Executive Summary
1. A recent article in Foreign Affairs authored by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice provides an account of how and why American foreign policy shifted following the 9/11 attacks, but also how little the Bush administration was driven away from its original intentions.
2. Dr. Rice candidly documents the changes that have reshaped Washington’s strategic worldview, and details a level of support for nation building that revises her previous statements on the role of the American military. However, in analysing the last eight years, America’s most senior diplomat details the strong correlation between the Bush administration’s aims and actions.
3. In addition to defending the administration’s record, Dr. Rice contributes to the future of American policy by outlining ways in which America has balanced the pursuit of national interests with a commitment to its founding ideals.
4. The Secretary of State’s analysis is an insightful account of the last eight years, but it gives rise to an intriguing paradox. Dr. Rice has presided over the State Department at a time when realist thinking crept back into the conduct of US foreign policy. Yet she has used her valedictorian essay to reaffirm her belief in the central tenets of neo-conservatism. Rethinking the National Interest therefore confirms her status as an outstanding analyst, but a less than effective official.
Contemporary analyses of George W. Bush’s election to the Presidency have established one of the great misnomers of modern American history. Conventional wisdom holds that the President’s political rise represented the triumph of privileged connections, and that his famous family name aided his White House run. Yet is worth recalling that throughout the 2000 campaign, the family ties of the then Governor Bush were a tremendous liability. George H. W. Bush had never been a favourite of the conservative right, and was regarded with disdain by many of the GOP’s rank and file supporters. He had also proven to be an electoral liability. On his watch, Republicans had failed to secure control of the executive branch for just the second time in a quarter of a century. Above all, the forty-first President’s impeccable credentials only served to draw attention to his son’s lack of foreign policy experience. George H. W. Bush had served as an Ambassador, Director of Central Intelligence and Vice President prior to taking the oath of office. By contrast, George W. Bush had developed no significant international experience during his time as a governor, a major weakness given that John McCain was fast emerging as the strongest challenger for the Republican Party nomination. As a result, demonstrating an ability to effectively manage American foreign relations was one of the Bush campaign’s highest priorities.
It was in this context that Condoleezza Rice published 'Promoting the National Interest', an eighteen page article in Foreign Affairs magazine on the future of the United States’ international role. As the main foreign policy advisor to the Bush campaign, Rice was charged with outlining a foreign policy manifesto for a possible Bush Administration. Her essay surveyed the current state of US relations with the world, and the upcoming challenges. It attacked the Clinton administration’s tendency to act within a strategic vacuum, and outlined a strategy for the next decade based upon America’s core national interests. Most importantly, it underscored the extent to which a small group of experienced confidantes would manage the US’ external relations. Indeed, Governor Bush’s key foreign policy talking point throughout the campaign was the breadth of his advisor’s collective experience. Accordingly, the piece read more like an internal memorandum than a magazine article in order to showcase the talented advice the candidate was receiving.
However, once in office Dr. Rice’s criticism of the Clinton administration’s regular use of military force would be swept aside by American occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Her warning that "the military is a special instrument...not designed to build a civilian society", would be overtaken by a focus on nation building. Moreover, her view that “America can exercise its power without arrogance and pursue its interests without hectoring and bluster” would come to be challenged around the world. As such, her essay has come to be known not for the vision it outlined, but as definitive proof that the September 11th attacks prompted a radical shift in policy.
Yet much like the conventional wisdom surrounding the President’s rise to power, interpretations of his management of America’s foreign relations have been woefully inaccurate. Rather than being driven away from its original aims and intentions by unforeseen events, the Bush administration has undertaken actions that have been remarkably consistent with its stated aims. The best exemplar of this, by an odd quirk of fate, is a recent essay in Foreign Affairs written by Condoleezza Rice. In 'Rethinking the National Interest', the Secretary of State details how her views have changed over the last eight years, and provides a convincing analysis of the principles that are likely to guide US policy in the coming years. Nevertheless, the most striking insight to emerge from a comparison between her 2000 essay and her most recent publication, is how little the 9/11 attacks shifted the Bush Administration’s worldview.
Unsurprisingly, Rice makes goes out of her way to correct the erroneous predictions made eight years earlier. Among these, were misguided notions about the long term role of the United States armed forces, and American policy in the Middle East. Promoting the National Interest devoted little attention to the sub national trends, and shunned the idea that the US should “enforce notions of ‘limited sovereignty’ worldwide in the name of...intervention”. The Secretary of State now acknowledges that “as globalisation strengthens some states, it exposes and exacerbates the failings of...those too weak or poorly governed to address challenges within their borders”. Rice’s change of heart represents the culmination effect of eight years experience, which recently resulted in the confirmation of David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno as the Commanders of Central Command and Multi National Forces Iraq respectively . The installation of counter-insurgency minded military personnel in key positions is deeply entwined with the Secretary of Rice’ revised outlook. This week, Dr. Rice announced the formation of the Civilian Response Corps, a civilian unit that could be deployed to international trouble spots at short notice. The CRC represents the first body within the American government to be devoted to nation building.
Rethinking the National Interest also demonstrates the changes that have re-shaped American policy in the Middle East. Rice now sees the preservation of the US’ “long standing partnerships in the Persian Gulf” as a means to establishing a “more democratic, and more prosperous Middle East”, rather than an end in itself. Indeed, Rice suggests that the post-war history of the Middle East has demonstrated that “decades of oppression and denied opportunity...yielded justice nor stability”, and that “freedom and democracy are the only ideas that can”. Rice’s respect for democratic practices even extends to a grudging acceptance that the elections in Gaza and Lebanon, which empowered Hamas and Hezbollah, must be respected. Far from stressing stability, the Secretary of State warns that “people cannot be denied the right to vote just because the outcome might be unpleasant”. Rice’s attitude is a marked departure from her outlook in 2000, when she singled out Saudi Arabia as representative of “moderate Arab States”, stressed the importance of “stability in the region”, and concluded that there was no need to focus extensive attention on regimes that were “living on borrowed time”.
The Secretary of State’s focus on the major developments in US policy over the last years is likely to be regarded as further evidence that the 9/11 attacks provoked a dramatic change of policy. Yet it should not be. Promoting the National Interest confirms that the Bush administration sought to update Washington’s worldview upon taking office, and Rethinking the National Interest illustrates that as it approaches the end of its second term, it has largely succeeded in doing so. Dr. Rice’s essays in Foreign Affairs therefore demonstrate that the Bush administration has succeeded in pursuing the agenda it outlined eight years earlier.
Despite possessing a tremendous degree of executive experience, few of the Bush Administration’s key appointees believed that the realist orthodoxy of previous Republican Presidents remained an appropriate model for the post Cold War world, and many entered office having adopted the neo-conservative belief that the United States had arrived at a moment in its history when it could transform the state of world affairs. Indeed, Promoting the National Interest contained all the hallmarks of the neo-conservative creed that has come to characterise the Bush administration’s foreign policy, including an evangelical declaration that “American values are universal”. The main theme of the essay was the need to fill the strategic vacuum that had been allowed to develop in the Clinton era by promoting national interests that would serve to make the world “more prosperous, democratic, and peaceful”.
Much has changed since 2000, when Dr. Rice proclaimed the inevitability of western ideals by proclaiming that “the United States and its allies are on the right side of history”. The Secretary of State now concedes that while such values may be universal, realising their spread will be “a difficult, generational task”. Yet Rethinking the National Interest does little to suggest that that her belief in the imperative of integrating the world into an American backed system of democratic capitalism has been shaken, and Dr. Rice places great emphasis on the need to “defeat challenges to this vision international order”. Her comments are indicative of thinking in Washington that considers America’s responses to a host of tactical threats and strategic challenges as part of a “global counter-insurgency”, a previously obscure term that has now been appropriated by America’s top diplomat.
An integral part of this ‘transformationalist’ vision was the incorporation of other major powers into the prevailing international system. For instance, Rice stressed in 2000 that a healthy relationship with China would be a vital component of a Bush administration’s foreign policy. On this score, the Secretary of State can rightly lay claim to a strong degree of success. It would be difficult to suggest that Dr. Rice’s hope that China would become “more integrated into the international economy” has not come to pass. After more than a decade of negotiations, Beijing secured entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, and trade between China the United States has rapidly increased in the years that have followed. Those on the left of the American political spectrum assert that regular Chinese currency manipulation and a burgeoning trade deficit demonstrate that Beijing has benefitted more from the relationship than the United States. Yet they would be hard pressed to claim that China has not developed a major stake in the existing international system. This fact suggests that the Bush administration has made great progress toward ensuring that China become a “status quo power” rather than “one that would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its own favour” – the main aim of it's policy as articulated in Promoting the National Interest.
Another major element of Dr. Rice’s 2000 essay was its focus on the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and rogue states. One of the main accusations made by critics of the administration is that it responded to the September 11th attacks by launching an unrelated campaign against rogue states. Critics often pinpoint the 2002 State of the Union address as the moment when Washington’s focus on terrorism, al-Qaeda and Afghanistan gave way to this different agenda. Yet the ‘Axis of Evil’ speech was thoroughly consistent with the comments Dr. Rice made in the early months of 2000. All three states singled out by President Bush were addressed in Promoting the National Interest, in which Rice clearly spelled out the Bush administration’s desire to “deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes...and the development of weapons of mass destruction”. American policy towards those states has been thoroughly consistent with her statements. The invasion of Iraq was foreshadowed by her belief that “the United States must mobilise whatever resources it can” to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The last eight years of US policy towards North Korea’s nuclear program could just as easily be summed up by Rice’s suggestion that it be met with “a clear and classical statement of deterrence”. Finally, American-Iranian relations have reflected the Secretary of States’ categorical assertion that “changes in U.S. policy toward Iran would require changes in Iranian behaviour”. A more accurate analysis than that offered by critics would conclude that the Bush administration entered office with a determination to address the issue of unstable nations, and that the attacks by al-Qaeda only served to deepen its resolve. Indeed, such suggestions are confirmed by Dr. Rice’s claim that above all, the 9/11 attacks “crystallized our vulnerability”.
Finally, Dr. Rice’s Rethinking the National Interest details the ways in which America’s strategic interests and moral certitude have been balanced. In 2000 Dr. Rice outlined the classic neo-conservative belief that the polarizing distinction that forced foreign policy practitioners to decide between being “a realist or devoted to norms and values...is a disaster for foreign policy”. Recent years have seen much discussion of this dichotomy, and striking a balance between interests and ideals will be as central to the next administration as it has to those which preceded it.
An appealing middle course, described as “Democratic Realism”, was outlined by Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute in 2004. Krauthammer’s main premise was that America’s promotion of democracy must be “targeted, focused and limited” to “the Islamic crescent stretching from North Africa to Afghanistan”. It is this concept that Dr. Rice, who refers to the marriage of realism and liberalism as a “uniquely American realism”, builds upon in Rethinking the National Interest. The Secretary of State accepts the importance of Krauthammer’s geographic distinctions, but also draws upon the experience of the Bush administration’s experiences to construct a more detailed model. For Rice, long term aims must be balanced by short term tensions, even when formulating policy towards countries falling within “the arc of states stretching from Morocco to Pakistan”. Thus, the United States must provide undemocratic allies “security assistance to fight terrorism and defend themselves” whilst simultaneously using “other points of leverage to promote democracy”. Secretary Rice demonstrates how such an approach can work in practice, by detailing the way Washington has balanced military aid to the Musharraf regime with three billion dollars of funding for civil society projects throughout Pakistan.
Thus, in addition to demonstrating the extent to which administration’s record in office reflects its incoming aims, the Secretary of State has succeeded in developing a new and increasingly mainstream school of thought. In explaining the last eight years, Dr. Rice demonstrates the direct link between the Bush administrations aims and policies. Yet she also builds upon the concept of ‘democratic realism’, and articulates scenarios in which it will have to be applied that are grounded in historical experience. In doing so, she has also helped to put the last eight years in context, whilst advance the ongoing debate over American policy in the post Cold War world.
However, while Dr. Rice’s effort to explain the Bush administration’s foreign policy successfully slays many erroneous assumptions, it does give rise to a major paradox. Dr. Rice has used her valedictorian essay to reaffirm her place within the neo-conservative school of foreign policy. She sides with prominent neo-conservatives in rejecting the suggestion that the United States’ “national interest and...universal ideals are at odds”. Moreover, she embraces the neo-conservative belief that the September 11th attacks were the product of American support for authoritarian regimes. Finally she accepts that the need to phase out such support by reducing American reliance upon undemocratic regimes, and promoting political reform in the Arab world. Indeed, anything less is decried as failing to address terrorism’s “underlying cause”, and Dr. Rice challenges critics of democracy promotion by proposing a rhetorical question grounded in American exceptionalism: “What real alternative worthy of America is there?”. Such neo-conservatism is in keeping with a true reading of Promoting the National Interest, and Dr. Rice’s statements on policy during her tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs during the Bush administration’s first term. Yet it is less consistent with the initiatives she has overseen whilst serving as Secretary of the State.
The conventional wisdom in Washington as of late 2006 was that Dr. Rice had finally gained the upper hand within the administration’s inner circles. Due to her close personal relationship with the President, she had avoided the isolation suffered by Colin Powell. By distancing herself from the failures of US policy in Iraq, she had avoided George Tenet’s fate. By charting a course between the administration’s extremes, she was neither forced out for being seen as opposed to the President’s agenda in the case of Richard Armitage, or too heavily identified with the administration’s excesses in the case of Paul Wolfowitz. Finally, by unseating Rumsfeld and shepherding the likeminded Robert Gates into the office of the Secretary of Defense, she had succeeded in breaking Vice President Cheney’s control over foreign and defence policy.
As such, the strong degree of realist orthodoxy adopted during the last twelve months was regarded as a product of Rice’s influence. The abandonment of a tough line towards the North Korean nuclear program was attributed to the Secretary of State, having been engineered by State Department official Christopher Hill. Likewise the “clear, hold and build” strategy in Iraq, an approach based upon realist notions of hard power rather than the allure of American values, was enabled by Rice’s push to end Rumsfeld’s leadership of the Pentagon and his insistence on US forces maintaining a ‘light footprint’. Finally, the administration’s increasing unwillingness to use military action against Iran, was last week demonstrated by State Department plans to open a special interests section in Tehran.
These developments conflict with many of the views Dr. Rice outlines in Rethinking the National Interest. Indeed, Rice’s comments have regularly suggested a strong affinity with the precepts outlined by the administration in the months after the 9/11 attacks. For example, the claim that “America has often preferred preponderances of power that favour our values over balances of power that do not”, foreshadowed the 2002 National Security Strategy which articulated Washington’s desire to create a “balance of power that favours human freedom”. Yet during Rice’s tenure as Secretary of State, American policy has drifted away from such concepts, and come to embrace a greater degree of realist thinking. Such countervailing trends ought to be considered a major anomaly, especially when one considers Dr. Rice’s declared neo-conservative persuasion, undoubted talents and close personal relationship with the President.
Thus, as historians come to consider the case of Condoleezza Rice, they might well be forgiven for thinking that Winston Churchill famous description of the Soviet Union as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” is equally applicable in the case of one of the communist empire’s most thoughtful students. However, clues as to the most likely explanation for the disparity can be found in Secretary Rice’s plans for the future. She has long been touted as a possible Presidential candidate, or Vice Presidential nominee. Yet speaking to a school in Australia last week, she once again rejected such possibilities, and outlined her desire to return to her teaching position at Stanford. Her comment that “deep in my soul, deep in my being, I am an academic” was revealing, for it lent itself to the suggestion that while she may be an extraordinarily talented analyst, the Secretary of State has been a less than effective official. Such a conclusion is supported by the disparity between the strength of her essays in Foreign Affairs, and the limited effect she has had upon American foreign policy in the years that fell between them.