created, declaring that Islam has strayed from its true path and that AQ is the revolutionary vanguard which can help correct its course.

TERRORISM

Different strands of the U.S. government define terrorism in varying ways. For example, terrorism is defined in Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 0.85, as ‘the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives’.² The Department of Defense defines it as ‘the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological’.³

This report uses the definition of terrorism as laid out in Title 22 of the United States Code of Federal Laws, Section 2656f(d): premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.⁴

This definition is used by sections of the U.S. government, including the State Department;⁵ National Counterterrorism Center;⁶ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.).⁷

CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION

In order to be included in this report, individuals must have either been convicted in a U.S. federal or military court, or have committed suicide attacks in the U.S. (specifically in the years between 1997 and 2011). They must also satisfy at least one of the following:

- Be a member of AQ – defined as having sworn *bayat* to its *emir*.
- Have links to AQ’s senior leadership – either AQ central, or its regional franchises – for purposes that demonstrably, and knowingly, furthered AQ or an AQ-inspired terrorist-cause.
- Have trained at camps known to be closely associated with AQ (for a full list of relevant camps, see p.12-13) – including those in countries such as Afghanistan or Pakistan – and subsequently convicted for AQ-related terrorism offenses.
- Be a member or associate of a group known to be affiliated or adherent with AQ and its ideology (including, but not limited to, LeT, al-Shabaab, and Tehrik-e-Taliban).^{8,9}

Should the individual not have any formal connections to AQ, they must instead demonstrate inspiration drawn from AQ’s ideology, as shown by any of the following:

- A self-proclaimed AQ-inspired motive (i.e. a suicide video or letter discussing key AQ concepts, such as martyrdom and jihad).

² ‘Terrorism 2002-2005’, United States Department of Justice, available at <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005>

³ ‘Congress; Bills; s.2885; Bill text’, *Govtrack.us*, May 8, 2012, available at <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s2885/text>

⁴ ‘USC; Title 22; Chapter 38; § 2656f’, *Cornell University Law School*, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2656f?quicktabs_8=1#quicktabs-8

⁵ ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2011’, United States Department of State, July 31, 2012, available at <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195554.htm>

⁶ ‘Terrorism Definitions’, National Counterterrorism Center, August 27, 2010, available at <http://www.nctc.gov/site/other/definitions.html>

⁷ ‘Terrorism 2002-2005’, United States Department of Justice

⁸ Using the U.S. Government’s definition: Individuals who have formed collaborative relationships with, act on behalf of, or are otherwise inspired to take action in furtherance of the goals of al-Qa’ida – the organization and the ideology – including by engaging in violence regardless of whether such violence is targeted at the United States, its citizens, or its interests, and available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf

⁹ One of the most contentious areas here lies with al-Shabaab in Somalia. The group did not become an official AQ franchise until February 2012, and has primarily focused on local goals, only launching attacks in Somalia. However, the group’s rhetoric espouses global jihadist aims and even before formally becoming a part of AQ, al-Shabaab had long established links to its leadership. For example, veteran AQ fighter Fazul Mohammed was both the former leader of al-Qaeda in East Africa and a senior al-Shabaab operative; and Ahmed Abdi Godane, the *emir* of al-Shabaab, publicly pledged loyalty to Osama bin Laden in a statement released in June 2008. Therefore, those who were convicted of al-Qaeda related offenses having fought and trained with al-Shabaab have been included.

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- An AQ-inspired motive for their offense, as identified and proven as such during trial.
- Possession of jihadist, AQ or AQ-inspired material (including, but not limited to, teachings from individuals such as Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Anwar al-Awlaki).
- Frequent contact with members of AQ, and requests for guidance, as part of the offense.
- Proof of identification with global jihadist, as opposed to purely nationalist, aims; or affiliation with groups known to focus on global aims.¹⁰

CASES OMITTED

Because of the severity of the threat of terrorism, and the subsequent interest in AQ and AQ-related studies, there have been a variety of other surveys undertaken on this subject area, both by government agencies and non-governmental organizations. There are, subsequently, a range of competing figures as to the total number of AQ-inspired convictions in the U.S.¹¹

The Department of Justice has released a list of 494 terrorism-related convictions from September 11, 2001, to December 3, 2011. However, this list includes convictions for actions not inspired by AQ (such as those connected to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or to the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka).¹² Furthermore, as then-Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty acknowledged in June 2006, upon closer inspection, individuals categorized as convicted or pleading guilty in ‘terrorism or terrorism-related cases’ since September 11, 2001, actually did not have established links to terrorism.¹³ The Department of Justice’s Inspector General has also previously criticized the inaccurate way in which his department classifies terrorism statistics, with cases which were initially filed under a terrorism category, at the time of charge, not being updated if no evidence of terrorism was subsequently found.¹⁴

The figures also conflict between different branches of the government. In September 2008, a White House press release stated that ‘[s]ince 9/11, more than two dozen terrorists and supporters have been convicted in the United States of terrorism-related crimes’.¹⁵ Yet, in the same year, the Department of Justice submitted a budget request in which it cited ‘319 convictions or guilty pleas in terrorism or terrorism-related cases arising from investigations conducted primarily after September 11, 2001.’¹⁶

There have been similar ambiguities in the figures cited by President Obama’s administration. For example, in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in November 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder stated that ‘[t]here are more than 300 convicted international and domestic terrorists currently in Bureau of Prisons custody’ (including terrorists convicted prior to 2001).¹⁷ However, discussing the use of federal courts in terrorism trials three months later, President Obama cited a different statistic, stating that the Bush administration had convicted 190 individuals.¹⁸

Non-governmental organizations have studied this area and also returned with widely-differing results:

- A 2009 study found that, by June 2, 2009, there were 195 convictions of ‘Islamist extremist terrorist organizations such as AQ or individuals and organizations that are ideologically or organizationally linked to such groups’.¹⁹

10 Jemaah Islamiyah’s links to terrorist attacks in multiple locations throughout Asia, its links to al-Qaeda, the fact that Osama bin Laden used to send funds, weapons and fighters to the group and the perceived influence of AQ ideology on the development of JI’s membership meant that this group was also included as a group inspired by AQ in this report. Finally, despite the debate as to the extent to which LeT is a global organization, the group’s members have perpetrated terrorist acts outside its own national borders. For example, a significant number of LeT members fought in defence of AQ and the Taliban following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the group launched a co-ordinated shooting and bombing operation in Mumbai in November 2008 which, at the very least, shows a strand of LeT with a global outlook similar to that of AQ.

11 ‘Just How Many Terrorists Has The U.S. Convicted’, *NPR*, October 18, 2012, available at <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123571858>

12 Introduction to National Security Division Statistics on Unsealed International Terrorism and Terrorism-Related Convictions, United States Department of Justice, available at <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/DOJ-Terrorism-Related-Convictions.pdf>

13 ‘F.B.I. Killed Plot In Talking Stage, A Top Aide Says’, *New York Times*, June 24, 2006, available at <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D05EFDA1630F937A15755C0A9609C8B63&pagewanted=all>

14 ‘Terror conviction rate high in US, with questions’, *Associated Press*, September 3, 2011

15 ‘Fact Sheet: The Seventh Anniversary of 9/11’, The White House, available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080910-5.html>

16 ‘Part One: 2009 Summary of Request and Key Performance Measures by Strategic Goal’, United States Department of Justice, available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2009summary/html/004_budget_highlights.htm

17 ‘Attorney General Eric Holder Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee’, United States Department of Justice, November 18, 2009, available at <http://www.justice.gov/ag/testimony/2009/ag-testimony-091118.html>

18 ‘Couric exclusive interview with President Obama’, *CBS News*, February 7, 2010, available at <http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6184114n>

19 Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, *In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts*, Human Rights First, July 2009, available at <http://www.human-rightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/090723-LS-in-pursuit-justice-09-update.pdf>

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- A May 2010 study cited twenty-six ‘jihadist plots and attacks’ targeting the U.S.²⁰
- A 2010 paper analyzed ‘46 publicly reported cases of domestic radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism’ in the U.S., concerning 125 individuals between September 11, 2001, and the end of 2009. This study included individuals who had been indicted but not convicted in court.²¹
- A February 2011 study claimed that there had been a total of 161 ‘Muslim-Americans terrorist suspects and perpetrators’ since September 11, 2001.²²
- In another 2011 report, one institution analyzed 376 convictions of those ‘inspired by jihadist ideas’ – a category which includes ‘local Islamist movements (i.e. Hamas)’, as well as those who unwittingly committed offenses, such as those who aided the September 11, 2001, hijackers.²³
- In September 2011, news-agency research cited 178 convictions in the U.S. regarding the ‘most serious terrorism cases’, as it interpreted the Department of Justice’s guidelines. However, not all of these were AQ- or Islamism-inspired.²⁴
- A November 2011 report by the Congressional Research Service estimated that there were fifty-three homegrown violent-jihadist cases in the U.S. since September 11, 2001.²⁵
- An April 2012 report looked at ‘fifty terror plots foiled since 9/11’, committed by ‘Islamist-inspired’ plotters, including individuals not yet convicted in a U.S. federal or military court.²⁶
- A June 2012 study also attempted to analyze ‘all the cases that have come to light of Islamist extremist terrorism since 9/11’ that targeted the U.S. The fifty examples cited included selected cases that had not yet come to trial.²⁷
- One database contains 192 cases, from September 11 onward, of Americans or U.S. residents ‘convicted or charged of some form of jihadist terrorist activity directed against the United States’, as well as those thought to have ‘traveled overseas to join a jihadist terrorist group’.²⁸

All of these studies have different methodologies and criteria for inclusion. Definitions of terrorist offenses, the breadth of focus (whether to include international as well as domestic terrorism), and what constitutes Islamist inspiration often differ; some reports have tended to have relaxed definitions as to what constitutes an Islamist or AQ-inspired offense.

This publication very specifically studies what is provably AQ or AQ-inspired terrorism, as defined earlier. This report deliberately constructed a high burden of proof in the criteria for inclusion, which includes suicide attacks and convictions since 1997, rather than the more-commonly studied period post-September 11, 2001. Subsequently, this report analyzes 171 individuals convicted for a total of 174 AQ-related offenses (AQROs).

In some cases, there have been perpetrators who, on first impressions, appear to have pursued typical AQ or AQ-inspired causes, but where involvement with, or inspiration from, AQ cannot be proven to have been the primary motivating factor, if a factor at all, behind the offense. For example:

20 Ashley Lohmann, ‘Jihad on Main Street: Explaining the Threat of Jihadist Terrorism to the American Homeland Since 9/11’, Stanford University, May 18, 2010, available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22921/Lohmann_-_Jihad_on_Main_Street.pdf

21 Brian Jenkins, ‘Would-Be Warrior: Incident of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001’ (Rand Corporation, 2010), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP292.pdf

22 Charles Kurzman, ‘Muslim-American Terrorism Since 9/11: An Accounting’, University of North Carolina, February 2, 2011, available at <http://privacysos.org/sites/all/files/terror%20since%20911.pdf>

23 ‘Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001-September 11, 2011’, Center on Law and Security, New York University School of Law, available at <http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/TTRC%20Ten%20Year%20Issue.pdf>

24 ‘35,000 worldwide convicted for terror’, *Associated Press*, September 3, 2011

25 Jerome P. Bjelopera, ‘American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat’, Congressional Research Service, November 15, 2011, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf>

26 James Jay Carafano, Steven P. Bucci & Jessica Zuckerman, ‘Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: The Homegrown Threat and the Long War on Terrorism’, The Heritage Foundation, April 25, 2012, available at <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/04/fifty-terror-plots-foiled-since-9-11-the-homegrown-threat-and-the-long-war-on-terrorism>

27 John Mueller, *Terrorism Since 9/11: the American Cases*, (Ohio State University, June 2012), available at <http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/SINCE.pdf>

28 ‘Post-9/11 Jihadist Terrorism Cases Involving U.S. Citizens and Residents: An Overview’, The Homegrown Threat, New America Foundation, available at <http://homegrown.newamerica.net/overview>

ANALYSIS OF BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Methodology


Between 1997 and 2011, there were 155 separate convictions for al-Qaeda-related offenses (AQROs) in the United States. A combined total of 152 U.S. citizens and foreign nationals were convicted. One of these individuals was convicted of offenses on two separate occasions; another individual was convicted on three separate occasions. In each of these cases, the convictions have been counted separately.

There were multiple suicide attacks on U.S. soil – all on September 11, 2001 – in which a total of nineteen perpetrators were killed. This makes an overall total of 174 separate AQROs, committed by 171 individuals. Unless otherwise stated, all data relates to the 171 individuals who have carried out AQROs.

Table 1A: Timeline: Year of charge or suicide attack

Year	n.	%
1997	1	0.57%
1998	4	2.30%
1999	1	0.57%
2000	5	2.87%
2001	22	12.64%
2002	19	10.92%
2003	14	8.05%
2004	12	6.90%
2005	15	8.62%
2006	14	8.05%
2007	18	10.34%
2008	4	2.30%
2009	25	14.37%
2010	16	9.20%
2011	4	2.30%
Total	174	100%

Figure 1A: Timeline: Year of charge or suicide attack



The timeline represents the year of charge or suicide attack for all 174 AQROs that occurred between 1997 and 2011. The proportion of AQROs in any year during this period varied from a minimum of one in 1997 and 1999, accounting for 0.6% of all AQROs, to a maximum of 25 in 2009, accounting for 14% of all AQROs. Peaks also occurred during 2001–2002, with these two years accounting for 24% (n¹=41) of all AQROs. Just under half of which related to al-Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 2001. In 2007, when 10% (n=18) AQRO charges were filed. There was then a significant drop in 2008, with just 2% of the overall percentage of AQROs occurring. However, this decline was followed by a huge spike in 2009 – the year when the highest rate of AQROs (14%) took place.

¹N=number, or frequency

GENDER


Table 2A: Gender

Gender	n.	%
Male	163	95.32%
Female	8	4.68%
Total	171	100%

Figure 2A: Gender

The overwhelming majority (95%, n=163) of terrorist offenses were committed by men. Of the eight women convicted of AQROs, Nadia Rockwood and October Martinique Lewis were both convicted for their roles supporting their partners in the commission of AQROs. They committed False Statements and Money Laundering respectively.

The remaining six women were convicted of AQROs that included; Attempted Identity Theft; Attempted Murder; Armed Assault; Conspiracy to Kill; Discharge of a Firearm; Conspiring to Provide, and Providing, Material Support to Terrorists or a Terrorist Organization (specifically al-Shabaab); and False Statements.



AGE

Average age at date of charge or incident

All age data refers to 174 AQROs. The two individuals with multiple convictions were of different ages for each offense and have been included separately.

Table 3A: Average age


All AQROs were carried out by individuals aged between 19 and 63 years at the time of charge or suicide attack – an age range of 44 years. The mean age was 29.6 years, and AQROs were most commonly committed by individuals aged 24 years.

Average	Age
Mean	29.6
Median	27.5
Mode	24
Range	44

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Frequency of age

Figure 3A: Frequency of age at time of charge or suicide attack



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Frequency of age ranges

Table 3B: Age range among AQROs -30/30+

Age Range	n.	%
Under 30	99	56.90%
15-19	5	2.87%
20-24	57	32.76%
25-29	37	21.26%
30+	75	43.10%
30-34	36	20.69%
35-39	12	6.90%
40-44	15	8.62%
45-49	7	4.02%
50+	5	2.87%
Total	174	100%

Figure 3B: Age range among AQROs





Figure 3C: Age range among AQROs: -30/30+

The majority (57%) of offenses were committed by individuals aged below 30 at the time of charge or incident. The remaining 43% of offenses were committed by individuals aged 30 and over.

A third (33%) of AQROs were committed by individuals aged 20-24 years. 21% were committed by individuals aged 25-29 or 30-34. Therefore, three quarters (75%, n=129) of AQROs were perpetrated by individuals aged between 20 and 34.

The age ranges 15-19 and 50+ were the least frequently represented, together comprising 6% (each age range holding five cases) of all 174 AQROs. The youngest individuals convicted of AQROs were all 19 at time of charge (Imran Mandhai, James Elshafay, Mark Robert Walker, Ehsanul Sadequee, Syed Maaz Shah and Hosam Smadi). The oldest individual convicted of an AQRO was Hawo Mohamed Hassan, who was 63 at the time of charge. Hassan was subsequently found guilty of wiring money to al-Shabaab in Somalia.



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NATIONALITY²

Table 4A: Nationality by world region and country

Region		n.	%
Northern American		97	56.73%
	American	93	54.39%
	Canadian	4	2.34%
Western Asian		31	18.13%
	Saudi Arabian	16	9.36%
	Lebanese	4	2.34%
	Iraqi	3	1.75%
	Emirati	2	1.17%
	Jordanian	2	1.17%
	Yemeni	2	1.17%
	Qatari Saudi Arabian	1	0.58%
	Turkish	1	0.58%
Northern African		12	7.02%
	Sudanese	5	2.92%
	Algerian	3	1.75%
	Egyptian	2	1.17%
	Libyan	1	0.58%
	Moroccan	1	0.58%
Southern Asian		12	7.02%
	Pakistani	10	5.85%
	Afghan	2	1.17%
Eastern African		6	3.51%
	Somali	4	2.34%
	Tanzanian	2	1.17%
Southern European		4	2.34%
	Macedonian	3	1.75%
	Kosovar	1	0.58%
Northern European		2	1.17%
	British	1	0.58%
	Swedish	1	0.58%
Western European		2	1.17%
	Dutch	1	0.58%
	French	1	0.58%
Eastern African-Northern American		1	0.58%
	Unspecified (Somali or American)	1	0.58%
Northern European-Western African		1	0.58%
	British Sierra Leonean	1	0.58%
Oceanic		1	0.58%
	Australian	1	0.58%
Western African		1	0.58%
	Nigerian	1	0.58%
N/A		1	0.58%
	Unspecified	1	0.58%
Total		171	100%

² World macro-regions as defined by the United Nations. Available at <http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/maplib/worldregions.htm>

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Figure 4A: Nationality by country




Table 4B: U.S. citizen status


U.S. citizen status	n.	%
U.S. citizen	93	54.39%
Non-U.S. citizen	76	44.44%
Unspecified	2	1.17%
Total	171	100%

Figure 4B: U.S. citizen status

The majority (54%, n=93) of individuals involved in AQROs were U.S. citizens. The second most common nationality was Saudi Arabian, with 9% (n=17, including one Qatari Saudi Arabian holding dual nationality), followed by Pakistani, with 6% (n=10). 70% (n=120) of all individuals were citizens from one of these three countries (including the Qatari Saudi Arabian with dual nationality).

Overall, 57% of individuals responsible for AQROs were Northern Americans (n=97). Non-Northern Americans who committed AQROs were from a variety of countries, most commonly in Western Asia (18%, n=31). Collectively, the Northern American and Western Asian regions were responsible for three quarters (75%, n=128) of all AQROs.

Other common regions included Southern Asia (7%, n=12) – most commonly Pakistan – and Northern Africa (7%, n=12) – most commonly Sudan. The entire continent of Europe was responsible for 5% (n=9, including the one Northern European-Western African dual national, British Sierra Leonean Semi Osman).



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Table 4C: U.S. born and non-U.S. born

U.S. status	n.	%
U.S. born	61	35.67%
Non-U.S. born	108	63.16%
Unspecified	2	1.17%
Total	171	100%

Figure 4C: U.S. born and non-U.S. born

■ U.S. born ■ Non-U.S. born ■ Unspecified




Table 4D: U.S. citizens and U.S. born

U.S. citizen status	n.	%
U.S. citizen	93	54.39%
U.S. born	61	35.67%
Non-U.S. born	32	18.71%
Non-U.S. citizen	76	44.44%
Unspecified	2	1.17%
Total	171	100%

Over a third (36%, n=61) of the total number of individuals involved in AQROs were U.S.-born. 63% were foreign-born, and the country of birth was unspecified in 1% of cases.

19% (n=32) of the total number of individuals who committed an AQRO were U.S. citizens who were not born in the U.S.³

³ U.S. Census Bureau Nativity Status and Citizenship data from 2010 found that 87% of the total U.S. population was 'native-born'. 13% were designated 'foreign-born', comprising of naturalized citizens (6%) and non-citizens (7%). See U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010, available at www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acs-19.pdf


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Table 4E: Proportion of AQROs committed by U.S./non-U.S. citizens by year

Year of charge / suicide attack	U.S. citizen		Non-U.S. citizen		Unspecified	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
1997	0	0%	1	1.32%	0	0%
1998	1	1.04%	3	3.95%	0	0%
1999	1	1.04%	0	0%	0	0%
2000	0	0%	5	6.58%	0	0%
2001	0	0%	22	28.95%	0	0%
2002	15	15.63%	4	5.26%	0	0%
2003	10	10.42%	4	5.26%	0	0%
2004	6	6.25%	6	7.89%	0	0%
2005	10	10.42%	5	6.58%	0	0%
2006	10	10.42%	4	5.26%	0	0%
2007	11	11.46%	7	9.21%	0	0%
2008	1	1.04%	3	3.95%	0	0%
2009	15	15.63%	8	10.53%	2	100%
2010	14	14.58%	2	2.63%	0	0%
2011	2	2.08%	2	2.63%	0	0%
Total	96*	100%	76	100%	2	100%

* The two individuals with multiple convictions are both U.S. citizens. Therefore, 93 U.S. citizens were responsible for 96 AQROs.

Figure 4D: Proportion of AQROs committed by U.S./non U.S. citizens by year



The year of charge or suicide attack was more evenly distributed among U.S. citizens than among non-U.S. citizens. Between 10% and 16% of AQROs committed by non-U.S. citizens occurred in seven separate years, 2002–2003, 2005–2007 and 2009–2010. Only 2% of AQROs committed by U.S. citizens occurred between 1998 and 2001.

In contrast, 29% of AQROs committed by non-U.S. citizens occurred in 2001, with the 9/11 attacks being responsible for the overwhelming majority of these. The only other year which accounts for over 10% of AQROs committed by non-U.S. citizens is 2009.

As a proportion of their overall involvement, U.S. citizens committed more AQROs than foreign nationals in seven of the fifteen years studied. These were: 1999, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010.

ANCESTRY

Table 5A: Ancestry by world region and country

Ancestry	<i>n.</i>	%
American/mixed American ethnicity	61	35.67%
African American	17	9.94%
American White Caucasian	13	7.60%
American - Unspecified	5	2.92%
American Yemeni	5	2.92%
American Jordanian	2	1.17%
American Pakistani	2	1.17%
American Saudi Arabian	2	1.17%
American Albanian	1	0.58%
American Balkan	1	0.58%
American Bangladeshi	1	0.58%
American Canadian	1	0.58%
American Egyptian	1	0.58%
American Egyptian Irish	1	0.58%
American Iraqi	1	0.58%
American Jordanian Palestinian	1	0.58%
American Malaysian	1	0.58%
American Moroccan	1	0.58%
American Peruvian Argentinian	1	0.58%
American Puerto Rican	1	0.58%
American Tunisian	1	0.58%
American Pakistani or American Afghan	1	0.58%
Unspecified Hispanic American	1	0.58%
Western Asian	42	24.56%
Saudi Arabian	16	9.36%
Lebanese	6	3.51%
Iraqi	4	2.34%
Yemeni	4	2.34%
Jordanian	3	1.75%
Palestinian	3	1.75%
Emirati	2	1.17%
Iraqi Kurdish	1	0.58%
Kuwaiti	1	0.58%
Palestinian Jordanian	1	0.58%
Turkish	1	0.58%
Southern Asian	23	13.45%
Pakistani	16	9.36%
Afghan	3	1.75%

AL-QAEDA IN THE UNITED STATES


Ancestry		n.	%
Northern African	Iranian	2	1.17%
	Indian	1	0.58%
	Iranian Pakistani	1	0.58%
		15	8.77%
	Moroccan	4	2.34%
	Sudanese	4	2.34%
Eastern African	Algerian	3	1.75%
	Egyptian	3	1.75%
	Libyan	1	0.58%
		13	7.60%
Other mixed ethnicity	Somali	11	6.43%
	Tanzanian	2	1.17%
Southern European		6	3.51%
	British Jamaican	1	0.58%
	Canadian Egyptian	1	0.58%
	Kuwaiti Egyptian	1	0.58%
	Kuwaiti Pakistani	1	0.58%
	Nigerian Yemini	1	0.58%
	Sudanese Iraqi	1	0.58%
Caribbean		4	2.34%
	Albanian	4	2.34%
Eastern Asian		2	1.17%
	Dominican	1	0.58%
	Trinidadian	1	0.58%
Northern European		1	0.58%
	South Korean	1	0.58%
Oceanic		1	0.58%
	British White Caucasian	1	0.58%
Unspecified		1	0.58%
	Australian	1	0.58%
		2	1.17%
	Palestinian Lebanese or Pakistani	1	0.58%
	Unspecified	1	0.58%
Total		171	100%

AL-QAEDA IN THE UNITED STATES

Figure 5A: Ancestry by world region and country



PLACE OF RESIDENCE⁴



⁴ The Place of Residence is the town or city in which the individual lived at the time of arrest or suicide attack. While AQRO perpetrators may have lived in multiple locations in the U.S. as listed in their profile, they can only have one Place of Residence counted as part of the data set. To classify as a Place of Residence, the AQRO perpetrator must have spent an extended period of time in that location. For example, while Said al-Ghamdi's last location was a hotel in New Jersey in the days before the attacks of September 11, 2001, his last place of residence is listed as Florida, as this was the location in the U.S. that he had spent the most amount of time (June through to August, 2001).

AL-QAEDA IN THE UNITED STATES

Table 6A: Residence in the U.S. at time of charge or suicide attack


Residence		<i>n.</i>	%
United States		141	82.46%
	Resident	138	80.70%
	Incarcerated	3	1.75
Abroad		21	12.28%
	Kenya	3	1.75%
	Afghanistan	2	1.17%
	Canada	2	1.17%
	Saudi Arabia	2	1.17%
	Sudan	2	1.17%
	Egypt	1	0.58%
	Ireland	1	0.58%
	Jordan	1	0.58%
	Netherlands	1	0.58%
	Oman	1	0.58%
	Somalia	1	0.58%
	Sweden	1	0.58%
	Tanzania	1	0.58%
	Unspecified [Afghanistan/Pakistan]	1	0.58%
	Yemen	1	0.58%
Other		9	5.26%
	No fixed address	4	2.34%
	Guantánamo Bay detention center	5	2.92%
Total		171	100%

AL-QAEDA IN THE UNITED STATES

Table 6B: U.S. residents: last known region and state of residence before charge or suicide attack

Region/state		n.	%
South		51	36.17%
	Florida	16	11.35%
	Virginia	9	6.38%
	North Carolina	7	4.96%
	Texas	6	4.26%
	Maryland	5	3.55%
	Georgia	2	1.42%
	Tennessee	2	1.42%
	Arkansas	1	0.71%
	Kentucky	1	0.71%
	Oklahoma	1	0.71%
	Washington, D.C.	1	0.71%
Northeast		42	29.79%
	New York	20	14.18%
	New Jersey	13	9.22%
	Massachusetts	4	2.84%
	Pennsylvania	4	2.84%
	Connecticut	1	0.71%
West		23	16.31%
	California	8	5.67%
	Oregon	6	4.26%
	Colorado	3	2.13%
	Alaska	2	1.42%
	Washington	2	1.42%
	Arizona	1	0.71%
	Wyoming	1	0.71%
Midwest		22	15.60%
	Minnesota	8	5.67%
	Illinois	7	4.96%
	Ohio	5	3.55%
	Missouri	2	1.42%
N/a		3	2.13%
	Incarcerated	3	2.13%
Total		141	100%

Figure 6A: U.S. residents: last known region of residence before charge or suicide attack



AL-QAEDA IN THE UNITED STATES

Figure 6B: U.S. residents: last known state of residence before charge or suicide attack




Table 6C: Natural born U.S. status among offenders residing in the U.S. at the time of charge or suicide attack

Native status	Residing in the U.S.		Not residing in the U.S.	
	n.	%	n.	%
U.S. born	56	39.71%	5	16.67%
Non-U.S. born	83	58.87%	25	83.33%
Unspecified	2	1.42%	0	0%
Total	141	100%	30	100%

AL-QAEDA IN THE UNITED STATES

Table 6D: U.S. residents: last known state of residence before charge or suicide attack among U.S. and non-U.S. born

State	U.S. born		Non-U.S. born		Unspecified		Total
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	
New York	11	19.64%	9	10.84%	0	0%	20
Florida	1	1.79%	15	18.07%	0	0%	16
New Jersey	1	1.79%	12	14.46%	0	0%	13
Virginia	5	8.93%	4	4.82%	0	0%	9
California	5	8.93%	3	3.61%	0	0%	8
Minnesota	0	0.00%	7	8.43%	1	50%	8
Illinois	4	7.14%	3	3.61%	0	0%	7
North Carolina	4	7.14%	3	3.61%	0	0%	7
Oregon	5	8.93%	1	1.20%	0	0%	6
Texas	2	3.57%	4	4.82%	0	0%	6
Maryland	3	5.36%	2	2.41%	0	0%	5
Ohio	1	1.79%	4	4.82%	0	0%	5
Massachusetts	1	1.79%	3	3.61%	0	0%	4
Pennsylvania	2	3.57%	1	1.20%	1	50%	4
Colorado	1	1.79%	2	2.41%	0	0%	3
Alaska	1	1.79%	1	1.20%	0	0%	2
Georgia	1	1.79%	1	1.20%	0	0%	2
Missouri	0	0.00%	2	2.41%	0	0%	2
Tennessee	1	1.79%	1	1.20%	0	0%	2
Washington	1	1.79%	1	1.20%	0	0%	2
Arizona	1	1.79%	0	0%	0	0%	1
Arkansas	1	1.79%	0	0%	0	0%	1
Connecticut	0	0.00%	1	1.20%	0	0%	1
Kentucky	0	0.00%	1	1.20%	0	0%	1
Oklahoma	0	0.00%	1	1.20%	0	0%	1
Washington, D.C	1	1.79%	0	0%	0	0%	1
Wyoming	1	1.79%	0	0%	0	0%	1
N/A - incarcerated	2	3.57%	1	1.20%	0	0%	3
Total	56	100%	83	100%	2	100%	141


The majority (59%, n=83) of those who were residing in the U.S. at the time of charge or suicide attack were not born in the U.S. Over a third (40%, n=56) of those residing in the U.S. were U.S. born, and 1% were unspecified. The most-common state of residence for AQROs committed by those born in the U.S. was New York (home to 20%, n=11, of all U.S.-born individuals resident in the U.S. at the time of charge or suicide attack), followed jointly by Virginia, Oregon and California (9%, n=5).

The second and third most-popular states of residence among all AQRO perpetrators resident in the U.S. at the time of charge or suicide attack – Florida and New Jersey, respectively – were responsible for only a combined total of 4% of U.S.-born AQRO individuals. Therefore, the three states that hosted the most AQRO offenders – New York, Florida, and New Jersey – contained a disproportionately high number of non-U.S.-born individuals. This is partly explained by the fact that the September 11, 2001, hijackers (none of whom were U.S.-born) were based in New Jersey and Florida.

EDUCATION


Table 7A: Level of education achieved

Education	n.	%
College graduate or above	39	22.81%
Achieved PhD	3	1.75%
Studied for PhD	2	1.17%
Achieved Master's degree	12	7.02%
Studied for Master's degree	1	0.58%
Achieved medical degree	1	0.58%
Achieved college degree	19	11.11%
Achieved associate degree	1	0.58%
Received college education	50	29.24%
Studied for college degree	38	22.22%
Studied at community college	12	7.02%
Vocational qualification	6	3.51%
Achieved vocational qualification	4	2.34%
Studied for vocational qualification	2	1.17%
High school graduate or equivalent	13	7.60%
Achieved high school diploma	9	5.26%
Achieved General Equivalency Diploma	2	1.17%
Graduated from military school	2	1.17%
Received high school education or below	29	16.96%
Studied for high school diploma/GED	21	12.28%
Studied at grade eight or below	5	2.92%
Unspecified	3	1.75%
Unspecified	34	19.88%
Total	171	100%

Figure 7A: Level of education achieved

AL-QAEDA IN THE UNITED STATES

Figure 7B: Level of education achieved: College education



Just over half (52%, n=89) of individuals who committed AQROs had some form of college education.

The most-common education category comprised of those who had studied at college-level but were not known to have graduated (29%, n=50). 22% (n=38) had studied for a college degree; and an additional 7% (n=12) had studied at a community college.

Nearly a quarter (23%, n=39) of all AQRO offenders had been educated to between college-graduate and doctorate level. 11% (n=19) were known to have achieved a college degree and one individual had received an associate degree. 8% (n=13) were committed by those who either possessed or were studying for a Master's degree, with an additional AQRO perpetrator possessing a medical degree. 3% (n=5) of individuals either possessed or were studying for a PhD.

A quarter (25%, n=42) of individuals had been educated to high school level or below, with 17% (n=29) not known to have earned a high school or General Equivalency diploma. A small proportion of offenders (4%, n=6) were known to have earned vocational qualifications and there was no information available on the education level of 20% (n=34) of those who had committed AQROs.

Table 7B: Level of education achieved: Nationality

Nationality	Received college education		Did not receive college education		Unspecified	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
U.S. citizen	53	59.55%	26	54.17%	14	41.18%
U.S. born	34	38.20%	21	39.58%	6	17.65%
Non-U.S. born	19	21.35%	5	4.17%	8	23.53%
Non-U.S. citizen	35	39.33%	22	45.83%	19	55.88%
Saudi Arabian	9	10.11%	4	8.33%	3	8.82%
Pakistani	8	8.99%	1	2.08%	1	2.94%
Canadian	1	1.12%	3	6.25%	0	0%
Lebanese	2	2.25%	0	0%	2	5.88%
Somali	1	1.12%	0	0%	3	8.82%
Sudanese	2	2.25%	2	4.17%	1	2.94%
Algerian	0	0%	1	2.08%	2	5.88%
Iraqi	1	1.12%	0	0%	2	5.88%
Macedonian	0	0%	3	6.25%	0	0%
Afghan	0	0%	1	2.08%	1	2.94%
Egyptian	2	2.25%	0	0%	0	0%
Emirati	1	1.12%	0	0%	1	2.94%
Jordanian	1	1.12%	1	2.08%	0	0%

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Nationality	Received college education		Did not receive college education		Unspecified	
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%
Moroccan	0	0.00%	1	2.08%	0	0%
Tanzanian	0	0%	2	4.17%	0	0%
Yemeni	2	2.25%	0	0%	0	0%
Australian	0	0%	1	2.08%	0	0%
British	0	0%	1	2.08%	0	0%
British Sierra Leonean	0	0%	0	0%	1	2.94%
Dutch	0	0%	0	0%	1	2.94%
French	1	1.12%	0	0%	0	0%
Kosovar	1	1.12%	0	0%	0	0%
Libyan	1	1.12%	0	0%	0	0%
Nigerian	1	1.12%	0	0%	0	0%
Qatari Saudi Arabian	1	1.12%	0	0%	0	0%
Swedish	0	0%	0	0%	1	2.94%
Turkish	0	0%	1	2.08%	0	0%
Unspecified	1	1.12%	0	0%	1	2.94%
Total	89	100%	48	100%	34	100%

Table 7C: Level of education achieved: U.S. and non-U.S. citizens

Education	U.S. citizen		Non-U.S. citizen		Unspecified	
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
Received college education	53	57%	35	46%	1	50%
Did not receive college education	26	28%	22	29%	0	0%
Unspecified	14	15%	19	25%	1	50%
Total	93	100%	76	100%	2	100%

Of those individuals who had received college education, 60% (n=53) were U.S. citizens and 39% (n=35) were non-U.S. citizens, with 1% an unspecified nationality. Of those who did not receive a college education, 54% (n=26) were U.S. citizens and 46% (n=22) were non-U.S. citizens.

Over half (57%, n=53) of U.S. citizens who committed AQROs had received a college education (slightly higher than the average for all AQRO perpetrators, 52%). Just over a quarter (28%, n=26) of U.S. citizens had not received a college education, and 15% were unspecified (n=14).

46% (n=35) of non-U.S. citizens had received a college education. Over a quarter (29%, n=22) of non-U.S. citizens had not received a college education, and over a quarter (25%, n=19) were unspecified.

AL-QAEDA IN THE UNITED STATES

Figure 7C: Level of education achieved: U.S. and non-U.S. citizens





Table 7D: Level of education achieved: U.S. born and non-U.S. born

Education	U.S. born		Non-U.S. born		Unspecified		Total
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	
Received college education	34	55.74%	54	50%	1	50%	89
Did not receive college education	21	34.43%	27	25%	0	0%	48
Unspecified	6	9.84%	27	25%	1	50%	34
Total	61	100%	108	100%	2	100%	171

Over half (56%, n=34) of the 61 individuals who were born in the U.S. had received a college education. Just over a third (34%, n=21) of those born in the U.S. had not received a college education, and 10% were unspecified (n=6).

50% (n=54) of the 108 individuals who were known not to have been born in the U.S. had received a college education. A quarter (n=27) had not received a college education, and a quarter (n=27) were unspecified.


Figure 7D: Level of education achieved: College education and non-college education



OCCUPATION

Table 8A: Occupation at date of charge or suicide attack

Occupation	n.	%
Employed	75	43.86%
Skilled	34	19.88%
Unskilled	24	14.04%
Self-employed/own or family business	13	7.60%
Part-time	4	2.34%
Student	22	12.87%
Unemployed	48	28.07%
Incarcerated	8	4.68%
Unspecified	18	10.53%
Total	171	100%

Figure 8A: Occupation at date of charge or suicide attack

44% (n=75) of AQROs were committed by individuals in employment at the date of charge or attack. A further 13% (n=22) were full-time students. Therefore, 57% (n=97) of AQROs were committed by those who were either in employment or education.

Just over a quarter (28%, n=48) of AQROs were committed by unemployed individuals. For 11% (n=18) of individuals, information on occupation at date of charge or suicide attack was unspecified, and for eight individuals (5%), occupation was not applicable as they were incarcerated at time of charge.


45% (n=34) of the individuals in employment, or 20% of all individuals, were in skilled employment.

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Table 8B: Occupation at date of charge or suicide attack: U.S. born and non-U.S. born

Occupation	U.S. born		Non-U.S. born		Unspecified		Total
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%	
In employment or education	41	67.21%	56	51.85%	0	0%	97
Not in employment or education	13	21.31%	35	32.41%	0	0%	48
Incarcerated	2	3.28%	6	5.56%	0	0%	8
Unspecified	5	8.20%	11	10.19%	2	100%	18
Total	61	100%	108	100%	2	100%	171

Figure 8B: Occupation at date of charge or suicide attack: U.S. born and non U.S.-born



Proportionally more U.S.-born offenders were in employment or education (67%, $n=41$) than offenders who were not born in the U.S. (52%, $n=56$). Of U.S. born individuals who committed AQROs, less than a quarter (21%, $n=13$) were not in employment or education, compared to almost a third (32%, $n=35$) of non-U.S. born individuals.

RELIGIOUS CONVERTS

Table 9A: Known religious converts

Convert status	Individuals		AQROs	
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%
Convert	40	23.39%	42	24.14%
Non-convert	131	76.61%	132	75.86%
Total	171	100%	174	100%

40 converts were responsible for 42 AQROs, with one convert (James Ujaama) being convicted on three separate occasions. 131 non-converts were responsible for 132 AQROs with one non-convert being convicted on two separate occasions.

Therefore, of all 171 individuals responsible for AQROs, 23% (n=40) were known converts to Islam. Furthermore, religious converts were responsible for almost a quarter of all AQROs (24%, n=42).

Figure 9A: Known religious converts




Table 9B: Converts: Previous religion

Previous religion	<i>n.</i>	%
Unspecified	26	65%
Christianity	14	35%
Catholicism	6	15%
Unspecified Christianity	4	10%
Baptism	2	5%
Episcopalianism	1	2.5%
Methodism	1	2.5%
Total	40	100%

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Figure 9B: Religious converts: previous religion

Of the 40 converts, the previous religion of 35% (n=14) of them was known. All previously followed some denomination of Christianity.




Table 9C: Average age of converts and non-converts

Age	Converts (n = 40)	Non-converts (n = 134)
Mean	31.2	29.1
Median	30	26
Mode	32	24
Range	33	44

The most common age of religious converts (32 years) was disproportionately high, compared with that of all AQRO perpetrators (24 years) and that among non-converts (also 24 years).

The average age among converts was, at 31.2 years, slightly older than that of all AQRO perpetrators (29.6 years) and that of non-converts (29.1 years).

The age range among converts was 33 years, disproportionately low compared to the age range among both all AQRO perpetrators and non-converts (44 years).

The median age range among converts was 30 years – two and a half years higher than that for all AQRO perpetrators, and four years higher than that for non-converts.

Table 9D: Gender of converts and non-converts

Gender	Converts		Non-converts	
	n.	%	n.	%
Male	36	90%	127	96.95%
Female	4	10%	4	3.05%
Total	40	100%	131	100%

A slightly lower proportion of converts are men (90%) compared to non-converts (97%), and the overall number of individuals who committed an AQRO (95%).

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Table 9E: Nationality of converts and non-converts by world region and country

Nationality	Convert		Non-convert	
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%
Northern American	38	95%	59	45.04%
American	38	95%	55	41.98%
Canadian	0	0%	4	3.05%
Western Asian	0	0%	31	23.66%
Saudi Arabian	0	0%	16	12.21%
Lebanese	0	0%	4	3.05%
Iraqi	0	0%	3	2.29%
Emirati	0	0%	2	1.53%
Jordanian	0	0%	2	1.53%
Yemeni	0	0%	2	1.53%
Qatari Saudi Arabian	0	0%	1	0.76%
Turkish	0	0%	1	0.76%
Northern African	0	0%	12	9.16%
Sudanese	0	0%	5	3.82%
Algerian	0	0%	3	2.29%
Egyptian	0	0%	2	1.53%
Moroccan	0	0%	1	0.76%
Libyan	0	0%	1	0.76%
Southern Asian	0	0%	12	9.16%
Pakistani	0	0%	10	7.63%
Afghan	0	0%	2	1.53%
Eastern African	0	0%	6	4.58%
Somali	0	0%	4	3.05%
Tanzanian	0	0%	2	1.53%
Southern European	0	0%	4	3.05%
Macedonian	0	0%	3	2.29%
Kosovar	0	0%	1	0.76%
Western European	0	0%	2	1.53%
Dutch	0	0%	1	0.76%
Swedish	0	0%	1	0.76%
American Puerto Rican	0	0%	0	0%
Northern European	1	2.50%	1	0.76%
British	1	2.50%	0	0%
French	0	0%	1	0.76%
Oceanic	1	2.50%	0	0%
Australian	1	2.50%	0	0%
Northern European - Western African	0	0%	1	0.76%
British Sierra Leonean	0	0%	1	0.76%
Eastern African - Northern American	0	0%	1	0.76%
Unspecified [Somali or American]	0	0%	1	0.76%
Western African	0	0%	1	0.76%

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
Nationality	Convert		Non-convert	
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%
Nigerian	0	0%	1	0.76%
Unspecified	0	0%	1	0.76%
Unspecified	0	0%	1	0.76%
Total	40	100%	131	100%

95% of converts who committed AQROs were American, as opposed to 46% of non-converts who committed AQROs. The other 5% of converts were British and Australian (2.5% each).

Table 9F: Religious converts among U.S. and non-U.S. citizens

Convert status	U.S. citizen		Non-U.S. citizen		Unspecified	
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%
Convert	38	40.86%	2	2.63%	0	0%
Non-convert	55	59.14%	74	97.37%	2	100%
Total	93	100%	76	100%	2	100%

Figure 9C: Religious converts among U.S. and non-U.S. citizens




Of U.S. citizens who committed an AQRO, over a third (41%, n=38) were converts. Non-U.S. citizens were overwhelmingly likely not to have been religious converts (97%, n=74).

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Table 9G: Religious converts among U.S. and non-U.S. born

Convert status	U.S. born		Non-U.S. born		Unspecified	
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%
Convert	33	54.09%	7	6.48%	0	0%
Non-convert	28	45.90%	101	93.52%	2	100%
Total	61	100%	108	100%	2	100%

Figure 9D: Religious converts among U.S. born and non-U.S. born




Of U.S. born citizens who committed an AQRO, over half (54%, n=29) were converts. Of those not born in the U.S. who committed an AQRO, only 6% (n=7) were converts.

Table 9H: Converts and non-converts: U.S. born or non-U.S. born

Native U.S. status	Converts		Non-converts	
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%
U.S. born	33	82.50%	28	21.37%
Non U.S. born	7	17.50%	101	77.10%
Unspecified	0	0%	2	1.53%
Total	40	100%	131	100%

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Figure 9E: Converts and non-converts: U.S. born and non-U.S. born




83% (n=33) of converts who committed an AQRO were born in the U.S. Over three quarters (77%) of non-convert AQRO perpetrators were not born in the U.S.

Table 9I: Proportion of AQROs committed by converts and non-converts by year

Year of charge/suicide attack	Convert		Non-convert	
	n.	%	n.	%
1997	0	0%	1	0.76%
1998	1	2.38%	3	2.27%
1999	0	0%	1	0.76%
2000	0	0%	5	3.79%
2001	0	0%	22	16.67%
2002	6	14.29%	13	9.85%
2003	7	16.67%	7	5.30%
2004	1	2.38%	11	8.30%
2005	4	9.52%	11	8.30%
2006	2	4.76%	12	9.09%
2007	7	16.67%	11	8.30%
2008	1	2.40%	3	2.30%
2009	4	9.50%	21	15.91%
2010	7	16.70%	9	6.82%
2011	2	4.80%	2	1.52%
Total	42	100%	132	100%

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Figure 9F: Proportion of AQROs committed by converts and non-converts by year



As a proportion of their overall involvement, converts committed more AQROs than non-converts in eight of the fifteen years studied. These were: 1998, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011.

The years with the most amount of AQROs committed by converts were jointly in 2003, 2007 and 2010 (17%, n=7).

The year that the most amount of AQROs were committed by non-converts was 2001, the year of al-Qaeda's September 11 attacks (17%, n=22). The second highest amount of AQROs committed by non-converts was in 2009 (16%, n=21).

Non-converts were responsible for a higher proportion of AQROs in seven of the fifteen years studied.

Table 9J: Last known region and state of residence among converts based in the U.S. prior to date of charge

Region/state		n.	%
South		13	39.39%
	Virginia	4	12.12%
	Texas	3	9.09%
	Arkansas	1	3.03%
	Maryland	1	3.03%
	North Carolina	1	3.03%
	South Carolina	1	3.03%
	Tennessee	1	3.03%
	Washington, D.C.	1	3.03%
West		11	33.33%
	California	3	9.09%
	Alaska	2	6.06%
	Oregon	2	6.06%
	Arizona	1	3.03%
	California - incarcerated	1	3.03%
	Colorado	1	3.03%
	Washington	1	3.03%
Northeast		5	15.15%

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Region/state		<i>n.</i>	%
Midwest	Pennsylvania	2	6.06%
	Massachusetts	1	3.03%
	New Jersey	1	3.03%
	New York	1	3.03%
		4	12.12%
	Illinois	2	6.06%
	Minnesota	1	3.03%
	Ohio	1	3.03%
Total		33	100%

Converts most commonly resided in Virginia before their offense and/or charge (12%, n=4). The next most-common states were Texas and California (both at 9%, n=3), followed by Alaska; Illinois; Oregon; and Pennsylvania (each at 6%, n=2).

Regionally within the United States, converts were most likely to reside in the South (39%, n=13), a slightly higher percentage than that for all U.S.-based AQRO perpetrators (36%).

Moreover, when compared to figures for all U.S.-based offenders, while a disproportionately high percentage of converts lived in the West (33% of converts; 16% of all U.S.-based offenders), a disproportionately low percentage lived in the Northeast (15% of converts; 30% of all U.S.-based offenders). Similarly, 12% of converts lived in the Midwest, compared to the 16% (n=22) of all U.S.-based offenders.

Table 9K: Ancestry of converts and non-converts by world region and country

Ancestry	Convert		Non-convert	
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%
Western Asian	2	5%	40	30.53%
Emirati	0	0%	2	1.53%
Iraqi	0	0%	4	3.05%
Jordanian	0	0%	3	2.29%
Iraqi Kurdish	0	0%	1	0.76%
Kuwaiti	0	0%	1	0.76%
Lebanese	1	2.5%	5	3.82%
Palestinian	1	2.5%	2	1.53%
Palestinian Jordanian	0	0%	1	0.76%
Saudi Arabian	0	0%	16	12.21%
Turkish	0	0%	1	0.76%
Yemeni	0	0%	4	3.05%
American/mixed American ethnicity	33	82.50%	28	21.37%
African American	16	40%	1	0.76%
American White Caucasian	10	25%	3	2.29%
American Canadian	1	2.5%	0	0%
American Egyptian	1	2.5%	0	0%
American Moroccan	1	2.5%	0	0%
American Peruvian Argentinian	1	2.5%	0	0%

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Ancestry	Convert		Non-convert	
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%
American Puerto Rican	1	2.5%	0	0%
American - Unspecified	1	2.5%	4	3.05%
Unspecified Hispanic American	1	2.5%	0	0%
American Albanian	0	0%	1	0.76%
American Balkan	0	0%	1	0.76%
American Bangladeshi	0	0%	1	0.76%
American Egyptian Irish	0	0%	1	0.76%
American Iraqi	0	0%	1	0.76%
American Jordanian	0	0%	2	1.53%
American Malaysian	0	0%	1	0.76%
American Pakistani	0	0%	2	1.53%
American Jordanian Palestinian	0	0%	1	0.76%
American Pakistani or American Afghan	0	0%	1	0.76%
American Saudi Arabian	0	0%	2	1.53%
American Tunisian	0	0%	1	0.76%
American Yemeni	0	0%	5	3.82%
Southern Asian	0	0%	23	17.56%
Afghan	0	0%	3	2.29%
Indian	0	0%	1	0.76%
Iranian	0	0%	2	1.53%
Iranian Pakistani	0	0%	1	0.76%
Pakistani	0	0%	16	12.21%
Northern African	0	0%	15	11.45%
Algerian	0	0%	3	2.29%
Egyptian	0	0%	3	2.29%
Libyan	0	0%	1	0.76%
Moroccan	0	0%	4	3.05%
Sudanese	0	0%	4	3.05%
Eastern African	0	0%	13	9.92%
Somali	0	0%	11	8.40%
Tanzanian	0	0%	2	1.53%
Other mixed ethnicity	1	2.5%	6	3.82%
British Jamaican	1	2.5%	0	0%
Canadian Egyptian	0	0%	1	0.76%
Kuwaiti Egyptian	0	0%	1	0.76%
Kuwaiti Pakistani	0	0%	1	0.76%
Nigerian Yemeni	0	0%	1	0.76%
Sudanese Iraqi	0	0%	1	0.76%
Southern European	0	0%	4	3.05%
Albanian	0	0.0%	4	3.05%
Caribbean	1	2.5%	1	0.76%
Dominican	1	2.5%	0	0%
Trinidadian	0	0.0%	1	0.76%
Eastern Asian	1	2.5%	0	0%
South Korean	1	2.5%	0	0%

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Ancestry	Convert		Non-convert	
	n.	%	n.	%
Northern European	1	2.5%	0	0%
British White Caucasian	1	2.5%	0	0%
Oceanic	1	2.5%	0	0%
Australian	1	2.5%	0	0%
Unspecified	0		2	1.53%
Unspecified	0	0%	1	0.76%
Palestinian Lebanese or Pakistani	0	0%	1	0.76%
Total	40	100%	131	100%

83% (n=33) of religious converts had some kind of Northern American ancestry, which was disproportionately high compared with 36% (n=61) of all AQRO perpetrators and 21% (n=28) of non-converts. Of converts, 40% (n=16) were African American and a quarter (n=10) were American White Caucasian. This was disproportionately high compared to non-convert individuals of this ancestry who committed AQROs: 1% (African American) and 2% (American White Caucasian).

Only two converts had a Western Asian ancestry (Palestinian for one, Lebanese for the other), a disproportionately low percentage (5%, n=2) compared with 25% of all AQRO perpetrators (n=42).


No religious converts were of Southern Asian ancestry, compared with the 18% (n=23) of all non-converts. Furthermore, 13% (n=23) of all AQRO perpetrators had a Southern Asian ancestry.

Table 9L: Level of education achieved among converts and non-converts

Education	Convert		Non-convert		Total	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
College graduate or above	11	27.50%	28	21.37%	39	22.81%
Achieved PhD	1	2.50%	2	1.53%	3	1.75%
Studied for PhD	0	0%	2	1.53%	2	1.17%
Achieved Master's degree	2	5%	10	7.63%	12	7.02%
Studied for Master's degree	0	0%	1	0.76%	1	0.58%
Achieved medical degree	0	0%	1	0.76%	1	0.58%
Achieved college degree	8	20%	11	8.40%	19	11.11%
Achieved associate degree	0	0%	1	0.76%	1	0.58%
Received college education	10	25%	40	30.53%	50	29.24%
Studied for college degree	7	17.50%	31	23.66%	38	22.22%
Studied at community college	3	7.50%	9	6.87%	12	7.02%
Vocational qualification	3	7.50%	3	2.29%	6	3.51%
Achieved vocational qualification	3	7.50%	1	0.76%	4	2.34%
Studied for vocational qualification	0	0%	2	1.53%	2	1.17%
High school graduate or equivalent	4	10%	9	6.87%	13	7.60%
Achieved high school diploma	3	7.50%	6	4.58%	9	5.26%
Achieved General Equivalency Diploma	1	2.50%	1	0.76%	2	1.17%
Graduated from military school	0	0%	2	1.53%	2	1.17%
Received high school education or below	7	17.50%	22	16.79%	29	16.96%
Studied for high school diploma/GED	6	15%	15	11.45%	21	12.28%
Studied at grade eight or below	1	2.50%	4	3.05%	5	2.92%
Unspecified	0	0%	3	2.29%	3	1.75%
Unspecified	5	12.50%	29	22.14%	34	19.88%
Unspecified	5	12.50%	29	22.14%	34	19.88%
Total	40	100%	131	100%	171	100%

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Figure 9G: Level of education achieved among converts and non-converts



Converts were slightly more likely to have received some form of college education (53%, n=21 converts) than non-converts were (52%, n=68 non-converts).

Converts were more likely than non-converts to have achieved a college degree (20% converts; 8% non-converts). Converts were, therefore, disproportionately more likely to have achieved a college degree than all AQRO perpetrators were (11%, n=19). However, non-converts were more likely than converts to have studied for, and achieved, a Master's degree (5%, n=2 converts; 8%, n=10 non-converts).

Converts (were more likely to have achieved a vocational qualification than non-converts (8% converts; 1% non-converts).

Table 9M: Level of education achieved among U.S. born and non-U.S. born converts

Education	U.S. born		Non-U.S. born	
	n.	%	n.	%
College graduate or above	8	24.24%	3	42.85%
Achieved PhD	1	3.03%	0	0%
Studied for PhD	0	0%	0	0%
Achieved Master's degree	1	3.03%	1	14.29%
Studied for Master's degree	0	0%	0	0.00%
Achieved medical degree	0	0%	0	0.00%
Achieved college degree	6	18.18%	2	28.57%
Achieved associate degree	0	0%	0	0%
Received college education	10	30.30%	0	0%
Studied for college degree	7	21.21%	0	0%
Studied at community college	3	9.09%	0	0%
Vocational qualification	2	6.06%	1	14.29%
Achieved vocational qualification	2	6.06%	1	14.29%
Studied for vocational qualification	0	0%	0	0%
High school graduate or equivalent	3	9.09%	1	14.29%
Achieved high school diploma	2	6.06%	1	14.29%
Achieved General Equivalency Diploma	1	3.03%	0	0%
Graduated from military school	0	0%	0	0%

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Education	U.S. born		Non-U.S. born	
	n.	%	n.	%
Received high school education or below	5	15.15%	2	28.57%
Studied for high school diploma/GED	4	12.12%	2	28.57%
Studied at grade eight or below	1	3.03%	0	0%
Unspecified	0	0%	0	0%
Unspecified	5	15.15%	0	0%
Unspecified	5	15.15%	0	0%
Total	33	100%	7	100%

Table 9N: Occupation at date of charge or offense among converts and non-converts

Employment	Convert		Non-convert	
	n.	%	n.	%
Employed	22	55%	53	40.46%
Skilled	14	35%	20	15.27%
Unskilled	4	10%	20	15.27%
Self-employed/family business	3	7.5%	10	7.63%
Part-time	1	2.5%	3	2.29%
Student	3	7.50%	19	14.50%
Unemployed	9	22.50%	39	29.77%
Incarcerated	3	7.50%	5	3.82%
Unspecified	3	7.50%	15	11.45%
Total	40	100%	131	100%


Religious conversion had an effect on levels of employment among AQRO perpetrators. 55% (n=22) of converts were employed, which was higher than all AQRO perpetrators (44%, n=75) and non-converts (41%, n=53).

The percentage of converts with skilled jobs (35%, n=14) was higher than that of all AQRO perpetrators (20%, n=34) and approximately in line with that of non-converts (15%, n=20). The proportion of converts in unskilled or part-time jobs was lower than that of non-converts (13%, n=5 converts; 18%, n=23 non-converts).

Converts were less likely to be unemployed than non-converts (23%, n=9 converts; 30%, n=39 non-converts), and were less likely to be students than non-converts were (8%, n=3 converts; 15%, n=19 non-converts).

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Figure 9H: Employment status at date of charge or suicide attack: converts and non-converts




There was a higher percentage of converts than non-converts in education or employment when the two figures were combined (63% converts, 55% non-converts).

Table 90: Last known location of converts prior to offense or charge

Residence		n.	%
United States		35	87.50%
	Resident	33	82.50%
	Incarcerated	2	5%
Abroad		3	7.50%
	Afghanistan	1	2.50%
	Ireland	1	2.50%
	Somalia	1	2.50%
Other		2	5%
	No fixed address	1	2.50%
	Guantánamo Bay detention center	1	2.50%
Total		40	100%

Figure 9I: Last known location of converts prior to offense or charge

The last place of residence for 87.5% (n=33) of individual converts was the U.S. Only 7.5% (n=3) were living abroad, with 5% (n=2) being either of no fixed address or incarcerated in Guantánamo Bay at time of charge.




ROLES/OFFENSES

The 174 AQROs varied in the type of offense, immediacy of the threat and intent of the perpetrator. They have been divided into five categories: Active Participants, Aspirants, Trained Aspirants, Facilitators and Ideologues.

Table 10A: All AQROs: Breakdown of offender roles

Role	n.	%
Active Participant	65	37.36%
Aspirant	44	25.29%
Facilitator	36	20.69%
Trained Aspirant	26	14.94%
Ideologue	3	1.72%
Total	174	100%

Figure 10A: All AQROs: Offender roles per year



Active Participants – Individuals who committed or were imminently about to commit acts of terrorism, or were formal members of al-Qaeda – were responsible for 37% (n=65) of AQROs.

Aspirants – Individuals who demonstrated an interest in terrorism but whose plans were not advanced enough to pose an imminent threat or whose role was limited – were responsible for 25% (n=44) of AQROs.

Facilitators – Individuals involved in the preparation for acts of terrorism, either operationally; by fundraising; or by transferring documentation, material goods or finances – were responsible for 21% (n=36) of AQROs.

Trained Aspirants – Individuals who demonstrated an interest in terrorism whose plans were not advanced enough to pose an imminent threat or whose role was limited, but who had received terrorist training at camps abroad – were responsible for 15% (n=26) of AQROs.


Ideologues – Individuals involved in the preparation for acts of terrorism by incitement or by encouraging terrorist acts – were responsible for 2% (n=3) of AQROs.

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Table 10B: All AQROs: Offender roles per year

Year	Active Participant		Aspirant		Facilitator		Trained Aspirant		Ideologue		All AQROs	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
1997	1	1.54%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	0.57%
1998	4	6.15%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	4	2.30%
1999	1	1.54%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	0.57%
2000	3	4.62%	0	0%	2	5.56%	0	0%	0	0%	5	2.87%
2001	21	32.31%	0	0%	1	2.78%	0	0%	0	0%	22	12.64%
2002	4	6.15%	5	11.36%	4	11.11%	6	23.08%	0	0%	19	10.92%
2003	2	3.08%	3	6.89%	2	5.56%	7	26.92%	0	0%	14	8.05%
2004	1	1.54%	5	11.36%	4	11.11%	1	3.85%	1	3.33%	12	6.90%
2005	7	10.77%	2	4.55%	3	8.33%	2	7.69%	1	3.33%	15	8.62%
2006	1	1.54%	10	22.73%	2	5.56%	1	3.85%	0	0%	14	8.05%
2007	8	12.31%	3	6.89%	6	16.67%	1	3.85%	0	0%	18	10.34%
2008	2	3.08%	1	2.27%	1	2.78%	0	0%	0	0%	4	2.30%
2009	6	9.23%	8	18.18%	5	13.89%	6	23.08%	0	0%	25	14.37%
2010	4	6.15%	6	13.64%	6	16.67%	0	0%	0	0%	16	9.20%
2011	0	0%	1	2.27%	0	0%	2	7.69%	1	3.33%	4	2.30%
Total	65	100%	44	100%	36	100%	26	100%	3	100%	174	100%

Figure 10B: Timeline: Frequency of AQROs by offender role



While the data used here relates to convictions in U.S. courts between 1997 and 2011, the date of charge (or attack), rather than date of conviction, has been used as a standard measure of the year of offense. For example, an individual charged in 1998 but convicted in 2001 would be categorised by year of charge (i.e. 1998).⁵

1997 saw the first ever terrorism charges filed against a member of al-Qaeda in the U.S., followed by four more sets of charges in 1998. Between 1997 and 1999, a total of six AQROs were perpetrated by individuals, all of whom were Active Participants.

The number of Active Participants, Facilitators, Trained Aspirants and Aspirants charged all rose sharply in 2009, before slightly decreasing in the years after. The lower numbers in 2011 are partially explained by the fact that some individuals charged in 2011 had their cases resolved in 2012, therefore excluding them from this field of study.

⁵ The authors acknowledge that, in some instances, the threat and/or offense may have occurred over several years or the conviction may relate to actions undertaken significantly prior to charge. In order to compare the offenses, however, the date of charge (i.e. the date the authorities decided to take legal action against the individual) has been used.

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Figure 10C: Active Participants: Proportion by year




Figure 10D: Aspirants: Timeline of AQROs





Figure 10E: Facilitators: Timeline of AQROs



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Figure 10F: Trained Aspirants: Timeline of AQROs




Figure 10G: Ideologues: Timeline of AQRO





Table 10C: Age range by offender role

Role	Under 30		30+		Total
	n.	%	n.	%	
Active Participant	44	44.44%	21	28.00%	65
Aspirant	28	28.28%	16	21.33%	44
Facilitator	9	9.09%	27	36.00%	36
Trained Aspirant	16	16.16%	10	13.33%	26
Ideologue	2	2.02%	1	1.33%	3
Total	99	100%	75	100%	174

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Figure 10H: Age range by offender role




Individuals aged under 30 were much more likely to have been Active Participants than those over 30. Trained Aspirants and Aspirants were also slightly more likely to be aged under 30. However, Facilitators were four times as likely to be over 30. With only three Ideologues (two under 30 and one over 30), there is not a large enough sample upon which to perform any meaningful analysis.

Table 10D: Offender role by age range

Age range	Active Participant		Aspirant		Facilitator		Trained Aspirant		Ideologue		All AQROs	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
Under 30	44	67.69%	28	63.64%	9	25%	16	61.54%	2	66.67%	99	56.90%
30+	21	32.31%	16	36.36%	27	75%	10	38.46%	1	33.33%	75	43.10%
	65	100%	44	100%	36	100%	26	100%	3	100%	174	100%

Figure 10I: Proportion of offender role by age range



Over two thirds of Active Participants (68%, n=44) were under 30 – a higher proportion than any other offender role category. Furthermore, between 62 – 67% of Aspirants, Trained Aspirants and Ideologues were aged under 30. In contrast, only 25% of Facilitators were under 30, disproportionately low in comparison to all other offender roles. Therefore, that 75% of Facilitators were over thirty was also disproportionately high in comparison to all other offender roles of those over 30 (which ranged from 32 – 38%).

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Table 10E: Native U.S. status by offender role

Role	U.S. born		Non-U.S. born		Unspecified		Total
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	
Active Participant	13	20.63%	52	47.71%	0	0%	65
Aspirant	27	42.86%	17	15.60%	0	0%	44
Facilitator	8	12.70%	27	24.77%	1	50%	36
Trained Aspirant	12	19.05%	13	11.93%	1	50%	26
Ideologue	3	4.76%	0	0%	0	0%	3
Total	63	100%	109	100%	2	100%	174

43% (n=27) of AQROs were committed by U.S. born Aspirants. When combining those both trained and non-trained, 62% of all AQROs were committed by some type of Aspirant born in the U.S., compared to only 28% of AQROs committed by some type of Aspirant not born in the U.S.

The role of nearly half of AQROs committed by those born outside the U.S. was Active Participant (48%) – over double the proportion of U.S. born Active Participants (21%). Furthermore, non-U.S. born Active Participant AQROs were almost twice as common than the next highest category (Facilitators, 25%, n=27). All Ideologues were born in the United States, comprising 5% of all U.S. born AQROs.

Therefore, U.S. born AQROs were more likely to be committed by some form of Aspirant; whereas non-U.S. born offenders were more likely to be Active Participants and Facilitators.

Figure 10J: Proportion of native U.S. status by offender role





Table 10F: Offender role by native U.S. status

Native U.S. status	Active Participant		Aspirant		Facilitator		Trained Aspirant		Ideologue		All AQROs	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
U.S. born	13	20%	27	61.36%	8	22.22%	12	46.15%	3	100%	63	36.21%
Non-U.S. born	52	80%	17	38.64%	27	75.00%	13	50.00%	0	0%	109	62.64%
Unspecified	0	0%	0	0%	1	2.78%	1	3.85%	0	0%	2	1.15%
	65	100%	44	100%	36	100%	26	100%	3	100%	174	100%

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Figure 10K: Proportion of offender role by native U.S. status



Active Participants and Facilitators were much more likely to have been born outside the U.S. (80% and 75% respectively). Trained Aspirants were also slightly more likely to be born outside the U.S.

All Ideologues were born in the U.S., and Aspirants were much more likely to have been U.S. born. 61% of AQROs committed by Aspirants were by those born in the U.S.

Table 10G: Religious converts and non-religious converts by offender role

Role	Convert		Non-convert		Total
	n.	%	n.	%	
Active Participant	13	30.95%	52	39.39%	65
Aspirant	14	33.33%	30	22.73%	44
Facilitator	8	19.05%	28	21.21%	36
Trained Aspirant	5	11.90%	21	15.91%	26
Ideologue	2	4.76%	1	0.76%	3
Total	42	100%	132	100%	174

Converts were most likely to have been Aspirants (33%) and least likely to have been Ideologues (5%). Nearly a third (31%) were Active Participants. Therefore, nearly two thirds (64%) of religious converts were either Active Participants or Aspirants.

Non-converts were most likely to have been Active Participants (39%) and least likely to have been Ideologues (1%).

There was a higher proportion of Aspirants among converts (33%) than non-converts (23%), whereas there was a slightly higher proportion of Facilitators among non-converts (21%) than converts (19%).


Table 10H: Offender role by convert status

Convert status	Active Participant		Aspirant		Facilitator		Trained Aspirant		Ideologue		All AQROs	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
Convert	13	20%	14	31.82%	8	22.22%	5	19.23%	2	66.67%	42	24.14%
Non-convert	52	80%	30	68.18%	28	77.78%	21	80.77%	1	33.33%	132	75.86%
Total	65	100%	44	100%	36	100%	26	100%	3	100%	174	100%

Nearly one third (32%) of all Aspirant AQROs were committed by converts. AQROs committed by Active Participants, Facilitators and Trained Aspirants all contained a broadly similar percentage of converts (ranging between 19 – 22%). Two out of the three Ideologues were converts.


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Figure 10M: Offender role by convert status



Nearly one third (32%) of all Aspirant AQROs were committed by converts. AQROs committed by Active Participants, Facilitators and Trained Aspirants all contained a broadly similar percentage of converts (ranging between 19 – 22%). Two out of the three Ideologues were converts.

Figure 10L: Offender role by convert status



AQRO TYPE AND CHARGES

Table 11A: Type of AQRO

Of all 174 AQROs committed, 89% (n=155) were prosecuted in the U.S. court system, with 86% (n=150) of AQROs leading to convictions in a federal court, and 3% (n=5) in a military court. Suicide attacks comprised 11% (n=19) of all AQROs.

AQRO type	n	%
Conviction	155	89.08%
Federal court	150	86.21%
Military court	5	2.87%
Suicide attack	19	10.92%
Total	174	100%

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Table 11B: Convictions in federal and military courts

Court	n.	%
Federal	150	96.77%
Military	5	3.23%
Total	155	100%

Figure 11A: Convictions in federal and military courts

The vast majority of the 155 AQROs that led to successful convictions (the total of 174 AQROs excluding the nineteen suicide hijackers from September 11, 2001) have been prosecuted in federal courts (97%, n=150). Just 3% (n=5) of all convictions have taken place in a military court.




Table 11C: Individual charges

155 separate AQRO convictions accrued 415 separate charges. Multiple instances of the same charge within a single conviction have not been counted separately. A total of 415 separate charges were successfully prosecuted in 155 AQRO convictions occurring between 1997 and 2011.

The different charges have been split into ten broad categories. Offenses are categorised depending on whether they relate to: Material Support; Mass Casualty; Kill, Kidnap, Maim or Injure; Firearms; False Information; General Conspiracy; Aiding the Enemy; Financial; Facilitation; and Rhetoric.

Charges	n.	%
Material Support	100	24.09%
Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists	34	8.19%
Providing Material Support to Terrorists	24	5.78%
Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to a Designated Terrorist Organization	22	5.30%
Providing Material Support to a Designated Terrorist Organization	20	4.82%
Mass Casualty	91	21.93%
Conspiracy to Damage or Destroy Buildings, Property or Public Transport of the United States	18	4.34%
Conspiracy to Use WMDs	10	2.41%
Conspiracy to Levy War Against the United States	7	1.69%
Attempted Use of a WMD	6	1.45%
Using or Carrying an Explosive	6	1.45%
Aiding and Abetting the Carrying of an Explosive	4	0.96%
Distributing Information Regarding WMDs	4	0.96%
Conspiracy to Commit Act of Transnational Terrorism	3	0.72%
Conspiracy to Destroy an Aircraft	3	0.72%
Attempted Destruction of Aircraft	2	0.48%
Attempted Murder within the Special Aircraft Jurisdiction of the United States	2	0.48%
Conspiracy to Commit Aircraft Piracy	2	0.48%

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Charges	n.	%
Conspiracy to Destroy National-Defense Materials, Premises, or Utilities of the United States	2	0.48%
Explosive Damage or Destruction	2	0.48%
Transportation of an Explosive	2	0.48%
Use of a Destructive Device	2	0.48%
Use of WMDS	2	0.48%
Aiding and Abetting Explosive Damage or Destruction	1	0.24%
Aiding and Abetting the Use of a Weapon of Mass Destruction	1	0.24%
Attempted Destruction of Property	1	0.24%
Act of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries	1	0.24%
Attempted Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries	1	0.24%
Attempted Use of a Destructive Device	1	0.24%
Carrying a Weapon or Explosive on an Aircraft	1	0.24%
Collecting Information to Assist in Planning a Terrorist Attack on a Transit Facility	1	0.24%
Conspiracy to Transport an Explosive	1	0.24%
Interference with Flight Crew Members and Attendants of an Aircraft	1	0.24%
Placing a Destructive Device in a Civil Aircraft	1	0.24%
Placing an Explosive in Proximity to a Terminal	1	0.24%
Possession of Unregistered Destructive Device	1	0.24%
Transferring, Possessing or Exporting a Device Designed or Intended to Launch a Rocket	1	0.24%
Kill, Kidnap, Maim or Injure	74	17.83%
Conspiracy to Kill, Kidnap, Maim or Injure	24	5.78%
Conspiracy to Murder	21	5.06%
Attempted Murder	13	3.13%
Murder	11	2.65%
Aiding and Abetting Attempted Murder	4	0.96%
Assault	1	0.24%
Firearms	43	10.37%
Use, Possession or Discharge of Firearms in Relation to a Crime of Violence	16	3.86%
Alien in Possession of a Firearm/Possessing Firearms while Unlawfully Present in the U.S.	5	1.21%
Conspiracy to Possess and Discharge/Use Firearms in Furtherance of Crime of Violence	5	1.21%
Illegal Possession of Machine Guns	5	1.21%
Unlawful Possession of a Firearm	3	0.72%
Attempted Possession of Firearms in Relation to a Crime of Violence	3	0.72%
Possessing or Receiving Ammunition Illegally	2	0.48%
Transfer or Transport Firearms	2	0.48%
Armed Assault	1	0.24%
Conspiring to Unlawfully Possess Firearms and Ammunition while Unlawfully Present in the U.S.	1	0.24%
False Information	25	6.02%
False statements	16	3.86%
False Declarations Before a Grand Jury/Perjury	3	0.72%
Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice	1	0.24%
False Statement in an Immigration Application	1	0.24%
False Statement in a Matter of Naturalization	1	0.24%
Influencing or Injuring Officer or Juror	1	0.24%

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Charges	n.	%
Scheme to Conceal Material Facts	1	0.24%
Use of a Fictitious Name	1	0.24%
General Conspiracy	22	5.30%
Conspiracy to Commit Offense or Defraud the United States	17	4.09%
Conspiracy	3	0.72%
Penalties	1	0.24%
Unspecified conspiracy	1	0.24%
Aiding the Enemy	19	4.58%
Conspiracy to Supply or Contribute Services or Support	7	1.69%
Attempting to Communicate with, Give Intelligence to, or Aid the Enemy	4	0.96%
Receiving Military-Type Training From a Foreign Terrorist Organization	3	0.72%
Attempting to Make a Contribution of Goods and/or Services	2	0.48%
Commencing an Expedition Against a Friendly Nation	1	0.24%
Providing Information to Military Personnel Believed to be Terrorists	1	0.24%
Spying	1	0.24%
Financial	16	3.86%
Bank or Wire Fraud	3	0.72%
Conspiring to Contribute Funds	3	0.72%
False Tax Returns and I.R.S. Obstruction	3	0.72%
Money Laundering	3	0.72%
Conspiracy to Engage in Money Laundering	1	0.24%
Financing Terrorism	1	0.24%
Forfeiture	1	0.24%
Receipt of Funds and Services from al-Qaeda	1	0.24%
Facilitation	13	3.12%
Fraud with ID documents	3	0.72%
Identity Theft	2	0.48%
Counterfeit Devices	2	0.48%
Smuggling	2	0.48%
Abetting Others to Receive Military Training from a Foreign Terrorist Organization	1	0.24%
Attempted Identity Theft	1	0.24%
Possession of False ID Documents	1	0.24%
Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution	1	0.24%
Rhetoric	12	2.88%
Solicitation to Commit a Crime of Violence	3	0.72%
Soliciting Others to Levy War Against the United States	2	0.48%
Communicating Threats	1	0.24%
Counselling and Inducing Others to Aid the Taliban	1	0.24%
Counselling and Inducing Others to Conspire to Violate the Neutrality Act	1	0.24%
Inducing Others to Carry Explosives	1	0.24%
Inducing Others to Conspire to Use Firearms	1	0.24%
Inducing Others to Use Firearms	1	0.24%
Soliciting to Commit Murder	1	0.24%
Total	415	100%

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
Material Support is the category with the highest number of charges, comprising nearly a quarter of the overall total (24%, n=100). The two most common charges from any category are in Material Support: Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists (8% of the total, n=34) and Providing Material Support to Terrorists (6%, n=24).

The second most common category is Mass Casualty, which contains nearly a quarter (22%, n=91) of all charges issued. The most common charge issued in this category that led to a successful prosecution is Conspiracy to Damage or Destroy Buildings, Property or Public Transport of the United States (4%, n=18). The third most common category is Kill, Kidnap, Maim or Injure (18%, n=74), which also contains the third most commonly used charge (Conspiracy to Kill, Kidnap, Maim or Injure, (6%, n=24). The next most common category is Firearms, which comprises 10% (n=43) of all successful prosecutions.

Table 11D: Charge category

Charge category	n.	%
Material Support	100	24.09%
Mass Casualty Attack	91	21.93%
Kill, Kidnap, Maim or Injure	74	17.83%
Firearms	43	10.37%
False Information	25	6.02%
General Conspiracy	22	5.30%
Aiding the Enemy	19	4.58%
Financial	16	3.86%
Facilitation	13	3.12%
Rhetoric	12	2.88%
Total	415	100%

Figure 11B: Charge category



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
Table 11E: Separate charges per conviction

Separate charges	Convictions		Charges	
	n.	%	n.	%
One	62	40%	62	14.94%
Two	37	23.87%	74	17.83%
Three	21	13.56%	63	15.18%
Four	9	5.81%	36	8.68%
Five	11	7.09%	55	13.25%
Six	3	1.94%	18	4.34%
Seven	5	3.23%	35	8.43%
Eight	1	0.65%	8	1.93%
Nine	3	1.94%	27	6.51%
Ten	0	0%	0	0%
Eleven	1	0.65%	11	2.65%
Twelve	0	0%	0	0%
Thirteen	2	1.29%	26	6.27%
Total	155	100%	415	100%

In 40% (n=62) of AQROs successfully prosecuted in court, the individual was charged with one offense. In a further 24% (n=37) of cases there were two separate charges and in 14% (n=21) of cases there were three charges. The highest amount of charges issued in one case was thirteen – against Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-‘Owhali and Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, for their roles in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings.

Cases where there were two separate charges constituted 18% (n=74) of the total number of charges, The next highest number was for cases where there were three separate charges (15%, n=63), followed by one charge (15%, n=62).

Figure 11C: Separate charges per conviction




PLEA

Table 12A: Plea

In the 155 AQROs successfully prosecuted in U.S. courts, 65% (n=101) of defendants pleaded guilty. 35% (n=54) pleaded not guilty.

Plea	n.	%
Guilty	101	65.16%
Not guilty	54	34.84%
Total	155	100%

Figure 12A: Plea




SENTENCE

Table 13A: Sentence duration

Sentence	n.	%
Non-custodial	1	0.65%
Probation	1	0.65%
Custodial	123	79.36%
0-11 months	3	1.94%
1-4 years	15	9.68%
5-9 years	19	12.26%
10-14 years	25	16.13%
15-19 years	15	9.68%
20-24 years	12	7.74%
25-29 years	5	3.23%
30-49 years	6	3.87%
50+	2	1.29%
Life	22	14.19%
Death	1	0.65%
Other	30	19.36%
Unspecified	2	1.29%
Awaiting sentence	27	17.42%
Total	155	100%

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Figure 13A: Sentence duration



The single most common length of custodial sentence given to AQRO convicts was between 10-14 years (16%, n=25). The second most common sentence length was life imprisonment (14%, n=22). The third most common sentence was between 5-9 years (12%, n=19). Therefore, over a quarter (28%, n=44) of AQROs prosecuted in court led to a sentence of between five and fourteen years.

18% of all 155 AQRO convictions have still not have received a sentence. One individual – Hasan Akbar – was sentenced to death (although this sentence is currently being appealed). Those sentenced to life in prison included members of al-Qaeda, one of the three Ideologues convicted of AQROs (Ali al-Timimi), and those connected to bomb plots in the U.S.


Only 2% (n=3) of AQRO perpetrators were sentenced to less than a year in prison. These offenses related to Unlawful Possession of a Firearm (Semi Osman); Conspiracy to Defraud (Samir al-Monla); and Conspiracy to Defraud and False Statements (Emadeddin Muntasser).

UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS

Table 14A: Undercover investigation

Undercover investigation	n.	%
Yes	50	28.74%
No	124	71.26%
Total	174	100%

Figure 14A: Undercover investigation



Nearly a third (29%, n=50) of AQROs involved an undercover investigation, and the use of informants or undercover officers. Therefore, 71% (n=124) did not involve an undercover investigation.

Table 14B: Offender role breakdown in undercover investigations

Role	Undercover investigation		No undercover investigation		Total
	n.	%	n.	%	
Active Participant	11	22%	54	43.55%	65
Aspirant	32	64%	12	9.68%	44
Facilitator	4	8%	32	25.81%	36
Trained Aspirant	3	6%	23	18.55%	26
Ideologue	0	0%	3	2.42%	3
Total	50	100%	124	100%	174

The majority of undercover investigations (64%, n=32) were against Aspirants – who only make up 25% of all AQROs. Therefore, undercover investigations were disproportionately focused on Aspirants in comparison to the overall percentage of AQROs. 22% (n=11) of operations were against Active Participants, who made up 37% of AQROs. Facilitators constituted 21% of the overall percentage of AQROs, yet only 8% (n=4) of all AQROs involved an undercover investigation. Similarly, while Trained Aspirants constituted 15% of all AQROs, only 6% of undercover investigations were against this type of offender.

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Figure 14B: Offender roles breakdown in undercover investigations





Table 14C: Use of undercover investigations within offender role

Undercover investigation	Active Participant		Aspirant		Facilitator		Trained Aspirant		Ideologue		All AQROs	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
Yes	11	16.92%	32	72.73%	4	11.11%	3	11.54%	0	0%	50	28.74%
No	54	83.08%	12	27.27%	32	88.89%	23	88.46%	3	100%	124	71.26%
	65	100%	44	100%	36	100%	26	100%	3	100%	174	100%

Of all Aspirant AQROs, nearly three quarters (73%, n=32), were the subject of an undercover investigation. This is over four times as high as the next most common offender role: Active Participant AQROs, 17% of which were the subject of an undercover investigation. Approximately the same proportion of Facilitator AQROs (11%, n=4) and Trained Aspirant AQROs (12%, n=3) were the subject of undercover investigations.

Figure 14C: Use of undercover investigations within offender roles



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Table 14D: Undercover investigations: Average age

Age	Undercover investigation (n = 50)	No undercover investigation (n = 124)
Mean	28.6	30
Median	26	28
Mode	22 & 24	24 & 25
Range	34	44

Undercover investigations have tended to focus on slightly younger AQRO perpetrators. The mean age was 28.6 (compared to 30 for AQROs not involving an undercover investigation). The median age was 26 (as opposed to 28); the mode was slightly lower at 22 and 24 (as opposed to 24 and 25); and the range is 34 (as opposed to 44 for non-undercover investigations).

TERRORIST TRAINING


Table 15A: Terrorist training

Terrorist training	n.	%
Received terrorist training	80	46.78%
One country	71	41.52%
Two countries	5	2.92%
Three countries	2	1.17%
Unspecified country	2	1.17%
Unspecified	4	2.34%
No terrorist training	87	50.88%
Total	171	100%

Figure 15A: Terrorist training

Almost half (47%) of individuals (53%, n=80) had attended training camps for terrorist purposes.⁶

Of these, 42% (n=71) were known to have attended one or more terrorist training camps, while the remaining trained in either two or three countries (3%, n=5 and 1%, n=2 respectively). 1% (n=2) trained in an unspecified country.



⁶ Training camp attendance is defined by the authors of the report as: known or reported attendance of a training camp for terrorist purposes.

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Table 15B: Trained individuals: Location of terrorist training

Location of terrorist training	n.	% (of trained individuals, n=80)	% (of all individuals, n=171)
Afghanistan	54	67.50%	31.58%
Pakistan	23	28.75%	13.45%
Somalia	4	5.00%	2.34%
Kosovo	1	1.25%	0.58%
Saudi Arabia	1	1.25%	0.58%
Sudan	1	1.25%	0.58%
Syria	1	1.25%	0.58%
U.S.	1	1.25%	0.58%
Yemen	1	1.25%	0.58%
Unspecified	2	2.50%	1.17%
Total received training	80*	100%	47%

*As seven individuals received training in more than one country, the cumulative total of all locations is higher than the 80 individuals involved. Five individuals received training in two countries: Bryant Neal Vinas, Christopher Paul, Daniel Patrick Boyd, L'Houssaine Kherchtou and Iyman Faris all trained in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Two individuals received training in three countries: Mamdouh Mahmud Salim in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sudan; and David Hicks in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kosovo. For two individuals, the location of training is unspecified. In total, therefore, there were 89 locations of which two are categorized as Unspecified.⁷

Therefore, there was a total of 89 known separate incidences of terrorist training.

Of trained individuals, 68% (n=54) attended camps in Afghanistan; 29% in Pakistan (n=23); and 5% (n=4) in Somalia. The remainder had one incidence of training in Sudan; Kosovo; Saudi Arabia; Syria; the United States; and Yemen. 3% of trained individuals had attended terrorist training in an unspecified country.

Therefore, the vast majority (97%, n=77) of individuals who had received terrorist training did so in Afghanistan and/or Pakistan.

Of the 171 individuals who committed AQROs, 32% attended camps in Afghanistan, while 13% attended camps in Pakistan; and 2% trained in Somalia.

As some individuals trained in more than one country, the total percentage who attended at least one training camp is 47%.

⁷Included in the section of those who received training are Wesam al-Delaema and Mohamed Suleiman al-Nalfi. Al-Delaema is alleged to have trained in Syria but has not had this allegation tested in court, yet planted roadside bombs and demonstrating on video how these explosives would detonate. Al-Nalfi was a member of al-Qaeda who had fought in Afghanistan. The nature of their actions makes it extremely likely they had received training, even if it has not been explicitly shown in court.

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Figure 15B: Trained individuals: Location of terrorist training




Table 15C: Known terrorist training camps

Known terrorist training camps		n.	% (trained individuals, n=80)	% (all individuals, n=171)
Afghanistan		54	67.50%	31.58%
	Al-Farouq	24	30.00%	14.04%
	Al-Matar	15	18.75%	8.77%
	Khalden	7	8.75%	4.09%
	Derunta	3	3.75%	1.75%
	Mes Aynak	3	3.75%	1.75%
	Abu Bakr Sadeek	2	2.50%	1.17%
	Jihad Wal	2	2.50%	1.17%
	Khalid Ibn Walid	1	1.25%	0.58%
	Sada	1	1.25%	0.58%
	Sheikh Shaheed Abu Yahya	1	1.25%	0.58%
	Tarnak Farms	1	1.25%	0.58%
	Unspecified	15	18.75%	8.77%
Pakistan		23	28.75%	13.45%
	Mosqua Aqsa	2	2.50%	1.17%
	Ibn Masood	1	1.25%	0.58%
	Ibn Taymiyaa	1	1.25%	0.58%
	Malakand	1	1.25%	0.58%
	Unspecified	19	23.75%	11.11%
U.S.		1	1.25%	0.58%
	Bly, Oregon	1	1.25%	0.58%
Unspecified training camp locations		11	13.75%	6.43%
	Somalia	4	5.00%	2.34%
	Kosovo	1	1.25%	0.58%
	Saudi Arabia	1	1.25%	0.58%
	Sudan	1	1.25%	0.58%
	Syria	1	1.25%	0.58%
	Yemen	1	1.25%	0.58%
	Unspecified	2	2.50%	1.17%
Total received training		80	100%	47%

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The majority of those who received terrorist training did so in Afghanistan. The highest proportion of those who received training attended al-Farouq training camp (30%, n=24) and then al-Matar training camp (19%, n=15). The third most common was Khalden (9%, n=7). All three of these camps were based in Afghanistan. 29% of all those who trained attended camps in Pakistan. There was one incident of terrorist training that occurred in Oregon, when, in 1999, Semi Osman received training from Oussama Kassir.


Table 15D: Nationality among trained individuals and those with no known terrorist training

Nationality	Received terrorist training		No terrorist training/un-specified		All individuals	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
Northern American	34	42.50%	63	69.23%	97	56.73%
American	31	38.75%	62	68.13%	93	54.39%
Canadian	3	3.75%	1	1.10%	4	2.34%
Western Asian	24	30.00%	7	7.69%	31	18.13%
Saudi Arabian	16	20.00%	0	0%	16	9.36%
Lebanese	1	1.25%	3	3.30%	4	2.34%
Iraqi	1	1.25%	2	2.20%	3	1.75%
Emirati	2	2.50%	0	0%	2	1.17%
Jordanian	1	1.25%	1	1.10%	2	1.17%
Yemeni	2	2.50%	0	0%	2	1.17%
Qatari Saudi Arabian	1	1.25%	0	0%	1	0.58%
Turkish	0	0%	1	1.10%	1	0.58%
Northern African	8	10.00%	4	4.40%	12	7.02%
Sudanese	5	6.25%	0	0%	5	2.92%
Algerian	1	1.25%	2	2.20%	3	1.75%
Egyptian	1	1.25%	1	1.10%	2	1.17%
Libyan	0	0%	1	1.10%	1	0.58%
Moroccan	1	1.25%	0	0%	1	0.58%
Southern Asian	4	5.00%	8	8.79%	12	7.02%
Pakistani	3	3.75%	7	7.69%	10	5.85%
Afghan	1	1.25%	1	1.10%	2	1.17%
Eastern African	2	2.50%	4	4.40%	6	3.51%
Somali	0	0%	4	4.40%	4	2.34%
Tanzanian	2	2.50%	0	0%	2	1.17%
Southern European	0	0%	4	4.40%	4	2.34%
Macedonian	0	0%	3	3.30%	3	1.75%
Kosovar	0	0%	1	1.10%	1	0.58%
Northern European	2	2.50%	0	0%	2	1.17%
British	1	1.25%	0	0%	1	0.58%
Swedish	1	1.25%	0	0%	1	0.58%

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Nationality	Received terrorist training		No terrorist training/un-specified		All individuals	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
Western European	2	2.50%	0	0%	2	1.17%
Dutch	1	1.25%	0	0%	1	0.58%
French	1	1.25%	0	0%	1	0.58%
Eastern African-Northern American	1	1.25%	0	0%	1	0.58%
Unspecified (Somali or American)	1	1.25%	0	0%	1	0.58%
Northern European-Western African	1	1.25%	0	0%	1	0.58%
British Sierra Leonean	1	1.25%	0	0%	1	0.58%
Oceanic	1	1.25%	0	0%	1	0.58%
Australian	1	1.25%	0	0%	1	0.58%
Western African	1	1.25%	0	0%	1	0.58%
Nigerian	1	1.25%	0	0%	1	0.58%
N/A	0	0%	1	1.10%	1	0.58%
Unspecified	0	0%	1	1.10%	1	0.58%
Total	80	100%	91	100%	171	100%

Figure 15C: Nationality among trained individuals and those with no known training



Over one third (39%, n=31) of those who had received terrorist training were U.S. citizens, followed by Saudi Arabians (20%, n=16) and Sudanese (6%, n=5). The high level of Saudis is explained by the high proportion who trained in Afghanistan in preparation for al-Qaeda's attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001.

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Table 15E: U.S. citizens: Terrorist training

Of all U.S. citizens, 33% (n=31) had received terrorist training, while 67% (n=62) had not.

Terrorist Training	<i>n.</i>	%
Received terrorist training	31	33.33%
No terrorist training	62	66.67%
Total U.S. citizens	93	100%

Figure 15D: U.S. citizens: Terrorist training





Table 15F: Undercover investigations and terrorist training

Terrorist training	Undercover investigation		No undercover investigation		All AQROs	
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%
Received terrorist training	5	10%	78	62.90%	83*	47.70%
No terrorist training	43	86%	44	35.48%	87	50%
Unspecified	2	4%	2	1.61%	4	2.30%
Total	50	100%	124	100%	174	100%

* Informant data relates to 174 AQROs. The frequency of terrorist training among all AQROs is 83 (rather than 80 among individuals) as the two individuals with multiple convictions both received terrorist training. - put with star sized text under table

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Figure 15E: Undercover investigations and terrorist training



Of those who were subject to undercover investigations, 10% (n=5) had received terrorist training, while 86% (n=43) had not received any and 4% (n=2) were unspecified. Of those who were not subject to undercover investigations, 63% (n=78) had received terrorist training, while 35% (n=44) had not received any training. 2% (n=2) were unspecified.


COMBAT EXPERIENCE

Table 16A: Combat experience among AQRO perpetrators

Combat experience	n.	%
Combat experience	30	17.54%
No combat experience	141	82.46%
Total	171	100%

Figure 16A: Combat experience among AQRO perpetrators.

The majority (82%, n=141) of individuals who committed AQROs had no combat experience. Therefore, 18% (n=30) had some combat experience



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Table 16B: Location of combat experience

Location	n.	% with combat experience, n=30	% all individuals, n=171
Afghanistan	19	63.33%	11.11%
Bosnia	3	10.00%	1.75%
Somalia	3	10.00%	1.75%
Iraq	2	6.67%	1.17%
Pakistan	2	6.67%	1.17%
Ethiopia	1	3.33%	0.58%
Kashmir	1	3.33%	0.58%
Unspecified [Israel / Lebanon]	1	3.33%	0.58%
Unspecified	1	3.33%	0.58%
Total with combat experience	30*	100%	18%

*As three individuals each gained combat experience in two countries (Christopher Paul in Afghanistan and Bosnia; Randall Royer in Bosnia and Pakistan; David Hicks in Afghanistan and Kashmir), the cumulative total of all locations is higher than the 30 individuals involved.

As a percentage of those who had fought abroad, Afghanistan was the location for 63% (n=19). The next two most common countries for combat experience were Bosnia and Somalia – at 10% each. As an overall percentage of the total number of AQROs, 11% were known to have fought in Afghanistan and 2% each in Bosnia and Somalia.

Figure 16B: Location of combat experience




Table 16C: Terrorist training and combat experience among individuals

Terrorist training	Individuals with combat experience		Individuals without combat experience	
	n.	%	n.	%
Received terrorist training	29	96.67%	51	36.17%
No terrorist training	1	3.33%	86	60.99%
Unspecified	0	0%	4	2.84%
Total	30	100%	141	100%

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The vast majority of those with combat experience had received training beforehand (97%, n=29). The only exception to this was Nuradin Abdi, who became involved in a firefight with Ethiopian military in 1993 without being known to have received training beforehand. Over one third of those who had no combat experience had still received terrorist training (36%, n=51).

Figure 16C: Terrorist training and combat experience among individuals




Table 16D: Nationality and combat experience among individuals

Nationality	Individuals with combat experience		Individuals without combat experience		All individuals	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
Northern American	13	43.33%	84	59.57%	97	56.73%
American	10	33.33%	83	58.87%	93	54.39%
Canadian	3	10.00%	1	0.71%	4	2.34%
Western Asian	6	20.00%	25	17.73%	31	18.13%
Saudi Arabian	2	6.67%	14	9.93%	16	9.36%
Lebanese	0	0%	4	2.84%	4	2.34%
Iraqi	1	3.33%	2	1.42%	3	1.75%
Emirati	0	0%	2	1.42%	2	1.17%
Jordanian	1	3.33%	1	0.71%	2	1.17%
Yemeni	2	6.67%	0	0%	2	1.17%
Qatari Saudi Arabian	0	0%	1	0.71%	1	0.58%
Turkish	0	0%	1	0.71%	1	0.58%
Northern African	5	16.67%	7	4.96%	12	7.02%
Sudanese	4	13.33%	1	0.71%	5	2.92%

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	Algerian	0	0%	3	2.13%	3	1.75%
	Egyptian	0	0%	2	1.42%	2	1.17%
	Libyan	0	0%	1	0.71%	1	0.58%
	Moroccan	1	3%	0		1	0.58%
Southern Asian		0	0%	12	8.51%	12	7.02%
	Pakistani	0	0%	10	7.09%	10	5.85%
	Afghan	0	0%	2	1.42%	2	1.17%
Eastern African		2	6.67%	4	2.84%	6	3.51%
	Somali	1	3.33%	3	2.13%	4	2.34%
	Tanzanian	1	3.33%	1	0.71%	2	1.17%
Southern European		0	0%	4	2.84%	4	2.34%
	Macedonian	0	0%	3	2.13%	3	1.75%
	Kosovar	0	0%	1	0.71%	1	0.58%
Northern European		1	3.33%	1	0.71%	2	1.17%
	British	0	0%	1	0.71%	1	0.58%
	Swedish	1	3.33%	0	0%	1	0.58%
Western European		1	3.33%	1	0.71%	2	1.17%
	Dutch	1	3.33%	0	0%	1	0.58%
	French	0	0%	1	0.71%	1	0.58%
Eastern African-Northern American		1	3.33%	0	0%	1	0.58%
	Unspecified [Somali or American]	1	3.33%	0	0%	1	0.58%
Northern European-Western African		0	0%	1	0.71%	1	0.58%
	British Sierra Leonean	0	0%	1	0.71%	1	0.58%
Oceanic		1	3.33%	0	0%	1	0.58%
	Australian	1	3.33%	0	0%	1	0.58%
Western African		0	0%	1	0.71%	1	0.58%
	Nigerian	0	0%	1	0.71%	1	0.58%
N/A		0	0%	1	0.71%	1	0.58%
	Unspecified	0	0%	1	0.71%	1	0.58%
Total		30	100%	141	100%	171	100%

Individuals who had received combat experience prior to their offense were most likely to be American (33%, n=10), followed by Sudanese (13%, n=4) and Canadian (10%, n=3). Therefore, 43% of individuals with combat experience had a nationality from within the region of Northern America.

Proportionally, there was a higher percentage of those from Western Asia of individuals with combat experience (20%, n=6) than without (18%, n=25). Furthermore, all Southern Asian individuals had combat experience (9%, n=12).

Individuals with combat experience were more likely to have had a Northern African nationality (17%; namely Sudanese at 13%) than those without combat experience (5%).

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Figure 16D: Nationality among individuals with and without combat experience





Table 16E: Combat experience within AQROs involving undercover investigations.

Informant used		No informant		All AQROs	
n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
2	4%	29	23.39%	31	17.82%
48	96%	95	76.61%	143	82.18%
50	100%	124	100%	174	100%

Figure 16E: Combat experience within AQROs involving undercover investigations and AQROs not involving an undercover investigation



An significant majority (96%) of AQROs committed by those subject to an undercover investigation had no known combat experience. Only 4% (n=2) had prior known combat experience. In contrast, AQROs which were not the subject of an undercover investigation contained almost a quarter (23%) of the total of AQROs committed by those with combat experience.

ANALYSIS OF LINKS TO DESIGNATED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS & WIDER NETWORKS⁸

Table 17A: Designated Terrorist Organizations (DTOs)

KEY	
Al-Qaeda	AQ
Lashkar-e-Taiba	LcT
Al-Shabaab	ALS
Maktab al-Khidamat	MAK
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula	AQAP
Al Haramain Foundation	AHF
Armed Islamic Group	GIA
Egyptian Islamic Jihad	EIJ
Jemaah Islamiya	JI
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	AIG
Ansar al-Islam	AAI
Harakat ul-Mujahideen	HuM
Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya	AIAI
Tchrik-e-Taliban Pakistan	TTP

Table 17B: Known links to DTOs

Known links to DTOs	All individuals		All AQROs	
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%
Known links to one or more DTO	98	57.31%	101	58.05%
One DTO	90	52.63%	93	53.45%
Two DTOs	8	4.68%	8	4.60%
No known links to a DTO	73	42.69%	73	41.95%
Total	171	100%	174	100%

The majority of individuals who committed AQROs were linked to DTOs (57%, n=98), with 53% (n=90) linked to one DTO and 5% (n=8) linked to two DTOs.

⁸ A DTO is defined as being on either the Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) or the Treasury's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.

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Figure 17A: Known links to DTOs





Table 17C: Known links by DTO

DTO	n.	% (DTO-linked individuals, n=98)	% (all individuals, n=171)
Al-Qaeda	61	62.24%	35.67%
Lashkar-e-Taiba	14	14.29%	8.77%
Al-Shabaab	9	9.18%	5.26%
Maktab al-Khidamat	6	6.12%	3.51%
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula	3	3.06%	1.75%
Al Haramain Foundation	2	2.04%	1.17%
Armed Islamic Group	2	2.04%	1.17%
Egyptian Islamic Jihad	2	2.04%	1.17%
Jemaah Islamiya	2	2.04%	1.17%
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	1	1.02%	0.58%
Ansar al-Islam	1	1.02%	0.58%
Harakat ul-Mujahideen	1	1.02%	0.58%
Al-Itihad al-Islamiya	1	1.02%	0.58%
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan	1	1.02%	0.58%
Total individuals linked to DTOs	98	100%	57.31%

Among these links to DTOs, 62% (n=61) were linked to al-Qaeda directly, while 14% (n=14) were links to LeT and 9% (n=9) had links to al-Shabaab.

Of the 171 individuals who committed AQROs, over one third (36%) had direct links to AQ, with a further 2% linked to AQAP. Therefore, 38% of all AQROs were directly linked to AQ. A further 9% were linked to LeT; and 5% to al-Shabaab.

Figure 17B: DTO-linked individuals: Known links by DTO



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Table 17D: Individuals with links to DTOs

Individuals with links to DTOs					
Al-Qaeda - 61			Lashkar-e-Taiba - 15		Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula - 3
Aafia Siddiqui	Mamdouh Mahmud Salim		Ali Asad Chandia		Barry Walter Bujol
Abdul Aziz al Omari	Marwan al-Shehhi		David Coleman Headley		Carlos Bledsoe
Ahmed al-Haznawi	Mohamed Abdullah Warsame		David Hicks		Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
Ahmad al-Nami	Mohamed Atta		Ibrahim Ahmed al-Hamdi		Al Haramain Foundation - 2
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani	Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-'Owhali		Jubair Ahmad		Omar Abdi Mohamed
Ahmed Omar Abu Ali	Mohamed Sadeek Odeh		Khwaja Mahmood Hasan		Pirouz Sedaghaty
Ahmed Ressam	Mohamed Suleiman al-Nalfi		Mahmud Faruq Brent		Armed Islamic Group - 2
Ahmed al-Ghamdi	Mohammed Jabarah		Masoud Khan		Ahmed Ressam
Ali A. Mohamed	Mohammed Junaid Babar		Muhammed Aatique		Mokhtar Haouari
Ali Hamza al-Bahlul	Mohand al-Shehri		Randall Royer		Egyptian Islamic Jihad - 2
Ali Saleh Hahlah al-Marri	Mukhtar al-Bakri		Sabri Benkahla		Ali A. Mohamed
Bryant Neal Vinas	Najibullah Zazi		Seifullah Chapman		Khalid al-Mihdhar
Christopher Paul	Nawaf al-Hazmi		Tahawwur Hussain Rana		Jemaah Islamiya - 2
Daniel Maldonado	Noor Uthman Muhammed		Yong Ki Kwon		Mohammed Jabarah
David Hicks	Omar Khadr		Al-Shabaab - 9		Rahmat Abdhir
Fayez Banihammad	Richard Reid		Abdifatah Yusuf Isse		Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya - 1
Faysal Galab	Sahim Alwan		Amina Farah Ali		Ahmed Abdel Sattar
Hamid Hayat	Said al-Ghamdi		Hawo Mohamed Hassan		
Hamza al-Ghamdi	Salem al-Hazmi		Kamal Said Hassan		Ansar al-Islam - 1
Hani Hanjour	Shafal Mosed		Mohamud Abdi Yusuf		Yassin Aref
Ibrahim al Qosi	Satam al-Suqami		Nima Ali Yusuf		
Iyman Faris	Uzair Paracha		Omer Abdi Mohamed		Harakat ul-Mujahideen - 1
Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl	Wadih el-Hage		Salah Osman Ahmed		John Walker Lindh
James Ujaama	Wail al-Shehri		Zachary Adam Chesser		
John Walker Lindh	Waleed al-Shehri		Maktab al-Khidamat - 6		Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya - 1
Jose Padilla	Yahya Goba		Aafia Siddiqui		Nuradin Abdi
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed	Yasein Taher		Emadeddin Z. Muntasser		
Khalid al-Mihdhar	Zacarias Moussaoui		Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl		Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan - 1
Khalid Ouazzani	Zarein Ahmedzey		Kifah Wael Jayyousi		Faisal Shahzad
L'Houssaine Kherchtou	Ziad Jarrah		Muhammed Mubayyid		
Majed Moqed			Samir Al-Monla		

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Table 17E: Nationality among DTO-linked individuals and those with no known links

Nationality	Known links to one or more DTO		No known links to a DTO		Total
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>
Northern American	46	46.94%	51	69.86%	97
American	42	42.86%	51	69.86%	93
Canadian	4	4.08%	0	0%	4
Western Asian	25	25.51%	6	8.22%	31
Saudi Arabian	16	16.33%	0	0%	16
Lebanese	2	2.04%	2	2.74%	4
Iraqi	1	1.02%	2	2.74%	3
Emirati	2	2.04%	0	0%	2
Jordanian	1	1.02%	1	1.37%	2
Yemeni	2	2.04%	0	0%	2
Qatari Saudi Arabian	1	1.02%	0	0%	1
Turkish	0	0%	1	1.37%	1
Northern African	10	10.20%	2	2.74%	12
Sudanese	5	5.10%	0	0%	5
Algerian	2	2.04%	1	1.37%	3
Egyptian	1	1.02%	1	1.37%	2
Libyan	1	1.02%	0	0%	1
Moroccan	1	1.02%	0	0%	1
Southern Asian	6	6.12%	6	8.22%	12
Pakistani	5	5.10%	5	6.85%	10
Afghan	1	1.02%	1	1.37%	2
Eastern African	6	6.12%	0	0%	6
Somali	4	4.08%	0	0%	4
Tanzanian	2	2.04%	0	0%	2
Southern European	0	0%	4	5.48%	4
Macedonian	0	0%	3	4.11%	3
Kosovar	0	0%	1	1.37%	1
Northern European	1	1.02%	1	1.37%	2
British	1	1.02%	0	0%	1
Swedish	0	0%	1	1.37%	1
Western European	1	1.02%	1	1.37%	2
Dutch	0	0%	1	1.37%	1
French	1	1.02%	0	0%	1
Eastern African-Northern American	1	1.02%	0	0%	1
Unspecified (Somali or American)	1	1.02%	0	0%	1
Northern European-Western African	0	0%	1	1.37%	1
British Sierra Leonean	0	0%	1	1.37%	1
Oceanic	1	1.02%	0	0%	1
Australian	1	1.02%	0	0%	1
Western African	1	1.02%	0	0%	1
Nigerian	1	1.02%	0	0%	1
Unspecified	0	0%	1	1.37%	1
Total	98	100%	73	100%	171

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43% (n=42) of AQROs linked to a DTO are committed by U.S. citizens. This is disproportionately low in comparison to the overall national percentage of AQROs committed by U.S. citizens (54%). In contrast, U.S. citizens are responsible for over two thirds (70%, n=51) of AQROs with no link to a DTO – disproportionately high.

All Saudi Arabians – the second most common nationality responsible for AQROs – were linked to a DTO (all AQ).

A higher percentage of individuals with known links to DTOs had Northern American nationality (47%, n=46) than those without known links (70%). Those with known links were also more likely to have nationalities from Western and Eastern Asian and Eastern and Northern African. No Southern Europeans had any links to a DTO, although they comprised 5% (n=4) of those with no links to a DTO.

Figure 17C: Nationality among DTO-linked individuals and those with no known links




Table 17F: DTO-linked individuals: Nationality by DTO

DTO	Nationality	n.	% of DTO
AQ - 61	American	20	32.79%
	Saudi Arabian	16	26.23%
	Sudanese	4	6.56%
	Canadian	3	4.92%
	Emirati	2	3.28%
	Pakistani	2	3.28%
	Tanzanian	2	3.28%
	Afghan	1	1.64%
	Algerian	1	1.64%
	Australian	1	1.64%
	British	1	1.64%
	Egyptian	1	1.64%
	French	1	1.64%
	Jordanian	1	1.64%
	Lebanese	1	1.64%
	Moroccan	1	1.64%
	Qatari Saudi Arabian	1	1.64%
	Sudanese	1	1.64%
	Yemeni	1	1.64%

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DTO	Nationality	n.	% of DTO
LeT - 14	American	8	57%
	Pakistani	3	21%
	Australian	1	7.14%
	Canadian	1	7.14%
	Yemeni	1	7.14%
ALS - 9	American	6	66.67%
	Somali	2	22.22%
	Unspecified [American/Somali]	1	11.11%
MAK - 6	American	2	33.33%
	Lebanese	1	16.67%
	Libyan	1	16.67%
	Pakistani	1	16.67%
	Sudanese	1	16.67%
AQAP - 3	American	2	66.67%
	Nigerian	1	33.33%
AHF - 2	American	1	50%
	Somali	1	50%
GIA - 2	Algerian	2	100%
EIJ - 2	American	1	50%
	Saudi Arabian	1	50%
JI - 2	American	1	50%
	Iraqi Canadian	1	50%
AIG - 1	American	1	100%
AIA - 1	American	1	100%
HuM - 1	American	1	100%
AIAI - 1	Somali	1	100%
TTP - 1	American	1	100%
Total		98*	-

*As eight individuals had links to two DTOs, the cumulative total of all links is higher than the 98 individuals involved.

Americans were most commonly connected to one of three groups: AQ, LeT and al-Shabaab. U.S. citizens connected to AQ comprised one third (n=20) of all those connected to AQ; over half (57%, n=8) of all those connected to LeT; and two thirds of all those connected to al-Shabaab.

In addition, two thirds of AQROs with direct links to AQAP were committed by U.S. citizens. The only operational, major bomb plot was committed by a non-U.S. citizen (a Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab).

Of non-Americans linked to al-Qaeda, 26% (n=16) were Saudi Arabian and 7% (n=4) Sudanese; of those linked to LeT, 21% (n=3) were Pakistani; and of those linked to al-Shabaab, 22% (n=2) were Somali. The remaining individual was of Unspecified nationality (yet was known to be either American or Somali).

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Table 17G: Known links to DTOs among converts and non-converts

Known links to DTOs	Convert		Non-convert		All individuals
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>
Known links to one or more DTO	15	37.50%	83	63.36%	98
No known links to a DTO	25	62.50%	48	36.64%	73
Total	40	100%	131	100%	171

Converts were far less likely to have had links to DTOs (38%, n=15) than non-converts (63%, n=83).

Figure 17D: Known links to DTOs among converts and non-converts





Table 17H: Known links to DTOs among AQROs involving an undercover investigation

Known links to DTOs	Informant used		No informant		All AQROs
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>
Known links to one or more DTO	5	10%	96	77.42%	101
No known links to a DTO	45	90%	28	22.58%	73
Total	50	100%	124	100%	174

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Figure 17E: Known links to DTOs among AQROs involving an undercover investigation



Individuals who were subject to undercover investigations were more likely (90%, n=45) to have had no known links to DTOs than those who had no informant or undercover officer. This is disproportionately low (57% of all AQROs are linked to DTOs). 77% (n=96) of individuals who were not the subject of an undercover investigation.

Table 17I: Known links to DTOs among MCOs

MCO plot	Year	No. of cell members*	No. of cell members with known links to DTOs					Any DTO	
			AQ	AQAP	EIJ	GIA	TTP	n.	%
East African Embassy bomb attacks	1998	6	6	-	1	-	-	6	100%
Millennium bomb plot	1999	2	1	-	-	2	-	2	100%
Shoe bomb plot	2001	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	100%
9/11 suicide attacks	2001	20	20	-	1	-	-	20	100%
Camp Pennsylvania murders	2003	1	-	-	-	-	-	0	0%
University of North Carolina plot	2006	1	-	-	-	-	-	0	0%
Underwear bomb plot	2009	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	100%
NYC subway plot	2009	2	2	-	-	-	-	2	100%
Florence Army Recruitment Centre murder	2009	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	100%
Times Square plot	2010	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	100%
Total		36	30	2	2	2	1	34	97.14%

* Refers to the total number of cell members convicted in the U.S. or who completed a successful suicide attack.

Among all major plots, only two had MCOs that were not connected to DTOs. All other major plots had 100% of MCOs having some kind of operational connection to a DTO.⁹

⁹ The links between Abdulhakim Muhammad were claimed by Muhammad himself, but have not been proven. However, the fact that Muhammad spent a significant amount of time in Yemen; is believed to have met a series of extremists while in prison there; claims to have begun his planning for an attack on America at this stage; and upon his return to the U.S. claimed affiliation with AQAP has led to his inclusion as having a connection to a DTO.

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Table 17J: Known links to DTOs and other networks


Network	Known links to one or more DTO			No known links to a DTO		
	n.	% (n=98)	% (n=171)	n.	% (n=73)	% (n=171)
Involved with a DTO only	32	32.65%	18.71%	N/a	0%	0%
Involved with one or more cell, network or non-DTO	63	64.29%	36.84%	59	80.82%	34.50%
Individual Actor	2	2.04%	1.17%	7	9.59%	4.09%
Involved in an F.B.I. constructed network	1	1.02%	0.58%	7	9.59%	4.09%
Total	98	100%	57.31%	73	100%	42.69%

One third of AQRO perpetrators with known links to one or more DTO were involved only with one organization. However, 64% of those with known links to one or more DTOs were also involved with one or more cell, network or a non-DTO.

Of all AQRO perpetrators, 19% were involved with a DTO only, and 37% with one or more cell, network or a non-designated organization.

There were nine Individual Actors whose offense was not reliant or connected to any kind of network, cell or DTO. While two of these Individual Actors had contact with a network (even though this network was not connected to the AQRO), seven Individual Actors had no connections to any type of network at all. Overall, Individual Actors comprised 5% of all individual AQRO perpetrators.

Figure 17F: Known links to DTOs and other networks




MASS CASUALTY OPERATIVES¹⁰

Table 18A: Involvement of Mass Casualty Operatives (MCOs)

Status	All individuals		All AQROs	
	n.	%	n.	%
Mass Casualty Operatives	36	21.05%	36	20.69%
Non-Mass Casualty Operatives	135	78.95%	138	79.31%
Total	171	100%	174	100%

Over a fifth (21%, n=36) of both individuals and all AQROs MCOs.

Figure 18A: All AQROs: Involvement of Mass Casualty Operatives (MCOs)

Table 18B: MCO plots: Fatalities

MCO plot	Year	n. (cell members*)	n. (fatalities)	% (fatalities)
East African Embassy bomb attacks	1998	6	224	6.95%
Millennium bomb plot	1999	2	-	-
Shoe bomb plot	2001	1	-	-
9/11 suicide attacks	2001	20	2996	92.96%
Camp Pennsylvania murders	2003	1	2	0.06%
University of North Carolina plot	2006	1	-	-
Underwear bomb plot	2009	1	-	-
NYC subway plot	2009	2	-	-
Florence Army Recruitment Centre murder	2009	1	1	0.03%
Times Square plot	2010	1	-	-
Total		36	3223	100%

* There have been ten major terrorism plots that either resulted in convictions, successful attacks (or a combination of the two) between 1997 and 2011. A total of 36 individuals were involved in these plots. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were the cause of 93% (n=2996) of the fatalities that have occurred as a result of these ten major plots.

¹⁰ Mass Casualty Operative refers to those individuals who committed an AQRO and were part of a major plot. The authors have defined a major plot as either: any kind of planned or pre-meditated attack that led to multiple deaths; a terrorism conspiracy which has led to a successful, mass casualty attack; an attempted mass casualty attack that took place without the state's knowledge yet led to no fatalities; a plot with operational involvement from AQ or another DTO; or a plot in which components for a bomb have been bought or assembled without an undercover investigation taking place.

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Figure 18B: MCO plots: Fatalities





Table 18C: MCOs: Nationality

Nationality		n.	%
Western Asian		20	55.56%
	Saudi Arabian	16	44.44%
	Emirati	2	5.56%
	Jordanian	1	2.78%
	Lebanese	1	2.78%
Northern American		6	16.67%
	American	6	16.67%
Northern African		4	11.11%
	Algerian	2	5.56%
	Egyptian	1	2.78%
	Moroccan	1	2.78%
Eastern African		2	5.56%
	Tanzanian	2	5.56%
Northern European		1	2.78%
	British	1	2.78%
Southern Asian		1	2.78%
	Afghan	1	2.78%
Western African		1	2.78%
	Nigerian	1	2.78%
Western European		1	2.78%
	French	1	2.78%
Total		36	100%

All MCO data refers to a total of 36 individuals.

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Figure 18C: Nationality of MCOs




The majority of operatives in major bomb plots are Western Asian (56%, n=20), largely from Saudi Arabia (44%, n=16, of all MCOs). The next most common nationality is American (17%, n=6).

Table 18D: MCOs: Education level achieved

Education	n.	%
Attended college or above	21	58.33%
Studied for college degree	12	33.33%
Achieved college degree	6	16.67%
Achieved Master's degree	3	8.33%
Did not receive college education	10	27.78%
Studied for high school diploma/GED	5	13.89%
Vocational qualification	2	5.56%
Unspecified	2	5.56%
High school graduate or equivalent	1	2.78%
Unspecified	5	13.89%
Total	36	100%

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Figure 18D: MCOs: Education level achieved




Over half (58%, n=21) of MCOs were educated to college level or above. One third studied for a college degree, compared to 22% of all AQRO individuals who studied for a college degree; 17% (n=6) achieved a college degree, compared to 11% of all AQRO individuals who achieved a college degree; and 8% (n=3) achieved a Master's degree, compared to 7% of all AQRO individuals who achieved the same qualification.

Table 18E: MCOs: Occupation

Employment	n.	%
Employed	10	27.78%
Skilled	4	11.11%
Unskilled	5	13.89%
Self-employed/family business	1	2.78%
Part-time	0	0%
Student	2	5.56%
Unemployed	24	66.67%
Incarcerated	0	0%
Unspecified	0	0%
Total	36	100%

Figure 18E: MCOs: Occupation

67% (n=24) of MCOs were unemployed – disproportionately high in comparison to all AQROs committed by unemployed individuals (28%). Similarly, that 28% (n=10) of MCOs were in employment and 6% (n=2) were students is a disproportionately low figure in comparison to the total number of AQRO perpetrators (44% and 13% respectively).



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Table 18F: MCOs: Involvement of religious converts

Convert status	n.	%
Convert	4	11.11%
Non-convert	32	88.89%
Total	36	100%

Figure 18F: MCOs: Involvement of religious converts

The majority of MCOs were not religious converts (89%, n=32). The 11% (n=4) of converts, included ‘shoe bomber’ Richard Reid, and Wadiah el-Hage, convicted for his role in the 1998 East African Embassy bombings. The percentage of converts among MCOs was disproportionately low in comparison with all individual AQRO perpetrators (23%).





Table 18G: MCOs: Country of terrorist training

Country of terrorist training	n.	%
Received terrorist training	32	88.89%
Afghanistan	28	77.78%
Pakistan	4	11.11%
Yemen	1	2.78%
No terrorist training	4	11.11%
Total	36	100%

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Figure 18G: MCOs: Location of terrorist training



The vast majority of MCOs (89%, n=32) had received terrorist training – a disproportionately high percentage compared to all individuals (47%). Of these, over three quarters (78%, n=28), did so in Afghanistan, with 11% (n=4) in Pakistan and 3% (n=1) in Yemen.

The one individual who did not, Mokhtar Haouari, played a facilitation role in the ‘Millennium bomb’ plot of 1999.

Table 18H: MCOs: Receipt of terrorist training and combat experience by plot

MCO plot	Year	No. of cell members	Terrorist training		Combat experience	
			n.	% cell members	n.	% cell members
East African Embassy bomb attacks	1998	6	6	100%	5	83.33%
Millennium bomb plot	1999	2	1	50%	0	0%
Shoe bomb plot	2001	1	1	100%	0	0%
9/11 suicide attacks	2001	20	20	100%	1	5%
Camp Pennsylvania murders	2003	1	0	0%	0	0%
University of North Carolina plot	2006	1	0	0%	0	0%
Underwear bomb plot	2009	1	1	100%	0	0%
NYC subway plot	2009	2	2	100%	0	0%
Florence Army Recruitment Centre murder	2009	1	0	0%	0	0%
Times Square plot	2010	1	1	100%	0	0%
Total		36	32	88.89%	6	16.67%

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Figure 18H: MCOs: Combat experience

The vast majority of MCOs had no known combat experience (83%, n=30). 17% (n=6) had some known combat experience – slightly less than the percentage of all AQROs (18%).





Table 18I: MCOs: Combat experience

Known combat experience	<i>n.</i>	%
Yes	6	16.67%
No	30	83.30%
Total MCOs	36	100%

Figure 18I: MCOs: Combat experience



Of the six individual MCOs known to have fought, five had done so in Afghanistan (all members of the 1998 East African Embassies bombing), and one in Bosnia (a member of the 9/11 cell).

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
Table 18J: MCOs: Country of known combat experience

Country of known combat experience	<i>n.</i>	%
Afghanistan	5	83.33%
Bosnia	1	16.67%
Total	6	100%

Table 18K: Known links to one or more DTO among MCOs

Known links to DTOs	MCOs		Non-MCOs		All individuals	
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%
Known links to one or more DTO	34	94.44%	64	47.41%	98	57.31%
No known links to a DTO	2	5.56%	71	52.59%	73	42.69%
Total	36	100%	135	100%	171	100%

Figure 18J: Known links to one or more DTO among MCOs



The vast majority (94%, n=36) of MCOs were linked to a DTO, with only 5% (n=2) having no links.

GUANTÁNAMO BAY

Table 19A: Overview: former Guantánamo Bay detainees convicted in U.S. military court

Name	Ali Hamza al-Bahlul	David Hicks	Ibrahim al Qosi	Noor Uthman Muhammed	Omar Khadr
Charge	Conspiracy; Solicitation to Commit Murder of Protected Persons; Providing Material Support for Terrorism	Providing Material Support for Terrorism	Conspiracy; Providing Material Support for Terrorism	Providing Material Support to Terrorism; Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorism	Committing Murder in Violation of the Law of War; Attempted Murder in Violation of the Law of War; Conspiracy; Providing Material Support to Terrorism; Spying
Age at time of charge/offense	39	32	48/49	46	20
Gender	Male	Male	Male	Male	Male
Nationality	Yemeni	Australian	Sudanese	Sudanese	Canadian
Education	Achieved college degree	Studied for high school diploma/ GED	Achieved college degree	Studied at grade eight or below	Studied at grade eight or below
Religious convert	No	Yes	No	No	No
DTO	AQ	AQ; LeT	AQ	AQ	AQ
Terrorist training	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
Training camp	Sada; Mes Aynak; al-Farouq	Mosqua Aqsa; Tarnak Farms; al- Farouq	Al-Farouq	Khalden	Unspecified
Combat experience	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
Sentence	Life	7 years [9 months custodial in Aus- tralia; 6 years 3 months suspended]	14 years [12 years suspended]	2 years, 10 months	8 years

Of those convicted at military tribunals of AQROs, all were male; 40% (n=2) were Sudanese and of North African ancestry; and 80% were educated to high school education or below (disproportionately high in comparison to all AQROs, at 25%). In addition, 80% were not religious converts (broadly in line with all AQROs).

Of all military convictions, all individuals were linked to AQ (in comparison to 37% of all AQROs); all had received training in Afghanistan – 60% at al-Farouq training camp (n=3) – and all had fought in Afghanistan (compared to 11% of all individuals who committed an AQRO).

However, the sample of those convicted (five) is too small to draw exhaustive conclusions.

SUICIDE ATTACKS

11% (n=19) of all AQROs were suicide attacks that led to fatalities, all of which were on September 11, 2001. The 19 hijackers, all male, launched a series of four co-ordinated suicide attacks upon New York City and Washington, D.C., in the United States.

Table 20A: Average age among suicide attackers

Age	Suicide attackers (n = 19)	Convictions (n = 155)
Mean	23.9	30.3
Median	23	29
Mode	22	24
Range	13	44

On average, the suicide attackers were all disproportionately younger than all perpetrators of AQROs.

The average age of the suicide attackers was 23.9 years (n=19), which was disproportionately low in comparison with all convictions (30.3 years, n=155).

The most common age amongst the suicide attackers was 22 years (n=19), two years less than that of all convictions (24 years).

The median age amongst the suicide attackers (23 years) – four and a half years less than that of all convictions (29 years).


The age range of the suicide attackers (13 years) was also disproportionately low in comparison with all AQROs (44 years).

Table 20B: Suicide attacks: Nationality

Nationality	n.	%
Western Asian	18	94.74%
Saudi Arabian	15	78.95%
Emirati	2	10.53%
Lebanese	1	5.26%
Northern African	1	5.26%
Egyptian	1	5.26%
Total	19	100%

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Figure 20A: Suicide attacks: Nationality




The percentage of suicide attackers with Saudi Arabian nationality (79%, n=15) was highly disproportionate to that of all AQRO perpetrators (9%). 95% of all suicide attacks were committed by Western Asians, and 5% by Northern Africans.

Table 20C: Suicide attacks: Education level achieved

Education	n.	%
Attended college or above	11	57.89%
Studied for college degree	8	42.11%
Achieved college degree	2	10.53%
Achieved Master's degree	1	5.26%
Did not receive college education	4	21.05%
Studied for high school diploma/GED	2	10.53%
Unspecified	2	10.53%
Unspecified	4	21.05%
Total	19	100%

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Figure 20B: Suicide attacks: Education level achieved




Suicide attackers were slightly more likely to have attended college or above (58%, n=10) than all AQRO perpetrators (52%). However, a lower percentage of suicide attackers had achieved a Master's degree (5%, n=1) than that of all AQRO perpetrators (7%, n=12).

Table 20D: Suicide attacks: Terrorist training and combat experience

Terrorist training			Combat experience		
	<i>n.</i>	%		<i>n.</i>	%
Received terrorist training	19	100%	Combat experience	1	5.26%
No terrorist training	0	0%	No combat experience	18	94.74%
Total	19	100%	Total	19	100%

Figure 20C: Suicide attacks: Terrorist training and combat experience




All suicide attackers had received terrorist training, while only 5% (n=1) had known combat experience.

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Table 20E: Known links to DTOs among individuals with and without combat experience

Known links to DTOs	MCOs		Non-MCOs		All individuals	
	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%	<i>n.</i>	%
Known links to one or more DTO	34	94.44%	64	47.41%	98	57.31%
No known links to a DTO	2	5.56%	71	52.59%	73	42.69%
Total	36	100%	135	100%	171	100%

Figure 20F: Known links to DTOs among individuals with and without combat experience



Of individuals with combat experience, 87% (n=26) had a known link to at least one DTO. 13% (n=4) did not have a known link to a DTO. Of individuals with no combat experience, a slight majority (51%, n=72) had a known link to a DTO, with 49% (n=69) having no known link.

CONCLUSION

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The majority of individuals who committed AQROs were young, educated men. 57% of perpetrators were aged under 30, and were most likely to have been aged between 20 and 24 years (33% of perpetrators). A total of eight women (5%) were convicted of AQROs between 1997 and 2011, two for their roles supporting their partners in the commission of AQROs.

The majority of AQRO perpetrators were U.S. citizens (54%), followed by Saudi Arabians (9%, including one Saudi holding a dual nationality). The third most common nationality was Pakistani (6%). Over a third (36%) of individuals who committed AQROs had some type of American ancestry. Of these individuals, the most common ancestry was African American (10%) and American White Caucasian (8%).

Of the 138 individuals whose last place of residence prior to charge or suicide attack was in the U.S., the South contained the highest number of individuals, with over a third (36%) of AQRO offenders living there. 11% resided in Florida. In comparison, the combined total of AQRO perpetrators living in the West and Midwest (33%) was still less than the number living in the South.

The Northeast contained the second-highest number of individuals (30%). 23% resided in either New York (14%, and overall the most common place of residence) or New Jersey (9%). Therefore, regionally, the South and Northeast were the places of residence for two thirds (67%) of individuals whose last place of residence prior to charge or suicide attack was in the U.S.

Among individuals born in the U.S., the most common place of residence was still New York (20% of U.S. born individuals resided there, and 11% of non-U.S. born residents), followed by Virginia, California and Oregon (9% each). In comparison, the second and third most popular states of residence overall – Florida and New Jersey – held only a combined total of 4%. Therefore, two of the three states that hosted the most AQRO perpetrators – Florida and New Jersey – have a disproportionately high amount committed by non-U.S. born individuals. This is partly explained by the fact that the September 11, 2001 hijackers (none of whom were U.S.-born) were based in New Jersey and Florida.

There was little evidence to show that AQRO perpetrators were poorly educated. A slight majority (52%) of individuals who committed an AQRO were college educated. The most common education category comprised of those who had studied at college-level but were not known to have graduated (29%). 23% of AQRO perpetrators were college graduates; and 8% of AQRO offenders either possessed or were studying for a Master's degree, with an additional AQRO perpetrator possessing a medical degree. 3% of individuals either possessed or were studying for a PhD.

Of those individuals who had received college education, 60% were U.S. citizens, compared to 39% who were non-U.S. citizens (and 1% with an unspecified nationality). U.S. citizens were more likely to have received a college education than not: over half (57%) of U.S. citizens who committed AQROs had received a college education. This is higher than the figure for non-U.S. born citizens (46%).

Of those individuals born in the U.S., 56% had received a college education, as opposed to 50% of those who had received a college education and were known not to have been born in the U.S.

There was little correlation between a lack of employment prospects and committing AQROs. As 44% of AQRO perpetrators were in employment at the date of charge or attack and a further 13% were committed by full-time students, 57% of individuals were in employment or education at the date of charge or attack. A particularly high percentage of those born in the U.S. were in employment or education – 67%. This compares to 52% of those not born in the U.S. Only 28% of all individuals who committed AQROs were unemployed. U.S. born individuals were less likely to be unemployed (21%) than those not born in the U.S. (32%).

Of all 171 individuals responsible for AQROs, nearly a quarter (23%) were known converts to Islam. As a proportion of their overall involvement, converts committed more AQROs than non-converts in eight of the fifteen years studied. The years with the most AQROs committed by converts were jointly 2003, 2007 and 2010, and in four of

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the last five years studied, converts committed a higher percentage of AQROs than non-converts.

Where known, all had converted from varying denominations of Christianity. Converts were primarily American (95%), and of U.S. citizens who committed an AQRO, 41% were converts. Furthermore, converts comprised over half (54%) of all U.S. born perpetrators.

Converts tended to be older at the age at time of charge than non-converts. The most common age among religious converts (32 years) was disproportionately high, compared with that of non-converts (24 years). Furthermore, a disproportionate amount of converts were women (10%, double the overall proportion of women responsible for AQROs).

Converts most commonly resided in the South prior to charge (39%), particularly in the state of Virginia (12%). A disproportionately high percentage of converts lived in the West (33%) in comparison with all AQRO perpetrators (16%), while a disproportionately low percentage of converts lived in the North East (15% of converts, as opposed to 30% of the overall total of individuals).

Religious conversion also had an effect on levels of employment among AQRO perpetrators. 55% of converts were employed, higher than all AQRO perpetrators (44%) and non-converts (41%). They were also more likely to be in skilled jobs (35%) than all AQRO perpetrators (20%), and less likely to be unemployed than non-converts (23% converts; 30% non-converts). There was a higher percentage of converts than non-converts in education or employment (63% converts, 55% non-converts).

ROLE, CHARGES AND TRIAL INFORMATION

The proportion of AQROs varied from a minimum of one (in 1997 and 1999, accounting for 0.6% each of all AQROs), to a maximum of 25 (in 2009, accounting for 14% of all AQROs).

There was a large increase in AQROs in 2001, caused by al-Qaeda's attacks on September 11, 2001. This number then steadily declined until 2004, with the number of AQROs committed rising and falling in alternate years since. The peak in 2009 had been preceded by a significant drop in 2008, when just 2% of the overall percentage of AQROs occurred. Also significant in 2009 was the diversity of threat, with relatively high numbers of Active Participants, Facilitators, Aspirants and Trained Aspirants. The sharp dip in AQROs in 2011 can be partially explained by the fact that certain individuals charged in 2011 were not convicted until 2012, and were therefore excluded from the period of study in this report.

Active Participants committed just over a third (37%) of all AQROs. The highest number of AQROs committed by Active Participants in any one year was in 2001, largely because of al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks on September 11. This accounted for 95% of all AQROs in 2001. The years with the second highest proportion of AQROs committed by Active Participants were 2005 and 2007. Since 2004, the number of Active Participants has risen and fallen year on year. There was a higher proportion of Active Participants among those aged under 30 (44%) than those aged over 30 (28%). Active Participants also tended to be born outside the United States (48% of non-U.S. born offenders were Active Participants, compared to 21% of those born in the U.S.).

Converts were less likely to be Active Participants than non-converts. Of offenses committed by religious converts, 31% were by Active Participants, compared to 39% of offenses committed by non-religious converts.

Aspirants were responsible for 25% of AQROs. The highest rate of AQROs committed in any one year by Aspirants was 2006. The first Aspirant AQRO occurred in 2002, after which the proportion of Aspirants rose and fell year on year, before a large rise in 2006. This was followed by a decline until a significant rise in 2009.

Of all AQROs committed by those aged under 30, 28% were by Aspirants, compared with 21% of those over 30. Aspirants tended to be born inside the United States (being responsible for 43% of AQROs by those born in the U.S., compared to 16% by those not born in the U.S.). Of offenses committed by religious converts, one third were Aspirants (33%), compared to 23% of non-religious converts.

Facilitators were responsible for 21% of AQROs. The highest numbers of AQROs committed by Facilitators were in 2007 and 2010. The first Facilitator AQRO occurred in 2000, after which the proportion of Facilitators rose

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and fell every other year, until a three year decline between 2004 and 2006. However, this preceded a large rise in 2007. There was a significant drop in Facilitator AQROs in 2008, which then rose to the extent that, by 2010, they had replicated their 2007 peak.

Of all AQROs committed by those aged over 30, 36% were by Facilitators, compared with only 9% of those under 30. Facilitators also tended to be born outside the United States (being responsible for a quarter of AQROs by non-U.S. born citizens, compared to 13% of AQROs by those born in the U.S). Facilitator offenses were slightly more likely to be committed by non-religious converts (21% of non-convert AQROs) than by religious converts (19% of convert AQROs).

Trained Aspirants were responsible for 15% of AQROs. The highest number of AQROs committed in any one year by Trained Aspirants was 2003. Since, then the proportion of Trained Aspirants has been generally low, barring an increase in 2009.

Of all AQROs committed by those aged under 30, 16% were by Trained Aspirants, compared with 13% of those over 30. Of offenses committed by those born in the U.S., 19% were by Trained Aspirants, compared to 12% of those not born in the U.S. Of offenses committed by religious converts, 12% were Trained Aspirants, compared to 16% of non-religious converts.

There were only three Ideologues, comprising 2% of AQROs.

The vast majority (97%) of the 155 AQROs that have led to successful convictions (the total of 174 AQROs excluding the nineteen suicide hijackers from September 11, 2001) were prosecuted in federal courts. 3% of all convictions have taken place in a military court. Nearly two thirds (65%) of those convicted of AQROs pleaded guilty, and the single most common category was a sentence of between 10 and 14 years.

Undercover investigations were used in over a quarter (29%) of AQROs. These were primarily against Aspirants: 64% of AQROs involving an undercover investigation were against Aspirants. By contrast, just 10% of cases not containing an undercover investigation involved Aspirants.

Similarly, of all Aspirant AQROs, nearly three quarters (72%) involved an undercover investigation. In comparison, for all other categories – Active Participants, Trained Aspirants, Facilitators and Ideologues – an undercover investigation was rarely used. 83% of Active Participants, 88% of Trained Aspirants, 89% of Facilitators and 100% of Ideologues were not the subject of an undercover investigation, which also tended to focus on slightly younger AQRO perpetrators.

A total of 415 separate charges were successfully prosecuted in the 155 AQROs that involved a conviction between 1997 and 2011. Forming nearly one quarter (24%) of all successful prosecutions were charges that fell into the Material Support category (Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists; Providing Material Support to Terrorists; Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to a Designated Terrorist Organization; or Providing Material Support to a Designated Terrorist Organization). The most commonly used charge was Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists (comprising 8% of the separate charges).

COMBAT EXPERIENCE, TERRORIST TRAINING AND DESIGNATED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

Nearly half (47%) of those who committed AQROs attended training camps for terrorist purposes. Of those who received training, the most popular location was Afghanistan (68% of those who trained did so here), followed by Pakistan (29%). Therefore, 97% of individuals who had received terrorist training had trained in either Afghanistan, Pakistan, or both.

The three most commonly attended training camps were all in Afghanistan. The most popular of these, al-Farouq, was a camp closely linked to al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. The most common nationality of those who had trained was American, with 39% of individuals who had received training being U.S. citizens. Of all U.S. citizens who had committed an AQRO, one third had received terrorist training. Only 10% of AQROs subject to an undercover investigation were against those who had received terrorist training.

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The vast majority (82%) of individuals who committed AQROs had no combat experience. The most common location of combat experience for those who had fought was Afghanistan (63% of those with combat experience, and 11% of the overall number of AQRO perpetrators). The most common nationality of those with combat experience was American (33% of those with combat experience), followed by Sudanese (13%) and Canadian (10%). While 97% of those with combat experience had terrorist training, only 36% of those with terrorist training had any combat experience. Most (96%) of those with combat experience were not the subject of an undercover investigation.

The majority of individuals who committed an AQRO (57%) had known links to a DTO. Of those linked to a DTO, 62% were linked to al-Qaeda. Overall, 36% of AQRO perpetrators were linked to the group. Of those known to be linked to a DTO, 43% were U.S. citizens (the most represented nationality). 38% of converts were linked to a DTO, while undercover investigations were used against only 10% of AQROs with a known link to a DTO.

U.S. citizens comprised 33% of those linked to al-Qaeda (of non-Americans linked to al-Qaeda, the most common nationality – 26% – was Saudi Arabian), and 67% of all those linked to al-Shabaab or al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

There were nine Individual Actors whose offenses were not reliant or connected to any kind of network, cell or DTO. Overall, Individual Actors comprised 4% of all AQRO perpetrators.

MASS CASUALTY OPERATIVES AND SUICIDE ATTACKERS

There have been ten major terrorism plots that either resulted in convictions, successful attacks (or a combination of the two) between 1997 and 2011. A total of 36 individuals were involved in these plots. Therefore, MCOs comprised 21% of all individual AQRO perpetrators.

Over half of MCOs (56%) were Western Asian, with the highest amount (44%) being Saudi Arabian, followed by U.S. citizens (17%). MCOs tended to be well educated, with 60% attended to above college level, yet also contained high levels of unemployment – 67% were unemployed at the time of charge or suicide attack.

The vast majority of MCOs were not converts and had received terrorist training (both 89%). Of those who were trained, over three quarters (78%) had done so in Afghanistan. However, only 17% of MCOs had combat experience (83% of those who had combat experience had gained it in Afghanistan). Of all MCOs, 94% were linked to a DTO.

Of suicide attackers, over three quarters (79%) were Saudi Arabian and, on average, the suicide attackers were significantly disproportionately younger (23.9) than non-suicide attackers (30.3). 58% of suicide attackers were educated to college level or above. Furthermore, all had received terrorist training in Afghanistan and were linked to DTO – al-Qaeda. They mainly (95%) had no combat experience, and none were religious converts.

“A study of this scale, of this ambition and of this meticulousness has never before been attempted in the United States and its findings will allow those responsible for our security and our liberty to make judgements based on fact rather than on hyperbole, fear or prejudice.”

Michael V. Hayden (General, USAF, retired)
Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Director, National Security Agency

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